Talk:Operation Market Garden

NPOV and OR

I know this subject generates a lot of passion. But at the moment – and without taking a position on who, if anyone, is right – the article and particularly the Debate on Allied strategy and tactics is a mess of PoV statements and original research, some sourced and some not. To maintain NPOV are we not supposed to give the source of opinions?

For example, the section below is not sourced and gives a PoV ("lack of guts") without attributing it (except vaguely to "both the British 1st Airborne and the U.S. 82nd Airborne") and the unsourced "Hypothetically" suggests OR as well:

"Hypothetically, had XXX Corps pushed north, they might have arrived at the south end and secured it (had the Guards Armoured sent more than five Sherman tanks across the bridge and had they not been later stopped by the German position at Ressen), leaving the way open for another crossing to the north at some other point. There was the smaller possibility of arriving with Frost's force intact. This perceived "lack of guts" caused some bitterness at the time among members of both the British 1st Airborne and the U.S. 82nd Airborne. As it was, XXX Corps did not resume the drive to Arnhem that night, but rather eighteen hours later."

My point is not whether this is correct or not - it's that it's not NPOV and it's OR.

I'm unsure how to proceed, as I don't want to delete large chunks of the article without discussion, given the sensitivity.

--Shimbo (talk) 13:34, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

The debate exists on whether this operation was a success or not, as most of these talk discussions attest. The typical measure of success is against the strategy set beforehand. Tactics involve who did what, and how much or how little, which is important for assigning blame. These debates started during the operation, quickly gained momentum afterwards, and remain in the present. So, yes, the section is petty, but the ongoing debate centers on these issues, petty or not. The section can certainly be improved, but it's stable for the moment. If removed, I suspect it will restart a lot of POV edits. Handle with care. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 01:05, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

I don't think that really addresses the point. Yes of course there has been much debate for many years over the blame for the failure of Market Garden, but Wikipedia is not a forum for debate. Wikipedia aspires to be NPOV and to only have reliably sourced information. Many reliable sources have participated in the debate and could be referenced, but aren't. Wikipedia is not supposed to present Wikipedian's opinion as fact, nor is it supposed to contain original research. This article includes both currently, IMO. My question is how to resolve that, which leaving the POV and OR in will not do. --Shimbo (talk) 11:42, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

I agree that how to resolve this is a question; my point is I don't know how. Previous attempts at bringing sources for this (here and related articles) were beaten back with accusations of NPOV and other drama. At least the article is not currently a battlegound. Thus my only advice: precede with care. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 22:29, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Anything that is not sourced can be removed, and cannot be restored without a proper reference. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:18, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Disadvantages of this article

What were the goals of this military operation? This remains unclear. Only the results of the operation are described. This is not enough to understand the historical event. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.155.64.26 (talk) 05:28, 11 February 2020 (UTC)

Meanwhile, the goals of this military operation were very ambitious. In fact, the goal was to "end the war by Christmas", taking control of the main part of Germany and its capital Berlin. thus, it had a political goal-to ensure the political dominance of the United States and Britain in the post-war world. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.155.64.26 (talk) 05:41, 11 February 2020 (UTC)

Actually the point of Market Garden was not for XXX corps to get across the Rhine and then charge for Berlin (which is obviously impossible - it's a single armoured corps) but for 21st Army Group as a whole be in a position (across the Lower Rhine) to form the northern arm of a pincer movement to encircle the Ruhr, cutting off the main armament producing area of Germany - something that eventually happened (see Ruhr Pocket). Still an ambitious goal, but not as crazy as a single corps charging for Berlin. --Shimbo (talk) 11:54, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Wow. It is not necessary to bring the opponent's idea to the point of absurdity. Operation "MG" was aimed at solving large problems. The crossing of the river Rhine was only stage 1. I insist that the goals were set very significant. Today we know the results. But what did they know then in September 1944? Successfully made the landing and in 2 months liberated France and went half the way to Berlin. Why not set a goal to pass this second half in 2 months? To do this, you need to cross the river Rhine. This is where the operation "MG" comes from. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 12:09, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

I can quote Montgomery's memoirs (translated from Russian): I will End this Chapter with another quote about the battle of Arnhem from Chester Wilmot's book ("the Battle for Europe", p. 528). Here's what he wrote:

"Unfortunately, the two main weaknesses of the allied command-the British caution about losses and the persistent reluctance of the Americans to concentrate their forces [315] - had a detrimental effect on the course of the operation, which was and could be a decisive blow in the battle in the West. There was no time to think about the price or the prestige of competing commanders. What was at stake was nothing less than the possibility of occupying the Ruhr and ending the war quickly, with all the consequences that followed for the future of Europe."

From my — biased-point of view, if the operation had received proper support from the very beginning, if we had received the air and ground forces and resources necessary to carry it out, it would have been successful, despite my mistakes, or bad weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer corps in the Arnhem area. I remain an unrepentant supporter of Market garden".

(Россиянин2019) and 93.81.221.43 (talk) 19:55, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Goal of the operation

Utilizing official histories from top down to corps level:

• Ellis, Victory in the West Vol. II, p. 49: "...as stated in Field-Marshal Montgomery's directive issued three days before..." the operation's immediate goals were to "secure crossings over the Rhine and Mass in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave" to allow the Second Army "to establish itself in strength on a line between Zwolle (on the Zuider zee) and Arnhem, facing east with deep bridgeheads east of the Ijssel river." In the grand scheme of things "It was to be the beginning of operations with the United States First Army designed to isolate and surround the Ruhr."

A diagram on the previous page shows the main thrust up along Hell's Highway, with the main elements of Second Army intending to drive towards Hamm and meet up with an American thrust (coming from between Cologne and Bonn) to the south. Additional advances would be made by Second Army towards the River Ems to establish a bridgehead near Osnabruck. First Canadian Army would move to clear Second Army's flank to at least the Amsterdam area.

• MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 6: "Allied strategy, as expressed in pre-DDay planning ... looked toward the ultimate objective of Berlin; but on the way the Allies wanted an economic objective, which ... "would rapidly starve Germany of the means to continue the war." This was the Ruhr industrial area, the loss of which, together with Belgium and Holland, would deprive Germany of 65 percent of its -production of crude steel and 56 percent of its coal. The widespread deployment of the Allied armies on 11 September reflected General Eisenhower's pre-D-Day decision to go after the Ruhr and Berlin on a broad front."

p. 120: "...MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives: to get Allied troops across the Rhine and to capture the Ruhr. Three major advantages were expected to accrue: ( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland; (2) outflanking the West Wall, and (3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain". MacDonald does not appear to include a southern thrust, but does talk in-depth about First and Third Armies advances towards the West Wall with the overall goal of capturing the Ruhr.

• Randel, A short history of 30 Corps, p. 31: "...30 Corps... learned of the ambitious attempt to be made to thrust northwards to the Zuider Zee [later referred to as the Zuider Zee crossings]...hereby cutting off communications between Germany and the Low Countries."
• Gill/Groves, Club Route in Europe: 30 Corps, p. 69: "...another spectacular dash, this time Northwards into Holland, and it was hoped that this next operation would carry us right through to the Zuider Zee, thus allowing the Second Army to debouche into the North German Plain before winter set in, and cut off the Germans in Western Holland."
• Jackson, 8 Corps, p. 151: "The official intention … was "to place Second Army … astride the Rivers Maas, Waal and Neder Rijn on the general axis Grave-Nijmegen-Arnhem, and to dominate the country between the Rhine and the Zuyder Zee, thus cutting communication between German and Holland.""

p. 152: "8 Corps orders were to establish a bridgehead over the Escaut Canal near Lille St. Hubert, capture and dominate the area Leende and Weert, seize Helmond and over-run the surrounding area, then advance north-east in line with the general plan and as ordered by Second Army.

Hopefully this will help clear up the overall intention (get over the rivers and cripple Germany by capturing the Ruhr), and the sources are there to be cited in the article.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:25, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Yes, that's right. Operation "MG" was aimed at solving far-reaching goals. This is crossing the river Rhine, bypassing the fortified Siegfried line from the North, and capturing Dutch ports. Relying on supplies from these ports, it was possible to develop an offensive deep into Germany, covering the Ruhr and further up to the capital Berlin: "subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain". 178.155.64.26 (talk) 08:42, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

The Soviet command also thought about this version of events, how to rush to Berlin. Only later, when the advancing troops reached the Oder river. The Oder was the last big river on the way to Berlin from the East, and the distance is less than 60 km, not 400 km (from Rhine). And still Zhukov and Stalin did not give permission to go-ahead for a dash to Berlin in February 1945. After the war, General Chuikov also spoke a lot on this topic. He said that if they had given him permission, his 8th army in February 1945 would have broken through the front with one blow and stormed into Berlin and the war would have ended sooner. But it was not approved in 1945 or the 1960s. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 11:05, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Per the sources, a run for Berlin was not on the cards. Describing Berlin as the ultimate goal of Market Garden is not supported. Setting up for a subsequent drive into the North German Plain does not equal a full out narrow thrust advance. Moreover the British and American official histories are in agreement that, if successful, the next major operation would be against the Ruhr (an economic and military victory over a symbolic of political one).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:14, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

I agree that the word "Berlin" was not in the cards. 400 km is not 60 km. No one wanted to look like a fool if the operation failed. Like Hitler in 1941 with Moscow. But in the long term, this (movement to the capital) was. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.155.64.26 (talk) 13:00, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Let me remind you and everyone that the question of attacking Berlin was discussed later. Eisenhower himself writes directly about this in his memoirs, that he insisted that the military actions were aimed at encircling the German military group in the Ruhr. That is, the issue was discussed seriously. This is all British again, on Churchill's side. Churchill kept thinking about what would happen after the war, not about the war itself. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 13:07, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Q: "What were the goals of this military operation?"

A: Per the sources, to get over a series of river obstacles to facilitate later operations to clear the Netherlands, encircle the Ruhr, and eventually to advance further into Germany.

Anything beyond that is essentially unsupported conjecture (unless there is a reference) or off topic (i.e. grand strategy outside the realm of Market Garden, or British post war thinking). This isn't a forum. If you are looking for a more wide ranging discussion, you may want to visit a more appropriate place to do so.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:01, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Answer: I think you are overconfident in your opponent's accusations. I can cite sources that will be difficult to dispute. For example: "5. I consider that the best objective is Ruhr, and thence on to Berlin by the northern tour. On that route are the ports, and on that route we can use our sea power to the best advantages. On other routes we would merely contain as many German forces as we could". Having stated his argument, Field Marshal Montgomery noted alternatives... " 93.81.220.91 (talk) 18:54, 13 February 2020 (UTC) and (Россиянин2019)

Taking Pogue out of context does not distract from the fact that Berlin was not the ultimate goal of Market Garden.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:41, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Answer:

I don't impose my opinion. But, it is written Berlin. BERLIN. Not Cologne, Hamburg, or Bonn. BERLIN. You can think what you want, but Montgomery is talking about BERLIN.

Yet sources quoting his written directive issued prior to the launch of the operation do not state Berlin was an objective of Market Garden. Your flogging a dead horse at this point.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:38, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

Answer: I'm not trying to impose my opinion on you. But Montgomery was not sitting on a dead horse when he wrote about Berlin. About Berlin. BERLIN. Once again, B-E-R-L-I-N. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 12:07, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

With the exception of the American and British official histories, quoting Montgomery, stating Berlin was not the objective of Market Garden. With the exception of histories wrote by staff members of the Corps involved, also quoting Montgomery, all saying Berlin was not the objective of Market Garden. You have yet to bring a piece of evidence to table to state that it was i.e. your continued opinion that it was is a waste of time, without evidence to support it.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:27, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

Answer: Dear interlocutor, we have fully expressed our position. In any case, we began to understand each other's positions better. On this positive note, I propose to end this topic. :)93.81.221.139 (talk) 15:31, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

Россиянин2019 and 178.155.64.26 (talk) 04:48, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

Additional potentially useful information for the article

Casualties

Unsure how this would be best added, considering the table already in the article with extensive notes.

Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 199:

• Airborne Corps losses of 11,850 (968 killed, 2,640 wounded, and 8,242 missing) thru to 25 September:

Corp HQ: 4 killed and 8 missing

1st AB: 286 killed, 135 wounded, and 6,041 missing

1st Pol Bde: 47 killed, 158 wounded, and 173 missing

Brit Glider pilots: 59 killed, 35 wounded, and 644 missing

38 Group RAF: 6 killed, 23, wounded, and 184 missing

82nd AB: 215 killed, 790 wounded, and 427 missing

101st AB: 315 killed, 1,248 wounded, and 547 missing

US Glider pilots: 12 killed, 36 wounded, and 74 missing

IX US Troop: 16 killed, 204 wounded, and 82 missing.

• 30 Corps: 1,480 casualties, and 70 tanks
• 8 and 12 Corps: 3, 874 casualties, and 18 tanks
• 144 transport aircraft

Staff, 21st Army Group (already cited in article), full quote:

• "[point/paragraph] 125, The enemy lost 16,000 prisoners and 30 tanks and SP guns destroyed; 159 of his aircraft were also destroyed.

Total casualties of the Airborne Corps were 9,600, of which the Brit element was 6986 including 322 killed."

Outcome

Forest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 288: "A German analysis, captured by the Allies after the operation, concluded that the Al- lies’ “chief mistake was not to have landed the entire First British Airborne Division at once rather than over a period of 3 days and that a second airborne division was not dropped in the area west of Arnhem.”"

Allied "operational failure" vs Allied defeat

Calling the outcome of Market Garden (MG) an "Allied operational failure" in the English-language wikipedia seems weasel-worded and non-neutral. Let's call MG what it was: a German victory and an Allied defeat. Non-English wikipedias are explicit regarding the outcome of MG: German wikipedia, "German victory, Allied withdrawal;" French wikipedia, "Tactical German victory;" and Dutch wikipedia, "German victory." If German, French, and Dutch wikipedias call MG a German victory, perhaps the English wikipedia is wrong? The verdict of history ideally should be the same no matter what language it is written in.

The English wikipedia article on the Battle of Arnhem is clear. Arnhem was a "German victory." If Arnhem was a German victory, how could MG be only an "operational failure" rather than an Allied defeat and a German victory? As the Allies failed to establish a foothold across the Rhine River at Arnhem, Market Garden was a failure, e.g. it was a defeat.

Following are a couple of quotes I believe are relevant to the discussion:

• "DEFEAT...The costly British defeat at Arnhem meant that Operation 'Market Garden' had been a failure, but the Allies had at least established a lodgement area from which to launch a future offensive into the German Rhineland." Imperial War Museum, [1].

• • Comment: On the questions of what MG achieved: "Market Garden had won a sixty-five mile salient that crossed five major water barriers but led nowhere....Two committed U.S. airborne divisions...would be stuck helping the British hold this soggy landscape until November" (and suffer more casualties than they had during MG)....Market Garden proved 'an epic cock-up.'" Four-fifths of the Netherlands "would endure another nine months of occupation." Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, pp. 287-288 (a major 3 volume history of WWII).

• "MARKET-GARDEN had two main objectives: first, to get across the Rhine, and second, to capture or neutralize Germany’s industrial heartland, the Ruhr Valley. The strategic rationale behind Market Garden centered on providing an opening for large ground formations to get into and maneuver on the North German Plain." The Rand Organization (a major think tank for the US government and the Department of Defense). [2]

• • Comment: Given that none of these objectives were achieved, I would conclude that MG was a defeat for the allies, not an "operational failure" which is more of an excuse than a reason. Smallchief (talk) 12:21, 24 April 2020 (UTC)

I completely agree with you. My proposal is "Operational success of the United States-Britain, Strategic victory of Hitler's Germany". 178.155.64.26 (talk) 08:45, 19 June 2020 (UTC)