War of the Pacific
The War of the Pacific (Spanish: Guerra del Pacífico) (1879 through 1883) was fought in western South America, between Chile and a united Bolivia and Peru. Despite cooperation among the three nations in the Chincha Islands War, disputes soon arose over the mineral-rich Peruvian provinces of Tarapaca, Tacna, and Arica, and the Bolivian province of Antofagasta. Chilean business enterprises, which had largely developed the area, thought their interests at risk when Peru nationalized all nitrate mines in Tarapaca, and Bolivia imposed a 10-cent tax on the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company. The foundations of the conflict were laid in a dispute between Chile and Bolivia over part of the Atacama Desert.
The war began on February 14, 1879 when Chilean armed forces occupied the port city of Antofagasta, after a Bolivian threat to confiscate the property of Chilean Antofagasta Nitrate Company. Peru tried to mediate, but when Bolivia announced that a state of war existed, the situation deteriorated. Bolivia called on Peru to activate their mutual defense pact, as Chile demanded that Peru declare its neutrality. On April 5, after Peru resisted both demands, Chile declared war on both nations. The following day, Peru responded by acknowledging the casus foederis.
This "Saltpeter War" took place over five years in a variety of terrain, including the Atacama Desert and Peru's deserts and mountainous regions. The war's first battle was the Battle of Topáter. For most of the first year, the war was played out in the naval campaign, as Chile struggled to establish a sea-based resupply corridor for its forces in the world's driest desert. The Peruvian Navy met initial success, but the Chilean Navy eventually prevailed.
Afterward, Chile's land campaign bested the poorly-equipped Bolivian and Peruvian armies. Bolivia was defeated and withdrew in the Battle of Tacna on May 26, 1880. The Peruvian army was defeated after the Battle of Arica on June 7. The land campaign climaxed in 1881, with the Chilean occupation of Lima. Peruvian army remnants and irregulars waged a guerrilla war against Chile. This Campaign of the Breña was fairly successful as a resistance movement, but did not change the war's outcome. After Peru's defeat in the Battle of Huamachuco, Chile and Peru signed the Treaty of Ancón on October 20, 1883. Bolivia signed a truce with Chile in 1884.
Chile acquired the Peruvian territory of Tarapacá, the disputed Bolivian department of Litoral (cutting Bolivia off from the sea), as well as temporary control over the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica. In 1904, Chile and Bolivia signed the "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" establishing definite boundaries. The situation between Chile and Peru worsened when the former did not hold a promised 1893 plebiscite to determine the fate of the provinces of Arica and Tacna. Colonization and violent Chileanization of the territories resulted in a break of relations in 1911. The 1929 Tacna–Arica compromise gave Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru, but did not resolve the antipathy. Later political problems among these neighbors have often referred back to this conflict.
- 1 Etymology
- 2 Background
- 3 Course of the war
- 4 Peace
- 5 Military analysis
- 6 Strategy
- 7 Consequences
- 8 Bibliography
- 9 See also
- 10 References
- 11 External links
Due to the cause of the war, it is also known as the Saltpeter War (Guerra del Salitre), Guano War (Guerra del Guano), and the Guano and Saltpeter War (Guerra del Guano y el Salitre). Other names include The Cents War, in reference to the controversial ten-cent tax imposed by the Chilean-run council of Antofagasta and supported by the Bolivian Congress, and the Second War of the Pacific. (The Chincha Islands War is sometimes known as the First War of the Pacific).
The dry climate of the Peruvian and Bolivian coasts had permitted the accumulation and preservation of vast amounts of high-quality nitrate deposits such as guano (bird excrement) and saltpeter. In the 1840s, guano's newfound value as fertilizer and saltpeter's role in explosives made the Atacama Desert strategically and economically important. Bolivia, Chile, and Peru were located in the area of the largest reserves of a resource the world demanded. During the Chincha Islands War (1864–1866), Spain, under Queen Isabella II, attempted to exploit an incident involving Spanish citizens in Peru to re-establish Spanish influence over the guano-rich Chincha Islands. It lost as Peru gained its independence. Peru and Chile signed a treaty of alliance against Spain on December 5, 1865. Together, with the minor aid of Bolivia and Ecuador (who had fought an inconclusive war with Peru from 1858 to 1860), they forced the Spanish to withdraw after clashes at Papudo, Abtao, and Callao.
During this time mutual interests sustained a Chile-Peru alliance, while Bolivia and Chile fell into a border dispute. Claiming territory according to the uti possidetis juris principle, the two disagreed on whether the territory of Charcas had access to the sea. Charcas had been part of the Viceroyalty of Peru and, later, part of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. Eventually, the two countries negotiated the Boundary Treaty of 1866 ("Treaty of Mutual Benefits"). The treaty established the 24th parallel south as their mutual boundary. The two countries gained equal rights to tax revenue on mineral exports from the territory between the 23rd and 25th parallels, which covered a large part of the Atacama Desert.
Starting from the Chilean silver rush in the 1830s, Atacama was prospected and populated by Chileans backed by Chilean and European (mainly British) capital. Chilean and foreign enterprises in the region eventually extended their control to the Peruvian saltpeter works. During the 1870s, Peru capitalized on the guano exploitation and nationalized all industries in the region. Peru controlled 58.8% of all saltpeter production, while Chile held 19% and Great Britain 13.5%. In the Peruvian region of Tarapacá Peruvian people constituted a minority behind both Chileans and Bolivians. Conflicts between Chilean and Bolivian miners were common in Peruvian saltpeter works. In some cases conflicts developed a xenophobic character, a notorious case occurred in 1870 when Chile had to evacuate its citizens from the Peruvian port of Iquique.
Secret Mutual Defense Treaty of 1873
In 1872, Peruvian foreign relations minister José de la Riva-Agüero believed Chile would use their acquisition of new ironclad ships to take possession of the Bolivian coastline. He wanted Peru to use its maritime influence to put an end to the conflict before matters got out of hand. Marshal Ramón Castilla had also warned Peru of a possible Chilean attack and recommended that when Chile bought a warship, Peru should buy two; lack of money prevented the Peruvian government from following Castilla's advice.
On February 6, 1873, Peru and Bolivia signed a treaty of alliance against Chile known as the "Secret Treaty of Mutual Defense," which guaranteed their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The last clause kept the treaty secret as long as both parties considered its publication unnecessary. Chile, through its Minister Plenipotentiary Carlos Walker Martínez, had learned of the treaty in 1874. Walker mentioned the treaty in his 1876 work, Pajinas De Un Viaje Al Traves De La America Del Sur. Chile also learned of the treaty through another minister in 1877, when Argentina's senate discussed the invitation to join the Peru-Bolivia defensive alliance.
Argentina, involved in a long standing dispute with Chile over the Strait of Magellan and Patagonia, was secretly invited to adhere to the pact, and in September 1873 the Argentine Chamber of Deputies approved the treaty and $ 6,000,000 for the war Eventually Argentina and Bolivia didn't agree about the territories of Tarija and Chaco, and the former feared a Chile-Brazil axis. The Argentine Senate postponed and later rejected the approval. Later in 1879, at the beginning of the crisis, Peru tried again to obtain the Argentine adhesion to the treaty. According to the Chilean historian Gonzalo Bulnes, Peru offered Argentina an outlet to the Pacific ocean through Chilean territories.
Boundary Treaty of 1874
In 1874, Chile and Bolivia replaced the 1866 boundary treaty with a treaty granting Bolivia the authority to collect all tax revenue between the 23rd and 24th parallels, fixing the tax rates on Chilean companies for 25 years and calling for Bolivia to open up. Chilean companies executed most of the exploitation of the Atacama coastal region. On December 26, 1874, the recently built ironclad Cochrane arrived in Valparaíso; it remained in Chile until the completion of the Blanco Encalada threw the balance of south Pacific power towards Chile. In 1875 Peru postponed the Argentine signing of the alliance treaty.
Starting in 1873, Chile's economy deteriorated. Chilean wheat exports were outcompeted by production in Canada, Russia, and Argentina. Chilean copper was largely replaced in international markets by copper from the United States and Spain. Chile's silver mining income also dropped. In the mid-1870s, Peru nationalized its nitrate industry, affecting both British and Chilean interests. Contemporaries considered the crisis the worst ever of independent Chile. Chilean newspaper El Ferrocarril predicted 1879 to be "a year of mass business liquidation". In 1878, then-President Aníbal Pinto expressed his concern through the following statement:
If a new mining discovery or some novelty of that sort does not come to improve the actual situation, the crisis that has long been felt will worsen—Aníbal Pinto, president of Chile, 1878.
This "mining discovery" came, according to historians Gabriel Salazar and Julio Pinto, into existence through the conquest of Bolivian and Peruvian lands. It has been argued that the economic situation and the view of new wealth in nitrate was the true reason for the Chilean elite to go into war against Peru and Bolivia.
The 1870s was for Peru's economy "a decade of crisis and change". Nitrate extraction rose while guano extraction declined and sugarcane dethroned cotton as the main cash crop. Guano exports dropped from 575,000 tons in 1869 to less than 350,000 tons in 1873 and the Chincha Islands and other guano islands were depleted or close to be so. Deposits elsewhere were of poor quality.
When in 1873 Peru imposed an estanco, a sales monopoly of nitrate, most larger nitrate firms opposed it. As the economic situation deteriorated and Peru held large overseas debts, the Peruvian state responded by replacing the estanco with a full state monopoly on production and exports. To uphold the monopoly, Peru bought in 1876 the nitrate concessions Henry Meiggs had in Bolivia. Chile was not considered a serious competitor due to the high costs of its nitrate deposits, which were too far from ports. However, Antofagasta Nitrate and Railway Company, controlled by Chilean Agustín Edwards and operating in Bolivia, was a serious competitor.
Course of the war
The crisis began in 1878 when the National Congress of Bolivia and a National Constituent Assembly determined an 1873 contract authorizing the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company to extract saltpeter duty-free for 15 years to be moot because it had never been ratified by the Bolivian Congress, as required by the constitution. The Congress proposed to approve the contract if the company would pay a 10 cents per quintal tax, but the company objected that the increased payments were illegal and demanded an intervention from the Chilean government. In response, Chile said that the treaty did not allow for such a tax hike. Bolivia suspended the tax in April 1878. In November Chile suggested the possibility of nullifying the treaty if Bolivia continued to insist on the taxes. Bolivia then said the tax was unrelated to the treaty and that the claim of the Nitrate Company should be addressed in Bolivian courts, and revived the tax. When the company refused to pay the tax, Bolivia threatened to confiscate its property.
In December 1878, Chile dispatched a warship to the area. Bolivia announced that the company was to be seized and auctioned on February 14, 1879. On the day of the auction, 500 Chilean soldiers arrived by ship and occupied the port city of Antofagasta without a fight and experienced widespread support. Antofagasta's population was 93–95% Chilean. On February 18, while in Antofagasta, Chilean colonel Emilio Sotomayor intercepted a letter from Bolivian president Hilarión Daza to Bolivian prefect-colonel Severino Zapata. The letter allegedly mentioned Daza's worry of Chilean interference with Bolivia's nationalization of British saltpeter companies, and mentioned a previously secret treaty that Bolivia would, if necessary, demand that Peru honor should Chile declare war.
News of the invasion reached Hilarión Daza on February 20, but he postponed mention of it until the end of the carnival festivities. On February 27, Daza made a public manifesto informing Bolivians and calling for patriotic support. The same day the Bolivian legislature authorized a formal declaration of war upon Chile, although it was not immediately announced. On March 1, Daza issued instead a decree which prohibited all commerce and communications with Chile "while the state-of-war provoked upon Bolivia lasts," provided Chileans ten days to leave Bolivian territory unless gravely ill or handicapped, embargoed Chilean furniture, property, and mining produce, allowed Chilean mining companies to continue operating under a government-appointed administrator, and provided all embargoes as temporary "unless the hostilities exercised by Chilean forces requires an energetic retaliation from Bolivia." Then, on March 14, in a meeting with foreign powers in Lima, Bolivia announced that a state of war existed with Chile. Bolivia called on Peru to activate the alliance treaty, arguing that Chile's invasion constituted a casus foederis. On March 23, while on their way to occupy Calama, north of 23rd parallel, 554 Chilean troops and cavalry defeated 135 Bolivian soldiers and civilians dug in at two destroyed bridges next to the Topáter river. This Battle of Topáter was the first of the war.
Peru sent a diplomatic team headed by José Antonio de Lavalle, a senior diplomat, to mediate with the Chilean government and request that Chile return Antofagasta to Bolivia. Under the impression that previous Peruvian demands had favored Bolivia, the Chilean government stalled. Chileans were further discomfited by Lavalle's claim that he did not know of a Peru-Bolivia Mutual Defense Treaty. Suspecting that Peru's attempt was not bona fide, Chile believed Peru was only trying to delay the situation until it completed its war preparations. However, international law expert Edwin Montefiore Borchard argues that "much reading fails to substantiate the charge" Chile made against Peru. He further writes that Peru "was in such financial distress – a fact which may also in lesser degree be asserted of Chile – that she could make no real preparations." Moreover, historian William Skuban notes that although in 1879 Chile, Bolivia, and Peru were "ill-prepared" for war, both Peru and Bolivia were less prepared than Chile.
On March 14, Alejandro Fierro, Chile's minister of foreign affairs, sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government. On March 17, Godoy formally presented the Chilean proposal in a meeting with Peruvian President Mariano Ignacio Prado. The following day, Godoy told the Chilean government about the Peru-Bolivia treaty, which had been revealed to him by President Prado while on a conference in Chorrillos.
On March 24, Peru responded to Chile and Bolivia by proposing that the Peruvian Congress debate both Chile's neutrality proposal and the Bolivian request for military action under the alliance on April 24. On March 31, after receiving the treaty from Lima, Lavalle proceeded to read the whole text to Fierro and told him that it was not offensive to Chile. Acknowledging the alliance, Chile responded by breaking diplomatic ties and formally declaring war on both countries on April 5, 1879. Peru responded on April 6, when President Prado declared the casus foederis of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Bolivia.
Given the few roads and railroad lines, the nearly waterless and largely unpopulated Atacama Desert was difficult to occupy. From the beginning naval superiority was critical. Bolivia had no navy, so on March 26 of 1879 Hilarión Daza formally offered letters of marque to any ships willing to fight for Bolivia. The Armada de Chile and Marina de Guerra del Perú fought the naval battles.
Chilean naval power was based on the twin central battery ironclads Cochrane and Blanco Encalada (commissioned in 1874 and 1875, respectively), the corvettes Chacabuco, O'Higgins, and Esmeralda, the gunboat Magallanes, and the schooner Covadonga. Peruvian naval power relied on the broadside ironclad Independencia and the monitor Huáscar (both commissioned in 1868), the corvette Unión, the gunboat Pilcomayo, and the coastal monitors Atahualpa and Manco Cápac. Although both the Chilean and Peruvian ironclads seemed evenly matched, the Chilean ironclads had twice the armor and greater range and hitting power.
Early on Chile blockaded the Peruvian port of Iquique, on April 5. This first naval encounter was the indecisive Battle of Chipana of April 12, 1879, in which the Chilean Magallanes escaped the Unión and Pilcomayo, but was unable to complete its reconnaissance mission. In the Battle of Iquique (May 21, 1879), Captain Miguel Grau commanding the Huáscar engaged and sank the Esmeralda; during the battle, Chilean commander Arturo Prat was fatally shot while attempting to board the Huáscar. In the aftermath, Grau ordered the rescue of the remaining Chilean sailors. Meanwhile, the Independencia, led by Captain Juan Guillermo More, chased the schooner Covadonga, led by Lieutenant Commander Carlos Condell, until the heavier Independencia collided with a submerged rock and sank in the shallow waters near Punta Gruesa. This naval battle gave a tactical victory to Peru as it stopped the blockade of Iquique. Nevertheless, it was a Pyrrhic victory; the loss of the Independencia, one of Peru's most important ships, was a fatal blow.
In the subsequent months, Miguel Grau's success upheld Peruvian morale in the early stages of the conflict. Despite being outnumbered, Grau's monitor Huáscar held off the Chilean navy for six consecutive months. During this time the Huáscar participated in the Battle of Antofagasta (May 26, 1879) and the Second Battle Antofagasta (August 28, 1879). The climax finally came with the capture of the steamship Rímac on July 23, 1879, while carrying a cavalry regiment (the Carabineros de Yungay), the Chilean army's largest loss to that point. The loss led Admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo to resign. Commodore Galvarino Riveros Cárdenas replaced Williams, and he devised a plan to catch the Huáscar.
The Battle of Angamos, on October 8, 1879 proved decisive. In this battle, the Chilean Navy managed to capture the Huáscar after several hours of fierce battle, despite her remaining crew's attempts to scuttle her. Miguel Grau died during the fighting, but his deeds made him a Peruvian national hero. After the loss of the Huáscar, the Peruvian navy still had some successful actions, particularly during the Naval Battle of Arica (February 27, 1880) and the Second Naval Battle of Arica (March 17, 1880), but its remaining units were locked in its main port during the long Blockade of Callao. When the Peruvian capital of Lima fell after the battles of San Juan and Miraflores, the Peruvian naval officers scuttled the entire fleet to prevent its capture by the Chilean forces.
Once Chile achieved naval superiority, the Chilean army initiated a series of military maneuvers in the Peruvian provinces of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica. The Campaign of Tarapaca began on November 2, 1879, when Chilean troops landed and attacked beach defenses in Pisagua, some 500 kilometres (310 mi) north of Antofagasta. That night, the Chilean army moved inland. From Pisagua the Chileans marched south towards Iquique and on November 19, 1879, defeated the allied troops gathered in Agua Santa in the Battle of San Francisco and Dolores. Bolivian forces retreated to Oruro and the Peruvians fell back to Tiliviche, while the Chilean army captured Iquique.
A detachment of Chilean soldiers, with cavalry and artillery, was sent to face the Peruvian forces in Tarapacá. Peruvian forces marched towards Arica to reach Bolivian troops led by Daza coming from Arica, but in Camarones Daza decided to return towards Arica. The two sides clashed on November 27 in the Battle of Tarapacá, where the Chilean forces were defeated, but the Peruvian forces, unable to maintain the territory, retreated north to Arica. Bruce W. Farcau comments that, "The province of Tarapacá was lost along with a population of 200,000, nearly one tenth of the Peruvian total, and an annual gross income of ₤ 28 million in nitrate production, virtually all of the country's export earnings." The victory afforded Santiago an economic boon and a potential diplomatic asset.
The Peruvian government was confronted with widespread rioting in Lima because of its failures. On December 18, 1879, Peruvian president Prado went from Callao to Panama, allegedly with six million pesos in gold, with the duty to oversee the purchase of new arms and warships for the nation. In a statement for the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio, he turned over the command of the country to vice president La Puerta, but a coup d'état led by Nicolás de Piérola overthrew the government and took power on December 23, 1879. In Bolivia, after receiving a telegram on December 27, informing him that the army had overthrown him, Daza departed to Europe with $500,000. General Narciso Campero became Bolivia's new president.
Meanwhile, Chile continued its advances in the Campaign of Tacna and Arica. On November 28, Chile declared the formal blockade of Arica.:214 A Chilean force of 600 men carried out an amphibious raid at Ilo as a reconnaissance in force, to the north of Tacna, on December 31, and withdrew the same day. On February 24, 1880 approximately 11,000 men in nineteen ships (protected by Blanco Encalada, Toro, and Magallanes and two torpedo boats) sailed from Pisagua and arrived off Punta Coles, near Pacocha, Ilo on February 26. The landing took several days without resistance. The Peruvian commander, Lizardo Montero, refused to try to drive the Chileans from the beachhead, as the Chileans had expected.:217 On March 22, 3,642 Chilean troops defeated 1,300 Peruvian troops in the Battle of Los Ángeles,:222 cutting any direct Peruvian supply from Lima to Arica or Tacna (Supply was possible only through the long way over Bolivia). After the Battle of Los Ángeles, only three allied positions remained in southern Peru: General Leyva's 2nd Army at Arequipa (including some survivors from Los Ángeles), Bolognesi's 7th and 8th Divisions at Arica, and at Tacna the 1st Army. These forces were under Campero's direct command. However, they were unable to concentrate troops or even to move from their garrisons. After crossing 40 miles (64 km) of desert, on May 26 the Chilean army (14,147 men:229) destroyed the allied army of 5,150 Bolivians and 8,500 Peruvians in the Battle of Tacna. The need for a port near the army to supply and reinforce the troops and evacuate the wounded compelled the Chilean command to concentrate on the remaining Peruvian stronghold of Arica. On June 7, after the Battle of Arica, the last Peruvian bastion in the Tacna Department fell. After the campaign of Tacna and Arica, the Peruvian and Bolivian regular armies ceased to exist,:256 and Bolivia effectively left the war.
To show Peru the futility of further resistance, on September 4, 1880 the Chilean government dispatched an expedition of 2,200 men to northern Peru under the command of Captain Patricio Lynch to collect war taxes from wealthy landowners. Lynch's Expedition arrived on September 10 to Chimbote:260–and levied taxes of $100,000 in Chimbote, $10,000 in Paita, $20,000 in Chiclayo, and $4,000 in Lambayeque in local currencies; those who did not comply had their property impounded, destroyed or were killed. On September 11, the Peruvian government decreed that payment was an act of treason, but most landowners still paid, given the many death threats.
Before the United States became formally involved, France, England, and Italy jointly proposed that Chile receive Tarapacá and withdrew their troops to the Camarones River; Chile accepted this solution.
On October 22, 1880, delegates of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and the United States Minister Plenipotentiary in Chile held a 5-day conference aboard the USS Lackawanna in Arica. Chile had refused previous peace mediations from Ecuador (in May). The Lackawanna Conference, also called the Arica conference, attempted to develop a peace settlement.
Chile demanded the Peruvian Tarapacá province and the Bolivian Atacama, an indemnity of $20,000,000 gold pesos, restoration of property taken from Chilean citizens, the Rimac's return, abrogating the treaty between Peru and Bolivia and Peru's formal commitment not to mount artillery batteries in Arica's harbor. Arica was to be limited to commercial use only. Chile planned to retain the territories of Moquegua, Tacna, and Arica until all peace treaty conditions were satisfied. Although willing to accept the negotiated settlement, Peru and Bolivia insisted that Chile withdraw its forces from all occupied lands as a precondition for discussing peace. Having captured this territory at great expense, Chile declined the terms and the negotiations failed.
Campaign of Lima
After the campaign of Tacna and Arica, the southern departments of Peru were in Chilean hands, and the armies of Peru and Bolivia could no longer fight. Nonetheless, Chilean public pressure and expansionist ambitions demanded an invasion of Lima to "exterminate the enemy." The defeated allies not only failed to realize their situation but, despite the empty Bolivian treasury, on June 16, 1880, the National Assembly voted to continue the war. On June 11, 1880, a document was signed in Peru declaring the creation of the United States of Peru-Bolivia. This situation forced both the Chilean government and its high command to plan a new campaign to obtain an unconditional surrender.
The Chilean forces confronted virtually the entire civilian population of Lima. The irregulars defended prepared positions, supported by a collection of old coastal guns located a few miles from the capital's arsenal and supply depots.:258–259 President Pierola ordered the construction of two parallel defense lines at Chorrillos and Miraflores a few kilometers south of Lima. The line of Chorrillos was 10 miles (16 km) long, lying from Marcavilca hill to La Chira, passing through the steep terrain of San Juan and Santa Teresa.:276– The Peruvian forces were approximately 10,000 untrained civilians between Arequipa and Lima. A small Chilean force went ashore near Pisco, approximately 200 miles (320 km) south of Lima, while the mass of the army disembarked in Chilca only 45 kilometres (28 mi) from the city. On January 13, 1881, the 23,129 Chilean troops charged 18,000 Peruvian defenders in Chorrillos. During the Battle of Chorrillos, the Chileans inflicted a harsh defeat and eliminated Lima's first defensive line. Following a triumph in the Battle of Miraflores, the Chilean army entered Lima on January 17, 1881.:296 The Peruvian dictator Nicolás de Piérola retreated from the capital to try governing from the rear, and defied Chile's demand for territory and indemnity.
After the Battle of Miraflores, Chilean soldiers started fires and performed sackings, rapes, and even fighting among themselves over war spoils in the towns of Chorrillos and Barranco. Chile ransacked the contents of the National Library of Peru in Lima and transported thousands of books (including many centuries-old original Spanish, Peruvian, and Colonial volumes) to Santiago, along with much capital stock. 3,000 wagons carried the plunder that hadn't already left by sea. In November 2007, Chile returned 3,778 stolen books to the National Library.
Without a Peruvian president who was willing to accept their terms, on February 22, 1881, the Chileans allowed a convention of Peruvian "notables" outside of Lima to elect Francisco García Calderón as president. Garcia Calderón was allowed to raise and arm two infantry battalions (400 men each) and two small cavalry squadrons to add credibility to the provisional government.
Campaign of the Breña or Sierra
The occupation commander, Vice-admiral Patricio Lynch, sited his military headquarters in the Government Palace in Lima. After the confrontations in San Juan and Miraflores, Peruvian Colonel Andrés Avelino Cáceres escaped to the central Andes to organize resistance. This would come to be known as the Campaign of the Breña or Sierra, which organized a rebellion in Lima and eventually organized a widespread resistance.
Despite the Bolivian tax crisis of 1879, Chile voted in a new Congress on schedule. In 1881 Domingo Santa María was elected President, assuming office on September 18, 1881. A new Congress was elected on schedule in 1882. The new administration pushed for an end to the costly war. In February 1881, Chilean forces under Lt. Col. Ambrosio Letelier started the first Expedition, with 700 men, to defeat the last guerrilla bands from Huánuco (April 30) to Junín. After many losses the expedition achieved very little and returned to Lima in early July,:309– where Letelier and his officers were courts-martialed for diverting money into their own pockets.
To annihilate the guerrillas, in January 1882 Lynch started an offensive with 5,000 men:315– first towards Tarma and then southeast towards Huancayo, reaching Izcuchaca. Lynch's army suffered enormous hardships including cold temperatures, snow, and mountain sickness. On July 9, 1882 they fought the emblematic Battle of La Concepción. The Chileans had to pull back with a loss of 534 soldiers: 154 in combat, 277 of disease and 103 deserters.
During the James A. Garfield administration (March 4—September 19, 1881), the anglophobic Secretary of State James G. Blaine wanted to advance the US presence in Latin America. He believed that England had prodded Chile into war to secure England's mining interests. Blaine proposed that Chile accept a monetary indemnity and renounce claims to Antofagasta and Tarapacá. These American attempts reinforced Garcia Calderon's refusal to discuss the matter of territorial cession. When it became known that Blaine's representative, Stephen Hurlburt, would personally profit from the settlement, it was clear that Hurlburt was complicating the peace process. Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen, Blaine's successor, publicly disavowed Blaine's policy, rejected any notion of intervening militarily in the dispute:306 and accepted Chile's right to annex Tarapacá.:329
Because Garcia Calderon refused to relinquish Peruvian control over Tarapacá, he was arrested. Before Garcia Calderon left Peru for Chile, he named Admiral Lizardo Montero as successor. At the same time President Pierola stepped back and supported Avelino Caceres for the Presidency. Caceres refused to serve and supported Lizardo Montero instead. Montero moved to Arequipa and in this way Garcia Calderon's arrest unified the forces of Pierola and Caceres.(p329)
On April 1, 1882 Miguel Iglesias, Defence Minister under Pierola, became convinced that the war had to be brought to an end or Peru would be completely devastated. He issued a manifesto, "Grito de Montan", calling for peace and in December 1882 convened a convention of representatives of the seven northern departments, where he was elected "Regenerating President":329–330 To support Iglesias against Montero, on April 6, 1883, Patricio Lynch started a new offensive to drive the guerrillas from central Peru and destroy Caceres' little army. The Chilean troops pursued Caceres northwest through narrow mountain passes until July 10, 1883, winning the definitive Battle of Huamachuco, the final Peruvian defeat.:317–338
After signing the peace treaty on October 20, 1883 with Iglesias' government, Lizardo Montero tried to resist in Arequipa with a force of 4,000 men, but when Chile's 3,000 fighters arrived, the troops in Arequipa revolted and allowed the Chileans to occupy the city. Montero opted for Bolivian asylum. On October 29, 1883 the Chilean occupation of Lima ended.
Peace treaty with Peru
On October 20, 1883 hostilities between Chile and Peru formally came to an end under the Treaty of Ancón. Under the treaty's terms, Peru formally ceded the province of Tarapacá to Chile. Chile was also to occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for 10 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held to determine nationality. For decades thereafter, the two countries failed to agree on the terms of the plebiscite. Finally, in 1929, through US mediation, under President Herbert Hoover, an accord was reached by which Chile kept Arica. Peru re-acquired Tacna on 1929, and received some concessions on Arica in 1999.
Peace treaty with Bolivia
In 1884, Bolivia signed a truce that relinquished the entire Bolivian coast, the province of Antofagasta, and its nitrate, copper and other mineral deposits. A 1904 treaty made this arrangement permanent. In return, Chile agreed to build the Arica–La Paz railway, a railroad connecting the capital city of La Paz, Bolivia, with the port of Arica, and Chile guaranteed freedom of transit for Bolivian commerce through Chilean ports and territory.
Military strength comparison
|Cochrane||3,560||3,000||9–12.8||up to 9||6x9 Inch||1874|
|Blanco Encalada||3,560||3,000||9–12.8||up to 9||6x9 Inch||1874|
As the war began, the Peruvian Army numbered 5,241 men of all ranks, organized in seven infantry battalions, three squadrons of cavalry and two regiments of artillery. The most common rifles in the army were the French Chassepot and the Minié rifles. The artillery, with a total of twenty-eight pieces, was composed mostly of British-made Blakely cannon and counted four machine guns. Much of the artillery dated from 1866, and had been bought for the Chincha Islands War against Spain. The mounts used by the cavalry were small and inferior to the Chileans'.
The Bolivian Army numbered no more than 2,175 soldiers, divided into three infantry regiments, two cavalry squadrons, and two sections of artillery. The Colorados Battalion, President Daza's personal guard, was armed with Remington Rolling Block rifles, but the remainder carried odds and ends including flintlock muskets. The artillery had three rifled pounders and four machine guns, while the cavalry rode mules given a shortage of good horses.
The regular Chilean Army was well equipped, with 2,694 soldiers. By April 5, when Chile formally declared war, the army had grown to 7,906 men. The regular infantry was armed with the modern Belgian Comblain rifle, of which Chile had a stock of some 13,000. Chile also had Gras, Minie, Remington and Beaumont rifles which mostly fired the same caliber cartridge (11 mm). The artillery had seventy-five artillery pieces, most of which were of Krupp and Limache manufacture, and six machine guns. The cavalry used French sabers and Spencer and Winchester carbines.
Control of the sea was Chile's key to an inevitably difficult desert war: supply by sea, including water, food, ammunition, horses, fodder and reinforcements, was quicker and easier than marching supplies through the desert or across the Bolivian high plateau. While the Chilean Navy started an economic and military blockade of the Allies' ports, Peru took the initiative and used its smaller navy as a raiding force. The raids delayed the ground invasion for six months, and forced Chile to shift its fleet from blockading to hunting and capturing the Huascar. After achieving naval supremacy, sea-mobile forces proved to be an advantage for desert warfare on the long coastline. Peruvian and Bolivian defenders found themselves hundreds of kilometers from home while Chilean forces were usually just a few kilometers from the sea.
Chilean ground strategy focused on mobility. They landed ground forces in enemy territory to raid, landed in strength to split and drive out defenders and then garrisoned the territory as the fighting moved north. Peru and Bolivia fought a defensive war maneuvering through long overland distances and relying where possible on land or coastal fortifications with gun batteries and minefields. Coastal railways reached to central Peru and telegraph lines provided a direct line to the government in Lima. During the entire conflict the Chilean armed forces sought the systematic destruction of the Peruvian infrastructure,. They also received the support of the Chinese coolies immigrants who were former soldiers of Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, they fled to Peru and had been enslaved by Peruvians, who joined the Chilean Army during the campaign of Lima and in the raids to the north Peruvian cities.
The occupation of Peru between 1881 and 1884 took a different form. The war theater was the Peruvian Sierra, where the remains of the Peruvian Army had easy access to population, resource and supply centers far from the sea; supporting an indefinite war of attrition. The occupying Chilean force was split into small garrisons across the theater and could devote only part of its strength to hunting down dispersed pockets of resistance and the last Peruvian forces in the Sierra. After a costly occupation and prolonged counterinsurgency campaign, Chile sought a diplomatic exit. Rifts within Peruvian society and Peruvian defeat in the Battle of Huamachuco resulted in the peace treaty that ended the occupation.
The three nations claimed to adhere to the Geneva Red Cross Convention to protect the war wounded, prisoners, refugees, civilians, and other non-combatants. However according to Peruvian historians, during the war, both sides commonly ordered a repaso (or repase), a method "to completely kill the dead" by executing all soldiers, regardless of injuries, of the opposing army left in the battlefield. After the Battle of Tacna, Chilean troops went as far as to enter field hospitals and execute all soldiers of the opposing Peruvian and Bolivian armies. The repaso further incremented the number of Peruvian casualties in the battles of San Juan, Chorrillos, and Miraflores.
After the Battle of La Concepcion, the Peruvian forces "dragged the cantineras [Chilean women] into the main plaza where they stripped the women naked and then cut them to pieces. The same fate also befell the two children".
In the aftermath of the Battle of Huamachuco, Chilean Colonel Alejandro Gorostiaga ordered a repase under the pretext that they formed part of an irregular army and could therefore not be considered prisoners of war. Peruvian Colonel Leoncio Prado was among the few soldiers who were not killed during the Huamachuco repase, but was executed shortly thereafter.
Beside the Peruvian-Chilean slaughter in the irregular war after the occupation of Lima, in Peru was simmering an ethnic and social conflict between its indigenous and (Chinese) coolies who had been enslaved by Peruvians population and its white criollo and mestizo Upper class. On 2 July 1884 the guerrillero Tomás Laymes and three of his men were executed in Huancayo by Caceres's forces, because of the atrocities and crimes committed by the guerrillas against the Peruvian inhabitants of the cities and helmets.
Both sides employed late 19th-century military technology such as breech-loading rifles and cannons, remote-controlled land mines, armor-piercing shells, naval torpedoes, torpedo boats, and purpose-built landing craft. The second-generation of ironclads (i.e. designed after the Battle of Hampton Roads) were employed in battle for the first time. That was significant for a conflict where no major power was involved, and attracted British, French, and U.S. observers. During the war, Peru developed the Toro Submarino ("Submarine Bull"). Though completely operational, she never saw action, and was scuttled at the end to prevent her capture.
The USS Wachusett (1861) commanded by Alfred Thayer Mahan, was stationed at Callao, Peru, to protect American interests during the war's final stages. Mahan formulated his concept of sea power while reading history in an English gentlemen's club in Lima, Peru. This concept became the foundation for his celebrated The Influence of Sea Power upon History.
The War of the Pacific had a profound impact on the societies of all three nations.
For Bolivians, the loss of the Litoral (the coast) remained a deeply emotional and practical issue, as was particularly evident during the 2003 natural gas riots. Popular belief attributed many of the country's problems to its landlocked condition; recovering the seacoast was seen as the solution to these difficulties. Numerous Bolivian Presidents pressured Chile for sovereign access to the sea. Diplomatic relations with Chile were severed on March 17, 1978, in spite of considerable commercial ties. The leading Bolivian newspaper El Diario featured at least a weekly editorial on the subject, and the Bolivian people annually celebrated a patriotic "Dia del Mar" (Day of the Sea) to remember the crippling loss. More recently, former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez brought up the issue and his support for Bolivian irredentism by declaring "Quiero nadar en mares bolivianos." (I want to swim in Bolivian seas). Chile for its part has said that there is no question of returning any part of Bolivia's Pacific coast, stating that wars of conquest were normal at that time, that the area has been completely assimilated racially and culturally into Chile, and that Bolivia should accept the outcome of the war as a fait accompli.
Politically, Narciso Campero ushered in a new era of civilian constitutional government that would last under the 1880 Constitution until defeat in the Chaco War with Paraguay radicalized opponents of the ruling elite.
As the victor and possessor of a new coastal territory, Chile benefited from the war by gaining a lucrative territory with significant mineral income. The national treasury grew by 900% between 1879 and 1902 due to taxes coming from the newly acquired lands. British involvement and control of the nitrate industry rose significantly. High nitrate profits lasted for several decades, but fell sharply once synthetic nitrates were developed during World War I. This led to a massive economic breakdown (known as the Nitrate Crisis). Many industrial factories had closed in the early 1880s to provide labor for the extraction industry. Loss of industry dramatically slowed the country's industrial development. When the saltpeter mines closed or became unprofitable, the British companies left the country, destroying many jobs. The former Bolivian region remained the world's richest source of copper and its ports moved trade between nearby countries and the Pacific Ocean. The former Peruvian region suffered because no new sources of wealth appeared after the Nitrate Crisis. On August 28, 1929, Chile returned Tacna to Peru, who later discovered copper deposits.
During the war Chile ceded to Argentina more than 1,000,000 sq kilometers of the Patagonia in the 1881 Chile/Argentina treaty, to ensure Argentina's neutrality. After the war, the Puna de Atacama dispute grew until 1899, since both Chile and Argentina claimed former Bolivian territories. On August 28, 1929, Chile returned the province of Tacna to Peru. In 1999, Chile and Peru at last agreed to fully implement the Treaty of Lima (1929), providing Peru with a port in Arica.
Ericka Beckman argued that during and after the war there was a rise of racial and national superiority ideas among the Chilean ruling class. Chilean historian Gonzalo Bulnes (son of president Manuel Bulnes) once wrote, "What defeated Peru was the superiority of a race and of a history". During the occupation of Tacna and Arica (1884–1929) the Peruvian people and nation were treated in racist and denigrating terms by the Chilean press. During the war Peruvians were despectivly referred to as "cholos" by Chilean officers.
In 2007 the Chilean government returned almost 4,000 books to Peru's national library, more than a century after they were taken by Chilean soldiers in hopes that the return of the books may go some way to improving the two nations’ relations.
After the war Chile had obtained military hegemony in Pacific coast of South America. Chile's expansion was seen with concern across the continent and Chilean diplomats responded to this by fomenting rivalries Chile's neighbors and other South American countries while promoting friendly relationships between countries with disputes with Chile's neighbors. Examples of this are the Chilean attempts to establish friendly relationships between Ecuador and Colombia, both were countries that had serious territorial disputes with Peru in the Amazon. Military cooperation with Ecuador grew considerably with Chile sending instructors to the military academy in Quito and selling superfluous arms and munitions to Ecuador.
After the occupation of Lima Chile diverted part of its war efforts to crush Mapuche resistance in the south. Chilean troops coming from Peru entered Araucanía where they in 1881 defeated the last major Mapuche uprising. Chile's newly acquired Aymara population was seen after the war as a "foreign element" contrasting with the also newly conquered Mapuches who were seen as "primordial" Chileans.
According to Bruce W. Farcau, "in Peru, the wounds run less deep than in neighboring Bolivia". After the War of the Pacific, Peru was left without saltpeter production, the Chilean controlled production decreased to 15%, and production controlled by British investors rose to 55%. According to military historian Robert L. Scheina, the Chilean plunder of Peruvian national literary and art treasures contributed to "demands of revenge among Peruvians for decades." Scholar Brooke Larson pointed out that the War of the Pacific was the "first time since independence wars" that "Peru was invaded, occupied and pillaged by a foreign army" and that "no other Andean republic experienced such a costly and humiliating defeat as Peru did in the hands of Chile".
Miguel Grau became an important figure in Peru due to his alleged gallantry during the conflict, especially his treatment of Prat's family and rescue of Chilean sailors in Iquique, which gained him recognition as the Caballero de los Mares ("Gentleman of the Seas").
The war and post-war period was one of profound political and social instability for Peru. The war shook the whole social order of Peru: armed indigenous peasants sacked and occupied haciendas of landed elite criollo "collaborationists" in the central Sierra, Chinese coolies revolted and even joined the Chilean Army, indigenous and mestizo Peruvians murdered Chinese shopkeepers in Lima, black slaves rose against their masters and fought equally the Chinese, Peruvian mobs sacked Chiclayo at the same time different criollo elite remained deeply divided in opposing camps. The fear of disorder, opposing factions and armed peasants was for many Peruvians larger than that of the Chilean invaders. In some cases, the delegations of European countries and the United States provided safety during riots and persecutions.
The War of the Pacific also sparked an indigenous peasant guerrilla movement throughout the central Sierra against Chileans and collaborationist landlords. In 1884 Cáceres turned against his former guerrilla allies in order to defend the old order. In 1886 and 1888 the Cáceres sent troops to the central sierra to disarm the peasants. The lack of rule of law in central sierra was such that, in one particular case, a landowner was only able to recover his occupied estate in 1902 after a massive mobilization of military, police and gunmen.
The principal cause of the great defeat is that the majority of Peru is composed of that wretched and degraded race that we once attempted to dignify and ennoble. The Indian lacks patriotic sense; he is born enemy of the white and of the man of the coast. It makes no difference to him whether he is a Chilean or a Turk. To educate the Indian and to inspire him a feeling for patriotism will not be the task of our institutions, but of the ages.
- Barros Arana, Diego (1881a). Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879–1880) (History of the War of the Pacific (1879–1880)) (in Spanish) 1. Santiago, Chile: Librería Central de Servat i Ca.
- Barros Arana, Diego (1881b). Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879–1880) (History of the War of the Pacific (1879–1880)) (in Spanish) 2. Santiago, Chile: Librería Central de Servat i Ca.
- Basadre, Jorge (1964). "Historia de la Republica del Peru, La guerra con Chile (History of Peru, The War on Chile)" (in Spanish). Lima, Peru: Peruamerica S.A.,.
- Bulnes, Gonzalo (1920). Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879. Santiago, Chile: Imprenta Universitaria.
- Chilean government (1879–1881). Boletin de la Guerra del Pacifico (Bulletin of the War of the Pacific) (in Spanish). Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andres Bello.
- De Varigny, Charles (1922). La Guerra del Pacifico (The War of the Pacific) (in Spanish) 1. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes. (published first time 1881–1882 in Revue des deux mondes)
- English, Adrian J. (1985). Armed forces of Latin America: their histories, development, present strength, and military potential. Jane's Information Group, Incorporated. ISBN 978-0-7106-0321-0.
- Farcau, Bruce W. (2000). The Ten Cents War, Chile, Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 978-0-275-96925-7. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- Gutierrez, Hipólito (1956). Crónica de un soldado de la Guerra del Pacífico (Chronicle of a soldier in the Pacific War) (in Spanish) 1. Santiago de Chile, Chile: Editorial del Pacífico.
- Jefferson Dennis, William (1927). Documentary history of the Tacna-Arica dispute from University of Iowa studies in the social sciences 8. Iowa: University Iowa City.
- Paz Soldan, Mariano Felipe (1884). Narracion Historica de la Guerra de Chile contra Peru y Bolivia (Historical narration of the Chile's War against Peru and Bolivia) (in Spanish). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprenta y Libreria de Mayo, calle Peru 115.
- Rosales, Justo Abel (1984). Mi campaña al Perú, 1879–1881 (My campaign to Peru, 1879–1881) (in Spanish) 1. Concepción, Chile: Editorial de la Universidad de Concepción.
- Sater, William F. (2007). Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-4334-7.
- Sater, William F. (1986). Chile and the War of the Pacific. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-4155-8.
- Milla Batres, Carlos (1994). Enciclopedia biográfica e histórica del Perú: siglos XIX-XX. Michigan: Editorial Milla Batres. p. 71. ISBN 978-958-9413-00-5. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- Scheina, Robert L. (2003). Latin America's Wars: The age of the caudillo, 1791–1899. Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN 978-1-57488-450-0.
- Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú (2004). Historia marítima del Perú, Volume 2; Volume 11. Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú. ISBN 978-9972-633-05-8. Retrieved January 17, 2009.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to War of the Pacific.|
- Anti-Chilean sentiment
- Atacama border dispute
- Chincha Islands War
- Chilean–Peruvian maritime dispute
- Chile–Peru relations
- Puna de Atacama Lawsuit
- Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia
- War of the Confederation
- 19,000 in San Juan, 4,000 in Lima, 1,000 in El Callao (Pierola letter to Julio Tenaud) 4,000 in Arequipa, Col. Jose de la Torre Basadre 1964
- Sater 2007
- Sater, pp. 348–349 tables 22 and 23. The figures consider neither Chilean POWs (from "Rimac" and "Esmeralda" survivors) nor deserters
- Sala Guerra del Guano y el Salitre , Peruvian Naval Museum
- Approving Treaty on offensive and defensive alliance concluded between the Republics of Peru and Chile. Lima: Congress of Peru. 1865 (Spanish)
- Boundary treaty between Bolivia and Chile. 1866 (Spanish)
- Bethell, Leslie. 1993. Chile Since Independence. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13-14.
- British Influence on the Salt: The Origin, Nature and Decline, Soto Cárdenas, Alejandro. Santiago : Ed. University of Santiago de Chile, 1998. Page 50
- Vergara, Jorge Iván; Gundermann, Hans (2012). "Constitution and internal dynamics of the regional identitary in Tarapacá and Los Lagos, Chile". Chungara (in Spanish) (University of Tarapacá) 44 (1): 115–134.
- See "Private note of Riva-Agüero to Novoa", November 20, 1872. Godoy papers. Cited in Bulnes 1920, pp. 58,59
- "It is desirable that once for all, and as soon as possible, the relations between the two Republics should be defined, because it is necessary to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. If Chile dealing with this boundary question seizes the most favorable opportunity to take possession of that coast-line, it is necessary that their plans develop before Chile is in possession of the ironclads under construction, in order that in the definite settlement of this question, the influence, which we are in a position to exert by means of our maritime preponderance may have due weight."
- Thomas Cleland Dawson, ''The South American Republics: Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama'' (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904), 118. Google Books. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
- B.W.Farcau, The Ten Cents War, page 37
- (See full English version of the treaty in Bulnes 1920
- Charles Edmond Akers. A History of South America, Page 439. Google Books. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
- Sir Clements Robert Markham (1882). The war between Peru and Chile, 1879–1882. Google Books. pp. 86–87. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
- Dolores Luna-Guinot, ''Conspiracy in Mendoza'' (Trafford Publishing, 2009), 316. Google Books. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
- Columbia studies in the social sciences — Columbia University. Faculty of Political Science, Herbert Millington — Google Books. Google Books. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
- Carlos Escudé y Andrés Cisneros, Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas, Sarmiento y Tejedor proponen al Congreso la adhesión al tratado secreto peruano-boliviano del 6 de febrero de 1873, retrieved on 13 November 2013
- Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879, page 82 ff
- Sir Clements Robert Markham, ''The war between Peru and Chile, 1879–1882'' (Sampson Low. Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1882), 87. Google Books. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
- Basadre 1964, p. 2282 "The beginning of the Peruvian naval inferiority and lack of initiative for preventive war":
- Won by Chile's supremacy at sea that year of 1874 contributed to the endeavor to avoid any problem Peru
- Basadre 1964, p. 2286, "Peru in 1874 and 1878 avoid the alliance with Argentina":
- In August, September and October 1875 ... Peru will hasten to take footdragging and even inhibitory for signing the treaty with that republic [Argentina] in order to retain their freedom of action. The existence of the Chilean ironclads perhaps explains the difference between this attitude and previous
- In 1878 [the Peruvian government] refused to deliver the items ship orders by the Argentine government and collaborate in the search for a peaceful solution...
- Palma, Gabriel. Trying to 'Tax and Spend' Oneself out of the 'Dutch Disease': The Chilean Economy from the War of the Pacific to the Great Depression. p. 217-240
- Historia contemporánea de Chile III. La economía: mercados empresarios y trabajadores. 2002. Gabriel Salazar and Julio Pinto. p. 25-29.
- Greenhill, Robert and Miller, Rory. (1973). The Peruvian Government and the Nitrate Trade, 1873–1879. Journal of Latin American Studies 5: pp 107–131.
- Retrospective of landlocked sea. A critical view on how the conflict started. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia
- Chile-Bolivia-Peru: The War of the Pacific. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
- Employers, policy, and the Pacific War. Luis Ortega. Santiago de Chile. 1984. (Page 18. File Antony Gibbs & Sons AGA. Valparaiso to Londres. Private N 25. March 6, 1878)
- (Spanish) Boundary Treaty of 1866 between Chile and Bolivia
- Barros Arana 1881a, p. 59
- Bulnes 1920, pp. 42
- War of the Pacific Chilean historian Gonzalo Bulnes. Antofagasta and Tarapacá. 1911.
Tengo una buena noticia que darle. He fregado a los gringos (se refiere a Mr. Hicks) decretando la reivindicacion de las salitreras i no podran quitarnoslas por mas que se esfuerce el mundo entero. Espero que Chile no intervendra en este asunto... pero si nos declara la guerra podemos contar con el apoyo del Peru a quien exijiremos el cumplimiento del Tratado secreto. Con este objeto voi a mandar a Lima a Reyes 0rtiz. Ya ve Ud. como le doi buenas noticias que Ud. me ha de agradecer eternamente i como le dejo dicho los gringos estan completamente fregados i los chilenos tienen que morder i reclamar nada mas.
- War of the Pacific. Francisco A. Machuca. Valparaíso "Mientras el señor Lavalle gozaba de relativa tregua, y estudiaba las causas de la poca prisa del Gobierno chileno para continuar las negociaciones, éste, en constante comunicación con nuestro Ministro Godoy, quedaba impuesto el 18 de Marzo, por comunicación del día anterior, 17, de la existencia del pacto secreto, y de una nota clara y terminante de nuestro Ministro al Gobierno de Lima...Por fin, el 31 de Marzo, el señor Lavalle se apersonó al señor Ministro de Relaciones y le dió conocimiento del tratado secreto, que acababa de recibir de Lima, en circunstancia que hacía días, el general Prado le había confesado su existencia a nuestro Ministro Godoy, en una conferencia tenida en Chorrillos."
- Current History (1922) (page 450) The New York Times
- Edwin Montefiore Borchard, Opinion on the controversy between Peru and Chile (Washington, 1920), p. 13.
- "The Peruvian government, fearful of being dragged into a war for which it was ill-prepared, attempted to mediate the dispute, and sent envoy Jose Antonio de Lavalle to Santiago to meet with Chilean president Anibal Pinto. [...] Briefly, though, the year 1879 found Chile almost as ill-prepare for war as Peru and Bolivia." See William Skuban, Lines in the Sand (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), p. 12.
- Bulnes 1920, pp. 147
- Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148. Bulnes Gonzalo.
- Peruvian Congress March 24, 1879
- William Jefferson Dennis, pp. 79–80. Google Books. Retrieved 2012-02-28.
- Farcau 2000, p. 65
- As the earlier discussion of the geography of the Atacama region illustrates, control of the sea lanes along the coast would be absolutely vital to the success of a land campaign there
- Vargas Valenzuela, José (1974). Tradición naval del pueblo de Bolivia. Bolivia: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro. p. 61. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- Sater 2007, p. 102 and ff
- "... to anyone willing to sail under Bolivia's colors ..."
- Farcau 2000, pp. 55–56
- López Urrutia, Carlos (2003). La Guerra del Pacífico, 1879–1884. Ristre Editorial. pp. 37–42. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- Farcau, Bruce W. (2000). The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-275-96925-7.
- Spila, Benedetto (1883). Chile en la guerra del Pacífico. Valparaíso, Chile: Impr. del Nuevo Mercurio. p. 94. Retrieved January 17, 2010.
- Lawrence A. Clayton, Grace: W.R. Grace & Co., the formative years, 1850–1930, Page 108. Google Books. Retrieved 2012-02-28. Direct Quote
- "Miguel Grau, Peruvian hero of the naval Battle of Iquique. His modern, heavily armed monitor Huáscar battered the Chilean frigate Esmeralda into a sinking hulk, thereby breaking the Chilean naval blockade of Iquique and rallying the morale of the Peruvian nation during the early stages of the War of the Pacific."
- Latin America: a general history. Google Books. p. 663. Retrieved 2012-03-26. Direct Quote
- "Much as Admiral Grau and the heroic vessel Huáscar did to lift Peruvian spirits, their deeds did not prevent the Chilean conquest of the nitrate-laden southern provinces, Tacna, Arica, and Tarapaca.."
- Milla Batres 1994, p. 71
- Arosemena Garland, Geraldo (1962). El Almirante Miguel Grau. Lima, Peru: Ministerio de Educación Pública. p. 188. Retrieved January 17, 2009.
- Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú 2004, p. 188
- Farcau 2000, p. 214
- Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Marítimos del Perú 2004
- Mellafe Maturana, Rafael; Mauricio Pelayo González (2007). La guerra del Pacífico: en imágenes, relatos, testimonios. Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario. p. 435. ISBN 978-956-8147-33-4. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
- López Urrutia, Carlos; Jorge Ortíz Sotelo (2005). Monitor Huáscar: una historia compartida (1865–2005). Lima, Peru: Asociación de Historia Marítima y Naval Iberoamericana. p. 192. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
- Historia del Ejército de Chile, Volume 6. Santiago, Chile: Estado Mayor General del Ejército. 1980. p. 54. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
- Luna Vegas, Emilio (1978). Cáceres, genio militar. Peru: Librería Editorial Minerva-Miraflores. p. 19. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- Valdés Vergara, Francisco (1908). Historia de Chile para la enseñanza primaria. California: Sociedad "Imprenta y litografía Universo". p. 319. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- Milla Batres 1994, p. 73
- Elías Murguía, Julio J. (1980). Marinos peruanos en Arica. Peru: Instituto de Estudios Histórico-Maritimos del Perú. p. 38. Retrieved July 22, 2009.
- Paz Soldán, Juan Pedro (July 1919). "El hundimiento de la Escuadra Peruana – 16 de enero de 1881". El Mercurio Peruano — Revista Mensual de Ciencias Sociales y Letras (Lima, Perú) III (13): 44–47. Retrieved 2011-09-24.
- Sater 2007, p. 172-
- Sater 2007, p. 204
- "only the lack of allied cavalry prevented Buendia's [Peruvian] men from finishing off the few remaining survivors"
- Sater 2007, p. 205
- "The victorious troops had no choice, as Colonel Suarez ruefully admitted, but to abandon Tarapacá to the Chileans".
- Farcau 2000, p. 119
- Sater 2007, p. 181
- "not only a economic bonanza but also a diplomatic asset that could barter in return for Peru ending the war".
- Farcau 2000, p. 120
- "He [Prado] was met with widespread rioting in the capital in protest over the administration's abysmal handling of the war to date"
- Farcau 2000, p. 120
- "...Prado suddenly gathered up his belongings ... and took a ship ..."
- Farcau 2000, p. 121
- "Pierola ... mounted an assault on the Palace but ... leaving more than three hundred corpses ..."
- Sater 2007, p. 208
- "Daza received a telegram from Camacho, informing him that the army no longer ..."
- Farcau 2000, p. 130
- "In the early morning hours of the 31. December 1879 ..."
- Sater 2007, p. 222
- "Baquedano could not simply bypass the Peruvian troops, whose presence threatened Moquegua as well as the communications network extending southeast across the Locumba Valley to Tacna and northwest to Arequipa and northeast to Bolivia"
- Farcau 2000, p. 138 specifies 3,100 men in Arequipa, 2,000 men in Arica and 9,000 men in Tacna, but this figures contradict the total numbers given (below) by William F. Sater in page 229
- Farcau 2000, p. 138
- "...it became evident that there was a total lack of the necessary transport for even the minimum amount of supplies and water"
- Sater 2007, p. 227
- "The allied force, he [Campero] concluded lacked sufficient transport to move into the field its artillery as well as its rations and, more significantly, its supplies of water"
- Farcau 2000, p. 1147
- Farcau 2000, p. 152
- "Lynch's force consisted f the 1° Line Regiment and the Regiments "Talca" and "Colchagua", a battery of mountain howitzers, and a small cavalry squadron for a total of twenty-two hundred man"
- Barros Arana 1881b, p. 98
- "[The Chilean government thought that it was possible to demonstrate to the enemy the futility of any defense of Peruvian territory not only against the whole [Chilean] army but also against small [Chilean] divisions. That was the purpose of the expedition, which the claims, insults, and affliction in the official documents of Peru and in the press had made famous"
- (Original: "[El gobierno chileno] Creía entonces que todavía era posible demostrar prácticamente al enemigo la imposibilidad en que se hallaba para defender el territorio peruano no ya contra un ejército numeroso sino contra pequeñas divisiones. Este fué el objeto de una espedicion que las quejas, los insultos i las lamentaciones de los documentos oficiales del Perú, i de los escritos de su prensa, han hecho famosa.")
- Basadre 1964, p. 2475
- Barros Arana 1881a quotes Johann Caspar Bluntschli:
- "Bluntschili (Derecho internacional codificado) dice espresamente lo que sigue: Árt. 544. Cuando el enemigo ha tomado posesión efectiva de una parte del territorio, el gobierno del otro estado deja de ejercer alli el poder. Los habitantes del territorio ocupado están eximidos de todos los deberes i obligaciones respecto del gobierno anterior, i están obligados a obedecer a los jefes del ejército de ocupación."
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