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Ratlines (World War II)

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High-ranking fascists and Nazis who escaped from Europe via the ratlines after World War II: Ante Pavelić, Adolf Eichmann and Josef Mengele

The ratlines (German: Rattenlinien) were systems of escape routes for German Nazis and other fascists fleeing Europe from 1945 onwards in the aftermath of World War II. These escape routes mainly led toward havens in the Americas, particularly in Argentina, though also in Paraguay, Colombia,[1] Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia, as well as the United States, Canada, Australia, Spain, and Switzerland.

There were two primary routes: the first went from Germany to Spain, then Argentina; the second from Germany to Rome, then Genoa, then South America. The two routes developed independently but eventually came together.[2] The ratlines were supported by rogue elements in the Vatican, particularly an Austrian bishop and four Croatian clergy of the Catholic Church who sympathized with the Ustaše.[3][4][5] Starting in 1947, U.S. Intelligence utilized existing ratlines to move certain Nazi strategists and scientists.[6]

While consensus among Western scholars is that Nazi leader Adolf Hitler died by suicide in 1945, in the late 1940s and 1950s the U.S. investigated claims that he survived and fled to South America.

Ratlines

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Franco's Spain

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The origins of the first ratlines are connected to various developments in Vatican-Argentine relations before and during World War II.[7] As early as 1942, the Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Luigi Maglione – evidently at the behest of Pope Pius XII – contacted an ambassador of Argentina regarding that country's willingness to accept European Catholic immigrants in a timely manner, allowing them to live and work.[8] Anton Weber, a German priest who headed the Roman branch of Saint Raphael's Society [de], traveled to Portugal with intentions to continue to Argentina, seemingly to lay the groundwork for Catholic immigration.[8]

Catholic leaders accepted working with the Nazis in order to fight the common enemy of Bolshevism. By 1944, ratline activity centered in Francoist Spain was conducted to facilitate the escape of Nazis.[9] Among the primary organizers were Charles Lescat, a French member of Action Française – an organization suppressed by Pope Pius XI and rehabilitated by Pius XII – and Pierre Daye, a Belgian with contacts in the Spanish government.[10] Lescat and Daye were the first to flee Europe with the help of Antonio Caggiano, Bishop of Rosario (Argentina) and a cardinal after February 1946.[10]

By 1946, there were hundreds of war criminals in Spain, as well as thousands of former Nazis and fascists.[11] According to United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Vatican cooperation in turning over these "asylum-seekers" was "negligible".[11] Historian Michael Phayer argues that Pius XII was primarily focused on fighting communism and would prefer "fascist war criminals [sail] to the New World rather than [rot] in POW camps".[12] Unlike the Vatican emigration operation in Italy which centered on Vatican City, the Spanish ratlines – though fostered by the Vatican – were relatively independent of the Vatican Emigration Bureau's hierarchy.[13]

Bishop Hudal's network

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Austrian Catholic bishop Alois Hudal, a Nazi sympathiser, was rector of the Pontificio Istituto Teutonico Santa Maria dell'Anima in Rome, a seminary for Austrian and German priests, and "Spiritual Director of the German People resident in Italy".[14] After the end of the war in Italy, Hudal became active in ministering to German-speaking prisoners of war and internees then held in camps throughout Italy. In December 1944, the Vatican Secretariat of State received permission to appoint a representative to "visit the German-speaking civil internees in Italy", a job assigned to Hudal.[citation needed]

Hudal used this position to aid the escape of wanted Nazi war criminals, including Franz Stangl, commanding officer of Treblinka; Gustav Wagner, commanding officer of Sobibor; Alois Brunner, responsible for the Drancy internment camp near Paris and in charge of deportations in Slovakia to German concentration camps; Erich Priebke, who was responsible for the Ardeatine Massacre; and Adolf Eichmann—a fact about which he was later unashamedly open.[15][16] Some of these wanted men were being held in internment camps; generally lacking identity papers, they would be enrolled in camp registers under false names. Other Nazis hid in Italy and sought Hudal out after learning about his role in assisting escapes.[17]

In his memoirs, Hudal said of his actions, "I thank God that He [allowed me] to visit and comfort many victims in their prisons and concentration camps and to help them escape with false identity papers."[18] He explained that in his eyes:

The Allies' War against Germany was not a crusade, but the rivalry of economic complexes for whose victory they had been fighting. This so-called business ... used catchwords like democracy, race, religious liberty and Christianity as a bait for the masses. All these experiences were the reason why I felt duty bound after 1945 to devote my whole charitable work mainly to former National Socialists and Fascists, especially to so-called 'war criminals'.

According to Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Hudal was the first Catholic priest to dedicate himself to establishing escape routes.[19] They claim that Hudal helped the Nazi fugitives with money, and more importantly with false identity documents from the Vatican Refugee Organisation (Pontificia Commissione di Assistenza). These Vatican papers were not full passports and thus were not enough to gain passage overseas. They were, rather, the first step in a paper trail—they could be used to obtain a displaced person passport from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which in turn could be used to apply for visas. In theory, the ICRC would perform background checks on passport applicants, but in practice, the word of a priest or particularly a bishop would be good enough. According to statements collected by Austrian writer Gitta Sereny from a senior official of the Rome branch of the ICRC,[20] Hudal would also use his position as a bishop to request papers from the ICRC "made out according to his specifications". Sereny's sources also revealed an active illicit trade in stolen and forged ICRC papers in Rome at the time.[citation needed]

Croatian Franciscans

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A travel ID issued by the International Red Cross to a Croatian national

A small but influential network of Croatian priests, members of the Franciscan order, led by Father Krunoslav Draganović, organised a highly sophisticated ratline with headquarters at the San Girolamo degli Illirici Seminary College in Rome, with links from Austria an embarcation point in Genoa. The ratline initially focused on aiding members of the Croatian Ustaše including its leader, Ante Pavelić.[21]

Priests active in the chain included: Fr. Vilim Cecelja, former Deputy Military Vicar to the Ustaše, based in Austria where many Ustashe and Nazi refugees remained in hiding; Fr. Dragutin Kamber, based at San Girolamo; Fr. Dominik Mandić, an official Vatican representative at San Girolamo and treasurer of the Franciscans, who put the Franciscan press at the ratline's disposal; and Monsignor Karlo Petranović, based in Genoa. Vilim would make contact with those hiding in Austria and help them cross the border to Italy; Kamber, Mandić and Draganović would find them lodgings, often in the monastery itself, while they arranged documentation; finally, Draganović would phone Petranović in Genoa with the number of required berths on ships leaving for South America.

The Draganović ratline was an open secret among the intelligence and diplomatic communities in Rome. As early as August 1945, Allied commanders in Rome were asking questions about the use of San Girolamo as a "haven" for Ustaše.[22] A US State Department report of 12 July 1946 listed nine war criminals, including Albanians and Montenegrins as well as Croats, plus others "not actually sheltered" at San Girolamo Seminary who "enjoy Church support and protection".[23]

In February 1947, CIC Special Agent Robert Clayton Mudd reported ten members of Pavelić's Ustaše cabinet living either in San Girolamo or in the Vatican itself. Mudd had infiltrated an agent into the seminary and confirmed that it was "honeycombed with cells of Ustashe operatives" guarded by "armed youths". Mudd reported a car protected under diplomatic immunity transported unidentified people between the Vatican and the Seminary.[24] He concluded that:

DRAGANOVIC's sponsorship of these Croat Ustashes definitely links him up with the plan of the Vatican to shield these ex-Ustasha nationalists until such time as they are able to procure for them the proper documents to enable them to go to South America. The Vatican, undoubtedly banking on the strong anti-Communist feelings of these men, is endeavoring to infiltrate them into South America in any way possible to counteract the spread of Red doctrine. It has been reliably reported, for example that Dr. VRANCIC has already gone to South America and that Ante PAVELIC and General KREN are scheduled for an early departure to South America through Spain. All these operations are said to have been negotiated by DRAGANOVIC because of his influence in the Vatican.

The existence of Draganović's ratline has been supported by a highly respected historian of Vatican diplomacy, Fr. Robert Graham: "I've no doubt that Draganović was extremely active in syphoning off his Croatian Ustashe friends." Graham stated that Draganović's ratline was not approved by the Vatican: "Just because he's a priest doesn't mean he represents the Vatican. It was his own operation."[25] At the same time, there were four occasions in which the Vatican did intervene on behalf of interned Ustasha prisoners.[citation needed]

Role of U.S. intelligence

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See also: Operation Paperclip

According to a declassified U.S. Army intelligence report from 1950, by mid-1947 U.S. forces had begun to use Draganović's established network to evacuate "visitors who had been in the custody of the 430th CIC and completely processed in accordance with current directives and requirements, and whose continued residence in Austria constituted a security threat as well as a source of possible embarrassment to the Commanding General of USFA, since the Soviet Command had become aware that their presence in U.S. Zone of Austria and in some instances had requested the return of these persons to Soviet custody".[26][better source needed]

These were suspected war criminals from areas occupied by the Red Army which the U.S. was obliged to hand over for trial to the Soviets. The U.S. reputedly was reluctant to do so, partly due to a belief that fair trials could hardly be expected in the Soviet Union.[citation needed] The deal with Draganović involved getting the visitors to Rome: "Dragonovich [sic] handled all phases of the operation after the defectees arrived in Rome, such as the procurement of IRO Italian and South American documents, visas, stamps, arrangements for disposition, land or sea, and notification of resettlement committees in foreign lands."[26]

Peron's Argentina

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See also: Juan Perón § Jewish and German communities of Argentina

Argentine president Juan Perón spoke out against the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals (1945–1946).[27] The final period of German immigration to Argentina occurred between 1946 and 1950 when Perón ordered the creation of a ratline for prominent Nazis, collaborators and other fascists from Europe.[citation needed]

According to Argentine researcher Uki Goñi, who had recently gained access to the country's archives for his 2002 book, Argentine diplomats and intelligence officers had, on Perón's instructions, vigorously encouraged Nazi and fascist war criminals to make their home in Argentina. According to Goñi, the Argentines not only collaborated with Draganović's ratline, but set up additional ratlines running through Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Belgium.

According to Goñi, Argentina's first move into Nazi smuggling was in January 1946, when Argentine bishop Antonio Caggiano, leader of the Argentine chapter of Catholic Action, flew with another bishop, Agustín Barrére, to Rome where Caggiano was due to be anointed Cardinal. In Rome the Argentine bishops met with French Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, where they passed on a message (recorded in Argentina's diplomatic archives) that "the Government of the Argentine Republic was willing to receive French persons, whose political attitude during the recent war would expose them, should they return to France, to harsh measures and private revenge".[citation needed]

Over the spring of 1946, a number of French war criminals, fascists and Vichy officials made it from Italy to Argentina in the same way; they were issued passports by the Rome ICRC office, which were then stamped with Argentine tourist visas. (The need for health certificates and return tickets was waived on Caggiano's recommendation.) The first documented case of a French war criminal arriving in Buenos Aires was Émile Dewoitine, who was later sentenced in absentia to 20 years of hard labour. He sailed first class on the same ship back with Cardinal Caggiano.[28]

Shortly after this Argentinian Nazi smuggling became institutionalised, according to Goñi, when Perón's new government of February 1946 appointed anthropologist Santiago Peralta as Immigration Commissioner and former Ribbentrop agent Ludwig Freude as his intelligence chief. Goñi argues that these two then set up a "rescue team" of secret service agents and immigration "advisors", many of whom were themselves European war-criminals, with Argentine citizenship and employment.[29]

Finnish ratlines

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Main article: Pro-German resistance movement in Finland

From 1944, a network of extreme right-wing Finns and Nazis in Finland, founded by Sturmbannführer (Major) Alarich Bross operated in Finland. Organized to engage in armed struggle against the Soviet occupation which never occurred, it smuggled out those who wanted to leave the country for Germany or Sweden. It created a system of safehouses in Finland under the cover of a company called "Great fishing cooperative" with routes provided by a 50–70-man maritime transport organization. Its targets in Sweden were secret loading bays in the small town of Härnösand in western Norrland. Others were smuggled to Sweden from the north over the Tornio river. Access to Europe was opened through the Swedish safehouse network.[30]

Through the safehouse routes, the resistance movement transported Finnish Nazis and fascists, officers and intelligence personnel, Estonian and East Karelian refugees and German citizens out of the country. Hundreds of people were assisted in Sweden, including more than a hundred German prisoners of war who had fled the Finns. Transport to Germany took place after the September 1944 break in German submarines, smuggling hundreds of people. At the same time Organisation ODESSA brought refugees from Germany to the Finnish coast, sometimes in several submarines at the same time.[31] They were transported along the safe house route to Sweden and further from there.[30]

Purported escape of Adolf Hitler

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Main article: Conspiracy theories about Adolf Hitler's death
The U.S. Secret Service imagines a disguise Hitler might use to try to evade capture (1944).

In 2014, over 700 FBI documents were declassified (as part of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act), revealing that the US government had undertaken an investigation in the late 1940s and 1950s as to reports of the possible escape of Adolf Hitler from Germany, as had been suggested by the Soviet Union after capturing Berlin.[32] Some leads assert that Hitler did not commit suicide in 1945 but fled Germany via Francoist Spain and then entered Argentina.[33][34][35]

CIA documents contain additional reported sightings and a purported 1954 photograph of Hitler[36] as claimed by a self-proclaimed former German SS trooper named Phillip Citroen, who said Hitler "left Colombia for Argentina around January 1955". The CIA report states that the agency was not "in a position to give an intelligent evaluation of the information" and that "enormous efforts could be expended ... with remote possibilities of establishing anything concrete", so the investigation was dropped.[36][37]

Claims of Hitler's escape as well as an alleged Soviet autopsy of his corpse have been dismissed by Western historians, according to whom Hitler's dental remains prove that he died in 1945.[32][37]

Ratline escapees

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Some of the Nazis and war criminals who escaped using ratlines include:

See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Colombia Nazi". Semana. Retrieved 14 November 2016.
  2. ^ Phayer 2008, p. 173.
  3. ^ "What did the Vatican know about the Nazi escape routes? – DW – 03/01/2020". dw.com. Retrieved 18 December 2022. [...] thousands of Nazis and collaborators [...], with the help of a rogue bishop of the Catholic Church, escaped Europve[sic] via routes called 'ratlines' — some of which ran from Innsbruck over the Alps to Merano or Bolzano in South Tyrol, then to Rome and from there to the Italian port city of Genoa.
  4. ^ Kertzer, David I. (31 May 2022). "The Pope's Secret Back Channel to Hitler". The Atlantic. Retrieved 18 December 2022.
  5. ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 46.
  6. ^ "History of the Italian Rat Line" (10 April 1950), document signed by "IB Operating Officer" Paul E. Lyon, 430th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), Headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Austria. Archived 2007-10-08 at the Wayback Machine, from the original, jasenovac-info.com; accessed 7 February 2023. "During the summer of 1947 the undersigned received instructions from G-2, USFA, through Chief CIC, to establish a means of disposition for visitors who had been in the custody of the 430th CIC and completely processed in accordance with current directives and requirements, and whose continued residence in Austria constituted a security threat as well as a source of possible embarrassment to the Commanding General of USFA, since the Soviet Command had become aware that their presence in US Zone of Austria and in some instances had requested the return of these persons to Soviet custody."
  7. ^ Phayer 2008, pp. 173–79.
  8. ^ a b Phayer 2008, p. 179.
  9. ^ Phayer 2008, p. 180.
  10. ^ a b Phayer 2008, p. 182.
  11. ^ a b Phayer 2008, p. 183.
  12. ^ Phayer 2008, p. 187.
  13. ^ Phayer 2008, p. 188.
  14. ^ (Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 36)
  15. ^ Agnew, Paddy. "Nazi funeral that's forcing Italy to face its past". The Irish Times. Retrieved 2 September 2020.
  16. ^ Phayer 2000, p. 11.
  17. ^ Sereny 1983, p. 289.
  18. ^ Hudal, Römische Tagebücher (Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 37)
  19. ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, ch. 2.
  20. ^ Sereny 1983, pp. 316–17.
  21. ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, ch. 5.
  22. ^ "Krunoslav Draganovic - From Pavelic-Papers.com". Domovod.info. 13 June 2012. Retrieved 21 December 2016.
  23. ^ "The Pavelic Papers: Documents" (PDF). Krajinaforce.com. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 21 December 2016.
  24. ^ Avraham, Yerachmiel Ben (12 April 2016). All in the Name of Jesus: The Murder of Millions. WaveCloud Corporation. p. 207. ISBN 9781622176342.
  25. ^ Aarons & Loftus 1998, p. 89.
  26. ^ a b "History of the Italian Rat Line" (10 April 1950), document signed by "IB Operating Officer" Paul E. Lyon, 430th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), Headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Austria. Archived 2007-10-08 at the Wayback Machine, from the original, jasenovac-info.com; accessed 4 August 2017.
  27. ^ From the 'Perón tapes' he recorded the year before his death, published in Yo, Juan Domingo Perón, Luca de Tena et al. (Goñi 2003, p. 100) "In Nuremberg at that time something was taking place that I personally considered a disgrace and an unfortunate lesson for the future of humanity. I became certain that the Argentine people also considered the Nuremberg process a disgrace, unworthy of the victors, who behaved as if they hadn't been victorious. Now we realize that they [the Allies] deserved to lose the war."
  28. ^ Goñi 2003, pp. 96–98.
  29. ^ Goñi 2003, ch. 8.
  30. ^ a b Lappalainen, Niilo: Aselevon jälkeen. WSOY, 1997. ISBN 951-0-21813-8. p. 111, 113–114
  31. ^ Alava, Ali: Gestapo Suomessa. Hämeenlinna: Arvi A.Karisto Osakeyhtiö, 1974. ISBN 951-23-0844-4.
  32. ^ a b Joachimsthaler, Anton (1999) [1995]. The Last Days of Hitler: The Legends, The Evidence, The Truth. London: Brockhampton Press. pp. 22–23, 174, 252–53. ISBN 978-1-86019-902-8.
  33. ^ "The Hunt for Hitler". History Today. 2 November 2015. Archived from the original on 7 July 2016. Retrieved 8 January 2019.
  34. ^ "New Investigation Questions Hitler's Suicide". Newhistorian.com. 20 November 2015. Retrieved 21 December 2016.
  35. ^ "FBI — Adolf Hitler". Vault.fbi.gov. Retrieved 21 December 2016.
  36. ^ a b "#HVCA-2592" (PDF). CIA.gov. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 February 2017. Retrieved 5 September 2018.
  37. ^ a b Selk, Avi (20 May 2018) "Scientists say Hitler died in WWII. Tell that to ‘Adolf Schüttelmayor’ and the Nazi moon base." The Washington Post
  38. ^ Wolfe, Robert (15 August 2016). "Analysis of the IRR File of Klaus Barbie". National Archives - Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group. The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved 3 January 2017.
  39. ^ André Swanström : Suomalaiset SS-miehet ja sotarikokset, Suomen kirkkohistoriallinen seura 11.10.2017
  40. ^ a b Silvennoinen, Oula: Salaiset aseveljet : Suomen ja Saksan turvallisuuspoliisiyhteistyö 1933–1944, s. 306, 319. Helsinki: Otava, 2008. ISBN 978-951-12150-1-1.
  41. ^ Uola, Mikko: Unelma kommunistisesta Suomesta 1944–1953. Helsinki: Minerva, 2013. ISBN 978-952-492-768-0.
  42. ^ Uola, Mikko (2001). "Talvela, Paavo (1897–1973)". Kansallisbiografia. Studia Biographica (in Finnish). Vol. 4. The Finnish Literature Society. ISSN 1799-4349. Retrieved 24 October 2021.
Sources

Further reading

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  • Birn, Ruth Bettina. Review of Goñi, Uki, Odessa: Die wahre Geschichte: Fluchthilfe für NS-Kriegsverbrecher and Schneppen, Heinz, Odessa und das Vierte Reich: Mythen der Zeitgeschichte. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. October, 2007.
  • Breitman, Richard; Goda, Norman J. W.; Naftali, Timothy; and Wolfe, Robert (2005). U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge University Press; ISBN 9780521617949.
  • Graham, Robert and Alvarez, David. (1998). Nothing Sacred: Nazi Espionage against the Vatican, 1939-1945. London: Frank Cass.
  • Loftus, John. (2010). America's Nazi Secret: An Insider's History. Waterwille: (Trine Day); ISBN 978-1936296040.
  • Simpson, Christopher (1988). Blowback: The First Full Account of America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Disastrous Effect on The cold war, Our Domestic and Foreign Policy. New York: (Grove/Atlantic); ISBN 978-0020449959.
  • Steinacher, Gerald (2006). The Cape of Last Hope: The Flight of Nazi War Criminals through Italy to South America, in Eisterer, Klaus and Günter Bischof (eds; 2006) Transatlantic Relations: Austria and Latin America in the 19th and 20th Century (Transatlantica 1), pp. 203–24. New Brunswick: Transatlantica.
  • Steinacher, Gerald (2012; P/B edition). Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice. Oxford University Press; ISBN 978-0199642458.
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Media related to Nazis in South America at Wikimedia Commons

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