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Turkish–Islamic synthesis

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Turkish–Islamic synthesis (Turkish: Türk-İslam sentezi) is a type of Turkish nationalism which has an Islamist leaning instead of secular.

History

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Historian Gökhan Çetinsaya explained that there are three opinions on the topic of Turkish nationalism and Islam. First are the nationalists who reject Islam, second are Islamists who reject nationalism, and third are the ones who mix them both together. There was fusion of Turkish nationalism with Islam during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. Hamit Bozarslan claimed that the Turkish–Islamic synthesis was the official state ideology of Turkey when it was established in 1923.[1] Turkish Islamonationalism was popularised and encouraged as part of Operation Gladio during the Cold War by American-backed right-wing intellectuals such as Alparslan Türkeş who were concerned about the increasing Soviet-backed leftist influence in the country. They wanted to make a religion-inspired nationalism.[2] Türkeş did not support Pan-Islamism.[3] A famous quote of his was "Turkishness is our body, Islam is our soul."[4] The Turkish government and military tolerated and even promoted the ideology during the 1976-1980 political violence.[5] While nationalists and Islamists were natural rivals in other Muslim nations, in Turkey, most Turkish Islamists professed a degree of ethnonationalism.[6][7] The synthesis emphasises on the Hanafi school.[8] According to the synthesis, Turkish identity and Islam are both essential to each other. Followers of the ideology claimed that even before adopting Islam, Turks were receptive to Islam. The synthesis emphasised on Islam domestically among Turks, and not on Islam among Muslims worldwide.[9] The synthesis also advocated for Islam in society which would culturally be more Turkish and less Arabic.[10]

In the late 1970s, the Turkish political scene was full of ideological conflicts between far-right ultranationalists (Idealists) and far-left groups, along with little-to-no governmental effort to stop it. Under the Motherland Party rule, Turkish Islamonationalism became the de facto official ideology of Turkey (and until today it is accused of being so under AKP rule, although the AKP strongly denies it). In 1982, religion was strengthened in schools and education as a way to strengthen Turkish Islamonationalism, which intended to weaken mainstream Islamism and secular nationalism.[11][12] The Turkish–Islamic synthesis was fully developed by Aydınlar Ocağı (Turkish: Intellectuals' Hearth) headed by Süleyman Yalçın in the 1980s.[13]

Views on non-Turks

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See also: Xenophobia and discrimination in Turkey

Arabs

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İbrahim Kafesoğlu claimed that Pre-Islamic Turks had innately been better Muslims than Arabs.[14] Alparslan Türkeş, founder of the MHP and Grey Wolves and one of the top ideologues of the Turkish–Islamic synthesis, was an advocate of the Turkish adhan and advocated for the Quran, Adhan, and even Salahs to be solely in the Turkish language in Turkey. He co-led the 1960 Turkish coup d'état and in an interview after the coup, Türkeş described the usage of Arabic for religion as a "betrayal", and said "In a Turkish mosque, the Quran should be read in Turkish, not Arabic."[15][16][17] After the refugee crisis, anti-Arabism increased, mostly among Grey Wolves. In Gaziantep, approximately 2 dozen Syrian Arabs had to leave the city after angry Turkish crowds belonging to the Grey Wolves ransacked their homes.[18] Another time a group of about 1,000 Grey Wolves, which organized on social media, blocked various roads in Kahramanmaraş and refused to leave even after police warnings. The protestors also removed Arabic signs from many Syrian-owned stores, and many store owners closed their shops in fear. They also attacked a Syrian in a car and broke his windows, however they ran away after the Turkish police fired a warning gunshot into the air.[19] Many Turkish Islamonationalist organizations volunteer to fight in Syria in favor of Syrian Turkmen to strengthen Turkmen interests and weaken Arab rule.[20] The Alperen Hearths sent 250 fighters in 2015 to "fight against Russia, Iran, and Assad. And to help Turkmen",[21] although they were later accused of having just came into Syria to take photos with fighters, as many of the Alperen Hearths were seen in Istanbul just days after they went to supposedly fight.[22]

Kurds

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In a 2013 interview, Altan Tan claimed that the Islamist movement in Turkey was "full of nationalists" who despised Kurds, therefore prompting Kurds to vote secular.[23] Turkish–Islamic nationalists often attempted to hide the Kurdishness of various Islamic figures.[24]

While Turks were known for Hanafism, Kurds were known for Shafi'ism. Turkish Islamonationalists were accused of downplaying Shafi'ism "at every opportunity" and attempting to spread Hanafism to Kurds in hopes that it would also lead them to adopt a Turkish identity.[25] Historically, the Shafi'i sect played a big role in preserving Kurdish culture, identity, and language, as the Shafi'i Kurds were surrounded by Hanafi Turks and Arabs, Hanbali Arabs, and Shia Persians and Azerbaijanis.[26][27][28]

Islamist and conservative groups in Turkey, such as the Refah Party, and the AKP, were accused of carrying nationalist views as well. Despite using an "Islamic formula" to counter Kurdish demands, the Turkish Islamists did not want to contradict Turkish nationalism, and their solutions to Kurdish issues failed.[29]

The 1980 coup implemented Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the de facto state ideology, and also implemented the most restrictive policies against Kurdish identity in the history of Turkey. The increased Turkish Islamonationalist hatred towards Kurds was shortly followed by the PKK taking up arms in 1984. Turkish Islamonationalist portrayed Kurds as the provocateurs in the conflict. Many Turkish Islamonationalists frequently made the excuse that they only oppose the PKK or separatists and not ordinary Kurds. However, in practice, they opposed Kurds in general, and they continued their Anti-Kurdish policies whilst simultaneously claiming that they have no problem with ethnic Kurds.[30][31]

Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initially achieved the most progress in solving the conflict, he took a sharp nationalist turn in the 2010s and began restricting Kurdish cultural expressions, and most Turkish Islamonationalists supported Erdoğan and became the bulk of the opposition to increased Kurdish cultural rights in Turkey.[32][33] Mucahit Bilici stated that "there is a clear pattern in Erdoğan's language and indeed in the approach of all Islamist interlocutors with the Kurds. The primary aim is to minimize and make invisible the Kurds' Kurdishness by highlighting their Muslimness. The word 'Kurd' itself is avoided and used only very strategically. It occurs most often as part of a laundry list of ethnicities—Laz, Circassian, Georgian, Arab, Bosnian, Albanian—all specificity swamped by false diversity. The Kurds can gain legitimacy and prominence only as servants and defenders of Islam. Kurdish cities are re-presented as deeply religious domiciles. For example, the city of Urfa is always called 'city of the prophets' and Diyarbakır 'city of the companions'. The purpose is to avoid treating anything Kurdish as purely Kurdish."[34]

On February 23, 1979, while the 20-year-old Kurdish Raider activist, Metin Yüksel, was leaving Istanbul's Fatih Mosque, he was shot dead by Grey Wolves loyal to the MHP.[35][36][37][38]

Despite the MHP's long history of opposing any form of rights given to Kurds,[39] Devlet Bahçeli claimed that it was "dishonorable to portray the MHP as anti-Kurdish, to provoke my brothers of Kurdish origin against the MHP, and to be enthusiastic about unrest and opportunism. At the same time, it is also a grave betrayal to the homeland, the flag, the nation and the thousand-year experience and integration. Those who engage in stealthy and conscious political Kurdism are the disgraceful ones who bring water to the PKK's mill. My brothers of Kurdish origin are not against MHP. Those who are against the MHP are PKK members, PYD/YPG lovers. Kurds cannot be terrorists, terrorists cannot be Kurds, they cannot even be called Kurds."[40] Regardless of the MHP's denial of being racist towards Kurds, the MHP and its supporters have continued to portray acts of racism against even the Kurds who do not have an affiliation with the PKK or HDP.[41][42]

In 2015, in Istanbul, after the failure of the PKK peace process, a wave of anti-Kurdish attacks came, in which stones were thrown at buses coming from or going to Kurdish-majority cities, and assaults on Kurdish seasonworkers increased.[43] The BBP's Alperen Hearths attempted to counter their Anti-Kurdish reputation by going onto the buses and giving out roses and Turkish delights.[44] In 2024, Mustafa Destici boldly accused almost every Turkish opposition party of supporting the PKK, and deleted his 2012 tweet in which he stated that he could accept Kurdish autonomy.[3] While continuing to oppose any form of rights given to Kurds, Destici claimed that Kurds and Turks have been "brothers for a thousand years".[45]

Greeks

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Turkish Islamonationalists are known to hate Greeks due to their conflicts in history as well as Greeks being Christian.[46] The Grey Wolves were once accused of storming an Istanbul pogrom memorial exhibition and throwing eggs and taking down pictures, although the Grey Wolves denied any involvement.[47][48] In 2005 many Turkish Islamonationalists organized a rally and marched to the gate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and chanted "Patriarch Leave" and "Patriarchate to Greece".[49] MHP leader also once held a map showing Turkey claiming all of the islands controlled by Greece.[50]

Armenians

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Similar to Greeks, Turkish Islamonationalists are also known to hate Armenians due to their conflicting history and due to Armenians practicing Christianity.[citation needed] Sevag Balıkçı, an Armenian in the Turkish Army, was murdered by Kıvanç Ağaoglu, who was a supporter of Abdullah Çatlı, the former Grey Wolves leader.[51] On Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day in 2012, various nationalist and Turkish Islamonationalist groups protested against the remembrance of the Armenian genocide in Taksim Square.[52] When Armenian pianist Tigran Hamasyan visited the city of Ani in Kars Province, the local Grey Wolves leader suggested that his anyone who supports him should "go on an Armenian hunt."[53][54]

Iranians

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Jews

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Criticism

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Turkish Islamonationalism is often criticized by Islamists who view nationalism as a sin, by secular Turkish nationalists who view religion as unimportant, and by various minority rights organizations and activists in Turkey.[55]

Ahmet Altan, a Turkish Islamist commentator, stated "would Turkish Muslims who believe in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and see it in accordance with the religion also accept the Kurdish-Islamic synthesis? Since they accept the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and find it appropriate to add a national name to Islam, they cannot object to the Kurdish-Islamic synthesis."[56] A Kurdish cleric had also called for violence against Turkish–Islamic synthesists, claiming that they are the exact same as Kemalists and Turanists when it comes to Anti-Kurdism.[57]

The Raiders Organization claimed that this ideology is a "fascistic product of imperialism", and that nationalism is a Western ideology, which has no place in Islamic nations.[58]

Nihal Atsız viewed it as an artificial ideology which forcefully fuses two contradictory ideologies together, and he also saw Islamism as being incompatible with Turkism.[59]

The ideology was also criticised by Pan-Turkists who said "the person who does not defend secularism cannot be a Turanist. The Gagauz are Christian, Karaites and Khazar are Jewish, Altais are Tengrist, Yakuts are shamanist, Azerbaijanis are Shia, Anatolian Turkmens are Alevi. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and its Sunnism, was not able to reach large utopias, but a small part of Anatolia. Instead of caring for the Turkmen Alevi, it considers it ideal to beat the son of a Turkmen in the name of idealism-sunnism because he is a leftist. In addition, secularism prevents the damage of sectarianism and gives the nation rationality. If he is an idealist, he cannot remain against secularism. The idealist who does not defend secularism does not have ideals nor kızılelma." Kızılelma means "red apple" and symbolizes the goal of conquest in Turkish tradition.[60]

Famous people

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Groups

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Sunni Muslim

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Alevi Muslim

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See also

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References

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  2. ^ Mehtap Söyler (2015). The Turkish Deep State State Consolidation, Civil Military Relations And Democracy.
  3. ^ a b "Birbirinden beslenirken birbirini eriten birimler: AKP ve MHP". Gazete Pencere (in Turkish). 26 September 2021. Retrieved 5 April 2024.
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  5. ^ The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey, Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larrabee, 2008, pp. 37-38
  6. ^ Kuru, A. T. (2009). Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey. Cambridge University Press, p. 192
  7. ^ Yavuz, M. H. (2003). Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. Oxford University Press, p. 166
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  46. ^ Chouseın, Şule. "Unwelcome Citizens: Muslim Turks of Greece and Orthodox Greeks of Turkey." Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 2009.2 (2009): 69-86.
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  50. ^ English, Duvar (7 November 2022). "Greek PM slams ultranationalist MHP leader for posing with map showing Greek islands as Turkish". Duvar English. Retrieved 11 August 2022.
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  52. ^ Moral, Efe (25 April 2012). "April 24th". The Globe Times.; Translated from the original Perrier, Guillaume (25 April 2012). "24 avril". istanbul.blog.lemonde.fr (in French). Archived from the original on 18 May 2019. Retrieved 11 August 2022.
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  55. ^ Affairs, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World. "AKP's Radicalization of Turkish Islam Among Minorities at Home and the Turkish Diaspora". berkleycenter.georgetown.edu. Retrieved 11 August 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  56. ^ ALTAN, Ahmet (23 May 2012). "Dindarlar ve Kürtler - Ahmet ALTAN". Risale Haber (in Turkish). Retrieved 22 December 2024.
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  58. ^ "MTTB ile Akıncılar Derneği, Fatih Akıncılar Derneği Başkanının komandolar tarafından öldürülmesini kınadılar", Aydınlık Gazetesi, 25 Şubat 1979 Pazar, s.1 ve s.7
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  62. ^ Bale, Jeffrey M. "Definition of Terrorism". Monterey Terrorism & Research Education Program. Middlebury, Vermont: Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Archived from the original on 7 January 2013.
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