Talk:Kashmir conflict

Christine Fair vs Victoria Schofield

@TalhaZubairButt: you have replaced sourced content by Christine Fair, calling it UNDUE, and replaced by content sourced to Victoria Schofield, which dates back to year 2000. Why is one content UNDUE and another DUE? Please explain. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:33, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Schofiield's account of pakistan's reasons to send forces into Kashmir was relevant to that paragraph. I don't see how Fair's statement is relevant to that particular paragraph and section. It would perhaps fit somewhere else. Doesn't seem to fit here.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 11:35, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

"Doesn't fit" is what you claimed in the edit summary. Simply repeating it is not a discussion. Why doesn't it fit? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:39, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Sorry, thats what I meant by its being UNDUE. That paragraph is supposed to be simply about Pakistani forces entry into Kashmir. Whereas Fair has made an analysis of the long term picture. Such long term analysis should be included elsewhere, perhaps as a note.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 11:43, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Christine Fair is saying that what happened in 1947 is the first instance of this `irregular warfare' syndrome. That theme will continue throughout the article because Kashmir conflict is where this irregular warfare is being practised, all the way till the latest Pathankot attack. Please don't expect us to brush this under the carpet.

Secondly, Victoria Schofield's analysis is badly out of date. Her being a close friend of Benazir Bhutto also dilutes the value of her assessments. She can never be used to override Christine Fair's analysis, which has more than a dozen favourable reviews from all parts of the world. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:06, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Being a friend of Bhutto does not make an academic's assessments weaker or less reliable. If this was the case, them many academic, including Christine Fair, could be seen in a less serious light due to their purported anti-Muslim biases, (which is very apparent from Christine's works).

And before pointing fingers, lets not forget India's role in guerilla (read: terrorist) warfare in Sri Lanka (LTTE) and East Pakistan (Mukti Bahini). Its easy to point fingers without introspection.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 13:22, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

[Thanks for using indentation, apparently for the first time. But please do indent every paragraph, not just the first one.]

The extent to which the source is independent of the subject determines WP:THIRDPARTY. I am not saying that everything sourced to Schofield should be thrown out. But, clearly, when she makes statements that go against evidence, those statements must be thrown out.

And, you should avoid WP:SOAPBOX and WP:FORUMy debates. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:33, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Jinnah-Mountbatten talks

In the section on Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, there was a passage that covered the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks. It read as follows [1]:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the offer, thereby "squandering his leverage" according to the scholar A. G. Noorani. Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (142 words)

TalhaZubairButt expanded to the following, which I tagged after review:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the ofer, thereby "squandering his leverage" according to the Indian scholar A. G. Noorani.

From the perspective of many authors, Jinnah was also convinced that a plebiscite under the supervision of the Indian Army would be sabotaged. Instead, he proposed an immediate and simultaneous withdrawal on both sides, including the Pakistani military and their allies, Pathan tribesmen, and the Indian troops. Afterwards, he suggested that the leaders of India and Pakistan should take control of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and sort out all matters including the arrangement of a free and fair plebiscite. Hearing the proposal, Mountbatten told Jinnah that he needed the consent of Nehru and Patel. Thus the talks ended and the dispute remained unresolved.

Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (303 words)

After finding a better source, I rewrote the problematic passage as follows [2]:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the ofer, thereby "squandering his leverage" according to the Indian scholar A. G. Noorani.

Jinnah felt that with the Indian troops in Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah in control, people would not have the courage to vote for Pakistan. When Mountbatten countered that the plebiscite could be conducted by the United Nations, Jinnah again rejected the proposal, saying the two Governors General (Mountbatten and Jinnah) should conduct it instead. However, this was not constitutionally tenable. According to Sir George Cunningham, the governor of N.W.F.P., Jinnah rejected UN-governed plebiscite because he was optimistic about the invasion succeeding and he felt that Pakistan was likely to lose the plebiscite in the prevailing circumstances.

Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (283 words)

However, TalhaZubairButt expanded it again as follows [3]:

On 1 November 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore for a conference with Jinnah, proposing that, in all the princely States where the ruler did not accede to a Dominion corresponding to the majority population (which would have included Junagadh, Hyderabad as well Kashmir), the accession should be decided by an `impartial reference to the will of the people'. Jinnah rejected the offer. According to Indian scholar A. G. Noorani Jinnah ended up squandering his leverage.

According to Jinnah a plebiscite was unnecessary when it was quite clear that states should accede according to their majority population. Jinnah was willing to urge Junagadh to accede to India if India gave him Kashmir. Mountbatten refused to forego Kashmir's accession to India unless decreed by the people. Jinnah, on the other hand, refused to accept any formula if it included Hyderabad; which was the state which wanted to accede to neither Dominion. According to Jinnah, he could not be party to coercion.

Jinnah demanded that both sides withdraw their troops simultaneously. Jinnah felt that with the Indian troops in Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah in control, 'the average Muslim would never have the courage to vote for Pakistan'. When Mountbatten countered that the plebiscite could be conducted by the United Nations, Jinnah again rejected the proposal, saying the two Governors General (Mountbatten and Jinnah) should conduct it instead. Mountbatten said this would not be tenable according to his Constitutional position. Jinnah's rejection of a plebiscite was driven by two considerations. Jinnah hoped that the tribal invasion may still succeed and he could then be able to swap Junagadh for Kashmir and also secure Hyderabad's independence. This proved to be a major miscalculation. According to Sir George Cunningham, the governor of N.W.F.P., Jinnah rejected UN-governed plebiscite because he feared that Pakistan might lose the plebiscite in the prevailing circumstances due to the Pathan invasion. Jinnah was determined that if a plebiscite was to be held at all it should be held in circumstances favourable to Pakistan. Thus, Jinnah wanted Indian troops to withdraw and Sheikh Abdullah to be unseated. India did not accept Jinnah's demand of removing Sheikh Abdullah, because India feared that its own political base in Kashmir would shrink rapidly.

Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan met again in December, when Nehru informed Khan of India's intention to refer the dispute to the United Nations under article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member states to bring to the Security Council attention situations `likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace'. (638 words)

I think this is rather too much coverage for 4 hours of failed talks, in an article covering 60 years of history! The basic facts are still the same. India offered Plebiscite. Pakistan rejected it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:27, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

References

Discussion

@Kautilya3: If you leave your natural bias aside, you'll realise upon close reading that Pakisan did not completely reject a plebiscite in itself. It simply wanted it to be held in circumstances most favourable to it. Or, as an alternate option, exchange Junagadh for Kashmir whilst securing Hyderabad's independence (Jinnah wanted no part in Hyderabad's coercion, where we know India invaded in violation of the StandStill Agreement). India also rejected Jinnah's proposals of troops/Shk. Abdullah removal because India knew that if Sheikh Abdulllah was removed, India would also stand no chance in a plebiscite.

Take this from a Kashmiri, Kautilya, India would have lost a plebisite with Sheikh Abdullah out of the picture. He was vital to any support India could have from Kashmiri Muslims. Kashmiri Muslims blindly loved Sheikh Abdullah due to his fighting for our rights against the Dogra regime and we would have blindly obeyed him. However, if he was not in the picture, Kashmiri desire would either be for Pakistan or our own independent country (this would be the first option for most). And it didn't take long after his death for our desire to be expressed. He was the anchor that kept Kashmiris from rebellion for decades. As soon as he died, Kashmiris became more and more active in plebiscite movements. Finally leading up to the 1987 elections.

And personally I don't see how Jinnah's 'refusal' for plebiscite gives any moral authority to India. Even till the 1950s, Nehru claimed he was committed to a plebiscite until Pakistan joined CENTO. He used Pakistan's entry into CENTO as an excuse to backtrack from his words. I don't think Nehru was sincere in the first place. The first chance he got, he took it, by calling Pakistan's CENTO membership an act of hostility and an expression of insincerity in resolving the Kashmir probllem.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 21:36, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for that lesson in Kashmiri politics (and I mean that sincerely). But the problem on hand is that you have expanded 142 words into 638 words, and the resulting text is completely unwieldy and loses focuses. This is not the way to write an encyclopedia. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:34, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

@TalhaZubairButt: No response for several days. I will reset the text back to the 283 words version. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:24, 15 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kauilya3: I have to say, I didn't take your preceding question as an unrhetorical question. So that is my reason of not responding. As for why it deserves expansion, then we could ask many questions. Like why do the Jinnah-Mountbatten talks need mentioning at all under the 1947 war section? Were the talks previously part on this section?

All in all, if Jinnah's refusal of plebiscite is going to be mentioned due to his fear of losing the plebiscite, then as per WP:BALANCE India's refusal of his conditions for a plebiscite also count, as India also feared losing the plebiscite if Jinnah's conditions for accepting Mountbatten's offer were followed.TalhaZubairButt (talk) 05:07, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

My original 142 word text never talked about why Jinnah refused plebiscite. I don't think it is necessary in a high-level summary. Facts need to be covered, not interpretations. (If interpretations need to be given, George Cunningham's interpretation, who knew all the discussions first-hand, should take priority.) Jinnah's objection about Sheikh Abdullah had been countered by Mountbatten that the plebiscite could be supervised by the UN. Jinnah still refused. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:18, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

I am not sure why you think I am engaging in rhetoric. I have raised an objection to your edit, which I thought you would address. But your solution seems to be to edit-war [4]. This is not the way to go. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:04, 16 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: 1. Jinnah made a counter-proposal to Mountbatten which would have resulted in a plebiscite had India accepted it, but India refused because it knew that without Sheikh Abdullah, it had no leg to stand on in Kashmir. If you are so keen on including Jinnah's refusal of plebiscite, then its only fair that India's behaviour at the time also be mentioned. Its against Wiki's balance policy to just mention that Jinnah refused a plebisciteTowns_Hill 06:01, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

2. You do now WP:OWN wikipedia or this article. I can expand this article andmake three separate relevant sections if I want. In any case, I will be looking into the issue of whether some sections like 'Problems before Plebiscite' and 'US Presidents on Conflict' are WP:UNDUE. They seem irrelevant to me and more like some kind of propaganda explaining India's failure to take Kashmiri self-determination into account. As this is abt Kashmir, this page should give the highest priority to the dominant Kashmiri version of events, not the Indian one. Kashmiris aren't interested in India's fascinating reasons for not holding a plebiscite. And its the Kashmiri opinion which matters the most. Towns_Hill 06:01, 28 April 2016 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by TalhaZubairButt (talk • contribs) Towns_Hill 06:04, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 what seems to be the problem? I thought TZB's points are valid enough for an edit, why are u not even debating/countering them? FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 06:21, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

I believe I have stated the problem quite clearly at the outset, almost a month ago. To repeat, I think this is rather too much coverage for 4 hours of failed talks, in an article covering 60 years of history!

To move towards resolution, Talha Zubar needs to at least state, what length of coverage he thinks is acceptable for the topic, what are the salient facts to be mentioned etc. Instead, he is engaging in WP:OR and WP:BATTLEGROUND comments, such as "would have resulted in a plebiscite had India accepted it", "India refused because...", "it had no leg to stand on", "You do not own Wikipedia" and what not. Such discussion is simply not productive. I almost felt like taking this to WP:AE this morning. For now, I have asked RegentsPark to advise him. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:49, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

There is also a full article on Jinnah-Mountbatten Talks (which I was surprised to hear about). So, enough detail can be added there. This article is not the place for it. We are talking about one round of talks that lasted 4 hours. This, compared to at least 3 meetings between the Prime Ministers in 1947, and almost a decade of talks with UN mediation etc. Talha Zubair's coverage is simply out of proportion. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:04, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

SheriffIsInTown intervention

@SheriffIsInTown: I don't think your intervention is helping. The WP:STATUSQUO is this version, before any of this expansion happened. I marked it right at the beginning of this discussion, which I opened on 5 April. Anyway, I don't particularly care what version is put up for the moment. What I want is for meaningful discussion to happen. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:36, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 you do not like to debate, you do not intervention. How would you like this article to be edited? FreeatlastChitchat (talk) 16:08, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

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