Battle of Thermopylae

For other battles at Thermopylae, see Battle of Thermopylae (disambiguation).

Battle of Thermopylae
Part of the Greco-Persian Wars
The site of the battle today.
Date ~September, 480 BC Location Thermopylae, Greece Result Pyrric Persian victory. Territorial changes Persians gain control of Boeotia and march for Athens.
Belligerents
Greek city-states	Achaemenid Empire
Commanders and leaders
Leonidas I †	Xerxes I of Persia, Mardonius, Artapanus†?, Hydarnes
Strength
Totala 5,200+ (Herodotus) 7,400+ (Diodorus Siculus) 11,200 (Pausanias) Individual groups 300 Spartans 400 Thebans 700 Thespians 900? Helots 1,000 Phocians 2,800+ other Greek alliesb	Total ~2,080,000 (Herodotus) 80,000 (Ctesias) ~200,000 (Modern estimates - see below)
Casualties and losses
1,000c to 4,000 ~400 capturedd	~20,000 (Herodotus)
aNumbers from the ancient sources. Modern estimates are discussed below; bDismissed on the last day of battle, leaving the above troops to guard the rear; cAt least 300 Spartans and 700 Thespians, plus all other casualties; d 400 Thebans (less casualties)

Leonidas at Thermopylae, by Jacques Louis David, 1814. This is a juxtaposition of various historical and legendary elements from the Battle of Thermopylae.

The Battle of Thermopylae [thər móppəlee] (Greek: Θερμοπύλαι), detailed primarily by Herodotus, was fought in September 480 BC, between an alliance of Greek city-states and the invading Persian Empire of Xerxes I, at the pass of Thermopylae in central Greece. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks held up the Persians for seven days in total (including three of battle), before the rear-guard was annihilated in one of history's most famous last stands. During two full days of battle, the small force led by King Leonidas I of Sparta blocked the only road through which the massive Persian army could pass. After the second day of battle, a local resident named Ephialtes betrayed the Greeks by revealing a small path used to take goats to other cities that led behind the Greek lines. Aware that they were being outflanked, Leonidas dismissed the bulk of the Greek army, remaining to guard the rear with 300 Spartans, 700 Thespian, 400 Thebans and perhaps a few hundred others.

The Persians succeeded in taking the pass but sustained losses disproportionate to those of the Greeks. In doing so, they conquered Boeotia and Attica, burning Athens in the process, but the fierce resistance of the Spartan-led army had given the Allies valuable time to prepare the defense of the Peloponnesus, at the Isthmus of Corinth, and later that year the Athenian-led navy was able to win a decisive naval battle that would do much to determine the outcome of the war. The Greek victory at the Battle of Salamis prevented a naval invasion of the Peloponnesus and therefore prevented the completion of the Persian conquest. Demoralised, Xerxes retreated to Asia, leaving a force in Greece under Mardonius to complete the subjugation of the Greeks. The following year, however, a full-strength Allied army defeated the Persian force at the Battle of Plataea, ending the expansion of the Persian Empire into Europe.

Both ancient and modern writers have used the Battle of Thermopylae as an example of the superior power of a patriotic army of freemen defending native soil. The performance of the defenders at the battle of Thermopylae is also used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain as force multipliers and has become a symbol of courage against overwhelming odds.

Sources

Main article: Herodotus

The main primary source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the Greek historian Herodotus. Herodotus, who has been called the 'Father of History', was born in 484 BC in Halicarnassus, Asia Minor (then under Persian overlordship). He wrote his "Enquiries" (Greek – Historia; English – (The) Histories) in around 440-430 BC, trying to trace the origins of the Greco-Persian Wars, which would still have been relatively recent history (the wars finally ending in 449 BC). Herodotus's approach was entirely novel, and at least in Western society, he does seem to have invented 'history' as we know it. As Holland has it:

"For the first time, a chronicler set himself to trace the origins of a conflict not to a past so remote so as to be utterly fabulous, nor to the whims and wishes of some god, nor to a people's claim to manifest destiny, but rather explanations he could verify personally."

Many subsequent ancient historians, despite following in his footsteps, derided Herodotus, starting with Thucydides. Nevertheless Thucydides chose to begin his history where Herodotus left off (at the Siege of Sestos), and must therefore have felt that Herodotus had done a reasonable job of summarising the preceding history. Plutarch criticised Herodotus in his essay "On The Malignity of Herodotus", describing Herodotus as "Philobarbaros" (barbarian-lover), for not being pro-Greek enough. This actually suggests that Herodotus might have done a reasonable job of being even-handed. A negative view of Herodotus was passed on Renaissance Europe, though he remained well read. However, since the 19th century his reputation has been dramatically rehabilitated by archaeological finds which have repeatedly confirmed his version of events. The prevailing modern view is perhaps that Herodotus generally did a remarkable job in his Historia, but that some of his specific details (particularly troop numbers and dates) should be viewed with skepticism. However, there are still some historians who believe Herodotus made up much of his story.

The Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus, writing in the 1st century BC in his Bibliotheca Historica, also provides an account of the Greco-Persian wars, partially derived from the earlier Greek historian Ephorus. This account is fairly consistent with Herodotus's. The Greco-Persian wars are also described in less detail by a number of other ancient historians including Plutarch, Ctesias of Cnidus, and are alluded by other authors, such as the playwright Aeschylus. Archaeological evidence, such as the Serpent Column, also supports some of Herodotus's specific claims.

Background

Main articles: Greco-Persian Wars and Second Persian invasion of Greece

The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499-494 BC. The Persian Empire was still relatively young, and prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples. Moreover, Darius was a usurper, and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule. The Ionian revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and Darius thus vowed to punish those involved (especially those not already part of the empire). Darius also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece. A preliminary expedition under Mardonius in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece, re-conquered Thrace, and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia.

In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of 'earth and water' in token of their submission to him. Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well. This meant that Sparta was also effectively at war with Persia.

Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos, before receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed. Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.

A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle

Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state. By early 480 BC, the preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.

The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for the Greeks to fight the Persians. However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta. Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.

The 'congress' met again in the spring of 480 BC. A Thessalian delegation suggested that the allies could muster in the narrow Vale of Tempe, on the borders of Thessaly, and thereby block Xerxes advance. A force of 10,000 Greek people including hoplites and cavalry to the vale of Tempe, through which they believed the Persian army would have to pass. However, once there, they were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed through the Sarantoporo Pass, and that the army of Xerxes was overwhelming, the Greeks retreated. Shortly afterwards, they received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont.

A second strategy was therefore suggested by Themistocles to the allies. The route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica and the Peloponnesus) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the very narrow pass of Thermopylae. This could easily be blocked by the Greek hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent the Persians bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied navies could block the straits of Artemisium. This dual strategy was adopted by the congress. However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth should it come to it, whilst the women and children of Athens had been evacuated en masse to the Peloponnesian city of Troezen.

Prelude

Battle of Thermopylae and movements to Salamis, 480 BC

Xerxes seems to have made rather leisurely progress through Thrace and Macedon, and June and July passed without the Persians approaching Greece. Finally, in August, news of the imminent arrival of the Persians reached Greece. At this time of year the Spartans, generally considered to be the best warriors in Greece, were celebrating the festival of Carneia. During the Carneia, military activity was forbidden by Spartan law; the Spartans had arrived too late at the Battle of Marathon because of this requirement It was also the time of the Olympic Games, and therefore the Olympic truce, and would have been doubly sacrilegious for the whole Spartan army to march to war On this occasion, the ephors decided the urgency was sufficiently great to justify an advance expedition to block the pass, under one of its kings, Leonidas I. Leonidas took with him the 300 men of the royal bodyguard, the Hippeis, and probably a larger number of support troops drawn from other parts of Lacedaemon (including helots). These were to try and gather other allied troops along the way and to await the arrival of the main Spartan army.

The legend of Thermopylae (as told by Herodotus) has it that Sparta consulted the Oracle at Delphi before setting out to meet the Persian army. The Oracle is said to have made the following prophecy in hexameter verse:

O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon!
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus,
Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country

Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.

Herodotus tells us that Leonidas, in line with the prophecy, was convinced he was going to certain death since his forces were not adequate for a victory, and so he selected only Spartans with living sons. En route to Thermopylae, the Spartan force was reinforced by contigents from various cities (see below) and numbered more than 5,000 by the time it arrived at the pass. Leonidas chose to camp at and defend the 'middle gate', the narrowest part of the pass of Thermopylae, where the Phocians had built a defensive wall some time before. News also reached Leonidas, from the nearby city of Trachis, that there was a mountain track which could be used to outflank the pass of Thermopylae; in response, Leonidas stationed 1,000 Phocians on the heights to prevent such a maneuver

Finally, in mid-August, the Persian army was sighted across the Gulf of Malia, approaching Thermopylae. With the Persian army's arrival at Thermopylae, the Greeks held a council of war. Some Peloponnesians suggested withdrawal to the Isthmus of Corinth and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. The Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas calmed the panic and agreed to defend Thermopylae. Since the whole strategy of the Greeks depended on holding both Thermopylae and Artemisium, it could scarcely have been otherwise.

A Persian embassy was sent by Xerxes to negotiate with Leonidas; the allies were offered their freedom and the title "Friends of the Persian People", moreover they would be re-settled on better land than they currently possessed. When these terms were refused by Leonidas, the ambassador asked him more forcefully to lay down his weapons; Leonidas's famous response was for the Persians to "Come and get them" (Μολὼν λἀβε). With the Persian embassy returning empty-handed, battle became inevitable. However, Xerxes delayed attacking for four days, waiting for the Greeks to disperse, before sending troops to attack the Greeks.

Opposing forces

Persian army

For a full discussion of the size of the Persian invasion force, see Second Persian invasion of Greece

The numbers of troops which Xerxes mustered for the second invasion of Greece have been the subject of endless dispute, because the numbers given in ancient sources are very large indeed. Herodotus claimed that there were, in total, 2.5 million military personnel, accompanied by an equivalent number of support personnel. The poet Simonides, who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million; Ctesias gave 800,000 as the total number of the army that was assembled by Xerxes.

Modern scholars tend to reject the figures given by Herodotus and other ancient sources as completely unrealistic, and as a result of miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors. The topic has been hotly debated but the modern consensus revolves around the figure of 200–250,000. Whatever the real numbers were, however, it is clear that Xerxes was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea.

The number of Persian troops present at Thermopylae is therefore as uncertain as the number for the total invasion force. For instance, it is unclear whether the whole Persian army marched as far as Thermopylae, or whether Xerxes left garrisons in Macedon and Thessaly. The force at Thermopylae probably consisted of the majority of the invasion force, and therefore around 200,000 men (by modern consensus). The only ancient source to comment on this, Ctesias, suggests that 80,000 Persians fought at Thermopylae, but his account is only fragmentary, and otherwise somewhat garbled, for instance claiming that the Battle of Plataea took place before the Battle of Salamis.

Greek army

According to Herodotus, and Diodorus Siculus, the Greek army included the following forces:

Group	Number - Herodotus	Numbers - Diodorus Siculus
Spartans	300	300
Lacedaemonians/ Perioeci	900?	1,000 (including the Spartans?)
Spartan helots	900?	-
Mantineans	500	3,000 (other Peloponnesians sent with Leonidas)
Tegeans	500
Arcadian Orchomenos	120
Other Arcadians	1,000
Corinthians	400
Phlians	200
Mycenaeans	80
Total Peloponnesians	3,100 or 4,000	4,000 or 4,300
Thespians	700	-
Melians	-	1,000
Thebans	400	400
Phocians	1,000	1,000
Opuntian Locrians	"All they had"	1,000
Grand Total	5,200 (or 6,100) plus the Opuntian Locrians	7,400 (or 7,700)

Notes:

• The number of Peloponnesians

Diodorus suggests that there were 1,000 Lacedemonians and 3,000 other Pelopennesians, for a total of 4,000. Herodotus agrees with this figure in one passage, quoting an inscription by Simonides saying there were 4,000 Peloponnesians. However, elsewhere, in the passage summarized by the above table, Herodotus tallies 3,100 Peloponnesians at Thermopylae before the battle Herodotus also reports that at Xerxes' public showing of the dead, "helots were also there for them to see", but he does not say how many or in what capacity they served. Thus, the difference between his two figures can be squared by supposing (without proof) that there were 900 helots (three per Spartan) present at the battle. If helots were present at the battle, there is no reason to doubt that they served in their traditional role as armed retainers to individual Spartans. Alternatively, Herodotus's 'missing' 900 troops might have been Perioeci, and could therefore correspond to Diodorus's 1,000 Lacedemonians.

• The number of Lacedemonians

Further confusing the issue is Diodorus's ambiguity about whether his 1,000 Lacedemonians include the 300 Spartans. At one point he says: "Leonidas, when he received the appointment, announced that only one thousand men should follow him on the campaign'". However, he then says that: "There were, then, of the Lacedaemonians one thousand, and with them three hundred Spartiates". It is therefore impossible to be clearer on this point.

Herodotus and Diodorus describe the levied troops differently, but the only actual direct contradiction between their accounts is the inclusion of 700 Thespians by Herodotus, and 1,000 Melians (and no Thespians) by Diodorus.

Pausanias' account agrees with that of Herodotus (whom he probably read) except that he gives the number of Locrians, which Herodotus declined to estimate. Residing in the direct path of the Persian advance, they gave all the fighting men they had; according to Pausanias 6,000 men, which added to Herodotus' 5,200 would have given a force of 11,200.

Many modern historians, who usually consider Herodotus more reliable, add the 1,000 Lacedaemonians and the 900 Helots to Herodotus' 5,200 to obtain 7,100 or about 7,000 men as a standard number, neglecting Diodorus' Melians and Pausanias' Locrians. However, this is only one approach, and many other combinations are plausible.

It is not possible given the sources and known history of the battle to arrive at precise numbers. It is unlikely even the Greeks knew the number of men that fought or were killed. Furthermore, the numbers changed later on in the battle when most of the army retreated and only approximately 3,000 men remained (300 Spartans, 700 Thespians, 400 Thebans, probably 900 helots and 1,000 Phocians stationed above the pass; less the casualties sustained in the previous days).

Strategic and tactical considerations

From a strategic point of view, by defending Thermopylae, the Greeks were making the best possible use of their forces. As long as they could prevent the Persian advance into their lands, they had no requirement to seek a decisive battle, and could thus remain on the defensive. Moreover, by defending two constricted passages (Thermopylae and Artemisium), the Greek's inferior numbers became much less problematic. Conversely, for the Persians the problem of supplying such a large army meant that the Persians could not remain in the same place for too long. The Persians must therefore retreat or advance; and advancing required the pass of Thermopylae to be forced.

Tactically, the pass at Thermopylae was ideally suited to the Greek style of warfare. A hoplite phalanx would be able to block the narrow pass with ease, with no risk of being outflanked by cavalry. In the pass, the phalanx would have been very difficult to assault for the more lightly armed Persian infantry. The major weak point for the Greeks was the mountain track which led across the highland parallel to Thermopylae, and which would allow their position to be outflanked. Although probably unsuitable for cavalry, this path could easily be traversed by the Persian infantry (many of whom were versed in mountain warfare). Leonidas was made aware of this path by local people from Trachis, and he positioned a detachment of Phocian troops there in order to block this route.

Topography of the battlefield

Map of Thermopylae area with modern shoreline and reconstructed shoreline of 480 BC

At the time, the pass of Thermopylae consisted of a track along the shore of the Gulf of Malis so narrow that only one chariot could pass through at a time. On the southern side of the track stood the cliffs, while on the north side was the gulf. Along the path was a series of three constrictions, or "gates" (pylai), and at the center gate a short wall that had been erected by the Phocians in the previous century to aid in their defense against Thessalian invasions. The name "Hot Gates" comes from the hot springs that were located there.

Today, the pass is not near the sea but is several miles inland because of sedimentation in the Gulf of Malis. The old track appears at the foot of hills around the plain, flanked by a modern road. Recent core samples indicate that the pass was only 100 meters wide and the waters came up to the gates; "Little do the visitors realize that the battle took place across the road from the monument." The pass still is a natural defensive position to modern armies, and British Commonwealth forces in World War II made a defense in 1941 against the Nazi invasion meters from the original battle field.

• Maps of the region:[6][7]
• Image of the battlefield, from the east:[8]

Battle

First day

Greek phalanx based on sources from The Perseus Project.

Xerxes waited four days for the Greek force to disperse. On the fifth day he sent Medes and Cissians, along with relatives of those who had died ten years earlier in the Battle of Marathon, to take the Greeks prisoner and bring them before him. They soon found themselves launching a frontal assault on the Greek position. The Greeks had camped on either side of the rebuilt Phocian wall. The wall was guarded by the Greeks who fought in front of it. Details of the tactics are scant; Diodorus says "the men stood shoulder to shoulder" and the Greeks were "superior in valor and in the great size of their shields." This is probably describing the standard Greek phalanx, in which the men formed a wall of overlapping shields and layered spear points. This would have been highly effective as long as it spanned the width of the pass. The small shields and shorter spears of the Persians were not a match for the superior armament of the Greek hoplites. Herodotus says that the units for each city were kept together; units were rotated in and out of the battle to prevent tiredness, which implies the Greeks had more men than necessary to block the pass. The Greeks killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have started up off the seat from which he was watching the battle three times. According to Ctesias, the first wave was "cut to pieces" with only two or three Spartans dead.

Depiction of Persian warriors, probably the Immortals.

According to Herodotus and Diodorus, the king, having taken the measure of the enemy, threw his best troops into a second assault the same day: the Immortals, an elite corps of 10,000 men. Ctesias tells a totally different story, that Xerxes sent another 20,000 troops against the Greeks, after the first 10,000 under Artapanus were defeated. They also failed to open the pass even though they were flogged by their leaders to press on.

Second day

According to Ctesias, on the second day Xerxes sent another 50,000 men to assault the pass, but again they failed. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and withdrew to his camp, totally perplexed.

Late on the second day of battle, as the Persian king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall: a Malian Greek traitor named Ephialtes informed him of the mountain path around Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army. Ephialtes was motivated by the desire of a reward. For this act, the name of Ephialtes received a lasting stigma, his name coming to mean "nightmare" and becoming the archetypal term for a "traitor" in Greek.

Herodotus reports that Xerxes sent his commander Hydarnes that evening, with the men under his command, to encircle the Greeks via the pass. However, he does not say who those men are. Hydarnes commanded the Immortals, but they had been bloodied the day before. Ctesias tells a different story, asserting that 40,000 troops were sent around the pass, conducted by the leaders of the Trachinians. The stories can be reconciled by presuming that Hydarnes was given overall command of an enhanced force including what was left of the Immortals, but it is only an assumption. The Immortals were given such a name because when a member fell in battle he was immediately replaced by another to maintain the 10,000, therefore it is also possible they had been replenished from the previous day's fighting. According to Diodorus, Hydarnes had a force of 20,000 for the mission, and not Herodotus' ~10,000 (modern scholars argue that when Herodotus asserts Hydarnes was sent with "the troops under his command," he meant with whatever was left or added to the Immortals from the previous day's of fighting) or Ctesias' 40,000, it is possible he was using both accounts to come up with an average number. The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at Alpenus, first town of Locris.

Third Day

At daybreak on the third day, the Phocians became aware of the outflanking Persian column by the rustling of oak leaves. Herodotus says that they jumped up and were greatly amazed. Hydarnes was perhaps just as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves as they were to see him and the Persian forces. He feared that they were Spartans but was enlightened by Ephialtes and proceeded by firing "showers of arrows" at them. The Phocians retreated to the crest of the mountain to make their stand and defend their city which was behind the mountain range, but the Persians took the left branch of the pass to Alpenus and hence circled behind the main Greek force.

Learning from a runner that the Phocians had not held the path, Leonidas called a council of war at dawn. Some Greeks argued for withdrawal, while others pledged to stay. After the council, many of the Greek forces did choose to withdraw. Herodotus believed that Leonidas blessed their departure with an order, but he also offered the alternative point of view that those retreating forces departed without orders. The Spartans had pledged themselves to fight to the death. A contingent of about 700 Thespians, led by their general Demophilus, the son of Diadromes, refused to leave with the other Greeks but cast their lot with the Spartans. Also present were the 400 Thebans and any helots that had accompanied the Spartans.

Ostensibly, the Spartans were obeying the laws of Sparta by not retreating. It is also possible that recalling the words of the Oracle, Leonidas was committed to sacrifice his life in order to save Sparta. A further possibility is that the Greeks had chosen a calculated strategy to extricate themselves from the situation. If they had all retreated, the open ground beyond the pass would have allowed the Persian cavalry to run the Greeks down. If they had all remained at the pass, they would have been encircled and would eventually have all been killed. By covering the retreat, and continuing to block the pass, Leonidas could save more than 3,000 men, who would be able to fight at some later point. At dawn Xerxes made libations, pausing to allow the Immortals sufficient time to descend the mountain, and then began his advance.

The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter as many Persians as they could. They fought with spears until every spear was shattered and then switched to xiphē (short swords). In this struggle, Herodotus states that two brothers of Xerxes fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes. Leonidas also died in the assault, and the sides fought over his body, the Greeks taking possession.

Receiving intelligence that Ephialtes and the Immortals were advancing toward their rear, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand on a hill behind the wall. The Thebans "moved away from their companions, and with hands upraised, advanced toward the barbarians..." (Rawlinson translation), but a few were slain before their surrender was accepted. The king later had the Theban prisoners branded with the royal mark. Of the remaining defenders, Herodotus says:

"Here they defended themselves to the last, those who still had swords using them, and the others resisting with their hands and teeth; ..."

Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered the hill surrounded, and the Persians rained down arrows until every last Greek was dead. In 1939, archaeologist Spyridon Marinatos, excavating at Thermopylae, found large numbers of Persian bronze arrowheads on Kolonos Hill, changing the identification of the hill on which the Greeks died from a smaller one nearer the wall.

Aftermath

Main article: Second Persian invasion of Greece

When the body of Leonidas was recovered by the Persians, Xerxes, in a rage against Leonidas, ordered that the head be cut off and the body crucified. Herodotus observes that this was very uncommon for the Persians, as they had the habit of treating "valiant warriors" with great honor (the example of Pytheas captured earlier off Skiathos also suggests that). However, Xerxes was known for his rage, as when he had the Hellespont whipped because it would not obey him. After the Persians' departure, the Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. A stone lion was erected to commemorate Leonidas. Forty years after the battle, Leonidas' bones were returned to Sparta where he was buried again with full honors; funeral games were held every year in his memory. According to Herodotus, the Persian dead numbered about 20,000.

With Thermopylae now opened to the Persian army, the continuation of the blockade at Artemisium by the Allied fleet became irrelevant. The simultaneous naval Battle of Artemisium had been a stalemate, and the Allied navy was able to retreat in good order to the Saronic Gulf where they helped to ferry the remaining Athenian citizens across to the island of Salamis.

Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not submitted to the Persians, Plataea and Thespiae; before marching on the now evacuated city of Athens. Meanwhile, the Allies (for the most part Peloponnesian) prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth, demolishing the single road that led through it, and building a wall across it. As at Thermopylae, to make this an effective strategy required the Allied navy to stage a simultaneous blockade, barring the passage of the Persian navy across the Saronic Gulf, so that troops could not be landed directly on the Peloponnese. However, instead of a mere blockade, Themistocles persuaded the Allies to seek a decisive victory against the Persian fleet. Luring the Persian navy into the Straits of Salamis, the Allied fleet was able to destroy much of the Persian fleet, which essentially ended the threat to the Peloponnese.

Fearing that the Greeks might attack the bridges across the Hellespont and trap his army in Europe, Xerxes now retreated with much of the army back to Asia. He left a hand picked force under Mardonius to complete the conquest the following year. However, under pressure from the Athenians, the Peloponnesian Allies eventually agreed to try and force Mardonius to battle, and marched on Attica. Mardonius retreated to Boeotia to lure the Greeks into open terrain and the two sides eventually met near the city of Plataea. There, at the Battle of Plataea the Greek army won a decisive victory, destroying much of the Persian army, and ending the invasion of Greece. Meanwhile, at the near-simultaneous naval Battle of Mycale they also destroyed much of the remaining Persian fleet, thereby reducing the threat of further invasions.

Significance

Thermopylae is arguably the most famous battle in European ancient history, repeatedly referenced in both ancient, recent and contemporary culture. It is (in western culture) the Greeks who are lauded for their performance in battle; yet, from a military stand-point, it was unarguably a defeat for the Greeks. The Greek position at Thermopylae, despite being massively out-numbered, was near-impregnable. If the position had been held for even slightly longer, the Persians may have had to retreat for lack of food and water. Thus, despite the heavy losses, forcing the pass was a clear Persian victory, both tactically and strategically. From the Greek point of view, the strategy which led to Thermopylae had been sound; but failing to hold the pass had undermined it. As a result, all of Boeotia and Attica fell to the Persians. Strategically, little was thus achieved by the Greeks at Thermopylae. It is sometimes suggested as a successful delaying action which gave the Allies more time to prepare, but whether this extra time was actually critical to the allied effort is debatable. The successful retreat of the bulk of the Greek troops, though morale-boosting, was in no sense a victory, though it did take some of the sheen off the Persian victory.

Thermopylae is famous because of the doomed heroism of the troops, who against appalling odds, remained at the pass and has inspired much praise:

...the fairest sister-victories which the Sun has ever seen, yet they would never dare to compare their combined glory with the glorious defeat of King Leonidas and his men

A second reason is the example it set of free men, fighting for their country and their freedom, and what they might thereby achieve:

So almost immediately, contemporary Greeks saw Thermopylae as a critical moral and culture lesson. In universal terms, a small, free people had willingly outfought huge numbers of imperial subjects who advanced under the lash. More specifically, the Western idea that soldiers themselves decide where, how, and against whom they will fight was contrasted against the Eastern notion of despotism and monarchy — freedom proving the stronger idea as the more courageous fighting of the Greeks at Thermopylae, and their later victories at Salamis and Plataea attested.

Militarily, the fame of Thermopylae is also justified, on the basis of the first two days fighting. The performance of the defenders is used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain as force multipliers.

Legacy

Monuments

Epitaph of Simonides

Epitaph with Simonides' epigram

Simonides composed a well-known epigram, which was engraved as an epitaph on a commemorative stone placed on top of the burial mound of the Spartans at Thermopylae. It is also the hill on which the last of them died. The original stone has not been preserved. Instead the epitaph was engraved on a new stone erected in 1955. The text from Herodotus is:

Ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε

κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

Ō ksein', angellein Lakedaimoniois hoti tēide

keimetha tois keinōn rhēmasi peithomenoi.

An ancient alternative substitutes πειθόμενοι νομίμοις for ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι; i.e., substitutes "laws" for "sayings." The sayings are not personal but refer to official and binding phrases of some sort.

The form of this ancient Greek poetry is an elegiac couplet. Some English renderings are given in the table below.

Translation	Notes
Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by, That here, obedient to their laws, we lie.	William Lisle Bowles
Stranger, tell the Spartans that we behaved as they would wish us to, and are buried here.	William Golding
Stranger! To Sparta say, her faithful band Here lie in death, remembering her command.	Rev. Francis Hodgson
Stranger, report this word, we pray, to the Spartans, that lying Here in this spot we remain, faithfully keeping their laws.	George Campbell Macaulay
Stranger, bear this message to the Spartans, that we lie here obedient to their laws.	William Roger Paton
Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here obedient to their laws we lie.	Steven Pressfield
Go, stranger, and to Lacedaemon tell That here, obeying her behests, we fell.	George Rawlinson
Go, way-farer, bear news to Sparta's town that here, their bidding done, we laid us down.	Cyril E. Robinson
Go tell the Spartans, you who read: We took their orders, and lie here dead.	Aubrey de Sélincourt
Friend, tell Lacedaemon Here we lie Obedient to our orders.	William Shepherd
Oh Stranger, tell the Spartans That we lie here obedient to their word.	From the 1962 film The 300 Spartans
Go tell the Spartans, passerby: That here, by Spartan law, we lie.	Frank Miller

John Ruskin expressed the importance of this ideal to Western civilization as follows:

Also obedience in its highest form is not obedience to a constant and compulsory law, but a persuaded or voluntary yielded obedience to an issued command .... His name who leads the armies of Heaven is "Faithful and True"... and all deeds which are done in alliance with these armies ... are essentially deeds of faith, which therefore ... is at once the source and the substance of all known deed, rightly so called ... as set forth in the last word of the noblest group of words ever, so far as I know, uttered by simple man concerning his practice, being the final testimony of the leaders of a great practical nation ...: [the epitaph in Greek].

Leonidas monument

Additionally, there is a modern monument at the site, called the "Leonidas Monument", in honor of the Spartan king. It features a bronze statue of Leonidas. A sign, under the statue, reads simply: "Μολών λαβέ" ("Come and get them!"). The metope below depicts battle scenes. The two marble statues on the left and the right of the monument represent, respectively, the river Eurotas and Mount Taygetos, famous landmarks of Sparta.

Thespian monument

In 1997, a second monument was officially unveiled by the Greek government, dedicated to the 700 Thespians who fought with the Spartans. The monument is made of marble and features a bronze statue depicting the god Eros, who was worshiped in ancient Thespiae. Under the statue, a sign reads "In memory of the seven hundred Thespians".

A plate, below the statue, explains its symbolism:

• The headless male figure symbolizes the anonymous sacrifice of the 700 Thespians to their country.
• The outstretched chest symbolizes the struggle, the gallantry, the strength, the bravery and the courage.
• The open wing symbolizes the victory, the glory, the soul, the spirit and the freedom.
• The broken wing symbolizes the voluntary sacrifice and death.
• The naked body symbolizes Eros, the most important god of the ancient Thespians, the god of creation, beauty and life.

The monument to the Thespians is placed beside the one to the Spartans.

• Thespians' Monument, Eros
  Thespians' Monument, Eros
• Thespians' Monument
  Thespians' Monument
• A plate, below the statue
  A plate, below the statue
• Leonidas Monument
  Leonidas Monument
• Leonidas monument
  Leonidas monument
• Leonidas monument
  Leonidas monument
• Leonidas
  Leonidas
• Leonidas Monument
  Leonidas Monument

Legends associated with the battle

Herodotus's colourful account of the battle has provided us with many apocryphal incidents and conversations away from the main historical events. These accounts are obviously not verifiable, but they form an integral part of the legend of the battle. They often demonstrate the Laconic speech (and wit) of the Spartans to good effect.

For instance, Plutarch recounts in his Sayings of Spartan Women that upon his departure, Leonidas's wife Gorgo asked what she should do if he did not return; to which Leonidas replied, "Marry a good man and have good children."

Herodotus attests several conversations that took place between Xerxes and Demaratus, an exiled Spartan king in his retinue. Early in the campaign, Xerxes asked Demaratus whether he thought that the Greeks would put up a fight, for in his opinion neither the Greeks nor even all peoples of Europe together would be able to stop him because they were disunited. Demaratus replied:

First, they will never accept conditions from you that bring slavery upon Hellas; and second, they will meet you in battle even if all the other Greeks are on your side. Do not ask me how many these men are who can do this; they will fight with you whether they have an army of a thousand men, or more than that, or less.

Xerxes laughed at this answer, claiming that "free men" of any number would never be able to stand against his army which was unified by a single ruler, and that obedience to one single master would make his troops extremely courageous, or they would be led into battle "by the whip" even against an army of any size. He added that "even if the Greeks have larger numbers than our highest estimate, we still would outnumber them 100 to 1". He asserted that his army contained men who would gladly fight with three Greeks at once and that Demaratus was talking nonsense. To this Demaratus answered:

I would most gladly fight with one of those men who claim to be each a match for three Greeks. So is it with the Lacedaemonians; fighting singly they are as brave as any man living, and together they are the best warriors on earth. They are free, yet not wholly free: law is their master, whom they fear much more than your men fear you. They do whatever it bids; and its bidding is always the same, that they must never flee from the battle before any multitude of men, but must abide at their post and there conquer or die.

It is reported that, upon arriving at Thermopylae, the Persian sent a mounted scout to reconnoiter. The Greeks allowed him to come up to the camp, observe them, and depart. When the scout reported to Xerxes the size of the Greek force and that the Spartans were indulging in calisthenics and combing their long hair, Xerxes found the reports laughable. Seeking again the counsel of Demaratus, Xerxes was told that the Spartans were preparing for battle and that it was their custom to adorn their hair when they were about to risk their lives. Demaratus called them "the bravest men in Greece" and warned the Great King that they intended to dispute the pass. He emphasized that he had tried to warn Xerxes earlier in the campaign, but the king had refused to believe him. He added that if Xerxes ever managed to subdue the Spartans, "there is no other nation in all the world which will venture to lift a hand in their defence" (Rawlinson translation).

Herodotus also describes the reception of a Persian embassy by Leonidas. The ambassador told Leonidas that Xerxes would offer him the kingship of all Greece if he joined with Xerxes. Leonidas answered: "If you had any knowledge of the noble things of life, you would refrain from coveting others' possessions; but for me to die for Greece is better than to be the sole ruler over the people of my race." Then the ambassador asked him more forcefully to surrender their arms. To this Leonidas gave his famous answer: Μολὼν λαβέ (IPA: [moˈlɔːn laˈbe]) "Come and get them".

Such Laconic bravado doubtlessly helped to maintain morale. Herodotus writes that when Dienekes, a Spartan soldier, was informed that Persian arrows would be so numerous as "to block out the sun", he retorted, unconcerned; "So much the better...then we shall fight our battle in the shade."

After the battle, Xerxes was curious as to what the Greeks had been trying to do (presumably because they had had so few men) and had some Arcadian deserters interrogated in his presence. The answer was that all the other men were participating in the Olympic Games. When Xerxes asked what was the prize for the winner, the answer was "an olive-wreath". Upon hearing this, Tigranes, a Persian general, said: "Good heavens, Mardonius, what kind of men are these that you have pitted against us? It is not for riches that they contend but for honor!" (Godley translation) or otherwise "Ye Gods, Mardonius, what men have you brought us to fight against? Men that fight not for gold, but for glory."

Thermopylae in popular culture

Main article: Battle of Thermopylae in popular culture

The Battle of Thermopylae has been an icon of western civilization from its very aftermath. This icon expresses itself in countless instances of adages, poetry and song, literature, films, television and video games. A more serious aspect has been its didactic use. The battle appears in many books and articles on military topics.

Main article: Sparta in popular culture

Prior to the battle, the Hellenes remembered the Dorians, an ethnic distinction to which the Spartans belonged, as the conquerors and displacers of the Ionians in the Peloponnesus. After the battle, Spartan culture became an inspiration and object of emulation, a phenomenon known as Laconophilia.

See also

• Aristodemus (Spartan)
• Battle of the Persian Gate
• Battles of macrohistorical importance involving invasions of Europe
• Molon labe
• Persian empire
• Pantites
• Spartan Army
• Battle of Saragarhi
• 300 - A movie depicting a stylized version of the Battle of Thermoylae

Further reading

• Barkworth, Peter R. (1993). "The Organization of Xerxes' Army" (PDF). Iranica Antiqua. XXVII: pages 149–167. Retrieved 2007-10-18. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
• Pressfield, Steven (1998). Gates of Fire. ISBN 9780553383683. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |publicher= ignored (help)
• Morris, Ian Macgregor (2000). "To Make a New Thermopylae: Hellenism, Greek Liberation, and the Battle of Thermopylae". Greece & Rome. 47 (2): pages 211–230. doi:10.1093/gr/47.2.211. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
• Bradford, Ernle (2004). Thermopylae: The Battle for the West. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0306813602.
• Cartledge, Paul (2006). Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World. Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press. ISBN 1585675660.
• Matthews, Rupert (2006). The Battle of Thermopylae: A Campaign in Context. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing. ISBN 1862273251.
• Holland, Tom (2006). Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West. ISBN 0385513119. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |publicher= ignored (help)

External links

• EDSITEment Lesson Plan: 300 Spartans at the Battle of Thermopylae: Herodotus' Real History (from the National Endowment for the Humanities)
• Ctesias; Freese, J.H. (Translator) (2002), "Persica", in Photius; Pearse, Roger (eds.), Bibliotheca (Myriobiblon): Codex LXXII, The Tertullian Project {{citation}}: |first2= has generic name (help).
• Lendering, Jona (1996–2007). "Herodotus' twenty-second logos: Thermopylae" (html). Livius articles on ancient history. Retrieved 2007-10-19.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
• Lendering, Jona (2007). "Thermopylae (480 BCE)" (html). Livius articles on ancient history. Retrieved 2007-10-19. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Stecchini, Livio C. (2007). "The Persian Wars: the Size of the Persian Army" (html). Iran Chamber Society. Retrieved 2007-10-19.
• The Five Great Battles of Antiquity by David L. Smith, Symposion Lectures, 30

June 2006.

• Modern monument at siu.edu
• Spartan burial mound at coloradocollege.edu
• Artemisium