Talk:Falun Gong

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In relation to qigong and its roots in Chinese culture

In 1992, Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong and along with teachings that touched upon a wide range of topics, from detailed exposition on qigong related phenomenon and cultivation practice to science and morality. In the next few years, Falun Gong quickly grew in popularity across China to become the most popular qigong practice in Chinese History. Falun Gong was welcomed into the state-controlled Scientific Qigong Research Association, which sponsored and helped to organize many of his activities between 1992 and 1994, including 54 large-scale lectures. In 1992 and 1993 he won government awards at the Beijing Oriental Health Expos, including the "Qigong Master most acclaimed by the Masses" and "The Award for Advancing Boundary Science."

According to academics, Falun Gong originally surfaced in the institutional field of alternative Chinese science, not religion. The debate between what can be called "naturalist" and "supernaturalist" schools of qigong theory has produced a considerable amount of literature. Xu Jian stated in The Journal of Asian Studies 58 (4 November 1999): "Situated both in scientific researches on qigong and in the prevailing nationalistic revival of traditional beliefs and values, this discursive struggle has articulated itself as an intellectual debate and enlisted on both sides a host of well-known writers and scientists — so much so that a veritable corpus of literature on qigong resulted. In it, two conflicting discourses became identifiable. Taking “discourse” in its contemporary sense as referring to forms of representation that generate specific cultural and historical fields of meaning, we can describe one such discourse as rational and scientific and the other as psychosomatic and metaphysical. Each strives to establish its own order of power and knowledge, its own “truth” about the “reality” of qigong, although they differ drastically in their explanation of many of its phenomena. The controversy centers on the question of whether and how qigong can induce “supranormal abilities” (teyi gongneng). The psychosomatic discourse emphasizes the inexplicable power of qigong and relishes its super-normal mechanisms or which causative factors which go beyond wht canbe explained by presentday scietific models, whereas the rational discourse strives to demystify many of its phenomena and to situate it strictly in the knowledge present day modern science." The Chinese government has generally tried to encourage qigong as a science and discourage religious or supernatural elements. However, the category of science in China tends to include things that are generally not considered scientific in the West, including qigong and traditional Chinese medicine.

David Aikman has written in American Spectator (March 2000): "Americans may believe that qigong belongs in a general category of socially neutral, New Age-style concepts that are merely subjective, not necessarily harmful, and incapable of scientific proof. But China's scientific community doesn't share this view. Experiments under controlled conditions established by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration. Qi, according to much of China's scientific establishment, for all intents existed."

Li Hongzhi states in Falun Buddha Fa Lectures in Europe:

"Since the time Dafa was made public, I have unveiled some inexplicable phenomena in qigong as well as things that hadn’t been explained in the qigong community. But this isn’t the reason why so many people are studying Dafa. It’s because our Fa can truly enable people to Consummate, truly save people, and allow you to truly ascend to high levels in the process of cultivation. Whether it’s your realm of mind or the physical quality of your body, the Fa truly enables you to reach the standards of different levels. It absolutely can assume this role."

Andrew P. Kipnis is quoted as stating: "...to the Western layperson, qigong of all sorts may seem to be religious because it deals with spiritual matters. Because Li Hongzhi makes use of many concepts from Buddhism and Taoism in his writings, this may make Falun Gong seem even more like a religion to the outsider; bur Falun Gong grew initially into a space termed scientific [in China], but was mostly insulated from the spaces formally acknowledged as institutionalized science in Western countries"

The term 'qigong' was coined in the early 1950s as an alternative label to past spiritual disciplines rooted Buddhism or Taoism, that promoted the belief in the supernatural, immortality and pursuit of spiritual transcendence. The new term was constructed to avoid danger of association with ancient spiritual practices which were labeled "superstitious" and persecuted during the Maoist era. In Communist China, where spirituality and religion are looked-down upon, the concept was "tolerated" because it carried with it no overt religious or spiritual elements; and millions flocked to it during China's spiritual vacuum of the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars argue that the immense popularity of qigong in China could, in part, lie in the fact that the public saw in it a way to improve and maintain health. According to Ownby, this rapidly became a social phenomenon of considerable importance.

Membership and finances

Sociologist Susan Palmer writes that, "...Falun Gong does not behave like other new religions. For one thing, its organization - if one can even call it that - is quite nebulous. There are no church buildings, rented spaces, no priests or administrators. At first I assumed this was defensive [...] now, I'm beginning to think that what you see is exactly what you get - Master Li's teachings on the Net on the one hand and a global network of practitioners on the other. Traveling through North America, all I dug up was a handful of volunteer contact persons. The local membership (they vehemently reject that word) is whoever happens to show up at the park on a particular Saturday morning to do qigong."

Finances

In his thesis, Noah Porter takes up the issue of Falun Gong and finance in Mainland China. He quotes and responds to some of the allegations of the Chinese Communist Party that Li benefited financially from teaching the practice. Porter writes that when teaching seminars, there was an admission of 40 yuan per new practitioner and 20 yuan for repeat practitioners--with the repeat practitioners making up for 50-75% of the admissions. He goes on to say with respect to the CCP's claims: "...but the Chinese government figures for the profits of the seminars counted all attendees as paying the 40-yuan fee charged to newcomers. Also, the Chinese Qigong Research Society received 40% of admission receipts from July 1993 to September 1994. Falun Gong's first four training seminars took in a total of 20,000 yuan, which is only 10% of the 200,000 figure cited by the Chinese government. Finally, from that 20,000 yuan, they had several operating expenses..."

Ian Johnson points out that during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were bootleg.

James Tong writes about the competing claims by Falun Gong and the Chinese government in 'The China Quarterly' journal, 2003. He writes that the government has attempted to portray Falun Gong as being financially savvy with a centralized administration system and a variety of mechanisms for deriving profit from the practice. He also looks over Falun Gong's claims of having no hierarchy, administration, membership or financial accounts, and that seminar admission was charged at a minimal rate. Tong writes that it was in the government's interest, in the post-crackdown context, to portray Falun Gong as being highly organised: "The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime's repression in the name of social order was." He writes that the government's charges that Falun Gong made excessive profits, charged exorbitant fees, and that Li Hongzhi led a lavish lifestyle "...lack both internal and external substantiating evidence" and points out that that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities "had disclosed no financial accounts that established the official charge and credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals."

Li Hongzhi stipulates in his books Falun Gong and Zhuan Falun that practitioners should only voluntarily help others learn the exercises and that this could never be done for fame and money, and also stipulates that practitioners must not accept any fee, donation or gift in return for their voluntarily teaching the practice. According to Falun Gong, Li's insistence that the practice be offered free of charge caused a rift with the China Qigong Research Society, the state administrative body under which Falun Dafa was initially introduced. Li subsequently withdrew from the organization.

Falun Gong website often state on their pages that "All Falun Gong Activities Are Free of Charge and Run by Volunteers"

In an interview in Sydney on May 2, 1999, mentioning his financial status, Li said : "In mainland China I published so many books, but added together, they haven't exceeded twenty thousand Renminbi (equivalent to US $ 2,469). This is what the publishing company gave me. When publishing books in other countries of the world, you know there is a rule, which pays 5 or 6% royalties to the author, so each time I can only get a little bit, a few hundred, or a few thousand dollars."

Questionable source: death toll of 65,000/70,000?

I found a citation at Falun Gong#Death Toll, where an article "According to Ethan Gutmann of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies" suggests "a likely death toll based on refugee testimony is approximately 65,000"(The number in the original article is 70000). After checking this article, I was doubtful about the validity of its opinion on the death toll: firstly, the main focus of the article is not Falun Gong but the overall Chinese political situation; secondly, the article provides neither citation of the "refugee testimony" nor any possible sources of them. Though this article provide some useful opinion, I think this article is not enough credible for claim of such a great number.--Inspector (talk) 08:07, 1 January 2012 (UTC)

The source provided does somewhat glance over the topic, but Gutmann is probably the most prolific writer on Falungong today, and this article is one of many that he has written, which together, I think, show the depth of research and corroboration he has conducted. Here’s the quote from the article currently cited followed by some more relevant information:

Beginning in the year 1999, the elimination of Falun Gong became the most potent issue in China, as reflected in the incarceration rates of Falun Gong practitioners (about 450,000 to one million in any single year) and it did not officially subside from that position until the middle of the next decade. At this point, the true casualty rate started to emerge from refugee testimony—approximately 70,000 fatalities, mostly through organ harvesting in military hospitals.

An explanation of how Gutmann arrived at these figures is here, and one example of the refugee testimonies he is referring to is found here. It’s worth noting, as Gutmann does in his personal blog, that his figures are fairly consistent with those of Kilgour and Matas, both estimates being arrived at independently of each other. The number, in my opinion, is valid and certainly notable. —Zujine|talk 17:25, 1 January 2012 (UTC)

I'm not sure that the validity matters. The accuracy is unknowable anyway. We should probably just treat statements by Gutmann the same way we treat official statements by the CPC. That seems to be essentially how it is handled now in the Death Toll section via attribution. I think the issue is more whether reliable non-partisan mainstream/academic sources or respected sources like Amnesty and HRW report Gutmann's estimates. I don't know but I don't think sourcing to the likes of highly partisan sources such as inFocus Quarterly, The Weekly Standard etc help to establish how much weight, if any, we should give to the claims. Sean.hoyland - talk 18:17, 1 January 2012 (UTC)

I see. So does Gutmann's method differ greatly from that of Kilgour and Matas? And also, the blog article gives the low and high estimations, so should we use that range instead of the number in the other article?--Inspector (talk) 01:00, 2 January 2012 (UTC)

When the death toll of a particular incident varies so widely, as from an estimation of thousands according to the NYT to tens of thousands according to Gutmann, it is rational to cast a doubt on either number. I wonder if we need a disclaimer such as "none of the death toll numbers quoted above as well as the alleged causes of the deaths are presented with reliable evidence". This is not to negate the crimes done by the CPC, rather, it is a way to make the article more neutral. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.244.152.119 (talk) 19:21, 2 January 2012 (UTC)

The paragraph already begins with the caveat that "Due to the difficulty in corroborating reports of torture deaths in China, estimates on the number of Falun Gong adherents killed under persecution vary widely." It is assumed that, given the political environment of China, independent verification is not always possible, and some cases are almost certainly never reported. I don't know that this needs to be emphasized further, and I have reservations about making the assessment (without knowledge of their methodology) that the researchers making these estimates lacked 'reliable evidence.' As to the handling of Gutmann's estimate, I just edited it to note that 65,000 is the median estimate he produced.

On another note, Gutmann is a reliable source on Falun Gong. He has published a well reviewed book on contemporary China in a mainstream press, has testified before U.S. and European parliament, and published numerous articles on the topic in reliable sources. One of his latest articles on organ harvesting was cited by David Brooks of the New York Times[5] as one of the best examples of long form journalism of the year. His comments are in no way of equivalent value as statements from the Communist Party, so let's avoid falling into a False balance fallacy again. That said, in the case of citing death toll estimates, all should be given inline citations. Homunculus (duihua) 02:53, 3 January 2012 (UTC)

On second thought, we might want to consider depicting these estimates within a table, which would cite the numbers, source of the estimate, publishing date, and a brief account of the methodology employed (if available).Homunculus (duihua) 03:30, 3 January 2012 (UTC)

I guess Gutmann should have published his research more formally and specificly somewhere, which would be better than that article just mentioned a bit about the persecution of Falun Gong and the death toll. And should we use the range 9,011-120,150 as shown in Gutmann's approach to be more specific?--Inspector (talk) 09:53, 3 January 2012 (UTC)

It would be nice to see Ethan Gutmann cited on question of Falun Gong death toll by secondary sources. Such secondary scholarly citings would not be that hard to find, if he is the most prolific writer on Falun Gong today. Source watch defines his area of expertise broadly though as recognized authority on American business involvement in China's Internet and an advocate of Chinese democracy. If we give his words on death toll weight equivalent to statements from the Communist Party we should make sure that reliable sources do the same. I'm currently, after doing some Google search homework, quite sceptic though that the equivalence tendency could be demonstrated. AgadaUrbanit (talk)

Sorry, I forgot about this until now. Inspector, after you raised this issue I edited the page to make clear that 65,000 was the median estimate. I suppose it would be just the same to give the range, however, so go ahead. Published articles in which he mentions this number (but doesn't describe his methodology) are here[6] [7] [8] Describing one's methodology is not the kind of thing that one would publish within the body of an article, obviously, which is why we're left with Gutmann's blog. AgandaUrbanit, I don't understand. Are you looking for sources that cite Gutmann's estimates side-by-side with Communist Party estimates? If so, you'll have a hard time indeed; the Communist Party does not publish estimates on Falun Gong deaths in custody. At most, they occasionally deny that deaths were caused by torture in individual cases. It would probably be prudent for us to make a note of this phenomenon. Case in point: [9] Here, an old woman is "imprisoned... without charge. Officials demanded that she recant her faith. She refused, was beaten unconscious and, on Feb.21, died, according to prison inmates and family members." Her body was found by family members to be bruised and burned from torture, and officials claimed the death was the result of natural causes. It is hard to know just how representative this is, but in the absence of statistics, anecdotal evidence like this is probably all we'll get to represent the official position. Homunculus (duihua) 00:57, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

I'm sorry, if I was unclear, Homunculus. I'm not looking for false balance between the Communist Party and Falun Dafa. Wikipedia is ideally a tertiary source. The references that are being cited, are primary, i.e. by Ethan Gutmann , last reference specifically How many harvested? - is a self published personal blog. Those sources are weak. Wikipedia articles should be based on reliable, published secondary sources. Secondary sources, books, academical peer-reviewed research papers, major news providers like NYTimes or BBC citing Ethan Gutmann numbers are required to establish weight and encyclopedic value of Ethan Gutmann material. AgadaUrbanit (talk) 20:47, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but the Weekly Standard, Jewish Policy Center, and National Review are not primary sources. They are solid, reliable sources, and Gutmann's articles within them would have needed to pass muster with some strict editorial boards. I included the blog because Wikipedia policy permits the use of self-published sources when the author is an established expert on the subject on which they are writing, and the blog provides a detailed explanation of Gutmann's methodology. If you want yet more sources that cite Gutmann's research, I suggest you check these: [10][11]. I'm very curious how you are defining a primary source. Homunculus (duihua) 21:12, 9 January 2012 (UTC) I'll elaborate: I assume you're defining Gutmann as a primary source because his conclusions were based, in part, on his own investigative research and interviews. He is a journalist. Conducting interviews and publishing the resulting findings is what journalists do. Gutmann's research has been reliably published on multiple occasions by reliable sources, cited in U.S. Congress, and lauded in the New York Times. Where his findings are provided on the page, they are given an inline citation. I'm really not clear on what you're objecting to.Homunculus (duihua) 21:28, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

Thank you for new references, Homunculus. I dont have access to CQ source, but Thomas Lum is a great source and currently being used as ref #8 at Kilgour-Matas report article. Weekly Standard, Jewish Policy Center, and National Review materials are not self-published like EastOfEthan, though the material is clearly by Ethan Gutmann, thus primary. I've tried to look for secondary sources books, academical papers or news articles saying something like: "according to Ethan Gutmann the death toll is 65,000" or talking about median estimations, but failed to find any. AgadaUrbanit (talk) 21:59, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

Ah, right, you have to pay for the CQ researcher. Here's an excerpt: "At least [Falun Gong practitioners] 62,000 were victims of organ harvesting operations from 2000-2008, according to Matas and Kilgour and Ethan Gutmann, an investigative journalist. Matas and Kilgour, who were nominated for a Nobel Prize for their investigation, say the organs were then “sold” to foreign transplant tourists." I appreciate your diligence on this, even though we clearly don't see eye-to-eye on the use of sources. In any case, even if one were to concede that reliably published journalistic findings like these are primary source (and I'm not prepared to make that concession in this case), primary sources can be used in wikipedia articles to describe themselves: "Unless restricted by another policy, primary sources that have been reliably published may be used in Wikipedia, but only with care, because it is easy to misuse them....A primary source may only be used on Wikipedia to make straightforward, descriptive statements that any educated person, with access to the source but without specialist knowledge, will be able to verify are supported by the source." That is, Gutmann's reliably published research can be used to describe the content of his own research. His notability an an expert on the topic has already been established. Homunculus (duihua) 22:28, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

Interesting, I could see the "at least" Sarah Glazer's quote here. AgadaUrbanit (talk) 22:44, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

References for above

References

Number of followers in 1999

We say in Demography section:

Prior to 1999, widely cited government estimates put the number of Falun Gong practitioners in China at over 70 million adherents. After the government imposed a ban on the group, it adjusted its estimates to approximately 2 million.

It might appear that the quoted material source is faluninfo.net, Number of Falun Gong practitioners in China in 1999: at least 70 million, which also uses the same three sources and arrives to adjustment conclusion. See sources for clarity:

• Renee Schoff's May 1 1999, New-age China: Cult or Cure (found it using faluninfo quote: "“But with more members than the Communist Party - at least 70 million, according to the State Sports Administration - Falun is also a formidable social network...”")
• Seth Faison, "In Beijing: A Roar of Silent Protestors," New York Times, 27 April 1999
• Seth Faison, "Followers of Chinese Sect Defend Its Spiritual Goals," New York Times, 30 July 1999

Later we add in 1996–1999 section:

By 1999, estimates provided by the State Sports Commission suggest there are upwards of 70 millions Falun Gong practitioners in China. Wu Shaozu, an official from China’s National Sports Commission, was at this time quoted in an interview with U.S. News & World Report that as many as 100 million may have taken up Falun Gong and other forms of qigong. Wu noted that the popularity of Falun Gong dramatically reduces health care costs, and that “Premier Zhu Rongji is very happy about that.”

Suggestions

1. We should do something about material duplication Demography<->1996–1999.
2. For Demography quoted material we might follow Seth Faison, 30 July 1999, along lines: Falun Gong followers insist that they number at least 100 million, though scholars say a truer figure is probably between 20 million and 60 million. The authorities, not known for their accurate portrayal of the group's followers, say there are only two million."

AgadaUrbanit (talk) 02:02, 4 February 2012 (UTC)

There doesn't seem to be a great deal of duplicate material. Given that the number of followers in China circa 1999 is relevant to both the history and the demography, I think it's fine to keep it in both places; the mention is brief enough. As to the Seth Faison accounts, there are two articles by him: the first, published in April 1999, cites government estimates of 70 million. The second, published after the suppression began in July 1999, notes the adjusted government estimate of 2 million. The estimate of ~2 million first appeared in mid-July of 1999, and was made public immediately after the campaign began. This is why it's stated that the government adjusted its estimate downwards from tens of millions to two million. I hope that's clear. The page already gives a range of estimates from Western observers of 10 - 70 million. Maybe it should be 10 - 60 million, citing Faison on the high end, and David Palmer on the low end. One could also add a note that estimates vary, in part, because people are measuring different things. Palmer, for instance, is trying to gauge the number of committed disciples, not casual practitioners.

Regarding you edit to the lede, it reads a little choppy to me. Also, I'm sure this was just an oversight, but you got the pronoun wrong. People are "who," things are "which."Homunculus (duihua) 03:33, 4 February 2012 (UTC)

• Regarding lede edit, somebody already fixed which->who.
• Regarding it adjusted its estimates - we can not attribute this material to Seth Faison, 30 July 1999, the source does not note that. We could attribute this observation to faluninfo.net, if other editors agree.
• Regarding 70 millions number, it appears this number comes from the State Sports Commission, according to Renee Schoff's May 1 1999. We have a source in 1996–1999 section where Wu Shaozu, an official from China’s National Sports Commission, raises estimations to 100 millions.

AgadaUrbanit (talk) 15:43, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

Regarding the adjusted estimate, I recommend we source this to the U.S. Department of State: "Prior to the Government's 1999 ban on Falun Gong, it estimated that there were 70 million adherents; the Government subsequently adjusted the number of adherents to approximately 2 million. Falun Gong sources estimate that tens of millions continue to practice privately."[12]. As to the other estimates, what do you propose? Homunculus (duihua) 02:16, 7 February 2012 (UTC)

The US government source does not shed more light on the issue, imho. The source is not academical, rather political, and does not cite any primary source for their claim. 70 millions number still appears to be reliably sourced to China’s National Sports Commission. The Sports Commission organization does not appear to represent CCP or PRC government. On the contrary, Wu Shaozu cited statements demonstrate that Sport Commission is sympathetic to Falun Gong. We have additional source in the lede

• By 1999, some estimates placed the number of Falun Gong adherents at over 70 million, exceeding the total membership of the Chinese Communist Party.

According to Gallagher-Ashcraft Falun Gong claimed 60 million followers, "rivaling the size of the CCP". Lede's Joseph Kahn's source attribute the 70 millions number to "Beijing" or PRC government., such claim contains internal contradiction, since Kahn notes: "Chinese Government estimates has more members than the Communist Party". Well, even reliable sources contain bad material from time to time. I'd sugest to treat claims that "rival the size of the CCP" indiscriminately as Falun Gong estimates.

For the article material, on question of number of Falun Gong partitioners in 1999, I'd sugest to go along lines of Librarian from Idaho, which cites this information to Tong, supra n. 11, at 636 and say:

• By the time of crackdown in1999, estimations on Falun Gong membership ranged from as low as 2.1 million according to CCP and and as high as 60-80 million according to Falun Gong.

AgadaUrbanit (talk) 02:04, 18 February 2012 (UTC)

Hi Agada, I'm afraid I'm more than a little confused as to what you're proposing. The State Sports Commission (aka State General Administration for Sports) that Wu Shaozu represented is a government organization under the control of the State Council. It is correct to say that a government body produced an estimate of ~70 million in 1998 (at that time the suppression had not begun, and several government ministries still openly supported Falun Gong). In July 1999, the Ministry of Public Security issued a revised number of about 2.1 million. It is my understanding that Falun Gong claimed to have closer to 100 million members, by contrast. I also don't know what you're saying regarding the notion that FG may have had more members than the party. Multiple news reports and other reliable sources have noted this comparison. As to the U.S. government source, I provided it because it's a reliable source that clearly connects the two divergent estimates from Chinese government sources, saying that the Chinese authorities revised their numbers downward from 70 million to 2 million. There is nothing politically driven in this observation; it's just what happened. Could you just clarify what you're suggesting? Homunculus (duihua) 16:39, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

Sorry, but the quantum leap State General Administration for Sports equals CCP is still not reliable. Sure, in 1999 when the crackdown started, sensational news reports might have included the material by media reporters where those two organizations were mixed up. For an observer outside China, it might appear that the Communist Party controls everything and everybody inside China and let's not pretend that PRC is a liberal democracy. But when we cross-reference with other sources present in this article even for a non-expert like me, it is clear that Wu Shaozu advocates for the Falun Gong. For the sake of the quality we need to base the material on later academical independent secondary sources, like Librarian from Idaho which summarizes academical world view on the subject. AgadaUrbanit (talk) 21:20, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

References for above

References

Organ Harvesting

The idea of the Chinese harvesting the organs of Falun Gong prisoners against their will while they're still alive and selling them on the black market is almost as interesting as it is horrific, to me anyway. With the way the People's republic of china seems to be silently castrating almost all Wikipedia articles concerning it I have to say I'm not surprised. If I was more knowledgeable about editing these pages I would take it on myself to fight the suppression of free information about China but as lowly ignorant consumer of Wikipedia's greatness I have to leave that to all of you. I hope that the Kilgour-Matas Report is found worth mentioning in this article and also that the tank picture is returned to the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 article...I really doubt the copyright owner is more concerned with his dues than preventing the power of his image from being suppressed and hidden from the world by the Chinese. '

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Propaganda

Nice propaganda in this article.

-There has never been any conclusive evidence for the allegations of organ harvesting or even the allegations of widespread torture of Falun Gong members. The allegations should be classified here as opinion, not stated as fact. Significant doubts have been raised concerning many of these supposed human rights abuses.

-Falun Gong was outlawed because of it's political motivations and it's threat to stability in China, not because of it's "spiritual teachings". Anybody who believes that is completely ignorant of the objective, observable reality. There are countless Qigong based spiritual groups operating in China openly, without any kind of persecution. Falun Gong was banned when it became increasingly political, culminating when 10'000 members staged an illegal demonstration at Zhongnanhai.

-Academic classifications of what Falun Gong actually is are varied. Margaret Singer, Berkeley professor and considered by many to be the world's foremost expert on cults, considered them a cult. This deserves mention.

-Absurd figures such as "70 million adherents in Mainland China", "more followers than the members of the Chinese Communist Party" are not consistent with reality and are not academically sound by any standard. How was this laughable data collected?

-Mention should be made of Falun Gong's control of/association with propaganda outlets such as The Epoch Times, Shen Yun Performing Arts and New Tang Dynasty Television.

-Proper mention should be made of the high profile murder and suicide cases involving Falun Gong members, as well as the hundreds of instances of FLG members perishing as a result of refusal to take medicine or recieve medical treatment

Honestly, this article reads like something straight off of clearwisdom. It's a laugh. — Preceding unsigned comment added by AnAimlessRoad (talk • contribs) 02:59, 13 February 2012 (UTC)

Gallagher and Ashcraft source

I noticed that an editor added to the section on teachings a paragraph about Falun Gong's understanding of the current "apocalyptic" period.[13] There is no academic consensus on whether Falun Gong's message is apocalyptic, in what respect it might be, or what the implications of that are. This is why that discussion is currently represented in the controversies section. Gallagher and Ashcraft appear to have written a reference work on Falun Gong, and as far as I can tell, did not do field work or serious textual analysis to come to their conclusions about Falun Gong's teachings. Furthermore, Eugene Gallagher also lacks a background in Eastern religions, and I can't even find a professional affiliation for Ashcraft. As long as they are making generally accepted statements, they're a fine source as a reference work. But given that they have no Falun Gong-specific expertise, I would suggest they are not qualified to be treated as the authoritative source on Falun Gong's "apocalyptic" message. As far as I'm concerned, Benjamin Penny is the closest thing to an authoritative source on this aspect of Falun Gong's teachings; he is an expert in eastern religion, and has published prolifically on Falun Gong, including on this subject specifically. I recommend putting the paragraph that was added into the broader discussion on this aspect of Falun Gong's teachings, which is at the end of the page (but condense it to come closer to due weight).Homunculus (duihua) 13:55, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

• Gallagher - Eugene V. Gallagher Rosemary Park Professor of Religious Studies. BA, La Salle University; MA, PhD, University of Chicago

"One of the fundamental purposes of education in the liberal arts: to situate students’ experience in the “here and now” in terms of multiple instances of “there” (other cultures) and “then” (other times). The comparative study of religion aims to fulfill that purpose by inviting students to entertain a variety of “what if” questions that can provide multiple points of entry into the religious worlds of others. That process of entertaining seriously how others make meaning of the world through their religious acts and convictions, much more than the factual knowledge it yields, is the beginning of religious literacy." - Eugene Gallagher

• Ashcraft Wm. Michael Ashcraft Dr. Ashcraft at Truman since 1996. He holds his doctoral and master’s degrees from the University of Virginia. He received his Master of Divinity from the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary and his bachelor’s from the University of Tennessee at Martin.
• Both appear to be editors of Nova Religio
• I'm not an expert, but the source in question appears academical and decently sourced also in Falun Gong section. Gallagher-Ashcraft cited widely Though, you are absolutely right the material should be attributed, AgadaUrbanit (talk) 00:08, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for clarifying their affiliations, but you don't address the main points I raised. These researchers do not have an expertise in Falun Gong or Eastern religions specifically; the focus of their research is on Western religions. They wrote a survey book on new and alternative religions in America. As I said, it's fine to use as a reference work for generally accepted statements, but there are many more high quality sources available on Falun Gong. Noah Porter or Craig Burgdoff have published the results of their extensive field work, and are quite good. Even better are experts on Eastern religion and Falun Gong like David Ownby or Benjamin Penny. Given that there are superior sources, and that they do not have a consensus on the question of the apocalyptic teachings, I'm saying that we shouldn't elevate the Gallagher / Ashcraft reference work to such an authoritative position in such a prominent place in the article. I recommend putting the substance of their writing into the relevant section on controversies. I'm not trying to disparage this book, but the views of the scholarly community should be presented according to their notability and prominence. Gallagher and Ashcraft, simply put, are not experts on Falun Gong teachings.Homunculus (duihua) 02:22, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

I'm sorry I was not clear. I don't have problems with David Ownby, for instance, which is also published by Nova Religio, according to sources in this article. I believe schoolars in comparative study of religion would be an appropriate source. Their work is decently sourced. Though you could take it to WP:RSN if you believe Eugene V. Gallagher; W. Michael Ashcraft (2006). Introduction to New and Alternative Religions in America: African diaspora traditions and other American innovations. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 174. ISBN 978-0-275-98717-6. Retrieved 4 February 2012. is unreliable for Falun Gong specifically and should be excluded from this article. Though I doubt such a move would be accepted, since Wikipedia needs to be balanced from multiple points of view. AgadaUrbanit (talk) 11:10, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

I never said that I believed the source to be unreliable. I said twice that I think it is fine as a reference work, particularly for statements that are generally accepted. The problem is that scholars disagree about one of the key statements Gallagher and Ashcraft made — that Falun Gong espouses apocalyptic teachings. There is currently a section in the article that describes that debate, and it is in the 'controversies' section. My argument is that, given the presence of this debate, we cannot regard Gallagher and Ashcraft's word on the matter as authoritative, which is what you have done. That is why I recommend that it be moved down into the relevant section in controversies, and shortened to reflect the weight that should be given to Gallagher and Ashcraft's views. I recommend this precisely because "Wikipedia needs to be balanced from multiple points of view." You cannot have non-expert scholars (non-expert on Falun Gong, I mean) saying definitively that Falun Gong is apocalyptical, and fail to note the divergence of views among scholars who actually have conducted field work or possess expertise in eastern religion. Do you follow? There is a hierarchy of sources. People like David Ownby and Benjamin Penny are considered experts on Falun Gong, and Gallagher and Ashcraft possess only general knowledge of it in the context of a new religious movement in America. I can make this change if you're not sure what I mean. Homunculus (duihua) 14:33, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

Sorry, no one takes Gallagher and Ashcraft as authoritative, that's why we have attribution. I've added more sources to reflect the controversy and Li's denial, per ref name="Schechter2001". AgadaUrbanit (talk) 18:58, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

I still don't think you understand what I was saying. There was already a section in the article that describes the academic debate around Li's views of the apocalypse. As such, that is where this material belongs. It should be stated using the views of the best and most notable sources, and should not be given undue weight. Please understand that this article would be unreadable if it became an indiscriminate repository of everything that every scholar has ever said on Falun Gong. The section on "core teachings" should reflect the most essential teachings, as agreed to and as noted by the best sources on Falun Gong. It should not become a place to cite at will every scholar's views on every aspect of Falun Gong morality and cosmology. I will revisit this later to try to clean it up more.Homunculus (duihua) 19:12, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

The main body of the article is not the a place to hash out debates on Falungong's views by quoting a handful of academics selectively (by the way, I recognized very few of the sourced AgadaUrbanit used; most seemed, like Gallagher, to be survey works on contemporary China or new religion). The body of an article should present clear summaries of the most important practices and beliefs that scholars generally agree upon. If you read Ownby, Porter, Palmer, Burgdoff, Penny, and others, I think you'll find that it does a fairly good job in its current form. To that end, Homunculus is right that the debate about 'apocalyptic' teachings, if it exists, should be in the controversies section. My own view is that the debate is at least partly imagined, because people are fixating on the classification as apocalyptic or millenial, rather than the substance. Ideally, we could use superior sources to tell us in simple, uneditorialised terms, what exactly Li says about this subject. I will also note that 'Fa rectification' is an important aspect of Falungong teachings, if a poorly understood one (Ownby makes no attempt to veil his confusion. At least he's honest). It's not as prominent as the more basic teachings, but has become more important since 1999. I would suggest that Penny's latest book is the best source to describe it. When I have a little more time, I can try to write something, and will propose it first on the talk page before trying to put it in the article.—Zujine|talk 19:40, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

Fair enough. Something on Fa rectification can be included, but yes, let's agree to it before making unilateral changes to the page. I took issue with AgandaUrbanit's edit because 1) I embrace in nuance, not sensational labels like "apocalyptic," 2) I once spent a lot of time cleaning up all the soundbites and scholarly "debate" on the page, when more often than not, it was totally unnecessary and served only to make things unreadable, and 3) I believe in only using only the best sources for controversial subjects, and hold that different sources have different uses. Homunculus (duihua) 20:23, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

Homunculus,

A Please don't remove sourced material without explanation, with misleading edit summary: "Moving this into controversies, where it belongs. Will revisit to clean up more later." Please restore:

1. According to Dillon, philosophical vision underlying Falun Gong teaching is that humanity is moving towards apocalypse, only true believers would achieve salvation. per Michael Dillon (2009). Contemporary China: an introduction. Routledge. p. 115. ISBN 978-0-415-34319-0. Retrieved 15 February 2012. {{cite book}}: External link in |author= (help)
2. According to Schafferer, Li predicts that human kind will be destroyed, because people have mutated (bianyi). Li said that he established Falun Dafa "to provide salvation to mankind ... in this final period of the Last Havoc". per Christian Schafferer (2005). Understanding modern East Asian politics. Nova Publishers. pp. 94–05. ISBN 978-1-59454-505-4. Retrieved 15 February 2012. {{cite book}}: External link in |author= (help)

B Please don't distort what sources say using neutral factual Wikipedia narrator voice. Please restore attributions:

1. GallagherAshcraft2006 distortion
2. Schechter2001

Please fix A and B

Let me make it clear: from looking at logical structure of this article the location under International reception -> Controversies is bit strange, when multiple sources provided discuss the controversy under Falun Gong teaching topic. Wikipedia editors are just citing monkeys and should comply to sources.

AgadaUrbanit (talk) 23:12, 15 February 2012 (UTC)

Evidently we have different understandings of the role of Wikipedia editors and the desirable presentation of information. My belief is that we are not simply monkeys quoting any and all scholars—regardless of expertise or notability—at will. In my view, it is our job to provide coherent, clear narratives for the reader, based on careful readings and summaries of the best reliable sources available. These sources should be used in proportion to their quality and prominence in the academic discourse. This is why I removed some of the sources you added: they are not notable experts on Falun Gong teachings, their contributions did not add anything new that would actually enhance a reader's understanding of the subject, and providing a lengthy paragraph in which scholars are quoted indiscriminately ended up giving this subject undue weight on the page. I meant no offense in removing some of your research, but really, I hope you can appreciate my point that articles should not just be a repository of quotations that fail to actually illuminate the subject. If you refer to articles that have achieved good or featured article status, I think you will find that they would never have paragraphs that do that.

As to the charge that I distorted sources, I don't know what you mean on the Schechter one. I could see how my change to the use of the Gallagher source might be construed as original synthesis, though, so will fix it. As to the organization of the page, you raised a good point: the controversies section should probably stand on its own, rather than as a sub-section of international reception. Homunculus (duihua) 00:08, 16 February 2012 (UTC)

A couple more points:

• The Schafferer source is actually a chapter by Maria Hsia Chang. Chang has published on Falun Gong before, though her research was not very well received by peers in the field (Ownby eviscerated her work, as I recall). In particular, she was out of her depth as a political scientist trying to interpret religious doctrine. I tried looking through the chapter she wrote in Christian Schafferer, and found it consistently contradictory. On one page, she says that Li predicts that mankind will be obliterated, and on the next page, she quotes him saying the opposite—that human society will exist forever. In one place she says that Li teaches good people will survive the ‘apocalypse’ (a liberal translation of the Chinese; it should be ‘calamity’), and elsewhere says otherwise, and so on. This is why we need to tread carefully with this material. I can put in something to reflect her views, but it pains me to quote sub-par scholarship for the sake of it. AgadaUrbanit, would you still like me to do that?
• Zujine, I just realized the Penny book I sent you is not going to be publicly accessible until April (I've been sitting on a review copy, knowing it would be published in 2012. I didn't realize it's not yet available to the masses, and as such, may fail WP:V). We should probably wait six weeks before citing it in the article, which is unfortunate. Maybe I'll ask an admin if there is a loophole for premature use of exceptionally good sources. Homunculus (duihua) 06:26, 16 February 2012 (UTC)

We’re really talking about two things here: writing a section on “Fa rectification” as a central teaching, and revising the discussion of Falungong’s views on apocalypse (or lack thereof). I will wait on the first, since that should really rely on Penny’s explanation. But for the second item, I think we can at least improve it.

A couple notes on sources, etc.:

• As Homunculus noted, Maria Hsia Chang is not a great source for analysing Falungong teachings. Her style of writing in the Christian Schachfer article is such that it necessarily takes Li’s words out of context. Good scholarship would put this into context. I’m not saying exclude her entirely, of course, but just to be aware of her limitations.
• I don’t find Gallagher and Ashcraft to be worthy of inclusion, personally. They did not do their own fieldwork or textual analysis, as Homunculus points out. Their analysis of Li’s teachings is derived from two sources: Maria Chang (mentioned above), and Patsy Rahn, a critic of Falungong who, as I understand it, was an undergraduate student when she published in the early 2000s (the latest information says she is an MA candidate in Indiana). So, not only are Gallagher and Ashcraft not experts on Falungong, but the sources they sued are not very good either, which is why they are not used as references in the more serious literature. I tried to capture some of the overall ideas they expressed, but using better sources. AgadaUrbanit, I hope that’s alright with you.
• I am sort of annoyed by the revelation that this controversy over ‘apocalyptic’ teachings might be produced, at least in part, by a lazy translation of the Chinese “jienan,” onto which some scholars (or readers?) have imposed Western meanings and implications of apocalypse.

Anyways, on reading through the sources that describe this, it becomes clear that this is not a simple issue to describe. But here’s what I propose. It’s a bit long maybe:

Opinions among scholars differ as to whether Falun Gong contains an apocalyptic message, and if so what the consequences of that are. Li situates his teaching of Falun Gong amidst the "Dharma-ending period" (Mo Fa, 末法), described in Buddhist scriptures as an era of moral decline when the teachings of Buddhism would need to be rectified.(Ownby) The current era is described in Falun Gong teachings as the "Fa rectification" period (zhengfa, which might also be translated as "to correct the dharma"), a time of cosmic transition and renewal (Penny). The process of Fa rectification is necessitated by the moral decline and degeneration of life in the universe, and in the post-1999 context, the persecution of Falungong by the Chinese government has come to be described as a tangible symptom of this moral decay.(Burgdoff) Through the process of Li’s Fa rectification, life will be reordered according to the moral and spiritual quality of each, with good people being saved and ascending to higher spiritual planes, and bad ones being eliminated or cast down.(Burgdoff). In this paradigm, Li assumes a messianic role of offering salvation.(Palmer).

Some scholars, such as Maria Hsia Chang and Susan Palmer, have described Li’s rhetoric about the “Fa rectification” and providing salvation "in the final period of the Last Havoc," as apocalyptic.(Chang, Palmer) However, Benjamin Penny argues that Li’s teachings are better understood in the context of a "Buddhist notion of the cycle of the Dharma or the Buddhist law."(Penny in ABC) Richard Gunde notes that unlike apocalyptic groups in the West, Falun Gong does not fixate on death or Armageddon(Gunde), and instead “has a simple, innocuous ethical message.” Li Hongzhi does not discuss a “time of reckoning”(Penny); to the contrary, he has rejected predictions of an impending apocalypse in his teachings.(Schechter).

How’s that?—Zujine|talk 17:16, 17 February 2012 (UTC)

This is fine with me. There's one dimension here that isn't explored, though. Craig Burgdoff (and, to a lesser extent, Susan Palmer), expressed concern that these teachings could be a possible area for exploitation. I mean, the notion that the Chinese government's actions are essentially a manifestation of this cosmic struggle could lead to the martyrdom of Falun Gong practitioners. Susan Palmer wrote about this concern in the early 00s, and her fears were never realized in practice (as Li's language became more "apocalyptic," Falun Gong practitioners became less audacious in confronting authorities, not more). Burgdoff also raises this concern, then basically dismisses it later in his paper for various reasons (ie. lack of dogmatic orthodoxy or totalistic control, and also the fact that, well, the persecution is real and not an abstraction or imagined dilemma; it required a real world response). We don't want to flesh all of that out, of course, as it gets complicated and/or speculative fast. But might be something to consider. Anyways, I think your proposal is an improvement over what's currently there.Homunculus (duihua) 19:26, 17 February 2012 (UTC)

Reading this discussion just puzzles me: the article is already sourced to the teeth, and the sourcing to Gallager and Ashcraft is being questioned again on the grounds that 'they are not scholars of Eastern religion', despite the fact that their publications appear in all the peer-reviewed journals and meet all the criteria that many editors on this article ask for ad nauseum. I find a degree of irony that Danny Schechter, who is about as far removed as one can be from being an expert on religion, China, or traditional eastern culture, is sourced so heavily in the article without any sort of careful scrutiny. Colipon+(Talk) 14:31, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

What is your point, Colipon?The Sound and the Fury (talk) 16:21, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

I think what's being pointed out is the tendentiousness of, on the one hand, fighting to exclude Falun Gong-skeptical sources like Maria Chang on account of their focus being more on politics rather than religion, while basing this article on Falun Gong-sympathetic sources with similarly (ir)relevant credentials, such as Danny Schechter. Now I'm not sure how much of a role Homunculus had in promoting Schechter, but he definitely added, for example, Ethan Gutmann's exoneration of Falun Gong on charges of homophobia, based on comparisons to "traditional religions" that Gutmann (of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies) has no scholarly credentials on religion to speak about. Shrigley (talk) 22:48, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

So, you are essentially protesting an attempt to use the highest quality sources to describe a contentious matter of theological interpretation. That's not very helpful. Zujine, seeing as no one has raised an actual objection to your proposal, I would say go ahead. As to other issues raised: 1)This is not a question of pro- or anti- Falun Gong sources for me as it is for you. I don't consider Maria Hsia Chang "anti-Falun Gong," I just consider that she's not an expert on religion, did not do any fieldwork, and was criticized by other scholars, partly for cleaving to simplistic narrative tropes. I've used her before as a general reference to support statements about Chinese history or politics, for example, so am not opposed to user her in principle. 2) I have never attempted to argue that Gallagher and Ashcraft are not reliable sources. My argument is that they are not experts on Falun Gong. They wrote a chapter on it in a survey of new religions, did not do any of their own field work or textual analysis, and employed sub-par sources. They are certainly not cited in other serious scholarly literature on Falun Gong. As such, they could be used as a general reference at best. But when it comes to a complex theological issue on which there is no scholarly consensus, we can and should use sources of a higher caliber. 3) As to Schechter, he is widely cited by scholars on Falun Gong, though with a caveat: while folks like Ownby acknowledge he's a valuable source, he is a journalistic and a partial one, and shouldn't be used too liberally. There are a handful of references to him on the page (mostly legacies from earlier versions). From the looks of it, though, all statements sourced to Schechter also appear in Palmer, Ownby, Tong, etc. I can add those references if desired.Homunculus (duihua) 23:51, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

He Zuoxiu and Luo Gan

I have raised this issue several times before, as early as 2007, and it is just incredible how it continues to get evaded. That He Zuoxiu is related to Luo Gan (or more specifically, the claim that he is the 'brother in law' of Luo Gan), is sourced to two places: one of which is the National Review, and the other is Palmer's ethnographic study. At Palmer's study, we see the passage: "He Zuoxiu, a scientist and one of Luo Gan’s relatives (FalunInfo.net n.d.a; Clearwisdom.net 2000g), perhaps partially motivated by how Li Hongzhi calls modern science limited." The National Review also evidently does not provide any sort of back-up to the claim, merely speculation. Furthermore, not only is the claim presented as fact in the article, we are also presented with outright synthesis via the painfully tenuous phrase, "Things could not have worked out better for the two if they had planned it — which, it appears, they just might have." Anyone who examines the parts in detail: the totally unsubstantiated and unverified idea that He Zuoxiu and Luo Gan are related and colluded to bring down Falun Gong, would not choose to leave such a claim in the article, and the fact that the origin of the claim happens to be Falun Gong sources just makes the case for their removal that much stronger. Those who insist on sourcing the article to the teeth cannot possibly look at this claim and regard it as authoritative. I call upon the passage about "brother-in-law" as well as the entire passage about 'familial relationship' between He and Luo to be removed. Colipon+(Talk) 14:49, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

This doesn't appear to be a synthesis on Wikipedia's part. It has an in-line citation and is qualified as an alleged familial relationship; the claim was found credible & notable to three reliable sources. I don't see what the problem is. The Sound and the Fury (talk) 16:21, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

There are three sources that claim is referenced to. Porter directly cites Falun Gong sources for this claim, which makes it highly problematic. I looked at Zhao's "Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China". Nowhere can I find a reference to He and Luo's 'familial relationship', "alleged" or not. That leaves us with just the National Review, the only source to insinuate that such a connection had any substantive effect on the crackdown of Falun Gong. And I point out that NR does this in a totally speculative manner. You put everything together and it makes the current claims ( 1. the relationship between He and Luo, and 2. that the relationship had an effect on FLG's crackdown) totally unsubstantiated and inappropriate. Colipon+(Talk) 21:04, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

I don't see that the relationship is appropriately qualified. Although one mention of the two says "Porter, along with Gutmann and Zhao, highlight an alleged familial relationship between He and Luo Gan to suggest...", another mention in section "1996–1999", reads "In June 1998, Tianjin professor He Zuoxiu, brother-in-law of security tsar Luo Gan^[66][112] and an outspoken critic of qigong..." This seems to be another case where a source (Palmer) is quoted out of his area of expertise to give poorly-sourced claims about living persons an air of authority. Shrigley (talk) 22:48, 21 February 2012 (UTC)

The most obvious problem is that the 'brother-in-law' claim has only a single source - The National Review, the Palmer source says "relative", and that is cited to Clearwisdom. The Zhao source says nothing at all. If we are to scrutinize sources like Maria Chang and Gallagher and Ashcraft to the teeth, I just cannot comprehend how we let problems like this He-Luo connection, which has much more problematic sourcing, be presented as gospel on the article. The only explanation, and I am quite certain non-involved editors will concur, is that the contention of sourcing is not actually rooted in the problems of the sources per se but in the POV-balance that the source reflects. This is what has made editing this article so problematic in the past, and the continuation of such patterns should be alarming to anyone who wants to achieve NPOV on this encyclopedia. Colipon+(Talk) 03:51, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Well, personally I think the only thing more helpful than accusations of bad faith is sarcasm. On factual level, does anyone here dispute that Luo Gan and He Zuoxiu have a familial connection? If there is countervailing evidence, or if this is really in dispute--i.e., specific counter claims have been made--then that throws the whole thing into question. Can one of you do some searches in Chinese? If there are no non-FLG Chinese sources on a familial connection between the two, then it is probably an artefact of the propaganda war and can be swept into the dustbin of history. I assume it's factual though. However, it should be qualified wherever it appears--right now it's stated as fact in one location, and shouldn't be. I'm fixing now. The Zhao quote should not be used to substantiate or forward a factual claim about a specific familial connection between the two, but her reference to a familial relationship clearly shows that this is a notable piece of information. Gutmann's analysis is also notable; he was in Beijing on April 25 and done his own research on Falun Gong and the politics leading up to the ban. Since it's notable, I think that as long as it's qualified we're fine. I don't know for sure, but perhaps in the other issues above there is counter-argument from stronger sources, which I haven't seen in this case. The Sound and the Fury (talk) 16:18, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

My response here is going to be long, maybe, so bear with me. There are several points to address.

• I would submit (and I think everyone would agree) that any time the familial relationship is noted, it should be qualified appropriately as a "purported" or "alleged" relationship, and/or given an inline citation. Also, it is certainly not necessary to note this every time that either character is mentioned. In the paragraph that discusses this relationship, it may also be worthwhile to note that, in addition to Porter and Gutmann, Falun Gong sources frequently highlight this connection.
• Regarding the Zhao source, she does not specifically name either Luo or He, but does allude to "scientists-cum- ideologues with political motives and affiliations with competing central Party leaders" who helped precipitate "the shift in the state’s position [toward Falun Gong]." I assume that this is a reference to He Zuoxiu, but it's not clear. Zhao shouldn't be used as a source on the specific connection between the two, but could potentially be used elsewhere to explain the role of unspecified interpersonal relationships in leading to the crackdown.
• Regarding Porter's use of Falun Gong sites as primary sources to support the connection, it doesn't inspire great confidence, but also can't be dismissed entirely. Eminently reliable sources on Falun Gong have used some Falun Gong websites as sources uncritically, not because they are lazy, but because they deem that the information contained in those specific articles is credible, plausible, consistent with the available evidence, and so on. Barend ter Haar has also noted that Falun Gong websites frequently write about this connection. He couldn't see the significance of it, but wrote that although some of these Falun Gong sites are propagandistic, their facts are "not necessarily unreliable" (here he is referring specifically to the He / Luo issue). Is Porter in a position to make the judgement call on whether this claim is true? I am not confident; he is not an expert on Chinese politics. But if the claim is true, then the fact that Porter notes as significant it provides notability. I know this is not conclusive or especially helpful. If Porter were the only source on this claim, I would have very serious reservations, but he is not.
• At the end of the day, the inescapable fact is that Gutmann — who is pretty well positioned to have insight into these things — wrote about the familial relationship and the significance, and it was reliably published.

Now, to address TheSound's question on the veracity of the claim, it is unusually difficult to find information on Chinese websites about who Luo Gan's wife is. Maybe someone else would have better luck. But I did find several sources. Apparently one of He Zuoxiu's ancestors was a big shot in Yangzhou. There is a garden there, I think owned by the family, which is a tourist attraction. In the garden is a family tree, which include He Zuoxiu and his sister or cousin (not clear to me) He Zuozhi. She is shown as having married Luo Gan. Several tourist accounts—none of which appear to have any political motivations—have made note of this.[14][15][16] So, He and Luo are either brothers-in-law or, um, cousins-in-law. I'm just bringing this up for our own reference. The claim of a familial relationship seems to be true, and a few sources have found that it may have played an important role in the events leading up to the crackdown, so it would seem to satisfy notability requirements. I hope this is a satisfactory response. If not, I think the only recourse left is to solicit the opinion of an uninvolved third party. Homunculus (duihua) 17:00, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Those are great finds. While they are not necessarily RS by any means, they do give a name to He's cousin who is supposedly the wife of Luo Gan. Tang Mei means that He Zuoshi merely shares the same recent ancestor with He Zuoxiu - so she could be a cousin, second cousin, or even third cousin. The burden of WP:N and WP:UNDUE means that not only do you need to demonstrate that such a familial relationship exists, that it is verifiable using reliable sources, but also that such a relationship is relevant.

In addition, I'm fully aware that Zhao talks about 'scientists-cum-ideologues'. But that this refers to He, and is an allusion to He and Luo colluding, is just pure speculation. This quote is taken totally out of context and synthesized with the other two sources in the article to support the point that there was some sort of state conspiracy against Falun Gong prior to April 1999, capped off with the phrase "Things could not have worked out better for the two if they had planned it — which, it appears, they just might have." Long story short, no reliable source provides any evidence that He and Luo's familial relationship has anything to do with the two colluding on Falun Gong. A simple passing mention in two sources is not enough to lend it the due weight as it currently appears in the article. Inviting an uninvolved editor would be great. Colipon+(Talk) 17:43, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Two reliable sources do suggest a kind of conspiracy in the events of April 1999 involving Luo and He, and the familial relationship is noted as having possible significance. To wit: Luo began using his influence in the Ministry of Public Security years earlier to launch "investigations" into Falun Gong, seeking evidence that it needed to be banned. At the same time, He Zuoxiu began publishing articles critical of Falun Gong. Luo's investigations failed to supply a sufficient pretext for suppression, but Luo did not appear to give up. In April 1999, He published a critical article in Tianjin. Falun Gong's response was by this time predictable, and they picketed the media offices asking for a retraction. A retraction was offered, and then the offer was rescinded. At the orders of the central Ministry of Public Security (where Luo's influence lay), public security agents beat and arrested 45 of the picketing Falun Gong practitioners. Authorities told them that the orders to do so came from Beijing. Days later, 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners show up in Beijing to demonstrate, and Luo is the first person to sound the alarm, alert Jiang Zemin, and demand a harsh and decisive response. The protest in Beijing results in Luo being given a plush position as head of the 610 Office, and He's star also rose as a result. The sequence of events is suspicious enough, and if Luo and He are related (the RS say they are, unrelated primary sources say they are, and there is no evidence to the contrary), it's not unreasonable to speculate that they may have colluded to bring about this outcome. This is essentially what Ethan Gutmann's article is saying, and also what Porter is insinuating. Anyways, your understanding of the burden of proof seems prohibitively high. I can concede that this paragraph can be written more clearly and improved to reduce the possibility of original synthesis, but maybe we can deal with one thing at a time.Homunculus (duihua) 18:05, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

What we need is the marriage certificate! Right? The Sound and the Fury (talk)

Funny. Unfortunately I don't share your views on the virtues of sarcasm.Homunculus (duihua) 18:26, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

All of that is your deduction from circumstantial evidence. Inviting an uninvolved would be good. Colipon+(Talk) 18:30, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

This appears to be a longterm bee in Colipon's bonnet. I just searched. The Sound and the Fury (talk) 20:58, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for digging that up, if you notice on December 5, 2010, user John Carter already gave his opinion at Talk:Falun_Gong/Archive_37 after enlisting it for RfC. Despite his assessment that He and Luo's connection should not be in the article, citing DUE, BLP, and SYNTH, the material was still restored. The He/Luo issue is but a microcosm for the ridiculous types of disputes that occur around here, so a sample of past discussion is great for any uninvolved parties to understand the history of this article. Colipon+(Talk) 21:11, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

I saw in the archive that John expressed concern that the material violated policy on original synthesis. I didn't read the whole discussion. But based on my reading of these sources, I don't see original synthesis. These sources, and especially Porter, makes it clear that he believes Luo and He likely colluded to catalyse the crackdown. Here's the relevant passage from Porter:

Finally, a man named Luo Gan, along with a relative of his, may bear some responsibility for the crackdown.[...] Luo Gan was secretary general of the State Council, and he “had been investigating Falun Gong and had wanted it banned since 1996 but could not find any legal basis for transgression” (Ching 2001). However, “[Luo] had the police direct [Falungong practitioners] to Zhongnanhai, in order to create an incident with which they afterwards could be charged” (Ching 2001). [...] He Zuoxiu, a scientist and one of Luo Gan’s relatives (FalunInfo.net n.d.a; Clearwisdom.net 2000g), perhaps partially motivated by how Li Hongzhi calls modern science limited (Sinclair 2001: 15), seems to have intentionally provoked Falun Gong [...] He Zuoxiu claimed that two of his graduate students had relapses of mental disorders due to Falun Gong, both in his article and on Beijing Television. The practitioners protested the magazine’s office in Tianjin because they would not carry a response, and were beaten and arrest by riot police (Schechter 2001: 69) under orders from Luo Gan (FalunInfo.net n.d.a). Afterwards, practitioners who complained to local authorities about this harsh treatment were told to go to Beijing (Schechter 2001: 69); Luo Gan had “secretly order[ed] the police to lead Falun Gong practitioners into gathering around the Zhongnanhai government compound” [...] Afterwards, Luo Gan was appointed as part of the team created by the Central Committee of the CCP to investigate the April 25 incident.It was Luo Gan who finally issued the order that Falun Gong be banned (Luo 1999). Luo Gan was then put in charge of the “the Head Office for Handling the Falun Gong Issue,” also known as the “610 Office.” [...] As for He Zuoxiu, he “became a national hero for opposing Falun Gong” (Yan 2001). Things could not have worked out better for the two if they planned it – which, it appears, they just might have.

The sources he used for the specific details aren't great, but all these claims I have also read in Palmer and elsewhere. What's key is that Porter is presenting this narrative, and this synthesis of events, as being a notable and plausible explanation for the way events unfolded in April 1999.

Gutmann says this of the family relationship:

"It was at that point that a physicist published an article in a Tianjin Normal University journal portraying Falun Gong as a dangerous cult. China isn't the West, and these things aren't random: The physicist, He Zuoxiu, is the brother-in-law of Luo Gan, at that time the head of public security, and the Tianjin Normal University journal answers to the state. The article was a flare in the night sky, a signal and trial of the party's designs."

His piece doesn't lend itself as well to being excerpted, but if you read the whole thing, what he's saying is that some leaders in the party wanted to go after Falungong for a long time, but lacked an excuse. He Zuoxiu's article in Tianjin led to protests, which led to the demonstration at Zhongnanhai. Once there, the security forces (which were under Luo Gan) told the Falungong to go to Fuyou street, which was about the most provocative place they could have gone. This provided the requisite pretext for suppression. I think if you put together these two articles, the message is clear, and it seems notable enough to warrant brief mention on the page. The revelation that non-Falungong Chinese sources (including, notably, He Zuoxiu's own family tree) vouch for the family relationship also helps absolve concerns that this was just an obscure piece of agitprop. I think the inclusion is fine as long as we keep it short, and don't overstep what the sources support.—Zujine|talk 21:56, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Whether it's original synthesis is a largely matter of how the information is presented. I see the point that the current presentation may border on original synthesis, but there is a way to do this where it would be fine (for example, sticking to the narrative as Porter presents it, with an inline citation ascribing that synthesis of facts to him, and presenting Gutmann's narrative with inline citation to him. And somehow keeping all of this fairly short so as to avoid giving undue weight). Another option is to note the familial relationship in passing as a natural part of the narrative, rather than as a separate paragraph. We could say something like "Porter and Gutmann have noted the possible significance of an alleged familial relationship between He and Luo Gan; Porter speculates that the two may have planned the events of April 1999 with the goal of provoking Falun Gong and creating a pretext for banning the group." On this page, I don't think more than a short sentence or two is warranted.Homunculus (duihua) 23:25, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Overthinking it. I don't think there's any infringement of wp:os on the page as the information is now presented. It is the sources that are cited making this connection. The Sound and the Fury (talk) 00:12, 23 February 2012 (UTC)

History of FLG

Hi all, as we all know, the editing ambiance of this article is still quite tense, so I would like to discuss some changes to the article prior to hitting the 'edit' button. My assessment is that the article has essentially back-pedaled to where it was prior to the 'clean-up' efforts by numerous involved and non-involved parties before July 2009, with window-dressing and the dilution of sources to restore the POV-balance in favour of Falun Gong. Comparing two revisions from early 2010 and now would make this difference obvious - and to a non-involved party it should quickly dawn which version is more in line with our WP:NPOV policy.

Apart from the issue with He and Luo above, another issue I take is the discussion about Falun Gong's reaction to criticism prior to the beginning of the propaganda campaign in 1999. This chunk of information is crucial to the understanding of the group yet it is continuously 'scrubbed clean', removed, altered, or otherwise obfuscated. The passage from Zhao Yuezhi that discusses this as follows (emphasis mine):

The three-year struggle between Falun Gong and the Chinese media over representation reached its apex in April 1999, with six days of protests by Falun Gong members over He’s article in Tianjin, leading to a peaceful demonstration by more than 10,000 Falun Gong members near Zhongnanhai in Beijing on April 25, 1999. In these protests, not only were specific claims disputed, but there was also an insistence on positive reporting of the movement. As the protests would demonstrate repeatedly, at stake is not a matter of evidence and opinion but, rather, a matter of “truth,” which is precisely what Falun Gong’s revelatory doctrines allowed the group to attain. This decidedly institutional approach to “truth” is underscored by the fact that, unlike an increasing number of Chinese citizens who have taken individual media outlets to the courts in libel cases, Falun Gong did not entertain any notion of separation between media organizations and the Chinese government. Despite its explicit demand that the government lift the publication ban against Falun Gong books, Falun Gong demanded more than the right to reply to media criticism, It demanded the censorship of opponents’ views in the first place.

Falun Gong, then, may be understood as a movement of resistance, but it is one that offers no resistance to either the theory or the practice of censorship. Indeed, the movement actually urged the Chinese government to use its powers of censorship to muzzle the opponents of Falun Gong. Perhaps the movement’s intimacy and comfort with the notion of absolute “truth” and with authoritarian state powers of censorship can be more easily understood if we remember that China’s older socialist generation comprises the core Falun Gong membership. From the perspective of this generation, the government is responsible for slanderous content in the media as well as “responsible for preventing their publication through its powers of censorship” (Madsen, 2000: 247). Just as the Party does not allow negative critiques of its doctrines and is averse to ideological pluralism, Falun Gong does not abide any refutation of its claims and negative comments. Thus, although the Party and Falun Gong oppose each other, they have in common their “unitary value orientation” (He, 1999: 24).

In simple terms, the most important part of the narrative that is missing is that in fact the 1999 Zhongnanhai protests were in fact not as much as demonstration against the state as much as it was part of a lobbying campaign for the state to censor Falun Gong's critics and to ensure positive portrayals of the practice. There is no doubt that elements of the leadership, particularly Jiang himself, wanted to crack down, but the relationship of the state and Falun Gong were far from the dichotomy that is currently implied in the article in the pre-1999 period. Colipon+(Talk) 15:13, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

Where does Zhao say that "the 1999 Zhongnanhai protests were in fact not as much as demonstration against the state as much as it was part of a lobbying campaign for the state to censor Falun Gong's critics and to ensure positive portrayals of the practice"? The Sound and the Fury (talk) 15:43, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

TheSound, I think that's Colipon speaking on his own behalf. Colipon, your suggestions of bad faith, POV editing are extremely wearisome. If you read Palmer, Ownby, Porter, Penny, or others who provide a complete narrative of events from 1996 to 1999, I think you would find that the article currently does quite a good job of representing the chronology of major events. Zhao's account here is interpretive. It's an important point, but whether it is the most important part of this story is entirely subjective. The fact here is that Falun Gong was asking authorities to enforce the "three nos" policy, which muzzled criticism of qigong in the official media. If you want to add a sentence saying as much, or explaining that Falun Gong sought government intervention to stop the criticism in the state-run press, I think that's appropriate. Anything further—like speculation on how this attitude reflects generational ideas, or something—would seen excessive. As to your opinion about the purpose of the Zhongnanhai protest, I agree that it was not a protest "against" the state. It took Falun Gong several more years to develop a genuinely antagonistic attitude toward the state, but as of 1999, they were like so many pilgrim petitioners asking the benevolent central government for help. Regarding the "dichotomous" relationship pre-1999, I don't know what you mean, exactly. I think the page conveys the fact that this relationship was complicated. Some government agencies supported Falun Gong, some (like the MPS faction controlled by Luo Gan) opposed it, and the whole period of 1996 to 1999 was the playing out of these power struggles.Homunculus (duihua) 15:55, 22 February 2012 (UTC)

You make some good points, Hom, and you will notice I have refrained from making any personal comments. Could you also respond to He and Luo above. Colipon+(Talk) 16:11, 22 February 2012 (UTC)