War of the Pacific

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War of the Pacific

Map showing changes of territory due to the war
Date 1879-1883
Location Peru and Bolivia in Pacific coast of South America
Result Chilean victory
Territorial
changes
Belligerents
Flag of Peru Peruvian Republic
Flag of Bolivia Republic of Bolivia
Flag of Chile Republic of Chile
Commanders
Flag of Peru Miguel Grau  ,
Flag of Peru Juan Buendia,
Flag of Bolivia Narciso Campero,
Flag of Peru Pedro Silva,
Flag of Peru Andres A. Caceres
Flag of Chile Manuel Baquedano,
Flag of Chile Patricio Lynch,
Flag of Chile Juan Williams
Strength
1878
Bolivian Army: 2,300 soldiers
Bolivian Navy: None
Peruvian Army: 4,700 soldiers
Remington and Minie rifles. Blakely cannon
Peruvian Navy: 2 ironclad, 1 corvette, 1 gunboat
1881
Peruvian Army: 28,000 soldiers[1]
Peruvian Navy: None
1878
Chilean Army: 4,000 soldiers
Comblain rifle. Krupp cannon
Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats
1881
Chilean Army: 45,000 soldiers
Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 1 ironclad, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats
Casualties and losses
35,000 Peruvians killed or wounded
5,000 Bolivians killed or wounded
Pisagua, Iquique, Mollendo, Supe, Chorrillos, Miraflores, Concepcion, San Pablo, bombed or burned
15,000 killed or wounded

The War of the Pacific, occurring from 1879-1883, was a conflict between Chile and the joint forces of Bolivia and Peru. Also known as the "Saltpeter War", the war arose from disputes over the control of territory that contained substantial mineral-rich deposits. It ultimately led to the Chilean annexation of the Peruvian Tarapaca department and Arica province, as well as the Bolivian department of Litoral, leaving Bolivia as a landlocked country.

Contents

[edit] Origins of the War of the Pacific

The War of the Pacific grew out of the initial dispute between Chile and Bolivia for control over a part of the Atacama desert that lies between the 23rd and 25th parallels on the Pacific coast, a territory that contained valuable mineral resources amid a period of worldwide economic recession.

[edit] Natural resources

The dry climate of Peruvian and Bolivian coast had permitted the accumulation and preservation of vast amounts of high-quality nitrate deposits - guano and saltpeter over many thousands of years. The discovery during the 1840s of the use of guano as a fertilizer and saltpeter as a key ingredient in explosives made the area strategically valuable. Bolivia, Chile and Peru suddenly found themselves sitting on the largest reserves of a resource that the world needed, and caused the population of the Atacama desert with Chilean operators backed by European capital.

From 1864 to 1866, Peru and Chile fought as allies against former colonial power Spain in the Chincha Islands War. It began with Spain's seizure of the guano-rich Chincha Islands and continued with bombing of Valparaíso and El Callao, but Spain was repulsed by the allied forces of Peru and Chile[2].

Heavy British capital investment drove development through the area, although Peru nationalized the guano exploitation during the 1870s.

[edit] Treaties

No permanent borders had been established between Bolivia and Chile until 1866. Bolivian and Chilean historians disagree on whether the territory of Charcas, originally part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, later of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, had access to the sea. Supporting their claims with different documents, Bolivians claim that it had while Chileans disagreed. Bolivia and Chile claimed its borders according to the uti possidetis principle.

In 1866, the two countries had negotiated the Boundary Treaty of 1866[3] (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Mutual Benefits) that established the 24th parallel as their boundary, and entitled Chile and Bolivia the right to share in the tax revenue on mineral exports from the territory between the 23rd and 25th parallels. Within this zone, Chile and Bolivia were provided equal rights.

In 1872 the foreign minister of Peru, Jose de la Riva-Agüero, told the Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru in Santiago, Ignacio Novoa, to move quikly in order to use the (then) preponderance of the Peruvian Navy in the Pacific to obtain secure boundary for Bolivia before the Chilean ironclads in construction (the Blanco Encalada and the Cochrane) became finished[4].

On 6th February 1873 Peru and Bolivia signed the treaty of alliance. The preamble of the treaty stated that Bolivia and Peru mutually guaranteed certain rights, thus formulating a treaty that they called one of defensive alliance. Specifically, the treaty guaranteed independence, sovereignty and the integrity of their territories, obliging them by the terms of the treaty to defend each other against all foreign aggression. An additional clause kept the treaty secret among the allies.[5] Chile viewed the alliance as a menace[6]. Argentina had begun talks with Peru and Bolivia to join the alliance, and the Chamber of Deputies, in a secret session, approved the law, but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874. Chile was not directly mentioned in the text of the treaty, and was not informed about its existence.

In 1874 a second Boundary Treaty between Chile and Bolivia superseded the first, granting Bolivia the authority to collect full tax revenue between the 23rd and 24th parallels, fixing the tax rates on Chilean companies for 25 years, and calling for Bolivia to open up.[3] Most of the exploitation of the coastal region of Atacama was to be conducted by Chilean companies and British interests.

On 26 December, 1874, the new (and incomplete) ironclad Cochrane arrived in Valparaiso; it remained in Chile until the completion of the Blanco Encalada, reversing the balance of power in the south Pacific ocean.[7] After that, Peru tried to pospone the Argentine signing of the Alliance Treaty.[8]

[edit] Crisis

On November 27 of 1873, the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company signed a contract with the Bolivian government in which it would have authorized the extraction of saltpeter duty-free for 15 years. In 1878, The Bolivian Congress and a National Constituent Assembly found the contract incomplete due to that it had not been ratified by congress as required by the Bolivian Constitution of 1871. Subsequently, the Bolivian congress suggested that it would approve the contract only if the company would pay a 10 cents tax per quintal of mineral extracted.[9][10] The company complained the increased payments were illegal, and after mounting significant pressure demanded that the Chilean government intervene in the problem.[11] In response, Chile claimed that the border treaty of 1874 did not allow for such a tax hike.[12]

When the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company refused to pay the tax, the Bolivian government under President Hilarion Daza threatened to confiscate its property. In December 1878, Chile answered by sending a warship to the area. Nonetheless, with the company failing to pay the tax, on February 14, 1879, Bolivia announced the seizure and auction of the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company. In turn, Chile threatened that such action would render the border treaty null and void. On February 14, the day of the auction of the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company, 500[13] Chilean soldiers arrived by ship and occupied the Bolivian port city of Antofagasta, whose population was 93%-95% Chilean,[14] without a fight.[13] According to Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre, not only did the Chilean troops occupy the city without any major resistance, but they also received widespread public support and encouragement.[15].

On February 18, while in Antofagasta, Chilean colonel Emilio Sotomayor intercepted a letter from Hilarión Daza directed to Bolivian prefect-colonel Severino Zapata. According to Chilean historian Gonzalo Bulnes, in said letter Daza mentioned his worry that Chile might intervene in Bolivia's nationalization of British saltpeter companies in the region, and made mention of a secret treaty that they would, if necessary, demand Peru to honor in case Chile declared war.[16]

After the Chilean invasion of Antofagasta, Hilarión Daza made a presidential decree on March 1, 1879, which demanded the expulsion of Chileans, the nationalizing of Chilean private property and prohibited trade and comunications with Chile "as long as the war lasts".[17] Due to its aggressiveness the Chilean government understood the decree as a declaration of war.[18][19] However, although both nations had already taken aggressive actions, in reality no war had yet been formally declared from either side of the conflict.[20][21] Bolivia then requested that Peru activate the secret defensive treaty of 1873 as they felt that the Chilean invasion of Antofagasta constituted as a reason for the defensive alliance to come into effect.[22]

Peru attempted to peacefully mediate the conflict by sending Jose Antonio Lavalle, a senior diplomat, to negotiate with the Chilean government in order to request for Chile to return Antofagasta to Bolivian authorities. On March 14 the Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Alejandro Fierro sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government.[23] On March 17, Godoy held a meeting with Peruvian President Mariano Ignacio Prado, and Godoy formally requested neutrality from the Peruvian Government,[24] The next day, March 18, Prado told Godoy that there existed a defensive treaty allying Peru with Bolivia.[25]

The Battle of Topater, which took place on 23 March 1879 is considered the first battle of the war. On their way to occupy Calama, north of 23th parallel, 554 Chilean troops and cavalry were opposed by 135 Bolivian soldiers and civilian residents led by Dr. Ladislao Cabrera, dug in at two destroyed bridges; calls to surrender were rejected before and during the battle. Outnumbered and low on ammunition, most of the Bolivian force withdrew, except for a small group of civilians led by Colonel Eduardo Abaroa, who fought to the end. Further land battles would not take place until the war at sea was resolved.[26]

On March 24, Peru responded to Chile and Bolivia by proposing consideration in the Peruvian Congress of April 24 of both the Chilean request for neutrality and the Bolivian request of alliance.[27]. On March 31, Peru's Jose Antonio Lavalle proceeded to read the whole treaty to Chile's Fierro and told him that it was not offensive to Chile.[25]

Acknowledging awareness of the Bolivia-Peru alliance, Chile responded by breaking diplomatic ties and formally declaring war on both countries on April 5, 1879. On April 6, Peru declared casus foederis of the defensive alliance treaty, stating that it had officially come into effect.[25][28] The War of the Pacific thus officially began.

[edit] Argentina's stance

In 1873 and 1879, Argentina had began talks with Perú and Bolivia in order to join the alliance, since it had a territorial dispute with Chile regarding the region of Patagonia,[29] Indeed, on 24 September, 1873 the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had approved the (secret) law, but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874[30].

According to Peruvian sources, prior the Chilean declaration of war, the Argentine President asked to Peruvian minister in Buenos Aires if Peru could be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a break with Chile. At the time, the Peruvian minister had not received instructions of any kind.[31].

According to Argentine sources, prior to the Argentine declaration of neutrality, Peruvians offered to Argentina an access to the Pacific Ocean through the Bolivian territories in order to join the alliance against the Chilean government. However, the offer was so vague in its formulation, that the Argentine foreign minister and the representative in Bolivia thought it did not deserve consideration.[32]

On May 20, 1879 the Argentine Foreign Minister Montes de Oca declared the neutrality of Argentina[33]. Despite this, when war broke out Argentina sent a naval squadron to Rio Negro menacing Chilean dominion over the Straits of Magellan.[34] John Crow, in his book "The Epic of Latin America", argues that the Chilean naval superiority was the main factor preventing Argentina from taking part in the war.[35]

[edit] The War

[edit] Naval campaign

Given the few roads, rail lines and the dreary of the inhospitable, waterless and unpopulated Atacama desert, the control of the sealines along the coast would be absolutly vital to the success of the land campaign to control the nitrate industry. From the beginning of the war it became clear that, in a difficult desert terrain, control of the sea would prove to be the deciding factor.

Since the vulneravility of Chile to hostile seapower was demostrated during the conflict with Spain in 1866, culminating with the bomberdement of Valparaiso, was undertaken by the government a stable action to build up a strong navy to secure the sea from the Magellan Straits to Panama. Chile - although in the middle of its own economic crisis - was better prepared, counting on its modern navy supplemented by a well-trained and equipped army.

For a short time after the Chincha's war, Peru enjoyed a dominance in the waters of the west coast of the south pacific but with the arrival of the 2 Chilean Ironclads Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada this periode was passed. 1874 the Peruvian congress destined $4.000.000[36] for the acquisition of ironclads, but President Prado spent the money during the civil war against Pierola. Peru faced an economic collapse that left its navy and army without proper training or budget. Most of its warships were old and unable to face battle, leaving only the ironclads Huascar and Independencia ready.

The Battle of Angamos decided the war on sea. After the lost of the Independencia in the Battle of Iquique on 21 May 1879, in Angamos Peru lost her last ship that could threatened the Chilean cost.

[edit] Land campaign and invasion

Chileans operations in the war.

Having gained control of the sea, Chile sent its army to invade Peru. Bolivia, unable to recover the Litoral Department, joined the Peruvian defense of Tarapaca and Tacna.

[edit] Campaign of Tarapaca

On 2 November 1879, naval bombardment and disembark assaults were carried out at the small port of Pisagua and the Junin Cove, –some 500 km North of Antofagasta. At Pisagua, several landing waves totaling 7,000 Chilean troops attacked beach defenses held by 1,160 Allies commanded by Isaac Recavarren, and took the town. By the end of the day, General Erasmo Escala and a Chilean army of 10,000 were ashore and moving inland.

The Chileans marched south towards the city of Iquique with 6,000 troops, commanded by Emilio Sotomayor. The Allies gathered 7,400 troops in Agua Santa, commanded by Juan Buendia. On 19 November, both armies met in Battle of San Francisco, with high casualties to both sides. Bolivians forces retreated to Oruro and Peruvians to Tiliviche. Four days later, the Chilean army captured Iquique without resistance.

A detachment of 3,600 Chilean soldiers, commanded by Luis Artega, cavalry and artillery, was sent to face the Peruvian forces in Tarapaca. Juan Buendia, with Peruvian forces, started a march towards Arica in order to found Bolivian troops led by Hilarion Daza. Daza departed from Arica towards Tarapaca but in Camarones he decided to return towards Arica. The Battle of Tarapaca, on 27 November, took place between Chilean and Peruvian forces. After the Peruvian victory at Tarapaca General Buendia's army, down to 4,000, retreated further north to Arica by 18 December.

[edit] Campaign of Tacna and Arica

Oil Painting by Juan Lepiani which represents the battle of Arica on June 7, 1880‎.

A new Chilean naval expedition left Pisagua and on 24 February 1880 disembarked nearly 12,000 soldiers at Pacocha Bay (near Ilo). Commanded by General Manuel Baquedano, this force isolated the provinces of Tacna and Arica, destroying any practical hope for reinforcements from Peru. On the outskirts of Tacna combatants from the three contending countries met on what would later be known as the Battle of El Alto de la Alianza. Commanding the allied army was Narciso Campero, the Bolivian president. In the subsequent carnage Chilean artillery proved superior, and as a result most of Peru's professional army was destroyed. After the battle Bolivia withdrew completely from the war.

On 7 June, some 4,000 Chilean forces backed by the Navy successfully attacked a Peruvian garrison in Arica, which was under the command of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi. Chilean forces, directed by Colonel Pedro Lagos, had to run up the Morro de Arica (a steep and tall seaside hill) facing 2,000 Peruvian troops.

The assault became known as the Battle of Arica, which turned out to be one of the most tragic and, at the same time, most emblematic events of the war: Chile suffered 479 mortal casualties, while almost 900 Peruvians lost their lives, including Colonel Bolognesi. This battle was especially bloody since most Chileans died because of landmines; and with bullets running low most of the Peruvian deaths were at the hands of Corvo-wielding Chileans. The multiple cuts on the corpses made many speculate that the execution of prisoners had taken place, but most authors say that the captains were actually holding back the enraged Chileans to prevent the deaths of routed soldiers.[37]

Other high ranking Peruvian officers who also perished were Colonel Alfonso Ugarte, Colonel Mariano Bustamante and his Chief of Detail. These three Peruvian officers belonged to the group that, on the eve of battle, had gallantly rejected an offer to deliver the doomed garrison to the Chileans in surrender; Colonel Bolognesi bore out his famous vow to the Chilean emissary that he would defend Arica "until the last round is fired." Bolognesi's complete vow goes as: "Tengo deberes sagrados que cumplir y los cumplire hasta quemar el ultimo cartucho." ("I have sacred duties to fulfill, and I will fulfill them until I fire the last round"). The expression "hasta quemar el ultimo cartucho" ("Until the last round is fired") has passed into the Spanish language as a famous phrase.

Since the Morro de Arica was the last bulwark of defence for the allied troops standing in the city, its occupation by Chile has been of utmost historical relevance for both countries.

In October 1880, the United States unsuccessfully mediated in the conflict aboard USS Lackawanna at Arica Bay, attempting to end the war through diplomacy. Representatives from Chile, Peru, and Bolivia met to discuss the territorial disputes; yet both Peru and Bolivia rejected the loss of their territories to Chile and abandoned the conference.

[edit] Lynch's expedition

Lynch's Expedition according to Diego Barros Arana's "Historia de la Guerra del Pacifico"

To show Peru the futility of further resistance againt Chilean forces, the Chilean government dispatched an expedition under the command of Captain Patricio Lynch to northern Peru to collect taxes. [38][39]

A division consisting of 1900 soldiers, 400 cavalrymen, 3 cannons and a field hospital - all in all 2,600 men - was put aboard two troopships and, guarded by warships O'Higgins and Chacabuco, sent to Chimbote. The convoi set off from Arica on 4 September 1880 and arrived in Chimbote on the morning of 10 September. During the disembarkment in Chimbote, Supe, Paita and the occupation of Viru, Chiclayo and other cities and ports, no resistance was encountered.

Lynch levied taxes of $100,000 in Chimbote, $10,000 in Piata, $20,000 in Chiclayo and $4,000 in Labayeque in local currencies. As the Peruan government heared of the levies, it decreed on 11 September not to pay taxes to the Chilean Army. Noncompilance was declared an act of treason and was to be punished with the confiscation of all remaining assets. Despite this threat, most land owners payed and followed the at this time prevalent opinion that denizens of occupied areas were relieved of duties to the former government and to comply with the occupying army.[40] Those who did not comply had their property impounded or destroyed.

The expedition also found and destroyed 300 crates with 200,000 rounds of ammunition in the Hacienda San Nicolas near Supe. The british Ship Islai was stopped and searched on 18 September and 28 crates of its freight impounded. Four of them contained Peruan postage stamps with the total value of $375,000, printed in the US, the other 24 inclosed $7,290,000 in freshly printed bills.

The expedition also recruited 400 chinese peons, who were working on the haciendas, as an auxilliary force and brought them back to Chile. [41]

Lynchs expedition returned to Arica on 26 and 27 October 1880.

[edit] The Lackawanna Conference

On October 22, 1880 began the Lackawanna Conference and ended five days later on October 27, 1880[42]. There were three meetings on October 22, 25 and 27, 1880.

The delegates, Aurelio Garcia and Antonio Arenas of Peru, Eusebio Lillo and Eulogio Altamirano of Chile, Mariano Baptista and Juan Carrillo of Bolivia and the Ministry Plenipotentiary of the Unites States of America Osborne in Chile met on the USS Lackawanna in Arica. Chile demanded Tarapaca and Atacama, an indemnity of $20,000,000, Gold Pesos, restoration of property taken from Chilean citizens, the return to Chile of the transport vessel "Rimac", the abrogation of the Secret Alliance Treaty between Peru and Bolivia, and a the retention by Chile of the territories of Moquegua, Tacna and Arica until all previous conditions were satisfied; and seventh, the formal commitment on the part of Peru not to mount artillery batteries in Arica's harbor once returned by Chile and to limit that port to commercial use only. If the allies accepted these terms, Chile would occupy Moquequa, Tacna, and Arica until they had paid the indemnity.

The Peruvian representative, Mr. Aurelio Garcia, proposed the arbitration by the United States, in view of the good will expressed by the American envoys and on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine but the Chilean delegates refused.

Although willing to accept a negotiated settlement, Peru and Bolivia insisted that Chile withdraw from all occupied lands as a precondition for discussing peace. Having captured this territory at great expense, Chile refused and the Lackawanna Conference negotiations stalled.

[edit] Campaign of Lima

Chilean charge during the Battle of San Juan‎.

19 November 1880 the Chilean army landed in Pisco, and by January 1881, the Chileans were marching towards the Peruvian capital, Lima. Regular Peruvian forces together with poorly armed people, set up to defend Lima. With little effective Peruvian central government remaining, Chile pursued an ambitious campaign throughout Peru, especially along the coast and in the central Sierra, penetrating as far north as Cajamarca, seeking to eliminate any source of resistance. Peruvian forces were decisevely defeated in the battles of San Juan and Miraflores, and Lima fell in January 1881 to the forces of General Baquedano.
The southern suburbs of Lima, including the upscale beach area of Chorrillos, were looted by demoralized Peruvian soldiers[43]

[edit] Occupation of Lima

Chilean army entering Lima.

During the occupation of Lima, Chilean troops pillaged[citations needed] Peruvian public buildings, turned the old University of San Marcos into a barracks, raided[citations needed] medical schools and other institutions of education, and stole[citations needed] a series of monuments and artwork that had adorned the city. As war booty, Chile confiscated the contents of the Peruvian National Library in Lima and transported thousands of books (including many centuries-old original Spanish, Peruvian and Colonial volumes) to Santiago de Chile, along with much capital stock. In November of 2007 3,778 books were returned to the National Library of Peru[44]

[edit] Campaign of the Sierra

With apparent encouragement from the United States,[45] Peruvians kept up the resistance for three more years. The leader of the resistance was General Andres Caceres (nicknamed the Warlock of the Andes), who would later be elected president of Peru. Under his leadership, the Peruvian militia forces strengthened with Native American montoneros inflicted several painful[citations needed] blows upon the Chilean army in small battles such as Marcavalle, Concepcion and San Pablo, forcing Colonel Estanislao del Canto's division to return to Lima on 1882. However, Caceres was conclusively defeated by Colonel Alejandro Gorostiaga at Battle of Huamachuco on July 10, 1883. After this battle, there was little further resistance. Finally, on 20 October 1883, Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Ancon, by which Peru's Tarapaca province was ceded to the victor; on its part, Bolivia was forced to cede Antofagasta.

[edit] Characteristics of the War

[edit] Strategic control of the sea

The theatre of war between 1879 and 1881 was a large expanse of desert, sparsely populated and far removed from major cities or resources; it is, however, close to the Pacific Ocean. It was clear from the beginning that control of the sea would be the key to an inevitably difficult desert war: supply by sea, including water, food, ammunition, horses, fodder and reinforcements, was quicker and easier than marching supplies through the desert or across the Bolivian high plateau.

While the Chilean Navy started an economic and military blockade of the Allies' ports, Peru took the initiative and utilized its smaller but effective navy as a raiding force. Chile was forced to delay the ground invasion for six months, and to shift its fleet from blockading to hunting Huascar until she was captured.

With the advantage of naval supremacy, Chilean ground strategy focused on mobility: landing ground forces in enemy territory in order to raid Allied ground assets; landing in strength to split and drive out defenders and leaving garrisons to guard territory as the war moved north. Peru and Bolivia fought a defensive war: maneuvering along long overland distances; relying where possible on land or coastal fortifications with gun batteries and minefields; coastal railways were available to Peru, and telegraph lines provided a direct line to the government in Lima. When retreating, Allied forces made sure that little if any assets remained to be used by the enemy.

Sea mobile forces proved to be, in the end, an advantage for desert warfare on a long coastline. Defenders found themselves hundreds of kilometers away from home; invading forces were usually a few kilometers away from the sea.

[edit] Occupation, resistance and attrition

The occupation of Peru between 1881 and 1884 was a different story altogether. The war theatre was the Peruvian Sierra, where Peruvian resistance had easy access to population, resource and supply centres further from the sea; it could carry out a war of attrition indefinitely. The Chilean army (now turned into an occupation force) was split into small garrisons across the theatre and could devote only part of its strength to hunting down rebels without a central authority.

After a costly occupation and prolonged anti-insurgency campaign, Chile sought to achieve a political exit strategy. Rifts within Peruvian society provided such an opportunity after the Battle of Huamachuco, and resulted in the peace treaty that ended the occupation.

[edit] Participation of Chinese immigrants

According to "Chinese Migration into Latin America – Diaspora or Sojourns in Peru?" some Chinese supported the Chilean army against their plantation owners[46].

[edit] Technology

The war saw the use by both sides of new, or recently introduced, late 19th century military technology such as breech-loading rifles & cannons, remote-controlled land mines, armor-piercing shells, naval torpedoes, torpedo boats, and purpose-built landing craft.

The second-generation of ironclads (i.e. designed after the Battle of Hampton Roads) were employed in battle for the first time. That was significant for a conflict where a major power was not directly involved, and it drew the attention of British, French, and U.S. observers of the war.

During the war, Peru developed the Toro Submarino ("Submarine Bull"). Though completely operational, she never saw action, and she was scuttled at the end of the war to prevent her capture by Chilean forces.

The U.S.S. Wachusett with Alfred Thayer Mahan in command, was stationed at Callao, Peru, protecting American interests during the final stages of the War of the Pacific. He formulated his concept of sea power while reading a history book in an English gentleman’s club in Lima, Peru. This concept became the foundation for his celebrated The Influence of Sea Power upon History[47][48].

[edit] Aftermath

[edit] Peace terms

Under the terms of the Treaty of Ancon,[8] Chile was to occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for 10 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held to determine nationality. The two countries failed for decades to agree on the terms of the plebiscite. Finally in 1929, through the mediation of the United States under President Herbert Hoover, an accord was reached by which Chile kept Arica. Peru reacquired Tacna and received some concessions in Arica.

In 1884, Bolivia signed a truce that gave control to Chile of the entire Bolivian coast, the province of Antofagasta, and its valuable nitrate, copper, and other mineral deposits, and a further treaty in 1904 made this arrangement permanent. In return, Chile agreed to build a railroad connecting the capital city of La Paz, Bolivia with the port of Arica, and Chile guaranteed freedom of transit for Bolivian commerce through Chilean ports and territory.

Bolivia has also negotiated treaties of commercial access to the oceans via Brazil, Argentina, etc.

[edit] Long-term consequences

The War of the Pacific left traumatic scars on all societies involved in the conflict. For Bolivians, the loss of the territory which they refer to as the Litoral (the coast) remains a deeply emotional issue and a practical one, as was particularly evident during the internal natural gas riots of 2003. Popular belief attributes much of the country's problems to its landlocked condition; accordingly, recovering the seacoast is seen as the solution to most of these difficulties. However, the real issue is the fear of being dependent on Chile or Peru.[citation needed] In 1932, this was a contributing factor in the failed Chaco War with Paraguay, over territory controlling access to the Atlantic Ocean through the Paraguay River. In recent decades, all Bolivian Presidents have made it their policy to pressure Chile for sovereign access to the sea. Diplomatic relations with Chile have been severed since 17 March 1978, in spite of considerable commercial ties. Currently, the leading Bolivian newspaper "El Diario" [9] still features at least a weekly editorial on the subject, and the Bolivian people annually celebrate a patriotic "Dia del Mar" (Day of the Sea) to remember the crippling loss.[49]

Picture from Bolivia, 1992. It says: "What once was ours, will be ours once again", and "Hold on rotos (Chileans), because here come the Colorados of Bolivia"

Peruvians developed a cult for the heroic defenders of the patria (nation, literally fatherland), such as Admiral Miguel Grau Seminario, Colonel Francisco Bolognesi, Colonel Alfonso Ugarte, who were killed in the war, and General Andres Avelino Caceres who went on to become a leading political figure and symbol of resistance to the occupying Chilean Army. Peruvian heroes of the war are buried in the "Cripta de los Heroes" in Presbitero Maestro cemetery in Lima, Peru. This mausoleum is the largest in the cemetery, and its entrance reads "La Nacion a sus Defensores" (From the nation, to its defenders). The defeat engendered a deep revenge desire among the ruling classes, which also led to a skewed view of the role of the armed forces; this attitude dominated society throughout the 20th century. War honors are also held for Vice Admiral Abel-Nicolas Bergasse Dupetit Thouars, a French commander, who after the Battle of Miraflores prevented the destruction and looting of Lima by threatening to engage and destroy the Chilean Navy with a French naval force under his command.

Chile fared better, gaining a lucrative territory with major sources of income, including nitrates, saltpeter and copper. The national treasury grew by 900% between 1879 and 1902 due to taxes coming from the newly acquired Bolivian and Peruvian lands. [50] Victory was, however, a mixed blessing. During the war Chile waived most of its claim over the Patagonia in the Boundary treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina, in order to ensure Argentina's neutrality; Chilean popular belief sees this as a territorial loss of almost half a million square miles. After the war Puna de Atacama dispute grew until it was solved in 1899, since both Chile and Argentina claimed former Bolivian territories. British involvement and control of the nitrate industry rose significantly after the war,[51] leading them to meddle in Chilean politics and ultimately to back an overthrow of the Chilean President in 1891.[citation needed] High nitrate profits lasted for only a few decades and fell sharply once synthetic nitrates were developed during World War I. This led to a massive economic breakdown (known as the nitrate crisis), since many industrial factories around the country had closed in the early 1880s to free up labor for the then rising and now dead extraction business, dramatically slowing the country's industrial development. When the saltpeter mines closed or proved no longer profitable, the British companies left the country, leaving a large number of unemployed behind. Currently, the former Bolivian region is still the world's richest source of copper and its ports move trade between nearby countries and the Pacific Ocean; the former Peruvian region faces more problematic issues since no new sources of richness have been discovered since the Nitrate Crisis, but at least on 28 August 1929, Chile returned the province of Tacna to Peru.

The war consolidated the Chilean navy as an institution, just as the war of independence and the 1836 war against the Santa Cruz confederation consolidated the Chilean Army.

In 1999, Chile and Peru at last agreed to complete the implementation of the last parts of the Treaty of Lima, providing Peru with a port in Arica. [52]

[edit] Prominent military commanders

[edit] Bolivia

  • Mr. Eduardo Abaroa /-, an engineer, was killed leading a group of civilian defenders at the Battle of Topater
  • Dr. Ladislao Cabrera, organizing the defense of Calama
  • General Narciso Campero, military President of Bolivia (1880-1884)
  • General Hilarion Daza, military President of Bolivia (1876-1879)

[edit] Chile

[edit] Peru

  • Colonel Francisco Bolognesi /-, was killed while leading the defense of the Arica garrison
  • General Andres Caceres, led the guerilla war during the occupation of Peru, was elected President of Peru after the war
  • Rear Admiral Miguel Grau /-, commander of Huascar and widely known as the gentleman of the seas, was killed at the Naval Battle of Angamos
  • Colonel Leoncio Prado /-, the son of former President Mariano Ignacio Prado, chose duty as a soldier over an oath not to fight, was captured and executed by a Chilean firing squad after the Battle of Huamachuco
  • Colonel Alfonso Ugarte /-, Bolognesi's top lieutenant, a rich saltpeter entrepreneur and former mayor of Iquique, was killed during the Battle of Arica, believed to have jumped off a cliff on his horse to save the flag from capture.

[edit] Other nationalities

  • Rear Admiral Abel Bergasse Dupetit-Thouars, French commander, after the Battle of Miraflores, he prevented the destruction and looting of Lima by threatening to engage and destroy the Chilean Navy with a French naval force under his command.
  • Colonel Robert Souper Howard /-, a British soldier who served in the Chilean Army in nearly every battlefield of the war, was killed at the Battle of San Juan.
  • Lt. Colonel Roque Saenz Pena, an Argentine lawyer who served as an officer in the Peruvian Army during the battles of Tarapaca and Arica, was later elected President of Argentina.

[edit] Bibliography

  • Gonzalo Bulnes(1851-1936), "Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879", Publisher Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago de Chile, in english Language (Download here)
  • Diego Barros Arana Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880), Publisher: "librería central de servat i c", Esquina de Huerfanos i Ahumada, Santiago, Chile, 1881 , 2 Vols. (Download Vol.1 and Vol.II) in Spanish Language
  • Jorge Besadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru, La guerra con Chile" in Spanish Language

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ 19,000 in San Juan, 4,000 in Lima, 1,000 in El Callao (Pierola letter to Julio Tenaud) 4,000 in Arequipa, Col. Jose de la Torre[1]
  2. ^ Aprobando Tratado de Alianza ofensiva y defensiva, celebrado entre las Repúblicas de Perú y Chile
  3. ^ a b Tratado de limites de 1866 entre Bolivia y Chile (Spanish)
  4. ^ See Private note of Riva-Agüero to Novoa, November 20 1872. Godoy papers. Cited in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile Peru, the causes of the War 1879, page 58 and 59:
    It is desirable that once for all, and as soon as possible, the relations between the two Republics should be defined, because it is necessary to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. If Chile dealing with this boundary question seizes the most favourable opportunity to take possession of that coast-line, it is necessary that their plans develop before Chile is in possession of the ironclads under construction, in order that in the definite settlement of this question, the influence, which we are in a position to exert by means of our maritime preponderance may have due weight.
  5. ^ (See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879, Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile.
  6. ^ See Gonzalo Bulnes, "Chile and Peru, The causes of the War of 1879" page 57 and 58:
    The Treaty menaces Chile … Never was Chile in greater peril, nor has a more favourable moment been elected for reducing her to the mere leavings that interested none of the conspirators. The advantage to each of them was clear enough. Bolivia would expand three degrees on the coast; Argentina would take possession of all our eastern terrisories to whatever point she liked; Peru would make Bolivia pay her with the salitre region. The synthesis of the Secret Treaty was this: opportunity: the disarmed condition of Chile; the pretext to produce conflict: Bolivia: the profit of the business: Patagonia and the salitre.
  7. ^ See Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2282, "El comienzo de la inferioridad naval peruana y la falta de iniciativa para una guerra preventiva":
    La supremacía conquistada por Chile en el mar ese mismo año de 1874 contribuyó a que el Perú procurase evitar cualquier problema
  8. ^ See Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2286, "El Peru en 1874 y 1878 evita la alianza con Argentina":
    …en agosto, septiembre y octubre de 1875 … el Peru se apresuro a tomar una actitud dilatoria y hasta inhibitoria para la firma del tratado de alianza con aquella republica [Argentina] con el fin de conservar su libertad de accion. La existencia de los blindados chilenos explica acaso la diferencia entre esta actitud y otras anteriores. …
    En 1878 [el gobierno peruano] se nego a entregar los elementos navales pedidos por el gobierno argentino y colaboro en la busqueda de una solucion pacifica …
  9. ^ [2] Retrospectiva del enclaustramiento maritimo. Una vision critica sobre como se inicio el conflicto. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia
  10. ^ [3] Relaciones Chile-Bolivia-Peru: La Guerra del Pacifico. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
  11. ^ [4] Los empresarios, la politica y la Guerra del Pacifico. Luis Ortega. Santiago de Chile. 1984. (Page 18. File Antony Gibbs & Sons AGA. Valparaiso to Londres. Private N 25. March 6, 1878)
  12. ^ (Spanish)http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Tratado_de_l%C3%ADmites_de_1874_entre_Bolivia_y_Chile
  13. ^ a b See Diego Barros Arana, "Historia de la Guerra del Pacifico", Vol. I, page 59.
  14. ^ See Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru, the Causes of the War of 1879 page 42
  15. ^ The Peruvian Historian stated See also Jorge Basadre, here (retrieved on 9 Juli 2009):
    El desembarco se efectuó sin resistencia, con manifestaciones de entusiasmo. La bandera chilena flameó en todos los edificios del puerto.
  16. ^ [5] Gonzalo Bulnes. Guerra del Pacífico. De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. 1911.
    Tengo una buena noticia que darle. He fregado a los gringos (se refiere a Mr. Hicks) decretando la reivindicacion de las salitreras i no podran quitarnoslas por mas que se esfuerce el mundo entero. Espero que Chile no intervendra en este asunto... pero si nos declara la guerra podemos contar con el apoyo del Peru a quien exijiremos el cumplimiento del Tratado secreto. Con este objeto voi a mandar a Lima a Reyes 0rtiz. Ya ve Ud. como le doi buenas noticias que Ud. me ha de agradecer eternamente i como le dejo dicho los gringos estan completamente fregados i los chilenos tienen que morder i reclamar nada mas.
  17. ^ See Guillermo Lazos Carmona, Historia de las fronteras de Chile ,page 65
  18. ^ http://www.archive.org/stream/storiadellaguer00caivgoog/storiadellaguer00caivgoog_djvu.txt
  19. ^ http://books.google.com.bo/books?q=Este+hecho%2C++fue+interpretado+por+el+gobierno+chileno%2C+como+declaratoria+de+guerra+y+como+causal+justificativa+parala+de+todo+el+litoral&btnG=Buscar+libros
  20. ^ http://www.la-razon.com/versiones/20080220_006188/nota_246_551329.htm
  21. ^ http://books.google.com.bo/books?id=WxppsTcZf7oC&q=%22la+expulsi%C3%B3n+de+los+chilenos.+Este+hecho,+h%C3%A1bilmente+fue+interpretado+por+el+gobierno+chileno+como%22&dq=%22la+expulsi%C3%B3n+de+los+chilenos.+Este+hecho,+h%C3%A1bilmente+fue+interpretado+por+el+gobierno+chileno+como%22&pgis=1
  22. ^ (See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879, Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile.
    "Republics of Bolivia and Peru, desirous of drawing together in a solemn manner the bonds which unite them, thus aujimenting their strength and mutually guaranteeing certain rights, formulate the present treaty of Defensive Alliance; for which object the President of Bolivia has conferred power adequate for such a negotiation to Juan de la Cruz Benavente, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plonipotenciary in Peru, and the President of Peru has conferred like powers to Jose de la Riva-Aguero; who have agreed on the following stipulations:
    Article I. The High Contracting Parties unite and league together mutually to guarantee their independence, their sovereignty and the integrity of their territories respectively, obliging themselves by the terms of the present treaty to defend themselves against all foreign aggression, whether emanating from one or several independent states or from a force without flag and obeying no recognised power.
    Additional Article:
    The present treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bolivia and Peru shall be secret until the two high contracting parties by common accord consider its publication necessary."
  23. ^ Bulnes, Gonzalo. Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879. pp. 147. 
  24. ^ [6] Bulnes Gonzalo, Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148
  25. ^ a b c [www.laguerradelpacifico.cl/Libros/Tomo%20I%20Tarapaca%20-%20Machuca.doc La Guerra del Pacífico. Francisco A. Machuca. Valparaíso] "Mientras el señor Lavalle gozaba de relativa tregua, y estudiaba las causas de la poca prisa del Gobierno chileno para continuar las negociaciones, éste, en constante comunicación con nuestro Ministro Godoy, quedaba impuesto el 18 de Marzo, por comunicación del día anterior, 17, de la existencia del pacto secreto, y de una nota clara y terminante de nuestro Ministro al Gobierno de Lima...Por fin, el 31 de Marzo, el señor Lavalle se apersonó al señor Ministro de Relaciones y le dió conocimiento del tratado secreto, que acababa de recibir de Lima, en circunstancia que hacía días, el general Prado le había confesado su existencia a nuestro Ministro Godoy, en una conferencia tenida en Chorrillos."
  26. ^ Jorge Basadre, Historia de la Republica del Peru, vol. VI, p. 40.
  27. ^ Peruvian Congress March, 24 1879
  28. ^ Vicuna Mackena. Campana de Tarapaca. Santriago de Chile
  29. ^ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2510820?seq=6
  30. ^ See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-066.htm "Sarmiento y Tejedor proponen al Congreso la adhesión al tratado secreto peruano-boliviano del 6 de febrero de 1873":
    el 24 de septiembre el presidente Sarmiento firmara el pedido de autorización al Congreso para la adhesión al tratado de alianza peruano-boliviano. El asunto fue aprobado en la Cámara de Diputados por 48 a 18 votos…
    El tratamiento del tema en el Senado sufrió sucesivos aplazamientos hasta finalmente quedar para las sesiones ordinarias del año siguiente
  31. ^ See La actitud de la Argentina. Jorge Basadre:
    el 26 me pidió una conferencia S. E. el Presidente y habiendo tenido lugar comprendí que su objeto había sido conocer la actitud que adoptaríamos en la cuestión que se ventilaba entre Chile y Bolivia y quizás aun si estaríamos dispuestos al fin a prestar auxilio a la Argentina en caso de un rompimiento con Chile. En esa conferencia me dijo que tenía noticia de que la mediación del Perú no sería admitida. Como ya no había recibido instrucciones de ninguna clase, bien a mi pesar tuve que eludir la respuesta que él esperaba, perdiendo de nuevo la oportunidad que se me presentaba para conseguir la alianza, sin solicitarla, lo que a mi juicio habría sido muy fácil entonces..."
    (Translation:
    On 26 asked me a conference the President and having been understood that its purpose had been to know the attitude taken in the matter was ventilated between Chile and Bolivia, and perhaps even be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a break with Chile. At that conference told me that he had news that the mediation of Peru would not be admitted. As I had not received instructions of any kind, I had to evade the answer he expected, again losing the opportunity that I had to get the alliance, without asking
  32. ^ See La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico:
    …[Peru] había instruido inicialmente a su ministro en Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, a ofrecer a la Argentina los territorios bolivianos situados entre los 24º y 27º de latitud en la costa oeste, a cambio del ingreso argentino en el conflicto contra el gobierno de Chile...Además, el canciller Montes de Oca creyó que el plan era "tan vago en la formulación que del mismo se hacía en la correspondencia de Uriburu que no merecía consideración"
    (Translation:
    …[Peru] had given instructions to his minister in Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, to offer to Argentina the Bolivian territories located between the 24°S and 27°S of the west coasts, in exchange of Argentine participation in the conflict against the government Chile...In addition, Foreign Minister Montes de Oca believed the plan was "so vague in the formulation, that did not deserve consideration according to Uriburu correspondence"
  33. ^ See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-081.htm "La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico":
    Paradójicamente, una semana después, el ministro de relaciones exteriores Montes de Oca proclamó oficialmente la neutralidad argentina…
  34. ^ The role of Jose Balmaceda in preserving Argentine neutrality
  35. ^ Crow, John. The Epic of Latin America. pp. 182-183. 
  36. ^ See EL COMIENZO DE LA INFERIORIDAD NAVAL PERUANA Y LA FALTA DE INICIATIVA PARA UNA GUERRA PREVENTIVA:
    Por eso fue que el Presidente Pardo no pudo dar cumplimiento a la ley que lo autorizaba para invertir hasta 4.000.000 de pesos en comprar dos blindados superiores a los chilenos, porque se vio precisado a gastar esos millones en conservar el orden público, es decir en combatir a Piérola
  37. ^ Actual number of casualties taken from http://www.soberaniachile.cl/norte3_6.html (in spanish)#sub11
  38. ^ Diego Barros Arana, Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880), vol. 2, page 98: [El gobierno chileno] Creía entonces que todavía era posible demostrar prácticamente al enemigo la imposibilidad en que se hallaba para defender el territorio peruano no ya contra un ejército numeroso sino contra pequeñas divisiones. Este fué el objeto de una espedicion que las quejas, los insultos i las lamentaciones de los documentos oficiales del Perú, i de los escritos de su prensa, han hecho famosa.
  39. ^ See also Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2475,
  40. ^ Diego Barros Arana quotes Johann Caspar Bluntschli: Bluntschili (Derecho internacional codificado) dice espresamente lo que sigue: Árt. 544. Cuando el enemigo ha tomado posesión efectiva de una parte del territorio, el gobierno del otro estado deja de ejercer alli el poder. Los habitantes del territorio ocupado están eximidos de todos los deberes i obligaciones respecto del gobierno anterior, i están obligados a obedecer a los jefes del ejército de ocupación.
  41. ^ According to "Chinese Migration into Latin America – Diaspora or Sojourns in Peru?" Chinese supported the Chilean army against their plantation owners http://www.history.appstate.edu/ConferencePapers/dorotheamartinpaper.pdf
  42. ^ See American Mediation: Peace Talks on the Lackawanna
  43. ^ See Charles de Varigny, "La Guerra del Pacifico", Imprenta Cervantes, Moneda 1170, Santiago de Chile, 1922, page XVIII:
    rendía incondicionalmente. La soldadesca [peruana] desmoralizada y no desarmada saqueaba la ciudad en la noche del 16, el incendio la alumbraba siniestramente y el espanto reinaba en toda ella.
  44. ^ Dan Collyns. "Chile returns looted Peru books". BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7082436.stm. Retrieved on 2007-11-10. 
  45. ^ [7] Chilean forces occupied the Peruvian capital of Lima the following January. Peruvian resistance continued for three more years, with U.S. encouragement.
  46. ^ http://www.history.appstate.edu/ConferencePapers/dorotheamartinpaper.pdf
  47. ^ See "The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan" by Richard W. Turk; Greenwood Press, 1987. 183 pgs. page 10
  48. ^ See Larrie D. Ferreiro 'Mahan and the "English Club” of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of The Influence of Sea Power upon History', The Journal of Military History - Volume 72, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 901-906
  49. ^ El dia del mar se recordara con mas que un tradicional desfile civico
  50. ^ Crow, The Epic of Latin America, p. 180
  51. ^ Foster, John B. & Clark, Brett. (2003). "Ecological Imperialism: The Curse of Capitalism" (accessed September 2, 2005). The Socialist Register 2004, p190-192. Also available in print from Merlin Press.
  52. ^ Dominguez, Jorge et al. 2003 Boundary Disputes in Latin America. United States Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace.

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