Engagements on Lake Huron
|Engagements on Lake Huron|
|Part of the War of 1812|
|Great Britain||United States|
|Commanders and leaders|
|Miller Worsley||Arthur Sinclair,
|Casualties and losses|
1 schooner destroyed
3 guns captured
2 gunboats captured
The British had captured the important American trading post at Fort Mackinac by surprise in the Siege of Fort Mackinac early in the war. Large numbers of Indians rallied to the British, who subsequently forced the surrender of an American army at the Siege of Detroit.
On 10 September 1813, the Americans won the decisive Battle of Lake Erie, which allowed them to recapture Detroit, and also cut the British supply line to Mackinac, although it was too late in the year for the Americans to send ships and troops into Lake Huron to attack Mackinac. During the ensuing winter and spring, the British established another supply line from York to Mackinac via the Nottawasaga River.
In 1814, the Americans mounted an expedition to recover Mackinac. The American force initially consisted of five vessels (the brigs Lawrence, Niagara and Caledonia, and the gunboats Scorpion and Tigress) under Commodore Arthur Sinclair, with 700 soldiers (half of them regulars from the 17th, 19th and 24th U.S. Infantry, the other half volunteers from the Ohio Militia) embarked under Lieutenant Colonel George Croghan.
The expedition sailed from Detroit and entered Lake Huron on 12 July. They first searched Matchedash Bay for the British supply base but failed to find it. They then attacked the British post at St. Joseph Island on 20 July but found that it had been abandoned. On 4 August, they attacked the main British position at Fort Mackinac but were repulsed with heavy losses at the Battle of Mackinac Island.
Action at Nottawasaga
In spite of their victory, the British at Mackinac were very short of provisions and would starve if they were not resupplied before Lake Huron froze at the start of winter. Sinclair had earlier captured a small schooner (the Mink) belonging to the Canadian North West Company, and learned from one of the prisoners that the British supply base was at Nottawasaga Bay. Having sent the Lawrence and Caledonia back to Detroit with the militia, he arrived at the Nottawasaga with the Niagara, Scorpion and Tigress on 13 August.
The British detachment at Nottawasaga consisted of a Midshipman and 21 sailors of the Royal Navy under Lieutenant Miller Worsley, and 9 French Canadian voyageurs. The schooner HMS Nancy was present at the Nottawasaga, loaded with 300 barrels of provisions (salted pork, flour, spirits etc.) for the garrison at Mackinac. A few days before the Americans appeared, Lieutenant Robert Livingston of the Indian Department had arrived, carrying a warning from Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall, the commandant at Mackinac, of the American presence. The Nancy was towed 2 miles (3.2 km) up the Nottawasaga River, and a crude blockhouse armed with two 24-pounder carronades removed from the Nancy and a 6-pounder field gun was hastily constructed for her protection. Livingston had proceeded onwards to York to request reinforcements, but none were available. (Almost all the British regular troops in Upper Canada were already engaged in the Siege of Fort Erie, and the militia could not be persuaded to turn out.) On his return, Livingston was able to gather 23 Ojibwa Indians to help Worsley's party.
The Americans believed that the Nancy was still en route to the Nottawasaga and intended to intercept the schooner on the lake, but on 14 August, some of Croghan's troops landed to set up an encampment on the spit of land at the mouth of the river, and foraging parties chanced on the schooner's hiding place. The next day, Croghan's troops (three companies of regular infantry) landed and attacked. The American ships opened fire over intervening sand hills without success, but the Americans then landed a detachment of artillery with one (or two) 5.5–inch howitzers to support the infantry.
Worsley had decided that further defence was impossible and made preparations to destroy the blockhouse and schooner. A line of powder was set running to the Nancy and from there to the blockhouse. At four o'clock, the Nancy was set alight  which in turn by way of the powder train, set off an explosion in the blockhouse. The blockhouse explosion surprised Sinclair, causing him to think that one of the howitzer's shots had found its mark. Worsley's party then retreated into the woods, having suffered one killed and one wounded.
The Americans recovered the guns from the wrecked blockhouse and then felled trees across the river to block it. Sinclair departed for Detroit in the Niagara, leaving the gunboats under Lieutenant Daniel Turner to maintain a blockade of the bay. Sinclair's orders were that the gunboats were to remain until they were driven from the Lake by bad weather in October, by which time it would be impossible for small boats to re-establish communications between the Nottawasaga and Mackinac. He did however authorize the Tigress to cruise for a week or two around St. Joseph Island to intercept fur canoes. The gunboats' crews were reinforced by twenty-five men of the 17th U.S. Infantry, to serve as marines.
Movements in late August
The Americans had missed one hundred barrels of provisions in a storehouse, and two batteaux and Livingston's large canoe which had been moved higher up the Nottawasaga River. Worsley removed the obstructions from the river and sailed for Fort Mackinac with his sailors and Livingston, carrying seventy barrels, late on 18 August. Accounts of subsequent events vary; some state that Worsley evaded the gunboats, which were forced back into Lake Huron by a storm (which also nearly sank the Niagara) a few days later, while others state that one or both gunboats had left the Nottawasaga almost as soon as the Niagara was out of sight, hoping to capture boats and canoes involved in the fur trade with their valuable cargoes, and thus leaving the Nottawasaga unguarded.
The Americans then heard that several boats manned by hired Canadian voyageurs under Captain J. M. Lamothe were attempting to reach Mackinac Island with supplies via the traditional fur-trading route of the Ottawa River, Lake Nipissing and the French River. To intercept this party, the gunboats cruised in a narrow channel about 36 miles (58 km) east of Mackinac Island, known as the Detour Passage. The voyageur party were warned and temporarily turned back up the French River. (Apparently, only three out of eleven boats ultimately reached Mackinac.)
Having rowed and paddled 360 miles (580 km), Worsley encountered the two gunboats in the Detour on 24 August but was able to turn aside without being spotted. He concealed the batteaux at a secluded bay and his whole party reached Mackinac Island in the canoe on 1 September. At one point, he had passed within only a few yards of one of the gunboats at night, without being detected.
Capture of the gunboats
Supplies at Mackinac had run so short that McDouall's soldiers were on half rations, and he had even killed some horses to feed the Native Americans. Worsley asked McDouall for reinforcements to be used to attack the gunboats. He was given four large boats and 60 men of the Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, all of whom were accustomed to serving as marines. Lieutenants Bulger, Armstrong and Raderhurst of the Royal Newfoundland commanded three of the boats. Worsley commanded the other, which held 17 of his sailors. Bulger's boat was armed with a 3-pounder gun railing gun from the Nancy and Worsley's with a 6-pounder gun, also from the Nancy. Two hundred Ojibwa Indians from Manitoulin Island, led by Chief Assiginack, followed them in nineteen canoes, in case any warriors were fighting for the Americans.
Late on 2 September, the boats and canoes landed on Drummond Island. Worsley and Livingston went scouting the next day, and spotted the Tigress anchored a few miles away. That night, the British and Ojibwa set out towards the gunboat. Except for Lieutenant Robert Dickson of the Indian Department and three chiefs, the Native Americans were told to wait 3 miles (4.8 km) away. In the early hours of 4 September, Worsley's four boats approached the Tigress silently. The crew of the gunboat (thirty-one sailors and soldiers under Sailing Master Stephen Champlin) spotted them too late, and their fire missed. Before they could reload, Worsley's and Armstrong's boats were alongside the starboard side of the gunboat, and Bulger's and Raderhorst's boats were to port. The Newfoundlanders and Worsley's sailors swarmed on board the gunboat and overpowered the Americans after a sharp struggle. Three Americans were killed and five wounded (including Champlin and both his junior officers). Three British were killed and seven wounded, including Lieutenant Bulger.
Livingston set off to find the Scorpion, and returned two hours later to report that she was approaching. The captured Americans were hastily sent ashore. The next day, the Scorpion came into view and anchored about 2 miles (3.2 km) away, but appeared not to have heard any of the fight. At dawn on 6 September, Worsley set sail towards the Scorpion in the Tigress, under American colours and with most of his men below decks or concealed under their greatcoats. The unsuspecting crew of the Scorpion could be seen scrubbing the deck. Worsley approached to within few yards of the Scorpion and then fired a volley of muskets and the Tigress's 24-pounder cannon. As the ships came into contact, Worsley's men swarmed aboard the American vessel. The surprised Americans made little resistance. Two Americans were killed and two wounded. There were no British casualties.
Scorpion (but not Tigress) had boarding nettings rigged and might have been able to fight off a boarding attempt from small boats, but not from a vessel of equal size.
The captured Scorpion and Tigress were renamed Confiance and Surprise. They sailed at once for the Nottawasaga. On hearing of the loss of the Nancy, Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Drummond, the Governor General of Upper Canada, had urgently dispatched batteaux and extra supplies to the Nottawasage. The Confiance and Surprise returned to Mackinac at the start of October with sufficient provisions to keep the garrison of Mackinac supplied until the end of the war.
The British planned to build a frigate and other vessels at Penetanguishene on Matchedash Bay in 1815, which would have further reinforced the British advantage in the area. The end of the war put a halt to their construction (although a naval base was opened at Penetanguishene in 1817). However, all British shipbuilding efforts on the lakes had to compete for resources against those on Lake Ontario, which were being surpassed by the Americans at Sackets Harbor. Another major problem was lack of additional land transportation for such purposes.
At the end of the war, some British officers (including McDouall) and Canadians objected to handing back Prairie du Chien and especially Mackinac under the terms of the Treaty of Ghent. However, the Americans retained the captured post at Fort Malden, near Amherstburg, until the British complied with the treaty.
Although small in scale, the British and Ojibwa Indian successes on Lake Huron were vital, given the remoteness and sparse population of the theatre.
Some historians maintain that the expedition to recapture Mackinac Island was not merely a failure but also a waste of resources. The troops would have been better employed in the battles on the Niagara peninsula and the crews of the vessels more use in the squadron on Lake Ontario. On the other hand, 300 extra regular soldiers and the same number of sailors would have made little difference given the scale of the battles further east; and the successful recovery of Fort Mackinac would have spared other American troops tied down in garrisons in the west by hostile Native Americans.
- Zaslow, p.148
- Gough, p.139
- Zaslow, p.150
- Zaslow, p.151
- Zaslow, p.153
- Cruikshank, Ernest A. "The Documentary History of the campaign upon the Niagara frontier. Part 1-2". Lundy's Lane Historical Society. p. 193. Retrieved April 30, 2008.
- Elting, p.280
- Roosevelt, p.206
- Zaslow, p.152
- Elting, p.311-312
- Elting, p.323
- Elting, p.273
- Cruikshank, Ernest A. (1964). "An Episode of the War of 1812: The Story of the Schooner Nancy". In Zaslow, Morris. The Defended Border. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. ISBN 0-7705-1242-9.
- Elting, John R. (1995). Amateurs to Arms. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-80653-3.
- Gough, Barry (2006). Through Water, Ice & Fire: Schooner Nancy of the War of 1812. Toronto: Dundurn Press. ISBN 1-55002-569-4.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. The Naval War of 1812. New York: Modern Library. ISBN 0-375-75419-9.