Talk:Smolensk air disaster

Duma condemns Katyn massacre

BBC are reporting that the Duma have condemned Stalin for the Katyn massacre. Putin reported to be planning a state visit to Poland. Not sure if this should be added to this article, or the related reactions article. Mjroots (talk) 14:16, 26 November 2010 (UTC)

It's only notable to this article if it's directly related to the accident. Let's wait and see what happens during the visit. I have no doubt the accident will be discussed, and we might be able to use what is said in the article. N419BH 17:43, 26 November 2010 (UTC)

The report

Apparently published around the 17 December. Poland has criticised certain aspect of the report (BBC). Mjroots (talk) 21:58, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Correction: Report has not been published yet. Mjroots (talk) 06:29, 1 January 2011 (UTC)

Final report is now out. English language version. Looks like pilot error was the cause. Mjroots (talk) 16:14, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

The report steers clear of identifying pilot error as the cause of the crash, although it accepts that there was nothing mechanically wrong with the plane.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 16:27, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm still reading it. Mjroots (talk) 16:32, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

Conclusion 3.130 says:"The crew members had valid medical licenses. No violations of the work and rest balances were detected. No evidence of alcohol or other prohibited substances was revealed by the coronary examination. The accident was not caused by the health or capacity of the crew members."--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 16:53, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

Looks like there's some photos which we should consider using in the article. Anyone know if MAK photos are copyrighted or on a Wikipedia compatible licence? Mjroots (talk) 17:04, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

Section 3.2 (Causes) reveals little that was not known since the preliminary report in June 2010. It states: "The Tu154-M aircraft was serviceable before the departure from Warsaw. No evidence of aircraft, engine or system failures before the collision was revealed. There was was no fire, explosion or in-flight destruction before the collision.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 18:04, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

Shorthand: The report says the immediate cause was the descent below MDA without adequate visual reference, thereby causing controlled flight into terrain (the term "Pilot error" has increasingly fallen into disuse by official investigations as it does not specify why an accident happened). We should probably change the infobox to agree with the official report in this regard. I will do that now (our own article on the topic quotes Boeing as saying Controlled Flight Into Terrain is often a form of pilot error). Obviously we are going to have to undertake a major rewriting of the article now that the official report has been released. I am reading the rest of the report. N419BH 19:27, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

So, who's up for getting this to GA (and possibly FA) standards? I suggest we do the work in a sandbox to avoid disruption to the article. I haven't read the report yet, but probably will this evening. wackywace 19:33, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

What is interesting is how the report avoids making an outright statement that the cause was pilot error. How could the cause be summarised in the infobox?--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 19:38, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

"Pilot Error" really isn't used much in official investigations anymore because it doesn't say why something happened. The media still uses it a lot but official report do not. Example: two airplanes collided when they could see each other. That's pilot error, but the cause of the accident is the failure of the pilots to see and avoid each other. In this case Russia has found a large number of causes leading up to the accident itself (pressure placed upon the pilots, bad weather, terrain features, etc). The accident itself though is summarized nicely by Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT): where a perfectly good airplane is accidently flown by a properly trained crew into the ground. The accident report states CFIT was the end result on page 182. I have already placed this as the cause in the infobox, although obviously an entire section of the article will have to delve into the root causes of the accident. CFIT though is a good generalization for what happened. I'll gladly help get this to FA status. We've got a lot of work to do... N419BH 19:47, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

A lot of work indeed... Would it be better to start again in a sandbox with just the infobox, since a lot of things in the article are completely unrelated to the actual accident. wackywace 19:51, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

Wackywace, for licensing reasons, that would not be a good idea. We need to continue working on/with the existing article. Mjroots (talk) 07:36, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

Primary cause was pilot error/CFIT. Secondary causes were lack of experience, lack of CRM, failure to maintain a sterile cockpit, poor planning and poor training. Mjroots (talk) 21:39, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

The Fog

An IP editor has twice added info on a Polish documentary whose title translates at "The Fog". The addition has been reverted twice.

It may well be appropriate to record that the documentary was made and aired on Polish Television. However, it should be understood that any claims as to the causes of the accident cannot be sourced from the documentary, particularly in light of the official report that was published today. Mjroots (talk) 18:05, 12 January 2011 (UTC)

Polish Television is not impartial and it cannot be trusted as a source automatically in this matter(see example). 99.236.14.72 (talk) 15:54, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm not saying it is impartial. What I'm saying is that it may be appropriate to mention that the programm was aired (subject to consensus for this). Mjroots (talk) 18:09, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

Tbilisi incident

The pilot and co-pilot on this flight were the co-pilot and navigator on the flight carrying Lech Kaczyński and the presidents of Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which LK ordered to fly to Tbilisi and the pilot refused to for safety related reasons. Said pilot was cleared at court-martial, but never flew an aircraft carrying LK again.

I think we should add details of this incident as it provides evidence of pressure on the flight crew to land at Smolensk and not to divert elsewhere - this is covered in the Final report issued yesterday. Mjroots (talk) 07:33, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

Pilot was not courtmartialed, he was given a decoration by the Minister of Defence for the correct decision not to land at Tbilisi. There was some criticism of the pilot in the pro-Kaczynski press, plus an accusation submitted to a prosecutor by an MP from Kaczynski's party but rejected out of hand as spurious. That was some form of pressure, but nowhere near a court-martial. Where do such stupid inaccuracies arise, I wonder? This is all so easy to check. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 16:04, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

I may have misunderstood the Final Report. I believe a Court Martial was certainly considered, but it was ruled that the pilot was correct in his actions. Despite this, he was either removed from flying the President, or sacked according to other sources which we cannot use in the article. Mjroots (talk) 18:07, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

According to this interview with Pietruczuk (the pilot) in Gazeta Wyborcza he was not sacked and flew the president multiple times after the incident (link). Use Google Translate if needed. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 18:30, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

 Done And no, the guy wasn't sacked, but according to the accident report he DID NOT fly the president again. N419BH 08:49, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

In that case the report is wrong. This not surprising. Why should Russians be particularly knowledgeable about personnel decisions taken in the Polish military in 2008? I would rely on the interview by the most respected Polish newspaper with the pilot himself. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 14:55, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

It's worth noting that Protasiuk (the captain who died at Smolensk) was second pilot in the Tbilisi incident, and part of the crew that refused the president's direct order to land then. If defying Kaczynski would get you sacked or prevented from flying him again, then what was Protasiuk doing in the cockpit in 2010? Also, if Protasiuk was so psychologically weak that he bent to the president's pressure in 2010, how come he was able to stand up to the president in 2008? This theory seems to be full of holes. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 15:13, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Protasiuk was not the pilot in charge of the Tbilisi flight, he was only the co-pilot. Pietruczuk made the decision not to fly to Tbilisi, and he carried the can afterwards. Mjroots (talk) 16:03, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

BTW, what we can verify from reliable sources will be used in the article, even if it is not the truth. Mjroots (talk) 16:05, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

If getting a medal for your actions fits the definition of carrying the can (not to deny that Pietruczuk did face unpleasantness, and implications that he was a coward from some circles). Anyway, Gazeta Wyborcza is a reliable source, so if it quotes the interview with Pietruczuk where he states he flew the president again after Tbilisi incident, that seems quite credible to me. In another article it states that during Tbilisi flight Kaczynski tried to dismiss the Captain (Pietruczuk) and ordered Second Pilot (Protasiuk) to perform the landing, and he refused. link The details of what happened on the way to Tbilisi are actually not at all clear. All the more surprising that the Russian Final Report is so definite on that incident's impact on the Smolensk crash. As Poland refused to certify the report, I would be careful about unquestioningly accepting the report's findings on the internal dynamics of the Polish military in 2008. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 16:18, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Here is the definitive source. Article from the September 23, 2008 (link). Translation of the beginning:

President flown by pilot who files where he wants'

The pilot who refused to land in Tbilisi with Lech Kaczyński again sat behind the controls of a plane with the president on board. This time Grzegorz Pietruczuk flew Kaczynski to New York. ...

Article goes on to state that the numbers of trained crews flying the Tu-154 is limited (only 2 at that time) and for safety reasons it is impossible to exclude one of the pilots for flying, even if someone dislikes him.99.236.14.72 (talk) 16:30, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Thank you. I have a couple questions and need your help to answer them. Can you determine from your sources who the command pilot was on the April 7 flight? I have a sneaking suspicion (though as I am not fluent in Polish I cannot read your sources), that the command pilot on April 7 with the Prime Minister on board was Pietruczuk, and that he was removed from the April 10 flight specifically because the President was on board. I have not included this in the article as I do not have a reliable source for this. I will re-read the section of the accident report on the Tbilisi incident and see if I missed something. If possible, can you also determine how often Pietruczuk flew the President after the 2008 incident? If the sources note that Pietruczuk flew the President much less often after 2008 and the accident Captain (I am not naming him since he was found at fault for the accident and is obviously not here to defend himself) flew him much more, then this is pertinent information to the article. As it stands though the information that Pietruczuk did not fly the President after Tbilisi is reliably sourced to the Russian accident report. If the Russians made a mistake than by all means let's find a reliable source with the correct information. It's also possible that the original report in Russian is correct and the true meaning of their statements was lost in the translation to English (we are referencing the official English translation of the MAK report in the article). Our goal here is to get the article right. We need your help as I for one do not speak Russian or Polish (I'm one of those dumb monolingual Americans, and for that I apologize). N419BH 18:01, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

You guessed correctly, Pietruczuk was the captain on April 7 (link) on the flight to Smolensk, while Protasiuk was second pilot on that flight. I have not come across any source which discusses why that choice was made: both pilots were competent to fly. I don't have any information about how often Pietruczuk flew with the president - since there were usually only 2 qualified crews in the unit, I imagine it was quite often, given crew rest requirements. In the Polish media this is a non-issue. However, Kaczynski and Pietruczuk clearly had some level of dislike between them, at least in 2008, so I would not be surprised that in situations when both pilots were available to fly, Pietruczuk would be selected less often. Still, this is just speculation on my part. The English version of the report was released by the Russians and it is official, unless of course there was a screwup at some point, in which case an official correction should be issued. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 18:23, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Anyway, the main point is that the Russian report brings in the 2008 Tbilisi incident to demonstrate that the pilots on April 10 felt pressure, and were afraid to say no to Kaczynski. But the fact is that the crew which did say no in August 2008 on the way to Tbilisi suffered no apparent professional consequences at all: the captain remained in the unit and continued to fly, and even got a medal for his actions from the Minister of Defence. It could be argued that the Tbilisi incident made it more likely that the pilots of the unit would resist Kaczynski's pressure, since they did it once already without professional consequences. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 18:42, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

While that's possible, the final report comes to a different conclusion on page 126 of the English translation, specifically, "This event had a serious response. According to the available information the PIC who took that decision was later never included in the crews conducting flights with the President on board." This would seem to be borne out by the fact that Pietruczuk was Captain on April 7 and not April 10. Since the accident Captain was also present on the April 7 flight crew it is likely this was not the result of crew rest requirements. The report also notes that the accident Captain received his VIP flight Captain authorization on September 8, 2008, less than a month after the August 12, 2008 Tbilisi incident. I am beginning to wonder if Pietruczuk continued to fly the President only until the accident Captain was properly trained to do so. It seems as though Pietruczuk was usually the captain of PLF 101 flights with the accident Captain and First Officer serving as Pietruczuk's First Officer and Navigator, respectively. When the President was on board however, Pietruczuk was removed from the crew, his usual First Officer and Navigator became Captain and First Officer, and a different Navigator was then brought on board. Obviously this is pure conjecture on my part based on the sources I have read, but if this can be reliably sourced it is certainly pertinent to the article. N419BH 19:01, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Your speculation is interesting and I hope it will be fully addressed in the Polish report, because the Russian report does not provide any lengthy discussion of these matters besides one factually incorrect sentence. I hope we agree at this point that the statement "PIC who took that decision was later never included in the crews conducting flights with the President on board" in the Report is clearly not true. If the Russians in fact meant something else, I hope the clarification of that statement from official sources will be coming soon. If it doesn't, I will certainly conclude that there is not much concern about the factual accuracy of the report in the minds of its authors. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 19:15, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Me too. When the Polish report comes out we will certainly have to compare the two and make note of any major differences. This has happened in the past, EgyptAir Flight 990 for example, where Egypt and the United States came to VERY different conclusions concerning what happened (United States determined it was suicide by the Cruise First Officer, Egypt faulted the airplane). I am not expecting such a severe difference in findings from Poland; they have already agreed the pilot was at fault, but I expect them to come to different conclusions regarding psychological pressure and the role of ATC in the accident. If you can read Russian, could you look at the Russian version of the report and see if it says anything different from the statement already covered in English? One recurring translation problem I have noted is the report often states "...despite the crew not once being timely informed of the poor weather conditions." To native English speakers this implies that the crew was never notified of the poor weather. However, the crew obviously was, and as such I am guessing the proper translated meaning is "despite the crew more than once being timely informed of the poor weather conditions." It is possible that a translation problem is to blame here too, and that the original Russian states something along the lines of, "PIC who took that decision was later rarely included in the crews conducting flights with the President on board." If you can confirm this in either the original Russian report or the MAK's Polish translation, I will change the quote immediately. N419BH 19:39, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

All that looks like too much speculation at this point and rather far fetched. We could just as well add the related 2008 incident where Russian troops fired at the presidential convoy in Georgia .. or is it already somewhere in the article? Richiez (talk) 20:06, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

In the Russian report the sentence is:

Командир, принявший данное решение, впоследствии не включался в состав экипажей, выполнявших рейсы с Президентом на борту.

I believe it matches the English sentence in meaning, stating that: The captain, having taken this decision, was subsequently not included in the crews which conducted flights with the president on board. My Russian is rudimentary, so please correct me if I am wrong. If I am correct, both versions contain the same error. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 20:01, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Ehh, that meaning is slightly different in that it says "not included" as opposed to "never included". "Never" implies "not once EVER", while "not" can mean "usually not (but sometimes)". Such is the difficulty with translation... I would say the situation is therefore unclear based on the accident report alone, but since your previous article from September 2008 says the President had flown with this Captain after the incident, I think for now we should use the direct Russian translation, the September 2008 article, and see if we can find anything from a later date regarding the President's flight crew composition once the accident Captain was fully trained as a TU-154 VIP Captain. Also, what does the Polish translation say? Thanks so much for all your help! N419BH 20:19, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Both English and Russian versions of the report are official documents issued by MAK. They are meant to be equally authoritative. If the English version contains an error, that is an error by MAK and not by some translator not associated with MAK. There is no official Polish version of the report issued by MAK. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 20:25, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

I am very surprised that MAK would not issue a Polish translation considering the circumstances. Oh well. The official MAK English translation does state that the Russian language version is the authoritative document should there be any questions regarding meaning. I'll make the appropriate edits if they haven't been made already. N419BH 05:31, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Hi. As a native Russian speaker, I can suggest that both Russian and English versions are slightly ambiguous. The source Russian phrase (впоследствии не включался) neither says directly, "was afterwards never included", nor says "was afterwards sometimes not included". Depending on the context, both meanings could be easily found in the phrase. I am almost certain that the original Russian writer has not paid much attention to this ambiguity, and we should instead look for more credible sources. A grammatically disputable, but somewhat adequate translation could be, "has been not included" in the sense that it has certainly happened, no further details provided. Ilya Martchenko —Preceding undated comment added 22:46, 17 January 2011 (UTC).

Thank you so much for the clarification!!! I'm trying to find additional sourcing, but it all seems to be in Polish and as such my English searches are coming up empty. N419BH 05:41, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

MAK or МАК?

Should the initialism MAK be replaced with МАК wherever it occurs? Mjroots (talk) 08:01, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

The lead says "Additional parties involved in the investigation were the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) (Russian: Межгосударственный авиационный комитет (МАК))" Subsequent references should stick to MAK, although new sections might consider a wikilink to create MAK. Interestingly, it is hard to tell apart the Roman and Cyrillic versions here. KGB is usually given as Roman initials rather than КГБ, so MAK is probably preferred.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 08:24, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

...I didn't even notice a difference...I've been calling it "MAK" in all my edits (I also don't have the other K key...). N419BH 08:36, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

There are online Cyrillic keyboards, but a lazy person can use copy and paste:)--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 08:40, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

I'll use keep using "MAK" and if we decide to change it later we can just grab an AWB bot and have it change every instance of "MAK" to "МАК". I copy-pasted the original Russian Russian: Межгосударственный авиационный комитет (МАК) from Interstate Aviation Committee anyway :). Think I'm done making major edits to the article. Most of the pertinent information from the accident report is now included. Lots more little things to do though... N419BH 08:45, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Smolensk tower tapes and other evidence not contained in the MAK report

There is an important matter which should be touched on, possibly even in the lead. In the aftermath of the crash, during the early phase of the investigation where the Russian side was more willing to share information, Poland obtained the recordings of the conversations carried out in the Smolensk airfield control tower, the contents of which are highly relevant to how the crash happened. The Russian report largely ignored the information which these tapes contained, which understandably infuriated the Polish side. These conversations will be revealed by Poland next week, but here is what they contain, in a nutshell (Gazeta Wyborcza article link)

• The flight controller at Smolensk ATC was pressured by his superior officer, who was also in the tower. "Despite multiple suggestions of the flight controller that the Poles be ordered not to land, the superior gave an unambiguous order: we direct (the plane) to 100m, 100m and this is the end of the conversation' "

• Polish commission unambiguously concludes that the superior's decision ended any further attempts by the controller to send the plane to the reserve airfield (this is based on actual tower recordings)

• The key point of the dispute is whether the Polish flight was military or civilian. The Russian side claims that the reason the ATC could not forbid the Polish plane to land was that it was treated as a civilian plane, and if it had been a military plane, the landing attempt would have been forbidden. However, shortly before the crash a Russian military Il-76 made two landing attempts with the permission of the tower.

What this shows is that there was psychological pressure and general confusion about procedures on the Russian side as much as on the Polish side on that fateful day, and yet the MAK report puts the blame exclusively on the Poles.

Hopefully, when the Polish side presents shortly unambigous evidence to the contrary, the Russian report can be reopened and amended. This article will certainly need to be expanded and possibly rewritten when the Polish report comes out.

In addition, Polish experts have deciphered some of the words spoken in the cockpit which in the Russian report are taken as unintelligible. Among them is an indication that the Captain decided to abort the landing by giving the command "We are departing" (Odchodzimy) when the plane passed the decision altitude of 100 m about 22 seconds before the crash - MAK report claimed the captain tried to pull up only in the final seconds when the plane was striking the first trees. This would put the actions of the captain in a completely different light, showing that he was not fixated on landing at any cost due to psychological pressure, as the MAK report claims, and was in fact following correct procedure (though it is not known why the attempt to abort the landing failed). This analysis was offered to the MAK before the publication of its report but was ignored. This issue is discussed in this Gazeta Wyborcza article (link). 99.236.14.72 (talk) 07:12, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Unfortunately, saying you're going to go around and actually doing it are two different things. If this 100m "go around" call was indeed made (I suspect it was), why didn't the crew actually abort the landing attempt at this point? Including the 60m "go around" call from the first officer, that is now two calls to go around made by members of the flight crew which were not carried out. The question now becomes why this was not done. Only an investigation can answer that. Since the Russian investigation did not fully answer this (they suspect psychological pressure but are not definitive in stating this), we will have to wait and hope the Polish side comes to a definite conclusion on this matter. The real question here is not what happened (both Poland and Russia agree it was CFIT and intentional violation of minimums by the flight crew), but why it happened. Why would a highly qualified flight crew make such grave mistakes? N419BH 08:05, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

I agree that CFIT due to minimum violation is the cause and that is not disputed by either side - only the circumstances which contributed to that violation occurring are contested. What is really at issue are the relations between Russia and Poland in the next decade, and that is much more important. If the Russian investigation was more even handed, fairly evaluated the evidence available and acknowledged at least some responsibility on the Russian side, a new era in relations between the two countries would have truly began, solidifying the reconciliation started around the time of the crash. Given the important role that Poland plays as one of the 6 big countries in the EU, the relations between EU and Russia would have certainly improved as well. Instead, things are proceeding in the opposite direction, which is unfortunate and against objective Russian interests. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 08:38, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Some of this has been discussed before at Talk:2010_Polish_Air_Force_Tu-154_crash#TAWS. At 10:40:50.5 and around 80m in the MAK transcript, the co-pilot Major Robert Grzywna says "Odchodzimy", variously translated from the Polish as "We're leaving/departing/coming away" The problem is that this appears to be conversational language rather than a formal aviation command, so its meaning is open to interpretation. Some sources interpreted it as "We're off course". The "Horizon 101" from air traffic control is a formal command to level off. It is true that at no point does the ATC issue a direct command not to land. However, the ATC has already said that there are no conditions for landing and recommended diverting to another airport. The controller was exonerated of blame by the report, and this has disappointed Donald Tusk and parts of the Polish media.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 08:06, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

To the comment regarding the Chief ATC ordering another controller not to deny landing permission, it seems perfectly reasonable to me that the Chief ATC received the memo regarding the treatment of PLF 101 as a civilian flight, and was instructing his subordinates as to the proper rule set to apply (ICAO standard: PIC in charge as opposed to Russian military standard: ATC in charge). I would expect some confusion from the Russian ATC as they usually handled military flights and almost never handled international flights. As to the Russian military IL-76 being offered approach attempts, the weather was much better at that time than it was when PLF 101 approached. N419BH 08:23, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

It the Polish and Russian reports end up saying two different things (even diametrically opposite things), we should report both in as neutral a tone as we can, and allow the reader to make up their own mind as to the version they believe. The publication by the Poles of their report (hopefully also with an English translation) will stop a lot of this speculation. Mjroots (talk) 08:38, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

The conditions were already quite bad at the time of the Il-76 landing, but you have a point. Nevertheless, if a Russian crew which knew the Smolensk airfield well could not manage a landing, the Polish Tu-154 in worsening conditions had no chance of landing and the controllers knew it.

It is indeed true that by not correctly acting on the weather information the Poles were making a tragic mistake. Nevertheless, the Smolensk ATC did have it in their power to save them from that mistake. The controllers and/or their superiors could have effectively said: forget the procedure (not very well established anyway), we are going to save some lives today, even if it causes some diplomatic unpleasantness and whining from Kaczynski. We are going to close the airfield and send the Polish flight to Moscow. That would have been the moral and common sense thing to do. The question of who prevented this from happening should be carefully examined. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 08:45, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

The criticism of the report seems to come down to the fact that the air traffic controller did not formally declare the airbase closed when the visibility dropped to 400 metres. With the benefit of hindsight, this may have been a mistake. However, the radio conversations show clear advice against landing, and the Tu-154 is never given clearance to land. This is probably why the air traffic controller was exonerated.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 09:25, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Just a minor point We're leaving/departing/coming away, in aviation sometimes departing can mean departing from normal flight, basically they have lost it and the aircraft is not responding, not sure the term is used in Polish. MilborneOne (talk) 10:54, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Re this edit: The "Горизонт 101" command ("Horizon 101") was given at 10:40:53.4.[1] This is around 11 seconds before the Крик (expression of fear followed by swearing) collision with the tree at 10:41:02.7 - 10:41:04.6. At the point of the 101 command, there would have been just about enough time to pull up. Also, as stated before on the talk page, the final decision on the safety of landing rests with the crew of the plane, not the tower.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 12:10, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

10:40:59.3 - 10:41:04.6 says Шум от столкновения с лесным массивом (Noise from collision with large forested area). The cockpit voice recording transcript says that the plane was at around 50 - 40 metres when "Horizon 101" was given by the tower. The article says "The Final Report would later determine that a go-around was technically possible from as low as 40m, but that 200m was the first of many times that the crew were required to go around but did not". This confirms the borderline nature of the 101 command.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 17:21, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Looking at the plot on page 156 of the final report, the "level 101" command is given when the airplane around 10 or 15 m above the level of the airport (and about to drop to altitude -15 m relative to airport level by flying into the valley along the approach path). So, from the tower's perspective the plane was basically already on the ground, and that is a bit late to issue a warning. Then again, the whole role of the ATC was confused: the Polish crew was not reporting altitude to the controller (as procedure required), and yet the ATC was periodically reassuring the plane that it was "on course, on glide path", even though the radar at Smolensk was not precise enough to do this. Maybe this contributed to the false sense of security of the Polish crew, who knows. One also wonders why, if the Polish crew was not following procedure and not reporting altitude, why did the ATC not order an abort just on that basis. "PLF 101, you are not following correct procedure, go around and try again". That would have done it. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 17:32, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Thanks, the voice transcript cited above shows that the crew of the plane seemed to believe that everything was OK at the time of the 101 command. Because of the bumpy terrain in the approach to the airbase, it was difficult to assess the altitude of the plane exactly. No doubt the debate will continue on this.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 17:44, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

It seems more and more obvious that the direct cause of the crash was the crew's reliance on the radar altimeter and its apparent ignorance of the fact that there is a deep valley along the glide path. Thus at a crucial moment the crew thought it was significantly higher relative to the airport level than they really were. If correct procedure was followed and the crew was continuously reporting its altitude to the ATC, maybe the controller would have realized the crew is in error and called out "level 101" earlier. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 17:55, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Yes, this has been mentioned in media reports before. In the absence of an instrument landing system, the crew seems to have relied on the radar altimeter for guidance. Since there was a valley in the approach to the airbase, the crew of the Tu-154 may have believed that its altitude relative to the airbase was considerably higher than it actually was. Perhaps the article should try to find sourcing on this.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 18:03, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

The bottom line is, under ICAO rules the handling of the aircraft is the pilot's responsibility; the quote in United States Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), which are ICAO compliant, is, "The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft (FAR 91.3(a))." Imagine what would have happened if the controllers had attempted to order the Polish jet not to land, especially considering Poland's status as a former member of the Soviet Bloc and all the baggage THAT entails. Nothing was particularly dangerous about this flight until the crew descended below the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) of 100m without having the runway environment in sight. This is the most important rule when conducting approaches in bad weather, you DO NOT descend below MDA without the runway environment in sight. Furthermore, airports, at least in the United States, are almost never closed due to bad weather. Pretty much the only time this happens is when all the runways are covered in snow and/or ice and need to be cleared. There was nothing dangerous about conducting an approach in such conditions, I've done several in such conditions myself in actual aircraft, literally hundreds more in small aircraft simulators, and dozens more in a B-727 (roughly equivalent to a TU-154) simulator. So long as you don't descend below MDA, you're perfectly safe. The moment you descend below MDA without seeing the runway, you're basically gambling that you'll break out of the clouds soon enough to see the runway and land safely. In this case the flightcrew lost the bet. This accident is pretty much a carbon copy of the 2001 Avjet Aspen crash. As for the Radar altimeter, even at 100m radar altitude the crew could have gone around safely. At 60m, well below minimums, and only 15m above the actual runway, they would have made it. At 40m, they probably would have made it. When they finally tried at 20m, -15m in relation to the runway, it was already too late. N419BH 18:29, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

The Polish flight to Smolensk was a highly unusual, one of a kind operation (flying a large jetliner to a half-abandoned military airport with the most rudimentary navigation aids) so it is far from clear that standard ICAO rules applied. It seems that due to poor coordination, the Russian side assumed they did and the Polish side assumed they did not. 18:41, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Also, your insights from personal experience are very interesting. Keep in mind though that the Polish crew was poorly trained, with much fewer flight hours than civilian airline pilots get (the navigator reading the crucial radar altimeter had only 60 hours on Tu-154(!), and co-pilot only 198 hours in that role on Tu-154), and most importantly without access to flight simulator training (not easily available for the Tu-154, apparently). The landing attempt should have been safe for a well trained crew, but apparently it was not safe for the PLF 101 crew flying that day. Admittedly, the Russian ATC was in no position to know the degree of Polish crew's training inadequacies. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 18:54, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Today it was announced that the Polish report on the accident will be released in February, while the content of the conversations in the Smolensk ATC control tower will be made public in the next few days.[2] The Polish government will also release the document listing its objections to the Russian report, among them the MAK report's refusal to address what was happening in the Smolensk ATC and the presence there of other unauthorized persons besides the controllers. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 22:20, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

The evidence indicates they didn't even react to "Horizon!" so in my mind it doesn't matter if the call was late. I actually wouldn't call the Polish crew poorly trained at all, in fact I'd call them highly trained. Lack of simulator training in a TU-154 is a bit of a difficulty, but that just means they had training in the actual airplane instead. As for lack of TU-154 simulators, the MAK report discusses going to Aeroflot's training center for the simulator experiments. I would imagine Aeroflot, once the largest operator of the TU-154, has at least a few simulators of the type... I also wouldn't characterize the airport as half abandoned, though it is a bit...primitive in its facilities. There are thousands of other airports around just like it worldwide. The next step here is really to wait for the Polish accident report.

As for the politics involved, at the bottom of the first page of the MAK report is the following statement, "In accordance with ICAO standards and recommended practices the sole objective of this report is air accident and incident prevention. The investigation conducted within the framework of this report and suggested recommendations does not apportion blame or liability. The criminal aspects of the accident are investigated within a separate criminal case." This is standard practice in the industry. In fact, most accident reports are inadmissible evidence in a court of law specifically so that there will be no outside pressure of any kind to taint an investigation. Accident investigations are one thing that must be conducted irrespective of politics in order to ensure the true cause is determined and valid, prudent recommendations are made with the goal of preventing future accidents. So while some people would have liked to have seen the controllers partially faulted, the fact is under ICAO rules it's the pilot's responsibility. Even the "Horizon 101!" call isn't an order. It's a last ditch warning. ATC assumes a pilot knows what they're doing. These pilots knew what they were doing. Why they chose to approach in the manner they did is still an open question, and it is a question that will never be fully answered. The only people who know the true reasons why the pilots made the decisions they made are the pilots themselves. And they unfortunately won't be talking anytime soon. N419BH 05:10, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Although the Polish media has said that the "Horizon 101" was given too late, the crew show no response to it and do not seem to have any worries about how things are going until the collision with the trees. This means that there may always be a mystery over what the crew was thinking about during the last fifteen seconds of the flight.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 07:25, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

We talked for a while, and I think the subject is becoming exhausted, so let me sum things up from my perspective. Clearly the crew bears the majority of the blame. They performed a landing approach which should have been been a very low risk operation, and they flew into terrain.

However, both the Polish and Russian sides agree that the conditions at the airfield made a safe landing impossible. So one should ask why the Polish crew was given permission to engage in a completely pointless exercise of attempting a "look and see" approach? Yes, the ATC could have assumed the risk of doing this was very low, but it would have been even less risky to just close the airport and send the plane somewhere else.

Let's also remember that flying to an alternate airfield would simply have meant that Kaczynski would be a few hours late for the Katyn ceremony, it would not amount to barring him from going to Katyn, so the diplomatic damage would have been very minor, if any. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 14:43, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Very, very true. The prudent move was for the crew and ATC to say, "There's no way we're going to be able to land; see you in Moscow." With the weather the way it was the fog actually lifted at noon, so they likely could have gone to Moscow, refueled, chatted with the Il-76 crew already there, waited until the fog lifted, then flown back to Smolensk arriving approximately 1300. Why this was not done is a question whose answer is only truly known by the persons in the cockpit. Let's continue to work on the article, keep everything neutral, and insert relevant Polish and Russian comments as they are made. When Poland issues their report, we will have a lot of work to do. N419BH 19:21, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Well according to transcript from tower they did say "Visibility 400 meters <...> no conditions to accept you". The capitains responce was "Thank you, will try if possible [meaning "will try and check if landing possible"], if not - will go to second circle [second attempt]". After that someone inside tower (probably chief) explains "<..> this is the decision of the capitain, [he] will try test landing, will make the decision on 100m height, [after that will] pull up, ask them ["them" means tower staff] to request readyniess of secondary [airport] in Minsk and Vitebsk" 91.76.18.134 (talk) 03:09, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

It should be noted that Minsk and Vitebsk are in Belarus. Poland has tense relations with Belarus so landing the Polish president there would have been inconvenient to say the least. It's unfortunate that the tower did not offer the Tu-154 an alternate airfield in Russia. Moscow was discussed as an alternate landing field in the tower but this was not passed on to the crew for some reason. From the pilot's viewpoint, it looked like his failure to land would exclude Kaczynski from coming to Russia at all. What I wonder about are the discussions in Warsaw at the command center which monitored the flight. Surely they would have been monitoring the situation, and examining alternate landing sites. We have not yet heard anything on that angle of the story. Hopefully the Polish report will shed light on this. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 14:01, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Agreed, this was probably one of the reasons Russians stated there was a 'psycological pressure' on pilots to attempt landing in these conditions. Since Minsk and Vitebsk where named by the crew themselves when they were initially asked about their secondary airports and quantity of fuel onboard, control tower was probably hesitant to offer the alternatives without any reason to do so, before they even made their attempt to land.

As for monitoring, control tower operator specifically asked, if the crew knew how to land on military airports. The reason behind it (partly) was that military airports (in former USSR at least) have very basic radars with poor resolution compared to civilian airports. Meaning the operator could not offer any reasonable help with blind landing and the crew was on their own - that is why they intially stated that there are no conditions to land. That is also the reason why the control tower operator probably never realized and warned the pilot that the plane was steadily descending at twice the normal speed - since his radar did not provide such information, and the crew did not inform him of their altimeter readings. Because of that when he started to warn and then shout at them to pull up - it was already too late.

Furthermore the operator said "Посадка дополнительно" at 10:39:40. According to russian aviation rules, this means that landing is PROHIBITED. According to the procedure, since the crew aknowledged this command, this means that they should make a decision whether to land *before* reaching "decision height", which was 100m in this case. After informing control tower about their decision they can continue to land only if control tower will accept it, however even then the responsibility for a safe landing lies solely on the crew, the control tower is only responsible for clearing the path and the landing zone. In reality the decision was never made, they continued to descend without informing control tower about anything, well below their decision height. Why didn't operator shout or curse at them for breaking the protocol - is not known, probably everyone thought that they really know what they are doing.

I hope when Polish analysis will be published they will also officially translate all the russian transcripts into English, preferrably with commentary about the meaning of phrases. I doubt it is possible to cite sound files with russian speech as sources of information... 91.76.18.134 (talk) 15:47, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Jan 18 press conference

Brief list of key points made at today's press conference by Polish investigators of the accident. Key additional source of data were the recordings made in the Smolensk ATC which the MAK report did not include.link

• Smolensk was fogged in even before Tu-154 took off from Warsaw.
• Polish Yak-40 landed violating minimums and ignoring the ATC order to go around, after which the ATC commended the pilot with "Molodets" ("good job!")
• Il-76 approaching in low visibility came close to crashing during its landing attempt, which placed great stress on ATC personnel (profuse swearing, sighs of relief)
• These two incidents put the ATC personnel at a high level of psychological stress
• Crew was contacted by person in the ATC other than the controller (breaking procedure)
• Heated discussion occurred in the ATC and with its superiors as to what to do and whether to allow a "trial approach" for the Tu-154
• The crew was not given a clear offer of an alternative airport to proceed to
• During final stage of landing the ATC was incorrectly reassuring the Tu-154 it was on the correct course, when it was in fact not (in particular the horizontal deviation was significant and should have been noticed).
• According to the Russian side, the videotape recording the ATC radar display during the landing "jammed" and recorded no data.
• The command "Level 101" was given 11 s too late by the controller, when Tu-154 was 70 m below glide path it was supposed to be on
• The captain gives the command "Go around" 3 s before "Level 101" is received.

Key conclusion: The level of support the crew received from the ATC was inadequate, and the incorrect reassurances the crew received about being "on course, on glide path" contributed to the accident.

In response MAK announced it will release its own transcripts of ATC conversations. Anonymous sources within MAK reported some inaccuracies in the Polish version of events. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 17:35, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Added to the article. However, that specific source does not contain the Yak-40 information, or at least my translation software didn't find it. Can you locate additional Polish sources for this press conference? N419BH 19:33, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

I watched the conference live and heard Yak-40 discussed. This link mentions the issue from Russian perspective, giving the Polish version and disputing it: [3] The list I made can be freely edited if need be, once news articles containing the information released at the press conference come online. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 19:48, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Transcripts released by MAK confirm that the Polish version of events with Yak-40 checks out. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 22:35, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

• The captain gives the command "Go around" 3 s before "Level 101" is received. This is a puzzle, as the transcript here does not contain these words. The "Горизонт 101" command ("Horizon 101") was given by the tower at 10:40:53. The only words (other than the height of the plane in metres) spoken at around 10:40:50 in this transcript are "В норме/W normie" (Normal) by the co-pilot.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 19:45, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

This was deciphered recently by Polish analysts, and not included in documents released by MAK. The analysis of the recordings is ongoing and new information obtained continuously. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 19:59, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Latest - MAK has published its transcripts of controller conversations (see link, at the bottom). 99.236.14.72 (talk) 20:50, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Direct links to the transcripts of controller conversations: Microphone in the Control Tower ("Open microphone") Phone calls Radio transmissions (the transcripts are in Russian and almost all communication was done in Russian with a few phrases in English). 93.153.182.18 (talk) 08:58, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

Criticism of Polish Air Force

Having read the English language version of the Russian investigation report I am struck by the criticism of the Polish Air Force, in particular crew composition and training. For example that the Pilot-in-Charge was relatively inexperienced, had been switching roles between PIC and co-pilot and between aircraft types, had no simulator training on type, was not current in flying below weather minima. Similarly the co-pilot had recently been flying another type, and that the navigator was very inexperienced and seems not to have understood his role on this very difficult approach. Then there is the claim, based on pathological evidence, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Force was not only in the cockpit during the landing approach but had been drinking (0.6% blood alcohol = 'light intoxication'). Granted that the Russian findings are disputed by Poland, these are, in the context of air accident investigation reports, serious allegations and if made against a civil airline in Europe would lead to formal action by the appropriate regulator and possibly withdrawal of licence. I don't want to prompt a flame war in suggesting that the article might refer to these criticisms, but at at the least it would help people abroad (like myself) to understand why the report has been so badly received by the Polish government. AJHingston (talk) 17:49, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Simple, the report ignored any problems on the Russian side. In particular problems with Air Traffic Control at the Smolensk airport, discussed in today's press conference (read above).99.236.14.72 (talk) 17:52, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

In this BBC article, Blasik's blood alcohol level is described as "just above the drink-driving limit for most EU states." This article says "The blood-alcohol content found in Blasik was lower than what is generally considered outright intoxication. But the professional pilots and physicians group www.flightphysical.com says “the number of serious errors committed by pilots dramatically increases at or above concentrations of 0.04 percent,” a level lower than Blasik’s." In this article, Blasik's widow denies that he was drunk.--♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 18:04, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Blasik was not flying the plane, he was a passenger. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 18:05, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Indeed, the issue was whether he placed pressure on the crew to land. Nothing in the voice transcript suggests this. According to the BBC article, Tatyana Anodina, the head of MAK, commented: "The presence of the Polish air force commander on the flight deck up to the aircraft's impact with the ground put psychological pressure on the crew captain to decide on continuing descent in a situation of unjustified risk, dominated by the goal of making a landing at any cost." --♦IanMacM♦ ^{(talk to me)} 18:10, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

I think no one would like to do their job with the top boss of their outfit sitting behind them and observing. The presence of Blasik in the cabin was clearly a violation of procedure and probably detrimental to the pilots. But his alcohol level is a red herring. MAK makes no argument how it contributed to the accident, just states the fact (in other words there is no demonstration how his alcohol level made the effect of his presence in the cabin worse than it already was). 99.236.14.72 (talk) 18:29, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

The MAK report makes no conclusions with regard to the alcohol level. They merely state that his blood contained alcohol which was most likely consumed during the flight. The conclusions section does not state anything with regard to his consumption of alcohol affecting the flight. The report instead states his presence on the flight deck contributed to the accident by placing psychological pressure on the crew. It is normal for an accident report to contain information regarding aspects of the events which were not determined to be a factor in the cause. This is because in an accident investigation you rule out theories until there is only one possible explanation, as opposed to making a hypothesis and finding evidence to support it. In this case the MAK's rough chain of though was, "it wasn't the airplane, it wasn't the navigation equipment, it wasn't ATC, it was the crew." Then they went, "it wasn't the crew alone, it wasn't the commander being intoxicated, it was the commander being present, amongst other factors." N419BH 19:04, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Perhaps I distracted attention from the main point by mentioning Blasnik's drinking (the MAC report does say that it corresponds to light intoxication though). There was nothing in itself wrong in his having a drink on the plane so long as he remained out of the cockpit and didn't otherwise interfere. On a civil flight he would not have been permitted to be there. The point I really wanted to make was that his presence was symptomatic of a number of serious failings which are blamed on the air force command rather than the actual crew of the flight. Aside from the possibility that the PIC might have falsified his records regarding currency in landings in reduced visibility, the aircrew's lack of training and experience was the responsibility of senior officers. It isn't just about pressures placed on the PIC during this particular flight, its about the professionalism and adherence to standards of the air force command. As a neutral, I'm concerned that the absence of any mention of these issues runs the risk that the NPOV of this article might be challenged. AJHingston (talk) 19:23, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Point taken. The shortcomings in training and organization however are listed as a systemic cause as opposed to an immediate cause in the MAK report. I'll add a new article section and report all the causes listed. N419BH 19:39, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

The special unit for transporting VIPs in the Polish Air Force is not an airline. Its pilots fly much less frequently. Poland is a small country and there is no need to fly around it in a Tu-154. That plane was used only for international trips for top level government officials and those did not happen very frequently. So it is not surprising the number of flight hours among unit's pilots was small - the question is whether it was so low it violated international norms. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 19:52, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

 Done Causes section added. Question: as the MAK report is a translation the English used is not on a native level. I have directly quoted several sections and closely paraphrased several others with citation. Since these are not direct quotes I have not placed them in quotation marks. Does anyone have a better way of doing this? I am not sure if such paraphrasing is the best option. N419BH 20:10, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

Maybe we should not use "Russian report". Russian transport minister said today that MAK is an independent body and it had Polish experts involved in the investigation, so it should not be called "Russian". [4] Of course some will disagree with that statement. 99.236.14.72 (talk) 20:32, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

 Done "Russian Report" changed to "MAK Report". Will add a brief section explaining MAK's role and link to the main article

B class

As part of the B-class review for WikiProject Poland, I reviewed this article and it appears to continue to meet the criteria for B-class. — Malik Shabazz ^Talk/_Stalk 19:21, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

The Crew

I think that describing the crew in a separate section would better describe the whole event. If there are no objections or breaking the rules in doing so, I can add a new subsection named "The Crew" to the "Background" section. Other background information, such as the 2008 incident with non-landing in Tbilisi can also be moved there.

The crew and their experience, according to commemorative page on the website of their unit (36 special aviation regiment):

• captain — kpt. pil. Arkadiusz PROTASIUK, 3528 total flight hours, 2937 hours on Tu-154;
• first officer — Robert GRZYWNA, 1939 total flight hours, 506 hours on Tu-154;
• navigator — Artur ZIĘTEK, 1069 total flight hours, 69 hours as navigator on Tu-154;
• flight mechanic — Andrzej MICHALAK, 330 total flight hours;
• flight attendants — Barbara MACIEJCZYK, Justyna MONIUSZKO, Natalia JANUSZKO.

93.153.182.18 (talk) 10:06, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

No objection in principle, although the crew should not be named per WP:NOTMEMORIAL - i.e. they are not Wikinotable people, not having or being notable enough to sustain a stand alone article on Wikipedia. Mjroots (talk) 10:49, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

The crew's experience, training, and involvement in the 2008 Tiblisi incident are all clearly relevant. But we need to be very aware of the sensitivity of the topic to family members and others. Given that the crew mambers are not able to answer for and explain their actions, experience shows that it can be very difficult to maintain NPOV, and neither appear to exonerate them by deflecting criticism to others nor attribute blame other than in the measured terms of the formal enquiry reports. Sometimes references to the recently dead can cause even more difficulty than to the living. For an example of a CFIT incident where the families of the pilots have waged a long campaign to argue that ultimate responsibility rests with the air force command and not the aircrew see 1994 Scotland RAF Chinook crash. Whatever is said about the actions of the ATC I can see that a similar debate may continue in this case given the questions raised both about the preparation and training of the crew and the demands made upon them. AJHingston (talk) 12:52, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

We should not name the crew, as they cannot defend their actions and are not notable outside of this accident. The only times we name crewmembers is when they have become notable for other events and have their own articles; Al Haynes is an example, of United Airlines flight 232 fame. Flight experience is certainly relevant, but we will need a reliable source before we place specific numbers in the article. If we choose to move this section, we will have to re-write the narrative as the way I originally wrote it causes the cockpit stresses section to flow in with the flight sections. N419BH 15:08, 20 January 2011 (UTC)

Stalin's last victims?

Can those who died on the plane be described as Stalin's last victims?

The most that can be said is that 'responsibility for the accident is diffused among various persons on the plane and elsewhere' combining with the weather and 'a wish to get the event over and done with.' —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.254.147.68 (talk) 14:20, 20 January 2011 (UTC)