Transition to the New Order

Indonesia's transition to the "New Order" in the mid-1960s, ousted the country's first president, Sukarno after 22 years in the position. One of the most tumultuous periods in the country's modern history, it was the commencement of Suharto's 32-year presidency.

Described as the great dalang ("puppet master"), Sukarno's position depended on balancing the opposing and increasingly hostile forces of the army and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). By 1965, the PKI extensively penetrated all levels of government and gained influence at the expense of the army. The army itself had become divided between a PKI-allied left-wing, and a right-wing courted by Western countries.

On September 30, 1965 six of the military's most senior officers were executed in an attempted coup by the so-called 30 September Movement, a group from within the armed forces. Within a few hours, Major General Suharto, took control of the army and launched counteraction, and by the following day it was clear the poorly-coordinated coup had failed. Anti-communists, initially following the army's lead, went on a violent purge of suspected communists, killing an estimated half million people and destroying the PKI, which was blamed for the coup.

The politically weakened Sukarno was out-manoeuvred and forced to transfer key political and military powers to General Suharto, who had become head of the armed forces. In March 1967, the Indonesian parliament (MPRS) named General Suharto acting president. He was formally appointed president one year later. Sukarno lived under virtual house arrest until his death in 1970. In contrast to the stormy nationalism, revolutionary rhetoric, and economic failure that characterised the early 1960s under the left-leaning Sukarno, Suharto's pro-Western "New Order" stabilised the economy and created a strong central government. Widely praised for economic development, the "New Order" years were also condemned for its human rights record and corruption. According to Friend, "instead of filling [Indonesians'] stomachs, [Sukarno] tried to inflame their imaginations..." whereas Suharto went on to "...cultivate full bellies and empty spirits".

Prelude

Sukarno, President of Indonesia (1945-1968) in undated photo

Nationalist leader, Sukarno had declared Indonesian independence in 1945 and was appointed president. Following an internal national revolution and struggle against the former Dutch colonial masters, Sukarno had managed to hold together the disparate country, however, his administration had not been able to provide a viable economic system to lift its citizens out of severe poverty. He stressed socialist policies domestically and an avidly anti-imperialist international policy, underpinned by an authoritarian style of rule dependent upon his charismatic personality. These policies led him to create alliances with the Soviet bloc, People's Republic of China, and to pioneer the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement of post-colonial states at the Bandung Conference. It also created a domestic political alliance with the Communist Party of Indonesia.

Military split

These same policies, however, won Sukarno few friends and many enemies in the Western nations. These especially included the United States and United Kingdom, whose investors were increasingly angered by Sukarno's nationalization of mineral, agricultural, and energy assets. In need of Indonesian allies in its Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. This fostered a split in the military's ranks, with the United States and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction overlapping with the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Comintern of which it was a part.

When Sukarno rejected food aid from USAID leading to famine conditions, the right-wing military adopted regional command structure through which it could smuggle staple commodities to win the loyalty of the rural population. Several officers, including Suharto, would be caught in such schemes and would be reassigned. In an attempt to curtail the right-wing military's increasing power, the Communist Party of Indonesia and the left-wing military formed a number of peasant and other mass organizations.

Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation

Main article: Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation

In 1963, a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia was announced by the Sukarno regime. This further exacerbated the split between the left-wing and right-wing military factions, with the left-wing faction and the Communist Party taking part in guerrilla raids on the border with Malaysia, while the right-wing faction was largely absent from the conflict (whether by choice or orders of Sukarno is not clear).

The Confrontation further encouraged the West to seek ways to topple Sukarno, viewed as a growing threat to Southeast Asian regional stability (as with North Vietnam under the Domino Theory). The deepening of the armed conflict, coming close to all-out warfare by 1965, both increased popular dissatisfaction with the Sukarno regime and strengthened the hand of the right-wing generals whose forces were still close to the center of power in Jakarta.

"G30S" and retaliation

Main article: 30 September Movement

As Major General, Suharto (at right, foreground) attends funeral for assassinated generals 5 October 1965. (Photo by the Department of Information, Indonesia)

In the early hours of October 1, 1965, a company of soldiers from the Presidential Guard, the Tjakrabirawa, raided the homes of seven of the right-wing anti-Communist generals in the Indonesian capital Jakarta.

Three of the generals were killed immediately, among them Lieut-Gen Ahmad Yani, the Chief-of-Staff of the Army. Three other generals were captured. A seventh target, the Defense Minister and Chief-of-Staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Abdul Haris Nasution escaped; his daughter, however, was fatally wounded. Ahmad Yani's assistants were Maj-Gen S. Parman, Maj-Gen Suprapto, Maj-Gen MT Haryono, Brig-Gen Donald Isaac Panjaitan and Brig-Gen Sutoyo Siswomiharjo. The three captured generals and the bodies of the others were taken to a place known as Lubang Buaya ("Crocodile Hole") near the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base in Jakarta. The three generals and Nasution's adjutant, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean (who had claimed he was Nasution to divert the attention of the kidnapping soldiers, allowing Nasution to escape), were subsequently killed and all the bodies were thrown down a well.

The presidential guards also seized the RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia) and Telecommunications Building in central Jakarta. From the RRI building, they broadcast statements calling themselves the "30th of September Movement" (Indonesian: Gerakan 30 September, abbreviated to G30S or Gestapu) led by Lieut-Col Untung bin Syamsuri. They claimed to have arrested several generals belonging to a conspiracy, the "Council of Generals", that had plotted a military coup against the government of President Sukarno. They further alleged that this coup was to take place on "Army Day" (October 5) with the backing of CIA, and that the Council would then install themselves as a military junta.

Furthermore, the soldiers proclaimed the establishment of a "Revolutionary Council" consisting of various well-known military officers and civilian leaders that would be the highest authority in Indonesia. Additionally, they declared President Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet as invalid ("demisioner").

According to one chief conspirator Lieut-Col Latief, the Palace Guards had not attempted to kill or capture Major General Suharto, commander of KOSTRAD (Komando Strategi dan Cadangan TNI Angkatan Darat - the Army Strategic and Reserves Command), because he was considered as a Sukarno-loyalist and an apolitical general. Suharto, along with the surviving General Nasution, made the counter-allegation that the G30S was a rebellious movement that sought to replace President Sukarno's government with a Communist government. Upon hearing of the radio announcement, Suharto and Nasution began consolidating their forces, successfully gaining the loyalty of Jakarta Garrison Commander Maj-Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah and Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, the commander of army special forces RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat - Army's Para-Commando Regiment).

During the evening of October 1, RPKAD soldiers recaptured RRI and Telecommunications Building without any resistance as the rebel soldiers had retreated back to Halim Base. RPKAD forces proceeded to attack Halim Perdanakusumah AF Base on the morning of October 2, but was stopped by the rebel soldiers in a fierce gunbattle in which several fatalities were inflicted on both sides. A direct order from President Sukarno managed to secure the surrender of the rebel soldiers by noon, after which Suhartoist forces occupied the base. The next day, soldiers discovered the buried remains of the kidnapped generals. The corpses were exhumed, displayed to the press, and buried in a sombre ceremony on October 5, 1965.

Internal military power-struggle

After the assassinations of those generals, the highest ranking officer in the Indonesian military, and third highest in the overall chain-of-command, was Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a member of the right-wing camp. However, on October 5 Sukarno moved to promote Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudra, considered a Sukarno-loyalist, to Army Chief-of-Staff.

After the promotion, the New York Times reported that an unnamed Western "diplomatic report" alleged that Pranoto was a former member of the PKI. Pranoto's alleged communism, as well as his timely promotion, led them to promote the view that the PKI and Sukarno conspired to assassinate the generals to consolidate their grip on power.

In the aftermath of the assassinations, however, Major Gen. Suharto and his KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserves) units were closest to Jakarta. By default, Suharto became the field general in charge of prosecution of the G30S. Later, at the insistence of Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Pranoto was removed and Suharto was promoted to Army Chief-of-Staff on October 14, 1965.

Retaliatory campaign

The installation of Suharto as Army Chief-of-Staff established the right-wing faction's dominance of the Indonesian Army's command. In addition to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), this faction was also hostile toward Sukarno-loyalists, and the Chinese (both Chinese Indonesians as well as expatriates from the People's Republic of China).

On October 18, a declaration was read over the army-controlled radio stations, banning the Communist Party of Indonesia. The ban included the party itself, and its youth and women's wings, peasant associations, intellectual and student groups, and the SOBSI union. At the time, it was not clear whether this ban applied only to Jakarta (by then controlled by the Army), or the whole Republic of Indonesia. However, the ban was soon used as a pretext for the Indonesian Army to go throughout the country carrying out extrajudicial punishments, including mass arrest and summary executions, against suspected leftists and Sukarno loyalists.

The Army, acting on orders by Suharto and supervised by Nasution, began a campaign of agitation and incitement to violence among Indonesian civilians aimed at the Communist community and toward President Sukarno himself. The regime was quickly destabilised, with the Army the only force left to maintain order.

The Toppling of Sukarno

Violence and Massacres

At the funeral of Nasution's daughter Irma, Navy commander Admiral Martadinata gave Muslim leaders the signal to attack Communists. The next morning the PKI head office was ransacked and burned to the ground while firefighters stood idly by. They then marched demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party. The homes of senior party figures, including PKI chairman D.N. Aidit and Lukman and Nyoto were also torched. As Communist China was also blamed for involvement, anti-Chinese feeling grew. In the Sumatran city of Medan, the Chinese consulate was attacked, and there were anti-ethnic Chinese riots.

As the violence spread, Sukarno issued orders to try and stop it, but he was ignored. He also refused to blame the PKI for the coup, yet alone ban it as the Army demanded. However, although Suharto and Nasution were increasingly suspicious about Sukarno's role in the affair, the Army was reluctant to confront the president directly because of his still widespread popularity.

Demonstrations

In October 1965, students in Jakarta formed the Indonesian Students Action Front (KAMI), which called for the banning of the PKI . It was soon joined by a host of similar organizations made up of high school students, workers, artists and laborers and the like. Other targets for the demonstrators were rising prices and government inefficiency. They also demonstrated against Subandrio, the foreign minister and head of the BPI intelligence agency and the number two man in the government.

On 10 January 1966, demonstrators, including KAMI, demonstrated in front of the Provisional legislature and announced what became known as the Three Demands of the People (Tritura):

• Dissolution of the PKI
• The expulsion from the cabinet of G30S/PKI elements
• Lower prices and economic improvements

In February 1966, as anti-communist demonstrations continued, Sukarno tried to placate Suharto by promoting him. On February 21, he tried to regain the initiative by announcing a new cabinet, which included former Air Force chief Omar Dhani, who had issued a statement on October 1 1965 initially supporting the coup. More provocatively still, Sukarno fired General Nasution from his cabinet post. The new cabinet immediately became known as the Gespatu cabinet, after the acronym coined by the military for the 30 September Movement.

Two days after the announcement, a huge crowd attempted to storm the presidential palace. The next day, while the new cabinet was being inaugurated, soldiers from the presidential guard opened fire on a crowd in front of the palace, killing student protester Arif Rachman Hakim, who was turned into a martyr and given a hero's funeral the following day.

On 8 March 1966, students managed to ransack the foreign ministry, and held it for five hours. They daubed slogans , one accusing Subandrio of murdering the generals, and drew graffiti showing Subandrio as a Pekingese dog (a reference to his perceived closeness to communist China) or hanging from gallows.

Sukarno then planned a three-day series of meetings to restore his authority. The first, on 10 March, involved the leaders of political parties. He managed to persuade them to sign a declaration warning against the undermining of presidential authority by student demonstrations. The second stage was a cabinet meeting planned for 11 March. However, as this meeting was underway, word reached Sukarno that unidentified troops were surrounding the palace. Sukarno left the palace in haste for Bogor, where later that night, he signed the Supersemar document transferring authority to restore order to Major General Suharto. Suharto acted quickly. One 12 March he banned the PKI. The same day, there was a "show of force" by the Army in the streets of Jakarta, which was watched by cheering crowds. On 18 March, Subandrio and 14 other ministers were arrested., including third deputy prime minister Chairul Saleh. That night, the radio announced that the ministers were in "protective custody".

Constitutional Moves

General Suharto is officially sworn in as Indonesia's second president on 27 March 1968 (Photo by the Department of Information, Indonesia)

On 27 March, the new cabinet lineup, agreed between Suharto and Sukarno, was announced. It included the key figures of Suharto himself as interim deputy prime minister for security and defense affairs, tasked with preventing the resurgence of communism, the Sultan of Yogyakarta Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX as deputy prime minister for economic, financial and development affairs, tasked with solving the nation's economic problems and Adam Malik as deputy prime minister for social and political affairs, whose job it would be to manage foreign policy .

On 24 April 1966, Suharto gave a speech to members of the Indonesian National Party in which he spoke of the "three deviations" that would have to be corrected by the youth of the country in cooperation with the Armed Forces. These were:

• The extreme-left radicalism of the Indonesian Communist Party and its efforts to impose a class struggle on the Indonesian people;
• Political opportunism motivated by personal gain led and exploited by the "puppetmasters" of the Indonesian Central Intelligence Board (BPI), at the time led by Sukarno ally Subandrio;
• Economic adventurism, resulting in the deliberate creation of economic chaos.

The new regime turned away from China and began moves to end the "Confrontation" with Malaysia, in defiance of Sukarno's wishes.

Meanwhile, Suharto and his allies continued to purge state institutions of Sukarno loyalists. The Tjakrabirawa palace guard was disbanded, and following further student demonstrations in front of the legislature building on 2 May, the leadership of the Mutual Cooperation House of Representatives (DPR-GR) was replaced and Sukarnoist and pro-communist members were suspended from the DPR-GR and the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), the supreme lawmaking body. Pro-Suharto replacements were appointed.

A session of the MPRS was scheduled to open 12 May, but eventually began on 20 June and continued until 5 July. One of its first actions was to appoint General Nasution as chairman. It then set about dismantling the apparatus Sukarno had built around himself. It passed several decrees, one of which was the ratification of the Supersemar, thus making revocation of it almost impossible. It also ratified the banning of the PKI and the teaching of Marxist ideology, instructed Suharto to form a new cabinet, called on Sukarno to provide an explanation for the economic and political situation in the nation and stripped him of the title "president for life". It also passed a decree stating that if the president was unable to carry out his duties, the holder of the Supersemar would assume the presidency.

The new cabinet, announced by Sukarno on 20 June, was led by a five-man presidium headed by Suharto, and including Malik and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. It saw the dismissal of more Sukarno loyalists.

On 11 August, a peace treaty was signed, formerly ending the Konfrontasi. Indonesian announced it would rejoin the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. It released political prisoners and paid compensation to the British and American governments for the damage caused to their diplomatic buildings during the demonstrations of the Sukarno era.

On 17 August, in his annual independence day speech, Sukarno claimed that Indonesian was not about to recognize Malaysia nor rejoin the UN. He also stated that he had not transferred power to Suharto. This provoked an angry reaction in the form of demonstrations, and Indonesian did indeed rejoin the UN in September, participating in the General Assembly on 28 September. Meanwhile, criticism from demonstrators became increasingly vociferous and personal, and there were calls for him to be out on trial.

On 10 January 1967, Sukarno wrote to the MPRS, enclosing a document known as Nawaksara giving his version of the events surrounding the 30 September Movement. In it, he said the kidnappings and murders of the generals had been a "complete surprise" to him, and that he alone was not responsible for the nation's moral and economic problems. This led to demonstrators calling for Sukarno to be hanged

The MPRS leadership met on 21 January and concluded that Sukarno had failed to fulfill his constitutional obligations. In a resolution passed on 9 February, the DPR-GR rejected the Nawaksara and asked the MPRS to convene a special session.

On 12 March 1967, the special session began. After heated debates, it agreed to strip Sukarno of his power. On 12 March, Suharto was appointed acting president. Sukarno went into de faco house arrest in Bogor. A year later, on 27 March 1968, another session of the MPRS appointed Suharto the second president of Indonesia.

General Nasution was believed to have launched his own bid for power on December 16, 1965, when he won appointment to the Supreme Operations Command, and gained a grip over the traditionally civilian-held portion of the military hierarchy. It was reported that Nasution would have preferred forming a military junta to replace Sukarno. (New York Times, December 16, 1965.)

Consequences

See also: New Order (Indonesia)

Massacres

Beginning in later October 1965, the Indonesian army and its civilian allies (especially Muslim militia groups) began to kill members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In most cases the killings were one-sided. In most cases the authorities arrested party members and members and leaders of affiliated organizations and held them in detention for some time before sending them out to be killed over subsequent weeks and months. In some cases, the army and militias organized raids on suspected communist villages or hamlets, slaughtering all or most of the inhabitants. The estimates of the death toll of the conflict range from over 100,000 to 3 million, but most scholars accept a figure of around 500,000.

Political imprisonment

It is known that with Suharto's rise, surviving members of the Communist Party of Indonesia were branded tapol (short for tahanan politik or "political detainee"). During Suharto's reign, tapol were often given harsh prison sentences without trial, and their property was either seized or destroyed. Spouses, children, and relatives of tapol were subjected to guilt by association. To be branded a tapol meant a permanent outcaste status in Indonesian society, even after completion of a sentence; tapol have sued in modern times for restitution of their right to the franchise and for compensation for their losses.

Possible prison sentences included internal exile to penal colonies on desolate islands within the Indonesian archipelago. These included Buru island in the Moluccas. Among its more famous prisoners included author and PEN Freedom to Write winner Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who was imprisoned there for alleged membership in a Communist Party literary group, LEKRA. In a book of memoirs (The Mute's Soliloquy), Pramoedya made detailed allegations of forced labour, starvation, torture and other abuses within the colony. (Inside Indonesia, April-June 1999)

Anti-Chinese laws

See also: Chinese Indonesian and Anti-Chinese legislation in Indonesia

While resentment toward Chinese Indonesians by indigenous Indonesians-descended peoples of the archipelago dated back to the Dutch East Indies era, the New Order instigated anti-Chinese legislation following the quashing of the Communists. Stereotypes of the Chinese as disproportionately affluent and greedy were common throughout the time (both in Indonesia as well as Malaysia), but with the anti-Communist hysteria, the association of the Chinese Indonesians with the People's Republic of China caused them to also be viewed as a communist fifth column.

Indonesia's hitherto friendly diplomatic relations with mainland China were severed, and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta burnt down by a mob. New legislation included the banning of Chinese language signs on shops and other buildings, and the closure of Chinese language schools, adoption of "Indonesian" sounding names, and limits on Buddhist temple construction.

Military rule

The liquidation and banning of the Communist Party eliminated one of the largest political parties in Indonesia. It had placed third in a 1955 election. It was also among the largest Communist Parties in the Comintern, at an estimated 3 million members. Along with the subsequent efforts by Suharto to wrest power from Sukarno by purging loyalists from the parliament, civilian government in Indonesia was effectively put to an end by the coup countermeasures.

In the place of civilian rule, a new system of military rule took hold, based on set-aside seats in the Parliament as well as the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine of the military, in taking the roles of both soldiers and administrators. The political parties not banned outright were consolidated into a single party, the Party of the Functional Groups (Indonesian: Partai Golongan Karya), more commonly known as Golkar. Though Suharto would later allow for the formation of two non-Golkar parties, these were kept weak during his regime.

Rise of Islamism

The purging of two secularist parties, the Nationalists and the Communists, had a notable side effect of giving greater space for the development of Islamism in Indonesia. This included liberal, conservative, and extremist groups practicing Islam in Indonesia. It widely believed by observers of Indonesian history and politics that Suharto's forces whipped up anti-Communist sentiment in part by exploiting conservative Muslims' fears of "godless" Communism to instigate a jihad against the leftists.

As for more mainstream groups, conservative Islamic groups (called the "Central Axis") became a prop of the regime for some time after the change of regime. Liberal Islamic groups, on the other hand, are believed to have defected during the wave of protests before the Indonesian Revolution of 1998.

Improved ties with the West

The change in regime from Sukarno to Suharto, though brutal, brought a shift in policy that allowed USAID and other relief agencies to operate within the country. Suharto would open Indonesia's economy by divesting state owned companies, and Western nations in particular were encouraged to invest and take control of many of the mining and construction interests in Indonesia. The result was stabilisation of the economy and the alleviation of absolute poverty and famine conditions that had resulted from shortfalls in the rice supply and Sukarno's reluctance to take Western aid.

As a result of his elimination of the communists, Suharto would come to be seen as a pro-Western and anti-Communist strongman regime, similar to that of Augusto Pinochet. An ongoing military and diplomatic relationship between the Indonesia and the Western powers was cemented, leading to American, British, and Australian arms sales and training of military personnel.

Revelations and mysteries

Four decades later, questions remain about the veracity of accounts of the events both leading up to and during the 30 September Movement provided by the Western governments and by Suharto. The ousting of the Suharto regime and beginning of the Reformation period in Indonesia and the end of the Cold War for the Western governments has allowed greater freedom of information, leading to a significant process of historical revisionism as well as the formation of conspiracy theories around the events of September 1965. Still, mysteries remain over the time period.

Was PKI actually involved in the G30S?

There are several theories about the involvement of the PKI in the G30S movement. They are as follows:

• The culprit of the G30S was the PKI

The PKI launced a coup d'etat against the Indonesian Army and the government to launch a communist government in Indonesia.

• The G30S was an army Internal Problem

An army clique led by Suharto launched the coup precisely by infiltrating the PKI

• The G30S was done by the CIA

The CIA worked together with an army clique to destroy the PKI. The aim of CIA in Indonesia at that time was clearly to destroy communism in Southeast Asia.

• The G30S was a Meeting Point between American and British Interests

The interests of Britain which wanted Sukarno's confrontation against Malaysia to end with him losing power and the USA's interest of ridding the world of communism sparked the G30S.

• Sukarno was the Mastermind of the G30S

One of the most controversial theories of the G30S, Sukarno wanted to make the top army officials 'vanish' because they threatened his power. The PKI was also pulled into the mess because of its closeness with Sukarno.

• The Chaos Theory

Nobody single person or organization was behind the G30S. There was no grand scenario and it was ultimately affected by field operations. The G30S was a mix of Western nations, the doings of the PKI's leaders and the army's corrupt cliques.

U.S. assistance to Suharto

Often cited by the left as evidence of a broader, international plot to topple Sukarno, a number of revelations were made by former employees of U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency regarding American actions around the time of the coup attempt.

Beginning in 1990, American diplomats divulged to the Washington Post and other media outlets that they had compiled lists of Indonesian "communist operatives" had turned over as many as 5,000 names to military and intelligence loyal to Suharto. American journalist Kathy Kadane revealed the extent of the secret American support of some of the massacres of 1965-66 that allowed Suharto to seize the Presidency. She interviewed many former US officials and CIA members, who spoke of compiled lists of PKI operatives, which the Americans ticked off as the victims were killed or captured. They worked closely with the British who were keen to protect their interests in Malaysia. Sir Andrew Gilchrist cabled the Foreign Office in London saying: "…a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change". The PKI had won some popular support from the poor, it was this popularity, rather than any armed insurgency that alarmed the American government. Like Vietnam in the North, Indonesia might 'go communist'. (San Francisco Examiner May 20, 1990)

In 2001, the National Security Archive at George Washington University obtained several internal documents of the U.S. Department of State, bolstering the ambassadors' claims of American collaboration with Suharto. However, the National Security Archive claims that communications between Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have been heavily redacted. A U.S. State Department cable indicates US government support for the military.

References

General references

• "Army in Jakarta Imposes a Ban on Communists." New York Times. 19 October 1965
• Blum, William. Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, Black Rose, 1998, pp. 193-198 ISBN 1-56751-052-3
• "CIA Stalling State Department Histories". The National Security Archive. Retrieved May 23. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• Cribb, Robert, 'Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966', Journal of Genocide Research 3 no. 2 (June 2001), pp. 219-239
• Easter, David. '"Keep the Indonesian pot boiling': western covert intervention in Indonesia, October 1965-March 1966', Cold War History, Vol 5, No 1, February 2005.
• Feith, Herbert & Castles, Lance (Editors). Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, Cornell University Press. ISBN 8014-0531-9
• Hughes, John (2002), The End of Sukarno – A Coup that Misfired: A Purge that Ran Wild, Archipelago Press, ISBN 981 4068 65 9
• "Jakarta Cabinet Faces Challenge." New York Times 16 December 1965
• "Jakarta Leftist Out As Army Chief." New York Times 15 October 1965
• Ricklefs, M.C. (1982) A History of Modern Indonesia", MacMillan. ISBN 0-333-24380-3
• Roosa, John (2007) Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto's Coup D'Etat in Indonesia, University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-9-299-22034-1
• Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia (1975) 30 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka: Jilid 3 (1965-1973) (30 Years of Indonesian Independence: Volume 3 (1965-1973)
• Simanjuntak, P.H.H (2003) Kabinet-Kabinet Republik Indonesia: Dari Awal Kemerdekaan Sampai Reformasi (Cabinets of the Republic of Indonesia: From the Start of Independence to the Reform era, Penerbit Djambatan, Jakarta, ISBN 979-428-499-8
• Lashmar, Paul; Oliver, James (1999). Britain's Secret Propaganda War. Sutton Pub Ltd. ISBN 0-7509-1668-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• "Sukarno Removes His Defense Chief" New York Times. 22 February, 1966
• "Sukarno Seen Behind Coup" New York Times. 6 October 1965
• "Tapol Troubles: When Will They End?". Inside Indonesia. April–June 1999.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
• Toer, Pramoedya Ananta (2000). The Mute's Soliloquy : A Memoir. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-028904-6.

External links

• Manai Sophiaan, Kehormatan bagi yang berhak - Bung Karno tidak terlibat G30S/PKI (Honour to one who deserves it: Sukarno was not involved in the G30S/PKI), Jakarta, 1994
• Oei Tjoe Tat, 1995, Memoar Oei Tjoe Tat: Pembantu Presiden Soekarno(The memoir of Oei Tjoe Tat, assistant to President Sukarno), Hasta Mitra, ISBN 979-8659-0-31 (banned in Indonesia)
• Shadow Play - Website accompanying a 2002 PBS documentary on Indonesia, with emphasis on the Suharto-era and the transition from New Order to Reformation.
• Tiger Tales: Indonesia - Website accompanying a 2002 BBC World Service radio documentary on Indonesia, focusing on early Suharto era. Features interviews with Indonesian generals and victims of the regime. Program is available in streaming RealAudio format.
• Indonesia 1965 -- The Coup That Backfired - Newly released (June 2007), extensive CIA document about the events of 1965, in PDF format. Originally written in 1968.
• [2] Roosa and Nevins on the mass killings