Alcibiades
Alcibiades | |
---|---|
Allegiance | Athens (415 BC-412 BC Sparta) |
Rank | general (strategos) |
Battles / wars | Battle of Abydos (410 BC) Battle of Cyzicus (410 BC) Siege of Byzantium (408 BC) |
Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides (Greek: Ἀλκιβιάδης Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδης; c. 450 BC–404 BC), also transliterated as Alkibiades, was a prominent Athenian statesman, orator and general. The last famous member of his aristocratic family, which fell from prominence after the Peloponnesian War, he played a major role in the second half of that conflict as a strategic advisor, military commander, and politician.
Alcibiades career can be divided into three phases. In Athens in the early 410s BC, he advocated for an aggressive foreign policy, first by agitating against Sparta inside the Peloponnese and then by pressing for the Sicilian expedition. His political enemies succeeded in exiling him as that expedition was beginning, and in the second phase of his career Alcibiades served first the Spartans and then the Persians as a military and political advisor; in this role, he suggested or oversaw several campaigns which caused devastating harm to Athens. Finally, in the third phase of his career, Alcibiades was recalled to the Athenian army at Samos and served for several more years as an Athenian general. In the wake of the spectacular victory at Cyzicus he returned triumphally to Athens, but just a few years later he was exiled again after the Athenian defeat at Notium. He retired to a castle on the Hellespont, and was assassinated shortly after the end of the war at Sparta's instigation.
The Sicilian expedition was Alcibiades' creation, and modern scholars have argued that, had that expedition been under Alcibiades' command instead of that of Nicias, the expedition might not have met its eventual disastrous fate.[1] In the years that he served Sparta, Alcibiades played a crucial role in the city's undoing; the capture of Decelea and the revolts of several critical Athenian subjects occured either at his suggestion or under his supervision. Once restored to his native city, however, he played a crucial role in a string of Athenian victories that eventually brought Sparta to seek a peace with Athens. He favored unconventional tactics, frequently winning cities over by treachery or negotiation rather than by siege;[2] the development of a Peloponnesian opposition to Sparta in the early 410s BC and the campaign in which Athens regained control of much of the Hellespont showcased his skill at diplomacy. Alcibiades' military and political talents frequently proved valuable to whichever state currently held his allegiance, but his capacity for making powerful enemies ensured that he never remained in one place for long, and, by the end of the war that he had helped rekindle in the early 410s, his days of political relevance were a bygone memory.
Early years
Alcibiades was born in ancient Athens, the son of Cleinias and Deinomache, the latter of whom belonged to the powerful and controversial family of the Alcmaeonidae; Pericles and his brother, Ariphron, were first cousins (father's sister's sons) of Deinomache.[3] It is said that his family was traced back to Eurysaces.[4] His grandfather, also named Alcibiades, was a friend of Cleisthenes, who had supported the democratic reforms.[5] After the death of Cleinias at the Battle of Coronea (447 BC), Pericles and Ariphron became his guardians.[6] Alcibiades had a number of famous teachers, such as Socrates, and was well trained in the art of rhetoric.[7] He was noted for his unruly behavior, which is mentioned by the ancient Greek writers in various occasions.[α]
Alcibiades took part in the Battle of Potidaea in 432 BC, where Socrates saved his life,[8] a service which he repaid at the Battle of Delium in 424 BC.[β][9] Alcibiades had an intimate but (according to idealized ancient accounts) chaste relationsip with Socrates, whom he admired and respected, and who in turn was drawn by his beauty but refused to succumb to the youth's attractions.[10][11] According to Plutarch, Alcibiades "feared and reverenced Socrates alone, and despised the rest of his lovers".[12]
Political career until 412 BC
Rise to prominence
Alcibiades first rose to prominence when he began advocating aggressive Athenian action after the signing of the Peace of Nicias. Historians Arnold W. Gomme and Raphael Sealey believe that Alcibiades felt offended with the Lacedaimonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth.[13][14] This uneasy truce between Sparta and Athens, signed midway through the Peloponnesian War, came at the end of seven years of fighting in which neither side had gained a decisive advantage.
Disputes over the interpretation of the treaty led the Spartans to dispatch ambassadors with full powers to arrange all hanging matters.[15] The Athenians initially received these ambassadors well, but Alcibiades met with them in secret before they were to speak to the ecclesia (the Athenian Assembly) and told them that the Assembly was haughty and had great ambitions.[15] He urged them to renounce their diplomatic authority to represent Sparta, and instead allow him to assist them through his influence in Athenian politics.[16] The representatives agreed and, impressed with Alcibiades' foresight, they alienated themselves from Nicias, who sincerely wanted to reach an agreement with the Spartans.[15] The next day during the Assembly Alcibiades asked them what powers Sparta had granted them to negotiate and they replied, as agreed, that they had not come with full and independent powers. This was in direct contradiction to what they had said the day before and Alcibiades seized on this opportunity to denounce their character, cast suspicion on their aims, and destroy their credibility. Having succeeded in this ploy, Alcibiades increased his standing at the expense of Nicias and he was subsequently appointed general. He then took advantage of his increasing power to orchestrate the creation of an alliance between Argos, Mantinea, Elis and other states in the Peloponnese, threatening Sparta's dominance in the region. According to Gomme, "it was a grandiose scheme for an Athenian general at the head of a mainly Peloponnesian army to march through the Peloponesse cocking a snook at Sparta when her reputation was at its lowest".[17] This alliance, however, would ultimately be defeated at the Battle of Mantinea.[18]
Somewhere in the years 416-415 BC, a complex struggle of Hyperbolos with Nicias and Alcibiades is said to have taken place. Hyperbolos tried to bring about the ostracism of one of this pair but Nicias and Alcibiades combined their influence to induce the people to expel Hyperbolos instead.[19] This incident reveals that Nicias and Alcibiades each commanded a personal following, whose votes were determined by the wishes of the leaders.[14]
Alcibiades was not one of the generals involved in the capture of Melos in 416-415 BC, but Plutarch makes him a supporter of the decree by which the grown men of Melos were killed and the women and children enslaved.[20] The orator Andocides alleges that Alcibiades had a child by one of these enslaved women.[21]
Sicilian Expedition
In 415 BC, delegates from the Sicilian city of Segesta (Egesta in Greek) arrived at Athens to plead for the support of the Athenians in their war against Selinus. During the debates on the undertaking, Nicias was vehemently opposed to Athenian intervention, explaining that the campaign would be very costly and attacking the character and motives of Alcibiades, who had emerged as the supporter of the expedition. On the other hand, Alcibiades argued that this new theatre would bring riches to the city and expand their empire just as had happened in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. In his speech Alcibiades appeared overconfident with regard to how easily the Athenians would be able to recruit allies in the region and impose their rule on Syracuse, the most powerful city of Sicily.[22] Still it was Nicias who turned a modest undertaking into a massive campaign and made the conquest of Sicily seem possible and safe.[23] It was at his suggestion that the size of the fleet was significantly increased from 60 ships to "140 galleys, 5,100 men at arms, and about 1300 archers, slingers, and light armed men".[24] Philosopher Leo Strauss underscores that the Sicilian expedition surpassed everything undertaken by Pericles.[25] Almost certainly Nicias' intention was to hint at the scale of forces necessary to invade Sicily, but rather than dissuade his fellow citizens it made them all the more eager.[25] Against his wishes Nicias was appointed general along with Alcibiades and Lamachus who were given full powers to do what was in the best interests of Athens while in Sicily.[26]
One night during preparations for the expedition the hermai, heads of the god Hermes on a plinth with a phallus, were mutilated throughout Athens. This was a religious scandal and was seen as a bad omen for the mission. Plutarch explains that Androcles, a political leader, used false witnesses who accused Alcibiades and his friends of mutilating the statues, and of profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries.[27] Later his opponents, chief among them being Androcles and Thessalus, Cimon's son, enlisted orators to argue that Alcibiades should set sail as planned and stand trial on his return from the campaign. Alcibiades was suspicious however of their intentions and asked to be allowed to stand trial immediately, under penalty of death, in order to clear his name.[27] This was not allowed however and the fleet set sail soon after, with the charge still over him.[28]
"Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs." |
Alcibiades' Oration before the Sicilian expedition as recorded by Thucydides, (VI, 18])[γ]; Thucydides disclaims verbal accuracy. |
As he suspected, his absence only served to embolden his enemies. They began to accuse him of other sacrilegious actions and speech and even alleged that these actions were connected with a plot against the democracy.[29] According to Thucydides, the Athenians were always in fear and took everything suspiciously.[30] When the fleet arrived in Catana, they found the state trireme Salaminia waiting to bring Alcibiades and the others indicted for mutilating the hermai or profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries back to Athens to stand trial.[30] In Thurii he escaped with his crew in his own ship and in Athens he was condemned to death in absentia. His property was confiscated and a reward of a talent was promised to whomever succeeded in killing any who had fled.[31] Meanwhile the Athenian force in Sicily scored a few victories and then moved against Messina, where they expected their secret allies within the city to betray it to them. Nonetheless, Alcibiades foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave information to the friends of the Syracusans in Messina, who succeeded in preventing the admission of the Athenians. [32] With the death of Lamachus in battle some time later, the Sicilian Expedition was in the hands of Nicias who did not have the capacity to manage and lead such a force.[1]
Defection to Sparta
After his disappearance at Thurii, Alcibiades quickly contacted the Spartans "promising to render them aid and service greater than all the harm he had previously done them as an enemy".[33] The Spartans granted this request and received him among them. When they were unable to secure a force to come to the relief of Syracuse, Alcibiades spoke and instilled fear of Athenian ambition into the Spartan ephors by informing them of their desire to conquer Sicily, Italy, and even Carthage.[34] Yale historian Donald Kagan believes that Alcibiades knowingly exaggerated the plans of the Athenians to convince them of the benefit they stood to gain from his help.[35] Kagan asserts that this was prior to Alcibiades's "legendary" reputation and the Spartans saw before them instead "a defeated and hunted man" whose policies "produced strategic failures" and brought "no decisive result".[35] If true this assessment underscores one of Alcibiades greatest talents, his political prowess.[35] After making the threat seem imminent, Alcibiades advised the Spartans to send troops and most importantly, a Spartan commander to discipline and aid the Syracusians.[34]
"Our party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part in preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing. As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps as well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity - meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter it under the pressure of your hostility." |
Alcibiades' Speech to the Spartans as recorded by Thucydides, (VI, 89])[γ]; Thucydides disclaims verbal accuracy. |
Alcibiades served as a military advisor to Sparta and helped the Spartans secure several crucial successes. He advised them to build a permanent fort in Decelea, an area just over ten miles from Athens and within sight of the city.[36] The purpose was to cut the Athenians off entirely from their homes and crops and the silver mines of Sunium.[35] This was part of Alcibiades's plan to renew the war with Athens in Attica. This move was devastating to Athens and forced the citizens into the long walls of the city year round, fostering the Plague of Athens and making them entirely dependent on their naval supremacy. A consequence of this would be the revolt of Delian League members as they saw that the war was going badly for Athens and that they were occupied on two fronts. To disrupt the Athenian's source of income Alcibiades brought almost all Ionia to revolt.[37] Despite his help to the Spartan cause, it was around this time that it was discovered Alcibiades was having an affair with the wife of the Spartan king, Agis II.[38] It is said that Timaia, Agis' wife, ultimately bore him a son, Leotychides.[39] Alcibiades's influence was further reduced after the retirement of Endius, the ephor who was most friendly to him.[40] It is alleged that Astiochus, a Spartan admiral, was sent orders to kill him, but Alcibiades received warning of this order and escaped over to the Persian satrap Tissaphernes who had been supporting the Peloponnesian forces financially in 412 BC.[41]
In Asia Minor
On his arrival in the Persian court, Alcibiades won the trust of the powerful satrap and made several policy suggestions which were well received. According to Thucydides, Alcibiades immediately began to do all he could with Tissaphernes to injure the Peloponnesian cause. Firstly the satrap had the payments to the Peloponnesian fleet reduced and made irregularly.[41] Next he told him to bribe the generals of the cities to gain valuable intelligence on their activities. Lastly, and most importantly, he told Tissaphernes to be in no hurry to bring the Persian fleet into the conflict, as the longer the war dragged out the more exhausted the combatants would become.[42] This would allow the Persians to more easily conquer the region in the aftermath of the fighting. Alcibiades therefore tried to convince the satrap that it was in Persia's interest to wear both Athens and Sparta out at first, "and after docking the Athenian power as much as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians".[42] Although Alcibiades' advice helped the Persians, it was merely a means to an end. Thucydides tells us that his real motives were to use his alleged influence with the Persians to effect his restoration to Athens.[43]
Recall to Athens
Negotiations with the Athenian oligarchs
Alcibiades seemed to assume that "radical democracy" would never agree to his recall to Athens.[44] Therefore, he exchanged messages with the Athenian leaders at Samos and suggested that if they could install an oligarchy friendly to him he would return to Athens and bring with him Persian money and possibly the Persian fleet of 147 triremes.[45] Alcibiades set about winning over the most influential military officers and achieved his goal by offering them a threefold plan: the Athenian constitution was to be changed, the recall of Alcibiades was to be voted, and Alcibiades was to win over Tissaphernes and the King to the Athenian side. Most of the officers in the Athenian fleet accepted the plan and welcomed the prospect of a narrower constitution, which would allow them a greater share in determining policy. According to Thucydides, only one of the Athenian generals at Samos, Phrynichus, opposed the plan and argued that Alcibiades cared no more for the proposed oligarchy than for the traditional democracy.[46] The involvement in the plot of another general, Thrasybulus, remains unclear.[δ]
These officers of the Athenian fleet formed a group of conspirators, triggering the anger of the majority of the armed forces, which calmed down "by the advantageous prospect of the pay from the king".[47] The members of the group assembled and prepared to send Pisander, one of their number, on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.[48] Pisander won the argument, putting Alcibiades and his promises at the center.[49] The ecclesia deposed Phrynichus and elected Pisander and ten other envoys to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.[50]
The main problem was, however, that Tissaphernes would not make an agreement on any terms, wanting to follow his policy of neutrality.[51] As Kagan points out, Tissaphernes was a prudent leader and had recognized the advantages of wearing each side out without direct Persian involvement.[52] Alcibiades realized this and attempted with success to make the Athenians think not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes, but that after he had been persuaded, they had not conceded enough to him.[53] Although the envoys were angered at the audacity of the Persian demands, they nevertheless departed with the impression that Alcibiades could have brought about an agreement among the powers if he had chosen to do so.[53] The fiasco at the court of Tissaphernes put, however, an end to the negotiations of the conspirators with Alcibiades.[51] The group was convinced that Alcibiades could not deliver his side of the bargain, as Tissaphernes preferred the policy of wearing down both sides of the Greeks. Therefore, the conspirators decided to break with Alcibiades.[53]
Reinstatement as an Athenian General
The conspirators finally succeeded in imposing the oligarchic government of the Four Hundred, in which participated, among others, Phrynichus and Pisander. At Samos, however, the coup did not go forward so smoothly. Samian democrats learned of the conspiracy and notified four prominent Athenians, the generals Leon, Diomedon, Thrasybulus, and Thrasyllus, at that time a hoplite in the ranks. With the support of these men and the Athenian soldiers in general, the Samian democrats were able to defeat the conspirators when they attempted to seize power.[54] Further, the Athenian troops at Samos formed themselves into a political assembly, deposed its generals and elected new ones, including Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The army, stating that they had not revolted from the city but that the city had revolted from them, resolved to stand by the democracy while continuing to prosecute the war against Sparta.[55]
After a time, Thrasybulus persuaded the assembled troops to vote Alcibiades' recall, a policy that he had supported since before the coup. Then he sailed to retrieve Alcibiades and returned with him to Samos. The aim of this policy was to win away Persian support from the Spartans, as it was still believed that Alcibiades had great influence with Tissaphernes.[56] Plutarch claims that they sent for Alcibiades so as to use his help in putting down the tyrants in Athens.[57] Kagan argues that this was not the glorious return to Athens which he had hoped for but rather he owed his reinstatement to Thrasybulus.[58] Moreover he was being recalled to Samos, not to Athens and his immunity there "protected him for the time being but not from a reckoning in the future".[58]
During his speech to the assembled troops, Alcibiades complained bitterly about the causes which had brought about his exile, but the main content of his speech was a large boast of his influence with Tissaphernes. Although he did have harsh words for the oligarchy in Athens, the primary motives of his speech were to make the oligarchs at Athens afraid of him and to increase his credit with the army at Samos. Upon hearing his speech the troops immediately elected him general alongside Thrasybulus and the others.[59] In fact, he roused them so much that they proposed to sail at once for Piraeus and attack the oligarchs in Athens.[59] It was primarily Alcibiades, along with Thrasybulus, who calmed the people and showed them the folly of this proposal, which would have sparked civil war and led to the immediate defeat of Athens.[57] Shortly after Alcibiades' reinstatement as an Athenian general, the government of the Four Hundrend was overthrown and replaced by a broader oligarchy, which would eventually give way to democracy.[60]
Presently Alcibiades sailed to Tissaphernes with a detachment of ships. According to Plutarch, the supposed purpose was to stop the Persian fleet from coming to the aid of the Peloponnesians.[57] Thucydides is in agreement with Plutarch that the Persian fleet was at Aspendus and that Alcibiades told the troops he would bring the fleet to their side or prevent it from coming at all, but Thucydides further speculates that the real reason was to flaunt his new position to Tissaphernes and try to gain some real influence over him.[59] According to the historian, Alcibiades had long known that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all, and wished to compromise him as much as possible in the eyes of the Spartans through his friendship for himself and the Athenians, and thus to oblige him to join their side.[61]
Battles of Abydos and Cyzicus
- Main articles: Battle of Abydos, Battle of Cyzicus
Alcibiades was recalled by the "intermidiate regime" of the Five Thousand, the government which succeeded the Four Hundred in 411, but it is most likely that he waited until 407 BC to actually return to the city.[62] Plutarch tells us that, although his recall had already been passed on motion of Critias, an ally of him, Alcibiades was resolved to come back with glory.[63] While this was certainly his goal, it was again means to an end, that end being avoiding prosecution upon his return to Athens.
The next significant part he would play in the war would occur at the battle of Abydos. While Alcibiades was away he managed to collect money with which he was able to pay the rowers and gain their favor.[64] From here the bulk of the Athenian force sailed northward and Alcibiades stayed behind to guard the southern entrance to the Hellespont. The engagement took place off the coast of Abydos, where the Peloponnesians had set up their main naval base. The battle was evenly matched and raged for a long time, when Alcibiades sailed into the Hellespont to their support, with eighteen triremes.[63][65] The Persian satrap Pharnabazus, who was now working with the Peloponnesian fleet instead of Tissaphernes, moved his land army to the shore to defend the ships and sailors who had beached their ships and moved to land. Only the supporting Persian land army and the coming of night saved their fleet from complete destruction.[66]
Shortly after the battle, Tissaphernes had arrived in the Hellespont and Alcibiades left the fleet at Sestos to meet him, bringing gifts and hoping to once again try to win over the Persian governor. Evidently Alcibiades made a grave misjudgment and he was arrested on arrival.[63] Within a month he would escape and resume command.[67] It was obvious however that he had no influence with the Persians; from now on his authority would depend on what he actually could accomplish rather than on what he promised to do.[68]
The next major sea battle took place at Cyzicus, where the Athenians had intelligence indicating that Pharnabazus and Mindarus, the Peloponnesian fleet commander, were together plotting their next move. Concealed by storm and darkness the combined Athenian force reached the vicinity in the spring of 410 completely to the surprise of the Peloponnesians.[67] Here the Athenians devised a plot to draw the enemy into battle. According to Diodorus Siculus, Alcibiades advanced with a small squadron in order to draw the Spartans out to battle, and, after he successfully deceived Mindarus with this ploy, the squadrons of Thrasybulus and Theramenes came to join him, cutting off the Spartan's retreat.[ε][69]
The Spartan fleet suffered losses in the flight, and reached the shore with the Athenians hot on their heels. Alcibiades's troops, leading the Athenian pursuit, landed and attempted to pull the Spartan ships back out to sea. The Peloponnesians, mooring their ships together, fought with their adversaries as they sailed down upon them. Alcibiades, however, sailed round the fleets and landed on the shore. When Mindarus saw this, he also landed, and fell fighting on the shore.[70] Thrasybulus landed his own force to temporarily relieve pressure on Alcibiades, and meanwhile ordered Theramenes to join up with Athenian land forces nearby and bring them to reinforce the sailors and marines on the beach. The Spartans and Persians, overwhelmed by the arrival of multiple forces from several directions, were defeated and driven off, and the Athenians captured all the Spartan ships which were not destroyed.[69][71] A letter dispatched to Sparta by Hippocrates, vice-admiral under Mindarus, was intercepted and taken to Athens; it ran as follows: "The ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We know not what to do".[70] A short time later Sparta petitioned for peace but their appeals were ultimately rejected by the Athenians.[72]
Further military successes
After their victory, Alcibiades and Thrasyllus began the siege of Chalcedon in 409 BC with about 190 ships.[73] Although unable to attain a decisive victory or induce the city to surrender, Alcibiades was able to win a small tactical land battle outside of the city gates and Theramenes concluded an agreement with the Chalcedonians.[74] Afterwards they concluded a temporary alliance with Pharnabazus which secured some much needed immediate cash for the army, but despite this Alcibiades was still forced to depart in search for more booty to pay the soldiers and oarsmen of the fleet.
In pursuit of these funds he traveled to the Thracian Chersonese and attacked Selymbria. He plotted with a pro-Athenian party within the city and offered the Selymbrians reasonable terms and imposed strict discipline to see that they were observed. He did their city no injury whatever, but merely took a sum of money from it, set a garrison in it and left.[75] Epigraphical evidence indicates the Selymbrians surrendered hostages until the treaty was ratified in Athens.[2] His performance is judged as skillful by historians, since it saved time, resources, and lives and still fully achieved his goal.[2][76]
From here Alcibiades joined in the siege of Byzantium along with Theramenes and Thrasyllus. A portion of the citizens of the city, demoralized and hungry, decided to surrender the city to Alcibiades for similar terms as the Selymbrians had received. On the agreed upon night the defenders left their posts and the Athenians attacked the Peloponnesian garrison in the city and their boats in the harbor. The portion of the citizenry that remained loyal to Peloponnesians fought so savagly that Alcibiades issued a statement in the midst of the fighting which guaranteed their safety and this persuaded the remaining citizens to turn against the Peloponnesian garrison which was nearly totally destroyed.[74]
Return to Athens, dismissal and death
Defeat at Notium
It was in the aftermath of these successes that Alcibiades resolved to finally return to Athens in the spring of 407 BC. Still Alcibiades was exceedingly careful in his return, mindful of the changes in government, the charges still technically over him, and the great injury he had done to Athens. Thus he entered the harbor full of fear till he saw his cousin and others of his friends and acquaintance, who invited him to land.[77] Upon arriving on shore he was greeted with a hero's welcome;[77] all the criminal proceedings against him were cancelled, his property was restored and ecclesia elected him general (strategos) with sole powers by land and sea.[78]
In 406 BC Alcibiades set out from Athens with 1,500 hoplites and a hundred ships. He failed to take Andros and then he went on to Samos. Later he moved to Notium, closer to the enemy at Ephesus.[79] In the meanwhile Tissaphernes had been replaced by Cyrus (a relative of Darius II of Persia) who decided to financially support the Peloponnesians. This new revenue started to attract deserters to the Spartan navy from the Athenians. Additionally the Spartans had replaced Mindarus with Lysander, a very capable admiral. These factors caused the rapid growth of the Peloponnesian fleet at the expense of the Athenian one. It was the search for funds and the need to force another decisive battle that caused Alcibiades to leave Notium and sail to help Thrasybulus in the siege of Phocaea.[80] Alcibiades was aware the Spartan fleet was nearby, so he left nearly eighty ships to guard against attack by them. In charge was Alcibiades personal helmsman, Antiochus, under orders not to attack. Antiochus disobeyed the order he was given and endeavored to draw Lysander into a fight by similar methods as had been employed at Cyzicus with great success. The conditions here were utterly different than they had been however and the battleplan was poorly conceived and executed. In practice, Antiochus' ship was sunk, and he was killed, by a sudden Spartan attack; the remaining ships of the decoy force were then chased headlong back toward Notium, where the main Athenian force was caught unprepared by the sudden arrival of the whole Spartan fleet. In the ensuing fighting, Lysander gained an entire victory. Alcibiades soon returned and desperately tried to undo the defeat at Notium by scoring another victory, but Lysander could not be compelled to attack the fleet again.[81]
Ultimately responsibility for the defeat fell on Alcibiades and his enemies used the opportunity to attack him and have him removed from command, although some modern scholars believe that Alcibiades quite unfairly got the blame for Antiochus' mistake.[82] Diodorus argues that, in addition to his mistake at Notium, Alcibiades was discharged on account of false accusations brought against him by his enemies.[69] According to Anthony Andrewes, professor of ancient history, the extravagant hopes formed in the previous summer were a decisive element in his downfall.[79] Consequently he himself condemned himself to exile. [69] Never again returning to Athens, he sailed north to the castles in the Thracian Chersonese, which he had secured during his time in the Hellespont. The implications of the defeat were severe for Athens. Although the defeat had been minor, it occasioned the removal of not only Alcibiades but also his allies like Thrasybulus, Theramenes and Critias, who had the decree for Alcibiades' recall.[78] These were likely the most capable commanders Athens had at the time and their removal would help lead to the Athenian surrender only two years later after their complete defeat at Aegospotami.[83]
Death
With one exception, Alcibiades' role in the war ended with his command. Prior to the Battle of Aegospotami, in the last attested fact of his career,[84] Alcibiades recognized that the Athenians were anchored in a strategically disadvantageous spot and advised them to move to Sestus where they could benefit from a harbor and a city.[85] Diodorus, however, does not mention this advice, arguing instead that Alcibiades offered the generals Thracian aid in exchange for a share in the command.[στ][86] The generals of the Athenians, however, "considering that in case of defeat the blame would attach to them and that in case of success all men would attribute it to Alcibiades", asked him to leave and not come near the camp ever again.[86][85] Days later the fleet would be annihilated by Lysander.
After the Battle of Aegospotami, Alcibiades crossed the Hellespont and took refuge in Phrygia, with the object of securing the aid of Artaxerxes against Sparta. But the Spartans induced Pharnabazus to put him out of the way. According to Plutarch, Lysander sent an envoy to Pharnabazus who then dispatched his brother to Phrygia where Alcibiades was living with his mistress, Timandra.[ζ][87] In 404 BC, as he was about to set out for the Persian court, his residence was surrounded and set on fire. Seeing no chance of escape he rushed out on his assassins, dagger in hand, and was killed by a shower of arrows.[87]
Assessments
Political career
In ancient Greece Alcibiades was a polarizing figure. Thucydides reprehends the Athenian statesman for his political conduct and motives. According to the historian, Alcibiades, being "exceedingly ambitious", proposed the expedition in Sicily in order "to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes".[88] Alcibiades is held responsible by Thucydides for the destruction of Athens, since "his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city".[88] Plutarch regards him as "the least scrupulous and most entirely careless of human beings".[89] Alcibiades excited in his contemporaries a fear for the safety of the political order.[90] Therefore, he has not been spared by ancient comedy, and stories attest to an epic confrontation between Alcibiades and Eupolis, a poet of the Old Comedy, resembling that between Aristophanes and Cleon.[91] On the other hand, Diodorus argues that he was "in spirit brilliant and intent upon great enterprises".[92] Sharon Press of Brown University points out that even Xenophon emphasizes Alcibiades' service to the state, rather than the harm he was charged with causing it.[93][94] Demosthenes defends Alcibiades's achievements, saying that he had taken arms in the cause of democracy, displaying his patriotism, not by gifts of money or by speeches, but by personal service.[95] For Demosthenes and other orators Alcibiades constitutes the figure of the great man during the glorious days of the Athenian democracy and becomes a rhetorical symbol.[91] In an Isocrates speech, delivered by the son of Alcibiades, it is argued that for his services the Athenian statesman deserves the Athenians' gratitude.[96] On the other hand, in a Lysias oration it is argued that Athenians should regard him as an enemy because of the general tenor of his life, as "he repays with injury the open assistance of any of his friends".[97][98] In the Constitution of the Athenians Aristotle does not include Alcibiades in the list of the best Athenian politicians, but in Posterior Analytics he argues that traits of a proud man like Alcibiades are "equanimity amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonour".[99][100] According to Andocides, Alcibiades "instead of holding that he ought himself to conform with the laws of the state, he expects you to conform with his own way of life".[101] Central to the depiction of the Athenian statesman is Cornelius Nepos' famous phrase that Alcibiades "surpassed all the Athenians in grandeur and magnificence of living".[102]
Even nowadays Alcibiades divides scholars. For Malcolm F. McGregor, former head of the Department of Classics in the University of British Columbia, Alcibiades was rather a shrewd gambler than a mere opportunist.[103] Evangelos P. Fotiadis, a prominent Greek philologist, asserts that Alcibiades was "a first class diplomat" and had "huge skills". Nevertheless his spiritual powers were not counter-balanced with his magnificent mind and he had the hard luck to lead a people susceptible to demagoguery.[5] K. Paparrigopoulos, a major modern Greek historian, underlines his "spiritual virtues" and compares him with Themistocles, but he then asserts that all these gifts created a "traitor, an audacious and impious man".[104] For his part, David Gribble argues that Alcibiades' actions against his city were misunderstood and predicates that "the tension which led to Alcibiades' split with the city was between purely personal and civic values".[105] Russell Meiggs, a British ancient historian, asserts that the Athenian statesman was absolutely unscrupulous despite his great charm and brilliant abilities.[38] According to Meiggs his actions were dictated by selfish motives and his feud with Cleon and his successors undermined Athens. The same scholar underscores the fact that "his example of restless and undisciplined ambition strengthened the charge brought against Socrates".[38] Even more critically, Athanasios G. Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, professors of strategic studies and international politics, state that Alcibiades' own arguments "should be sufficient to do away with the notion that Alcibiades was a great statesman, as some people still believe".[106]
Military achievements
Despite his critical comments, Thucydides admits in a short digression that "publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired".[88] Diodorus and Demosthenes regard him as a great general.[92][95] According to Fotiadis, Alcibiades was an invincible general and, wherever he went, victory followed him.[5] Fotiadis believes that, had he led the army in Sicily, the Athenians would have avoided disaster and, had his countrymen followed his advice at Aegospotami, Lysander would have lost and Athens would have ruled Greece.[5] On the other hand, Paparrigopoulos believes that the Sicilian Expedition, prompted by Alcibiades, was a strategical mistake.[107] In agreement with Paparrigopoulos, Platias and Koliopoulos underscore the fact that the Sicilian expedition was a strategic blunder of the first magnitude, resulting from a "frivolous attitude and an unbelievable underestimation of the enemy".[22] For his part, Angelos Vlachos, a Greek Academician, underlines the constant interest of Athens for Sicily from the beginning of the war.[η] According to Vlachos the expedition had nothing of the extravagant or adventurous and constituted a rational strategic decision based on traditional Athenian aspirations.[108] Vlachos asserts that Alcibiades had already conceived a broader plan: the conquest of the whole West.[109] He intended to conquer Carthage and Libya, then to attack Italy and, after winning these, to encompass at once Italy and Peloponnesus.[110] The initial decision of the ecclesia provided however for a reasonable military force, which later became unreasonably large and costly because of Nicias' demands.[109] Kagan criticizes Alcibiades for failing to recognize that the large size of the Athenian expedition undermined the diplomatic scheme on which his strategy rested.[111]
Kagan believes that Alcibiades was a commander of considerable ability, but he constituted no military genius and his confidence and ambitions went far beyond his skills.[111] He thus was capable of important errors and serious miscalculations. Kagan argues that at Notium Alcibiades committed a serious error in leaving the fleet in the hands of an inexperienced officer and that in Cyzicus the key figure was Thrasybulus and not he.[111] These remarks remind us of Cornelius Nepos, who said that the Athenians' extravagant opinion of Alcibiades's abilities and valor was his chief misfortune.[112]
Press argues that "though Alcibiades can be considered a good general on the basis of his performance in the Hellespont, he would not be considered so on the basis of his performance in Sicily", but "the strengths of Alcibiades' performance as a general outweigh his faults".[93] Professors David McCann and Barry Strauss attempt a comparison between Alcibiades and Douglas MacArthur, pointing out that "both men stood out as military leaders to whom a mystique attached itself".[113]
Oratorical skill
Plutarch asserts that "Alcibiades was a most able speaker in addition to his other gifts", while Theophrastus argues that Alcibiades was the most capable of discovering and understanding what was required in a given case. Nevertheless, he would often stumble in the midst of his speech, but then he would resume and proceed with all the caution in the world.[114] Even the lisp he had, which was noticed by Aristophanes, made his talk persuasive and full of charm.[115][116] Eupolis calls him "prince of talkers, but in speaking most incapable";[19] namely more eloquent in his private discourses than when orating in front of the ecclesia.[104] For his part, Demosthenes underscores the fact that Alcibiades was regarded as "the ablest speaker of the day".[95] Paparrigopoulos does not accept Demosthenes's opinion, but acknowledges that the Athenian statesman could sufficiently support his case.[104] Kagan acknowledges his rhetorical power, whilst Thomas Habinek, professor of Classics at the University of Southern California, believes that the orator Alcibiades seemed to be whatever his audience needed on any given occasion.[117][118] According to Habinek, his appearance in Plato's Symposium conforms to the pattern of Alcibiades literature: Alcibiades is always just what is wanted. In the field of oratory, the people responded to Alcibiades' affection with affection of their own. Thereby, the orator was "the institution of the city talking to - and loving - itself".[118] According to Aristophanes Athens "yearns for him, and hates him too, but wants him back".[119]
References in comedy, philosophy and literature
Alcibiades is mentioned several times in the satirical plays of the comic poets, such as Aristophanes, and also figures as a fictional character in several Socratic dialogues (Symposium, Alcibiades I and II). He continues to fascinate the modern world, notably as the main character in historical novels, like those of Anna Bowman Dodd, Gertrude Atherton, Rosemary Sutcliff, Daniel Chavarría, Steven Pressfield and Peter Green.[120] He is also a central character in Paul Levinson's time travel novel, The Plot To Save Socrates.
See also
Notes
α. ^ According to Plutarch, who is however criticized for using "implausible or unreliable stories" in order to construct Alcibiades' portrait,[121] Alcibiades once wished to see Pericles, but he was told that Pericles could not see him, because he was studying how to render his accounts to the Athenians. "Were it not better for him," said Alcibiades, "to study how not to render his accounts to the Athenians?".[7] Plutarch describes how Alcibiades "gave a box on the ear to Hipponicus, whose birth and wealth made him a person of great influence." This action received much disapproval, since it was "unprovoked by any passion of quarrel between them". To smooth the incident over, Alcibiades went to Hipponicus' house and, after stripping naked, "desired him to scourge and chastise him as he pleased". The wealthy Hipponicus not only pardoned him but also bestowed upon him the hand of his daughter.[122] Another example of his flamboyant nature occurred during the Olympic games of 416 where "he entered seven teams in the chariot race, more than any private citizen had ever put forward, and three of them came in first, second, and fourth".[123]According to Andocides, once Alcibiades competed against a man named Taureas as choregos of a chorus of boys and "Alcibiades drove off Taureas with his fists. The spectators showed their sympathy with Taureas and their hatred of Alcibiades by applauding the one chorus and refusing to listen to the other at all."[101]
β. ^ According to Plutarch, Alcibiades "served as a soldier in the campaign of Potidaea and had Socrates for his tentmate and comrade in action" and "when Alcibiades fell wounded, it was Socrates who stood over him and defended him".[122] Nonetheless, Antisthenes insists that Socrates saved Alcibiades at the Battle of Delium.[124]
γ. ^ Thucydides records several speeches which he attributes to Pericles; but Thucydides acknowledges that: "it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said."[125]
δ. ^ Kagan has suggested that Thrasybulus was one of the founding members of the scheme and was willing to support moderate oligarchy, but was alienated by the extreme actions taken by the plotters.[126] Robert J. Buck, on the other hand, maintains that Thrasybulus was probably never involved in the plot, possibly because he was absent from Samos at the time of its inception.[127]
ε. ^ In the case of the battle of Cyzicus, Robert J. Littman, professor at Brandeis University, points out the different accounts given by Xenophon and Diodorus. According to Xenophon, Alcibiades' victory was due to the luck of a rainstorm, while, according to Diodorus, it was due to a carefully conceived plan.[128]. Although most historians prefer the accounts of Xenophon,[128] Jean Hatzfeld remarks that Diodorus' accounts contain many interesting and unique details.[129].
στ. ^ Plutarch mentions Alcibiades' advice, writing that "he rode up on horseback and read the generals a lesson. He said their anchorage was a bad one; the place had no harbor and no city, but they had to get their supplies from Sestos".[130] [131] B. Perrin regards Xenophon's testimony as impeachable.[84] According to A. Wolpert, "it would not have required a cynical reader to infer even from Xenophon's account that he (Alcibiades) was seeking to promote his own interests when he came forward to warn the generals about their tactical mistakes".[132].
ζ. ^ The assassins were probably either employed by the Spartans or by the brothers of a lady whom Alcibiades had seduced.[133][134] According to Isocrates, when the Thirty Tyrants established their rule, all Greece became unsafe for Alcibiades.[135]
η. ^ Since the beginning of the war, the Athenians had already initiated two expeditions and sent a delegetion to Sicily.[136] Plutarch underscores that "on Sicily the Athenians had cast longing eyes even while Pericles was living".[110]
Citations
- ^ a b A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 59 etc.
- ^ a b c P.B. Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, 151
- ^ C.A. Cox, Houshold Interests, 144
- ^ Plato, Alcibiades 1, 121a
- ^ a b c d "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedic Dictionary The Helios. 1952.
- ^ N. Denyer, Commentary of Plato's Alcibiades, 88-89
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 7
- ^ Plato, Symposium, 220e
- ^ Plato, Symposium, 221a
- ^ I. Sykoutris, Introduction to Symposium, 159-180
- ^ Plato, Symposium, 215a-222b
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 6
- ^ A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 339
- ^ a b R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, 353
- ^ a b c Plutarch, Alcibiades, 14
- ^ Thucydides, V, 45
- ^ A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 70
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 15
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 13
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, XVI
- ^ Andocides, Against Alcibiades, 22
- ^ a b Platias-Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 237-246
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 322
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 20
- ^ a b L. Strauss, The City and Man, 104
- ^ Thucydides, VI, 26
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 19
- ^ Thucydides, VI, 29
- ^ Thucydides, VI, 61
- ^ a b Thucydides, VI, 53
- ^ D. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 273
- ^ Thucydides, VI, 74
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 23
- ^ a b Thucydides, VI, 89-90
- ^ a b c d D. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 282-283
- ^ Thucydides, VII, 18
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 24 and Thucydides, VIII, 26
- ^ a b c "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2002.
- ^ Plutarch, Lysander, 22 and Agesilaus, III
- ^ P.J. Rhodes, A History of the Classical Greek World, 144
- ^ a b Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.45
- ^ a b Thucydides, VIII, 46
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 47
- ^ T. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History, 411
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 25
- ^ R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, 359
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 48
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 49
- ^ D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 131
- ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.53
- ^ a b D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 136-138
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 366
- ^ a b c Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8.56
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 73
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 76
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 81
- ^ a b c Plutarch, Alcibiades, 26
- ^ a b Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 389
- ^ a b c Thucydides, VIII, 82
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 97
- ^ Thucydides, VIII, 88
- ^ Cartwright-Warner, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 301
- ^ a b c Plutarch, Alcibiades, 27
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 406
- ^ Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.5
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 408
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 28
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 410
- ^ a b c d Diodorus, XIII, 50-51 Cite error: The named reference "Diodorus74" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ a b Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1.17-23
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 410-413
- ^ Diodorus, Library, 52-53
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 429
- ^ a b Diodorus, Library, xiii, 66.3 Cite error: The named reference "Diodorus66" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 30
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 410
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 32
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 33
- ^ a b A. Andrewes, The Spartan Resurgence, 490
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 443
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 35
- ^ G. Cawkell, Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War, 143
- ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 447
- ^ a b B. Perrin, The Death of Alcibiades , 25-37
- ^ a b Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1.25
- ^ a b Diodorus, Library, xiii, 105
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 39
- ^ a b c Thucydides, VI, 15
- ^ Plutarch, The Comparison of Alcibiades with Coriolanus, 6
- ^ D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 41
- ^ a b D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 32-33
- ^ a b Diodorus, Library, xiii, 68.5
- ^ a b S. Press, Was Alcibiades a Good General
- ^ Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4. 18
- ^ a b c Demosthenes, Against Meidias, 144-145
- ^ Isocrates, Concerning the Team of Horses, 15
- ^ Lysias, Against Alcibiades 1, 1
- ^ Lysias, Against Alcibiades 2, 10
- ^ Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians, 28
- ^ Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, ii, 13
- ^ a b Andocides, Against Alcibiades, 19 Cite error: The named reference "Andocides19" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades, XI
- ^ M.F. McGregor, The Genius of Alkibiades, 27-50
- ^ a b c Κ. Paparrigopoulos, History of the Greek Nation, Αβ, 264-268
- ^ D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 55 etc.
- ^ A.G. Platias and C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 240
- ^ Κ. Paparrigopoulos, History of the Greek Nation, Αβ, 272
- ^ A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 206
- ^ a b A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 202-203
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 17
- ^ a b c D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 419-420
- ^ Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades, VII
- ^ D. McCann - B. Strauss, War and Democracy, xxv
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 10
- ^ Aristophanes, Wasps, 44
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 1
- ^ D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 178
- ^ a b T. Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, 23-24
- ^ Aristophanes, Frogs, 1425
- ^ T.T.B. Ryder, Alcibiades, 32
- ^ D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 30
- ^ a b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 7
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 12
- ^ I. Sykoutris, Symposium of Plato (Comments), 225
- ^ Thucydides, I, 22
- ^ Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 385
- ^ R.J. Buck, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy, 27-28
- ^ a b R.J. Littman, The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus, 271
- ^ J. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 271
- ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 36
- ^ Plutarch, Comparison of Alcibiades with Coriolanus, 2
- ^ A. Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 5
- ^ H.T. Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities
- ^ W. Smith, New Classical Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, 39
- ^ Isocrates, Concerning the Team of Horses, 40
- ^ A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 204
References
Primary sources
|
|
Secondary sources
- "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2005.
- "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedia of Ancient Greece. Routledge (UK). 2002. ISBN 0-41597-334-1.
- "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedic Dictionary The Helios (in Greek). 1952.
- Andrewes, A. (1992). "The Spartan Resurgence". The Cambridge Ancient History edited by David M. Lewis, John Boardman, J. K. Davies, M. Ostwald (Volume V). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-52123-347-X.
- Buck, R.J. (1998). Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy: the Life of an Athenian Statesman. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ISBN 3-515-07221-7.
- Buckley, Terry (1996). Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-09957-9.
- Cartwright David, Warner Rex (1997). A Historical Commentary on Thucydides: A Companion to Rex Warner's Penguin Translation. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-08419-4.
- Cawkwell, George (1997). Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-16552-0.
- Cox, C.A. (1997). "What Was an Oikos?". Houshold Interests. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-69101-572-4.
- Denyer, Nicolas (2001). Alcibiades (commentary). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-52163-414-8.
- Gomme, A. W. (A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover). An Historical Commentary on Thucydides (I-V). Oxford University Press (1945-1981). ISBN 0-19-814198-X.
{{cite book}}
: Check date values in:|year=
(help)CS1 maint: year (link) - Gribble, David (1999). Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-815267-1.
- Habinek, Thomas N. (2004). Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-23515-9.
- Hatzfeld, Jean (1951). Alcibiade (in French). Presses Universitaires de France.
- Kagan, Donald (1991). The Fall of the Athenian Empire. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-9984-4.
- Kagan, Donald (2003). The Peloponnesian War. Viking Penguin (Penguin Group). ISBN 0-670-03211-5.
- Kern, Paul Bentley (1999). "Treatment of Captured Cities". Ancient Siege Warfare. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-25333-546-9.
- Littman, Robert J. (1968). "The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus". Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. 99: pp265-272.
{{cite journal}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - McCann David, Strauss Barry (2001). War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-0695-X.
- McGregor, Malcolom F. (1965). "The Genius of Alkibiades ". Phoenix. 19: pp27-50.
{{cite journal}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos (-Pavlos Karolidis) (1925), History of the Hellenic Nation (Volume Ab). Eleftheroudakis (in Greek).
- Peck, Harry Thurston (1898). Harper's Dictionary Of Classical Literature And Antiquities.
- Perrin, Bernadotte (1906). "The Death of Alcibiades". Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. 37: pp25-37.
{{cite journal}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - Platias Athanasios G., Koliopoulos Constantinos (2006). Thucydides on Strategy. Eurasia Publications. ISBN 960-8187-16-8.
- Rhodes, P.J. (2005). A History of the Classical Greek World. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-22564-1.
- Sealey, Raphael (1976). "The Peloponnesian War". A History of the Greek City States, 700-338 B. C. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-03177-6.
- Press, Sharon (1991). "Was Alcibiades a Good General?". Brown Classical Journal. 7.
- Smith, Willian (1851). A New Classical Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, Mythology and Geography. Harper & brothers.
- Strauss, Leo (1978). The City and Man. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-77701-4.
- Sykoutris, Ioannis (1934). Symposium (Introduction and Comments) -in Greek. Estia.
- Vlachos, Angelos (1974). Thucydides' Bias. Estia (in Greek).
- Wolpert, Andrew (2002). Remembering Defeat: Civil War and Civic Memory in Ancient Athens. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-6790-8.
Further reading
- Atherton, Gertrude (2004). The Jealous Gods. Kessinger Publishing Co. ISBN 1-41792-807-7.
- Chavarria, Daniel (2005). The Eye Of Cybele. Akashic Books. ISBN 1-88845-167-X.
- Green, Peter (1967). Achilles his Armour. Doubleday.
- Hughes-Hallett, Lucy. Heroes: A History of Hero Worship. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, New York, 2004. ISBN 1-4000-4399-9.
- Pressfield, Steven. Tides of War: A Novel of Alcibiades and the Peloponnesian War. Doubleday, New York, New York, 2000. ISBN 0-385-49252-9.
- Robinson, Cyril Edward (1916). The Days of Alkibiades. E. Arnold.
- Romilly de, Jacqueline (1997). Alcibiade, ou, Les dangers de l'ambition (in French). LGF. ISBN 2-253-14196-8.
- Sutcliff, Rosemary (1971). Flowers of Adonis. Hodder & Stoughton Ltd. ISBN 0-34015-090-4.
External links
|
|