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Kherson Counter-Offensive
Part of Southern Ukraine offensive and 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Date16 March 2022 - present (2 years, 2 weeks and 6 days)
Location
Kherson Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast, and Kryvyi Rih Raion (border), Ukraine
Status

Ongoing

  • Ukrainian forces push Russian forces out of most of the Mykolaiv Oblast and away from the border of Kryvyi Rih Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Ukrainian forces penetrate into Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast
Territorial
changes		 Ukrainian forces recaptures +44 settlements in the Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblast
Belligerents
 Ukraine

 Russia

 Donetsk People's Republic
Commanders and leaders
Unknown

Russia Yakov Rezantsev † (per Ukraine)[1]

Russia Artyom Nasbulin † (per Ukraine)[2]
Units involved
See Order of Battle See Order of Battle
Strength
Unknown

On 24 July 2022

15,000 (per Ukraine)[3]
Casualties and losses
Heavy Heavy

The Kherson Counter-Offensive is an ongoing military engagement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian forces launched a counter offensive against Russian forces in the Kherson Oblast, Mykolaiv Oblast and on the border of the Kryvyi Rih Raion (north of the Kherson Oblast) in order to reclaim and push the Russian forces out of the Kherson Oblast. The counter-offensive operation is divided into known three phases. The first phase began on 16 March 2022, which aimed to push Russian forces away from the city of Mykolaiv in the west and the Kryvyi Rih Raion in the north. The second phase began on 28 May 2022, which aimed to spread Russian forces thin and prevent them from regrouping effectively. The third phase began on 29 August 2022, which aims to retake all of the occupied territories from the Russian forces.

Background[edit]

See also: Battle of Kherson and Russian occupation of Kherson Oblast

On 2 March 2022, Russian forces captured the city of Kherson after pushing Ukrainian forces out and gained full control of the city on the next day. Kherson is the first major city to fall to the Russian forces since the start of the invasion.[4][5] By 15 March, the Russian Defense Ministry claimed to have gained full control of the Kherson Oblast.[5] The fall of Kherson has been described as strategically important for Russia as it can use the region as a staging area to push further into Ukraine from the south; the ultimate goal being to capture as far as the Odessa Oblast and cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea.[4][5]

Order of Battle[edit]

Ukraine[edit]

Armed Forces of Ukraine

Ukrainian resistance[14]

Russia and Separatists[edit]

Russian Armed Forces

National Guard of Russia[14]

  • 785th Separate Special Unit[23]

DPR People's Militia (a.k.a. 1st Army Corps)[24]

  • 109th Regiment
  • 113th Rifle Regiment
    • 5th Infantry Battalion (Mutinied)[25][26]

LPR People's Militia (a.k.a. 2nd Army Corps)[24]

Battle[edit]

Further information: 2022 Chornobaivka attacks and Battle of Mykolaiv

First phase[edit]

March[edit]

On 16 March, Ukrainian forces launched a nation wide counter-offensive aimed at driving back Russian forces from the capital city Kyiv and other important cities. In the south, Ukrainian forces launched an offensive from the Mykolaiv Oblast into the Kherson Raion. This was done to relieve the city of Mykolaiv which was besieged by Russian forces.[27][28] Simultaneously, Ukrainian forces shelled the Russian-held Kherson International Airport, destroying scores of Russian helicopters. These attacks on the airport would continue throughout the Ukrainian counter-offensive.[29][30][31] The next day, the Ukrainian 28th Mechanized Brigade liberated the village of Posad-Pokrovske, which sits between the Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblast.[6] Ukrainian officials later reported that the Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade liberated a village in the Mykolaiv Oblast.[11]

By 18 March, Ukrainian forces pushed Russia forces 10 km away from Mykolaiv; effectively back to the border of the Kherson Oblast. Critical Threats, a project created by the American Enterprise Institute, attributed the success of the Ukrainian counterattack to the Russian forces overstretching themselves in an attempt to encircle Mykolaiv. Oleksiy Arestovych, Adviser to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, reported that Russian forces were retreating "en masse" because of the counterattack.[32] As a result of the Ukrainian counterattack, Russian forces took an operational pause on all fronts to restore their combat effectiveness.[33][34]

On 25 March, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Ukrainian forces killed Russian Lieutenant General Yakov Rezantsev during another attack on Russian-held Kherson International Airport.[1]

On 26 March, Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian resistance in Kherson were tying down Rosgardia units and hindering Russian efforts to resume offensive operations. The severity of the resistance forced Russia to deploy more Rosgardia units from Crimea and other occupied Ukrainian territories to help suppress the resistance in Kherson.[14][35]

On 31 March, Ukrainian forces conducted several local counterattacks and recaptured the villages Orlove, Zagradivka, and Kochubeyevka in northern Kherson Oblast.[36]

April[edit]

On 1 April, the Operational Command South announced that the Ukrainian 60th Separate Infantry Brigade and the 4th Tank Battalion of 17th Tank Brigade retook 11 settlements in the Kherson Oblast: Novovorontsovka, Mala Shesternia, Novohryhorivka, Topolyne, Kniazivka, Krasnivka, Svobodne, Kamianka, Pryhiria, Kochubeivka, Orlove.[37][7][38] The recapture of these settlements allowed Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces away from the city of Kryvyi Rih.[39] Ukrainian forces reportedly repurposed captured Russian armored vehicles to augment their forces.[37][7][38] Critical Threats noted that Russian forces were unlikely to conduct offensive operations towards Mykolaiv due to Ukrainian resistances in Kherson. As such, Critical Threats assessed that the Russian forces have likely prioritized defending their positions against Ukrainian counterattacks.[39]

On 3 April, Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Kherson Oblast in an effort to regain control of the village Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian forces recaptured the village sometime in mid-March.[40]

On 6 April, Ukrainian forces launched successful counterattacks into the Kherson Oblast from the Mykolaiv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih Raion. From the west Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Black Sea coast, while in the north Ukrainian forces recaptured Osokorivka, Dobryanka, Novovoznesenske and Trudolyubivka.[41]

On 8 April, a Canadian volunteer fighter claimed that the unit he is in were fighting in Bilozerka, a settlement 15km west of Kherson. Though this claim couldn't be independently verified, Critical Threats noted that Ukrainian counter-attacks have taken back territories in the west and north of Kherson city. Mykolaiv Oblast governor Vitaliy Kim stated that the only settlement that Russia controls in the Mykolaiv Oblast is Snihurivka, which is north of Kherson.[13]

On 10 April, Ukrainian forces successfully repelled Russian counterattacks against Ukrainian gains in Osokorivka and Oleksandrivka in the Kherson Oblast.[42]

On 13 April, Oleksiy Arestovych reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed ammunition depots for the Russian 22nd Army Corps at an unspecified location in the Kherson Oblast.[43]

On 14 April, Russian forces continued to conduct minor attacks towards Oleksandrivka. The Ukrainian 80th Air Assault Brigade reportedly liberated several villages in the south but declined to name them for security reasons.[43]

On 15 April, the Head of the Military Administration of Kryvyi Rih, Oleksandr Vilkul, reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced deep into the Kherson Oblast from the north and in doing so shifted the battle lines far away from the borders of the Kryvyi Rih Raion. He claimed that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 15 localities since their advances.[44]

On 20 April, Russian forces made minor advances during their attack on Ukrainian positions in Oleksandrivka.[45]

On 23-24 April, Ukrainian forces several local counterattacks against Russian positions in the Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblast. While their claims of liberating five settlements in Mykolaiv and eight in Kherson could not be independently verified, Ukrainian counterattacks have successfully disrupted Russian preparations to resume offensive operations. In addition, heavy Russian casualties were reported. Ukraine's Operational Command South claimed that two Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units in the Mykolaiv Oblast lost half their troops before retreating. Other Russian units reportedly retreated back to Chornobaivka. As a result of these counterattacks, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces made limited withdrawals from several forward positions to consolidate their strength in order to conduct limited attacks towards Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih.[46]

On 26 April, Critical Threats reported that Russian forces were likely preparing a major offensive operations towards Mykolaiv. Ukrainian General Staff of reported Russian losses near Novodmytrivka and Bilousove. Additional reports indicated that Russian forces were forcibly evacuating residents of Velyka Oleksandrivka from their homes. These three towns are within 15-20 kilometers of the Mykolaiv-Kherson border. Based on the proximity of of Russian forces near the border, Critical Threats assessed that Russian forces were likely preparing a major offensive operations towards Mykolaiv. Simultaneously, Russian forces shelled and made smaller ground offensive towards Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih.[47]

On 27 April, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army, 49th Combined Arms Army, 22nd Army Corps, coastal troops of the Black Sea Fleet, and Russian Airborne Forces were reinforcing their positions and replenishing ammunitions. In addition, Russian forces actively conducted aerial reconnaissance in what seemed like a preparation for an upcoming offensive. Small scale battles have occurred in the Mykolaiv direction. Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks towards Tavriyske and Nova Zorya and recaptured Shyroke, Novopetrivka, and Lyubino in the Mykolaiv Oblast.[15]

On 28 April, Russian forces attacked Nova Zorya and Oleksandrivka and captured the outskirts of Tavriyske.[48]

On 30 April, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army, 49th Combined Arms Army, 22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet, and Russian Airborne Forces were continuing to improve their positions, regrouping, and replenishing their supplies in preparations for a new offensive to push the Ukrainian forces back to the Kherson borders. Throughout this operational pause the Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions to keep them at bay.[49]

May[edit]

However, by early to mid-May, Russian forces have suspended their offensive operations and instead began to dig into their positions in the Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblast. These include building fortifications, trenches, concentrating more anti-air weapons and destroying bridges to hinder the Ukrainian offensive.[50][51][52][53][54]

On 16-17 May, Ukrainian forces struck several ammunition and field depots in the Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblast, including one in Chornobaivka.[55][56]

On 20 May, Russian forces began constructing a second line of defense in the Kherson Oblast and mined a bridge that crosses over the Inhulets River.[57]

On 25 May, Russian forces attacked Ukrainian defenses in northeastern Mykolaiv Oblast while attempting to advance towards Kryvyi Rih. The attack occurred near Kniazivka and Ivanivka, with the Russian forces ultimately being repelled from the area.[58][59]

On 26 May, Russian forces began constructing a third line of defense in the Kherson Oblast.[59]

On 27 May, Russian forces launched an unsuccessful attack on Ukrainian-held Lyubomyrivka near the Mykolaiv-Kherson border, a first attack near Kherson in several weeks.[60]

Second phase[edit]

May[edit]

On 28 May, Ukrainian forces launched a new counteroffensive into the Kherson Oblast, with the aim to prevent Russian forces from regrouping by spreading them thin and to make a break through in order to cut off Russian supply routes crossing over the Dnipro river.[61][62][63][64][65] This renewed offensive comes as Russia concentrated much of its forces for a major offensive at Sievierodonetsk and as Ukraine requested longer range artillery systems and U.S.-made Multiple launch rocket systems from Western nations.[61][63] Ukrainian military officials reported that their forces have pushed back Russian forces near the villages of Andriivka, Lozove, Bilohirka, and Bila Krynytsia, crossed the Inhulets river, and engaged Russian forces near the village of Davydiv Brid.[62][63][64][65] Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Air Force claimed that one of their MiG-29s shot down a Russian Su-35 over the Kherson Oblast.[62][10]

On 29 May, Russian forces conducted another attack in northern Kherson Oblast around the villages of Vysokopillya, Dobryanka, and Kochubeivka. Additionally, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces took up defensive positions in Kostromka, a village 10 km within the Mykolaiv-Kherson border in northwestern Kherson Oblast, and that Russian reserves were being moved to regain lost positions near Andriiivka, Bilohirka, and Bila Krynytsia.[66]

On 30 May, the Operational Command South reported that a pair of Russian Mi-24s attacked Ukrainian positions and shelled settlements in the Mykolaiv Oblast. At the same time, it was also reported that Ukrainian forces recaptured the village of Mykolaivka in northern Kherson, causing Russian units in the area to "panic".[67][68][69]

June[edit]

On 1 June, Hennadiy Lahuta, the head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration, stated that Ukrainian forces liberated over 20 settlements in the Kherson Oblast during the advances from the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (specifically from the Kryvyi Rih Raion). He also stated that 50% of Kherson's population have fled from the region.[70][71] On the same day, Oleksandr Vilkul claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reconnaissance squad near the village of Dobryanka, a village in the Kherson Oblast near the border of Kryvyi Rih Raion.[72] Critical Threats noted that Ukrainian counter-offensive operations were threatening Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in the northeastern Kherson Oblast. In response, Russian forces destroyed several bridges that crosses over the Inhulets river in and around Davydiv Brid in order to protect and solidify their control over the T2205 Highway, which they rely heavily for their GLOCs.[73]

On 2 June, Critical Threats and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that Ukrainian forces have secured the western side of the Inhulets river and engaged Russian forces in eastern side of the river near the village of Starosillya.[74]

On 3 June, Oleksiy Arestovych claimed that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Battalion tactical group (BTG) near the village of Inhulets, which shares the same name of the Inhulets river. According to Oleksiy, Ukrainian forces took advantage of tactical errors and poor coordination from the Russians to cross the Inhulets river and create a bridgehead to strike the Russian forces. Oleksiy admitted that there were Ukrainian casualties but otherwise stated that the BTG was wiped out after losing dozens of pieces of equipment and at least a hundred troops.[75]

On 5 June, Ukrainian forces recaptured the village of Sukhyi Stavok.[76]

On 7 June, Russian forces began withdrawing troops from the Zaporizhzhia Oblast to rotate/reinforce Russian units in the Kherson Oblast. Critical Threats reported that Russian forces were counterattacking Ukrainian forces in Lozove and Bila Krynytsia in an attempt to regain positions on the western side of the Inhulets river after reportedly recapturing Davydiv Brid a day prior.[77] On the same day, Ukrainian forces reportedly attacked Russian positions in the Kherson Oblast and struck ammunition depots in the Mykolaiv Oblast with airstrikes. These strikes reportedly killed over 20 Russian soldiers and destroyed 10 units of military equipment.[78]

On 8 June, Ukrainian officials reported that Russia deployed Iskander-M missile systems in Crimea, eight kilometers away from the border of the Kherson Oblast.[79] In addition, U.K. Ministry of Defence reported that Ukrainian forces have managed to regain a "key foothold" over the eastern bank of the Inhulets river.[80] This assessment contradicts a claim from pro-Russian milblogger named Swodki who reported that Russian forces gained a foothold on the western bank of the Inhulets river near Bila Krynytsia and Velyke Artakove. Critical Threats surmises that the bridgehead south of Davydiv Brid is still a contested zone.[81] Two weeks later, Critical Threats would confirm the pro-Russian claims that Russian forces captured Davydiv Brid sometime around 6 June.[82] In a separate report, Ukrainian military journalist Roman Bochkala reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Blahodatne.[81]

On 10 June, the Ukrainian MoD released a statement reporting that the Ukrainian Air Force conducted a series of airstrikes around five different settlements in the Kherson Oblast. The airstrikes targeted Russian bases, areas where Russian soldiers and equipment were assembling, and field depots.[83] Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces were improving fortifications in their second and third lines of defense. Russian sources claimed that Russian troops took control of the Kinburn Spit, which would allow Russian forces to exert greater control of the northwestern Black Sea coast, especially at the city of Ochakiv where the Ukrainian Navy faced constant bombardment.[84]

On 11 June, local Ukrainian authorities reported that the Ukrainian forces were counterattacking Russian positions in the directions of the villages of Kyselivka, Soldatske and Oleksandrivka and have recaptured the village of Tavriiske in the Kherson Oblast.[85] All of these settlements are about 40 km away from Kherson City. The Ukrainian Operational Southern Command reported that Russian forces were fortifying positions around the North Crimean Canal.[86]

On 13 June, Ukrainian and Russian forces were engaged in heavy fighting around the Davydiv Brid area. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted aerial reconnaissance over the area.[87]

On 14 June, Ukrainian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed 5 km east of Tavriiske. There were also claims that Ukrainian forces advanced 18 km within occupied territories. These claims could not be independently verified, but Critical Threats assessed that whatever gains Ukraine is making is likely putting more pressure on the Russian forces to secure their defensive lines. In response, Russian troops were reportedly mining unspecified locations on the bank of the Inhulets river and several artillery batteries were sent to reinforce Russian positions near the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border.[88]

At some point before 21 June, Russian forces recaptured the eastern bank of the Inhulets river around the Davydiv Brid area; pushing Ukrainian forces out of their bridgehead and back to the western bank of the river.[82] Earlier reports between June 15-16 indicated that Russian engineering corps were improving defenses around Bezvodne and Ishchenka, villages southeast of Davydiv Brid.[89][90] Critical Threats later reported that combat footage released on 17 June showing Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions near the villages of Lozove and Andriivka were likely recorded earlier than 17 June.[91] After confirming that the Russian forces expelled Ukrainian forces to the western bank of the Inhulets river, Critical Threats reassessed their analysis and believe that Ukrainian forces lost the bridgehead on the eastern bank sometime before 17 June.[82]

On 22 June, Russian forces made some gains around the Kherson-Mykolaiv border, including securing the villages of Novopetrivka, Burkhanivka, and Kalynivka. Oleksandr Motuzyanyk, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian MoD, claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army, 49th Combined Arms Army, 22nd Army Corps, and Airborne Forces were operating around the border to prevent Ukrainian counterattacks from reaching towards Kherson City. Kyrylo Tymoshenko, the Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured the village of Kiselivka, which would put themselves within 15 km of Kherson City.[92] This claim however is contradicted by some Ukrainian social media users and Pro-Russian sources whom stated that the settlement is either still contested or under Russian control.[93]

At some point before 25 June, Ukrainian forces recaptured the village of Potomkyne in northern Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces reinforced and launched several unsuccessful counterattacks from Vysokopillya over the course of several days in order to regain control of Potomkyne, as well as the villages of Plotnytske and Lupareve. Potomkyne was officially declared liberated on 30 June by the Ukrainian 60th Separate Infantry Brigade, who've claimed to destroy several Russian infantry fighter vehicles (IFV), tanks, and a Tigr infantry mobility vehicle when defending the village.[94][95][96][97][98][99]

On 26 June, the Ukrainian Operational Southern Command reported that Russian forces were increasing their rate of shelling by 150%. As a result of the increased shelling, settlements near Davydiv Brid on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River were almost completely destroyed.[95]

On 28 June, Ukrainian forces liberated the villages Zelenyi Hai and Barvinok. These two villages lie 25 km north of Kherson City on the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border.[97]

July[edit]

On 2 July, Ukrainian forces recaptured Ivanivka after Russian forces withdrew from their positions from the village.[100] The Ukrainian 60th Separate Infantry Brigade would officially announce Ivanivka's liberation on 11 July.[101][102]

On 3 July, Russian forces conducted a large-scale and "systematic" artillery strikes along the Mykolaiv-Kherson border. NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), a satellite observation system designed to locate and track wildfires, was able to detect "abnormally high numbers of fires" near Snihurivka, Zasillia, Kopani, Zelenyi Hai, and Tavriiske. This may indicate that Ukrainian bases were positioned near those settlements in preparation for another counteroffensive.[103] These artillery strikes continued into the next day.[104]

On 5 July, Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian "platoon-sized" attack near Lozove. The presence of Ukrainian troops near Lozove indicates that either Ukrainian forces reestablished a bridgehead near the Inhulets River or have successfully defended the original one that was established in early June. Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assault near Snihurivka, Lozove, and Bila Krynytsya along the Inhulets River. NASA's FIRMS data detected fires south and east of Lozove, confirming Ukrainian reports of fighting near the village. Critical Threats assessed that Ukrainian forces likely secured some territories around Lozove and Davydiv Brid.[105]

Between 6-9 July, Russian forces launched a series of unsuccessful attacks and reconnaissance on Ukrainian positions in order to regain lost grounds. On 6 July, Russian forces launched unsuccessful attacks on Lozove and the Mykolaiv-Kherson border, as well as conducted large-scale artillery strikes along the Mykolaiv-Kherson and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border to stave off Ukrainian counteroffensive. Critical Threats stated that Ukrainian forces were continuing to "set conditions" for a counteroffensive towards Kherson City by continuously striking Russian bases and ammunition depots.[106] On 7 July, Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian platoon-sized and a reconnaissance force operating along the T2207 highway in northern Kherson Oblast near Dobryanka, Myrolyubivka, and Potemkyne.[107] On 8 July, Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions along the Mykolaiv-Kherson and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and in the direction of Lozove. Ukrainian forces responded by striking Russian positions and ammunition depots near the Vysokopillya area on the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and areas near Davydiv Brid, Pravdyne, and Nova Kakhovka. Critical Threats reports that Russian forces in the Kherson Oblast may be lacking in sufficient air defense systems as the Ukrainian Air Force were able to conduct successful attacks on their positions.[108] On 9 July, Russian forces launched their last unsuccessful reconnaissance attempt on the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border; they were ultimately repelled by Ukrainian forces in the villages of Knyzivka and Olhyne. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces began to prioritize defending their current positions and halting Ukrainian advances with “available fire means". Critical Threats interprets that this means Russian forces are facing deteriorating logistics problems, likely due to the continuous Ukrainian ammunition depot strikes. This appears to be true as reports have come out that Russian S-300 missile system, a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, were being used to hit ground targets. This may also indicate that Russian forces are either running low on surface-to-surface missile (SSM) or guidance and communication parts needed to make the missile track its target in the air.[109][110] Ukrainian officials have urged civilians to evacuate the Kherson Oblast so as to not be caught in the crossfires of Ukrainian advances. Those who could not evacuate where urged to stock up on food and water and seek shelter.[111][112]

On 9 July, Ukrainian forces struck Russian bases and supply depots in and around Chornobaivka, including in the Kherson International Airport.[109] Ukrainian forces claimed their artillery strikes killed 58 Russian soldiers and destroyed two Msta-B howitzers, a R-330ZH Zhitel mobile truck mounted jamming communication station, three armored vehicles and 12 other combat vehicles.[113]

On 10 July, Ukrainian artillery struck Russian forces near Novomykolaivka.[114]

On 11 July, Serhiy Khlan, Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Military Administration, reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian command center and equipment concentration in Tavriisk, which was confirmed by residents.[114][115] According to Khlan, the artillery strike destroyed a mobile command post, radar and air defense systems, military equipment and caused some Russian casualties.[116] More explosions were reported in the Kherson International Airport, indicating a second Ukrainian artillery strike targeted Russian positions at the airport.[115] Khlan also stated that Russian forces were moving a equipment unloading site further away from Kherson City due to increased Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure. Russian forces have also prepared themselves for urban warfare in Kherson City by strengthening security around the city.[114] Later at 11 p.m., Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Nova Kakhova using American-supplied M142 HIMARS.[2] Witnesses reported and captured images of massive fire balls erupting from the ammunition depot, which reportedly continued to burn and cause secondary explosions six hours after the strike. It was reported that the explosion was so great that it blew out apartment building windows as far as two kilometers away. Ukrainian sources reported the ammunition depot in Nova Kakhova contained fuel trucks, dozens of vehicles, and at least 200 heavy artillery rockets. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that the HIMARS strike nearly completed destroyed the ammo depot and killed at least 52 Russian military personnel. Russian occupation authorities and media claimed that there were no military targets in the city and instead the HIMARS rockets struck civilian homes and buildings, including a warehouse containing a large quantity of saltpeter which they claimed was the source of the massive explosion, and killed seven people and wounded 80 more. Ukrainian officials rejected this claim.[117][118][119][120]

On 12 July, Ukrainian forces reported to have struck an ammunition depot in the village of Charivne using HIMARS rockets.[2][121][122]

On 13 July, Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions and supply depots along the T2207 highway which runs parallel to the Inhulets River. The strikes reportedly included Ukrainian aircraft attacking a Russian ammunition depot in Novopetrivka (near the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border) and a manpower concentration point in Chkalove (65 km northeast of Kherson City). Another ammunition depot in Chornobaivka and two command posts and a helipad in Nova Kakhova were struck again by Ukrainian forces.[123][124] Additionally, Russian forces began fortifying the Antonivka Road Bridge in preparation for the Ukrainian counter-offensive reaching the Kherson City.[123]

On 14 July, Dmytro Butriy, the acting head of the Kherson Regional Military Administration, reported that Ukrainian forces recaptured 44 towns and villages since the start of the first counteroffensive. These settlements lie within territories near Velyka Oleksandrivka, Kochubeyivka and Novovorontsovka. Dmytro further stated that numerous Russian bases, warehouses, and ammunition depots were destroyed as well as over 1,000 Russian troops killed during the liberations of these settlements.[125][126] Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in the village of Radensk, about 26 km southeast of Kherson City) and used a unspecified ground attack aircraft to attack Russian positions in Nova Kakhova. Operational Command South claimed that Russian Su-35s made an unsuccessful attempts at intercepting the Ukrainian aircraft. Critical Threats believes that areas around Nova Kakhova may be lacking air defense systems if Ukrainian aircraft can strike deep into Russian occupied territory.[127]

On 15 July, Russian forces launched airstrikes against Ukrainian positions around villages Velyke Artakove and Olhyne, both of which are located on the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast borders respectively.[127]

On 17 July, Russian forces attempted to disrupt Ukrainian logistics by shelling civilian and military infrastructures in the Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblast. The Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces were moving their concentration areas into densely populated areas in order to deter Ukrainian strikes in fear of civilian collateral damage.[128] At some point between 16-17 July, Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian ammunition warehouse in Lazurne according to the Kherson Oblast Administration.[128]

On 18 July, Russian forces conducted defensive operations to prevent Ukrainian advances. Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Ukrainian positions along the Kherson-Mykolaiv and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast borders and engaged in artillery duel with Ukrainian forces in these areas. Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Ukrainian forces were amassing in the north near the Mykolaiv Oblast-Kryvyi Rih Raion border in preparations for another offensive into the Kherson Oblast. These preparations included Ukrainian forces establishing a pontoon bridge to cross the Inhulets River and attack Russian forces near Arkhanhelske.[129]

On 19 July, Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivka Road Bridge using HIMARS. While the rocket strikes did little damage to bridge itself, it is significant in that the bridge serves as one of three major Russian supply routes crossing over the Dnipro River (the other being the Antonivka Railway Bridge and Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant) and that Ukrainian forces now has the means to threaten it.[130] At an unspecified time, Ukrainian artillery destroyed a Russian 48Ya6-K1 Podlet mobile radar station in Lazurne. According to Serhiy Bratchuk, the spokesperson for the Odessa Oblast Administration, the destroyed radar is considered "ultra-modern" and was used guide S-300 and S-400 missile systems. Bratchuk claimed the radar was destroyed over 100 km away from Ukrainian positions.[131][132] At 20:00 (8:00 p.m.) an unspecified anti-aircraft force of the Ukrainian Air Force reportedly shot down a Russian fighter jet over Nova Kakhovka. According to the Ukrainian Air Force the fighter jet, believed to be an Su-35, was attempting to intercept Ukrainian Close air support aircraft and that the pilot ejected once the jet was shot down.[133]

On 20 July, Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivka Road Bridge a second time with HIMARS. Reportedly, 12 rockets were fired with eight or 11 rockets hitting their bridge. Pro-Russian collaborator Volodymyr Saldo claimed some of the rockets were intercepted by Russian air defense. The second HIMARS strike did considerably more damage the first strike the day before. While Kirill Stremousov, another pro-Russian collaborator, claimed the bridge wasn't closed for traffic, Saldo restricted traffic or possibly closed the bridge for repairs and proposed building pontoon bridges as an alternative. Saldo claims that the damage sustained on the bridge would only allow passenger vehicles to cross through. Heavier vehicles, such as freight vehicles, would have to cross the Kakhovka Hydroelertic Power Plant. This statement corroborates with Serhiy Khlan's assessment that the bridge is to damaged for Russian forces to move heavy equipment across. No casualties were reported from the rocket strikes.[134][135][136][137]

On 21 July, Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled a Russian platoon-sized assault near Lozove and Andriivka, protecting their bridgehead. Other Russian forces continued to maintain defensive positions and shell Ukrainian positions. Operation Command South claimed that soldiers of the 34th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade even refused to go into battle after taking casualties. Ukrainian forces further destroyed six ammunition depots near the cities of Kherson, Beryslav, and Kakhovka.[138][139]

On 22 July, the Ukrainian General Staff and Russian Telegram Channel Rybar reported that Russian forces made unsuccessful advances near the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border. Rybar reported that Ukrainian forces have entered Lozove, while the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Bilohirka, likely taking control of the village.[140] Operation Command South reported that Ukrainian aircraft destroyed five Russian strongholds and two ammunition depots in the Skadovsk Raion and Beryslav Raion. According to Operational Command South, the strikes eliminated 35 Russian soldiers, a Msta-S self-propelled howitzer, two UAVs, three armored vehicles, and eight unarmored vehicles.[139][140][141] Near Vysokopillya Ukrainian forces reportedly encircled three Russian BTGs. The encircled group reportedly consists of 1,000 to 2,000 soldiers and includes a tank company and Spetsnaz or Special Operations Forces. According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the commanders of the BTGs requested a green corridor from the Ukrainians to allow safe passage out of the encirclement. In the Beryslav Raion, Ukrainian forces reported that two Russian BTGs were manning a defensive line between Novovoznesenske and Zolota Balka while Russian forces near Arkhanhelske were on the verge of being encircled after Ukrainian forces crossed the Inhulets River.[142][143] The reports of the encirclements could not be independently verified.[140][144] Yuriy Sobolevsky, the Deputy Head of Kherson Regional Council, reported that Russian forces were surveying several sections of the Dnipro River to organize the construction of a pontoon bridge in light of the HIMARS strikes on the Antonivka Road Bridge.[145]

On 23 July, Ukrainian forces struck the Daryivka Bridge with HIMARS rockets, which crosses over the Inhulets River. The Daryivka Bridge is located in the village of Dar'ivka, which is less than 10 km away from Kherson City. Serhiy Khlan commented that the bridge strike were part of a "serious preparatory steps" in the liberation of Kherson by cutting off supplies to Russian forces.[146][147][148] The Main Directorate of Intelligence (Ukraine) reported that Russian forces were importing tube and rocket artillery ammunitions into Kherson under the guise of humanitarian aide and have set up new ammunition warehouses inside civilian buildings.[24]

On 24 July, Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes against the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, which is the third and final road bridge leading into Kherson City (the other two being the Antonivka Road Bridge and Daryivka Bridge). Russian forces forced construction workers to repair the bridges.[146][149][150]

On 25 July, Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a command post belonging to the 785th Separate Special Unit of the Rosgvardia.[23][151]

On 26 July, Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian ammunition depots and manpower concentrations in the Beryslav and Kherson Raion. Near the village of P'yatykhatky a command post belonging to the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade was destroyed amongst the Ukrainian strikes. The strikes reportedly killed 48 Russian soldiers and destroyed four T-72 tanks, one 152 mm howitzer, one self-propelled howitzer, three armored vehicles, and three automotive equipment.[21][152] Serhiy Khlan reported that Russian forces were beginning to establish a pontoon crossing over the Inhulets River near Dar'ivka.[21] Furthermore, Ukrainian forces liberated the villages of Andriivka and Lozove.[153]

On 27 July, Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivka Road Bridge with HIMARS for a third time. The rockets also struck the nearby Antonivka Railway Bridge. Kirill Stremousov announced the road bridge would be closed to all traffic. Critical Threats assessed that the road bridge was likely rendered inoperable based of images of the damages that were observed.[146][154] A few days later, as more images of damages on the Antonivka Railway Bridge began to appear, Serhiy Khlan reported that the railway bridge has become inoperable.[155] In Soldatske, Ukrainian missile and artillery units destroyed a Russian ammunition depot. Casualties include 51 Russian soldiers killed, two Msta-B howitzer, and four vehicles.[156]

On 28 July, Ukrainian forces struck another ammunition depot in Chornobaivka and in Bilohirka. The strikes killed 66 Russian soldiers and destroyed three T-72 tanks, three counter-mine equipment, two Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, one 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer, one 2S12 Sani motor system, and three vehicles. Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian aircraft conducted airstrikes in the Beryslav and Kherson Raion and a Russian Forpost UAV was shot down in the Mykolaiv Oblast.[157] Russian forces established a ferry/pontoon crossing near the Antonivka Road Bridge and repaired the Daryivka Bridge enough to reopen traffic and remove the previous pontoon bridge.[158][159]

On 29 July, Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack in the direction near Bilohirka. Russian forces reportedly used Ka-52 attack helicopters during the attack.[160] Operational Command South would later confirm that Ukrainian forces destroyed the command post of the 34th Independent Motor Rifle Brigade in Bruskynske.[155] In the Kherson Raion, Ukrainian forces destroyed several ammunition depots, one of which was in Brylivka.[160]

On 30 July, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a preemptive artillery strike on Russian forces in Bruskynske, preventing them from attacking Ukrainian forces in nearby Bilohirka.[155]

August[edit]

On 1 August, Russian forces conducted defensive operations to stall or delay Ukrainian advances. Russian forces launched airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near the Inhulets River bridgehead in Bila Krynytsia and Andriivka, conducted heavy artillery fire in northern Kherson Oblast, and constructed fortifications within irrigation systems in Pravdyne. Operational Command South reported that Russian units from the Donbas were transferred to reinforce southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition warehouse in Skadovsk, two strongholds in Oleksandrivka and Blahodatne (these villages were likely recaptured by the Russian forces), and a electronic warfare station in Bilyaivka, Beryslav Raion. At an unspecified location Ukrainian marines reportedly took 11 Russian soldiers prisoner after conducting a localized counterattack. Ukrainian forces claimed that 46 settlements have been recaptured since the start of the counter-offensive.[161][162]

On 2 August, Ukrainian forces reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Trydolyubivka and conducted a failed reconnaissance in Bilohirka. Dmytro Butriy claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated seven unnamed villages, bringing the total number of recaptured settlements to 53.[163][164] Ukrainian forces targeted Russian GLOCs on the T2207 highway; striking ammunition depots in Arkhanhelske and Starosillya. In Soldatske, Russian mortar positions were struck by Ukrainian forces using US-supplied Phoenix Ghost loitering munitions. Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian airstrikes hit three Russian strongholds Oleksandrivka and Maksymivka. Separately, Chornobaivka was reportedly struck Ukrainian forces.[163]

On 3 August, Ukrainian military and government officials reported that Russian forces were gathering military equipment and soldiers in the northern Kherson Oblast to form a strike group in preparations for a Russian counteroffensive to reach the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. In southern Kherson Oblast, Russian forces began to spread out their ammunition warehouses to lessen the risks and effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes and were attempting to repair the Antonivka Road Bridge.[165]

Between 3-4 August, Russian forces launched unsuccessful attacks on Bilohirka, Andriivka, Lozove, and Bila Krynytsia in an effort to dislodge the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River. Russian forces reportedly launched airstrikes and shelled on over two dozen settlements in the Kherson Oblast.[17] Oleksiy Gromov, the Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Operational Command South reported that three BTGs operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast area and elements of the 35th Combined Arms Army that fought in the Kyiv offensive and the Battle of Izium were transferred to northeastern Kherson Oblast. Critical Threats assessed that these additional reinforcements will be of little help in any offensive operations given that these units likely suffered extensive equipment and personnel losses from fighting on the other fronts. Gromov further reported that Russian forces were transferring large amounts of military equipment to Crimea via the Kerch Bridge and regrouping aviation equipment from the Eastern Military District in the peninsula. These efforts were done to reinforce and support the Russian lines in the Kherson Oblast, with Gromov describing Crimea as a “bridgehead for stockpiling weapons.“[17] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted strikes against Russian strongholds in Blahodatne and Pravdyne, a command post belonging to the 22nd Army Corps in Chornobaivka, a ammunition depot in Nova Maiachka, and allegedly the Antonivka Railway Bridge.[17]

On 5 August, Russian forces made an unsuccessful attempted to advance on the Ukrainian bridgehead near Lozove. The Russian attack include airstrikes targeting Ukrainian positions near Lozove, Velyke Artakove, and Andriivka and an attempted advance by two platoon-sized units. According to Ukrainian military officials the two platoon-sized units consists of Spetsnaz and tank forces.[166] Operational Command South reported Ukrainian missile and artillery units destroyed three Russian ammunition depots, logistic points, and an air defense network in Kherson City, Prydniprovs'ke, and Tokarivka (the latter two are east of Kherson City). The artillery strikes reportedly killed 39 Russian servicemen and destroyed four S-300 SAM systems, a 9S19M Imbir radar system, a 2B9 Vasilek mortar, and nine trucks and armored combat vehicles.[166][167]

On 6 August, Russian forces ceased offensive operations against the Ukrainian bridgehead but conducted aerial reconnaissance and air/artillery strikes around the area. Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian missile units destroyed two Russian controls points in Chornobaivka belonging to the 76th Airborne Assault Division and the 49th Combined Arms Army, a command and observation post in Bruskynske, and an ammunition depot in Oleshky. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces have been congregating in Oleshky to defend logistic routes to Kherson City.[19]

On 7 August, Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to make advances in the Mykolaiv Oblast by attacking in the areas between the villages of Vasylky and Blahodatne. Both villages are about 45 km east of Mykolaiv City. Russian forces continued to target areas near the Ukrainian bridgehead by intensifying aerial reconnaissance and airstrikes at Andriivka, Bilohirka, Velyke Artakove. Kherson Oblast governor Yaroslav Yanushevych and advisor Serhiy Khlan noted that Russian forces were preparing several defensive measures in anticipation for a Ukrainian offensive. These include mining critical infrastructures, diverting civilian traffic over the Kakhovka Hydroelertic Power Plant and pontoon bridges to deter Ukrainian strikes over these logistic routes, establishing air defense systems in residential neighborhoods in Kherson City, and digging trenches in forested areas.[168] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck two Russian strongholds in the Kherson and Beryslav Raion and destroyed an ammunition depot in Charivne. At night, Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivka Road Bridge and the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, forcing occupation officials to postpone their reopening.[169]

On 8 August, Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Andriivka, Lozove, and Ol'hyne.[169]

On 9 August, Russian forces maintained a defensive position; an intercepted Russian communication picked up by the Main Directorate of Intelligence (Ukraine) indicated that Russian forces lacked necessary manpower to conduct offensive operations. Russian launched airstrikes on Bila Krynytsia, Andriivka, Ol'hyne and Osokorivka. Ukrainian officials and social media users reported an ammunition depot explosion in Novooleksiivka, which occurred around the same time of the 2022 Novofedorivka explosions in Crimea.[170] Ukrainian military officials would later confirm the Ukrainian military's involvement in the strike in Novooleksiivka. Ukrainian forces would also strike a command post in the village of Maksyma Hor'koho, which is about 30 km west of the northwestern Crimean border. The command post reportedly belonged a BTG of the Russian 217th Guards Airborne Regiment. These long-range strikes are notable in that they are beyond the range of the US-supplied HIMARS. Critical Threats assessed that Ukrainian forces may have had or modified existing weapons to perform such long-range strikes.[20] Operational Command South further reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in Snihurivka and two command posts in the Kherson and Beryslav Raion.[170]

On 10 August, a Russian airborne assault platoon attempted a reconnaissance-in-force operation in Lozove. Russian airstrikes targeted Andriivka, Ol'hyne, and Novohryhorivka. Ukrainian forces attacked the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, damaging it enough to restrict Russian movement over the bridge. Russian forces installed radar reflectors near the Daryivka Bridge as part of a defensive effort to protect their logistics routes.[20]

On 11 August, Russian forces launched airstrikes on Andriivka, Bila Krynytsia, Lozove, Velyke Artakove, Novohryhorivka, and Myrne. Ukrainian General Staff Oleksiy Gromov however noted that Russian aviation sorties have decreased because of the Saky airbase explosion. Operational Command South reported Ukrainian forces striking a command post of the 126th Coastal Defence Brigade in Nova Kam'yanka and an ammunition depot in Barvinok (the village of Barvinok was previously under Ukrainian control in late June). Other reports include Ukrainian forces striking a command and observation post belonging to a BTG of the 76th Airborne Assault Division in Ishchenka (a village east and nearby the Ukrainian bridgehead) and another command post belonging to 49th Combined Arms Army in Chervonyi Mayak (which is 30 km northeast of Nova Kakhovka, along the Dnipro River). Based on observation and past reporting, Critical Threats assessed that Russian forces commanders have continuously relocated their command post close to front and within range of US-supplied HIMARS, likely to better control their forces in anticipation of a Ukrainian offensive. However, this practice has always placed the Russian commands in serious danger and has led the Russians to suffer a leadership and logistics attrition whilst preparing for the Ukrainian offensive.[22]

On 12 August, Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces conducting artillery strikes against civilian and military targets, UAV reconnaissance on the line of contact, and airstrikes on Andriivka, Lozove, Veyke Artakove, Blahodatne, Novohryhorivka, Bruskynske and Myrne. Serhiy Khlan reported that a Ukrainian strike rendered the last bridge in the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant inoperable. Operational Command South reported Ukrainian forces striking an ammunition depot in Vesele, a village adjacent to Nova Kakhovka in the Beryslav Raion. Ukrainian forces also launched airstrikes on a Russian stronghold near Andriivka and a manpower/equipment concentration near Bruskynske.[171]

On 13 August, Ukrainian General Staff and Operational Command South reported that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian ground assaults, most of them aiming at the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River. The General Staff reported that a Russian attack occurred near Sukhyi Stavok, while Operational Command South reported that three Russian ground assaults with tanks failed to advance towards Andriivka and Oleksandrivka in the Kherson Oblast and the village of Shyroke in the Mykolaiv Oblast.[172] Mykolaiv Oblast governor Vitaliy Kim reported that elements of the Russian military command in the upper Kherson Oblast have relocated to the left bank of the Dnipro River, indicating that the Russian leadership has begun to be increasingly worried about their forces' positions no longer being tenable.[172] Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivka Road Bridge during the night to prevent convoys from crossing through and possibly destroying some in the process.[173]

On 14 August, Operational Command South reported that two unspecified Russian airborne detachments failed to take Lozove while Ukrainian forces conducted successful missile strikes on Russian ammunition depots in Muzykivka and Nova Kakhova. Russian forces intensified their airstrikes on Ukrainian positions along the line of contacts in Bila Krynytsia, Velyke Artakove and Bilohirka. Yuriy Sobolevsky claimed that a "significant portion" of the Russian military command left Kherson City to avoid being trapped on the right bank of the Dnipro River.[173]

Third phase[edit]

Analysis[edit]

Importance of the Kherson Oblast[edit]

Effects on other Russian fronts and vice versa[edit]

HIMARS and strikes against Russian logistics[edit]

The introduction of HIMARS has been described as a "game changer" in the war for Ukraine, as the long-range rocket launcher allows Ukrainian forces to strike Russian logistics and command centers deep behind the from frontlines. HIMARS has a much longer range than most, if not all, of Russian artilleries (tube or rocket) used in across every front, let alone in the Kherson Oblast.

Serhiy Khlan commented that Ukrainian forces striking deep behind Russian lines would not have been possible without Western weapons, particularly with HIMARS.[147]

The HIMARS strikes alone inflicted significant losses on the Russian side. Although the locations of the casualties inflicted vary between reports, in general the HIMARS strikes in the Kherson Oblast reportedly killed 150 Russian military personnel, including five to twelve high ranking officers. Ukrainian officials reported that 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division Commander Colonel Aleksei Gorobets, 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division Deputy Commander Colonel Sergey Kens, 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division Deputy Artillery Commander Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Gordeev, the Head of the Operational Department of the Headquarters of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel Sergey Koval and 22nd Army Corps Chief of Staff Major General Artyom Nasbulin were among the high ranking officers killed.[2][119][174][175][176]

With regards to the HIMARS bridge strikes British Intelligence assessed that the Antonivka Road Bridge is the biggest exploitable weakness of the Russian army in Kherson and that control over the Dnipro River crossings will become a key factor in outcome of the Kherson counter-offensive.[137][141] Yuriy Sobolevsky, the Deputy Head of Kherson Regional Council, stated the strikes could cut off Russia's means of supplying or retreating.[177]

The bridge is vulnerable.[146]

Ukrainian Operational Silence Economist reprimand[edit]

As part of the Ukrainian forces operational silence Serhiy Khlan urged Ukrainian civilians to not report on the progress of the Ukrainian counter-offensive until authorities release official statements.[148] Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk echoed similar statements, addressing listeners in a radio interview not to discuss too much about the counter-offensive as the Russians were monitoring Ukrainian information space for any information to use against them.

Igor Girkin request mobilization[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ This is according to the testimony of Pavel Filatyev.

References[edit]

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