Talk:Yom Kippur War

Infobox

When did the infobox get reversed? I had changed it so that the attacking parties were on the left, initial side of the box, and the attacked party, Israel, was on the right. Kaisershatner (talk) 16:08, 13 April 2010 (UTC)

Result

It is unreasonable to state "strategic victory" for Egypt in the infobox. While many sources do claim political victory for Egypt, there is only one who claims "strategic victory" for Egypt and it is Dupuy. There is more than one source that actually claims political victory for Israel. The main body does not support "Egyptian strategic victory" by quoting Dupuy's words. The main body supports nothing by quoting anyone's words. It supports arguments through what is written by the editors. Megaidler (talk) 20:23, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

Since no discussion took place, I changed it to only "political victory". I don't own the source, so it would be good if someone could verify that "political victory" does not misrepresent it.  dmyersturnbull  ⇒ talk 23:53, 5 May 2010 (UTC)

I quoted Dupuy a bit in the Lead section above. Many sources, probably the majority, would agree.John Z (talk) 07:31, 6 May 2010 (UTC)

Reverts

So nothing is allowed in if it doesn't meet ElUmmah's standards? What was wrong with the line from the Egyptian president? Why did you remove it? Cptnono (talk) 21:53, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

As mentioned in your talk page, removing that particular paragraph was accidental. Everything else however, was perfectly justified and I think you'll find that I'm not the only to think so.ElUmmah (talk) 22:18, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

ElUmmah.

Unless you have Gawrych's book, "your" edits are actually reinsertions of Sherif's own edits, removed by me, while you even don't have this book. Sherif claims that his edits are based on Gawrych's book, but I think he did not write exactly what appears in the book. Until Sherif gives detailed explanations for these edits and quote Gawrych's words in the talk page, these edits shouldn't appear in the article. I'm still expecting Sherif to do it. You have no write to reinsert edits based on a book you don't have. Stop reinserting Sherif's edits. Megaidler (talk) 11:48, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

For the most part, they are my edits, the only re-insertion was the part regarding the 400 destroyed Israeli tanks as well as the countries in the infobox. Sherif has already provided the explanation you required, and so you cannot continue to remove a sourced figure just because it differs from the sources you like.

So now you know what books I have and don't have is that right? For your information, the book is available on google books, if you had taken the time to verify this you wouldn't have made such a false accusation. You, Megaidler, are the one who has no right to remove referenced information and try to impose your own POV upon a featured article that is supposed to be NEUTRAL. You make baseless claims regarding the reliability of many top scholars and you try to undermine their work, when you are hardly a scholar on the subject yourself.ElUmmah (talk) 19:24, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

I concur. Fascinating hypothesis there Megaidler but useful only if you're authoring a book. What you're doing is WP:OR and WP:SYNTH. Please remember that you do not WP:OWN this article either; you cannot remove sourced material and order editors to comply with your requests simply because they do not match your POV, all the while throwing false accusations at me. Drop it for everyone's sake, and let's move on to other issues with the article. --Sherif9282 (talk) 21:17, 25 April 2010 (UTC)

Question: Did Ezekiel's Prophecy of Gog and Magog Cause the Americans to Act Out of Fear?

NOTE If we can answer this question, maybe we can give motive to why Kissinger acted as he did, or perhaps acted without the President?Chris-marsh-usa (talk) 23:04, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

For the record, I am an American. I have a question. Are there any reliable sources online that demonstrate that Ezekiel's (chapter 38 http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Ezekiel%2038;&version=NASB;) prophecy of a King of the North (Gog and Magog) would attack Israel unleashing God's wrath possibly caused Kissinger and others to react (with the nuclear alert) to the Soviet communication to Nixon out of fear, fearing Armageddon? That is how I, as a reader of the pronogisticator Hal Lindsey, interpreted Doomsday: On The Brink when it discussed the Soviet paratroops on alert.Chris-marsh-usa (talk) 22:43, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

It is fortunate that the Soviets were guided more by reason than possible religious panic that day.Chris-marsh-usa (talk) 22:45, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

israeli victory

y is this disputed? israel clearly won, the arabs were pushed back a ceasefire went into effect and the us prevented israel from advancing on egypt. ( kissinger used this in order to get egypt to support the us and not the ussr). syria was pushed back and if im not mistaken israel was 45 kilometers away from damascus.--Marbehtorah-marbehchaim (talk) 01:51, 28 April 2010 (UTC)

FAR

This article has two tags, unformatted citations, an External link farm, and many issues-- it should be cleaned up or submitted to WP:FAR for reevaluation of featured status. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 12:55, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

I believe there is little chance of this remaining a FA. To address the comments made instead of taking it to FAR at this time:

I don't know why the neutrality tag is on. I assume it has to do with the infobox. However, in hindsight, I agreed it was needed a few months ago when the article was heavily slanted towards the Arab perspective.

Length: This has been brought up before. It is long but it is within WP:LENGTH. It could be tightened. One idea was to spin the Golan part out. I think that is a terrible idea and if anything certain sources need to be limited because they are overused. Rabinovich is one example and this is discussed in the archives. If any sections should be trimmed or summarized with a new article created it should be sections 3 and 4.

The link farm is easy enough and should be cut. Is there anything anyone sees as being essential as an external link instead of a source?

And a note about the infobox : If we could properly summarize the victory conditions at the top of section 3 or 4 as "aftermath" we would not need the disputed info in the infobox. There is no place discussing the info in a consolidated manner for that to be acceptable since the reader would have to go through a dozen paragraphs to find the info.

Cptnono (talk) 20:48, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

A lot of the Israeli-Palastinian conflict partisans have moved in and wrecked this article since I last edited it. I'll see what I can do. I agree that the length tag is specious, and that there are several other things that could be done to fix this article. Raul654 (talk) 20:50, 3 May 2010 (UTC)

Agreed! It looks and reads like crap.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 14:06, 4 May 2010 (UTC)

By way of example, the casualty section is way too long and filled w/ mumbo jumbo psycho babble and other useless and biased crap that is irrelevant and designed simply for the purpose of skewing the article in a certain direction. I made an effort to make it more concise, drawing from a number of sources and setting forth dry numbers and stats. I'll try to re-work it again and trim the fat and BS.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:24, 4 May 2010 (UTC)

Aftermath

Apologies to start another subsection but the other ones are being ignored and edit waring is increasing. Would anyone be opposed to fixing the victory bit by using "Se aftermath" in the "Result" parameter of the infobox. We would have to formulate a paragraph at the top of the section discussing claims to military victory and the political outcome. Right now, the section is not suitable for such a link but if we stop bickering we might be able to figure out a concise summary. Although I have been against doing this, it has been based on that section not existing properly (the reader has to comb through too much as is) and what we have now just isn't working. We have precedent for doing this according to the infobox:

1. result – optional – this parameter may use one of several standard terms: "X victory", "Decisive X victory" or "Inconclusive". The choice of term should reflect what the sources say. In cases where the standard terms do not accurately describe the outcome, the preferred method is to enter a link to the section of the article where the result is discussed in detail (such as "See the 'Aftermath' section"). -Template:Infobox military conflict

Cptnono (talk) 20:50, 4 May 2010 (UTC)

I support this. The relevant section needs to reflect what the sources say, and then the infobox needs to point to it. (Hohum ^@) 00:16, 7 May 2010 (UTC)

Recent removal

An editor just removed "Egyptian political and strategic victory" from the infobox with the edit comment "No consensus for this edit. Not from editors and not from sources. IDF tactical victory is supported by at least 7 reliable sources)"

The main body text contains "However, the war is described as a military stalemate and an Egyptian strategic and political victory by Major Steven J. Piccirilli, USMC" which is properly cited, and is a reliable western source.

This, as I have argued before, makes the recently removed outcome supported, or more properly for an infobox summary - disputed. Please stop fighting over the wording in the infobox instead of getting the relevant main body text right, and then reflecting it in the infobox. (Hohum ^@) 21:49, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

I don't see how one can make the argument for political victory. Piccirili is in the minority on this as evidenced by the numerous sources that I cited and added in the main body text. These additions are now consistent with the infobox. Moreover, in addition to being contrary to the body of sources, several editors have expressed reservations about this speculative conclusion. respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 00:16, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

I have now cited several sources that argue persuasively that in addition to emerging militarily victorious from the Yom Kippur War, Israel gained politically as well. These are reliable sources from respected historians, defense analysts and academics that lay out in cogent, articulate fashion grounds for their claims. There will always be a minority that will argue otherwise. There are those who believe that the CIA was responsible for Kennedy’s death and that 911 was a Zionist conspiracy but that does not make it so. The majority of western sources agree that Israel emerged victorious from the war. Even Garwych begrudgingly acknowledges that the prevailing western viewpoint is that Israel won the war. A core group of Egyptian revisionists and a few of their supporters stubbornly cling to the view of stalemate but these are a minority and hardly represent the consensus of sources and I’ve proven that.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 03:38, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

You don't have to understand why a respectable source has a particular opinion. Wikipedia reflects what reliable sources say. It's disputed, Piccirili is not a fringe opinion. (Hohum ^@) 18:55, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

I’m curious. Is Piccirili an author, historian or academic? Has he published any notable books? Has his article on YKW been subjected to any form of peer review? And aside from “GlobalSecurity,” has it been published or recited in any RS? I did a Google search and found nothing of note. Can you enlighten me as to why we should consider such an obscure writer be an RS? Can you please explain to me why the opinions of a “no name” like Piccirili should be given equal weight to the dozen or so sources that I cited that stand for the opposite position? Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 23:13, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

So it appears JJG wasted no time in taking advantage of my absence to once again remove "Egyptian political and strategic victory" from the infobox. I am quickly tiring of this constant edit warring. JJG, it's obvious that the matter is disputed, as Piccirili's opinion is shared by other reliable sources, including Hammad, Dupuy and O'Ballance, to name a few. Be it a minority viewpoint or not, the matter IS disputed, and the infobox needs to reflect this. Thus, I am giving you the chance to self-revert, or at least to implement Hohum's suggestion, which I think is highly agreeable, as it allows the reader to examine both sides and come to their own conclusion. I think it is in the best interest of this article that we, as editors, collaborate rather than edit war. Also, regarding the casualty figures in the infobox, they are inaccurate. You say Rabinovich gives the figure as 15,000, which is true, yet another source gives the figure as 8,528. Thus, the range needs to be 8,528 - 18,500. Regarding Arab air losses, you state the range to be 450-514. Yet Gawrych states that Egypt lost 223 and Syria lost 118 (223+118 = 341). Thus, the infobox needs to say 341-514. I also noticed you removed Gawrych's sourced material from the casualties paragraph in the body. He states at least 2800 Israelis were killed and at least 8800 were wounded. He also mentions that some sources give Israeli aircraft losses as closer to 200. I believe O'Ballance provides additional figures, but I don't have the book yet and so won't be able to provide them at the moment. Regardless, Gawrych is a reliable source, and his figures need to be included, and it would be great if you could do so. Another concern of mine is that you reverted me to place Israel's estimate of Arab casualties first (in the Arab casualties paragraph). Other, more accurate secondary sources need to be placed first, otherwise the reader is given an immediate incorrect impression of Arab casualties. I do not oppose its inclusion, as it is relevant, but please put it after, rather than before other most reliable estimates. I hope we will be able to collaborate further on this project, and avoid pointless edit warring. Respectfully, ElUmmah (talk) 21:56, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

Elummah, I too have no interest in edit warring and will make some modifications consistent w/ ur suggestions. Aside from his own quote of 15,000 Rabinovich cites another source as saying 8,528 but he doesn't say which and that's why I didn't include it in the infobox but I did include in in the casualty section. Herzog cites a figure of 18,500 and the London Sunday Times states 16,000. Johnson and Tierney state that the Arab forces sustained between 40,000 to 50,000 casualties (dead and wounded) Nonetheless, in the interest of collaboative editing, I'll make changes that will hopefully meet with ur approval. Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 22:33, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

Sounds good :). I just took a look at Rabinovich's book, and I saw that the 15,000 killed figure is attributed to Israel's estimate, rather than his own. Also, Gawrych states that Egypt and Syria lost 8,000 killed (5,000 for egypt and 3,000 for syria).ElUmmah (talk) 23:15, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

I think that "disputed" would be better for the infobox than a disputable "Israeli tactical victory" which should only be ther if balanced by "Egyptian political/strategic victory" . The majority opinion of reliable sources assess it as an Egyptian (or Arab) political / strategic victory; it is much harder to see how it can be viewed as an Israeli political victory. As I mentioned above, some of the sources cited to support "Israeli victory" (e.g. Kumaraswamy, Liebman) support the Egyptian strategic/political victory view in other places, call the Israeli victory "pyrrhic" , and/or argue from the position that they are dissenting from the mainstream view that the war was a stalemate or Egyptian strategic victory. "Egyptian revisionism" does not enter into it. The "Egyptian strategic victory" sources, the majority, are not Egyptian, and many were published soon after the war. Whetten's book The Canal War, published in 1974, assesses it as an Egyptian and Syrian political victory: p.283, on their prewar military objectives "Militarily, Syria failed and Egypt partially failed. Politically, however, both Arab states were successful." Dupuy's says the same. General histories like Khouri's Arab-Israeli Dilemma, Morris's Righteous Victims and Shlaim's Iron Wall don't accord with a nonexistent consensus of Israeli victory. e.g. Morris, p.441: "Sadat's gamble, to achieve a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations through the application of shock treatment, had paid off. What Israel had been unwilling to contemplate in 1971 ... it acceded to after the Yom Kippur war." Homum is absolutely right. Call it disputed in the box, and work on getting a good text that is pointed to from the box.John Z (talk) 04:10, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

I would go with "See aftermath" over "Disputed" but see and agree that it might be a good solution. I lean that way since "too complex" might be more accurate than "disputed" and "disputed" might cause more edit warring.Cptnono (talk) 04:26, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

Yes. You're right, "See Aftermath" is probably better. I would be happy with either.John Z (talk) 05:46, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

Agreed, probably an effective solution. ElUmmah (talk) 18:02, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

Okay as I see it from the body of sources, militarily, you've got to hand it to Israel. The issue gets murkier when adding the political component. Some sources led by Dupuy argue that politically, Egypt came out ahead while others, including Johnson & Tierney and Luttwak don't see it that way. Rabinovich argues that both sides, Egypt as well as Israel, gained politically. So perhaps as a solution we could write:

• Israel tactical victory
• Political gains for Egypt and Israel
• See "Aftermath" (with a link to that section)

On another issue, ElUmmah expressed concern over the fact that Garwych's stats were omitted from the infobox and he was correct. I have now included Garwych's stats in the infobox and will re-work the "casualty" section so that it remains consistent with the information provided in the infobox.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:39, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

It's an improvement, but I still think there should be some reference to Egyptian strategic successes. I'm not denying that Israel achieved tactical gains on both fronts, nor that they achieved political gains (I do tend to think Egypt gained more, but that in itself is disputed). However, Egypt did achieve strategic successes which is acknowledged by many historians (e.g. surprising Israel, capturing and holding the east bank of the canal, the bab el mandab blockade), which fulfilled Egypt's strategic objectives and affected the long-term outcome. ElUmmah (talk) 20:02, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

Okay progress. I think there might be a light at the end of the tunnel. Egypt gained politically because a measure of Arab pride was restored and Sadat became immensely popular in Egypt as a result. She gained strategically because she was able to acquire the Sinai through the negotiation process, a process that was jump-started by the war. Israel gained politically because it achieved peace with its most formidable opponent and in so doing, opened doors to relations with other Arab countries including Jordan. Moreover, it was able to achieve peace without conceding on other disputed territories. It gained strategically because its security situation improved drastically with the advent of peace. In light of that, perhaps the following would be suitable:

• Israel tactical victory
• Political & strategic gains for Egypt and Israel
• See "Aftermath" (with a link to that section)

On another note, I have re-worked the casualty section to include Garwych's stats so that it now conforms to the infobox.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 20:02, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

I can live with that :). Let's put it in the infobox and if anyone has any suggestions they can bring it up here. Now we have to work on the results section so that it reflects the infobox. Respectfully, ElUmmah (talk) 21:45, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

I'd like to applaud the recent outbreak of cooperation (and hope that mentioning it doesn't break the spell). Kudos to those participating. (Hohum ^@) 20:45, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

Okay, I made the edit reflecting above-discussed compromise to the long-standing debate. Hopefully, the recent edits that I made to the infobox and casualty sections will placate some of the concerns expressed by various well-informed and well-intentioned editors.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 15:26, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

Egyptian tank strength

Egyptian tank strength as noted in the infobox seems vastly understated and inconsistent with information in the body text. All sources including Garwych agree that Egypt lost 1,100 tanks during the war. The infobox states that she started the war with 1,700. Under the Arab re-supply section Hammad is quoted as stating that Egypt was not re-supplied with tanks. If that's the case, Egypt was left with 600 tanks by war's end (1,700-1,100 = 600). Yet there's a claim in the body text that Egyptian tank strength on the east bank at the time of ceasefire was 700. This amounts to a discrepancy of negative 100 tanks. it would also mean that Egypt had no tanks on the west bank. This makes absolutely no sense and demonstrates the absurdity and inconsistency of Egyptian sources--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 00:39, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

I've looked, but can't see a mention of 700 Egyptian tanks at the ceasefire in the current version of the page, or versions before recent edits. If you feel certain sources are "absurd" and don't want them to be used, you will either need to gain consensus here, or have them vetted at WP:RSN. (Hohum ^@) 19:19, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

The article says 720 tanks, though I don't see the point of this argument. Hammad states that the Egyptians received no tanks in the Soviet re-supply effort. However, looking at JJG's edit which consisted of putting practically the entire Arab world (as well as Cuba, Pakistan and North Korea) on Egypt's side, it's evident that Egypt received much more than just Soviet help, which is more than enough to account for the noted discrepancy.ElUmmah (talk) 21:39, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

"However, looking at JJG's edit which consisted of putting practically the entire Arab world (as well as Cuba, Pakistan and North Korea) on Egypt's side, it's evident that Egypt received much more than just Soviet help, which is more than enough to account for the noted discrepancy."

ElUmmah, that's original research. You've got to find a way so that your numbers jive with your sources. Otherwise, you have to change your sources.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 23:21, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

True, alright I'll get on that as soon as possible. What do you propose we do in the meantime? ElUmmah (talk) 23:45, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

eh leave it for now. I'll make some of the changes u proposed above but tomorrow, if its okay.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 23:56, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

That's fine, talk to you tomorrow then :) ElUmmah (talk) 00:28, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

This argument is useless because you have a variety of sources being used for the many figures: one for the pre-war strength, a few for the number of tanks lost (which are controversial, O'Ballance gives a figure smaller than that), and a completely different source for the post-war strength. We can't try to explain the discrepancy ourselves because that would be OR. Obviously it all arises from a dispute on the estimate of Egyptian losses during the war. --Sherif9282 (talk) 08:22, 14 May 2010 (UTC)

FA and EL

External links came up in the mention of a Featured Article Review. There are so many I am just removing them all. They are all shown below so that appropriate ones can be added in. Keep in mind that an inline citation will do if it can be used as a reference. For everything else, make sure that WP:EL is followed.Cptnono (talk) 22:43, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs—The Jarring initiative and the response
• Jerusalem Post's—Yom Kippur War: Shattered Heights
• Jewish Agency for Israel's Timeline of Israeli history
• Jewish Education Dept., JAFI, Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War of 1973
• Put an end to Israeli aggression, an article printed in the Pravda newspaper on October 12, 1973 (translation at CNN)
• A detailed account of 1973 October War (Yom Kippur War) – From Ariel Sharon's Biography
• The October War national park, Cairo
• The Bitter Blow - Israeli-Arab Relations after the wars
• The October War, Al Ahram supplement
• The October War and US Policy—Provided by the National Security Archive.
• Lessons of the October War, Ahmad Faruqui
• A Cry From The Bunkers Recordings by IDF soldier Avi Yaffe from inside the IDF position, under attack at the outbreak of the war
• The reasons for the war by Major Ebrahim Al-Jowder Bahrain Armed Forces
• The 1973 October War: The Egyptian Perspective—Provided By Major J.C. Moulton, United States Air Force.
• The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns— Provided by Major Michael C. Jordan, United States Marine Corps.
• Operation Valiant: Turning of the Tide in the Sinai 1973 Arab-Israeli War by Major Richard L. Owen, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College
• Kissinger's Yom Kippur oil shock – Reasons for outbreak of war according to F.William Engdahl.
• Yom Kippur War: Sacrificial Stand in the Golan Heights – by Gary Rashba, Military History Magainze, October 1998 issue.
• Fundamental surprise, by Dr. Zvi Lanir, Tel Aviv University
• Radio program – 6:36 min from radio program about the war. The program includes authentic recordings of the first moments of the war.
• "Another Round in the War of Words" Time Monday, Oct. 29, 1973. Separate interviews, same questions, with the Foreign ministers of Israel and Egypt

Piccirili

I have some serious reservations on citing Major Steven Piccirili in this article. He is neither an author, historian or academic. He has never published any notable books. His article or report on the Yom Kippur War has never been subjected to any form of peer review. And aside from “GlobalSecurity,” it has never been published or recited in any RS. I did a Google search on this chap and found nothing of note. Can anyone enlighten me as to why we should consider such an obscure writer be an RS? Can anyone please explain why the opinions of a “no name” like Piccirili should be given equal weight to the likes of Dupuy, Herzog, Pollack, Garwych, Rabinovich and the Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, just to name a few? Moreover, Piccirili's conclusions are derived directly from Dupuy's, quoting him word for word in his report and we already have Dupuy's opinion noted in the aftermath section. Having Piccrili quoted alongside Dupuy is redundant. Additionally, Piccirili borrows heavily from Badri, universally recognized as an unreliable source. The Journal of Military History criticized Badri's book as being "totally biased in its approach, and should be avoided by anyone seeking a general history of the war." (Review: The Arab-Israeli War of Words: Recent Books Reviewed, Military Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp. 200–202, at p. 201). And military historian Simon Dunstan called Badri's book a "mere rhetoric." Reliance on tainted sources necessarily corrupts the "report." But my latter two objections are secondary concerns. My main concern is that this fella, for the reasons noted, is essentially a nobody and should not be considered an RS. His inclusion is to the article's detriment. Incidentally, I feel the same way about Major Richard Owen (also cited as a source along side Piccirili) who feels that Israel emerged victorious. Both of these "majors" should be removed.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 05:52, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

According to this, the Piccirilli report was originaly published by the Marine Corps University Command and Staff College, which surely is an RS? Has Badri been accepted as being unreliable by consensus on wikipedia somewhere? (Hohum ^@) 13:47, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

As for the latter comment concerning Badri, he has not been vetted at RSN. I just made a point by stating that his work has been deemed by some who are in the field to be sub-par and unreliable. Just by way of illustration, his book refers to a fictitious naval engagement between Israeli and Egyptian Navies that resulted in the sinking of four INS naval vessels. Not one source subscribes to this fantasy. But the fact that Piccirili relies to a large extent on Badri was not my main point. All the sources cited in our wiki Yom Kippur War article cross reference each others works. For example, Dupuy cites Herzog and Herzog cites Hammad who cites Adan and so on and so forth. Of course, each cited author has his own POV and brings a unique perspective but all are recognized authorities and all reference each other in their respective publications. However, not one of these authors, not Liebman, not Herzog, not Shazly, not Hammad, not Garwych, not Rabinovich, etc…, reference Piccirili (or Owen for that matter). He is cited nowhere and unlike the others; his “work” has not undergone serious peer review. Accordingly, he should be precluded.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:31, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

Reliability can stem from who deems it fit to publish a work. In this case the Marine Corps University Command and Staff College - who seem unlikely, as a body, to support a pro Egyptian bias, nor poor quality. A writer doesn't have to be prolific to be reliable.

Seperately: If Badri truly is unreliable, it may be worth taking it to RSN, or the military history wikiproject to gain consensus. (Hohum ^@) 23:52, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

This problem of what is reliable and what not is a recurring and chronic problem in wp. The formal requirements are very low; any newspaper article or book piblished by an established publisher is a RS (unless there is an established consensus to the contrary regarding a specific source). However many communities find it to be too broad and establish their own rules that rank sources related to a group of topics. Maybe some ranking like this can be done for this long article. Would be nicer if it was for a group of articles or a project, but this may be impractical. - BorisG (talk) 04:48, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

Back on the specific topic, Marine Corps University Command and Staff College is just a college. I don't consider a college or university publication to be that reliable, even if it has such a grand name. Pretty close to self-publishing. - BorisG (talk) 04:54, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

It's hardly just "a" college. It's the Command and Staff College of the USMC University, which is a center of expertise in Military History, which seems somewhat specialised and relevant to an article on a war. Perhaps we should also exclude the Physics departments of universities in article about Physics? (Hohum ^@) 20:30, 17 May 2010 (UTC)

egyptian victory

wikipedia biasand to israel.

This article mainly focused on surrounding of 3rd egyptian army and claimed that Israel won the war and ignored the fact that the Egyptian army of the first and the second Egyptian army were able to destroy the israeli troops which surrounded the 3rd egyptian army. Why did not the article speak about the israeli about the losses of israeli army when it tried to enter the city of suez Why does the article talk briefly about destroying of the Bar Lev Line, despite the strength of this line? Why does the article talk briefly about crossing of suez canal by egyptian army despite of napalm existence Why did not speak about the destruction of 95% of Israeli targets in the egyptian air attack the article ignored the egyptian achievements und focused on the israeli ones —Preceding unsigned comment added by Abraam 2 (talk • contribs) 02:44, 19 May 2010 (UTC)

The Bar-Lev Line

Hello everybody. I'm back after a long absence. With new sourced stuff. I'm strongly opposing the argument that the Suez Canal was heavily fortified. In fact I would prefer the term lightly fortified, or poorly guarded.

According to Haber & Schiff p 80, 81, 82, 83
The Israelis started to build the Bar-Lev line, at first, for protection from artillery, and not for countering Egyptian crossings. On 15/07/1967 the UN observers were to arrive and many places along the canal were unguarded. The Israelis decided to deploy forces across the canal. The Egyptian army made preparation so the Israelis decided to fortify their positions as quick as possible. The first fortifications were made of outposts located on the water line. Each outpost was surrounded by sand ramparts, and had positions in front of all directions. The posts were lightly protected. Between the outposts mine were laid.
Following an Egyptian bombardment, it was decided to reinforce the bunkers with the tracks of the railroad linking Kantara to El-Arish. During the works there were bombardments and it was later been decided to build a massive fortified line across the canal. The architect of the line was chosen to be Abraham Adan, then a brigadier. The decision was to build strong-points across the canal with intervals of 10 km between them. There were some intervals of up to 15 km. On each strong point there was to be no more than a platoon. On places were Egyptian crossing is more possible, many strong-points would be built next to each other. The strong points were to observe and in case of Egyptian crossing attempts, to stop it together with mobile reinforcements.
In Fort "Budapest" stationary Stalin tanks would be used in dug in positions. In each strong point there was a shelter for resting, kitchen, toilet and systems of electricity, water and sewage. Sand ramps were built along the canal for hiding Israeli patrols. The supporters of strong-points were Adan, Gavish, and Bar-Lev. The stationary positions could counter Egyptian crossings. If an Egyptian small force would cross, and dug in, it would be hard for the Israelis to recapture the land.
This scenario can repeat itself over and over. Unlike mobile forces they are immune to ambush. Generals Tal and Sharon opposed the stationary defense. Sharon claimed that the supply convoys to the strong points are vulnerable. Tal claimed that the strong points can't counter Egyptian crossing because of the large intervals between them. He also claimed that the strong point is an inefficient combat system and it is no more than a shelter. Both claimed that heavy Egyptian artillery fire can neutralize the strong points ability to use fire against Egyptian crossing. Following the war of attrition Sharon received approval to close to dilute part of the double strong points.
14 strong points were closed. Albert Mendler opposed this. Some of the strong points were closed by barbed wire and earth. Others became observation post during day time. Sharon suggested converting some of the strong points into tank position but this didn't take place. Meanwhile, the Egyptians built a sand ramp on the western bank, higher than the eastern one. This exposed many areas on the eastern bank to fire and observation from the west. Shmuel Gonen suggested removing the eastern sand ramp. He claimed that it actually disturb fighting against a possible Egyptian crossing. Later when he became head of the southern command, he had plans to build triangle like sand ramps behind the strong points. This would allow the tanks to hit the crossing Egyptians, to support the strong points, and to be protected from Egyptian fire from the higher western sand ramp. The war broke out before he had time to do this.
Neither of the defensive concepts was implemented on 06/10/1973 14:00. The strong points were manned by insufficient troops who lacked sufficient training and weaponry. There was lack of artillery, the tanks were not in position in time, and the second defense line was also insufficiently garrisoned. When the Egyptian crossing began, southern command was pondering whether to evacuate the strong points or to reinforce them with tanks. Only on 07/10 it was decided to abandon the Bar-Lev line. The forts from north to south were: Traklin, Budapest, Orkal, Lachtzanit, Drora, Ktuba, Milano, Mifreket, Hizayon, Purkan, Matzmed, Lakekan, Botzer, Lituf, Maftseach, Nisan, Masrek, Egrofit.

According to Haber & Schiff p. 274 - 275
30 strong points (each one of them called Maoz in Hebrew) were established on the shores of the Suez Canal following the 6 day war. Abraham Adan was the one who planned them. He was inspired by an Israeli built fort from 1948. Each strong point was made of a square like perimetric sand rampart. Its total length was 400 meters. Within the strong point there was a yard for logistic activity. The entrance was in the rear.
It was possible to place there a tank, with its gun directed toward the exit, or a halftrack. Additional 200 meters of connecting trenches were built. The fences were thickened with coiled barbed wire and mines. On the corners there were firing positions and shelters next to them. The firing positions and the shelters next to them were built from metal scraps captured in the Sinai desert. Their reinforcements were built from the disassembled railroad track.
On the two western positions, the directions toward the canal were sealed. As I understand, it means that only diagonal firing toward the canal was possible. Frontal firing toward the canal was possible from the connecting trenches built in the sand ramparts. Firing up to 1,200 meter was possible with medium machine guns. Later, an 81 mm mortar position was built within the yard, an AA gun position was built in one of the corners, in some bunkers the reinforcing railroad tracks were replaced by rocks and one or two observation positions were built toward the front. The frontal observation post was to be manned by a single soldier even in case of shelling, while the rest were to take cover inside the bunkers.
Within the yard there was a semi open bunker for a generator, a bunker for ammunition, a bunker for fuel, a dining room and a toilet. In some strong points, positions for tanks were built next to the sand rampart. The upgraded strong points were better protected. There were only few cases of penetration of 152 mm shells with delay fuses. The heavy weight of the reinforcements caused the collapsing of some bunkers, but usually, they sustained the Egyptian bombardments.
Each strong point was to cover about two kilometers along the water line by fire and observation. It was expected that the strong points would hold on until tank reinforcements would arrive. Generally, in each strong point there were to be 25-30 men, 2 machine guns in the front, 3 machine guns in the rear, 3 52 mm mortars and automatic rifles. Anti-tank weaponry was very little - one Bazooka and two rifle grenades adapter. Optional weapons were a 20 mm gun and an 81 mm mortar.
Between 01/03/1969 and 07/08/1970 there were 26 Egyptian raids in the Sinai desert. 9 of these were against the strong points. Inside the strong points, Israel suffered 3 dead and 5 wounded. The Egyptian suffered 33 dead and dozens of wounded. The supporter of the strong points was Bar-Lev. The opponents were Sharon and Tal. On 06/10/73 only 16 strong points were occupied. "Budapest" was the only fully manned strong point. 7 were evacuated, one survived and the rest were captured, by the Egyptians.

According to Haber & Schiff p 418-419
A second line of forts was established behind the strong points line. Each fort was called "Taoz". It was build during Sharon service as chief of the southern command and according to his suggestion. Sharon was aware of the possibility that Israel won't have air superiority, and the holding of the first line will be hard. The second line will replace it and will be out of the range of Egyptian small arms and mortars. This concept was fitting with the suggestion made in the same time by Moshe Dayan and Anuar Sadat: Israel will withdraw from the east bank and Egypt will open the canal for sailing. The line was built along the artillery road, some 8-12 km from the canal, and was made of 11 forts.
The strongholds were built on the eastern slopes of hills, for hiding them from Egyptian observations and giving them protection from artillery fire. In each strong hold there were two large bunkers, 4 AA positions, trenches for vehicles and connection trenches that reached dual riflemen positions. In these forts there were to park companies of tanks. The tanks were to move rapidly in case of Egyptian crossing or to reach the strong points in case of Egyptian raids. In case of alert, there were to be between 1 to 2 infantry platoons in each stronghold. Another mission was to establish on the peak of these forts long range observation posts toward the canal and use advanced binoculars.
On the out break of the war there was no Infantry in the strongholds and in part of them there were not even tanks. When the tanks left the strongholds and moved toward the water line, most of the strongholds were left unmanned.

This file describes some of what was on the Sinai Peninsula on 06/10/1973 14:00.
Manned strong points in black, unmanned strong points in red, rear strong holds in orange. Forts on the Suez Canal (From the north-east to south) were:
Traklin, Budapest, Orkal, Lachtzanit, Drora, Ktuba, Milano, Mifreket, Hizayon, Purkan, Noah (mistakenly marked on the western bank), Matzmed, Lakekan, Botzer, Lituf, Maftseach, Nisan, Masrek, Egrofit, Chelbon. Strong holds (from north to south):
Yoram, Martef, Maror, Havraga, Nachal, Televizia, Kishuf, Churba, Mitsva, Notsa, Tsidar.
Megaidler (talk) 20:49, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

I would agree. The postion was manned by an understrength reserve brigade and when Sharon was OC southern command, he actually closed down three forts. Also, at the time of Badr, there were only three tanks at the Canal itself with an understrength division in the rear.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 20:55, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

Even undermanned, the Bar-Lev line wasn't designed to completely repel an Egyptian invasion, it was meant to slow them down enough for the reserves to be called up and the air force to come into action and repel the assault. The line itself was considered heavily fortified. ElUmmah (talk) 15:40, 22 May 2010 (UTC)

Sources

But many Egyptian editors continue to suspects that the Israeli authorities tell their people such lies about this war, more than 30 years after it was over. It is fascinating that a honey moon has emerged between the least expectable editors - JJG and ElUmmah. So cute. Miracles can happen, even in wiki.
However, I'm still persisting that my arguments should be accepted. Sorry to break the consensus you have reached. After a long period I have repeatedly requested the Egyptian nationalist editors to quote the sources they are relying on, I have found it is better to do it by myself. Twice I went to library of the Tel-Aviv University, which is not the place I study. I have scanned many pages from many books: Dupuy, O'balance, Herzog, Gawrych and Wagner & Cordesman. I have scanned pages from books in Hebrew as well: Oren, Gordon, and Bergman & Meltzer. I have extracted the text were it's possible. SimpleOCR is a great program.

• O'Ballance, Edgar (1996) [1978]. No Victor, No Vanquished: the Yom Kippur War. Presidio Press. p. 384. ISBN 978-0891416159. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  

Elchanan Oren was a Lt. Colonel in the Israeli army and he wrote the official research of this war in 1987. On December 2004, an updated version was published. The head of the IDF history department by then was Dr. Shaul Shai, a retired Colonel. He was assisted by Dr. Shimon Golan. This book is a non-classified version of the research. It is an internal document of the IDF and it is not widely published.
Dr. Shmuel Gordon was an F-4 pilot during that war and later he became Colonel. Now he is an independent researcher of national security issues. On 2008 he published the book - Thirty Hours in October, discussing mainly about the Israeli AF during the first 30 hours of the war. There is no ISBN.

• Gordon, Shmuel (2008). Thirty Hours in October (in Hebrew). Ma'ariv Book Guild. p. 604.
  

The Journalists Ronen Bergman Gil Meltzer published their book on 2003. They have criticized the continued censorship of material and researches of this war by the Israeli authorities. They were highly critical against Ariel Sharon. Ronen Bergman is a controversial persona he is suspecting of coordinating testimonies with Eli Zeira regarding Ashraf Marwan. See this article. Throughout the war, Gonen used to record his conversations. Amir Porat was a radio operator and Itzhak Rubinshtein was a radio technician. They stole the recordings, kept them in their homes and gave them to Yedioth Ahronoth and Maariv newspapers after almost 30 years. Rubinshtein gave his recordings to Bergman & Meltzer from Yedioth. This material is interesting. It reveals that the first cease fire of 22/20 was violated by Israel. The Israelis initiated provocations to make the cease fire collapse, so they would be able to continue their offensive.

• Bergman, Ronen; Meltzer, Gil (2003). Yom Kippur War – Moment of Truth (in Hebrew). P.O.B. 53494, Tel-Aviv, 61534 Israel: Miskal - Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books. ISBN 965-511-597-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  

Soon, I will quote these sources. Megaidler (talk) 18:02, 22 May 2010 (UTC)