Talk:Operation Market Garden

NPOV and OR

I know this subject generates a lot of passion. But at the moment – and without taking a position on who, if anyone, is right – the article and particularly the Debate on Allied strategy and tactics is a mess of PoV statements and original research, some sourced and some not. To maintain NPOV are we not supposed to give the source of opinions?

For example, the section below is not sourced and gives a PoV ("lack of guts") without attributing it (except vaguely to "both the British 1st Airborne and the U.S. 82nd Airborne") and the unsourced "Hypothetically" suggests OR as well:

"Hypothetically, had XXX Corps pushed north, they might have arrived at the south end and secured it (had the Guards Armoured sent more than five Sherman tanks across the bridge and had they not been later stopped by the German position at Ressen), leaving the way open for another crossing to the north at some other point. There was the smaller possibility of arriving with Frost's force intact. This perceived "lack of guts" caused some bitterness at the time among members of both the British 1st Airborne and the U.S. 82nd Airborne. As it was, XXX Corps did not resume the drive to Arnhem that night, but rather eighteen hours later."

My point is not whether this is correct or not - it's that it's not NPOV and it's OR.

I'm unsure how to proceed, as I don't want to delete large chunks of the article without discussion, given the sensitivity.

--Shimbo (talk) 13:34, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

The debate exists on whether this operation was a success or not, as most of these talk discussions attest. The typical measure of success is against the strategy set beforehand. Tactics involve who did what, and how much or how little, which is important for assigning blame. These debates started during the operation, quickly gained momentum afterwards, and remain in the present. So, yes, the section is petty, but the ongoing debate centers on these issues, petty or not. The section can certainly be improved, but it's stable for the moment. If removed, I suspect it will restart a lot of POV edits. Handle with care. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 01:05, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

I don't think that really addresses the point. Yes of course there has been much debate for many years over the blame for the failure of Market Garden, but Wikipedia is not a forum for debate. Wikipedia aspires to be NPOV and to only have reliably sourced information. Many reliable sources have participated in the debate and could be referenced, but aren't. Wikipedia is not supposed to present Wikipedian's opinion as fact, nor is it supposed to contain original research. This article includes both currently, IMO. My question is how to resolve that, which leaving the POV and OR in will not do. --Shimbo (talk) 11:42, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

One comment on the opening sentence that states this a "failed...military operation". It was certainly not a "failure" from the German point of view. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2600:6C50:7008:200:C912:C8E2:6D18:1801 (talk) 06:06, 31 July 2020 (UTC)

I agree that how to resolve this is a question; my point is I don't know how. Previous attempts at bringing sources for this (here and related articles) were beaten back with accusations of NPOV and other drama. At least the article is not currently a battlegound. Thus my only advice: precede with care. --A D Monroe III^(talk) 22:29, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Anything that is not sourced can be removed, and cannot be restored without a proper reference. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:18, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Disadvantages of this article

What were the goals of this military operation? This remains unclear. Only the results of the operation are described. This is not enough to understand the historical event. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.155.64.26 (talk) 05:28, 11 February 2020 (UTC)

Meanwhile, the goals of this military operation were very ambitious. In fact, the goal was to "end the war by Christmas", taking control of the main part of Germany and its capital Berlin. thus, it had a political goal-to ensure the political dominance of the United States and Britain in the post-war world. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.155.64.26 (talk) 05:41, 11 February 2020 (UTC)

Actually the point of Market Garden was not for XXX corps to get across the Rhine and then charge for Berlin (which is obviously impossible - it's a single armoured corps) but for 21st Army Group as a whole be in a position (across the Lower Rhine) to form the northern arm of a pincer movement to encircle the Ruhr, cutting off the main armament producing area of Germany - something that eventually happened (see Ruhr Pocket). Still an ambitious goal, but not as crazy as a single corps charging for Berlin. --Shimbo (talk) 11:54, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Wow. It is not necessary to bring the opponent's idea to the point of absurdity. Operation "MG" was aimed at solving large problems. The crossing of the river Rhine was only stage 1. I insist that the goals were set very significant. Today we know the results. But what did they know then in September 1944? Successfully made the landing and in 2 months liberated France and went half the way to Berlin. Why not set a goal to pass this second half in 2 months? To do this, you need to cross the river Rhine. This is where the operation "MG" comes from. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 12:09, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

I can quote Montgomery's memoirs (translated from Russian): I will End this Chapter with another quote about the battle of Arnhem from Chester Wilmot's book ("the Battle for Europe", p. 528). Here's what he wrote:

"Unfortunately, the two main weaknesses of the allied command-the British caution about losses and the persistent reluctance of the Americans to concentrate their forces [315] - had a detrimental effect on the course of the operation, which was and could be a decisive blow in the battle in the West. There was no time to think about the price or the prestige of competing commanders. What was at stake was nothing less than the possibility of occupying the Ruhr and ending the war quickly, with all the consequences that followed for the future of Europe."

From my — biased-point of view, if the operation had received proper support from the very beginning, if we had received the air and ground forces and resources necessary to carry it out, it would have been successful, despite my mistakes, or bad weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer corps in the Arnhem area. I remain an unrepentant supporter of Market garden".

(Россиянин2019) and 93.81.221.43 (talk) 19:55, 12 February 2020 (UTC)

Goal of the operation

Utilizing official histories from top down to corps level:

• Ellis, Victory in the West Vol. II, p. 49: "...as stated in Field-Marshal Montgomery's directive issued three days before..." the operation's immediate goals were to "secure crossings over the Rhine and Mass in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave" to allow the Second Army "to establish itself in strength on a line between Zwolle (on the Zuider zee) and Arnhem, facing east with deep bridgeheads east of the Ijssel river." In the grand scheme of things "It was to be the beginning of operations with the United States First Army designed to isolate and surround the Ruhr."

A diagram on the previous page shows the main thrust up along Hell's Highway, with the main elements of Second Army intending to drive towards Hamm and meet up with an American thrust (coming from between Cologne and Bonn) to the south. Additional advances would be made by Second Army towards the River Ems to establish a bridgehead near Osnabruck. First Canadian Army would move to clear Second Army's flank to at least the Amsterdam area.

• MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 6: "Allied strategy, as expressed in pre-DDay planning ... looked toward the ultimate objective of Berlin; but on the way the Allies wanted an economic objective, which ... "would rapidly starve Germany of the means to continue the war." This was the Ruhr industrial area, the loss of which, together with Belgium and Holland, would deprive Germany of 65 percent of its -production of crude steel and 56 percent of its coal. The widespread deployment of the Allied armies on 11 September reflected General Eisenhower's pre-D-Day decision to go after the Ruhr and Berlin on a broad front."

p. 120: "...MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives: to get Allied troops across the Rhine and to capture the Ruhr. Three major advantages were expected to accrue: ( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland; (2) outflanking the West Wall, and (3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain". MacDonald does not appear to include a southern thrust, but does talk in-depth about First and Third Armies advances towards the West Wall with the overall goal of capturing the Ruhr.

• Randel, A short history of 30 Corps, p. 31: "...30 Corps... learned of the ambitious attempt to be made to thrust northwards to the Zuider Zee [later referred to as the Zuider Zee crossings]...hereby cutting off communications between Germany and the Low Countries."
• Gill/Groves, Club Route in Europe: 30 Corps, p. 69: "...another spectacular dash, this time Northwards into Holland, and it was hoped that this next operation would carry us right through to the Zuider Zee, thus allowing the Second Army to debouche into the North German Plain before winter set in, and cut off the Germans in Western Holland."
• Jackson, 8 Corps, p. 151: "The official intention … was "to place Second Army … astride the Rivers Maas, Waal and Neder Rijn on the general axis Grave-Nijmegen-Arnhem, and to dominate the country between the Rhine and the Zuyder Zee, thus cutting communication between German and Holland.""

p. 152: "8 Corps orders were to establish a bridgehead over the Escaut Canal near Lille St. Hubert, capture and dominate the area Leende and Weert, seize Helmond and over-run the surrounding area, then advance north-east in line with the general plan and as ordered by Second Army.

Hopefully this will help clear up the overall intention (get over the rivers and cripple Germany by capturing the Ruhr), and the sources are there to be cited in the article.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:25, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Yes, that's right. Operation "MG" was aimed at solving far-reaching goals. This is crossing the river Rhine, bypassing the fortified Siegfried line from the North, and capturing Dutch ports. Relying on supplies from these ports, it was possible to develop an offensive deep into Germany, covering the Ruhr and further up to the capital Berlin: "subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain". 178.155.64.26 (talk) 08:42, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

The Soviet command also thought about this version of events, how to rush to Berlin. Only later, when the advancing troops reached the Oder river. The Oder was the last big river on the way to Berlin from the East, and the distance is less than 60 km, not 400 km (from Rhine). And still Zhukov and Stalin did not give permission to go-ahead for a dash to Berlin in February 1945. After the war, General Chuikov also spoke a lot on this topic. He said that if they had given him permission, his 8th army in February 1945 would have broken through the front with one blow and stormed into Berlin and the war would have ended sooner. But it was not approved in 1945 or the 1960s. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 11:05, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Per the sources, a run for Berlin was not on the cards. Describing Berlin as the ultimate goal of Market Garden is not supported. Setting up for a subsequent drive into the North German Plain does not equal a full out narrow thrust advance. Moreover the British and American official histories are in agreement that, if successful, the next major operation would be against the Ruhr (an economic and military victory over a symbolic of political one).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:14, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

I agree that the word "Berlin" was not in the cards. 400 km is not 60 km. No one wanted to look like a fool if the operation failed. Like Hitler in 1941 with Moscow. But in the long term, this (movement to the capital) was. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.155.64.26 (talk) 13:00, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Let me remind you and everyone that the question of attacking Berlin was discussed later. Eisenhower himself writes directly about this in his memoirs, that he insisted that the military actions were aimed at encircling the German military group in the Ruhr. That is, the issue was discussed seriously. This is all British again, on Churchill's side. Churchill kept thinking about what would happen after the war, not about the war itself. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 13:07, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Q: "What were the goals of this military operation?"

A: Per the sources, to get over a series of river obstacles to facilitate later operations to clear the Netherlands, encircle the Ruhr, and eventually to advance further into Germany.

Anything beyond that is essentially unsupported conjecture (unless there is a reference) or off topic (i.e. grand strategy outside the realm of Market Garden, or British post war thinking). This isn't a forum. If you are looking for a more wide ranging discussion, you may want to visit a more appropriate place to do so.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:01, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Answer: I think you are overconfident in your opponent's accusations. I can cite sources that will be difficult to dispute. For example: "5. I consider that the best objective is Ruhr, and thence on to Berlin by the northern tour. On that route are the ports, and on that route we can use our sea power to the best advantages. On other routes we would merely contain as many German forces as we could". Having stated his argument, Field Marshal Montgomery noted alternatives... " 93.81.220.91 (talk) 18:54, 13 February 2020 (UTC) and (Россиянин2019)

Taking Pogue out of context does not distract from the fact that Berlin was not the ultimate goal of Market Garden.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:41, 13 February 2020 (UTC)

Answer:

I don't impose my opinion. But, it is written Berlin. BERLIN. Not Cologne, Hamburg, or Bonn. BERLIN. You can think what you want, but Montgomery is talking about BERLIN.

Yet sources quoting his written directive issued prior to the launch of the operation do not state Berlin was an objective of Market Garden. Your flogging a dead horse at this point.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:38, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

Answer: I'm not trying to impose my opinion on you. But Montgomery was not sitting on a dead horse when he wrote about Berlin. About Berlin. BERLIN. Once again, B-E-R-L-I-N. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 12:07, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

With the exception of the American and British official histories, quoting Montgomery, stating Berlin was not the objective of Market Garden. With the exception of histories wrote by staff members of the Corps involved, also quoting Montgomery, all saying Berlin was not the objective of Market Garden. You have yet to bring a piece of evidence to table to state that it was i.e. your continued opinion that it was is a waste of time, without evidence to support it.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:27, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

In particular Tedder in a contemporaneous letter to Portal, quoted in Tedder's autobiography says of the 10 September meeting "... the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue, nor do I think it was so intended. The real issue is the degree of priority given the American Corps operating on Montgomery's right flank, and the extent to which Montgomery controls its operations."86.151.26.10 (talk) 17:12, 21 August 2020 (UTC)

Answer: Dear interlocutor, we have fully expressed our position. In any case, we began to understand each other's positions better. On this positive note, I propose to end this topic. :)93.81.221.139 (talk) 15:31, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

Россиянин2019 and 178.155.64.26 (talk) 04:48, 14 February 2020 (UTC)

Additional potentially useful information for the article

Casualties

Unsure how this would be best added, considering the table already in the article with extensive notes.

Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 199:

• Airborne Corps losses of 11,850 (968 killed, 2,640 wounded, and 8,242 missing) thru to 25 September:

Corp HQ: 4 killed and 8 missing

1st AB: 286 killed, 135 wounded, and 6,041 missing

1st Pol Bde: 47 killed, 158 wounded, and 173 missing

Brit Glider pilots: 59 killed, 35 wounded, and 644 missing

38 Group RAF: 6 killed, 23, wounded, and 184 missing

82nd AB: 215 killed, 790 wounded, and 427 missing

101st AB: 315 killed, 1,248 wounded, and 547 missing

US Glider pilots: 12 killed, 36 wounded, and 74 missing

IX US Troop: 16 killed, 204 wounded, and 82 missing.

• 30 Corps: 1,480 casualties, and 70 tanks
• 8 and 12 Corps: 3, 874 casualties, and 18 tanks
• 144 transport aircraft

Staff, 21st Army Group (already cited in article), full quote:

• "[point/paragraph] 125, The enemy lost 16,000 prisoners and 30 tanks and SP guns destroyed; 159 of his aircraft were also destroyed.

Total casualties of the Airborne Corps were 9,600, of which the Brit element was 6986 including 322 killed."

Outcome

Forest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 288: "A German analysis, captured by the Allies after the operation, concluded that the Al- lies’ “chief mistake was not to have landed the entire First British Airborne Division at once rather than over a period of 3 days and that a second airborne division was not dropped in the area west of Arnhem.”"

Allied "operational failure" vs Allied defeat

Calling the outcome of Market Garden (MG) an "Allied operational failure" in the English-language wikipedia seems weasel-worded and non-neutral. Let's call MG what it was: a German victory and an Allied defeat. Non-English wikipedias are explicit regarding the outcome of MG: German wikipedia, "German victory, Allied withdrawal;" French wikipedia, "Tactical German victory;" and Dutch wikipedia, "German victory." If German, French, and Dutch wikipedias call MG a German victory, perhaps the English wikipedia is wrong? The verdict of history ideally should be the same no matter what language it is written in.

The English wikipedia article on the Battle of Arnhem is clear. Arnhem was a "German victory." If Arnhem was a German victory, how could MG be only an "operational failure" rather than an Allied defeat and a German victory? As the Allies failed to establish a foothold across the Rhine River at Arnhem, Market Garden was a failure, e.g. it was a defeat.

Following are a couple of quotes I believe are relevant to the discussion:

• "DEFEAT...The costly British defeat at Arnhem meant that Operation 'Market Garden' had been a failure, but the Allies had at least established a lodgement area from which to launch a future offensive into the German Rhineland." Imperial War Museum, [1].

• • Comment: On the questions of what MG achieved: "Market Garden had won a sixty-five mile salient that crossed five major water barriers but led nowhere....Two committed U.S. airborne divisions...would be stuck helping the British hold this soggy landscape until November" (and suffer more casualties than they had during MG)....Market Garden proved 'an epic cock-up.'" Four-fifths of the Netherlands "would endure another nine months of occupation." Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, pp. 287-288 (a major 3 volume history of WWII).

• "MARKET-GARDEN had two main objectives: first, to get across the Rhine, and second, to capture or neutralize Germany’s industrial heartland, the Ruhr Valley. The strategic rationale behind Market Garden centered on providing an opening for large ground formations to get into and maneuver on the North German Plain." The Rand Organization (a major think tank for the US government and the Department of Defense). [2]

• • Comment: Given that none of these objectives were achieved, I would conclude that MG was a defeat for the allies, not an "operational failure" which is more of an excuse than a reason. Smallchief (talk) 12:21, 24 April 2020 (UTC)

I completely agree with you. My proposal is "Operational success of the United States-Britain, Strategic victory of Hitler's Germany". 178.155.64.26 (talk) 08:45, 19 June 2020 (UTC)

Yes, the above is sensible and reasonable. Despite all the various reasons given it was the opposition of the German army that stopped the Allied forces from achieving their objectives. If an attacking force fails to achieve its objectives then the operation is a failure. If the activities of the defending force are the main reason for the operational failure then defenders have achieved a victory i.e. Wikipedia article on Battle of Britain ("British Victory"). Therefore, the outcome of MG has to be that it was a German military victory. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.159.113.15 (talk) 03:29, 8 August 2020 (UTC)

Not so simple. The Germans lost quite a bit of ground, Eindhoven and Nijmegen were liberated. The operational failure was that this did not lead to crossing the Rhine, but this does not make a German victory, a draw maybe.--Astral Leap (talk) 12:28, 14 August 2020 (UTC)

It might be useful to see how other wikipedia's describe the outcome of Operation Market Garden:

German wikipedia: "German victory, allied withdrawal."

Dutch wikpedia: "German victory"

French wikipedia: "Tactical German victory"

Russian wikipedia: "German victory"

Describing Market Garden as an "Allied operational failure is (1) weasel-worded (what is an operational failure? The allies forgot to give their soldiers bullets? The allied airplanes didn't fly? etc.) ; and (2) disagrees with other wikipedias. Market Garden should be described on the English wikipedia as a "German victory." Smallchief (talk) 14:34, 14 August 2020 (UTC)

Using wikipages as a source does not work. What do the reliable sources state? If I recall correctly, the last time there was an actual major effort to do this, the consensus of sources consulted was how we ended up where we are. For example, using the source at the top of this section: "an epic cock-up" does not support an Allied victory, a German victory, does not state a tactical victory, an allied withdrawal, nor operational failure. There has, over the years, large debates across the community for inferring what a source means too. So, perhaps, instead of further debate on how to word it, we collate the source conclusions to obtain consensus.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:51, 14 August 2020 (UTC)

Second thought: Why not just state "See Aftermath", where a detailed account can be provided to discuss the nuance?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:54, 14 August 2020 (UTC)

I'm not using Wikipedia as a source. I'm pointing out that other relevant Wikpedia articles in other languages call Market Garden a German victory -- which means to me that the English wikipedia may be wrong in calling it an "operational failure." History ideally should be the same, no matter what language it is written in.

With regard to what the sources say, as you've listed them below, they confirm to me that Market Garden was an allied defeat. How can we conclude that Market Garden was an "operational failure" if none of the sources call it that?

Referring the result to the "aftermath" section as you propose is a bit of a cop-out, but preferable to "operational failure." Smallchief (talk) 00:05, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

Unless the other language articles have a source, what they say is rather irrelevant. I have updated several non-English ones, where information was either translated incorrectly or not sourced. What sources do the other language wikis use to support their conclusions?

As for saying it is a "cop-out", not necessary. It reflects that there is no straight forward answer. Looking over the sources below, with the exception of one - if I am not mistaken - none state it was a "allied defeat". Such a conclusion could prove controversial and could result in an edit war from various parties. The vast majority of the sources (even the German), so far (position to change as more information comes to light) all bat around the term of "failure". Several, for example, state the operation was a strategic failure, but they do not state it was a German strategic victory, for example. The German official history, which I unfortunately could not fully access, seems to imply their point of view was that it was not a victory of their intended goals either.

I have only transcribed some of the sources I have access to (physically or e-docs), there are obviously a lot more out there, including ones dedicated to the battle. I believe we should await more sources and more opinions, and summarize accordingly. At present, in my opinion, there are essentially (at present) several general schools of thought listed below regarding the outcome: 1) for a variety of reasons, the Allies did not achieve what they set out to do. 2) the captured terrain was worthless, so there was no tangible benefit of the operation 3) the captured terrain had strategic and tactical benefits to the Allies 4) the operation had the knock on result of the Hunger Winter. If a cop-out position is stating to see a detailed section for more info, then a brief summary could be: Strategic failure of the operation (still using the terminology so many people have taken issue with, because that is the terminology the sources use), debated tactical effects (which would need to be detailed in the afermath section), Hunger Winter.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:29, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

Very informative listing of sources. Good job. Smallchief (talk) 01:50, 15 August 2020 (UTC)

What do the sources say?

• "In terms of the Allies' original objectives, the operation was a total failure. They had not managed to cut off the German units in the Western Netherlands, nor could they now contemplate making a wide detour round the West Wall fortifications from the north. At this point it seemed impossible envisage any real end to the war before the onset of winter. The reasons why Market-Garden failed were the poor terrain and bad weather conditions ... [the Allies] had assessed the enemy situation wrongly. ... Similarly, the Germans succeeded only in part with their plans to counter Market-Garden. Model was trying to hem in the Allied troops south of the Lower Rhine and to destroy them there. Yet British 2nd Army proved ... [unable to access the next page]", German official history, Vol VII, The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944/5, Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs, Detlef Vogel, p. 669:
• "It is therefore desirable to see why [Market-Garden] failed to do so [secure bridges etc.] and why it only succeeded in winning a valuable salient and a bridgehead over the Waal which had no immediate effect on the Allies advance into Germany." British official history, Victory in the West Vol II: The Defeat of Germany, L.F. Ellis, pp. 50-51,. To note, the emphasis is in book. This is about the only short overall summary provided as the rest discusses individual factors. One should also note that Ellis does not have the best reputation.
• "Operation MARKET-GARDEN accomplished much of what it had been designed to accomplish. Nevertheless, by the merciless logic of war, MARKET-GARDEN was a failure. ... The Allies had trained their sights on far-reaching objectives. These they had not attained. On the credit side, MARKET-GARDEN had gained bridgeheads over five major water obstacles, including the formidable Maas and Waal Rivers. The bridgehead beyond the Maas was to prove a decided advantage in February 1945 when the 21 Army Group launched a drive to clear the west bank of the Rhine opposite the Ruhr. The bridgehead beyond the Waal was to pose a constant threat of an Allied thrust northward, through the Germans subsequently lessened the threat by a program of widespread inundation. Operation MARKET-GARDEN also had forged a salient sixty-five miles deep into enemy territory, had liberated many square miles of the Netherlands, and had gained some valuable airfields. It also had drawn some German formations from other sectors of the Western Front and had imposed upon these forces a high rate of attrition. On the debit side, some might maintain that the cardinal point was the failure to precipitate a German collapse. Although the enemy's collapse was hardly a formal objective of the operation, few would deny that many Allied commanders had nurtured the hope. In regard to more immediate and clearly defined objectives, the operation had failed to secure a bridgehead beyond the Neder Rijn, had not effectively turned the north flank of the West Wall, had not cut off the enemy's Fifteenth Army, and had not positioned the 2 I Army Group for a drive around the north flank of the Ruhr. The hope of attaining these objectives had prompted the ambition and daring that went into Operation MARKET-GARDEN. Not to have realized them could mean only that the operation had failed." US Official history, The Siegfried Line Campaign, Charles MacDonald, p. 198
• "The costly British defeat at Arnhem meant that Operation 'Market Garden' had been a failure, but the Allies had at least established a lodgment area from which to launch a future offensive into the German Rhineland." Imperial War Museum article on Market Garden, in the section labeled "Defeat" with context of talking about Arnhem.
• "...one-fifth of the Netherlands had been liberated. But the rest would endure another nine months of occupation", "The 'Hunter Winter' ... [resulted in] sixteen thousand [dead] of starvation... . 'My country,' Prince Bernhard observed, 'can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success. ... Market Garden had won a sixty-five mile salient that crossed five major water barriers but led nowhere. Without turning the German flank or gaining a bridgehead over the Nedger Rijn ... That task would entangle most of Second Army ... until mid-November... . Market Garden proved 'an epic cock-up'... a poor plan with deficient intelligence, haphazard execution, and indifferent generalship. ... the battle would be, [per Max Hastings, be] the last occasion of the war when Eisenhower unequivocally accepted a strategic proposal by Montgomery" Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light, pp. 287-288
• "With the war still in progress, it was inevitable that Market-Garden would be presented to the British and American people as a victory. Churchill described it as 'a decided victory' and Montgomery claimed it was 90% successful since 90% of the ground specified in the Operation Order had been taken. In reality, it was a strategic failure. The West Wall had not been outflanked, Second Army was not positioned for an attack on the north flank of the Ruhr, the German Fifteenth Army had not been cut off and there had been collapse of German arms. The salient achieved led nowhere and was to prove extremely costly in the coming months. ... The seven [British commanders] most directly involved ... bear responsibility for the failure of the Operation. It is also clear that, whilst the German commanders were prepared to take all necessary measures and risk to win the battle, even to point of using men untrained in ground warfare, their British adversaries were [not]..." Reynolds, Sons of the Reich, p. 174
• "...the partly unsuccessful Market-Garden offensive..."(p. 162) and "When [Market-Garden] failed, Montgomery immediately reconstituted the Second (British) Army so that it could launch Operation Gatwick, an eastward thrust intended to reach the Rhine near Krefeld" (p. 170), Stephen Ashley Hart, Colossal Cracks - this is not a history of the operation, rather an analysis of the Army Group in Europe.
• "Strategically, therefore, Market Garden was a failure. ... If Market Garden ever had a chance it was the last chance to seize this great strategic opportunity. It failed, and the war went on." David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 348
• "This salient, 60 miles deep, was of immense tactical value for the purpose of driving the Germans from the area south of the Maas and thus removing the threat of an immediate counter-stroke against Antwerp; strategically, however, it was in danger of becoming a blind alley, unless the bridgeheads over the Maas and the Wall could be quickly exploited. ... although Montgomery's troops were deployed beyond the northern end of the Siegfried Line, these defences had not been effectively outflanked. Moreover, the barrier of the Rhine remained and the threat to the Ruhr was neither as great nor as immediate as Montgomery had hoped. ... [Montgomery's claim of 90% success] is difficult to support, unless the success of the operation is judged merely in terms of the number of bridges captured. ... the failure to secure the ninth, the bridge at Arnhem, meant the frustration of Montgomery's strategic purpose." Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 523
• "...the airborne operation had achieved some useful results. It had driven a wedge into the German northern position, thereby isolating the Fifteenth Army north of Antwerp from the First Parachute Army on the eastern side of the bulge. This segregation from the rest of the German front complicated the supply problem of Fifteenth Army, which was to forced to rely on the inferior crossings over the Maas and the Waal rivers west of the Allied penetration. The capture of these bridgeheads ... served as an important base for subsequent operations against the Germans on the Rhine. 'The loss of the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen was a great embarrassment to us,' said General von Zangen of Fifteenth Army. 'By capturing them the Allies forced us to remain on the defensive in this area in order to prevent this bulge from growing. We were never able to assemble enough troops for a serious counterattack to retaken Antwerp." Milton Shulamn, Defeat in the West, p.210
• "At the end of ten days of bitter fighting, as the advance of the thrust from the south had ground to a halt, that thin wedge itself under heavy German attack... the attempt to 'bounce' the [Rhine] had failed by a narrow margin in the face of reviving Germany resistance, but it had failed nonetheless. ... the defeat suffered in the operation Market Garden ..." Gerhard Weinberg, A World At Arms, pp. 701-702

"Operational failure" OR "Failure of the Operation"?

Some people try to convince you that it's the same thing. And give the first definition to denote the result of a military operation. But it's not the same thing, is it? I think so. If this is supposedly the same thing, then I think there will be no objection when I put the second definition? Isn't that right? 178.155.64.26 (talk) 14:14, 25 December 2020 (UTC)