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There exists evidence that German resistance forces, highly placed anti-Nazi government officials, were working with British intelligence, [[M16]] to eliminate Hitler and negotiate a peace with the Allies. One such man was Admiral [[Wilhelm Canaris]], head of German intelligence, the ''[[Abwehr]].'' His persistent overtures for support from the United States were ignored by Franklin Roosevelt. <ref>www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org, "''Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 1887-1945''," Canaris worked with Roosevelt’s Balkan representative in Instanbal, former Pennsylvania governor, George H. Earle who communicated with Roosevelt through diplomat pouch; retrieved August 28, 2012</ref> <ref>www.historylearningsite.co.uk, retrieved August 28, 2012</ref>
There exists evidence that German resistance forces, highly placed anti-Nazi government officials, were working with British intelligence, [[M16]] to eliminate Hitler and negotiate a peace with the Allies. One such man was Admiral [[Wilhelm Canaris]], head of German intelligence, the ''[[Abwehr]].'' His persistent overtures for support from the United States were ignored by Franklin Roosevelt. <ref>www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org, "''Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 1887-1945''," Canaris worked with Roosevelt’s Balkan representative in Instanbal, former Pennsylvania governor, George H. Earle who communicated with Roosevelt through diplomat pouch; retrieved August 28, 2012</ref> <ref>www.historylearningsite.co.uk, retrieved August 28, 2012</ref>


==Topics of discussion and agreements==
==Other discussions==
==== European invasion ====
⚫
The conference called for recognition of joint leadership of the [[Free French forces]] by [[Charles de Gaulle|de Gaulle]] and [[Henri Giraud]]. Also decided during the Casablanca Conference was that there would be no "cross channel invasion" in 1943. Instead of invading Europe across the English Channel, an [[Operation Husky|invasion into Sicily]] and then Italy would take place.
Roosevelt, under the advisement of General [[George Catlett Marshall]], US Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral [[Ernest King]], Chief of Naval Operations, lobbied for a cross channel invasion of Europe. Churchill felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on [[Sicily]] moving in through Italy. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, with Churchill pledging more troops and resources to the Pacific and [[Burma]] to reinforce positions held by [[Chiang Kai-Shek]] against the Japanese. America would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing crafts. <ref>nytimes.com. Middleton, Drew, ''On This Day'', "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy,” January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012</ref>
⚫
During the Conference, Roosevelt spoke with the French resident general at Rabat, Morocco, about postwar independence and Jewish immigrants in North Africa. Roosevelt proposed that:


⚫
The conference called for recognition of joint leadership of the [[Free French forces]] by [[Charles de Gaulle|de Gaulle]] and [[Henri Giraud]]. Also decided during the Casablanca Conference was that there would be no "cross channel invasion" in 1943. Instead of invading Europe across the English Channel, an [[Operation Husky|invasion into Sicily]] and then Italy would take place.
⚫
"[t]he number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population.... [T]his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over 50 percent of the lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, college professors, etc., in Germany were Jews."<ref>Manfred Jonas, Harold D. Langley, and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Correspondence, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Saturday Review Press, 1975, p. 308. This quote is taken from a conversation memorandum prepared by Captain John L. McCrae, Roosevelt's naval aide.</ref><ref>http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/tguide/index.html</ref> This harkened back to a mindset communicated in earlier years to Roosevelt by the American ambassador to Germany, [[William Dodd]] (1933-1937). Dodd had appraised Germany’s repression of Jews, and writing to Roosevelt parroted the Nazi propaganda: “The Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their number or talents entitled them to.” <ref>Larson, Erik, “In the Garden of Beasts,” Crown, 2011, p. 39</ref>
⚫
During the Conference, Roosevelt spoke with the French resident general at Rabat, Morocco, about postwar independence and Jewish immigrants in North Africa. Roosevelt proposed that:


⚫
"[t]he number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population.... [T]his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over 50 percent of the lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, college professors, etc., in Germany were Jews."<ref>Manfred Jonas, Harold D. Langley, and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Correspondence, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Saturday Review Press, 1975, p. 308. This quote is taken from a conversation memorandum prepared by Captain John L. McCrae, Roosevelt's naval aide.</ref><ref>http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/tguide/index.html</ref>


This disposition of the Jewish population harkened back to a mindset communicated in earlier years to Roosevelt by the American ambassador to Germany, [[William Dodd]] (1933-1937). Dodd had appraised Germany’s repression of Jews, and writing to Roosevelt parroted the Nazi propaganda: “The Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their number or talents entitled them to.” <ref>Larson, Erik, “In the Garden of Beasts,” Crown, 2011, p. 39</ref>


Roosevelt presented the results of the conference to the American people in a radio address on February 12, 1943.
Roosevelt presented the results of the conference to the American people in a radio address on February 12, 1943.

Revision as of 20:01, 29 August 2012

Free French leaders Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle in front of Roosevelt and Churchill at the Casablanca Conference, January 14, 1943

The Casablanca Conference (codenamed SYMBOL) was held at the Anfa Hotel in Casablanca, Morocco, then a French protectorate, from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the European strategy of the Allies during World War II. Present were Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and many French representatives to file reports for the French. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had also been invited but declined to attend in light of the ongoing conflict at Stalingrad. General Charles de Gaulle had initially refused to come but changed his mind when Churchill threatened to recognize Henri Giraud as head of the Free French Forces in his place. Giraud was also present at Casablanca, and there was notable tension between the two men during the talks, notably leading Roosevelt to force the two men to shake hands, which they did reluctantly and so quickly that photographers had to ask them to repeat for the shoot. Both men also limited their exchange to offering the other to serve under him.[1]

Casablanca Declaration

Doctrine of "unconditional surrender"

American president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

The conference produced a unified statement of purpose, the "Casablanca Declaration" which announced to the world that the Allies would accept nothing less than the “unconditional surrender” of the Axis powers. Roosevelt had borrowed the term “unconditional surrender” from General Ulysses S. Grant who had communicated this stance to the Confederate commander at Forts Donelson and Henry during the American Civil War. [2] [3]

In a radio address Roosevelt made on February 12, 1943, the President laid forth the tenets of “unconditional surrender”:

“In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution upon their guilty, barbaric leaders.” [4] [5]

Behind the scenes, the United States and England were not, however, united in the commitment to see the war through to Germany’s capitulation. Some source material contradicts the official, reported accord between Churchill and Roosevelt, indicating Churchill did not fully subscribe to the doctrine of “unconditional surrender.” Drew Middleton, correspondent and military analyst, was in Casablanca reporting on the conference for The New York Times. In his book, “Retreat From Victory,” Middleton provided a revelation, which Churchill had made to him years later: “I was startled by the [public] announcement [of unconditional surrender]. I tried to hide my surprise. But I was his [Roosevelt’s] ardent lieutenant.” [6] [7] The former United States ambassador to Moscow, Charles P. Bohlen, wrote that the “Responsibility for this unconditional surrender doctrine rests almost exclusively with President Roosevelt. He announced it…”

It is felt that Roosevelt made the announcement in a maneuver to effectuate two goals: One was to keep Soviet forces engaged with Germany on the Russian front thus depleting German munitions and troops, and secondly to prevent Stalin from negotiating a separate piece with the Nazi regime. [8] [9]

That the war would be fought by the Allies until the total annihilation of enemy forces, was not universally welcomed. Diplomatic insiders were critical that such a stance was too unequivocal, and inflexible, cancelling out opportunity for political maneuvering, and morally debilitating to French and German resistance groups. [10]

The British felt that arriving at some accommodation with Germany would allow the German army to help fight off the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe. To Churchill and the other Allied leaders, the real obstacle to actualizing this mutual strategy with Germany was the leadership of Adolf Hitler. Allen Dulles, the chief of OSS intelligence in Bern, Switzerland, maintained that the "Casablanca Declaration" was “merely a piece of paper to be scrapped without further ado if Germany would sue for peace. Hitler had to go.” [11]

There exists evidence that German resistance forces, highly placed anti-Nazi government officials, were working with British intelligence, M16 to eliminate Hitler and negotiate a peace with the Allies. One such man was Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German intelligence, the Abwehr. His persistent overtures for support from the United States were ignored by Franklin Roosevelt. [12] [13]

Topics of discussion and agreements

European invasion

Roosevelt, under the advisement of General George Catlett Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, lobbied for a cross channel invasion of Europe. Churchill felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on Sicily moving in through Italy. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, with Churchill pledging more troops and resources to the Pacific and Burma to reinforce positions held by Chiang Kai-Shek against the Japanese. America would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing crafts. [14]

The conference called for recognition of joint leadership of the Free French forces by de Gaulle and Henri Giraud. Also decided during the Casablanca Conference was that there would be no "cross channel invasion" in 1943. Instead of invading Europe across the English Channel, an invasion into Sicily and then Italy would take place.

During the Conference, Roosevelt spoke with the French resident general at Rabat, Morocco, about postwar independence and Jewish immigrants in North Africa. Roosevelt proposed that:

"[t]he number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population.... [T]his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over 50 percent of the lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, college professors, etc., in Germany were Jews."[15][16]

This disposition of the Jewish population harkened back to a mindset communicated in earlier years to Roosevelt by the American ambassador to Germany, William Dodd (1933-1937). Dodd had appraised Germany’s repression of Jews, and writing to Roosevelt parroted the Nazi propaganda: “The Jews had held a great many more of the key positions in Germany than their number or talents entitled them to.” [17]

Roosevelt presented the results of the conference to the American people in a radio address on February 12, 1943.

See also

References and notes

  1. ^ Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn
  2. ^ www.nytimes.com, Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy,” January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012
  3. ^ www.avalon.law.yale.edu, Yale Law School, “The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943,” retrieved August 27, 2012
  4. ^ www.avalon.law.yale.edu, Yale Law School, “The Avalon Project: The Casablanca Conference: 1943,” retrieved August 27, 2012
  5. ^ www.ibiblio.org, “Casablanca Conference,” Radio address, February 12, 1943, (The Public Papers of F.D. Roosevelt, Vol. 12, p. 71), retrieved August 27, 2012
  6. ^ www.ww2db.com, Chen, Peter C., “Casablanca Conference, 14 Jan. 1943,” retrieved August 27, 2012
  7. ^ www.nytimes.com, Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy,” January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012
  8. ^ www.ww2db.com, Chen, Peter C., “Casablanca Conference, 14 Jan. 1943,” retrieved August 27, 2012
  9. ^ www.nytimes.com, Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy,” January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012
  10. ^ www.history.com, This Day In History, “Roosevelt And Churchill Begin Casablanca Conference,” retrieved August 27, 2012
  11. ^ Vaughan, Hal, "Sleeping With The Enemy, Coco Chanel's Secret War," Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 178
  12. ^ www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org, "Admiral Wilhelm Canaris 1887-1945," Canaris worked with Roosevelt’s Balkan representative in Instanbal, former Pennsylvania governor, George H. Earle who communicated with Roosevelt through diplomat pouch; retrieved August 28, 2012
  13. ^ www.historylearningsite.co.uk, retrieved August 28, 2012
  14. ^ nytimes.com. Middleton, Drew, On This Day, "Roosevelt, Churchill Map 1943 War Strategy,” January 24, 1943, retrieved August 27, 2012
  15. ^ Manfred Jonas, Harold D. Langley, and Francis L. Lowenheim, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Correspondence, New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Saturday Review Press, 1975, p. 308. This quote is taken from a conversation memorandum prepared by Captain John L. McCrae, Roosevelt's naval aide.
  16. ^ http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/tguide/index.html
  17. ^ Larson, Erik, “In the Garden of Beasts,” Crown, 2011, p. 39

Further reading

  • Farrell, Brian P. "Symbol of paradox: The Casablanca Conference, 1943," Canadian Journal of History, (April 1993) 28#1 pp 21–40
  • Stoler, Mark. Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (2006) excerpt and text search
  • Wilt, Alan F. "The Significance of the Casablanca Decisions, January 1943," Journal of Military History (1991) 55#4 pp 517–529 in JSTOR
Preceded by
Cherchell Conference
October 21–22, 1942
 World War II Conferences
Casablanca Conference
January 14–24, 1943 		Succeeded by
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