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==Social media influence operations==
==Social media influence operations==


China is reported to use social media platforms like WeChat to shape public opinion and manipulate political discourse among Chinese Canadian diaspora.<ref name="FoxHunt"/> This includes the spreading of false or misleading information to create confusion, sow discord, or undermine confidence in political institutions.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hamilton |first1=Clive |title=Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia |url=https://www.amazon.ca/Silent-Invasion-Chinas-Influence-Australia/dp/1743794800 |access-date=8 May 2023}}</ref> By using bots and fake accounts, China is able to amplify divisive content or create the appearance of grassroots support for certain narratives. The Chinese government also uses astroturfing through the creation of seemingly independent, grassroots movements that are in fact controlled or funded by the Chinese government or its proxies. These groups may use social media to promote pro-China narratives, discredit critics, or manipulate public opinion.<ref name="FoxHunt"/>
China is reported to use social media platforms like WeChat to shape public opinion and manipulate political discourse among Chinese Canadian diaspora.<ref name="FoxHunt"/><ref>{{cite news |title=Globe editorial: The alarm on China’s interference is ringing louder |url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-the-alarm-on-chinas-interference-is-ringing-louder/ |access-date=8 May 2023 |work=The Globe and Mail |date=2 May 2023 |language=en-CA}}</ref> This includes the spreading of false or misleading information to create confusion, sow discord, or undermine confidence in political institutions.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hamilton |first1=Clive |title=Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia |url=https://www.amazon.ca/Silent-Invasion-Chinas-Influence-Australia/dp/1743794800 |access-date=8 May 2023}}</ref> By using bots and fake accounts, China is able to amplify divisive content or create the appearance of grassroots support for certain narratives. The Chinese government also uses astroturfing through the creation of seemingly independent, grassroots movements that are in fact controlled or funded by the Chinese government or its proxies. These groups may use social media to promote pro-China narratives, discredit critics, or manipulate public opinion.<ref name="FoxHunt"/>


== Interference in 2019 and 2021 federal elections ==
== Interference in 2019 and 2021 federal elections ==

Revision as of 14:14, 8 May 2023

Chinese government interference in Canada consists of espionage, compromise of politicians and government officials, election interference, and control of individuals and companies with ties to the Chinese government or Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[1]

These overseas influence operations have allegedly risen to the extent that they represent an alarming security threat to the United States, who have conducted a secret probe of the issue, according to former Canadian and US intelligence officials.[2]

Trudeau cash-for-access scandal

Main article: Trudeau cash-for-access scandal

In 2016, newspaper sources reported that Justin Trudeau had been attending cash-for-access events at the homes of wealthy Chinese-Canadians in Toronto and Vancouver, generating a political scandal.[3][4][5][6] Attendees at these events, including attendees with connections to the CCP, would pay up to $1,525 per ticket to meet Trudeau. In response, the Liberal Party indicated that all party fundraising complied with Elections Canada rules and regulations.[3][7]

Operation of Chinese police stations in Canada

See also: Chinese police overseas service stations

While there is no official Chinese police presence on Canadian soil, several reports and allegations have surfaced regarding the presence of clandestine Chinese police stations in Canada. Among these are claims that Chinese law enforcement officials have been conducting unofficial operations within Canadian borders, targeting Chinese nationals and Canadian citizens alike.[8][9]

Clandestine Chinese police stations are reported to operate in Vancouver, Montreal, and Toronto.[10] Such operations could be used to intimidate, monitor, and control the Chinese community in Canada, potentially infringing upon their rights and freedoms.[9][11] Furthermore, there have been claims that Chinese law enforcement officers have been operating under the guise of Chinese community organizations or businesses in Canada, further blurring the lines between legitimate community support and potential foreign government influence.[12]

China describes the foreign outposts as "service stations" for Chinese abroad, and accuses Canada of "smearing".[13]

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau responded to the reports in March 2023 by saying that "we’ve known about the (presence of) Chinese police stations across the country for many months, and we are making sure that the RCMP is following up on it and that our intelligence services take it seriously."[13]

The RCMP is investigating the activities of two alleged Chinese police stations in Quebec: one in Montreal, and the other in nearby Brossard.[14] They are also investigating the activities of alleged Chinese police stations in Vancouver and the Greater Toronto Area.[15][16]

While the US has already conducted arrests over Chinese police stations operating on its territory, no arrests have yet taken place in Canada.[17] The lack of a foreign agents registry as exists in the US, UK, and Australia, is cited as being a major impediment to enforcement against Chinese police stations operating in Canada.[18][19]

The two alleged stations in Quebec are reported to still be operating as of May 2023.[20]

Intimidation of Canadian politicians

See also: Michael Chong

In a report by the Globe and Mail based on a top-secret intelligence document and an anonymous national security source, family of outspoken Conservative MP Micheal Chong were allegedly targeted for harassment by the Chinese government as part of China’s state interference in Canadian politics.[21][22][23] The campaign against Chong's family began in February 2021 after Chong voted in favor of a House of Commons motion condemning China's treatment of its Uyghur minority as genocide.[24] At the time, China sanctioned Chong by barring him from entry and prohibiting Chinese citizens from conducting business with him.[24]

As part of the intimidation operation to get Chong to change his political position, an officer in the Ministry of State Security gathered information to target Chong's family in China.[24] Chong also revealed that a Toronto-based Chinese diplomat, Wei Jo, “was involved in conducting these intimidation operations”.[25] Chong accused the federal government of failing to inform him about allegations that Beijing wanted to intimidate his family.[26][24]

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said Wednesday he knew that after Chong was sanctioned by China in 2021, CSIS was giving the MP what Trudeau called “defensive” briefings, but claimed that CSIS withheld information about China's threats to Chong.[25][27] However, Chong claims that the top secret document made its way to Trudeau’s national security advisor and the Privy Council’s Office.[24]. According to CBC News, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau says he has told Canada’s spy agency it needs to share more information about threats to MPs while being adamant that he only learned of reports that the Chinese government was targeting a Conservative MP and his family this week.[26][25]

The Trudeau government has been reluctant to expel Wei Jo, the Chinese diplomat involved, because it will affect "economic interests, consular interests and also diplomatic interests" according to Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly and could lead to "potential backlash".[24][28] Chong says that he is "astounded" by this reluctance and believes that it will embolden China to target more Canadians.[24]

According to Chong, other Canadian MPs are also alleged to have been targeted by the Ministry of State Security, but their identities have not been revealed.[24]

Social media influence operations

China is reported to use social media platforms like WeChat to shape public opinion and manipulate political discourse among Chinese Canadian diaspora.[29][30] This includes the spreading of false or misleading information to create confusion, sow discord, or undermine confidence in political institutions.[31] By using bots and fake accounts, China is able to amplify divisive content or create the appearance of grassroots support for certain narratives. The Chinese government also uses astroturfing through the creation of seemingly independent, grassroots movements that are in fact controlled or funded by the Chinese government or its proxies. These groups may use social media to promote pro-China narratives, discredit critics, or manipulate public opinion.[29]

Interference in 2019 and 2021 federal elections

Main article: Allegations of Chinese interference in the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections

In late 2022, Global News reported on a suspected attempt by the government of China to infiltrate the Parliament of Canada by funding a network of candidates to run in the country's 2019 federal election.[32][33][34][35][36] The operation is reported to have been successful in moderating the Conservative Party stance towards China: according to Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former head of CSIS’s Asia-Pacific desk, "the Chinese have successfully scared and bullied the Conservatives."[37]

Other alleged influence operations targeting Canadian politicians and officials

Chinese security agencies are known to try to compromise Canadian officials who travel to China.[38]

According to the 2017 “Memorandum for the Prime Minister” prepared by Trudeau's National Security Advisor, Daniel Jean, “Canadian officials are highly likely to be subjects of Chinese efforts to exert undue influence or otherwise compromise their independence during travel to China."[38] The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), which reports to the United Front Work Department, is one of the key state agencies that regularly funds trips of Canadian politicians.[39] Between 2006 and 2017, Canadian parliamentarians took 36 trips to China sponsored by arms of the Chinese government or by Chinese-affiliated business groups.[39]

In 2018, Ted Jiancheng Zhou, owner of Shanghai Oriental Capital Group and Evertrust Development Group Canada Inc.,[40] travelled to China with Conservative senators Victor Oh, Don Plett, and Leo Housakos, along with their spouses. On this two week all-expense paid trip, the politicians were introduced to senior Chinese Communist Party officials and fêted, including at a lavish dinner at the five-star St. Regis Hotel in Beijing.[40][39]

During the years he was a backbench MP from 2008 to 2015, John McCallum, who subsequently served as ambassador to China for the Trudeau government, is reported to have enjoyed $73,300 in all-expense paid trips to China at the expense of Beijing-friendly groups prior to being appointed ambassador.[39][41]

See also

References

  1. ^ Chiang, Chuck (2023-04-13). "Chinese communities in Vancouver tell public safety minister about intimidation by foreign powers and proxies". CBC News. Retrieved 2023-04-13.
  2. ^ Panetta, Alexander (18 March 2023). "U.S. ran secret probe into China's operations in Canada, new book alleges". Retrieved 24 March 2023.
  3. ^ a b Fife, Robert; Chase, Steven (2 December 2016). "Influential Chinese-Canadians paying to attend private fundraisers with Trudeau". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  4. ^ Kassam, Ashifa (15 December 2016). "Trudeau to be questioned by ethics watchdog over reports of cash for access". The Guardian. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  5. ^ "Trudeau government faces 'cash-for-access' criticism". BBC News. 23 November 2016. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  6. ^ Fife, Robert; Chase, Steven (13 December 2016). "Justin Trudeau says he uses cash-for-access fundraisers to champion the middle class". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  7. ^ Zimonjic, Peter (November 22, 2016). "Trudeau defends fundraiser with Chinese businessman who later donated $200,000 to father's foundation". CBC News. Retrieved 23 March 2023.
  8. ^ "Opinion: Why are Chinese police operating in Canada, while our own government and security services apparently look the other way?". The Globe and Mail. 26 September 2022. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  9. ^ a b "CSIS warns China's Operation Fox Hunt is targeting Canada's Chinese community". The Globe and Mail. 10 November 2020. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  10. ^ "Canadian police investigate Chinese 'police stations' in Quebec". BBC News. 9 March 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  11. ^ "CSIS is 'increasingly concerned' about China's interference in Canada - National | Globalnews.ca". Global News. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  12. ^ "CSIS is 'increasingly concerned' about China's interference in Canada - National | Globalnews.ca". Global News. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  13. ^ a b "China accuses Canada of smearing over secret police stations". AP NEWS. 10 March 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  14. ^ Shakil, Ismail; Cone, Molly (10 March 2023). "Canada police probe alleged Chinese 'police stations' in Montreal". Reuters. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  15. ^ "RCMP 'actively investigating' Chinese government police stations following arrests in U.S. | Globalnews.ca". Global News. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  16. ^ "Canada probes reports of Chinese 'police service stations' in Toronto". Reuters. 22 November 2022. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  17. ^ "RCMP 'actively investigating' Chinese government police stations following arrests in U.S. | Globalnews.ca". Global News. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  18. ^ https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-us-stations-canada-1.6818889. Retrieved 8 May 2023. {{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  19. ^ "FBI finds Canadian link in covert Chinese police station probe". The Globe and Mail. 17 April 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  20. ^ https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/alleged-chinese-police-stations-still-open-1.6828345. Retrieved 8 May 2023. {{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  21. ^ "China views Canada as a 'high priority' for interference: CSIS report". The Globe and Mail. 1 May 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  22. ^ "Conservative MP says Trudeau government knew China targeted his family but didn't warn him". thestar.com. 1 May 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  23. ^ Newton, Paula (4 May 2023). "Canada says 'all options on table' over claims China tried to interfere in election, harass lawmaker". CNN. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  24. ^ a b c d e f g h "China will be emboldened to target more Canadians if diplomat not expelled: Chong - National | Globalnews.ca". Global News. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  25. ^ a b c "Justin Trudeau says he didn't know Tory MP's family was allegedly targeted by Beijing". thestar.com. 3 May 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  26. ^ a b https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chong-csis-china-trudeau-1.6830687. Retrieved 8 May 2023. {{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  27. ^ "Canada MP demands Chinese diplomat's expulsion over alleged intimidation bid". South China Morning Post. 4 May 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  28. ^ "No decision yet on whether to expel Chinese diplomats over alleged attempts to threaten MP: Trudeau". nationalpost. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  29. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference FoxHunt was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  30. ^ "Globe editorial: The alarm on China's interference is ringing louder". The Globe and Mail. 2 May 2023. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  31. ^ Hamilton, Clive. Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  32. ^ Cooper, Sam. "Canadian intelligence warned PM Trudeau that China covertly funded 2019 election candidates: Sources". Global News.
  33. ^ "Trudeau accuses China of 'aggressive' election interference". BBC News. 8 November 2022.
  34. ^ "Trudeau: China playing 'aggressive games' with Canadian democracy". Deutsche Welle.
  35. ^ "China trying to gut Canada's democracy: PM". Taipei Times. The Guardian.
  36. ^ "China playing 'aggressive games' with Canada democracy: Trudeau". France 24.
  37. ^ "Conservatives have softened China stance since riding losses in 2021 election, critics say". nationalpost. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  38. ^ a b Cooper, Sam (8 February 2023). "2017 memo prepared for PM warns of Beijing election interference". Global News. Archived from the original on 1 March 2023. Retrieved 5 March 2023.
  39. ^ a b c d Fife, Robert; Chase, Steven (1 December 2017). "Beijing foots bill for Canadian senators, MPs to visit China". The Globe and Mail. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
  40. ^ a b Fife, Robert; Chase, Steven (3 December 2018). "Security experts question political influence of Toronto developer with ties to Beijing". The Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on 6 March 2023. Retrieved 2 March 2023.
  41. ^ Fife, Robert; Chase, Steven; VanderKlippe, Nathan (25 January 2019). "Ottawa's man in China: Who was McCallum and what was his strategy?". The Globe and Mail. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 1 March 2023.
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