Apollo 1

Apollo 1 (also AS-204) CHEEZE WHIZ AND FRIES

Remains of the Apollo 1 cabin interior, charred by a fire which killed the entire crew
Mission type	Crewed spacecraft verification test
Operator	NASA
Mission duration	Up to 14 days (planned)
Spacecraft properties
Spacecraft	CSM-012
Manufacturer	North American Aviation
Launch mass	20,000 kilograms (45,000 lb)
Crew
Crew size	3
Members	Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom, Command Pilot Edward H. White, Senior Pilot Roger Chaffee, Pilot
Start of mission
Launch date	February 21, 1967 (planned)
Rocket	Saturn IB AS-204
Launch site	Cape Canaveral LC-34
End of mission
Destroyed	January 27, 1967 23:31 (1967-01-27UTC23:32) UTC
Orbital parameters
Reference system	Geocentric
Regime	Low Earth
Perigee altitude	300 kilometers (160 nmi) (planned)
Apogee altitude	220 kilometers (120 nmi) (planned)
Inclination	31 degrees (planned)
Period	89.7 minutes (planned)
Left to Right: White, Grissom, Chaffee Project Apollo Manned missions

Spacecraft problems

The Apollo 1 crew expressed their concerns about their spacecraft's problems by presenting this parody of their crew portrait to ASPO manager Joseph Shea on August 19, 1966

The Apollo Command/Service Module spacecraft was much bigger and far more complex than any previously implemented spacecraft design. In October 1963, Joseph F. Shea was named Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) manager, responsible for managing the design and construction of both the CSM and the LM. When North American shipped spacecraft CM-012 to Kennedy Space Center on August 26, 1966, there were 113 significant incomplete planned engineering changes, and an additional 623 engineering change orders were made after delivery. Grissom was so frustrated with the inability of the training simulator engineers to keep up with the actual spacecraft changes, that he took a lemon from a tree by his house and hung it on the simulator.

In a spacecraft review meeting held with Shea on August 19, 1966 (a week before delivery), the crew expressed concern about the amount of flammable material (mainly nylon netting and Velcro) in the cabin, which the technicians found convenient for holding tools and equipment in place. Though Shea gave the spacecraft a passing grade, after the meeting they gave him a crew portrait they had posed with heads bowed and hands clasped in prayer, with the inscription:

It isn't that we don't trust you, Joe, but this time we've decided to go over your head.

Shea gave his staff orders to tell North American to remove the flammables from the cabin, but did not supervise the issue personally.

You sort of have to put that out of your mind. There's always a possibility that you can have a catastrophic failure, of course; this can happen on any flight; it can happen on the last one as well as the first one. So, you just plan as best you can to take care of all these eventualities, and you get a well-trained crew and you go fly.

— Gus Grissom, in a December 1966 interview

Accident

Plugs-out test

The Block I hatch, as used on Apollo 1, consisted of two pieces, and required pressure inside the cabin be no greater than atmospheric in order to open. A third outer layer, the boost protective hatch cover, is not shown

The launch simulation on January 27, 1967, was a "plugs-out" test to determine whether the spacecraft would operate nominally on (simulated) internal power while detached from all cables and umbilicals. Passing this test was essential to making the February 21 launch date. The test was considered non-hazardous because neither the launch vehicle nor the spacecraft was loaded with fuel or cryogenics, and all pyrotechnic systems were disabled.

At 1:00 pm EST (1800 GMT) on January 27, first Grissom, then Chaffee, and White entered the Command Module fully pressure-suited, and were strapped into their seats and hooked up to the spacecraft's oxygen and communication systems. There was an immediate problem: Grissom noticed a strange odor in the air circulating through his suit which he compared to "sour buttermilk", and the simulated countdown was held at 1:20 pm, while air samples were taken. No cause of the odor could be found, and the countdown was resumed at 2:42 pm. (The accident investigation found this odor not to be related in any way to the fire.)

Three minutes after the count was resumed, the hatch installation was started. The hatch consisted of three parts: a removable inner hatch, which stayed inside the cabin; a hinged outer hatch, which was part of the spacecraft's heat shield; and an outer hatch cover, which was part of the boost protective cover enveloping the entire Command Module to protect it from aerodynamic heating during launch and from launch escape rocket exhaust in the event of a launch abort. The boost hatch cover was partially but not fully latched in place, because the flexible boost protective cover was slightly distorted by some cabling run under it to provide the simulated internal power. (The spacecraft's fuel cell reactants were not loaded for this test.) After the hatches were sealed, the air in the cabin was replaced with pure oxygen at 16.7 psi (1.15 bar), 2 psi higher than atmospheric pressure.

Further problems included episodes of high oxygen spacesuit flow, which tripped an alarm. The likely cause was determined to be the astronauts' movements, which were detected by the spacecraft's inertial guidance gyroscope and Grissom's stuck-open microphone. The open microphone was part of the third major problem, with the communications loop connecting the crew, the Operations and Checkout Building and the Complex 34 blockhouse control room. The problems led Grissom to remark: "How are we going to get to the Moon if we can't talk between three buildings?" The simulated countdown was held again at 5:40 pm while attempts were made to fix the problem. All countdown functions up to the simulated internal power transfer had been successfully completed by 6:20 pm, but at 6:30 the count remained on hold at T minus 10 minutes.

Fire

Exterior of the Command Module was blackened from eruption of the fire after the cabin wall failed

The crew members were using the time to run through their checklist again, when a voltage transient was recorded at 6:30:54 (23:30:54 GMT). Ten seconds later (at 6:31:04), Chaffee exclaimed "Hey!", and scuffling sounds followed for two seconds. White then reported, "I've got a fire in the cockpit!". Some witnesses said that they saw White on the television monitors, reaching for the inner hatch release handle as flames in the cabin spread from left to right and licked the window. The final voice transmission is believed to have come from Chaffee. Six seconds after White's report of a "fire in the cockpit", a voice cried out, "There's a bad fire!". The sound of the spacecraft's hull rupturing was heard immediately afterwards, followed by "I'm burning up!" and a scream. The transmission then ended abruptly at 6:31:21, only 17 seconds after the first report of fire. The cabin had ruptured due to rapidly expanding gases from the fire, which over-pressurized the Command Module to 29 psi (2.0 bar).

Flames and gases then rushed outside the Command Module through open access panels to two levels of the pad service structure. Intense heat, dense smoke, and ineffective gas masks designed for toxic fumes rather than heavy smoke hampered the ground crew's attempts to rescue the men. There were fears the Command Module had exploded, or soon would, and that the fire might ignite the solid fuel rockets in the launch escape tower above the Command Module, which would have likely killed nearby ground personnel. It took five minutes to open all three hatch layers, and they could not drop the inner hatch to the cabin floor as intended, so they pushed it out of the way to one side.

The initial phase of the fire lasted only about 15 seconds before the Command Module's hull ruptured. As the cabin depressurized, the convective rush of air caused the flames to spread rapidly, beginning the second phase. The third phase began when most of the atmosphere was consumed. At this point, the fire largely stopped, but massive amounts of smoke, dust, carbon monoxide, and fumes now filled the cabin. Although the cabin lights remained lit, the ground crew was at first unable to find the astronauts through the dense smoke. As the smoke cleared they found the bodies but were not able to remove them. The fire had partly melted Grissom's and White's nylon space suits and the hoses connecting them to the life support system. Grissom had removed his restraints and was lying on the floor of the spacecraft. White's restraints were burned through, and he was found lying sideways just below the hatch. It was determined that he had tried to open the hatch per the emergency procedure, but was not able to do so against the internal pressure. Chaffee was found strapped into his right-hand seat, as procedure called for him to maintain communication until White opened the hatch. Because of the large strands of melted nylon fusing the astronauts to the cabin interior, removing them took nearly 90 minutes.

Investigation

As a result of the in-flight failure of the Gemini 8 mission on March 17, 1966, NASA Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans wrote and implemented Management Instruction 8621.1 on April 14, 1966, defining Mission Failure Investigation Policy And Procedures. This modified NASA's existing accident procedures, based on military aircraft accident investigation, by giving the Deputy Administrator the option of performing independent investigations of major failures, beyond those for which the various Program Office officials were normally responsible. It declared, "It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations."

Immediately after the Apollo 1 fire, Seamans directed establishment of the Apollo 204 Review Board chaired by Langley Research Center director Floyd L. Thompson, which included astronaut Frank Borman, spacecraft designer Maxime Faget, and six others. To avoid the possible appearance of a conflict of interest, NASA Administrator James E. Webb got the approval of President Lyndon B. Johnson for an internal NASA investigation, and notified appropriate leaders of Congress. According to Webb's official NASA bio:

"...Webb went to President Lyndon Johnson and asked that NASA be allowed to handle the accident investigation and direct the recovery from the accident. He promised to be truthful in assessing blame and pledged to assign it to himself and NASA management as appropriate."

Seamans immediately ordered all Apollo 1 hardware and software impounded, to be released only under control of the Board. On February 3, two members, a Cornell University professor and North American's Chief engineer for Apollo, left the Board, and a U.S. Bureau of Mines professor joined. After thorough stereo photographic documentation of the CM-012 interior, the board ordered its disassembly using procedures tested by disassembling the identical CM-014, and conducted a thorough investigation of every part. The board also reviewed the astronauts' autopsy results and interviewed witnesses. Seamans sent Webb weekly status reports of the investigation's progress, and the Board issued its final report on April 5, 1967.

According to the Board, Grissom suffered severe third degree burns on over one-third of his body and his spacesuit was mostly destroyed. White suffered third degree burns on almost half of his body and a quarter of his spacesuit had melted away. Chaffee suffered third degree burns over almost a quarter of his body and a small portion of his spacesuit was damaged. The autopsy report confirmed that the primary cause of death for all three astronauts was cardiac arrest caused by high concentrations of carbon monoxide. Burns suffered by the crew were not believed to be major factors, and it was concluded that most of them had occurred postmortem. Asphyxiation happened after the fire melted the astronauts' suits and oxygen tubes, exposing them to the lethal atmosphere of the cabin.

The review board identified five major factors which combined to cause the fire and the astronauts' deaths:

Ignition source

The review board determined that the electrical power momentarily failed at 23:30:55 GMT, and found evidence of several electric arcs in the interior equipment. However, they were unable to conclusively identify a single ignition source. They determined that the fire most likely started near the floor in the lower left section of the cabin, close to the Environmental Control Unit. It spread from the left wall of the cabin to the right, with the floor being affected only briefly. The engulfed area on the left contained the manual depressurization valve which would have been used to vent the cabin atmosphere to the outside. Consequently, the astronauts were unable to reach it, however this was in any case insufficient to prevent heat and pressure buildup.

They noted a silver-plated copper wire running through an environmental control unit near the center couch had become stripped of its Teflon insulation and abraded by repeated opening and closing of a small access door. This weak point in the wiring also ran near a junction in an ethylene glycol/water cooling line which had been prone to leaks. The electrolysis of ethylene glycol solution with the silver anode was a notable hazard which could cause a violent exothermic reaction, igniting the ethylene glycol mixture in the CM's corrosive test atmosphere of pure, high-pressure oxygen.

In 1968, a team of MIT physicists went to Cape Kennedy and performed a static discharge test in the CM-103 Command Module while it was being prepared for the launch of Apollo 8. With an electroscope, they measured the approximate energy of static discharges caused by a test crew dressed in nylon flight pressure suits and reclining on the nylon flight seats. The MIT investigators found sufficient energy for ignition discharged repeatedly when crew-members shifted in their seats and then touched the spacecraft's aluminum panels.

Flammable materials in the cabin

The review board cited "many types and classes of combustible material" close to ignition sources. The NASA crew systems department had installed 34 square feet (3.2 m²) of Velcro throughout the spacecraft, almost like carpeting. This Velcro was found to be flammable in a high-pressure 100% oxygen environment. Up to 70 pounds of other non-metallic flammable materials had also crept into the design.

Buzz Aldrin states in his book Men From Earth that the flammable material had been removed (per the crew's August 19 complaints and Joseph Shea's order), but was replaced prior to the August 26 delivery to Cape Kennedy.

Pure oxygen atmosphere

The Apollo 1 crewmen enter their spacecraft in the altitude chamber at Kennedy Space Center, October 18, 1966

The plugs-out test had been run to simulate the launch procedure, with the cabin pressurized with pure oxygen at the nominal pre-launch level of 16.7 psi (1.15 bar), 2 psi above standard sea level atmospheric pressure. This is more than five times the 3 psi partial pressure of oxygen in the atmosphere, and provides an environment in which materials not normally considered highly flammable will burst into flame.

The high-pressure oxygen atmosphere was consistent with that used in the Mercury and Gemini programs. The pressure before launch was deliberately greater than ambient in order to drive out the nitrogen-containing air and replace it with pure oxygen. After liftoff, the pressure would have been reduced to the in-flight level of 5 psi (0.34 bar), providing sufficient oxygen for the astronauts to breathe while reducing the fire risk. The Apollo 1 crew had tested this procedure with their spacecraft in the Operations and Checkout Building altitude (vacuum) chamber on October 18 and 19, 1966, and the backup crew of Schirra, Eisele and Cunningham had repeated it on December 30.

When designing the Mercury spacecraft, NASA had considered using a nitrogen/oxygen mixture to reduce the fire risk near launch, but rejected it based on two considerations. First, nitrogen used with the in-flight pressure reduction carried the clear risk of decompression sickness (known as "the bends"). But the decision to eliminate the use of any gas but oxygen was crystalized when a serious accident occurred on April 21, 1960, in which McDonnell Aircraft test pilot G.B. North passed out and was seriously injured when testing a Mercury cabin / spacesuit atmosphere system in a vacuum chamber. The problem was found to be nitrogen-rich (oxygen-poor) air leaking from the cabin into his spacesuit feed. North American Aviation had suggested using an oxygen/nitrogen mixture for Apollo, but NASA overruled this. The pure oxygen design also carried the benefit of saving weight, by eliminating the need for nitrogen tanks.

In his monograph Project Apollo: The Tough Decisions, Deputy Administrator Seamans wrote that NASA's single worst mistake in engineering judgment was not to run a fire test on the Command Module prior to the plugs-out test. In the first episode of the 2009 BBC documentary series NASA: Triumph and Tragedy, Jim McDivitt said that NASA had no idea how a 100% oxygen atmosphere would influence burning. Similar remarks by other astronauts were expressed in the 2007 documentary film In the Shadow of the Moon.

Other oxygen fires

Several fires in high-oxygen environments had been known to occur prior to the Apollo fire. For example, in 1962, USAF Colonel B. Dean Smith was conducting a test of the Gemini space suit with a colleague in a pure oxygen chamber at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas when a fire broke out, destroying the chamber. Smith and his partner narrowly escaped.

Other oxygen fire occurrences are documented in certain U.S. reports archived in the National Air and Space Museum, such as:

• Selection of Space Cabin Atmospheres. Part II: Fire and Blast Hazaards [sic] in Space Cabins. (Emanuel M. Roth; Dept of Aeronautics Medicine and Bioastronautics, Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research. c.1964–1966.)
• "Fire Prevention in Manned Spacecraft and Test Chamber Oxygen Atmospheres." (MSC. NASA General Working Paper 10 063. October 10, 1966)

On January 28, 1986, the Soviet Union disclosed that cosmonaut Valentin Bondarenko died after a fire in a high-oxygen isolation chamber on March 23, 1961, less than three weeks before the first Vostok manned space flight. This revelation caused some speculation whether the Apollo 1 disaster might have been averted had NASA been aware of the incident.

Hatch design

The higher than atmospheric cabin pressure made it impossible for the senior pilot to remove the inner hatch, until the excess cabin pressure (16.7 psi absolute, 2 psi above ambient) had been vented. Emergency procedure called for the command pilot to open the cabin vent first, but this was located near the origin of the fire, and while the system could easily vent the normal pressure, it was utterly incapable of handling the extra increase in pressure (to at least 29 psi absolute) caused by the fire.

North American had originally suggested the hatch open outward and use explosive bolts to blow the hatch in case of emergency, as had been done in Project Mercury. NASA did not agree, arguing the hatch could accidentally open, as it had on Grissom's Liberty Bell 7 flight, so the inward-opening hatch was selected early in the Block I design.

Before the fire, the Apollo astronauts had recommended changing the design to an outward-opening hatch, and this was already slated for inclusion in the Block II Command Module design. According to Donald K. Slayton's testimony before the House investigation of the accident, this was based on ease of exit for spacewalks and at the end of flight, rather than for emergency exit.

Emergency preparedness

The board noted that: the test planners had failed to identify the test as hazardous; the emergency equipment (such as gas masks) were inadequate to handle this type of fire; that fire, rescue, and medical teams were not in attendance; and that the spacecraft work and access areas contained many hindrances to emergency response such as steps, sliding doors, and sharp turns.

Political fallout

Deputy Administrator Seamans, Administrator Webb, Manned Space Flight Administrator George E. Mueller, and Apollo Program Director Phillips testify before a Senate hearing on the Apollo accident

Committees in both houses of the United States Congress with oversight of the space program soon launched investigations, including the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, chaired by Senator Clinton P. Anderson. Seamans, Webb, Manned Space Flight Administrator Dr. George E. Mueller, and Apollo Program Director Maj Gen Samuel C. Phillips were called to testify before Sen. Anderson's committee.

In the February 27 hearing, Senator Walter F. Mondale asked Webb if he knew of a "report" of extraordinary problems with the performance of North American Aviation on the Apollo contract. Webb replied he did not, and deferred to his subordinates on the witness panel. Mueller and Phillips responded they too were unaware of any such "report".

However, in late 1965, just over a year before the accident, Phillips had headed a "tiger team" investigating the causes of inadequate quality, schedule delays, and cost overruns in both the Apollo CSM and the Saturn V second stage (for which North American was also prime contractor.) He gave an oral presentation (with transparencies) of his team's findings to Mueller and Seamans, and also presented them in a memo to North American president John L. Atwood, to which Mueller appended his own strongly worded memo to Atwood. Mondale said he had been told of the existence of the "Phillips report", and Seamans was afraid that Mondale might be in possession of a hard copy of the presentation, so he said tentatively that contractors have occasionally been given negative reviews, but that he knew of no such extraordinary report. Mondale raised controversy over "the Phillips Report", despite Phillips' refusal to characterize it as such before Congress, and was angered by what he perceived as Webb's deception and concealment of important program problems from Congress, and questioned NASA's selection of North American as prime contractor. On May 11, Webb issued a statement defending the selection. On June 9, Seamans filed a seven-page memorandum documenting the process that led to North American's selection in November 1961. Webb eventually provided a controlled copy of Phillips' memo to Congress. Seamans later wrote that Webb roundly chastised him in the cab ride leaving the hearing, for volunteering information which led to the disclosure of Phillips' memo.

The committee noted in its final report NASA's testimony that "the findings of the [Phillips] task force had no effect on the accident, did not lead to the accident, and were not related to the accident", but stated in its recommendations:

"Notwithstanding that in NASA's judgment the contractor later made significant progress in overcoming the problems, the committee believes it should have been informed of the situation. The committee does not object to the position of the Administrator of NASA, that all details of Government/contractor relationships should not be put in the public domain. However, that position in no way can be used as an argument for not bringing this or other serious situations to the attention of the committee."

Freshman Senators Edward W. Brooke III and Charles H. Percy jointly wrote an Additional Views section appended to the committee report, chastising NASA more strongly than Anderson for not having disclosed the Phillips review to Congress. Mondale wrote his own, even more strongly worded Additional View, accusing NASA of "evasiveness, ... lack of candor, ... patronizing attitude toward Congress, ... refusal to respond fully and forthrightly to legitimate Congressional inquiries, and ... solicitous concern for corporate sensitivities at a time of national tragedy."

The potential political threat to Apollo blew over, due in large part to the support of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who at the time still wielded a measure of influence with the Congress from his own Senatorial experience. He was a staunch supporter of NASA since its inception, had even recommended the Moon program to President John F. Kennedy in 1961, and was skilled at portraying it as part of Kennedy's legacy.

Internal acrimony developed between NASA and North American over assignment of blame. North American argued unsuccessfully it was not responsible for the fatal error in spacecraft atmosphere design. Finally, Webb contacted Atwood, and demanded either he or Chief Engineer Harrison A. Storms resign. Atwood elected to fire Storms.

On the NASA side, Joseph Shea became unfit for duty in the aftermath and was removed from his position, although not fired.

Program recovery

From this day forward, Flight Control will be known by two words: Tough and Competent. Tough means we are forever accountable for what we do or what we fail to do. We will never again compromise our responsibilities... Competent means we will never take anything for granted... Mission Control will be perfect. When you leave this meeting today you will go to your office and the first thing you will do there is to write Tough and Competent on your blackboards. It will never be erased. Each day when you enter the room, these words will remind you of the price paid by Grissom, White, and Chaffee. These words are the price of admission to the ranks of Mission Control.

Gene Kranz, speech given to Mission Control after the accident.

Gene Kranz called a meeting of his staff in Mission Control three days after the accident, delivering a speech which has subsequently become one of NASA's principles. Speaking of the errors and overall attitude surrounding the Apollo program before the accident, he stated: "We were too 'gung-ho' about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work. Every element of the program was in trouble and so were we." He reminded the team of the perils and mercilessness of their endeavor, and stated the new requirement that every member of every team in mission control be "tough and competent", requiring nothing less than perfection throughout NASA's programs. 36 years later, following the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, then-NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe quoted Kranz's speech, adopting it in principle to honor the lives of Apollo 1's and Columbia's astronauts.

Command Module redesign

After the fire, the Apollo program was grounded for review and redesign. The Command Module was found to be extremely hazardous and in some instances, carelessly assembled (for example, a misplaced socket wrench was found in the cabin).

It was decided that remaining Block I spacecraft would only be used for unmanned Saturn V test flights. All manned missions would use the Block II spacecraft, to which many Command Module design changes were made:

• The cabin atmosphere at launch was changed to 60% oxygen and 40% nitrogen at sea-level pressure: 14.7 psi (1.01 bar). During ascent the cabin rapidly vented down to 5 psi (0.34 bar), releasing approximately 2/3 of the gas originally present at launch. The vent then closed and the environmental control system maintained a nominal cabin pressure of 5 psi as the spacecraft continued into vacuum. The cabin was then very slowly purged (vented to space and simultaneously replaced with 100% oxygen), so the nitrogen concentration fell asymptotically to zero over the next day. Although the new cabin launch atmosphere was significantly safer than 100% oxygen, it still contained almost three times the amount of oxygen present in ordinary sea level air (20.9% oxygen). This was necessary to ensure a sufficient partial pressure of oxygen when the astronauts removed their helmets after reaching orbit. (60% of 5 psi is 3 psi, compared to 20.9% of 14.7 psi, or 3.07 psi in sea-level air.)

• The environment within the astronauts' pressure suits was not changed. Because of the rapid drop in cabin (and suit) pressures during ascent, decompression sickness was likely unless the nitrogen had been purged from the astronauts' tissues prior to launch. They would still breathe pure oxygen, starting several hours before launch, until they removed their helmets on orbit. Avoiding the "bends" was considered worth the residual risk of an oxygen-accelerated fire within a suit.

• Nylon used in the Block I suits was replaced in the Block II suits with Beta cloth, a non-flammable, highly melt-resistant fabric woven from fiberglass and coated with Teflon.

• Block II had already been planned to use a completely redesigned hatch which opened outward, and could be opened in less than ten seconds. Concerns of accidental opening were addressed by using a cartridge of pressurized nitrogen to drive the release mechanism in an emergency, instead of the explosive bolts used on Project Mercury.
• Flammable materials in the cabin were replaced with self-extinguishing versions.
• Plumbing and wiring were covered with protective insulation.
• 1,407 wiring problems were corrected.

Thorough protocols were implemented for documenting spacecraft construction and maintenance.

New mission naming scheme

The astronauts' widows asked that Apollo 1 be reserved for the flight their husbands never made, and on April 24, 1967, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, Dr. George E. Mueller, announced this change officially: AS-204 would be recorded as Apollo 1, "first manned Apollo Saturn flight – failed on ground test". Since three unmanned Apollo missions (AS-201, AS-202, and AS-203) had previously occurred, the next mission, the first unmanned Saturn V test flight (AS-501) would be designated Apollo 4, with all subsequent flights numbered sequentially in the order flown. The first three flights would not be renumbered, and the names Apollo 2 and Apollo 3 would go unused.

The manned flight hiatus allowed work to catch up on the Saturn V and Lunar Module, which were encountering their own delays. Apollo 4 flew in November 1967. Apollo 1's (AS-204) Saturn IB rocket was taken down from Launch Complex 34, later reassembled at Launch complex 37B and used to launch Apollo 5, an unmanned Earth orbital test flight of the first Lunar Module LM-1, in January 1968. A second unmanned Saturn V AS-502 flew as Apollo 6 in April 1968, and Grissom's backup crew of Wally Schirra, Don Eisele, and Walter Cunningham, finally flew the orbital test mission as Apollo 7 (AS-205), in a Block II CSM in October 1968.

Memorials

The names of the three astronauts on the Space Mirror at the Kennedy Space Center

Gus Grissom and Roger Chaffee were buried at Arlington National Cemetery. Ed White was buried at West Point Cemetery on the grounds of the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York.

Their names are among those of several astronauts and cosmonauts who have died in the line of duty, listed on the Space Mirror Memorial at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex in Merritt Island, Florida.

An Apollo 1 mission patch was left on the Moon's surface after the first manned lunar landing by Apollo 11 crew members Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin.

The Apollo 15 mission left a memorial plaque on the surface of the moon with the names of the Apollo 1 astronauts as well as the names of others including Russians who perished in the pursuit of astronautics.

Launch Complex 34

Main article: Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Launch Complex 34

After the Apollo 1 fire, Launch Complex 34 was subsequently used only for the launch of Apollo 7 and later dismantled down to the concrete launch pedestal, which remains at the site (28.52182°N 80.561258°W / 28.52182; -80.561258) along with a few other concrete and steel-reinforced structures. The pedestal bears two plaques commemorating the crew. Each year the families of the Apollo 1 crew are invited to the site for a memorial, and the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Center includes the site in its tour of the historic Cape Canaveral launch sites.

In January 2005, three granite benches, built by a college classmate of one of the astronauts, were installed at the site on the southern edge of the launch pad. Each bears the name of one of the astronauts and his military service insignia.

Launch pedestal, with dedication plaque on rear of right post	Memorial kiosk	Dedication plaque attached to launch platform	Memorial plaque attached to launch platform	Granite memorial benches on the edge of the launch pad

Stars, landmarks on the Moon and Mars

• Apollo astronauts frequently aligned their spacecraft inertial navigation platforms and determined their positions relative to the Earth and Moon by sighting sets of stars with optical instruments. As a practical joke, the Apollo 1 crew named three of the stars in the Apollo catalog after themselves and introduced them into NASA documentation. Gamma Cassiopeiae became Navi – Ivan (Gus Grissom's middle name) spelled backwards. Iota Ursae Majoris became Dnoces – "Second" spelled backwards, for Edward H. White II. And Gamma Velorum became Regor – Roger (Chaffee) spelled backwards. These names quickly stuck after the Apollo 1 accident and were regularly used by later Apollo crews.

• Craters on the Moon and hills on Mars are named after the three Apollo 1 astronauts.

Civic and other memorials

• Grissom Hall, student residence hall at the Florida Institute of Technology
• Three public schools in Huntsville, Alabama (home of George C. Marshall Space Flight Center and the U.S. Space & Rocket Center): Virgil I. Grissom High School, Ed White Middle School, and the Chaffee Elementary School
• Virgil Grissom Elementary School in Princeton, Iowa, and the Edward White Elementary School in Eldridge, Iowa, are both part of the North Scott Community School District also naming the other three elementary schools after astronauts Neil Armstrong, John Glenn, and Alan Shepard
• Edward H. White Middle School in White's hometown of San Antonio, Texas
• Edward H. White High School in Jacksonville, Florida
• Edward H. White II Elementary School, El Lago, Texas
• Edward H. White Memorial Youth Center, Seabrook, Texas
• Virgil Grissom Elementary School in Tulsa, Oklahoma
• Roger B. Chaffee Elementary School at the former Naval Air Station Bermuda (closed)
• Virgil I. Grissom Middle School in Sterling Heights, Michigan, part of Warren Consolidated Schools
• Virgil I. Grissom Middle School in Mishawaka, Indiana, part of the Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation
• A memorial to Grissom in Spring Mill State Park, near his hometown of Mitchell, Indiana. In Mitchell itself is the town's Gus Grissom Memorial. Mitchell High School's auditorium is also named for him
• Three man-made oil drilling islands in the harbor off Long Beach, California, are named Grissom, White and Chaffee. A fourth island is named for Theodore Freeman, an USAF test pilot chosen as an astronaut in 1963 but who was killed while piloting a T-38 jet when it crashed at Ellington Air Force Base
• A road that formerly ran through Kent County Airport (GRR) in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Chaffee's hometown, was named Roger B. Chaffee Memorial Boulevard after the airport was moved further from the city limits
• The Roger B. Chaffee Planetarium is located at the Grand Rapids Public Museum
• Roger B. Chaffee Scholarship Fund in Grand Rapids, Michigan each year in memory of Chaffee honors one student who intends to pursue a career in engineering or the sciences
• White Hall and Grissom Hall at the former Chanute Air Force Base (closed, 1993) in Rantoul, Illinois

• The names of Grissom, White and Chaffee were used for streets in Amherst, New York. These are connected to Niagara Falls Boulevard and located near the Bell Aircraft plant, where the X-planes were built in the 1940s. There is a museum dedicated to the work of Bell in the aeronautic sciences. The roads commemorating White and Chaffee are still in existence, however a local restaurant purchased the entire length of Grissom Drive, and renamed it against the protests of the local citizenry and the town board
• Three adjacent parks in Fullerton, California, are each named for Grissom, Chaffee and White. The parks are located near a former Hughes Aircraft research and development facility. A Hughes subsidiary, Hughes Space and Communications Company, built components for the Apollo program
• Grissom Air Reserve Base (formerly Grissom Air Force Base, formerly Bunker Hill Air Force Base, 65 miles (105 km) north of Indianapolis) in Grissom's home state of Indiana was renamed for Grissom on May 12, 1968
• The three letter identifier of the VOR located at Grissom Air Reserve Base is GUS, Grissom's nickname
• Two buildings on the campus of Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, are named for Grissom and Chaffee (both Purdue alumni). Grissom Hall houses the School of Industrial Engineering (and was home to the School of Aeronautics and Astronautics before it moved into the new Neil Armstrong Hall of Engineering). Chaffee Hall is the administration complex of Maurice J. Zucrow Laboratories where thermal sciences and rocket propulsion are studied
• Grissom Parkway runs between Cocoa and Titusville, Florida, intersecting White Drive and Chaffee Drive near the Titusville Police Department
• Virgil I. Grissom Library in Newport News, Virginia
• Virgil I. Grissom Bridge across the Hampton River, on Rt 258 (Mercury Blvd, named after Project Mercury) in Hampton, Virginia, is one of the six bridges and one road named after the original seven Mercury astronauts, who trained in the area
• Edward White Hospital in St. Petersburg, Florida
• Three trees (one for each astronaut) were planted on NASA grounds at Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, not far from the Saturn V building, along with trees for each astronaut from the Challenger and Columbia disasters. Tours of the space center pause briefly near the grove for a moment of silence, and the trees can be seen from nearby NASA Road 1

Remains of CM-012

The Apollo 1 Command Module has never been on public display. After the accident, the spacecraft was removed and taken to Kennedy Space Center to facilitate the review board's disassembly in order to investigate the cause of the fire. When the investigation was complete, it was moved to the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, and placed in a secured storage warehouse.

On February 17, 2007, the parts of CM-012 were moved approximately 90 feet (27 m) to a newer, environmentally controlled warehouse. Only a few weeks earlier, Gus Grissom's brother Lowell publicly suggested CM-012 be permanently entombed in the concrete remains of Launch Complex 34.

Popular culture

• The accident is briefly depicted in the opening scene of the 1995 film Apollo 13.
• The Apollo 1 tragedy and its aftermath is the subject of episode 2 of the 1998 HBO miniseries From the Earth to the Moon, starring Mark Rolston as Gus Grissom, Chris Isaak as Ed White and Ben Marley as Roger Chaffee.
• The launch pedestal and memorial plaque are briefly depicted in scenes from the 1985 IMAX film Chronos and the 1998 feature film Armageddon.

See also

• Apollo program
• List of spaceflight-related accidents and incidents
• Joseph Francis Shea
• List of unusual deaths

References

 This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

• Anderson, Clinton P. (January 30, 1968), Apollo 204 Accident: Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, with Additional Views, vol. Senate Report 956, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
• Benson, Charles D.; Faherty, William Barnaby (1978). Moonport: A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations. NASA History Series. NASA. LCCN 77-29118. NASA SP-4204. Retrieved July 12, 2013.
• Kranz, Eugene (2000). Failure is Not an Option: Mission Control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond. Berkley Books. ISBN 978-0-425-17987-1.
• Murray, Charles; Cox, Catherine Bly (1990). Apollo: The Race to the Moon. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-671-70625-8.

Further reading

• Bergaust, Erik (1968). Murder on Pad 34. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. LCCN 68-12096. OCLC 437050.
• Lattimer, Dick (1985). All We Did Was Fly to the Moon. History-alive series. Vol. 1. Foreword by James A. Michener (1st ed.). Alachua, FL: Whispering Eagle Press. ISBN 0-9611228-0-3.
• Freiman, Fran Locher; Schlager, Neil (1995). Failed Technology: True Stories of Technological Disasters. Vol. 1. New York: Gale Research. ISBN 0-8103-9795-1. LCCN 96129100.

External links

• NASA Apollo 1 website
• Baron testimony at investigation before Olin Teague, 21. April 1967
• Apollo 204 Review Board Final Report, NASA's final report on its investigation, April 5, 1967
• Apollo 204 Accident: Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, with Additional Views, Final report of the U.S. Senate investigation, January 30, 1968
• Apollo 1 Crew- U.S. Spaceflight History Biography
• Apollo Operations Handbook, Command and Service Module, Spacecraft 012 (The flight manual for CSM 012)