Jump to content

Free and Open Indo-Pacific

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Mazewaxie (talk | contribs) at 19:25, 30 December 2023 (formatting, replaced: ’ → ' (2), typo(s) fixed: explictly → explicitly, 557-585 → 557–585). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Indo-Pacific. The green circle covers ASEAN.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP; Japanese: 自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略, romanized: jiyū de hirakareta Indotaiheiyō senryaku) is an umbrella term that encompasses Indo-Pacific-specific strategies of countries with similar interests in the region.[1] The concept, with its origins in Weimar German geopolitics, has been revived since 2006 through Japanese initiatives and American cooperation.[2][3]

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan introduced the FOIP concept and formally put it down as a strategy in 2016.[4][1] In 2019 the United States Department of State published a document formalizing its concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific.[5] Since then, multiple countries in regions from the European Union to Southeast Asia, have referred to the Indo-Pacific in national security or foreign policy documents.

Origin

Historians and political scientists have shown that the "Indo-Pacific" emerged in the context of Weimar German geopolitics in the 1920s-1930s, and since then spread to Japan through Karl Haushofer's intervention.[6][7][8]

During 2006–07 when Taro Aso was Foreign Minister, the Japanese government presented the idea of "Freedom and Prosperity".[9]

In August 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech in the Parliament of India included the following:[10]

"We are now at a point at which the Confluence of the Two Seas is coming into being. The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity."

It was the base model of FOIP according to Keiichi Ichikawa, the diplomat who had been in charge of Abe's Policy Coordination Division,[11] and Katsuyuki Yakushiji [ja], one of the consulted experts.[3]

According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Abe first officially explained Japan's commitment to the FOIP strategy in Kenya on 27 August 2016.[3][12]

However, even before then, the concept of FOIP also fell in place with Abe's thinking of "diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map". In 2012, Prime Minister Abe's first elucidation of FOIP went as follows:[3][13]

"Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role—alongside Australia, India, and the US—in preserving the common good in both regions"

Indo-Pacific-specific strategies

Japan's diplomatic implementation

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan (2012-2020).

In January 2013, the Japanese government had prepared a PM Abe's speech on "Five New Principles" to be delivered in Jakarta. However, as PM Abe had to go back to Japan before the scheduled date to respond to In Amenas hostage crisis, the speech was not realized; instead its script was made available.[14]

In 2015, to implement the framework, Japan upgraded "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" with US,[15] agreed and shared "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership" with India,[16] agreed and shared "Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond" with Australia,[17] and the quadrilateral framework was prepared.

In November 2017, President of the United States Donald Trump visited Japan, and summit meeting was held with PM Abe. Regarding regional and global affairs, the two leaders discussed on "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy", and affirmed that Japan and the United States will work together to promote peace and prosperity in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific as free and open and directed relevant ministers and institutions to flesh out detailed cooperation, in particular, in the following areas:[18]

  • Promotion and establishment of fundamental values (rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc.)
  • Pursuit of economic prosperity (improvement of connectivity, etc.)
  • Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, etc.)

On 10 February 2023, PM Fumio Kishida oversaw the signing of several defense pacts and investment deals with President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. of the Philippines; Marcos also announced he was considering opening tripartite defense talks with the United States and Japan.[19][20]

On 20 March 2023, Kishida, who visited New Delhi, India, delivered a policy speech entitled "the Future of the Indo-Pacific—Japan's New Plan for a `Free and Open Indo-Pacific'– `Together with India, as an Indispensable Partner'" at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), announcing Japan's new plan for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)". S. Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister of India, attended the speech, representing the Indian government.[21]

As of April 2023, Japan is boosting Pacific Island Country resilience through increased collaboration under this vision.[22][23]

India's foreign policy

In June 2018, PM Narendra Modi articulated India's vision towards the "Indo-Pacific region" for the first time.[24] A central feature of Indian PM Modi's foreign policy has been to advance the need to create a "free, open, and inclusive" Indo-Pacific.[25]

According to defense minister Rajnath Singh, the Indian government stands for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific as it is important for economic development of the region and the wider global community.[26]

U.S. National Security Strategy

On 18 October 2017, The United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson delivered remarks speech at CSIS, explicitly using the term "free and open Indo-Pacific".[27] And in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, Asia-Pacific was exchanged with Indo-Pacific.[3]

On 30 May 2018, The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is also renamed the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).[28]

In December 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a speech on the United States' approach to the Indo-Pacific in Jakarta.[29][30]

In February 2022, the Biden-⁠Harris Administration published the "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States" which describes "free and open" as a top priority.[31] In its 2022 National Security Strategy, "Promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific" is the topic at the top of its fourth part.[32]

Australia's foreign policy

In the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, a stable and prosperous Indo–Pacific is described as the most important Australia's interest, and Indo–Pacific democracies are described as of first order importance to Australia.[33]

New Zealand's strategic direction

In October 2021, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) published the MFAT Strategic Intentions 2021-2025 which describes "seven strategic goals". For the Indo-Pacific, the MFAT's goal is:

"Embed Aotearoa New Zealand as an active and integral partner in shaping an Indo-Pacific order that delivers regional stability and economic integration."

"Free and Open Indo-Pacific constructs", "free and open trade" and "free and open regional development" are also described in the document.[34]

Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy

In November 2022, Canada launched the Indo-Pacific Strategy to support long-term growth, prosperity, and security for Canadians.[35][36]

The United Kingdom's strategic framework

After Brexit in 2020, the UK Government expressed its wish to participate in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, reflected in its Integrated Review Refresh 2023.[37][38]

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)

In June 2019 at the 34th ASEAN Summit, they released ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which is consistent with and anchored in the principles of ASEAN centrality through ASEANjournal-led mechanisms like the East Asia Summit (EAS).[39] The AOIP was of Indonesia's proposal, and the document calls for dialogue, co-operation, inclusivity, and a rule-based framework, rather than rivalry.[40] While accepting FOIP's basic idea that an ASEAN-led AOIP is "free and open," AOIP also considers "inclusiveness," which does not uniformly exclude China, and it is appropriate to understand that the "centrality of ASEAN" was emphasized as a device for that purpose.[41]

Indonesia's Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept

In May 2013, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa made a speech on "An Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific" at The Indonesia Conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as keynote address.[42][43]

At the CSIS Global Dialogue in May 2018 in Jakarta, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi unveiled the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. The concept is based on the principles of being "open, transparent and inclusive, promoting the habit of dialogue, promoting cooperation and friendship, and upholding international law".[44] And in August 2018, Retno formally presented the Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept to the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS).[45]

In November 2018, president Joko Widodo said that "The Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept puts emphasis on several principles, including cooperation, instead of rivalry, inclusiveness, transparency and openness as well as respect for international law", at the 13th EAS plenary session held at the Suntec Singapore Convention and Exhibition Centre.[46]

The Philippines' diplomatic strategy

While it has yet to produce a definitive Indo-Pacific strategy document as of April 2023, the administration of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. has discussed intensifying cooperation with the U.S. government, whose officials have made agreements with the Philippines on energy, telecommunications, human rights, education, food security, and nuclear technology sales.[47] In February 2023, Marcos briefly met with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to finalize an agreement to add U.S.-accessible Philippine military bases to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement allowing U.S. military visits.[48] The Philippines also signed a defense agreement with Japan earlier that year, and Marcos announced that talks for a joint defense pact between Japan, the Philippines, and the United States are underway. The Philippines is also a prolific buyer of South Korean arms and military equipment,[49] and has a long-standing security partnership with Australia and India.[50][51]

Bangladesh's Indo-Pacific outlook

In April 2023, the foreign ministry of Bangladesh formally announced its Indo-Pacific Outlook with 15 points which emphasized a "peaceful, secure and inclusive" Indo-Pacific.[52] The Bangladeshi strategy promotes resilience in global value chains; food, water and energy security; freedom of navigation and overflight; maritime security and counter-terrorism; combating crime networks; nonproliferation, peacekeeping, sustainable development, SDG 14, and the "unimpeded and free flow of commerce in the Indo-Pacific".[52][53][54]

South Korea's diplomatic strategy

South Korea's approach to the Indo-Pacific is based on cooperation and complementarity between its New Southern Policy and the U.S.'s and the Quad's Indo-Pacific policy, but without openly antagonizing China.[55] In this respect, South Korea is balancing the desire for foreign policy autonomy with the need for strategic alliances, above all with the United States.[56]

In December 2022, South Korea published its "Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region".[57]

NATO

As of July 2022, NATO does not have a policy for the Indo-Pacific, yet its political and diplomatic interests in the region are broad. Apart from the U.S., more recently other NATO countries have reoriented their maritime policy in defense of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).[58]

Countries in the European Union

France's territories and EEZ, excluding Antarctic territories. A large proportion of France's overseas territories are located in the Indo-Pacific region.

In September 2021, the European Union published its Joint Communication on the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy.[59]

France

France is an Indo-Pacific power because of the several territories of France located there. The administration of Emmanuel Macron released a strategy in 2019 which was subsequently updated in 2021.[60]

Germany
Germany adopted policy guidelines for the region in September 2020.[61]

Netherlands
In November 2020, the Netherlands published the white paper "Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia". [62]

Criticism

Political scientist Sharifah Munirah Alatas has argued that the origin of the term "Indo-Pacific" was Euro-centric, so it lacked the input of Asian countries in a broader anticolonial context.[8] The Australian Citizens Party has publicly denounced the "Nazi roots" of the "Indo-Pacific" concept.[63]

Chinese officials often criticize the "Indo-Pacific" concept and see it as a tool to contain China.[64] China's partner, Russia, also echoes Chinese views,[65] describing it as a "closed and exclusive group structure", and called for an "equal, open, and inclusive Asia-Pacific security system that does not target third countries".

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Hosoya, Nicholas Szechenyi, Yuichi; Hosoya, Nicholas Szechenyi, Yuichi (10 October 2020). "Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 2020-10-29. Retrieved 2020-11-04.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ Li, Hansong (September 2022). "The "Indo-Pacific": Intellectual Origins and International Visions in Global Contexts". Modern Intellectual History. 19 (3): 807–833. doi:10.1017/S1479244321000214.
  3. ^ a b c d e Watanabe, Tsuneo "Nabe" (30 October 2019). "Japan's Rationale for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy [1]". International Information Network Analysis | The Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Archived from the original on 2020-10-27. Retrieved 2020-11-04.
  4. ^ McMaster, H.R. (19 July 2021). "Japan: The Legacy Of Japan's Longest Serving Prime Minister". Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University. Hoover Institution.
  5. ^ "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision" (PDF). www.state.gov. U.S. State Department. 4 November 2019. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 October 2020.
  6. ^ Li, Hansong (September 2022). "The "Indo-Pacific": Intellectual Origins and International Visions in Global Contexts". Modern Intellectual History. 19 (3): 807–833. doi:10.1017/S1479244321000214. ISSN 1479-2443.
  7. ^ Kassab, Hanna Samir (28 January 2023). "What Is the Indo-Pacific? Genealogy, Securitization, and the Multipolar System". Chinese Political Science Review. 8 (4): 573–596. doi:10.1007/s41111-023-00233-z. ISSN 2365-4252.
  8. ^ a b Alatas, Sharifah Munirah (3 April 2022). "Appropriating the Indo-Pacific Construct: An Analysis of Eurocentrism from a Southeast Asian Perspective". Politikon. 49 (2): 120–135. doi:10.1080/02589346.2022.2065424. ISSN 0258-9346. S2CID 248331763. Retrieved 31 January 2023.
  9. ^ "Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons"". MOFA, Japan. 30 November 2006. Retrieved 11 December 2021.
  10. ^ "Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India "Confluence of the Two Seas"". MOFA, Japan. 22 August 2007. Retrieved 24 September 2021.
  11. ^ "自由で開かれたインド太平洋 誕生秘話" [The behind-the-scenes story of the birth of "Free and Open Indo-Pacific"]. NHK (in Japanese). 30 June 2021. Retrieved 29 July 2022.
  12. ^ "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of TICAD VI". MOFA, Japan. 27 August 2016. Archived from the original on 2020-11-07. Retrieved 4 December 2020.
  13. ^ Abe, Shinzo (27 December 2012). "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond | by Shinzo Abe". Project Syndicate. Archived from the original on 2021-01-18. Retrieved 4 November 2020.
  14. ^ Shinzo Abe (18 January 2013). "The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy". MOFA, Japan. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
  15. ^ "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" (PDF). MOFA, Japan. 27 April 2015. Retrieved 16 February 2021.
  16. ^ "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership". MOFA, Japan. 12 December 2015. Retrieved 16 February 2021.
  17. ^ "Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond". MOFA, Japan. 18 December 2015. Retrieved 16 February 2021.
  18. ^ "Japan-U.S. Working Lunch and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting". MOFA, Japan. 6 November 2017. Retrieved 8 May 2023.
  19. ^ Dominguez, Gabriel (February 10, 2023). "Concerns over China drive Tokyo and Manila closer together". The Japan Times. Retrieved April 14, 2023.
  20. ^ Parrocha, Azer (February 12, 2023). "Gov't to review tripartite agreement with US, Japan: Marcos". Philippine News Agency. Retrieved April 14, 2023.
  21. ^ Fumio Kishida (20 March 2023). "Policy Speech by Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio (New Plan for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific")". MOFA, Japan. Retrieved 21 March 2023.
  22. ^ Marc Jacob Prosser (2 April 2023). "Japan boosting Pacific Island Country resilience through increased collaboration". Indo-Pacific Defense Forum. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  23. ^ "Courtesy Call on Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs BROWN of the Cook Islands by Foreign Minister Hayashi". MOFA, Japan. 21 March 2023. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  24. ^ Rahul Roy-Chaudhury (7 August 2018). "inclusive Indo-Pacific policy". The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Retrieved 11 May 2023.
  25. ^ Aman Thakker (19 February 2020). "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific Needs a Free and Open India". The Diplomat. Retrieved 11 May 2023.
  26. ^ Luthra, Swati (25 November 2022). "India stands for free and open Indo-Pacific: Defence Minister". Mint. Retrieved 29 November 2022.
  27. ^ Rex Tillerson (18 October 2017). "Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century". CSIS. Retrieved 7 May 2023.
  28. ^ Li, Hansong (September 2022). "The "Indo-Pacific": Intellectual Origins and International Visions in Global Contexts". Modern Intellectual History. 19 (3): 807–833. doi:10.1017/S1479244321000214.
  29. ^ "A Free and Open Indo-Pacific". United States Department of State. December 14, 2021. Retrieved August 4, 2022.
  30. ^ Brad Lendon; Andrew Raine (July 21, 2022). "'A free and open Indo-Pacific': With a single phrase, Shinzo Abe changed America's view of Asia and China". CNN. Retrieved August 5, 2022.
  31. ^ "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States". White House. February 11, 2022. Retrieved December 17, 2022.
  32. ^ "National Security Strategy" (PDF). White House. October 12, 2022. Retrieved October 12, 2022.
  33. ^ "2017 Foreign Policy White Paper". DFAT. 2017. Retrieved October 12, 2022.
  34. ^ "MFAT Strategic Intentions 2021-2025" (PDF). New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). October 2021. Retrieved 20 April 2023.
  35. ^ "Canada launches Indo-Pacific Strategy to support long-term growth, prosperity, and security for Canadians". Government of Canada. 27 November 2022. Retrieved 28 November 2022.
  36. ^ "Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy" (PDF). Global Affairs Canada. 27 November 2022. Retrieved 28 November 2022.
  37. ^ "Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world" (PDF). Gov.uk. March 13, 2023. Retrieved April 16, 2022.
  38. ^ "Foreign Secretary visits G7 Japan and Pacific islands". Gov.uk. April 16, 2023. Retrieved April 16, 2022.
  39. ^ "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" (PDF). ASEAN. 20 June 2019. Retrieved 16 May 2023.
  40. ^ Rakhmat Syarip (15 July 2020). "Defending Foreign Policy at Home: Indonesia and the ASEAN-Based Free Trade Agreements". Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 39 (3): 405–427. doi:10.1177/1868103420935556. S2CID 225574920.
  41. ^ Teruaki Aizawa (24 December 2020). "Recent Trends Regarding each actor's "Indo-Pacific Policy" and FOIP". The Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Retrieved 29 May 2023.
  42. ^ Marty Natalegawa (20 May 2013). "An Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific". The Jakarta Post. Retrieved 12 May 2023.
  43. ^ Jack Georgieff (17 May 2013). "An Indo-Pacific Treaty: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 12 May 2023.
  44. ^ Jansen Tham (16 May 2018). "What's in Indonesia's Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept?". The Diplomat. Retrieved 11 May 2023.
  45. ^ Donald E. Weatherbee (7 June 2019). "Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept" (PDF). ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Retrieved 21 May 2023.
  46. ^ Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary (15 November 2018). "Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept Focuses on Cooperation, Not Rivalry: President Jokowi". Cabinet Secretariat, Indonesia. Retrieved 13 May 2023.
  47. ^ The White House (November 20, 2022). "FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Launches New Initiatives to Strengthen U.S.-Philippines Alliance". The White House. Retrieved April 14, 2023.
  48. ^ Gomez, Jim; Knickmeyer, Ellen (February 2, 2023). "'A big deal': US, Philippines tighten military ties". AP NEWS. Retrieved April 14, 2023.
  49. ^ Harold, Scott W.; Grossman, Derek; Harding, Brian; Hornung, Jeffrey W.; Poling, Gregory; Smith, Jeffrey; Smith, Meagan L. (May 5, 2019). "The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation". RAND Corporation. Retrieved April 14, 2023.
  50. ^ Grossman, Derek (February 21, 2023). "The Philippines Is America's New Star Ally in Asia". Foreign Policy. Retrieved April 14, 2023.
  51. ^ "'BrahMos deal is the beginning of further defence pacts between Delhi and Manila'". The Times of India. 2023-07-01. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 2023-07-04.
  52. ^ a b "Bangladesh announces 15-point Indo-Pacific Outlook". The Financial Express. Retrieved 2023-05-05.
  53. ^ "Bangladesh formally announces its Indo-Pacific Outlook". www.dhakatribune.com. 2023-04-24. Retrieved 2023-05-05.
  54. ^ "Bangladesh Joins the Region in Signalling its Indo-Pacific Outlook". Australian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved 2023-05-05.
  55. ^ Pacheco Pardo, Ramon (May 21, 2021). "South Korea Rebuffed Trump. Here's Why It Might Cooperate with Biden". The Washington Post. Retrieved December 17, 2022.
  56. ^ Snyder, Scott A. (2020). South Korea at the Crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an Era of Rival Powers. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231185493.
  57. ^ "Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region". Ministry of Foreign Affairs (South Korea). December 28, 2022. Retrieved December 29, 2022.
  58. ^ "REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES REPORT ON THE INDO-PACIFIC" (PDF). NATO. July 2022. pp. 15–16. Retrieved October 18, 2022.
  59. ^ "Questions and Answers: EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific". European Union. September 16, 2021. Retrieved December 17, 2022.
  60. ^ "The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for France". Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France. November 2021. Retrieved 3 August 2020.
  61. ^ Amt, Auswärtiges. ""Germany – Europe – Asia: shaping the 21st century together": The German Government adopts policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region". German Federal Foreign Office. Retrieved September 24, 2021.
  62. ^ "Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia". Government of the Netherlands. November 2020. Retrieved December 19, 2022.
  63. ^ "The Nazi roots of the 'Indo-Pacific strategy'". Australian Citizens Party. Retrieved 31 January 2023.
  64. ^ "China's Indo-Pacific Folly". Foreign Affairs. 2023-01-31. Retrieved 2023-05-06.
  65. ^ "Xi, Putin joint statement reveals new stand on Indo-Pacific, plan for G20 meet". Hindustan Times. 2023-03-22. Retrieved 2023-05-06.

Further reading

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Free_and_Open_Indo-Pacific&oldid=1192682879"