First Battle of Gaza

First Battle of Gaza
Part of the Middle Eastern theatre of World War I
Officers of the regiment that successfully defended Gaza during the first battle
Date 26 March 1917 Location Gaza, southern Palestine Result Ottoman victory
Belligerents
British Empire	Ottoman Empire German Empire
Commanders and leaders
Archibald Murray Philip Chetwode Charles Dobell	Tala Bey (nominal) Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein (actual)
Units involved
Eastern Force 52nd (Lowland) Division 54th (East Anglian) Division No. 7 Light Car Patrol Nos. 11 and 12 Armoured Motor Batteries Desert Column 53rd (Welsh) Division Anzac Mounted Division Imperial Mounted Division Imperial Camel Corps Brigade	Fourth Army 79th Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion 81st Infantry Regiment 125th Infantry Regiment Reinforced by 3rd Infantry Division 31st and 32nd Infantry Regiments 16th Infantry Division 47th and 48th Infantry Regiments
Strength
	2,000 almost doubled by reinforcements
Casualties and losses
523 killed 2932 wounded 512 missing	16 Germans and Austrians killed or wounded and 41 missing 300 Ottomans killed, 750 wounded and 600 missing

The First Battle of Gaza was fought on 26 March 1917 during the first attempt by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) to invade the southern region of the Ottoman Empire territory of Palestine during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of the First World War. Fighting took place in and around the town of Gaza on the Mediterranean coast when the Desert Column component of the EEF attacked the town. Late in the afternoon, on the verge of capturing Gaza, the Desert Column was withdrawn amid concerned for approaching large Ottoman reinforcements. This British defeat was followed a few weeks later by the even more emphatic defeat of the Eastern Force, also part of the EEF, at the Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917.

In August 1916 the victory at Romani, by the EEF, ended the possibility of land-based attacks on the Suez Canal. In December of the same year, the newly created Desert Mounted Corps' victory at Magdhaba secured the Mediterranean port of El Arish and the supply route, water pipeline, and railway stretching across the Sinai Peninsula from the Suez Canal. In January 1917 the Desert Mounted Corps' victory at Rafa completed the capture of the Sinai Peninsula.

Gaza was attacked two months later by infantry from the 52nd (Lowland) Division reinforced by an infantry brigade from Eastern Force. This attack was protected from the threat of attack by Ottoman reinforcements by two mounted divisions, which were also to support the infantry attack as necessary. They launched their attack on the Ottoman garrison in and around Gaza, but strong defences made it difficult to advance. While the Imperial Mounted Division held off the Ottoman reinforcements, the Anzac Mounted Division (Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division) reinforced the infantry attack and together, they succeeded in entering Gaza from the north and capturing Ali Muntar. However the determination of the Ottoman defenders, and the threat from large Ottoman reinforcements approaching from the north and north east, which may not have been held off indefinitely by the depleted mounted screen, were probably responsible for the decision to withdraw. It has been suggested the withdrawal snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

Background

The Eastern Desert (also known as the Negev)

Allied operations in the Middle East were secondary to the Western Front campaign, so the reinforcements requested by General Sir Archibald Murray, commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), were denied. On 11 January 1917, the War Cabinet informed Murray that large scale operations in Palestine were deferred until September, and he was required by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal William Robertson to be ready to send possibly two infantry divisions to France. One week later, Murray received a request for one infantry division and dispatched the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division. Murray was assured that none of his mounted units would be transferred from the EEF, and the War Cabinet informed him "that there was no intention of curtailing such activities as he considered justified by his resources." Murray nevertheless repeated his estimate that five infantry divisions in addition to the mounted units were needed in the EEF.

Murray was given stronger encouragement after the 26 February, when an Anglo-French Congress at Calais decided on a spring offensive. This decision by the Supreme War Council was given increased impetus for "Allied activity" on 8 March when the Russian Revolution began. On 11 March Baghdad in Mesopotamia was occupied by the British, and the offensive in Macedonia launched. In April the Battle of Arras was launched by the British, and the French launched the Nivelle offensive. Britain's three major war objectives now were to maintain maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea, while preserving the balance of power in Europe and the security of Egypt, India, and the Persian Gulf. The latter could be secured by an advance into Palestine and the capture of Jerusalem. A further advance would ultimately cut off Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia from those on the Arabian Peninsula.

By 5 February the water pipeline from the Sweetwater Canal had reached El Arish while the railway line was being laid well to the east of the town. The arrival of this infrastructure enabled a strong defensive position and a forward base to be established in the town. There were now two possible directions an advance towards Jerusalem by Eastern Force could take: through Rafa on the coast or through Hafir El Auja inland, on the Ottoman railway. Lieutenant General Charles ‪Macpherson‬ Dobell, commanding Eastern Force, thought that an advance along the coast would force a withdrawal inland as they became outflanked and subject to attack from the rear. He proposed keeping two divisions at El Arish and moving his headquarters there, while his mounted division would advance to reoccupy Rafa (captured by Desert Column on 9 January during the Battle of Rafa).

With the 11 January War Cabinet decision regarding large scale operations in Palestine, reversed by the 26 February Congress, the EEF was now required to capture the stronghold of Gaza as a first step towards Jerusalem. Gaza was one of the most ancient cities in the world, being one of five cities of the Palestine Alliance, which had been fought over many times during its 4,000 year history. The Egyptians and the Assyrians had attacked Gaza, followed in 731 BC by the Greeks, with Alexander conducting three attacks and the Siege of Gaza in 332 BC. The town was completely destroyed in 96 BC and rebuilt slightly to the south of the original site. This Gaza was captured by Caliph Omar in 635 AD, by Saladin in 1187 AD, and by Napoleon in 1799. At Gaza there was an important depot for cereals with a German steam mill, barley, wheat, olives, vineyards, orange groves, and wood for fuel were grown, as well as many goats. Barley was exported to England for brewing into English beer and in 1912 the 40,000 inhabitants of Gaza imported £10,000 of yarn from Manchester. Maize, millet, beans, and watermelon. all harvested in early autumn. were cultivated in most of these localities. British estimates of the defenders facing the EEF in the region at the beginning of 1917 were no more than 12,000, with the possibility of reinforcements by, at most, one division.

EEF reorganisation

After the 42nd Division left for the Western Front, Eastern Force, under the command of Dobell, consisted of four infantry divisions; the 52nd (Lowland) Division, the 53rd (Welsh) Division, the 54th (East Anglian) Division, and the newly raised 74th (Yeomanry) Division, formed from dismounted yeomanry already serving in Egypt. A pause in EEF's advance was necessary to enable the lines of communication to be lengthened and strengthened, and while this work was being carried out, the mounted brigades were reorganised into two mounted divisions.

This reorganisation was prompted by the arrival of the 6th and the 22nd Mounted Brigades from the Salonika campaign. Instead of grouping the two new mounted brigades with the 5th Mounted Brigade to form the new Imperial Mounted Division, the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was transferred out of the Anzac Mounted Division while the newly arrived 22nd Mounted Brigade took its place. The Imperial Mounted Division, established 12 February 1917 at Ferry Post on the Suez Canal under the command of Major-General H.W. Hodgson, included the 3rd and the 4th Light Horse Brigades (in the process of formation at Ferry Post, it was planned to leave for the front on 18 March) and the 5th and 6th Mounted Brigades. Within Dobell's Eastern Force, General Philip Chetwode commanded the Desert Column, which included the Anzac Mounted Division, the partly formed Imperial Mounted Division, and the 53rd (Welsh) Division of infantry.

EEF Raid on Khan Yunis

Australian prisoners captured at Shellal

Dobell, the commander of the Eastern Force, considered that the victory at Rafa should be quickly exploited by attacking Gaza; "an early surprise attack was essential ... otherwise it was widely believed the enemy would withdraw without a fight." He ordered Rafa occupied by mounted troops while two infantry divisions of Eastern Force remained at El Arish to defend his headquarters.

On 23 February, the Anzac Mounted Division and the 53rd (Welsh) Division, commanded by General Mott, were camped on the beach at Sheikh Zowaiid. Here they were joined by the 22nd Mounted Brigade replacing the 5th Mounted Brigade which returned to El Burj. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 2nd Light Horse Brigades commanded by Edward Chaytor made a reconnaissance in force to Khan Yunis 5 miles (8.0 km) past the unoccupied Rafa on the same day. The town was held in strength, and the Chaytor's Column withdrew after "a brush" with the defenders. Khan Yunis formed part of a line of strong posts held by the Ottoman Army to protect the southern Ottoman Empire. These posts, consisting of well-dug trenches, were located at a particularly strongly fortified position at Shellal, at Weli Sheikh Nuran and at Beersheba (also referred to as the Hans Yonus–El Hafir line), in addition to those at Khan Yunis.

As a consequence of the reconnaissance on Khan Yunis, and the growing strength of EEF units in the area, the Ottoman Army garrisons realised this line was too weak to be defended. Enver Pasa, Kress von Kressenstein, and Cemal Pasa evacuated Khan Yunis and the system of defences stretching to Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzzeh, to retire 14 miles (23 km) north. Here they established a defensive line stretching along Gaza to Beersheba road to cover any Allied advance up the coast or inland through Beersheba towards Jerusalem. This withdrawal, which had begun in February, was completed by mid–March when the Ottoman Fourth Army was in position. Their new defensive line stretched north and north east, from Gaza on the north side of the Wadi Ghuzzee to Tel esh Sheria, where the railway to Beersheba crossed the Wadi esh Sheria.

On 28 February, Desert Column occupied Khan Yunis unopposed and the headquarters of the Column was established at Sheikh Zowaiid, with Eastern Force headquarters at El Arish. The ancient town of Khan Yunis (said to be the birthplace of Delilah), with bazaars, narrow streets and a castle, was one of several villages in this fertile area of southern Palestine, 6 miles (9.7 km) north of Rafa and the Egyptian–Ottoman frontier on the main road to Gaza. At Khan Yunis the largest and deepest well in the area was found, and after engineers had installed a pumping machine, it gave an unlimited supply of water to both men and horses. This water supply made the village an important forward site for supply depots and bivouacs. Around Khan Yunis gardens, orange orchards, fig plantations and grazing were seen, while in the Rafa and Sheikh Zowaiid areas barley and wheat were grown.

The area across the border ... was "delightful country, cultivated to perfection and the crops look quite good if not better than most English farms, chiefly barley and wheat. The villages were very pretty – a mass of orange, fig and other fruit trees ... The relief of seeing such country after the miles and miles of bare sand was worth five years of a life."

— Lieutenant Robert Wilson

EEF aerial bombing

No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps and No. 14 Squadron bombed Beersheba in mid February, destroying 3 German planes, and on 25 February assisted a French battleship's shelling of Jaffa by directing the ship's fire. On the same day, the German aerodrome at Ramleh was bombed. On 5 March six aircraft of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) conducted bombing attacks intended to interfere with the Ottoman withdrawal. They bombed Beersheba and the railway at Tel esh Sheria 12 miles (19 km) to the northwest. Although the damage was not great, the railhead at Tel esh Sheria continued to be bombed by relays of aircraft in the moonlight of the night of 7 March. Junction Station, an important railway junction of Beersheba and the Jaffa–Jerusalem railway and supply depot many miles to the north, was also bombed on 9, 13, and 19 March. "Sheria was till June headquarters of the enemy force in the Gaza-Beersheba line. In consequence of the British air bombing it was moved in July to Huj." These bombing raids on the railway from Junction Station to Tel el Sheria aimed to disrupt the Ottoman lines of communication during the build-up to the battle.

Prelude

Defending force

Kress Von Kressenstein and Colonel Gott at Huj in 1916

In early March, Gaza was garrisoned by two battalions, supported by two batteries of Ottoman field artillery. The garrison of Ottoman Fourth Army units was increased to seven battalions.

Group Tiller

79th Infantry Regiment

2nd Battalion 81st Infantry Regiment

125th Infantry Regiment

one squadron of cavalry

one company of camelry

Further reinforcements of between 10,000 and 12,000 were ordered by Kress von Kressenstein, as a result of the 300th Flight Detachment's reports of the EEF advances towards Gaza. Arriving before Eastern Force's attack, they consisted of,

3rd Infantry Division (from Jemmame)

31st Infantry Regiment

32nd Infantry Regiment

16th Infantry Division (from Tel esh Sheria)

47th Infantry Regiment

48th Infantry Regiment

They were supported by 12 heavy mountain howitzers in two Austrian batteries, two long guns in the German 10-cm battery from Pasha I, and the two Ottoman field artillery batteries. The Ottoman 53rd Infantry Division, which had been garrisoned at Jaffa, was ordered to march south to Gaza, but was not expected before the morning of 27 March. Kress von Kressenstein moved his headquarters from Beersheba to Tel esh Sheria where it remained until June.

On 20 March the Ottoman Army defending Gaza, which dominated the coastal route from Egypt to Jaffa, was considered by the British to be "steadily deteriorating." Kress von Kressenstein complained of "heavy losses" caused by deserters. Between the victory at Rafa in early January and the end of February, 70 deserters had arrived in the EEF lines. These were thought to be a "very small proportion" of the majority of Arabs and Syrians in particular, who disappeared from the Ottoman army, "into the towns and villages of Palestine and Trans-Jordan." The EEF were unaware of recent reinforcements and thought the garrison at Gaza was 2,000 strong. By the eve of battle there were probably 4,000 rifles defending the town, with up to 50 guns in the surrounding area, while a force of 2,000 rifles was at Beersheba.

Ottoman Army defences

Ottoman Gun among the hedges near Gaza

For millennia the town of Gaza had been the gateway for invading armies travelling the coastal route to and from Egypt and the Levant. When the First World War began, Gaza had had a large cereals depot and a German steam mill. Barley, wheat, olives, vineyards, orange groves and wood for fuel were grown as well as fields of grazing goats. Barley was exported to England from Gaza for brewing into beer, and in 1912 the 40,000 inhabitants of Gaza imported £10,000 of yarn from Manchester. In Gaza and the surrounding areas of Rafa, Khan Yunis, Sheikh Zowaiid Maize, millet, beans and water melon were cultivated.

Between Rafa and Gaza east of the coastal sand dunes is a gently rolling plateau of light, firm soil rising slowly inland, which is crossed by several dry wadis which become torrential flows in the rainy season. In the spring, after the winter rains, the area is covered by young crops or fresh grass. Gaza and the surrounding areas strongly favoured defence; the town being located on a plateau 200 feet (61 m) high which is separated from the Mediterranean Sea by about 2 miles (3.2 km) of sand hills to the west. To the north, west, and south, orchards surrounded by impenetrable prickly pear hedges extended out for some 3–4 miles (4.8–6.4 km) from the town. With the exception of the ridge extending southwards, which culminated in the dominating 300 feet (91 m) high Ali Muntar, the area of orchards stretched from the high plateau down into a hollow.

Sketch map of Gaza defences (shown in green) at 09:30 on 25 March 1917

In addition to these natural defences, the Ottoman Army constructed trenches and redoubts that extended from the south west of the town virtually all the way round the town, except for a gap to the north east. They built additional defences on the ridge to the south of the town, which incorporated Ali Muntar into the town entrenchments. Although the trenches were only lightly strengthened with barbed wire, those to the south of Gaza commanded bare slopes which were completely devoid of any cover whatsoever.

Plan of defence

Felmy in his Albatros at Huj

Kress von Kressenstein deployed most of his Fourth Army away from Gaza. British intelligence had assessed that they would not fight hard for Gaza because von Kressenstein's plan was to use the 3rd and 16th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Cavalry Division to encircle the attacking force and cut the Sinai railway and water pipeline in the rear of the EEF. A total of 12,000 of the available 16,000 Ottoman soldiers were moving west to be in position for an attack by nightfall on the day of battle.

As a result of the EEF advance to Rafa and the lengthening of their lines of communication along the coast, flank attacks became a possibility as the Ottoman lines of communication further inland overlapped the EEF advance on the coast, and it became important to strongly garrison the region. The EEF right flank would not be in prepared defences, and was potentially vulnerable to an envelopment assault.

The main Ottoman forces of between two and a half and three divisions, estimated between 6,000 and 16,000 rifles, were deployed at Tel el Negile and Huj with detachments at Gaza, Tel esh Sheria, Jemmameh, Hareira, and Beersheba, to prevent the EEF from out-flanking the Gaza fortress,. Meanwhile, the rear of the EEF was to be attacked by the 16th Division at a point where the road from Khan Yunis to Gaza crossed the Wadi Ghuzze, and by the Beersheba Group which was to advance via Shellal to attack Khan Yunis.

Attacking force

Main article: Egyptian Expeditionary Force § Order of Battle March

The 23,000-strong attack force consisted of 12,000 infantry and 11,000 mounted troops, supported by between 36 and 96 field guns and 16 howitzers. The mounted units were to stop Ottoman reinforcements from Tel el Sheria, Jemmameh, Hareira, Negile, Huj, and Beersheba from reinforcing the Gaza garrison while the infantry captured the town.

John Singer Sargent's 1919 portrait of Sir Charles Macpherson Dobell

For the attack Dobell deployed Eastern Force as follows:

Desert Column commanded by Lieutenant General Chetwode

53rd (Welsh) Division (Major General Dallas)

158th (North Wales) Brigade

159th (Cheshire) Brigade

160th (Welsh Border) Brigade

53rd Division (3 Brigades RFA 12 18–pdrs=24 guns) 4 of each battery only = 16 guns; 4 X 4.5-inch howitzers = 8 howitzer

Anzac Mounted Division (Major General Harry Chauvel) (less 1st Light Horse Brigade)

2nd Light Horse Brigade

New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade

22nd Mounted Brigade

Anzac Mounted Division 4 Batteries Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) of 4 X 18–pdrs = 16 guns

Imperial Mounted Division (Major General Henry West Hodgson) (4th Light Horse Brigade not yet formed)

3rd Light Horse Brigade

5th Mounted Brigade

6th Mounted Brigade

Imperial Mounted Division 4 Batteries RHA of 4 X 18–pdrs = 16 guns

No. 7 Light Car Patrol

Nos. 11 and 12 Armoured Motor Batteries.

Eastern Force units under the direct command of Dobell at Rafa, to protect the lines of communication, the Wadi el Arish crossing and Khan Yunis from an attack on the right flank, 8,000 men in the

52nd (Lowland) Division (Major General W.E.B. Smith)

155th (South Scottish) Brigade

156th (Scottish Rifles) Brigade

157th (Highland Light Infantry) Brigade

Also under the direct command of Dobell

54th (East Anglian) Division (Major General S.W. Hare) (less one brigade in the Suez Canal Defences)

161st (Essex) Brigade

162nd (East Midland) Brigade

163rd (Norfolk & Suffolk) Brigade

54th Division (3 Brigades RFA 12 18–pdrs=24 guns) 4 of each battery only = 16 guns; 4 X 4.5-inch howitzers = 8 howitzer

74th (Yeomanry) Division

229th Brigade

Imperial Camel Corps Brigade (Brigadier General S. Smith)

1st (Australian) Battalion

2nd (British) Battalion

3rd (Australian) Battalion

4th (Australian and New Zealand) Battalion

Imperial Camel Brigade 1 Camel Pack Battery of 6 X 2.75-inch = 6 guns

5th Wing Royal Flying Corps

No. 14 Squadron Royal Flying Corps

No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps

Army Troops (3 Batteries of 4 X 60–pdrs=12 guns) one section only = 6 guns.

The chain of command during the first Battle of Gaza was:

1. Murray's Advanced GHQ EEF in a railway train at El Arish, without reserves; its role was to advise.
2. Dobell's Eastern Force headquarters of three infantry divisions, two mounted divisions and a brigade of camels, equivalent to an army of two corps near In Seirat, with a staff smaller than an army corps serving on the western front
3. Chetwode's Desert Column headquarters, equivalent to a corps near In Seirat, with a staff the size of an infantry division.

Medical support

The evacuation of wounded had been reviewed following the problems encountered during the Battle of Romani, with particular attention given to the development of rail transport. By the time the advance to El Arish occurred in December 1916, two additional hospital trains on the Sinai railway with medical sections had been deployed at the following:

close to the battlefield at railhead, where the immobile sections of divisional field ambulances could accommodation 700 casualties,

at Bir el Abd No. 24 Casualty Clearing Station (CCS), which could accommodate 400 cases, and Nos. 53 and 54 CCS could each accommodate 200,

at Bir el Mazar No. 26 CCS, which could accommodate 400 cases,

at Mahamdiyah No. 2 (Australian) Stationary Hospital with 800 beds,

at Kantara East No. 24 Stationary Hospital with 800 beds.

Lines of communication

British infantry marching on the wire road across the desert between Bir el Mazar and Bardawil in February 1917

The Ottoman withdrawal back from Khan Yunis and Shellal put enough distance between the two forces to require a pause in the advance while the railway was laid to Rafa. By the end of February 1917, 388 miles (624 km) of railway had been laid (at a rate of 1 kilometre a day), 203 miles (327 km) of metalled road, 86 miles (138 km) of wire and brushwood roads, and 300 miles (480 km) of water pipeline had been constructed. By 1 March the railhead had reached Sheikh Zowaiid 30 miles (48 km) from Gaza, by the middle of March the railway had reached Rafa, 12 miles (19 km) from Deir el Belah and the Rafa railway station opened on 21 March, but "was not ready for unloading supplies till after the First Battle of Gaza." The railhead eventually reached Khan Yunis. However, with the arrival of the railway at Rafa, 12 miles (19 km) from Deir el Belah, Gaza was within range for an EEF attack by mounted troops as well as infantry. The Royal Navy undertook to land stores on the beach at Deir el Belah as soon as required and until the railway approached the Wadi Ghazzee.

Transport

Stores being unloaded and carried to a dump being constructed behind the tent at El Arish. A caravan of loaded camels is in the foreground

Firmer ground made it possible to use wheeled vehicles. The pedrails came off the guns and their teams of eight and ten horses were reduced to six, and in January the War Office agreed to the infantry divisions being re-equipped with wheeled transport trains. These were to replace camel transport on the condition that drivers would be found locally, as no transfers from other campaigns were possible. Although camel trains remained important throughout the war, together with pack mules and donkeys where roads were bad and in hilly trackless terrain where the horse-drawn and mule-drawn wagons, motor lorries and tractors could not go, they began to be replaced. General service and limber wagons drawn by horses or mules were grouped in supply columns, with the transport wagons of the regiments, the machine–gun squadrons, and the field ambulances, to travel on easier but less direct routes. However, all these animals required vast quantities of food and water which greatly increased pressure on the lines of communication. During the advance across the Sinai, horses were found to do better with two drinks a day instead of three, but the volume remained the same. "The wagons [of the Anzac Mounted Division] with their teams of mules, two in the pole and three in the lead, [were] driven by one man from the box. [These wagons and mules] did such excellent service that the five-mule team was laid down for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force ... and they ultimately almost superseded the British four or six horse ride-and-drive team."

Transport was reorganised so that the horse-drawn and mule-drawn supply columns were combined with the camel trains to support Eastern Force operating beyond railhead for about 24 hours. Supplying the infantry and mounted divisions was a vast undertaking as one brigade (and there were six involved in the attack on Gaza) of light horse, mounted rifles, and yeomanry at war establishment consisted of approximately 2,000 soldiers as well as the division of infantry; all requiring food and drink, clothing, ammunition and tools, etc.

Plan of attack

File:AWMART08007Gaza1.jpg

Painting by Septimus Power of Lieutenant F H McNamara and Captain D W Rutherford No. 67 Squadron, 5th Wing Royal Flying Corps, returning from aerial bombing near Gaza on 20 March 1917

Although Murray delegated the responsibility for the battle to Dobell, he set three objectives. These were to capture a line along the Wadi Ghuzzee in order to cover the laying of the railway line, to prevent the defenders withdrawing before they were attacked, and to "capture Gaza and its garrison by a coup de main." The attack plan produced by Dobell and his staff was similar to those successfully implemented at Magdhaba by Chauvel and at Rafa by Chetwode, except that EEF infantry were to have a prominent role. On a larger scale the garrison at Gaza, established in formidable fortified entrenchments and redoubts, was to be surrounded and captured before Ottoman reinforcements arrived.

The main attack on Gaza and the Ali Muntar hill would come from the south by the Desert Column's 53rd (Welsh) Division commanded by Dallas, supported by one infantry brigade of Eastern Force's 54th (East Anglian) Division commanded by Hare. The Anzac and Imperial Mounted Divisions, commanded by Chauvel and Hodgson respectively, were to establish a cordon around Gaza to the north and east to isolate the garrison, cutting the main roads and preventing an incursion by Ottoman reinforcements reaching the town from their garrisons at Hareira, Beersheba, and Huj. If necessary the mounted divisions were to be ready to reinforce the infantry attack on Gaza. The remaining infantry brigades of the 54th (East Anglian) Division were to extend the mounted screen to the southeast just across the Wadi Ghuzzee.

On 5 March, Murray agreed to Dobell's planned attack on Gaza, to be launched at the end of March. On 20 March Dobell moved his headquarters from El Arish to Rafa. The next day, the Rafa Race Meeting took place, complete with trophies ordered from Cairo and a printed programme. There was an enclosed paddock, totalizator, jumps, and a marked course with each horse race contested by Yeomanry, Australians and New Zealanders. On 22 March, all roads and tracks were reconnoitred as far as Deir el Belah and allotted to the different formations, and preliminary moves towards Gaza had begun. On 24 March, Dobell issued battle orders.

Preliminary moves

On 25 March, the Anzac Mounted Division moved out of their bivouacs in two columns. The first column, consisting of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and 22nd Mounted Yeomanry Brigades, marched up the beach from Bir Abu Shunnar at 02:30 and went out in front to establish a line just south of the Wadi Ghuzzeh. This movement was to cover reconnaissances to find the best place to cross the deep, dry wadi; a formidable obstacle for both infantry and mounted troops in their advance on Gaza. The second column, consisting of Anzac Mounted Division's divisional headquarters, Signal Squadron, Field Artillery, and 2nd Light Horse Brigade (divisional reserve), arrived .75 miles (1.21 km) southwest of Deir el Belah, when the 2nd Light Horse Brigade and the artillery were ordered to water and bivouac at Deir el Belah. By 10:00, Chauvel's Anzac Mounted Division's headquarters and Chetwode's Desert Column headquarters had been established on Hill 310.

While the Ottoman army positions at Gaza had been reconnoitred and photographed from the air, it was still necessary for the staff of the two mounted divisions and the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) to carry out reconnaissances of the Wadi Ghuzzeh in person. In the afternoon all likely crossings were carefully reconnoitred, and the chosen crossing near the Wadi Sharta to be used the next day was marked.

At 15:30 the Imperial Mounted Division, led by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, marched out of camp at Marakeb heading for Deir el Belah about six hours or 18 miles (29 km) away. The three brigades and their machine gun squadrons were accompanied by their mobile veterinary sections and the 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance. The troops had been supplied with their rations for the day, while the rations for 26 and 27 March were to be brought forward during the night of 25/26 March by the first line transport of camels and wagons. As it had been expected the division would be away five days, additional rations were carried on improvised packs and accompanied the division as far as Deir el Belah.

Dallas' orders were handed to the Anzac, Imperial Mounted, and the 54th (East Anglian) Divisions' commanders at 17:00. The 53rd (Welsh) Division's 158th (North Wales) and 160th (Welsh Border) Brigades were to begin crossing the Wadi Ghuzzeh at 03:30 and advance up the Burjabye and Es Sire ridges, while the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade which followed the 158th (North Wales) across the wadi was to remain close to the wadi until further orders were received. Money's Detachment was to cross the wadi mouth and hold a position in the sand dunes between the Rafa-Gaza road and the sea to divert the Ottoman defenders' attention and cover a section of the 15th Heavy Battery. A section of 91st Heavy Battery was to move into the wadi, while a section the 10th Heavy Battery of 60-pdrs was attached to the 160th Brigade Group. However, artillery ammunition was limited and was to be mainly targeted at the Labyrinth group of Ottoman defences. The mounted divisions were to isolate Gaza by stopping the Gaza garrison retiring and stopping any reinforcements from Huj and Hareira areas attempting to reinforce Gaza. They were to pursue any hostile force that showed signs of retiring, and if necessary support the main assault on Gaza by the 53rd (Welsh) Division. This division was to be reinforced if necessary by the 161st (Essex) Brigade of the 54th (East Anglian) Division. At 18:00 Murray, the commander in chief of the EEF, established his headquarters in the carriage of a railway train at El Arish.

Approach marches

On 26 March the day of battle, the attacking division, the 53rd (Welsh) Division, moved out from Deir el Belah at 01:00 in four columns towards El Breij, followed by the artillery. At 02:30 the Anzac Mounted Division left Deir el Belah with the Imperial Mounted Division following at 03:00, heading for the Um Jerrar crossing of the Wadi Ghazze 4.5 miles (7.2 km) east of Deir el Belah. Dallas established his battle headquarters near El Breij at 03:45, while Chetwode arrived at his headquarters at In Seirat at 06:37, although he intended to continue moving on to Sheikh Abbas. Dobell arrived from Rafa at his battle headquarters just north of In Seirat at 06:45.

Money's Detachment moved towards the wadi in preparation for crossing at dawn, while the 91st Heavy Battery was covered by the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry and the divisional cavalry squadron moved to a position on the Rafa-Gaza road. The 54th (East Anglian) Division marched from In Seirat and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade started from Abasan el Kebir. The mobile sections of the field ambulances, followed by their immobile sections and ambulance camel transport, moved towards their outpost positions northeast and east of Gaza. With the wadi crossed and strongly defended by the EEF, divisional engineers quickly began to develop a supply of water in the dry bed of the Wadi Ghuzzeh which was eventually sufficient for all troops engaged. Water was pumped into long rows of temporary canvas troughs for the horses.

Fog had begun to develop and from about 03:50 became very thick. It remained for about four hours, then began to lift. Just before dawn at 05:00, it was so dense that objects could not be seen 20 yards (18 m) away, but by this time most of the infantry had crossed the wadi. However, the fog made it impossible for Dallas to reconnoitre the proposed battleground and he waited at El Breij for it to lift while his two leading brigades moved slowly forward. Visibility was improving about 07:30, and by 07:55 the fog had lifted sufficiently for heliographs to be used. However, all aircraft in No. 1 Squadron had to return to their new landing ground at Rafa, as nothing of the ground could be seen from the air.

Despite the fog, the 53rd (Welsh) Division was moving forward to make a direct assault on Gaza. At 05:20, the 158th (North Wales) and the 160th (Welsh Border) infantry brigades were crossing the Wadi Ghuzze with the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade in reserve. By 06:50 the 160th (Welsh Border) Brigade had moved towards Shaluf and the 158th (North Wales) Brigade towards Mansura, but they were ordered to move more slowly under cover of the fog because artillery support may not have been available if the fog were to suddenly lift.

By 07:50, the leading battalions were approaching Sheikh Seehan without having encountered any Ottoman force. Between 08:15 and 08:55 hostile planes flew over the advancing infantry, firing their machine guns into the columns. By 08:30 the 160th (Welsh) Brigade was about 2,400 yards (2,200 m) with their leading battalion 2 miles (3.2 km) southwest of the commanding heights of their main objective Ali Muntar. The 158th (North Wales) Brigade had reached Mansura, and by 09:30 they were three quarters of a mile (1.2 km) north of 53rd (Welsh) Division's headquarters at Mansura.

Meanwhile, the 54th (East Anglian) Division (less 161st Essex Brigade in Eastern Force reserve) was ordered to cross the Wadi Ghuzzeh immediately after the mounted troops and take up a position at Sheikh Abbas to cover the rear of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, and keep the corridor open along which it was to attack. The division took up its position on Sheikh Abbas Ridge and began digging trenches facing east. The 161st (Essex) Brigade moved to El Burjabye, where it would be able to support either the 53rd (Welsh) Division or the 54th (East Anglian) Division, covering the right rear of the attack at Sheikh Abbas.

Position of the Anzac Mounted Division at about 09:30 (not labelled) with the Imperial Mounted Division, two columns of the 53rd (Welsh) Division and one column of the 54th (East Anglian) Division. Ottoman defences shown in green

While the fog made navigation difficult, it also shielded the movement of large bodies of troopers, so the two mounted divisions with the Imperial Camel Brigade attachedrapidly cut the roads leading to Gaza from the north and east to isolate the garrison in a 15 miles (24 km) long cavalry screen.

The Anzac Mounted Division first encountered hostile forces at 08:00. At that time the 7th Light Horse Regiment (2nd Light Horse Brigade) was attacked near Sheikh Abbas. Shortly afterwards, hostile aircraft fired machine guns on the leading Desert Column mounted troops. As the mounted screen crossed the Gaza to Beersheba road, they cut the telegraph lines, a patrol captured ten wagons, while other units captured 30 German pioneers and their pack-horses. At this time, the German commander at Tel esh Sheria, Kress von Kressenstein, received an aerial report describing the advance of two enemy infantry divisions towards Gaza, while about three enemy cavalry divisions and armoured cars had advanced north between Gaza and Tel esh Sheria. Major Tiller, commanding the Gaza garrison, reported later being attacked from the south, east, and northeast "in great strength." He was ordered to hold Gaza "to the last man."

Soon after 09:00 the 2nd Light Horse Brigade reached Beit Durdis, closely followed by the remainder of their Anzac Mounted Division. At 09:30 four "Officers Patrols" were sent forward towards Huj, Najd 3 miles (4.8 km) north northeast of Huj, Hareira, Tel el Sheria and towards the Ottoman railway. Anzac Mounted Divisional Headquarters were established at Beit Durdis and by 10:10 communications had been established by cable with Desert Column, the Imperial Mounted Division, and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade. Heliograph stations were also set up and wireless communications established, but the wireless was blocked by a more powerful enemy transmitter at Gaza. By 10:30 the 2nd Light Horse Brigade had taken up a position (known as Australia Hill) overlooking Gaza from the northeast and had occupied the village of Jebaliye, 2 miles (3.2 km) northeast of Gaza. Half an hour later, the 7th Light Horse Regiment (2nd Light Horse Brigade) was pushing westwards and by 11:30 had reached the coast of the Mediterranean Sea to complete the encirclement of Gaza. In the process the regiment captured the commander of the Ottoman 53rd Division, not to be confused with the 53rd (Welsh) Division, and his staff, who had been on their way to strengthen the Gaza garrison. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was concentrated near Beit Durdis, while the 22nd Mounted Brigade formed up south of them. Two squadrons of the 8th Light Horse Regiment (3rd Light Horse Brigade) moved towards Deir Sneid 7 miles (11 km) northeast of Gaza to watch and wait for the expected approach of reinforcements moving to strengthen Gaza.

The Imperial Mounted Division sent patrols towards Hareira, Tel esh Sheria, Kh. Zuheilika and Huj, on their way to Kh er Reseim where they arrived at 10:00, to meet with the Anzac Mounted Division. Meanwhile, at 09:45, a squadron from the Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars (5th Mounted Brigade) had encountered hostile units northwest of Kh. el Baha which they charged, capturing 60 prisoners. A further two squadrons of the 5th Mounted Brigade pushed forward towards Kh. el Baha south east of Kh er Reseim 1 mile (1.6 km) north of the Gaza to Beersheba road, where they remained in support. The Imperial Camel Brigade crossed the Wadi Ghuzzeh at Tel el Jemmi south of the crossings at Um Jerrar. They reached El Mendur on the bank of the Wadi esh Sheria and established an outpost line between the right of the 5th Mounted Brigade and the Wadi Ghuzzeh.

The two mounted divisions were now in position, watching for reinforcements expected to move towards Gaza. By between 11:00 and 11:35, more or less all mounted troops were under fire. This fire came from shells launched from Gaza or from German or Ottoman planes flying over Beit Durdis, as well as a long range gun, while another gun also fired on a mounted column. The battery of the 5th Mounted Brigade fired on small groups of Ottoman infantry, but the hostile long range gun accurately returned fire, causing this battery to change position. Very little fighting had yet taken place so far as the mounted units were concerned and the infantry attack was not making much progress. However, news was beginning to come in from the overwatching Desert Column patrols, describing movements in the direction of Huj and the Beersheba railway line, and columns of dust in the direction of Tel esh Sharia, all indicating large scale Ottoman Army movements in progress. However, by 12:00 Chetwode, commanding Desert Column, had not yet received any reports of Ottoman reinforcements moving towards Gaza and he sent a message to Chauvel commanding the Anzac Mounted Division, and Hodgson commanding the Imperial Mounted Division, to prepare to send a brigade each to assist the infantry attack on Gaza.

Battle

Infantry attack

Four arrow headed red dotted lines indicate direction of infantry attack

Gaza was now completely surrounded and, following Desert Column's orders, the 53rd (Welsh) Division, which had not seen action since the Gallipoli campaign, made a direct attack from the south and east towards Ali Muntar. Their 160th (Welsh Border) Brigade advanced towards Esh Sheluf to get into position by 08:30, with the 158th (North Wales) Brigade advancing towards Mansura, while the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade, which had crossed the wadi by 08:25, had to wait an hour before Dallas ordered them to Mansura to support the 158th Brigade. This delay meant that the 159th could not get into position to take part in the attack until noon. Dallas "had not yet decided" what to do with the 159th. He was at the 158th Brigade's headquarters when he met with his brigadiers at 10:15 to discuss detailed arrangements of the attack. During this time Dallas had been out of communication with Chetwode for two hours while his headquarters was moved forward. Dallas contacted Chetwode at 10:50 and blamed the delay on the difficulty of bringing the artillery forward, but confirmed he would be prepared to attack at 12:00. The artillery was in fact already in position between the Burjabye and Es sire Ridges, although communications had not been established, and had begun firing at 10:10. Fog has been blamed for the delayed infantry attack.

Dallas received his orders at 11:00 for the attack, and half an hour later Dobell and Chetwode ordered him to launch his attack forthwith. Dallas ordered the attack to begin at 11:45 on Ali Muntar by the 158th (North Wales) and the 160th (Welsh Border) Brigades. The 160th (Welsh Border) Brigade approached Ali Muntar along the Es Sire Ridge while the 158th (North Wales) advanced from Mansura to also attack Ali Muntar. These two brigades were about 2.5 miles (4.0 km) from their objectives with patrols going forward towards Ali Muntar. The 159th (Cheshire) Brigade (less one battalion), which had not yet arrived at Mansura, was to cover their right and attack the hummock known as Clay Hill to the north of Ali Muntar on the other side of the Gaza to Beersheba road. These brigades were to be supported by two field artillery brigades, while the divisional reserve was formed by the one battalion of the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade, until the arrival of the 161st (Essex) Brigade (Eastern Force's 54th Division).

Dallas phoned Desert Corps at "10.4" [sic] to be told that the 161st (Essex) Brigade and the 271st RFA were at Sheikh Nebhan. However, they had moved to an exposed position at El Burjabye before finding a covered position in the valley between the Burjabye and Es Sire Ridges. At 11:45 the 161st (Essex) Brigade was ordered to move up to Mansura but apparently the message was never received. At 13:10 an order which had originated from Eastern Force at 12:45 was finally received by hand from a staff officer or motorcyclist. In support the 54th (East Anglian) Division (less one brigade in Eastern Force reserve) was ordered to cross the Wadi Ghuzzeh immediately after the mounted troops and take up a position at Sheikh Abbas, to cover the rear of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, and keep open the corridor along which the attack was launched. By 11:30 Desert Column staff considered that the 53rd (Welsh) Division was practically stationary, and the following message was sent to Dallas: "I am directed to observe that (1) you have been out of touch with Desert Column and your own headquarters for over two hours; (2) no gun registration appears to have been carried out; (3) that time is passing, and that you are still far from your objective; (4) that the Army and Column Commanders are exercised at the loss of time, which is vital; (5) you must keep a general staff officer at your headquarters who can communicate with you immediately; (6) you must launch your attack forthwith." A similar message was sent again at 12:00.

The artillery bombardment began at 12:00 although there was no artillery program and the Ottoman defences had not been identified. Infantry in the 158th (North Wales) and 160th (Welsh Border) Brigades had been in position awaiting orders for between three and four hours, while the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade rapidly deployed. These attacking infantry brigades met with stubborn opposition from determined defenders, firing from strong entrenchments with a clear view of the infantry line of advance, over completely open ground. In these conditions, the attacking infantry's artillery support proved inadequate and a very high number of casualties was suffered.

Combined attack

Positions of the attacking force shown in red and hostile force in green at about 14:00

By noon Chetwode had become concerned that the strength of the opposition to the infantry attack could make it impossible to capture Gaza before dark. He then ordered Chauvel and Hodgson to reconnoitre towards Gaza, warning them to be prepared to supply one brigade each to reinforce the infantry attack. At 13:00 he put Chauvel in command of both divisions. The order took an hour to reach Chauvel. So by 14:00 Chauvel was ordering the whole of the Anzac Mounted Division to attack Gaza from the north, while the Imperial Mounted Division and Imperial Camel Brigade, supported by Nos 11 and 12 Light Armoured Motor Batteries and No. 7 Light Car Patrol, took over the outpost line and all observation posts. The Anzac Mounted Division was replaced in the mounted screen by the Imperial Mounted Division, which in turn was replaced by the Imperial Camel Brigade so the Anzac Mounted Division could launch their attack.

Positions of the mounted screen (in red) and hostile forces (in green) at 14:00

It took time to move Chauvel's headquarters to a knoll between Beit Durdis and Gaza so he could oversee operations. It was not until during a meeting there at 15:15 that orders were issued for the mounted division's attack. The Anzac Mounted Division was to attack from the north, with the 2nd Light Horse Brigade on a front extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gaza to Jebalieh road, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade covering the front from the Gaza-Jebalieh road to the top of the ridge running northeast, while the Lincolnshire Yeomanry and Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry regiments, of the 22nd Mounted Brigade, took over the front from the right of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade to the track leading to Beit Durdis.

During this time, the infantry attack on Gaza by the 53rd (Welsh) Division had been progressing. By 13:30, the 160th (Welsh Border) Brigade on the left had advanced rapidly and captured the Labyrinth, a maze of entrenched gardens due south of Gaza. Their 2/10th Middlesex Regiment had established itself on a grassy hill, while their 1/4th Royal Sussex Regiment had advanced up the centre of the Es Sire ridge under intense hostile fire while suffering heavy casualties, including their commanding officer. Having reached the crest, they were forced to fall back in some disorder. However, after being reinforced at 16:00 they recommenced their advance. On the right the 158th (North Wales) Brigade's 1/5th Royal Welsh Fusiliers battalion reached the cactus hedges south of Ali Muntar, where they paused to wait for supporting battalions to come up on their right. Along with the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade, these two brigades slowly fought their way forward towards Clay Hill. Meanwhile, Dallas ordered the 161st (Essex) Brigade and 54th (East Anglian) Division to capture Green Hill and fill the gap between the 158th (North Wales) and 160th (Welsh Border) Brigades. By 15:30 the 161st (Essex) Brigade had reached Mansura and they were in a position to launch their attack at 16:00 with the arrival of the 271st Brigade RFA. The fire from this artillery brigade dampened the hostile machine gun fire from Clay Hill, and at 15:50, 45 minutes after the 161st (Essex) Brigade joined the battle, the infantry succeeded in entering the defenders' trenches. They entered at two places to the east of the Ali Muntar mosque, capturing 20 Germans and Austrians and another 20 Ottomans. The 53rd (Welsh) Division reported the successful capture of Clay Hill at 16:45, with a position within 600 yards (550 m) of Ali Muntar.

The attack by the Anzac Mounted Division, began twenty minutes ahead of schedule at 15:40, before all the patrols had been relieved by the Imperial Mounted Division. The attacking division was supported by the Leicester and Ayrshire artillery batteries, which came into action at ranges of between 3,000 and 4,500 yards (2,700 and 4,100 m) from their targets, respectively. Shortly after the attack began, Chetwode sent messages emphasising the importance of this attack, warning that the trench line northwest of Gaza between El Meshaheran and El Mineh on the sea was strongly held, and offering another brigade from the Imperial Mounted Division, which Chauvel accepted. Hodgson sent the 3rd Light Horse Brigade.

At 16:15, five minutes after the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade captured the redoubt near Ali Muntar, the attack on Gaza from the north by the Anzac Mounted Division's 2nd Light Horse Brigade, supported by the Somerset artillery battery, began to develop. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade, advancing on the northern side towards the town, had not been seriously engaged until they reached the cactus hedges where they were strongly resisted in close, intense fighting. The cactus hedges forced the light horsemen to dismount, however, the assault soon developed and progress was rapid. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade was supported by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. The New Zealanders moved forward with the Canterbury Mounted Rifle Regiment in advance and the Wellington Mounted Rifle Regiment in support, extending their right. However, only three troops of the Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment were in position, the remainder being delayed in the mounted screen by strong hostile columns of reinforcements advancing from Huj and Nejed to the attack.

At 16:23, the high ridge east of Gaza was captured by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, while the 22nd Mounted Brigade on their left captured the knoll running west from the ridge. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade's headquarters subsequently took up a position on the ridge, in an area later called "Chaytor's Hill", while the Wellington and Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiments pressed on towards Gaza. Only four machine guns were attached to each of these regiments, the remaining four being held in reserve. Between 16:30 and 17:00, Ali Muntar was captured by the infantry and the dismounted New Zealanders. The Canterbury Mounted Rifles Regiment had pushed along 'The Ridge' from the rear to assist in the attack, one squadron swinging south against Ali Muntar to enter the defenders' trenches just after the infantry.

File:Powles p.92 Gaza.jpg

Two Krupp Guns captured by the Wellington Mounted Rifle Regiment

By dusk the light horsemen had reached the northern and western outskirts of the town. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade's dismounted fighters advanced from Jebaliye against the east and northeast of Gaza to assist in the capture of Ali Muntar, before pushing on through a very enclosed region. This area was intersected with cactus hedges, buildings, and rifle pits occupied by defending riflemen, who strongly resisted the attackers. Despite considerable opposition the New Zealanders continued to slowly advance through the orchards and cactus hedges to the outskirts of the town. During this advance, the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment captured two 77-mm Krupp guns with limbers and ammunition. Subsequently, when their progress was stopped by snipers in several houses on the eastern outskirts of the town, they pushed the Krupp guns forward to fire point blank, blowing up several houses and causing the surrender of 20 hostile soldiers. The 22nd Mounted Brigade, advancing at the gallop along the track from Beit Durdis to Gaza, had also reached the outskirts of the town by dusk.

By nightfall, the Anzac Mounted Division had fought their way into the streets of Gaza, suffering very few casualties during this fighting. While the attack in the centre by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was progressing, the 22nd Mounted Brigade had come up on the New Zealanders' left, and it was this attacking force that entered the town. Meanwhile, the 2nd Light Horse Brigade met stiff resistance from defenders holding entrenchments in the sand hills to the northwest of the town. Closest to the Mediterranean coast, the 7th Light Horse Regiment (2nd Light Horse Brigade) met considerable opposition but was eventually able to advance close up to the town.

Position at about 1800

By 18:00, the position of the attacking force was most satisfactory and by 18:30 the whole position had been captured and the defenders were retreating into the town centre. The Wellington Mounted Rifle Regiment and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade were well into the northern outskirts of the town. Units of the 158th (North Wales) Brigade and the Canterbury Mounted Rifle Regiment held Ali Muntar, the 159th (Cheshire) Brigade's right was holding trenches on Clay Hill, while its left was south of the town holding the Gaza to Beersheba road. The 161st (Essex) Brigade held Green Hill and the 160th (Welsh Border) Brigade was north of the Labyrinth. By nightfall this combined force was consolidating its captured positions. Only on the southwestern side of Gaza in the sand hills had the attack not been completely successful.

Mounted screen attacked

Position of the mounted screen (in red) and hostile forces (in green) at 18:00

At 14:20 Hodgson ordered his Imperial Mounted Division to move north and take over the Anzac Mounted Division's outpost positions. The 6th Mounted Brigade was to move to the east of Beit Durdis, while the 5th Mounted Brigade, currently astride the Gaza to Beersheba road, was to "fill the gap between it and the Camel Brigade," which had orders to move to Kh er Reseim. Owing to a delay in the Camel Brigade receiving its orders, this relief was not completed until two hours later, after 18:30 when the 5th Mounted Brigade moved 2 miles (3.2 km) north.

Meanwhile, the Ottoman Fourth Army's 3rd and 16th Infantry Divisions prepared to launch a counterattack by 1,000 men advancing towards Gaza. The two divisions were expected to be in action before dark, but the EEF cavalry and armoured cars were able to stop their advance before they were halfway from Tel esh Sheria to Gaza. Von Kressenstein did not persist with the attack but ordered a renewal of their attacks at dawn. From the north, about 300 hostile reinforcements had been seen at 15:50 (ten minutes after the combined attack on Gaza began) marching towards Gaza, and a little later three columns were reported moving in the same direction, while another 300 soldiers had moved into the sand hills west of Deir Sineid, to the north of Gaza. A squadron from the 22nd Mounted Yeomanry Brigade was sent to oppose these forces.

From the east, units of the Ottoman Army had first been reported at 14:20, advancing from the direction of Jemmameh (to the east of Huj). When they were about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) from Beit Durdis, they attacked the Desert Column outposts holding Hill 405. Two squadrons and one troop of Berkshire Yeomanry of the 6th Mounted Brigade had taken command of the front, sending back information about the attack by infantry, mounted troops, and some machine gun crews. Hodgson ordered the brigade with the support of the Berkshire Battery RHA to reinforce the outposts. However, the 6th Mounted Brigade was in the process of watering and could not start at once. The delay allowed the Ottoman force to capture the crest of Hill 405 at 17:15.

Hodgson, commanding the mounted screen, asked Chauvel, commanding the mounted attack on Gaza, for reinforcements at 17:00. Chauvel sent back the 8th and 9th Light Horse Regiments of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General J. R. Royston. The two regiments moved back quickly to capture a high hill northwest of Hill 405, which enabled the 6th Mounted Brigade to hold onto their position. The two light horse regiments were deployed, with the 1/1st Queen's Own Dorset Yeomanry and 6th Mounted Brigade on their right, the 1st Nottinghamshire Battery Royal Horse Artillery on the left of the 6th Mounted Brigade, and the Berkshire Battery in the centre, to enfilade the advancing hostile formations. Despite considerable damage already being done by six hostile guns in their firing line, more hostile guns were brought forward. When three hostile batteries enfiladed the Berkshire Battery, the battery was forced to withdraw at about 18:30, just before dusk.

After his divisional headquarters had moved north, Hodgson discovered that he had lost contact with the 5th Mounted Brigade. It was nearly dark when, at 17:30, a gap occurred in the line between the 6th Mounted Brigade and Imperial Camel Brigade at Kh er Reseim. Fortunately, hostile soldiers did not attempt to investigate the area before Chauvel sent back his divisional reserve, the 10th Light Horse Regiment (3rd Light Horse Brigade), to fill the gap. In the growing darkness the light horse regiment succeeded in reaching its position.

The No. 7 Light Car Patrol was sent up the road to reinforce units holding off hostile reinforcements from Deir Sineid at 17:15. These units were the original two squadrons of 6th Light Horse Regiment (2nd Light Horse Brigade) holding the main road to the north which were reinforced by a squadron of 22nd Mounted Brigade and another two squadrons of 6th Light Horse Regiment. The Nos. 11 and 12 Light Armoured Motor Batteries (LAMB) reinforced Desert Column units opposing about 4,000 hostile soldiers advancing from the direction of Huj and Jemmameh. These Ottoman Army units were reported to be 3,000 infantry and two squadrons of cavalry. The LAMBs reported to Royston and engaged the Ottoman Army until dark.

Withdrawal

Positions at 18:30 on 26 March 1917

During the battle, serious pressure was expected from the east from reinforcements marching to relieve Gaza. In view of the late start to the battle and the threat from reinforcements, Dobell, the commander of Eastern Force, after talking with Chetwode, the commander of Desert Column, decided that unless Gaza was captured by nightfall, the fighting must stop and the mounted force withdraw. The threat from reinforcements had begun to make an impact by 16:00. By this time, some of the strongly designed trenches and redoubts of the Ottoman Army defending Gaza were still held and the British infantry casualties were substantial, while some 304 shells and 150,000 rounds of small arms ammunition had been fired. On the 26 March 1917, the sun set at 18:00 (Cairo time), before Desert Column was aware of the capture of Ali Muntar. Therefore, with the approval of Dobell, at 18:10 Chetwode ordered Chauvel to withdraw the mounted force and retire across the Wadi Ghuzzeh. As Chetwode's orders to Chauvel to withdraw were being dispatched, a report came in from Dallas that Ali Muntar had been captured, but this information did not change Chetwode's mind. It was not until some time later that he was informed of the capture of the entire ridge. Chetwode's orders were to break off the action after dark and withdraw the two mounted divisions to Deir el Belah, while the Imperial Camel Brigade moved to extend the right of the 54th (East Anglian) Division to the Wadi Ghuzzee.

The Anzac Mounted Division "knew they were winning, and saw victory snatched away from them by the order to withdraw." This decision to withdraw was puzzling to many of those fighting in and near the town, as the infantry held Ali Muntar and 462 German and Ottoman army prisoners, including a general who was a divisional commander. They had also captured an Austrian battery of two Krupp 77mm field guns, along with a complete convoy.

However, between 27 and 28 March the whole attacking force was withdrawn to Deir el Belah and Khan Yunus. The first units to withdraw were all the slow moving wheels and camels, which received their orders at 17:00 from Desert Column. They were to move back to Hill 310 via Sheikh Abbas. The withdrawal of the fighting mounted units was also slow and difficult, not because of hostile pressure (there was none until dawn) but because the units were intermixed and the dismounted troops were far from their horses. One unit, the 7th Light Horse Regiment (2nd Light Horse Brigade) was nearly 4 miles (6.4 km) from their horses and all their wounded had not yet been collected. However, the Imperial Mounted Division remained in position to cover the retirement of the Anzac Mounted Division, beginning with the artillery.

The No. 7 Light Car Patrol reported to the headquarters of the Anzac Mounted Division at 18:40 and was ordered to return to base, while Nos. 11 and 12 LAM Batteries camped in the vicinity of Kh er Reseim. At 19:05 Anzac Mounted Division's artillery began its retirement from divisional headquarters under escort, and the 43 wounded from the Anzac Mounted Division and 37 wounded from Imperial Mounted Division were collected and brought to the ambulances, while prisoners were sent back under escort. At 19:30 the 22nd Mounted Brigade was moving toward Divisional Headquarters and the 6th Mounted Brigade drew back while Ottoman soldiers dug in on Hill 405.

At about midnight the Imperial Mounted Division, with the assistance of the Imperial Camel Brigade and armoured motor car patrols, held off the Ottoman reinforcements until the Anzac Mounted Division was clear of the battlefield. At 02:00 when the guns of Anzac Mounted Division had reached Dier el Belah and the division was just passed Beit Dundis, Hodgson gave orders for the concentration of the Imperial Mounted Division's 3rd Light Horse, 5th, and 6th Mounted Brigades, while the Imperial Camel Brigade took up a line from the Wadi Guzzeh to the left of the 54th (East Anglian) Division's headquarters.

At 04:30, Nos. 11 and 12 LAM Batteries broke camp near Kh er Reseim, and as they moved to the south encountered opposition from Ottoman Army units. After two hours of stiff fighting they managed to retire, while at 04:50 No. 7 Light Car Patrol was moving along the Gaza to Beersheba road. It was not until 05:30 that an Ottoman attack in strength fell on the rear of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade just as the brigade was crossing the Gaza-Beersheba road near Kh Sihan. The No. 7 Light Car Patrol gave very effective support to the brigade, and together with the light horsemen, became heavily engaged with the Ottoman Army advancing from Huj. The Ottoman advance was rebuffed and the light cars covered the 3rd Light Horse Brigade's retirement to the Imperial Camel Brigade at 07:00 on the morning of 27 March 1917.

I wish to draw special attention to the excellent service rendered by the Imperial Mtd Div under Major General H.W. Hodgson CB CVO, in holding off greatly superior forces of the enemy during the afternoon of the 26th and the night of 26/27th thus enabling the A & NZ Mtd Div to assist in the Infantry attack on Gaza and subsequently to withdraw after dark. Had the work of this Division been less efficiently carried out it would have been quite impossible to extricate the A & NZ Mtd Div without very serious losses.

— Chauvel commanding Anzac Mounted Division, Account of Operations dated 4 April 1917

Infantry withdrawal

Although a withdrawal is not mentioned, at 17:38 Dobell ordered the 54th (East Anglian) Division to move 2 miles (3.2 km) to the west to Burjabye Ridge without informing the 53rd (Welsh) Division, although he did inform Desert Column. An hour later, at 18:35 (25 minutes after Chetwode ordered Chauvel to withdraw), Dobell informed Chaytor at Desert Column and the 54th (East Anglian) Division "that he contemplated withdrawing the whole force across the Wadi Ghazze if Gaza did not shortly fall."

There have been claims that the infantry were the first to retire and that, due to a communications breakdown, the 53rd (Welsh) Division made a complete and premature retirement. However, it was not until just before 19:00 that Chetwode phoned Dallas, commander of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, to inform him of the withdrawal of the mounted troops and the need for him to withdraw his right to reestablish contact with the 54th (East Anglian) Division. Dallas was under the impression that he was to make contact at Sheikh Abbas, 4 miles (6.4 km) from his right on Clay Hill, while Chetwode meant that contact should be made with the 54th (East Anglian) Division's new left flank 1 mile (1.6 km) north of Mansura and not much over 1 mile (1.6 km) from the 161st (Essex) Brigade, 54th (East Anglian) Division, at Green Hill. Dallas protested, instead asking for reinforcements to close the gap between the two divisions. This request was denied and when he prevaricated, asking for time to consider the order, Chetwode gave him the verbal order, believing the 53rd (Welsh) Division was moving its right back to gain touch with the 54th (East Anglian) Division near Mansura. "Dallas states that he had explained on the telephone the full extent of his withdrawal to General Chetwode; the latter states that he did not understand his subordinate to mean that he was abandoning anything like so much ground. In any case the responsibility rests upon Desert Column Headquarters, since General Dallas had telegraphed to it the line he was taking up."

As late as 21:12, the 53rd (Welsh) Division still held Ali Muntar, at which time they advised Desert Column they would have to evacuate towards Sheikh Abbas to conform with a withdrawal occurring on their right. At 22:30 Dallas, commander of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, issued orders for the whole of his force to withdraw to a line which stretched from the caves at Tell el Ujul, near the Wadi Ghuzzeh on the left through a point 1 mile (1.6 km) north of Esh Sheluf, and on to Mansura and Sheikh Abbas involving a retirement of 1 mile (1.6 km) on the Es Sire Ridge and 3 miles (4.8 km) between Clay Hill and Mansura. He informed Desert Column of this move. By 23:00, Dobell had become aware of the extent of the 53rd (Welsh) Division's successes. He also received intercepted wireless messages, which had been unduly delayed, between Kress von Kressenstein at Tel esh Sheria and Major Tiller, the German officer commanding the Gaza garrison, indicating the desperate situation of the garrison. Dobell immediately ordered Chetwode and Dallas to dig in on their present line, connecting his right with the 54th (East Anglian) Division. It was nearly midnight when Dallas discovered the 54th (East Anglian) Division was moving towards the north of Mansura – had he known of this move at the time he would not have abandoned all of the captured positions.

Reoccupations and retreats

At 05:00 on 27 March, when Chetwode learned that the 53rd (Welsh) Division had abandoned its entire position, he ordered the infantry division back to Ali Muntar. Dallas ordered the 160th (Welsh Border) Brigade (53rd Division) and 161st (Essex) Brigades (54th Division) to push forward with strong patrols to the positions they had held on the previous evening. Both Green Hill and Ali Muntar were found to be unoccupied and one company of the 1/7th Battalion Essex Regiment, (161st Brigade) reoccupied Ali Muntar, while two companies of the same battalion reoccupied Green Hill. After the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Middlesex Regiment (160th Brigade) had pushed forward patrols beyond Sheluf, the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Queen's Royal West Surry or West Kent Regiment (160th Brigade) was ordered "to advance and gain touch" with the 161st Brigade. However, as the battalion advanced in artillery formation, they could see the 161st Brigade to the northeast "falling back." Meanwhile the 1/1st Battalion, Herefordshire Regiment (158th Brigade, 53rd Division) had also been ordered to reoccupy their brigade's position and was advancing when they too saw the 161st Brigade withdrawing.

After dawn on 27 March the first Ottoman counterattacks recaptured Ali Muntar and a portion of Green Hill, but the 1/7th Battalion of the Essex Regiment, (161st Brigade, 54th Division), retook the positions before consolidating and re-establishing their posts. Meanwhile the Ottoman force, which had attacked the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, appeared on Sheikh Abbas and shelled the rear of Dallas' position, "including his reserves, medical units and transport camels," but made no serious attack on the 54th (East Anglian) Division holding Burjabye Ridge. The hostile artillery batteries at Sheikh Abbas also targeted all the tracks across the Wadi Ghuzzeh, imperiling the Egyptian Camel Transport Corps, who at the time were supplying food, water and ammunition to the forward units.

At 08:00 Dallas and the 53rd (Welsh) Division came under orders of Eastern Force, and Dobell received an appreciation from Dallas at 09:15. This stated that if the present positions of the 53rd (Welsh) and 54th (East Anglian) Divisions were to be maintained, the German and Ottoman occupation of Sheikh Abbas must be ended. This was confirmed by G. P. Dawnay, Brigadier General General Staff (BGGS), Eastern Force who thought that unless Sheikh Abbas could be occupied, the line at its current position could not be held for three or four days. Dallas suggested Sheikh Abbass might best be recaptured by Desert Column, as the 52nd (Lowland) Division was too far away.

However, by 08:10 the Imperial Mounted Division had arrived back at Deir el Belah and the Anzac Mounted Division was marching via Abu Thirig past Hill 310 where Chauvel met Chetwode. Chetwode ordered the horses of both divisions to water and return to a position near El Dameita to support an attempt by the infantry to retake Ali Muntar. At 08:30 when the Anzac Mounted Division also arrived back at Deir el Belah, Chetwode took over command of the two mounted divisions from Chauvel. Ali Muntar, which had been held by two battalions of the Essex Regiment (54th Division), was strongly attacked, and at 09:30 the British infantry were forced to withdraw, having suffered severe losses. They fell back to Green Hill where they were almost surrounded, but managed to withdraw to a line south of Ali Muntar halfway between that hill and Sheluf.

The Anzac Mounted Division returned to take up a position near El Dameita which it held until 16:00, while the 54th (East Anglian) Division remained near Sheikh Abbas engaging the advancing Ottoman units from Beersheba. After first advising Murray, at 16:30 Dobell issued orders for the withdrawal to the left bank of the Wadi Ghuzzeh of the 53rd (Welsh) and 54th (East Anglian) Divisions under the command of Dallas. This retirement, which began at 19:00, was completed without interference from the Ottoman Army. An aerial reconnaissance on the morning of 28 March reported that no Ottoman units were within range of the British guns. No large scale attacks were launched by either side, but very active aircraft bombings and artillery duels continued.

Casualties

British prisoners

British casualties amounted to 4,000; 523 killed, 2932 wounded and over 512 missing, including five officers and 241 other ranks known to be prisoners. These were mainly from the 53rd (Welsh) Division and the 161st (Essex) Brigade of the 54th (East Anglian) Division. The Ottoman Army forces suffered a total of 2,447 casualties. Of these, 16 Germans and Austrians were killed or wounded, while 41 were reported missing, while the Ottomans suffered 1,370 killed or wounded and 1,020 missing. According to Cemal Pasha, Ottoman losses amounted to less than 300 men killed, 750 wounded, and 600 missing. The Anzac Mounted Division suffered six killed, 43 or 46 wounded, and two missing, while the Imperial Mounted Division suffered 37 casualties.

Aftermath

In itself the engagement was a severe blow to the British Army, since it affected the troops on both sides to a degree out of all proportion to the casualties suffered, or to the negative victory gained by the Turks. There was not a single private in the British infantry, or a trooper in the mounted brigades, who did not believe that failure was due to staff bungling and to nothing else.

— Henry Gullett, Official Australian Historian

Both Murray and Dobell portrayed the battle as a success. Murray sent the following message to the War Office:

We have advanced our troops a distance of fifteen miles from Rafa to the Wadi Ghuzzee, five miles west of Gaza, to cover the construction of the railway. On the 26th and 27th we were heavily engaged east of Gaza with a force of about 20,000 of the enemy. We inflicted very heavy losses upon him. It is estimated that his losses were between 6,000 and 7,000. We have in addition 900 prisoners, including the GOC and the whole of the staff of 53 Ottoman Division. This figure includes four Austrian officers and 32 Austrian and five German other ranks. We captured two Austrian guns. All troops behaved splendidly.

— General Murray 28 March 1917

And Dobell wrote,

This action has had the result of bringing the enemy to battle, and he will now undoubtedly stand with all his available force in order to fight us when we are prepared to attack. It has also given our troops an opportunity of displaying the splendid fighting qualities they possess. So far as all ranks of the troops engaged were concerned, it was a brilliant victory, and had the early part of the day been normal victory would have been secured. Two more hours of daylight would have sufficed to finish the work the troops so magnificently executed after a period of severe hardship and long marches, and in the face of most stubborn resistance.

— General Dobell

The British press reported the battle as a success, but afterwards an Ottoman plane dropped a message that said, "You beat us at communiqués, but we beat you at Gaza." Dallas, the commander of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, resigned after the battle, owing to a "breakdown in health." Judged by Western Front standards, the defeat was small and not very costly. Murray's offensive power had not been greatly affected and preparations for a renewal of the offensive were quickly begun. The Second Battle of Gaza began on 17 April 1917.

Notes

Footnotes

Citations

References

• "3rd Light Horse Brigade War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 10-3-15, 17, 20, 26, 44. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. April, June, September 1916 & March 1917, September 1918. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
• "22nd Mounted Brigade Headquarters War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 9-2-1. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. March 1917.
• "Anzac Mounted Division General Staff War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 1-60-13 Part 1. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. March 1917.
• "Desert Column, Headquarters War Diary". First World War Diaries AWM4, 1-64-3 Part 1. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. March 1917.
• Mounted Service Manual for Mounted Troops of the Australian Commonwealth. Sydney: Government Printer. 1902. OCLC 62574193.
• Blenkinsop, Layton John; Rainey, John Wakefield, eds. (1925). History of the Great War Based on Official Documents Veterinary Services. London: H.M. Stationers. OCLC 460717714.
• Bou, Jean (2009). Light Horse: A History of Australia's Mounted Arm. Australian Army History. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-19708-3.
• Bruce, Anthony (2002). The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-5432-2.
• Carver, Michael, Field Marshal Lord (2003). The National Army Museum Book of The Turkish Front 1914–1918 The Campaigns at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine. London: Pan Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-283-07347-2.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Cutlack, Frederic Morley (1941). The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War, 1914–1918. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918. Vol. Volume VIII (11th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 220900299. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
• Downes, Rupert M. (1938). "The Campaign in Sinai and Palestine". In Butler, Arthur Graham (ed.). Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea. Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918. Vol. Volume 1 Part II (2nd ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. pp. 547–780. OCLC 220879097. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
• Dennis, Peter (2008). The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (2nd ed.). Melbourne: Oxford University Press, Australia & New Zealand. ISBN 9780195517842. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Erickson, Edward J. (2001). Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War. No. 201 Contributions in Military Studies. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press. OCLC 43481698.
• Erickson, Edward J. (2007). Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I: A Comparative Study. No. 26 of Cass Series: Military History and Policy. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-96456-9. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
• Falls, Cyril (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from the Outbreak of War with Germany to June 1917. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 1. London: HM Stationery Office. OCLC 610273484. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Grainger, John D. (2006). The Battle for Palestine, 1917. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. ISBN 978-1-84383-263-8.
• Gullett, Henry S. (1941). The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914–1918. Official History of Australian in the War of 1914–1918. Vol. Volume VII (11th ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 220900153. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
• Hill, A. J. (1978). Chauvel of the Light Horse: A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel, GCMG, KCB. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. ISBN 978-0-522-84146-6.
• Keogh, E. G. (1955). Suez to Aleppo. Melbourne: Directorate of Military Training by Wilkie & Co. OCLC 220029983. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• McPherson, Joseph W. (1985). The Man Who Loved Egypt: Bimbashi McPherson. London: Ariel Books BBC. ISBN 978-0-563-20437-4. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
• Moore, A. Briscoe (1920). The Mounted Riflemen in Sinai & Palestine: The Story of New Zealand's Crusaders. Christchurch: Whitcombe & Tombs. OCLC 156767391.
• Powles, C. Guy (1922). The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine. Official History New Zealand's Effort in the Great War. Vol. Volume III. Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs. OCLC 2959465. {{cite book}}: |volume= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Preston, R. M. P. (1921). The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account of the Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria 1917–1918. London: Constable & Co. OCLC 3900439.
• Pugsley, Christoper (2004). The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War. Auckland: Reed Books. ISBN 978-0-7900-0941-4.
• Wavell, Field Marshal Earl (1968) [1933]. "The Palestine Campaigns". In Sheppard, Eric William (ed.). A Short History of the British Army (4th ed.). London: Constable & Co. OCLC 35621223.
• Woodward, David R. (2006). Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-2383-7.