Rashidun army: Difference between revisions
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== Generals of Rashidun Caliphate == |
== Generals of Rashidun Caliphate == |
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* [[Khalid ibn Walid]] |
* [[Khalid ibn Walid]] |
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* [[Amr ibn al-Aas]] |
* [[Amr ibn al-Aas]] |
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* [[Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas]] |
* [[Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas]] |
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* [[Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan]] |
* [[Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan]] |
Revision as of 16:28, 19 September 2007
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The Rashidun Caliphate Army or Rashidun army was the primary military body of the Islamic Arab Rashidun Caliphate's armed forces during the Muslim conquests of the 7th century, serving alongside the Rashidun Navy. The Rashidun army maintained a level of discipline, strategic prowess, and organization.
In its time, the Rashidun army was one of the most powerful and effective military forces in the world. The size of the Rashidun army was initially 13,000 troops in 632, but as the Caliphate expanded, the army gradually grew to 100,000 troops by 657. The two most successful generals of the Rashidun army were Khalid ibn al-Walid and 'Amr ibn al-'As.
Infantry
Rashidun army relied heavily on their infantry. On the attack Muslim infantry would weaken the enemy with arrow volleys, followed by a spear/sword charge, pining the enemy in place for a cavalry attack on the flanks and rear. Defensively the Muslim spearman would close ranks, forming a protective wall for archers to continue their fire.[1]
Cavalry
Rashidun caliphate army fell into the two basic categories of infantry and light cavalry. The Rashidun light cavalry was armed with lance and sword, his main role being the attack of the enemy flanks and rear. Armor was relatively light.
Weaponry
Reconstructing the military equipment of early Muslim armies is problematic. Compared with Roman armies—or, indeed, later mediaeval Muslim armies—the range of visual representation is very small, often imprecise and difficult to date. Physically very little material evidence has survived and again, much of it is difficult to date.[2] The soldiers use to wear Iron and bronze segmented helmet that comes from Iraq and was of central Asian type. The standard form of protective body armour was chain mail There are also references to the practice of wearing two coats of mail (dir’ayn), the under one being shorter or even made of fabric or leather. hauberks and large wooden or wickerwork shields were used as a protection in combat[3]. The soldiers were usually equipped with Sword that was hanged in baldric. They also possessed spears and the daggers.[4]
Siege weaponry
Catapults were used extensively in siege operations. Under Caliph Umar another machine employed in siege operations was Dababah. It was a wooden tower which moved on wheels and consisted of several storys. The tower was wheeled up to the foot of the fort under siege, and then the walls were pierced. Archers guarded the ram and the soldiers who use to managed it. [5]
Organization of army as a state department
Caliph Umar was the first Muslim ruler to organize the army as a State Department. This reform was introduced in 637 A.D. A beginning was made with the Quraish and the Ansars and the system was gradually extended to the whole of Arabia and to Muslims of conquered lands. A register of all adults who could be called to war was prepared, and a scale of salaries was fixed. All men registered were liable to military service. They were divided into two categories, namely:
- Those who formed the regular standing army; and
- Those that lived in their homes, but were liable to be called to the colors whenever needed.
The pay was paid in the beginning of the month of Muharram. The allowances were paid during the harvesting season. The armies of the Caliphs were mostly paid in cash salaries. In contrast to many post-Roman polities in Europe, grants of land, or of rights to collect taxes directly from the payers, were of only minor importance. A major consequence of this was that the army directly depended on the state for its subsistence which, in turn, meant that the military had to control the state apparatus.[6] Promotions in the army were made on the strength of the length of service or exceptional merit. Officer ship was an appointment and not a rank. Officers were appointed to command for the battle or the campaign; and once the operation was concluded, they could well find themselves in the ranks again.
Leave of absence was given to army men at regular intervals. The troops stationed at far off places were given leave after four months. Each army corps was accompanied by an officer of the treasury, an Accountant, aQadi, and a number of interpreters besides a number of Physicians and Surgeons. Expeditions were undertaken according to seasons. Expeditions in cold countries were undertaken during the summer, and in hot countries in winter. In spring the troops were generally sent to lands which had a salubrious climate and a good pasturage. According to instructions every soldier was required to keep with him several things of personal need. These included among other things needles, cotton, twine, scissors, and a feeding-bag Special instructions issued by Caliph Umar laying stress on the teaching of four things to the soldiers, namely: Horse racing; archery; walking barefoot, and swimming.
Rashidun Caliphate Army Strength
Year | Strength |
---|---|
632 | 13,000 |
633 | 18,000 |
634 | 41,000 |
635 | 37,000 |
636 | 70,000 |
640 | 74,000 |
648 | 80,000 |
652 | 120,000 |
657 | 100,000 |
661 | 80,000 |
Movement
When the army was on the march, it always halted on Fridays. When on march, the day's march was never allowed to be so long as to tire out the troops. The stages were selected with reference to the availability of water and other provisions.
One remarkable feature of the movement of this great army was that it was independent of lines of communication. Behind it stretched no line of supply, since it had no logistical base. This army could not be cut off from its supplies, for it had no supply depots, Under the Army Department, there was a separate Commissariat Department. All the food stores were collected at one place and trotted along with the army. It needed no roads for its movement, for it had no wagons and everything was carried on camels. Thus this army could go anywhere and traverse any terrain so long as there was a path over which men and animals could move. This ease of movement gave the Muslims a tremendous edge on the Romans and Persians in mobility and speed.
When on march, this army moved like a caravan and gave the impression of an undrilled horde; from the point of view of military security it was virtually invulnerable. The advance was led by a advance guard consisting of a regiment or more. Then came the main body of the army, and this was followed by the women and children and the baggage loaded on camels. At the end of the column moved the rear guard. On long marches the horses were led; but if there was any danger of enemy interference on the march, the horses were mounted, and the cavalry thus formed would act either as the advance guard or the rearguard or move wide on a flank, depending on the direction from which the greatest danger threatened. In case of need, the entire army could vanish in an hour or so and be safe at a distance beyond terrain which no other large army could traverse.
When on march the army was divided into:
- Maqaddamah (مقدمة) or The vanguard
- Qalb (قلب) or The center
- Al-khalf (الخلف) or The rear
- Al-moukhir (المؤخرة) or The rearguard
During march most of the men mounted camels, the rest on horses, this made their movement fast as compared to their enemies the Persians and the Romans.
Divisions in battle
The army was organized on the decimal system.[7]
On the battlefield the army was divided into sections. These sections were:
- Qalb (قلب) or The center
- Maimanah (ميمنه) or The right wing
- Maisarah (ميسرة) or The left wing
Each section was under a command of a commander. Every tribal unit had its leader called Arifs. In such units There were commanders of 10, 100 and 1,000 men, the latter corresponding to regiments. The grouping of regiments to form larger forces was flexible, varying with the situation. Arifs were grouped and each group was under a Commander called Amir-ul-Ashar and Amir-ul-Ashars were under the command of a section commander, who were under the command of the commander in chief, Amir-ul-jaish.
Other components of the army were:
- Rijal (الرجال) or the Infantry
- Farsan (فرسان) or the cavalry
- Ramat (الرامي) or the Archers
- Talaiah (طليعة) or patrols to keep watch over the movements of the enemy
- Rukban (ركبان) or the Camel corps
- Nahab al-Muon (نهب المؤن) or Foraging parties
Intelligence and espionage
It was one of the most highly developed department of the army which proved helping in most of the campaigns. The espionage (جاسوسية) and intelligence services were first organised by a brillent Muslim general Khalid ibn Walid during is campaign to Iraq[8]. Later when he was transferred to Syrian front he organized the espionage department there as well[9], later it became a essential part of an army and became a separate department. who procured intelligence about the movements and activities of the enemy, this unit comprises the local inhabitants of the conquered land, it was very well organized and liberal pays were given to the spys for there work. Reporters were attached to every unit, and they kept the Caliph fully informed about everything pertaining to the army.
Jund
Military centers known as junds (جند) were first established by Caliph Umar, For the purpose of army administration. These Centers were set up at Madinah, Kufa, Basra, Mosul, Fustat, Damascus, Jordan and Palestine. At these centers and barracks were built for the residence of troops. Big stables were constructed where four thousand horses fully equipped were kept ready for service at short notice at every Military Center. Reinforcements were sent to the troops from these junds. All records pertaining to the army were kept at Military Centers. Food stores of the commissariat were kept at these places and there from sent to other places. In addition to Military Centers, cantonments were established in big towns and places of strategic importance. Much thought was given to climate and sanitation in the lay out of cantonments and the construction of barracks. Special provisions were made for roads and streets in cantonments, and Caliph Umar issued instructions prescribing the width of roads and streets.
Tactics
The basic strategy of early Muslim armies set out to conquere the foreign land was to exploit every possible drawback of the enemy army in order to achieve victory with minimum losses. As Rashidun army was quality wise and strength wise substandard the Sassanid Persian army and Byzantine army. Khalid ibn Walid, the first general of Rashidun Caliphate to make conquest in foreign land and to triger the whole scale invasion of the two most powerful empires, during his campaign against the Sassanid Persian Empire(Iraq 633 - 634)and Byzantine Empire (Syria 634 - 638) developed this brilliant tactics, that he used effectively against both the Sassanid army and Byzantine army. The main drawback of the armies of Sassanid Persian Empire and Eastern Roman Empire was the lack of mobolity.[10] Khalid ibn Walid decided to use mobility of his own army to exploit its lack in the Sassanid army and Byzantine army, later the same strategy was abopted by all other Muslim generals through out the period of military expansion. Though only part of Rashidun army was actual cavalry, but the entire army was camel mounted for movement and could strike at the decisive place and the decisive time as its commander wished. It could move fast enough to fight a battle at A, and then be present at B for another battle before the enemy could react. Along side with the mobility, an other main instrument that Khalid ibn Walid in early classic period of conquest and other Muslim generals in later period of the conquest used to make there maneuver successful was the fine fighting quality of the Muslim soldiers, a bulk of them were the boduien and were excellent in swordmen ship.
Muslims light cavalry during the later years of Islamic conquest of Levant became the most powerful section of army. The best use of this lightly armed fast moving cavalry revealed at Battle of Yarmouk (636 A.D) in which Khalid ibn Walid, knowing the importance and ability of his cavalry, used them to turn the tables at every critical instance of the battle with there ability to engage and dis-engage and turn back and attack again from the flank or rear, this resulted in shattering defeat of Byzantine army. A strong cavalry regiment was made by Khalid ibn Walid which includes the best of the Rashidun soldiers, the veterans of campaign of Iraq and Syria, early Muslim historians have given it the name Mutaharrik tulaiha( متحرك طليعة ), or the Mobile guard. This was used as an advance guard and a strong striking force to route the opposing armies with its greater ability of mobility that give it an upper hand for maneuvering against any Byzantine army. With this mobile striking force the conquest of Syria was made easy.[11]
Another remarkable strategy developed by Khalid and later followed by others generals, was of not moving far from the desert so long as there were opposing forces within striking distance of its rear and its route to the desert. To fight the battles close to the desert, with there routes to the desert open in case they would suffer a defeat, the desert was behind them and could provide safe route to retreat in possible defeat.[12] The desert was not only a haven of security into which the Sassanid army and Byzantine army would not venture but also a region of free, fast movement in which there camel mounted troops could move easily and rapidly to any objective that they chose. Following this same strategy during the conquest of Iraq and conquest of Syria, Khalid ibn Walid leading the Rashidun army did not enter deep into Iraq and Syria until the hostile Army had lost its ability to threaten his routes to the desert. Another possible advantage of always keeping desert at the rear, was of communication with the Caliph at Madinah and making it easy for him to sent messangers and reinforcement.
Once the power of the two empires i.e Eastern Roman empire and Sassanid Persian Empire was shattered, the later Rashidun generals were free to use any strategy and tactics to over power the opposing forces, mainly they too exploit the mobility of there troops to prevent the concentration of troops in large number and to face a heavily outnumbered army.[13]
The Caliph Abu Bakr's way was to give his generals their mission, the geographical area in which that mission would be carried out, and the resources that, could be made available for that purpose. He would then leave it to his generals to accomplish their mission in whatever manner they chose, on the other hand Caliph Umar in later part of his Caliphate use to direct his generals as to where they would stay and when to move to the next target and who will be commanding the left and right wing of the army in the particular battle, this made the pase of conquest comparatively slower but provided a well organised campaigns. Caliph Uthman used the same method as of Abu Bakr, he woulod give missions to his generals and then leave it to them how they accomplish it. Caliph Ali also followed the same method.
Generals of Rashidun Caliphate
- Khalid ibn Walid
- Amr ibn al-Aas
- Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah
- Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas
- Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan
- Shurhabil ibn Hasana
- Qa'qa ibn Amr
- Zirrar ibn Azwar
- Asim ibn Amr
- Abdullah ibn Aamir
See also
- Rashidun caliphs
- Rashidun Caliphate
- Mobile guard
- Muslim conquests
- Fall of Sassanids
- Byzantine-Arab Wars
- Muslim conquest of Syria
- Muslim conquest of Egypt
- Islamic conquest of Persia
- Islamic conquest of Afghanistan
- Arab conquest of Armenia
- Muslim conquest in the Indian subcontinent
- Rashidun Caliphate Conquest of North Africa
References
- ^ http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/muslimwars/articles/yarmuk.aspx
- ^ The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State. Contributors: Hugh Kennedy - author. Publisher: Routledge. Place of Publication: London. Publication Year: 2001. Page Number:168
- ^ http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/102802943
- ^ Augus Mcbride
- ^ http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/102802958
- ^ The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State. Contributors: Hugh Kennedy - author. Publisher: Routledge. Place of Publication: London. Publication Year: 2001. Page Number:59
- ^ Tabari: Vol. 3, p. 8
- ^ Ibn Kathir, Al-Bidayah wan-Nihayah, Dar Abi Hayyan, Cairo, 1st ed. 1416/1996, Vol. 6 P. 425.
- ^ al-Waqdi Fatuh-al-sham page 61
- ^ A. I. Akram (1970). The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed, His Life and Campaigns. National Publishing House, Rawalpindi. ISBN 0-7101-0104-X.
- ^ Annals of the Early Caliphate By William Muir
- ^ Tabari: Vol: 2, page no: 560.
- ^ A. I. Akram (1970). The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed, His Life and Campaigns. National Publishing House, Rawalpindi. ISBN 0-7101-0104-X.