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==Terminology==
==Terminology==
My idea is if you don't want a baby, don't have sex......you f$%#@! porch monkeys
Many of the terms used in the debate are seen as [[Framing (social sciences)|political framing]]: terms used to validate one's own stance while invalidating the opposition's. For example, the labels "pro-choice" and "pro-life" imply endorsement of widely held values such as [[liberty]] and [[Freedom (political)|freedom]], while suggesting that the opposition must be "''anti''-choice" or "''anti''-life" (alternatively "pro-''coercion''" or "pro-''death''"). Such terms gloss over the underlying issue of ''which'' choice or life is being considered and ''whose'' choice or ''what kind'' of life is deemed most important.

Appeals are often made in the abortion debate to the alleged "[[rights]]" of the fetus, pregnant woman or other parties. Such appeals can generate confusion if the ''type'' of rights is not specified (whether [[Civil rights|civil]], [[Natural rights|natural]], or otherwise), or if it is simply ''assumed'' that the right appealed to takes precedence over all other competing rights (an example of [[Begging the question|begging the question]]).

The appropriate terms with which to designate the human organism prior to birth are also debated. The terms "[[embryo]]" and "[[fetus]]" are seen by pro-life advocates as [[dehumanization|dehumanizing]]; the terms "[[Infant|baby]]" and "unborn child" are seen by pro-choice advocates as [[emotionalism|emotionalized]]. Likewise, there is debate between use of the terms "[[woman]]" and "[[mother]]".


==Political debate==
==Political debate==

Revision as of 18:23, 30 January 2008

The abortion debate refers to discussion and controversy surrounding the moral and legal status of abortion. The two main groups involved in the abortion debate are the pro-choice movement, which generally supports access to abortion and regards it as morally permissible, and the pro-life movement, which generally opposes access to abortion and regards it as morally wrong. Each movement has, with varying results, sought to influence public opinion and to attain legal support for its position. In Canada, for example, abortion is available on demand,[1] while in Nicaragua abortions are always illegal. In the USA, abortion is generally legal but subject to restrictions in some jurisdictions and circumstances. In some cases, the abortion debate has led to the use of violence.

Terminology

My idea is if you don't want a baby, don't have sex......you f$%#@! porch monkeys

Political debate

Politics refers to the processes, defined and limited through legal documents, by which decisions (laws) are made in governments. In politics, rights are the protections and privileges legally granted to citizens by the government. Regarding abortion law, the political debate usually surrounds a right to privacy, and when or how a government may regulate abortion. For example, there is abundant debate regarding the extent of abortion regulation. Some argue that it is (or should be) illegal for governments to regulate abortion any more than other medical practices.[2] Some argue that governments may (or should be permitted to) regulate abortions after the 20th week,[3] viability,[4] or the second trimester.[5] Some want to regulate all abortions, starting from conception.[6]

Privacy

Time has stated that the issue of bodily privacy is "the core" of the abortion debate.[7] In political terms, privacy can be understood as a condition in which one is not observed or disturbed by government.[8] Privacy, in relation to abortion, is defined as the ability of a woman to "decide what happens to her own body".[7]

While governments are allowed to invade the privacy of their citizens in some cases, they are expected to protect privacy in all cases lacking a compelling state interest. Abortions are recognized as being private, but are criticized for involving the death of a human organism. Critics argue that abortion regulation is valid because the state interest in protecting prenatal life is compelling. Defenders argue either that there is no state interest in regulating abortion, or that the woman's privacy is a more compelling interest.

Albert Wynn and Gloria Feldt at the U.S. Supreme Court to rally in support of Roe v. Wade.

U.S. judicial involvement

Roe v. Wade, which struck down state laws banning abortion in 1973, was the first of many cases that have defined abortion law in the United States. Since Roe, abortion has been legal throughout the country, but states have placed varying regulations on it, from requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion to restricting late-term abortions.

Critics of the Roe decision argue that it is an example of judicial activism and that it should be overturned so that abortion law can be decided by legislatures.[9] Justice Potter Stewart, who joined with the majority, viewed the Roe opinion as "legislative" and asked that more consideration be paid to state legislatures.[10] In response to an argument that the judiciary can "call the contending sides of national controversy to end their national division", Justice Antonin Scalia wrote:

Quite to the contrary, by foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish [over abortion].[11]

Some also cite Gonzales v. Carhart as judicial activism.[12] In upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Carhart is the first judicial opinion upholding a legal barrier to a specific abortion procedure.

"No to abortion" at a 2007 meeting with Pope Benedict XVI in São Paulo, Brazil. The crowd have both arms raised in a prayer gesture.

Church and state

The separation of church and state is an oft-debated topic in connection with abortion. Many churches have official positions on abortion, and there is a correlation between these official positions and the personal positions of adherents. Religious influences are closely tied to ethical opposition to abortion.[13] Some argue that efforts to codify official church positions (particularly pro-life positions) are an illegal or unjust breach of separation, either because those positions are innately religious or on the basis that separation of church and state should include separation of religion from politics.[14] Some argue that restrictions on abortion are not a breach of separation, since the pro-life position can be defended by appeal to secular ethical arguments.[15] It has also been argued that churches have an important role to play in political life, since in some communities they are an important source of information, resources, and incentives to engage in the political process.[16]

Ethical debate

Main articles: Ethical aspects of abortion and Philosophical aspects of the abortion debate

Ethics refers to "moral philosophy," or the study of values and the analysis of right and wrong. The ethical debate over abortion usually surrounds the issues of whether a fetus has rights, in particular a right to life, and whether the pregnant woman's rights over her own body justify abortion even if the fetus has a right to life. For many, there is a strong correlation between religion and abortion ethics.

Personhood

Some argue that abortion is morally wrong on the basis that a fetus is an innocent human being.[17] Others reject this position by drawing a distinction between human being and human person, arguing that while the fetus is innocent and biologically human, it is not a person with a right to life.[18] In support of this distinction, some propose a list of criteria as markers of personhood. For example, Mary Ann Warren suggests consciousness (at least the capacity to feel pain), reasoning, self motivation, the ability to communicate, and self-awareness.[19] According to Warren, a being need not exhibit all of these criteria to qualify as a person with a right to life, but if a being exhibits none of them (or perhaps only one), then it is certainly not a person. Warren concludes that as the fetus satisfies only one criterion, consciousness (and this only after it becomes susceptible to pain),[20] the fetus is not a person and abortion is therefore morally permissible. Other philosophers apply similar criteria, concluding that a fetus lacks a right to life because it lacks self-consciousness,[21] rationality,[22] and autonomy.[23] These lists diverge over precisely which features confer a right to life,[24] but tend to propose various developed psychological features not found in fetuses.

Critics of this position typically argue that the proposed criteria for personhood would disqualify two classes of born human beings — reversibly comatose patients, and human infants — from having a right to life, since they, like fetuses, are not self-conscious, do not communicate, and so on.[25] Defenders of the proposed criteria may respond that the reversibly comatose do satisfy the relevant criteria because they "retain all their unconscious mental states".[26] Warren concedes that infants are not "persons" by her proposed criteria,[27] and on that basis she and others concede that infanticide could be morally acceptable under some circumstances (for example if the infant is severely disabled[28] or in order to save the lives of several other infants[29]). Critics may see such concessions as an indication that the right to life cannot be adequately defined by reference to developed psychological features.

An alternate approach is to base personhood or the right to life on a being's natural or inherent capacities. On this approach, a being essentially has a right to life if it has a genetic propensity or natural capacity to develop the relevant psychological features; and, since human beings do have this natural capacity, they essentially have a right to life (beginning at conception or whenever they come into existence).[30] Critics of this position argue that mere genetic potential is not a plausible basis for respect (or for the right to life), and that basing a right to life on natural capacities would lead to the counterintuitive position that anencephalic infants, irreversibly comatose patients, and brain-dead patients kept alive on a medical ventilator, are all persons with a right to life.[31]

Pro-life demonstrators in Washington, D.C. symbolically cover their mouths with red tape.

Deprivation

Some argue that abortion is morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of a valuable future.[32] On this account, killing an adult human being is wrong because it deprives the victim of a future like ours—a future containing highly valuable or desirable experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.[33] If a being has such a future, then (according to the argument) killing that being would seriously harm it and hence would be seriously wrong.[34] But since a fetus does have such a future, the "overwhelming majority" of deliberate abortions are placed in the "same moral category" as killing an innocent adult human being.[35] Not all abortions are unjustified according to this argument: abortion would be justified if the same justification could be applied to killing an adult human.

Criticism of this line of reasoning follows several threads. Some reject the argument on grounds relating to personal identity, holding that the fetus is not the same entity as the adult into which it will develop, and thus that the fetus does not have a "future like ours" in the required sense.[36] Others grant that the fetus has a future like ours, but argue that being deprived of this future is not a significant harm or a significant wrong to the fetus, because there are relatively few psychological connections (continuations of memory, belief, desire and the like) between the fetus as it is now and the adult into which it will develop.[37] Another criticism is that the argument creates inequalities in the wrongness of killing:[38] as the futures of some people (for example the young, bright and healthy) appear to be far more valuable or desirable than the futures of other people (for example the old, depressed and sick), the argument appears to entail that some killings are far more wrong than others, or that some people have a far stronger right to life than others—a conclusion that is taken to be counterintuitive or unacceptable. Finally, some argue that as gametes have a similar potential to the fetus, the argument would entail that contraception is as wrong as the killing of an adult human being—a conclusion that is similarly taken to be counterintuitive or unacceptable.

The 2004 March for Women's Lives near the Washington Monument.

Bodily rights

Main article: A Defense of Abortion

Some argue that even if the fetus has a right to life, abortion is morally permissible because a woman has a right to control her own body. The best known variant of this argument draws an analogy between forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy and forcing a person's body to be used as a dialysis machine for another person suffering from kidney failure. It is argued that just as it would be permissible to "unplug" and thereby cause the death of the person who is using one's kidneys, so it is permissible to abort the fetus (who similarly, it is said, has no right to use one's body against one's will).

Critics of this argument generally attempt to identify morally relevant disanalogies between abortion and the kidney failure scenario. For example, it is argued that the fetus is the woman's child as opposed to a mere stranger;[39] that abortion kills the fetus rather than merely letting it die;[40] and that in the case of pregnancy arising from voluntary intercourse, the woman has either tacitly consented to the fetus using her body,[41] or has a duty to allow it to use her body since she herself is responsible for its need to use her body.[42] The absence of these factors from the kidney failure scenario is thought to undermine the analogy between that scenario and abortion. Some writers defend the analogy against these objections, arguing that the alleged disanalogies are morally irrelevant or do not apply to abortion in the way critics have claimed.[43]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ "abortion on demand". Dictionary.com. Retrieved 2007-05-01. (1) the right of a woman to have an abortion during the first six months of a pregnancy; (2) an abortion performed on a woman solely at her own request
  2. ^ "Abortion". Positions. British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. Retrieved 2007-05-24. …rights call for complete legal freedom to secure an abortion, in the sense that the legal status of abortion should be the same as that of other medical services that a doctor provides to a patient
  3. ^ "Abortion". Where We Stand—CMA Position Papers. California Medical Association. 1973. p. 43. Retrieved 2007-05-24. Good medical practice indicates that abortion should not be performed after the 20th week of pregnancy {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  4. ^ Lee, Ellie (2002). "Abortion issues today - a position paper" (PDF). Legal Issues for Pro-Choice Opinion - Abortion Law in Practice. University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NY, UK. p. 2. Retrieved 2007-05-24. While most people have no difficulty accepting the legality of abortion at early stages of pregnancy, fewer are so sure about their position as pregnancy progresses – especially when the fetus is perceived to be 'viable' {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  5. ^ "Abortion". Positions. American Medical Women's Association. 2000. Retrieved 2007-05-24. The 1973 Supreme court decision Roe v. Wade struck a fair balance between the responsibility of the state to protect a woman's right to make personal medical decisions and the responsibility of the state to protect the potentially viable third trimester fetus
  6. ^ Johnston, Wm. Robert (24 December 2002). "Evaluation of the BGCT Christian Life Commission's "Abortion and the Christian Life"". Committee Report. First Baptist Church, Brownsville, Texas. …the unique value that human life has, as a gift from God, regardless of stage of development or physical health, from the point of conception to the point of physical death {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ a b "Abortion and Privacy". TIME. 1972-03-13. Retrieved 2007-05-25.
  8. ^ "Privacy". Compact Oxford English Dictionary. AskOxford.com. Retrieved 2007-05-24.
  9. ^ Romney, Mitt (2005-07-26). "Why I Vetoed Contraception Bill". The Boston Globe. Retrieved 2007-05-24. …avoiding the bitter battles engendered by 'one size fits all' judicial pronouncements. A federalist approach would allow such disputes to be settled by the citizens and elected representatives of each state, and appropriately defer to democratic governance
  10. ^ Kmiec, Douglas W. (1996-04-22). "Testimony of Douglas W. Kmiec". Judiciary Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. Retrieved 2007-05-24.
  11. ^ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
  12. ^ Hossain, Farhana (2007). "The Presidential Candidates on Abortion". New York Times. Retrieved 2007-05-23. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  13. ^ Kelley, Jonathan (1993). "Moral Reasoning and Political Conflict: The Abortion Controversy". The British Journal of Sociology. 44 (4): 589–612. doi:10.2307/591412. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  14. ^ Weithman, Paul J. (Winter 1991). "The Separation of Church and State: Some Questions for Professor Audi". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 20 (1): 52–65. Audi sees the separation doctrine so understood as but one part of a larger issue: the separation of religion from politics {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  15. ^ Roth, Jen (2000-08-20). "A Secular Case Against Abortion". Secularist v. Secularist: Abortion. Infidels.org. Retrieved 2007-05-23.
  16. ^ Greenberg, Anna (Fall 2000). "The Church and the Revitalization of Politics and Community". Political Science Quarterly. 115 (3): 377-394(18). {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  17. ^ Warren, 1973
  18. ^ Warren 1973: 457. See also Tooley 1972: 40-43; Singer 2000: 126-28 and 155-156; and John Locke. The term person may be used to denote a psychological property (being rational and self-conscious), a moral property (having a right to life), or both.
  19. ^ Warren 1973: 458.
  20. ^ Warren 1973: 458-459
  21. ^ Tooley 1972: 44.
  22. ^ Singer 2000: 128 and 156-157.
  23. ^ McMahan 2002: 260
  24. ^ It is similarly unclear which features one must have a natural capacity for, in order to have a right to life (cf Schwarz 1990: 105-109), or which features constitute a "future like ours."
  25. ^ Marquis 1989: 197; Schwarz 1990: 89
  26. ^ Stretton 2004: 267, original emphasis; see also Singer 2000: 137; Boonin 2003: 64-70
  27. ^ Warren 1982
  28. ^ Singer 2000: 186-193
  29. ^ McMahan 2002: 359-360
  30. ^ Lee 1996 and 2004: Schwarz 1990: 91-93.
  31. ^ Stretton 2004: 274-281.
  32. ^ Marquis 1989. See also Stone 1987.
  33. ^ Marquis 1989: 189-190
  34. ^ Marquis 1989: 190. The type of wrongness appealed to here is presumptive or prima facie wrongness: it may be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
  35. ^ Marquis 1989: 183.
  36. ^ McMahan 2002: ch 1.
  37. ^ McMahan 2002: 271; Stretton 2004: 171-179
  38. ^ Stretton 2004: 250-260; see also McMahan 2002: 234-235 and 271
  39. ^ Schwarz 1990; McMahan 2002
  40. ^ Schwarz 1990; McMahan 2002; Lee 1996
  41. ^ Warren 1973
  42. ^ McMahan 2002
  43. ^ Boonin 2003: ch 4

References

  • Boonin, David (2003). A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy. Boulder: University of Colorado. ISBN 0521520355.
  • Lee, Patrick (1996). Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Catholic University of America Press. ISBN 0813208467.
  • Lee, Patrick (2004). "The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense". Bioethics. 18 (3): 249. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • Mappes, Thomas A. (2001). Biomedical Ethics. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0072303654. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Marquis, Don (1989). "Why Abortion is Immoral". The Journal of Philosophy. 86 (4): 183–202. doi:10.2307/2026961. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • McMahan, Jeff (2002). The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford Ethics Series. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195169824.
  • Warren, Mary Ann (1973). "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". In Thomas A. Mappes (ed.). Biomedical Ethics. David DeGrazia. McGraw-Hill. pp. 456–461. {{cite conference}}: Unknown parameter |booktitle= ignored (|book-title= suggested) (help)
  • Warren, Mary Ann (1982). "Postscript on Infanticide". In Thomas A. Mappes (ed.). Biomedical Ethics. David DeGrazia. McGraw-Hill. pp. 461–463. {{cite conference}}: Unknown parameter |booktitle= ignored (|book-title= suggested) (help)
  • Schwarz, Stephen D. (1990). The Moral Question of Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press. ISBN 0829406239.
  • Singer, Peter (2000). Writings on an Ethical Life. Ecco (HarperCollins). ISBN 0060198389.
  • Stone, Jim (1987). "Why Potentiality Matters". Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 17 (4): 815–830. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • Stretton, Dean (2004). "Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee". Bioethics. 18 (3): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00394.x. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  • Tooley, Michael (1972). "Abortion and Infanticide". Philosophy and Public Affairs. 2 (1): 37–65. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |laydate= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysource= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |laysummary= ignored (help)

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