This is an archive of past discussions about Philosophy of mind. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.
"Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly"
In which world can that be possible? How can you study scientifically something that isn't even material? and directly? Or either is it a science that studies behavior scientifically (and by those actions you can infer the mental states) or is it the study of the mind (when it can't possibly be scientific). WLoku (talk) 03:47, 28 May 2009 (UTC)
Besides that point, there are two other issues with the article. First, I think that is rather necessary to add some more references to some other monists, like Ryle in The Concept of Mind (there is a mentiont to Daniel Denett, but is rather ocasional). As a second issue, when we speak of behaviorism, we are not just "describing behavior". It do holds only to observable behavior, but it's not because "that's the only thing we can do", but because they say that all that we do is behavior. If this is an A-rated class article, we need to get some improvement here. WLoku (talk) 19:10, 1 June 2009 (UTC)
Bridging the gap between monism and dualism in solving the mind body problem
Dualists rightly state that a scientist's assertion that pain is the firing of C-Fibre neurones in the brain does not in any way explain the sensation of pain; why or how it occurs, or even what it is. This first order perception which a neuroscientist may posit is not really the consciousness, and I would go on to say rather that the consciousness is 'the perception of perception'. No matter how scientists have attempted to solve this 'perception of perception' in the past, they have utterly failed to do so by limiting themselves to the 3rd dimension, or as a dualist would say 'the physical plane'. The reason these solutions have failed is that they fail to capture the nature of the problem as miserably as my first example - that pain is a result of C-Fibre neurones firing in the brain. They will never satisfy a dualist, or indeed anyone who properly appreciates the problem by the nature of their stoic monism. I have a theory - and I am aware of the relevant articles propounding the invalidity of personal theories, by the way - which seeks to satisfy monists in terms of being strictly scientific and dualists in acknowledging a slight(if one takes the concept from a very contrived point of view) dichotomy between brain activity and consciousness.
In the same way that objects represent the 3rd dimension and the passage of time the 4th dimension, I believe that the conscious phenomenon of 'feeling' is the representation of some dimension higher than 4 - lets say for arguement's sake 5 - one that, thus far, has not been visualized in any other form than in formulae relating to string theory and the like. One might then go on to argue that, if that is the case, and all objects exist in all dimensions, why don't all objects have a consciousness. And to this I say that they do, only, not the same as us. You see, we in our brains have a vast, complicated, but ultimately structured, network of thought, memory, vision and all the senses that other objects simply do not. I imagine that the 5th dimension requires a degree of structured complexity to come through as consciousness, just like particles must come together before atoms and objects can exist. Imagine the 5th dimension to be paparazzi and our chemical, 3rd dimension quantifiable sensations to be celebrities. The paparazzi require celebrities to be present in order to represent them in articles(imagine in this analogy that articles are the actual consciousness) - but the paparazzi still exist if celebrities are not present. This is the same as, for example, empty space existing without their being objects around to properly represent it, or time existing without any noticeable changes occuring in the environment. Other forms of the consciousness, different and abstract from ours, may exist, but not in inanimate objects, or artificial intelligence as I will explain later.
Oh, and as for where the 3d representation of the consciousness is found, it is not in the brain.
Huh?
Yep. Every 'event' as we perceive it happens slightly differently to every atom: if you imagine yourself punching a wall - every atom in that wall and in your fist receives a slightly different measure of force from the one next to it, so it could actually be rationalised in this way to be several events, several million changes in the energy states of the wall atoms and your knuckle atoms. I regard the entire consciousness to be just one event(otherwise how could one facet of the consciousness, say thought, interact with another, for example memory - if it was not one event their would be no reasonable structure or, more specifically chronological consitency). So this begs the question, how can the consciousness occur inside the brain if the brain is made up of many millions of atoms? Certainly , every atom within the brain does not have the necessary structured complexity to fulfill the conditions of consciousness and the brain does not fulfill the condition of being one indevisable object for the conscious 'event' to occur - so what's up?
The solution? Think Electromagnetic Field.
It's shape on a moment to moment basis is determined by brain activity, and so represents the brain's complexity, but it is also one indevisable object, in fact, luckily for my theory, besides sub atomic particles it is one of the only 4 things to be fully indevisable (Gravity, EM, Weak and Strong nuclear).
I know this is only my theory, not significant when weighed against the heavyweights of the philosophy world, but I think it makes more sense than any alternative, and is just as worthy of a mention in the article as any other theory, despite its lack of following compared to them. People read encyclopedias to find out hard information, and if they can't get that, why put a filter on the speculative content in place in the article they are reading, because any one piece of speculation is just as likely to provide enlightenment as another, surely —Preceding unsigned comment added by Omg Pop (talk • contribs) 15:03, 24 July 2009 (UTC)
So what you're saying is that if went on to right a book expounding this theory, I could then cite it as a valid theory?
It's nothing personal, believe me. Those are the rules the project runs by, and I did not write them (although I agree with them). If you were to write a book, and it were published, another editor could cite it. --Tryptofish (talk) 15:16, 25 July 2009 (UTC)
You might be interested in the article on Electromagnetic theories of consciousness. Material there also needs to be based on reputable published sources, but since it is more focused on the ideas you are talking about, there is more room to go into detail. (Also, please remember to sign talk page messages by typing ~~~~ afterward.) Regards, Looie496 (talk) 14:52, 25 July 2009 (UTC)
Hi OMG Pop. Another possibility for you would be to develop your theory in the open survey topic on the best theories of consciousness at canonizer.com. The most important measure of the quality of a theory is how many people agree that it is a good theory. Publishing a book helps, but it is not absolutely necessary if lots of people agree with you (or are in your 'camp'). There is room there for all theories to stand together, as long as someone is willing to support them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Brent Allsop (talk • contribs) 03:53, 4 August 2009 (UTC)
There's no God, and your human ideals are laughable
If such is the opinion of the "majority of modern philosophers", then I guess this article ought to cover the fact. However, I think the last part of the article pretty much gives the lie to the fact that said "modern philosophers" are those in the analytic tradition, and that everyone else doesn't count. I think this little gem says it quite well:
...while Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than the person whose customs and habits they are
Now, I am not a Post-Colonial theorist, but I can can quite clearly how such a person would respond. Something to the effect of, an anthropologist can study a person's habits and customs and come up with conclusions based on an epistemology that is inherently grounded in white, Western privilege. I personally don't hold this view, but I think there is something to be said for it. If this article remains as it is now, I think there should be some indication at the top of the page that no attempt is being made to represent the views of non Anglo-American philosophy on the matter, which the reader should only expect since this is an English Wiki. Corbmobile (talk) 15:00, 29 November 2009 (UTC)
If you think something in the article needs to be changed, could you please be clearer about what it is and how it ought to be changed? Regards, Looie496 (talk) 16:18, 29 November 2009 (UTC)
I believe that it should be made clear from the get-go that the "majority of modern philosophers" are monist means "the majority of modern analytic philosophers" are monist. Not near the bottom where it currently rests. Corbmobile (talk) 06:09, 30 November 2009 (UTC)
I changed "the majority of" to "many" -- will that suffice? (I also did some other copy-editing of the poorly written prose in the section.) Looie496 (talk) 17:19, 30 November 2009 (UTC)
Well, I don't think that quite addresses the problem. In every philosophy department but a handful in America and or England, the overwhelming majority is Physicalist/Monist (or so the article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy this article is heavily copy-pasted from says). That certainly ought not to be brushed under the rug. I just would like it to be acknowledged in the article that, while the majority of philosophers who feel that science reflects reality (namely Analytical philosophers) are Physicalists/monists/atheists or whatever you'd like to call it, there is a whole other school of philosophy which holds science (or perhaps at least theoretical science) mostly reflects scientists' biases of culture, social status, race, gender, etc., and thus find the question of whether or not there is an extra-physical mind or just the brain wholly irrelevant. Corbmobile (talk) 20:05, 30 November 2009 (UTC)
The vast majority of the philosophers who work in Western universities are ontological physicalists (a.k.a. materialists). In stark contrast, the vast majority of lay-people are ontological dualists, (usually because dualism goes hand-in-hand with most religions). Thus, any reference to the "weight of numbers" is fraught with difficulties - do we refer to the dominant beliefs of the philosophers or of the general population of the world? I am not sure the "weight of numbers" is especially relevant, especially given that the vast majority of lay-people know very little about science, and the vast majority of scientists know very little about philosophy or the metaphysical problems it raises for science. If you don't believe me, try raising a few physical metaphysical problems with a boorish scientist and watch him squirm as you turn his conclusions on their head - it's easy and fun. —Preceding unsigned comment added by BlueRobe (talk • contribs) 23:20, 27 February 2010 (UTC)
Free will section requires update
I have recently tried to modify some original text I wrote expanding on (the critique of) the various definitions of free will provided in the free will section of this article ("Free will - updated the description of volition libertarianism"), but the change was reverted ("It is actually about the will, not the will power").
This section requires the modification of the definition of free will provided in c) "determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the will of a non physical agency". A non-physical agency having a (presumably free) will of it's own and affecting physical reality based upon this will does not deserve a separation classification - this is just a form of substance dualism and so it belongs to a) "not completely determined by natural laws and natural law is broken by dualistic sentient beings" [where definition a) is expanded to be independent of physical determinism/indeterminism - which are irrelevant constraints in substance dualism - see causation].
Case c) refers to the concept of libertarian volition which is the free will concept under non reductive physicalism (property dualism) in which non-physical ageny (subjective/non-observed) is mapped to physically indeterministic physical ageny (objective/observed brain), and provides some level of control over one or more volitions via "effort" (will power) - these may be called Self Forming Actions (SFA) - SFA involve will(s) yet these are not non-physical. (Eg Free Volition, Robert Kane (2007). Libertarianism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub. [[1], page 39]).
Therefore, I changed c) to "determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the will power of a non physical agency".
I think "will power" is a property whereas "will" expresses volition and intentionality. From a libertarian point of view, I believe it is the volition and intentionality of the non-physical agency that is important, rather than its having the property of "will power." That is why I reverted the change. If I'm mistaken, please let me know why - I would appreciate it. I'm also curious what others think about this. I also agree that the section needs to be updated. D15724C710N (talk • contribs) 09:01, 6 April 2010 (UTC)
There are Libertarian models in which non-physical agency has it's own separate will/volition/intentionality. They all fall into category a) and require substance dualism (will is stored in memory and is physical therefore break down in casual interaction is required for alignment purposes between a separate non physical will and that stored in the brain). The model being described in c) is unique in that the will(s) itself is not special, the only process which is especially linked to non-physical agency in this model are those non-deterministic events described in physics / neuroscience (assuming any exist) that correspond to SFAs. This model enables the will(s) to be free under one definition of free will - ie 1) not bound by physical determinism, and 2) controlled to some extent by non-reducible agency; it is (they are) not merely indeterministic, which is the correct scientific description. This definition of free will is proposed as being in support of a form of ultimate responsibility (UR).
Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:37, 8 April 2010 (UTC)
Forgive me for saying so, but I believe the above passage does not argue clearly for changing "will" to "will power". Also, I see no answer to the argument I have provided for reverting the change. As it stands, I think I made the right choice for the article. D15724C710N (talk • contribs) 08:53, 9 April 2010 (UTC)
No problem - I did not directly answer your argument. This is possibly a semantics issue. I have equated 'will power' and 'effort' (see above) as all instances of will power require effort and all instances of effort require will power - but whether or not this equality is accepted, it is arguably confusing to use the phrase will power in this context because people will mistake it as a necessary property of will(s) rather than an action with respect to will(s) - which is as far as I am aware how the phrase is most commonly used in English. Suggest using 'effort' instead of 'will power' to avoid confusion (this is also what is used by Kane).
Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 09:46, 9 April 2010 (UTC)
I see no relevance to the issue we are discussing. Regarding its relevance to the issue of free will, the article is interpretive and incoherent. I do not see why (or how) this piece could be used to better any encyclopedic article. Am I perhaps missing the point? If so, please explain -- and forgive my impertinence. D15724C710N (talk • contribs) 16:27, 22 April 2010 (UTC)
The article does not specify whether physical determinism or indeterminism is accepted. Assuming physical indeterminism is accepted, then it's description of free will coincides with Libertarian Incompatibilism case b) determined by indeterministic natural law only; "Each one of us, too, lead separate lives, darting about randomly, depending on the forces acting upon us". Assuming determinism is accepted (ie, despite being chaotic, making it impossible to reverse engineer the initial conditions, it is still deterministic), then it's definition of free will formally coincides with a form of Compatibilism. Regardless, this article is most probably not appropriate for Wikipedia - it was however an interesting article.
Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:50, 11 April 2010 (UTC)
With respect to this discussion, I have made the following modified update; "These philosophers affirm the course of the world is either a) not completely determined by natural law where natural law is intercepted by physically independent agency, or b) determined by indeterministic natural law only, or c) determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the subjective effort of physically non-reducible agency".
Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:46, 13 April 2010 (UTC)
I have nothing more to say then regarding the issue of "will" vs. "will power." :-) Still, I think there is a lot of room for improvement in the "free will" subsection. Another day, perhaps. D15724C710N (talk • contribs) 16:40, 22 April 2010 (UTC)
Casual Reducibility versus Ontological Reducibility
I recently made some clarifications to the Non-reductive Physicalism section [3][4][5]. The following is with respect to a change which keeps coming up [removal of all instances of the word "casual"]. I have kept reverting this change immediately as it results in some serious errors to the text;
Although mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties, and mental states (such as qualia) are not reducible to physical states, they are however causally reducible to physical states - this makes no sense
Davidson's uses the thesis of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical - causal reducibility between the mental and physical without ontological reducibility - this makes no sense (it removes the explanation of the type of reducibility)
Because causally reducible nonreductive physicalist theories attempt to - this makes no sense
both ontologically and causally irreducible to physical states - this makes no sense
Non-reductive physicalists maintain ontological non-reducibility, but they generally do not claim casual non-reducibility.
The word 'casual' has at least two meanings;
it may indeed mean informal, careless, accidental, incidental, etc
in the scientific world it often refers to two events occurring at the same time (or in close proximity) as a result of one event causing another event (ie, "they are casually related"). In the philosophical world, it may have similar connotations.
One state (A) may cause another state (B) [eg in Epiphenomenalism, the existence of a physical state may cause the existence of a mental state], but this does not necessarily (by itself) imply casual reducibility. Casual reducibility requires state A to cause B, and state B to cause state A (ie, their occurrences are mapped together one-to-one). These states therefore occur at the same time, and can be reduced to (encapsulate) a single temporal state (ie, "they are casually reducible"). Note, the word temporal means "in time", not "temporary". Casual reducibility is therefore reducibility in terms of two states occurring simultaneously, and only occurring simultaneously. Although non-reductive physicalism generally asserts casual reducibility (except for Epiphenomenalism - if it is classed as non-reductive physicalism), it will still maintain that the two states are not ontologically reducible, claiming they are of a different nature (or order of nature); subjective and objective - observer and observed.
I don't mind replacing the word 'casual' with another word to explain this type of reducibility - however; a) I believe it is correct as stands, and b) I am not aware of a better word for it's replacement. Please advise if otherwise.
in the scientific world [casual] often refers to two events occurring at the same time (or in close proximity) as a result of one event causing another event (ie, "they are casually related"). In the philosophical world, it may have similar connotations.
appears to be a misuse of the word casual. It is certainly not the usage in science that I have ever seen. Do you have a dictionary source for this? I can't find this definition or use in Wiktionary or Merriam-Webster. According to the latter, the two words have different Latin sources: casus (chance) and causa (cause). Do you have a scholarly source that uses casual in this way? --EPadmirateur (talk) 19:44, 2 June 2010 (UTC)
I am sorry the correct phrase is "causally related" - this is a serious mistake of semantics; and I apologise - the intended meaning remains the same as stated above however. Hopefully we will be able to resolve this issue soon. Note again, I don't mind changing the phrase "causally reducible" if someone can come up with a better way of describing the difference between non-reductive physicalism which claims a mapping between physical states and mental states (such as Anomalous monism) and Epiphenomenalism which claims a one-way relationship (byproducts) where one or more mental states have no physical consequences. This problem would not exist of course if Epiphenomenalism never wished to be called non-reductive physicalism; no harm is intended - I only wish to remove contradictions from Wikipedia (that would otherwise exist) and clarify the positions recorded. Thanks for picking up this error.
Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 15:55, 3 June 2010 (UTC)
Casual versus causal
Casual means informal, happening by chance, careless. So "casually irreducible" means "informally irreducible".
Causal means causing or relating to the cause of something. So "causally irreducible" means "the causes are irreducible".
Wikipedia's articles should aim to make contact with a broad group of readers, especially articles such as this one. The fraction of readers who will understand this usage of "casual" is tiny, so it would be far better to use different wording. That's regardless of the correctness of the argument, which I don't want to judge. Looie496 (talk) 16:19, 2 June 2010 (UTC)
Richard, when you changed the illustration[6] you didn't cite a source for the extra form of dualism you added. I've looked but came up with nothing.
Non-reductive Physicalism is the view that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: mental states (such as qualia)are not reducible to physical states.
to
Alternatively, it is stated that all mental states are casually reducible to physical states. Although mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties, and mental states (such as qualia) are not reducible to physical states, they are however casually reducible to physical states.
which is a significant shift in meaning, without providing a source. I'm reverting it for now. Please provide a reliable source that says what the reverted text and image say. Anthony (talk) 20:14, 2 June 2010 (UTC)
I agree with Looie in principle (see above - Casual Reducibility versus Ontological Reducibility) - lets find a way of describing this distinction to the reader.
Anthony - thanks for performing this analysis. The phrase was not derived from the literature and has been used to describe a distinction between two versions of non-reductive physicalism defined in wikipedia (see above).
taken in context (it reads after a description of Epiphenomenalism) there is no intended change of meaning (let alone significant change in meaning) in the example provided. The meaning however is again subject to the interpretation of the phrase 'causally reducible' - an issue which must be resolved.
"Causally irreducible" means "the causes are irreducible" - this is correct - I did not read your comment properly. I thought that all instances of the word were being removed, when they were actually being replaced. I misinterpreted the red text in the comparison, and failed to visually see the distinction between the words "casual" and "causal" used in multiple comments in the talk and history section, if not every comment. (This is on top of failing to recognise the distinction between these words in general, as outlined above).
Causally reducible means reducible via it's causes - they have the same causes as implication of the fact they are mapped together one-to-one. There is no other interpretation that has been proposed. They also occur simultaneously and only simultaneously - which would provide another way of describing the same scenario if there were actually a word in the dictionary for this.
Again, I apologise for the inconvenience caused by this misunderstanding.
Anthony, please note that the changes introduced by the edit [7] seem to defeat the purpose of the original revision process;
by restoring the old image and the old caption where epiphenomenalism is illustrated as separate from property dualism ("... Property dualism and Occasionalism are not shown"), epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of property dualism
by restoring the description of property dualism, where non-reductive physicalism is listed as separate from epiphenomenalism, epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of nonreductive physicalism
Personally, I really don't mind what the truth of the classification is. I personally like the way it was originally classified on this page, as I mentioned earlier, and therefore don't mind the changes you have made in principle. The classification as implied above however has been contradicted by other members of the Wikipedia community (see Heligan, [8]), and how it has therefore been classified elsewhere on Wikipedia.
I suggest that either a) these changes are reverted now that the spelling has been corrected in DualismCausationViews2.svg [9], b) additional changes are applied to re-remove one or more of the above one or more contradictions (1. , 2.), or c) someone finds a reference to confirm the position that no form of Epiphenomenalism can be classified as either nonreductive physicalism or property dualism.
Man, I've been brawling with Christians and am all tuckered out. If you want to restore this to coherence that aligns with some authoritative secondary sources, I'd be thrilled. I'm very conscious of the featured article status of this essay, which means every assertion should be based on the words of some generally recognized authority. I find this very useful for generating citations. Just enter the ISBN and hit go. Cheers. Anthony (talk) 22:38, 4 June 2010 (UTC)
Understood - I found references to support the claim that the original (and restored) classifications on this page are contested.
Epiphenomenalism may be classified as non-reductive physicalism; [1]
This classification is under serious contention. Traditionally Epiphenomenalism (causally irreducible mental states) has not been classed as non-reductive physicalism (causally reducible mental states), but these two views have been equated at times, in favour of both causally reducible mental states [2][3], and causally irreducible mental states (see review of Kim Jaegwon's 'Physicalism, or something near enough' [4]).
Epiphenomenalism may be classified as property dualism; [5]
The diagram [10] includes the causal interactions asserted by the dominant though non-exclusive form of property dualism where in causally reducible mental states are maintained (orthodox non-reductive physicalism) [6]. As illustrated in the diagram, non-reductive physicalism is subject to critiques regarding overdetermination, especially when viewed in it's most simple form (instead of the more advanced forms of supervenience involving coarse-grained scenarios where events each have multiple properties; adding explanatory significance to mental properties if nothing else). [7]. Epiphenomenalism is subject to similar critiques. As the diagram stands, it makes no judgements as to the classification of Epiphenomenalism (although this was not the case originally; see [11][12]).
Epiphenomenalism is not generally classified as non-reductive physicalism, and I have reverted all changes which were made to allow for this possibility (see my contributions; 'Reverting previous changes regarding classification of epiphenomenalism - See Property Dualism Talk Page' [13]).
This means that the changes I made which Anthony has already reverted regarding "2. epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of nonreductive physicalism" were incorrect. The additional reversions applied however (replacing the diagram and caption added 26 April 2009) I believe are not required and restore an old problem ("1. epiphenomenalism can no longer be classified as a form of property dualism").
Thanks for your support in picking up this additional error - note I do believe I posted a notice on multiple Talk pages asking for feedback on this question last year (adding links to "Is Epiphenomenalism Non-reductive physicalism?" [14]) - but in retrospect the safest method was to research the answer myself.
Richardbrucebaxter, for the love of God, please learn to format properly. Your failure to use colons properly is making these threads very confusing. Or are you under the impression that this talk page revolves around you? BlueRobe (talk) 08:51, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
this was a complete oversight, I have never been comfortable with colons having to add them to individual paragraphs. I guess my subconscious might have also wanted to bend the indenting rules for consecutive reposts, or based on some function of the user post ratio. I appreciate your re-reading of the threads (which were posted simultaneously). Note, I viewed your original analysis as correct, regarding the typo, although I believe this incident has led to a number of valuable corrections and improvements ([15], [16], [17]). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 14:33, 19 September 2010 (UTC)
Mind body problem, links to mind-body dichotomy article, wtf?
The mind body problem is the problem of trying to understand how a mind can arise from the physical, biological, stuff in the brain. As is mentioned in the article.
This is an important problem.
Why, then, does it link to the unrelated article on mind-body dichotomy?
Which says that "The mind-body dichotomy is the view that "mental" phenomena are, in some respects, "non-physical" (distinct from the body)".
Surely the article on the 'mind-body dichotomy' is the exact opposite of what the mind-body problem is all about?
In other words, the "mind-body problem" is about figuring out how minds arise from the body, where as the "mind-body dichotomy" is about saying that minds DONT arise from the body.
The two are most assuredly not the same thing, and that the 'mind-body dichotomy' is the main article for the mind-body problem is crazy. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.141.75.182 (talk) 13:08, 30 September 2010 (UTC)
I thus deleted the link to the 'mind-body dichotomy' as the main article, as this philosophy of mind one is clearly much more about the 'mind-body problem' than the 'dichotomy' article is. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.141.75.182 (talk) 13:12, 30 September 2010 (UTC)
Article structure and Mind Body problem
The current article essentially splits an explanation of the MBP into two: a rather brief description under
the heading "mind body problem" and a fuller one half way down the article, under "Problems with naturalism".
This wouldn't be so bad if the article were structured historically into an "old" and "new" MBP, but it isn't.
The MBP has changed over time: Descartes' concerns that matter was incapable of thought has been removed by advances in AI and neuroscience. What I am calling for is a single section on the MBP, that covers its history and all aspects of the modern MBP: experience/qualia; intentionality/content; volition/mental causation; the self.
Part of my concern is the present article on the Mind body problem, which is currently too thin to be much use.
13:09, 1 January 2011 (UTC)
Explanation of revert
I have just undone an edit that added a line saying, The way that this is understood is that "Growth then is a series of changes in Outlook" and these propositions are axioms. I removed it because (a) I don't understand what it means and I doubt that other readers will either, and (b) it places a phrase in quotation marks without any evidence that anybody actually used exactly those words. Looie496 (talk) 16:27, 2 April 2011 (UTC)
removing new material
I am removing the following material that was just added to the article by Alengleman2 (talk·contribs), for the following reasons: (1) it is incomprehensible; (2) it is not neutrally worded; (3) based on user name the editor who added it is the author of the book being cited, so it constitutes a conflict of interest; (4) the book does not meet our criteria for usable sources, as specified in WP:RS.
It must be said, compatabilists notwithstanding, that the "self" must be viewed as Expressional, when one rejects the strict Solophist oneness, and includes "Self" with the old philosophic "Being", then the best an emergentist can hope for is Self-Being, which Expressional Emergentists like AL Engleman, call Self-Working Energy, or just "I AM". So philosophical 'Selfness" is Matter and Energy trying to get back to their original oneness, which is synonymous with selfness, while "being" represents the dispersal Energy that is still Expanding the Universe, which we see as Time. In this view, The "I" of Self equals the expanding dispersal of "Being" ("I"equals"Being")so as to combine into the more Holistic "I AM", and which finally, we hope, to get to "I Love".<ref>{{cite book | author=Engleman AL | title=Expressions: A Philosophy of Mind | publisher=Cafe Press USA | year=2005 }}</ref>
Note that since this is a featured article, the standards for adding material need to be enforced pretty strictly. Looie496 (talk) 19:33, 6 March 2011 (UTC)
Yes, this article is riddled with add-on mentions and references to authors of questionable general notability. Surely the motive for this is self-promotion, or promotion of own's friends, associates, former teachers. It's pretty disgusting that anyone with pretensions of being a scholar or academic interested in philosophy would engage in this kind of behaviour. Wouldn't they be more likely to find a calling in the advertising or marketing industry? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 118.12.9.239 (talk) 00:22, 16 June 2011 (UTC)
What is this thing here?
The Argument from Reason holds that if, as monism implies, all of our thoughts are the effects of physical causes, then we have no reason for assuming that they are also the consequent of a reasonable ground. Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if monism is correct, there would be no way of knowing this—or anything else not the direct result of a physical cause—and we could not even suppose it, except by a fluke.
As far as I know, there are no physicalist philosophers who assume that all of our "thoughts", or even many of them, are the consequences of an inference. A thought is generally, though not universally, characterized in the lit. as an occurrent belief. How the devil does any of the rest follow? --Francesco Franco (talk) 16:29, 27 December 2011 (UTC)
This is a bizarre argument and not at all common in the literature.. Moreover, there is no citation and it links back to an article about the existence of god.
Much better and commonly debated arguments against materialism, hence tending in favor of some form of dualism (at least of properties) are omitted. Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, Nagel's What it is like... etc..— Preceding unsigned comment added by Lacatosias (talk • contribs)
The citation would be to C. S. Lewis. I agree with you that the argument is bogus, but it actually is pretty well known, although more commonly as an argument for the existence of God than as an argument against physicalism. Looie496 (talk) 17:21, 27 December 2011 (UTC)
Argument from Reason explains Lewis a little better (is that the “link back to an article about the existence of god”?). The devil is in the details but perhaps, in the context of an argument, even a physicalist would concede that inference isn't just some kind of nonsense? I replaced the patent nonsense attributed to Lewis with his argument. Maybe he thought God requires a loophole in science, but it strikes me as somewhat… improbable. Still, people think the darndest things about QM, to say nothing of thoughts on God.—Machine Elf 173518:30, 27 December 2011 (UTC)
I think CS Lewis argument is just a version of the Wittgenstenian notion that reasons cannot be causes. It was a popular topic back in the 1950 and 60s before Donald Davidson published his defense of causal theories in Actions and Events in the 1964. Not much discussed in modern times, but it's still worthy of attention since, as all things in philosophy, someone might publish a better argument for the contrary position eventually and move the fashion in the other direction. Therefore, the argument holds some interest. --Francesco Franco (talk) 14:09, 30 December 2011 (UTC)
Recently made some substantial edits
So I feel I must explain myself. First added a short section on Mysterianist positions (McGinn and Nagel) which I think should not be a big deal. I realize that my larger addition (an entirely new section on eastern philosophy of mind in place of the small section on Buddhist views) might raise some objections. Particularly whether it deserves to be here at all given that these are also theological theories. After all, there is no section here for Christian "philosophy of mind" with extensive explanations of the Christian view of the soul and so on. Firstly I would like to say that Christian views are pretty much dualism from the get go, they just don't get very diverse and would fall under the dualism section of this article. Secondly and most importantly the article needed expansion to include other non anglo-american philosophical viewpoints which were sorely lacking. I find that eastern philosophical theories of mind are intellectually stimulating, albeit of a different character and from a different viewpoint (generally phenomenological, at least when it comes to Buddhism). I think most readers would prefer having an article that includes a wider definition of "philosophy of mind" that includes these theories. After all, these ideas have defined the way that most of the world's population have framed the mind-body problem. We tend to sometimes forget that looking at things from a Western perspective. Javierfv1212 (talk) 04:13, 18 November 2012 (UTC)
Subjective-objective dichotomy
An aspect of the philosophy of mind that does not appear to be treated in any detail in Philosophy of mind is the relation between the subjective and the objective. Below is a draft discussion of this topic for consideration and comment.
Subjective-objective dichotomy
The world "out there" is perceived by the mind, and so also is the interior world of conscious events. The relation between the two is much debated:
We consciously experience many different things, and we can think about the things that we experience. But it is not so easy to experience or think about consciousness itself...Does the world have an observer-independent existence (realism) or does its existence depend in some way on the operation of own minds (idealism)? Is knowledge of the world ‘public’ and ‘objective’, and knowledge of our own experience ‘private’ and ‘subjective’?[C 1]
— Max Velmans, Understanding Consciousness p. 3
There is a common philosophical tendency...to conceive of the realm of belief and attitude as clearly distinct from the world of objects and events. This separation is typically presented in terms of a distinction between subjective and objective ...[C 2]
— J. E. Malpas, Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, Interpretation p. 192
The objective aspects of experience often are considered to lie within the domain of science. Science has practical impact upon technology and our understanding of interconnections. However, there are areas where science so far has had little impact. So there exists a difference in optimism about science, with one view opining that science will gradually extend to everything,[C 3] and the opposite view opining that won't happen. For example, the statement is found in many books:
"...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells.."[C 4]
— Eric R. Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind
On the other hand, a contrary view is described by Northoff:
"Epistemically, the mind is determined by mental states, which are accessible in First-Person Perspective. In contrast, the brain, as characterized by neuronal states, can be accessed in Third-Person Perspective. The Third-Person Perspective focuses on other persons and thus on the neuronal states of others' brain while excluding the own brain. In contrast, the First-Person Perspective could potentially provide epistemic access to own brain...However, the First-Person Perspective provides access only to the own mental states but not to the own brain and its neuronal states."
[C 5]
— Georg Northoff, Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem, p. 5
The formulation of a scientific theory is a mental process, not simply a matter of observation, although observation is involved. In considering a statement like All events p are determined by other events P, in order to be consistent with science today, and avoid oversimplification, one has to be very clear about how the events (p,P) are defined. One also has to replace "determined" by something like "logically imply".
"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."[C 6]
— Ernest Nagel, Alternative descriptions of physical state
The need for great care in defining "events" and "determined" involves detailed descriptions of what constitutes an "event" and how one is said to "determine" another. These developments take the subjective-objective distinction to a more general level than arguments over the prospects of success in bringing certain areas of experience within the grasp of science. A Popper-like view emerges with an "event" as some kind of formalized "state" and the relationship "determines" phrased as a "logical implication" of connection between states, all combined as parts of one or another abstract theory. That formalization puts a lot of emphasis upon mental constructions.[C 7] From the stance of a Duhem, or a Popper, or a Hawking, the use of an intermediary, elaborate mental construction is a meld of the subjective and objective. It is used to determine connections about objective events, but the form of the theoretical construct is a product of subjective activities, and its particular form may well be more about the brain than anything else. Just like a computer algorithm can be expressed in assembly language instructions peculiar to a particular computer by translating the algorithm into steps that particular computer can handle, some aspects of the universe's operation can be expressed in terms of mental constructs.
Lest this apparatus be thought of as an entirely formal understanding, some among us actually do have an intuitive grasp of these creative abstractions, perhaps analogous to the fact that some among us hear music in ambient sounds. Quoting Feynman about his creative process:
It is impossible to differentiate the symbols from the thing; but it is very visual. It is hard to believe it, but I see these things not as mathematical expressions but a mixture of a mathematical expression wrapped into and around, in a vague way, around the object. So I see all the time visual things associated with what I am trying to do."[C 8]
— Richard P. Feyman, As quoted by Schweber: QED and the men who made it: Dyson, Feynman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga
This comment could be paralleled by others about the intuitions of musicians and mathematicians.[C 9] The point is that the creation of scientific theories is subjective, and the very concepts of determinism are themselves subjective and mutable creations of the human mind. What is in charge here: the intuition conceiving the theory, or the theory that results; or is it an unending back-and-forth spiral from one to the other? The development of a theory is something of a bootstrapping process that might never converge.
When stated at a general level, the subjective/objective dichotomy is recognized by most social scientists as one of the enduring metatheoretical dilemmas in the social sciences...[C 10]
— David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, p. 55
It is not possible to resolve which of the subjective or physical universes ultimately contains the other.[C 11]
^
Aaron Copland (1980). "The Charles Elliot Norton lectures, 1951-52". Music and Imagination. Harvard University Press. p. 10. ISBN0674589157. It [music] is at the same time outside and away from us and inside and part of us.
^Kim, Jaegwon (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. ISBN0-691-11375-0.
^Campbell, N. (2001). "[What Was Huxley{\textquoteright}s Epiphenomenalism?]". Biology and Philosophy. 16 (3): 357–375. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
^Dennett, Daniel Clement (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. ISBN0-316-18065-3.
^Sven Walter (2008). "[Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim]". European Journal of Philosophy. 16 (1): 157–161.
^ Robinson, Howard (2003-08-19). "Dualism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 2006-09-25. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
^Sven Walter (2008). "[Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim]". European Journal of Philosophy. 16 (1): 159.
^Paul Raymont (2003). Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (ed.). Physicalism and Mental Causation (Kim on Overdetermination, Exclusion, and Nonreductive Physicalism). Imprint Academic.
Ockham's Razor
The "main argument" to support ontological dualism may be the argument, that, the dualistic conception of the non-physical mind is not occamistic while the Cartesian Ego cannot be explained in entirely physical terms. While this may not be the main argument for all philosophers of mind it does pose an intellectual challenge that occupies the intellectual dexterity of many philosophy students when they first confront the mind-body problem.
What about the considerations of the mind not needing it's body to think or to be a "being". As well-known philosopher Martin Heidegger explained, our soul might just be imprisoned in our bodies. How would this fit in with thoughts on Monism or Dualism. SydneyFocht (talk) 21:05, 26 February 2014 (UTC)
Difference between philosophy of mind and psychology
I've moved this comment to the bottom where new comments belong. Also, though it's superficially not about the article but rather about the subject matter, it maybe raises the topic of something worth including in the article: the demarcation of the subject from other similar subject.
Short answer to the question at hand: psychology is more of the empirical study of how actual humans actually think. Philosophy of mind is more of the conceptual of study of what it means to think and, largely, whether thinking is a purely physical process or not and in general what the relation between mind and body is. Psychology can largely brush all those questions under the rug and just ask particular questions about the kinds of things people think (and feel, and so on), in response to what, and so on.
That's all off the cuff from me though; if we're to include anything in the article we'll need to find and balance some sources discussing the matter. I'm not sure where to begin there. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:18, 17 September 2014 (UTC)
Broken references?
For some reason all these references are showing up at the bottom of page here despite the lack of a tag placing them here. Anyone has any idea why this is happening? I'm creating a new section so that they don't get lumped in with the end of the section above. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:18, 17 September 2014 (UTC)
IMHO this articla resembles a car boot sale. it desperately needs to be pruned back to the roots and given some sort of structure. At the moment it seems to be an excuse for a collection of OR essays associated, loosely at times, with the article's topic. One section itself recognizes this, beginning:
Most of the discussion in this article has focused on ....
A Wikipedia article is not supposed to be a discussion. Not even its Talk page is supposed to be a discussion! Yet the article seems to be not even a discussion but more a series of soap boxes for various pieces of OR. No offence but most of it sounds like extracts from an eclectic group of first year students' essays. Each section should be written to succinctly answer the question "What is Philosophy of Mind?" from the point of view of proponets of particular specialisms and schools. Rather than attempting to summarize the entire field a section should heavily use the "main article" tag. However, the overall approach of a fair, eih each section touting its own wares irrespective of all others seems absurd to me. Wht hasn't a historical timeline to the issue been taken for instance so that a reader could see what has become of the different approaches taken over time? I can't see any way that the article doesn't needs a hatchet job. LookingGlass (talk) 20:40, 27 September 2014 (UTC)
Qualia and the famous(?) Qualia Question
The section on qualia says "This semantic problem, of course, led to the famous "Qualia Question", which is: Does Red cause Redness?" This gives no source for "the famous Qualia Question". Googling the expression "Does Red cause Redness?" only returns this article and other wiki articles taken from it. I suggest there is no famous Qualia Question about red causing redness and the sentence be removed or rewritten to be an illustration. (A university library search returns four articles containing the words 'qualia', 'question', 'red' and 'redness' so it's hardly a famous question.) SandJ-on-WP (talk) 20:35, 18 April 2016 (UTC)
Spinoza dual-aspect?
Perhaps I'm not familiar enough with philosophy of mind and there's some nuance I'm missing, but Spinoza considered mental and physical to be two attributes out of infinitely many attributes. To call it dual seems to suggest otherwise. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 206.169.66.45 (talk) 12:09, 12 April 2017 (UTC)
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Sometimes things just "creep in" so could someone take a look at the "External links" section for possible article integrating or trimming? 10 links give rise to concerns of link farming. Otr500 (talk) 09:13, 25 July 2018 (UTC)
Need to take care when making claims of consensus
It might be true that most philosophers of mind adhere to physicalism, but the article presents no evidence of such a consensus. As such, I have edited in the need for a citation.
I would also err caution on making such claims in topics concerning philosophy, as a philosophical consensus is less likely to indicate the truth of a matter. Unlike science (modern natural philosophy), most branches of philosophy do not adhere to a systematic set of methods.
There's also the issue of truth by consensus; as mentioned above, a scientific consensus (a consensus of modern natural philosophy) is qualitatively different from a consensus in any other given branch of philosophy.
Articles dealing with more metaphysical-esque topics should be careful when making claims that border on consensus so as not to mislead a lay reader into thinking that one position (e.g. physicalism) is inherently more correct, or likely to be correct than another (e.g. dualism). Even subtle suggestions in this direction flies in the face of the very spirit of philosophy, which is that we should not make our conclusions based on anything but the argumentative content of ones propositions. This includes deciding what we think about a topic by basing our conclusions on the positions held by experts. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.96.86.27 (talk) 01:16, 17 August 2018 (UTC)
Could this sort of consensus be expressed through a citation to a work that asserted something like this? Along the lines of 'according to...<physicalism consensus>.' Kraaj 00:55, 5 February 2020 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by DPUAlbany (talk • contribs)
FA assessment status after 10 years
The original FA for this article with its gold star was granted in 2006 over 10 years ago, and the lead editor is long retired from Wikipedia over 5 years ago. The original 2006 FA article was well-written, coherent, and useful for persons interested in a short and clear introduction to this subject matter. The current article has had numerous scattered and non-specific edits added by numerous editors over the years since then which do not appear very well-presented or even marginally organized; this has led to the current highly complex and overly long format for the article's outline. At some point since 2006, it appears that an attempt was made by some editors to synthesize an extensive east-meets-west version of this article with possible asides made concerning the usefulness of yoga. Would the article benefit from being returned to a non-peer reviewed status for re-development, or, perhaps the original FA version of the article from 2006 could be restored which did not make recommendations for the use of yoga. CodexJustin (talk) 18:32, 10 December 2018 (UTC)
Considering that notice was given almost two years ago, and this article is still not at standard, it needs to go to FAR. It is 50% larger than the FA version (meaning a good amount of the text has not been vetted), has numerous lists and quote farms, and large swatches of uncited text, an enormous navbox chunked in to the lead, incorrect use of bolding, breach of naming with repeat of the title in section headings, poor use of summary style, cleanup needed at See also Further reading and External links, inconsistent citation formatting, in addition to the issues raised above. At FAR, the possibility of reverting to the featured version can be reviewed. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 15:26, 18 August 2020 (UTC)
Evolution of spirit from breath, wind, speech, dreams and madness
From sections in the book of Job and Psalms as well as the late book of Eccelestias (Koheleth) that much of the linguistic meaning of "spirit" comes from the behavior of objects animated and moved seemingly on their own by wind and the connection between wind and breath. The Hebrew word for spirit is eather Rooaahh the sound of blowing wind and the sound of coughing, or "Neffesh" with the root N.F.Sh the nasal sounds of blowing (N.Sh.F), or "Neshamma" (root N.Sh.M) meaning breathing in. The nose in Hebrew is Aff or Annff the mouth Feh or Peh, the lips Saffah, the tooth Shenn, and face Pnneh. Snorting sound is Hhaarrah (Hh.R.H) also meaning anger, or Annaaff (A.N.F), while life is HHy. (Notice that in the English language breath, lips, mouth, teeth, death, froth, nose, snore, anger, all use similar consonants as well)
Wind itself can be felt, but cannot be cought in the hand or seen. Wind (air) can fill a skin bag made from animal intestines and used to make a fire grow or blow out. It animates the tree-heads, and comes as a side effect to heavenly wars where loud explosions and arrows can be seen shooting between the stars and pouring rain and cold until the grand sun comes out and makes heavenly peace, and raises the blackness (SheHhorr). For example Psalms 18.
These descriptions are common in the Bible, as well as in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic and Mesopotanian cuneiform inscriptions. At the end of the book of Ecclestias Koheleth says: "And the earth shall go back to the ground and the wind will go back to the Gods who gave it".
The ability to talk using the "wind of the mouth" - breath, is also associated with conciousness, and so you have a wind in you (a spirit) that speaks your thoughts, and a mad person, especially with personality disorder has a "bad wind" enter their body, and use it to send out the bad wind's words. (Genessis: and he blew into his nose
It is quite obvious that these were the ancient beliefs in the east reaching the early Greek philosophers who systematically discussed it for the first time.
I am quite sure I read about these beliefs and am not the first to notice them. I will be grateful to anyone who can help me find sources for this. I think it is important to have at least a mention of that information in this article and other articles on dualism and spiritualism etc.פשוט pashute ♫ (talk) 09:39, 21 March 2021 (UTC)
Spirit and vitality
IMHO there should be some mention of the connection between Dualism and the belief in Vitality (which brought the 19th century materialists to claim there was no existing neural synapsis to be seen under the microscope, while the vitalists claimed that it was proof to the existence of the life spirit).פשוט pashute ♫ (talk) 09:42, 21 March 2021 (UTC)
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