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Battle of the Eastern Solomons

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Battle of the Eastern Solomons
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II

USS Enterprise (center left), maneuvering radically under aerial attack and afire on August 24, 1942. Anti-aircraft shell bursts directed at the attacking Japanese dive bombers are visible above the carrier.
DateAugust 24–25, 1942
Location
North of Santa Isabel, Solomon Islands
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Allied forces including:
United States United States,
Australia Australia		 Japan Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
United States Robert Ghormley
United States Frank Jack Fletcher		 Japan Isoroku Yamamoto
Japan Chūichi Nagumo
Strength
2 fleet carriers,
1 battleship,
4 cruisers,
11 destroyers,
176 aircraft[1]		 2 fleet carriers,
1 light carrier,
2 battleships,
16 cruisers,
25 destroyers,
1 seaplane tender,
4 patrol boats,
3 transports,
171–177 aircraft[2]
Casualties and losses
1 carrier heavily damaged,
25 aircraft destroyed,
90 killed[3]		 1 light carrier,
1 destroyer,
1 transport sunk,
1 light cruiser,
1 seaplane tender heavily damaged,
75 aircraft destroyed,
290+ killed[4]

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The naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons (also known as the Battle of the Stewart Islands and, in Japanese sources, as the Second Battle of the Solomon Sea (第二次ソロモン海戦), took place on August 24, 1942 – August 25, 1942, and was the third carrier battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II and the second major engagement fought between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Guadalcanal Campaign. As at Coral Sea and Midway, the ships of the two adversaries were never in direct visual range of each other. Instead, all of the attacks by either side were carried out by either carrier or land-based aircraft.

After several damaging air attacks, the naval surface combatants from both the United States of America (U.S.) and Japan withdrew from the battle area without either side securing a clear victory. However, the U.S. and its allies apparently gained a greater tactical and strategic advantage from the battle than Japan because the Allied forces suffered fewer losses than the Japanese, who lost a significant number of aircraft and experienced aircrews. Also, Japanese reinforcements intended for Guadalcanal were delayed and eventually delivered by warships rather than transport ships, giving the Allies more time to prepare for the Japanese counteroffensive and preventing the Japanese from landing heavy artillery, ammunition, and other supplies that would have significantly assisted their forces in the struggle for the island.

Background

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.[5]

U.S. carriers Wasp (foreground), Saratoga, and Enterprise (background) operating in the Pacific south of Guadalcanal on August 12, 1942

The Allied landings were directly supported by three U.S. aircraft carrier task forces: TF 11 (USS Saratoga), TF 16 (USS Enterprise), and TF 18 (USS Wasp), their respective air groups, and supporting surface warships, including a battleship, cruisers, and destroyers.[6] The overall commander of the three carrier task forces was Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher who flew his flag on Saratoga.[7] The aircraft from the three carriers provided close air support for the invasion forces and defended against Japanese air attacks from Rabaul.[8] After a successful landing, they remained in the south Pacific area charged with guarding the line of communication between the major Allied bases at New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo, supporting the Allied ground forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi against any Japanese counteroffensives, covering the movement of supply ships to Guadalcanal, and engaging and destroying any Japanese warships, that came within range.[9]

Between August 15 and August 20, the U.S. carriers covered the delivery of fighter and bomber aircraft to the newly opened Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.[10] Henderson Field and the aircraft based there soon began having a telling effect on the movement of Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands and in the attrition of Japanese air forces in the South Pacific Area. In fact, Allied control of Henderson Field became the key factor in the entire battle for Guadalcanal.[11]

Taken by surprise by the Allied offensive in the Solomons, Japanese naval (under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto) and army forces prepared a counteroffensive, with the goal of driving the Allies out of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The counteroffensive was called Operation Ka (Ka comes from the first syllable for Guadalcanal as pronounced in Japanese) with the naval portion having an additional objective of destroying Allied warship forces in the South Pacific area, specifically the U.S. carriers.[12]

Battle

Prelude

A convoy containing 1,411 Japanese soldiers from the "Ichiki" regiment as well as several hundred naval troops from the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force, loaded on three slow transport ships, departed the major Japanese base at Truk (Chuuk) on August 16 and headed towards Guadalcanal.[13] The transports were guarded by light cruiser Jintsu, eight destroyers, and four patrol boats, led by Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka (flag in Jintsu)[14] Also departing from Rabaul to help protect the convoy was a "Close Cover force" of four heavy cruisers from the 8th Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa.[15] These were the same cruisers that had defeated an Allied naval surface force in the earlier Battle of Savo Island. Tanaka planned to land the troops from his convoy on Guadalcanal on August 24.[16]

Japanese Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo

On August 21, the rest of the Japanese Ka naval force departed Truk, heading for the southern Solomons. These ships were basically divided into three groups: the "Main Body" contained the Japanese carriers—Shōkaku and Zuikaku, light carrier Ryūjō, plus a screening force of one heavy cruiser and eight destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo in Shōkaku; the "Vanguard Force" consisted of two battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers, commanded by Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe; the "Advanced Force" contained five heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, six destroyers, and a seaplane carrier (Chitose), commanded by Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo.[17] Finally, a force of about 100 IJN land-based bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance aircraft at Rabaul and nearby islands were positioned to support.[18] Nagumo's main body positioned itself behind the vanguard and advanced forces in order to more easily remain hidden from U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.[19]

The Ka plan dictated once U.S. carriers were located, either by Japanese scout aircraft or an attack on one of the Japanese surface forces, Nagumo's carriers would immediately launch a strike force to destroy them. With the U.S. carriers destroyed or disabled, Abe's Vanguard and Kondo's Advanced forces would close with and destroy the rest of the Allied naval forces in a warship surface action. The Japanese naval forces would then be free to neutralize Henderson Field through bombardment while covering the landing of the Japanese army troops to retake Guadalcanal and Tulagi.[20]

In response to an unanticipated land battle fought between U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal and Japanese forces on August 19–20, the U.S. carrier task forces under Fletcher headed back towards Guadalcanal from their positions 400 miles (640 km) to the south on August 21. The U.S. carriers were to support the Marines, protect Henderson Field, and to combat and destroy any Japanese naval forces that arrived to support Japanese troops in the land battle on Guadalcanal.[21]

U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
U.S. Navy map from 1943 showing approximate paths and actions of Japanese (top) and Allied (bottom) naval forces in the battle from August 23 through August 26, 1942.[22] Guadalcanal is the large, roughly oval-shaped island in the center-left of the map.

Both the Allied and Japanese naval forces continued to head towards each other on August 22. Although both sides conducted intense aircraft scouting efforts, neither side spotted the other. Because of the disappearance of at least one of their scouting aircraft (shot down by aircraft from Enterprise before it could send a radio report), the Japanese strongly suspected U.S. carriers were in the area.[23] The U.S., however, was unaware of the disposition and strength of approaching Japanese surface warship forces.[24]

At 09:50 on August 23, a U.S. PBY Catalina aircraft, based at Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands, sighted Tanaka's convoy. By late afternoon, with no further sightings of Japanese ships, two aircraft strike forces from Saratoga and Henderson Field took off to attack Tanaka's convoy. However, Tanaka, knowing that an attack would be coming his way after being sighted, reversed course once the Catalina had left the area, and eluded the aircraft. After Tanaka reported to his superiors that he had lost time because he turned north to avoid the Allied air attacks, the landings of his troops on Guadalcanal was pushed back to August 25. By 18:23 on August 23, with no Japanese carriers sighted and no new intelligence reporting their presence in the area, Fletcher detached Wasp, which was getting low on fuel, and the rest of TF18 for the two-day trip south towards Efate to refuel. Thus, Wasp and her escorting warships missed the upcoming battle.[25]

Carrier action on August 24

At 01:45 on August 24, Nagumo ordered Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara with the light carrier Ryūjō, along with the heavy cruiser Tone and destroyers Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze, to proceed ahead of the main Japanese force and send an aircraft attack force against Henderson Field at daybreak.[26] The Ryūjō mission was most likely in response to a request from Nishizo Tsukahara, the naval commander at Rabaul, for help from the combined fleet in neutralizing Henderson Field.[27] The mission may also have been intended by Nagumo as a decoy to divert U.S. attention so that the rest of the Japanese force could approach the U.S. naval forces undetected[28] as well as to help provide protection and cover for Tanaka's convoy.[29] Most of the aircraft on Shōkaku and Zuikaku were readied to launch on short notice if the U.S. carriers were located. Between 05:55 and 06:30, the U.S. carriers (mainly Enterprise),[29] augmented by Catalinas from Ndeni, launched their own scout aircraft to search for the Japanese naval forces.[30]

At 09:35, a Catalina made the first sighting of the Ryūjō force. Several more sightings of Ryūjō and ships of Kondo's and Mikawa's forces by carrier and other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft followed later that morning. Throughout the morning and early afternoon, U.S. aircraft also sighted several Japanese scout aircraft and submarines, leading Fletcher to believe that the Japanese knew where his carriers were, which, however, was not yet the case. Still, Fletcher hesitated to order a strike against the Ryūjō group until he was sure there were no other Japanese carriers in the area. Finally, with no firm word on the presence or location of other Japanese carriers, Fletcher launched a strike of 38 aircraft from Saratoga at 13:40 to attack Ryūjō. However, he kept aircraft from both U.S. carriers ready just in case any Japanese fleet carriers were sighted.[31]

At 12:20, Ryūjō launched six "Kate" bombers and 15 A6M Zero fighters to attack Henderson Field in conjunction with an attack by 24 "Betty" bombers and 14 Zero fighters from Rabaul. However, unknown to the Ryūjō aircraft, the Rabaul aircraft had encountered severe weather and returned to their base at 11:30. The Ryūjō aircraft were detected on radar by Saratoga as they flew towards Guadalcanal, further fixing the location of their ship for the impending U.S. attack.[32] The Ryūjō aircraft arrived over Henderson Field at 14:23, and tangled with Henderson's fighter aircraft (members of the Cactus Air Force) while bombing the airfield. In the resulting engagement three Kates, three Zeros, and three U.S. fighters were shot down, and no significant damage was done to Henderson Field.[33]

At 14:25, a Japanese scout aircraft from the cruiser Chikuma sighted the U.S. carriers. Although the aircraft was shot down, its report was transmitted in time, and Nagumo immediately ordered his strike force launched from Shōkaku and Zuikaku. The first wave of aircraft, 27 "Val" dive bombers and 15 Zeros, was off by 14:50 and on its way towards Enterprise and Saratoga. About this same time, two U.S. scout aircraft finally sighted the main force. However, because of communication problems, these sighting reports never reached Fletcher. The two U.S. scout aircraft attacked Shōkaku before leaving the area, causing negligible damage. A second wave of 27 Vals and nine Zeros was launched by the Japanese carriers at 16:00 and headed south towards the U.S. carriers. Abe's Vanguard force also surged ahead in anticipation of meeting the U.S. ships in a surface action after nightfall.[34]

The disabled Ryujo (just right of center) being bombed on August 24, 1942, from high level by B-17 bombers. The destroyer Amatsukaze (center bottom) is moving away from Ryujo at full speed and Tokitsukaze (faintly visible, center right) is backing away from the bow of Ryujo in order to evade the B-17's falling bombs

About this same time, the Saratoga strike force arrived and began their attacks on Ryūjō, hitting her with three to five bombs, perhaps one torpedo, and killing 120 of her crew. Heavily damaged, the crew abandoned ship at nightfall, and she sank soon after. Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze rescued Ryūjō's survivors as well as the aircrews from her returning strike force, who ditched their aircraft in the ocean nearby. During this time, several U.S. B-17 bombers attacked the crippled Ryūjō but caused no additional damage.[35] After the rescue operations were complete, both Japanese destroyers and Tone rejoined Nagumo's main force.[36]

At 16:02, still waiting for a definitive report on the location of the Japanese fleet carriers, the U.S. carriers' radar detected the first incoming wave of Japanese strike aircraft. Fifty-three F4F Wildcat fighters from the two U.S. carriers were directed by radar control towards the attackers. However, communication problems, limitations of the aircraft identification capabilities of the radar, primitive control procedures, and effective screening of the Japanese dive bombers by their escorting Zero fighters, prevented all but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the Vals before they began their attacks on the U.S. carriers.[37] Just before the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks, Enterprise and Saratoga cleared their decks for the impending action by launching the aircraft that they had been holding ready in case the Japanese fleet carriers were sighted. These aircraft were told to fly north and attack anything they could find, or else to circle outside the battle zone, until it was safe to return.[38]

A Japanese "Val" dive bomber, believed to be piloted by Yoshihiro Iida, is shot down by anti-aircraft fire directly over Enterprise.[39]

At 16:29, the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks. Although several attempted to set-up to attack the Saratoga, they quickly shifted back to the nearer carrier, Enterprise. Thus, Enterprise was the target of almost the entire Japanese air attack. Several Wildcats followed the Vals into their attack dives, despite the intense anti-aircraft artillery fire from Enterprise and her screening warships, in a desperate attempt to disrupt their attacks.[40] As many as four Wildcats were shot down by U.S. anti-aircraft fire, as well as several Vals.[41]

Because of the effective anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships, plus evasive maneuvers, the bombs from the first nine Vals missed Enterprise. However, at 16:44, an armor-piercing, delayed-action bomb penetrated the flight deck near the after elevator and passed through three decks before detonating below the waterline, killing 35 men and wounding 70 more. Incoming sea water caused Enterprise to develop a slight list, but it was not a major breach of hull integrity.[42]

Just 30 seconds later, the next Val planted its bomb only 15 feet (4.5 m) away from where the first bomb hit. The resulting detonation ignited a large secondary explosion from one of the nearby 5-inch guns' ready powder casings, killing 35 members of the nearby gun crews and starting a large fire.[42]

The third and last bomb, dropped by an aircraft piloted by Kazumi Horie who died in the attack, hits Enterprise, causing minor damage. Smoke from the first two bomb hits can be seen in the upper left of the picture.[39]

About a minute later, at 16:46, the third and last bomb hit Enterprise on the flight deck forward of where the first two bombs hit. This bomb exploded on contact, creating a 10-foot (3 m) hole in the deck, but caused no further damage.[42] Four Vals then broke-off from the attack on Enterprise to attack the U.S. battleship North Carolina, but all of their bombs missed and all four Vals were shot down by anti-aircraft fire or U.S. fighters. The attack was over at 16:48, and the surviving Japanese aircraft reassembled in small groups and returned to their ships.[43]

Both sides thought that they had inflicted more damage than was the case. The U.S. claimed to have shot down 70 Japanese aircraft, even though there were only 42 aircraft in all. Actual Japanese losses, from all causes, in the engagement were 25 aircraft, with most of the crews of the lost aircraft not being recovered or rescued. The Japanese, for their part, mistakenly believed that they had heavily damaged two U.S. carriers, instead of just one. The U.S. lost six aircraft in the engagement, with most of the crews being rescued.[44]

Although Enterprise was heavily damaged and on fire, her damage-control teams were able to make sufficient repairs for the ship to resume flight operations at 17:46, only one hour after the engagement ended.[45] At 18:05, the Saratoga strike force returned from sinking Ryūjō and landed without major incident.[46] The second wave of Japanese aircraft approached the U.S. carriers at 18:15 but was unable to locate the U.S. formation because of communication problems and had to return to their carriers without attacking any U.S. ships, losing five aircraft in the process from operational mishaps.[47] Most of the U.S. carrier aircraft launched just before the first wave of Japanese aircraft attacked failed to find any targets. However, five TBF Avengers from Saratoga sighted Kondo's advanced force and attacked the seaplane tender Chitose, scoring two near misses which heavily damaged the unarmored ship.[48] The U.S. carrier aircraft either landed at Henderson Field or were able to return to their carriers after dusk.[49] The U.S. ships retired to the south to get out of range of any approaching Japanese warships. In fact, Abe's vanguard force and Kondo's advance force were steaming south to try to catch the U.S. carrier task forces in a surface battle, but they turned around at midnight without having made contact with the U.S. warships. Nagumo's main body, having taken heavy aircraft losses in the engagement, plus being low on fuel, also retreated towards the north.[50]

Actions on August 25

Believing that two U.S. carriers had been taken out of action with heavy damage, Tanaka's reinforcement convoy again headed towards Guadalcanal and, by 08:00 on August 25, was within 150 miles (240 km) of their destination. At this time, Tanaka's convoy was joined by five destroyers which had shelled Henderson Field the night before, causing slight damage.[51] At 08:05, 18 U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field attacked Tanaka's convoy, causing heavy damage to Jintsu, killing 24 crewmen, and knocking Tanaka unconscious. The troop transport Kinryu Maru was also hit and eventually sank. Just as the Japanese destroyer Mutsuki pulled-alongside Kinryu Maru to rescue her crew and embarked troops, she was attacked by four U.S. B-17s from Espiritu Santo which landed five bombs on or around Mutsuki, sinking her immediately. A revived and uninjured but shaken Tanaka transferred to the destroyer Kagero, sent Jintsu back to Truk, and took the convoy to the Japanese base in the Shortland Islands.[52]

Both the Japanese and the U.S. elected to completely withdraw their warships from the area, ending the battle. The Japanese naval forces lingered near the northern Solomons, out of range of the U.S. aircraft based at Henderson Field, before finally returning to Truk on September 5.[53]

Aftermath

The burned-out 5 inch (127 mm) gun gallery on Enterprise, photographed after the battle

The battle is generally considered to be more or less a tactical and strategic victory for the U.S. because the Japanese lost more ships, aircraft, and aircrew, and Japanese troop reinforcements for Guadalcanal were delayed.[54] Summing up the significance of the battle, historian Richard B. Frank states,

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was unquestionably an American victory, but it had little long-term result, apart from a further reduction in the corps of trained Japanese carrier aviators. The (Japanese) reinforcements that could not come by slow transport would soon reach Guadalcanal by other means.[55]

The U.S. lost only seven aircrew members in the battle. However, the Japanese lost 61 veteran aircrew, who were hard for the Japanese to replace because of an institutionalized limited capacity in their naval aircrew training programs and an absence of trained reserves.[56] The troops in Tanaka's convoy were later loaded onto destroyers at the Shortland Islands and delivered piecemeal, without most of their heavy equipment, to Guadalcanal beginning on August 29, 1942.[57]

Emphasizing the strategic value of Henderson Field, in a separate reinforcement effort, Japanese destroyer Asagiri was sunk and two other Japanese destroyers heavily damaged on August 28, 70 miles (130 km) north of Guadalcanal in "The Slot" by U.S. aircraft based at the airfield.[58] The battle for the island settled into a two-month-long stalemate, punctuated by an intense land battle at Edson's Ridge on September 13 and a large surface naval engagement at Cape Esperance in early October.

Enterprise traveled to Pearl Harbor for extensive repairs, which were completed on October 15, 1942.[59] She returned to the South Pacific on October 24, just in time for the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and her rematch with Shōkaku and Zuikaku.[60]

Notes

  1. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 166–174. The U.S. carriers present for the battle carried 154 aircraft, 22 more fighter or attack aircraft of the Cactus Air Force were located at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The "176" number doesn't include B-17s based at Espiritu Santo or PBY Catalinas based in the Santa Cruz Islands.
  2. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 166–174 (171 aircraft) and Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 106 (177 aircraft). This number doesn't include Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul or scout aircraft from the Japanese battleships, cruisers, and seaplane tender Chitose or Japanese aircraft based elsewhere in the Solomon Islands.
  3. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 191–192.
  4. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 191–193, Peattie, p. 180 & 339. No known records exist that record the losses from the sinking of Kinryu Maru and damage to Chitose, and other Japanese ships. However, known casualties are: 120 killed on Ryūjō, 40 on Mutsuki, 24 on Jintsu (Parshall, [1]), six on Shōkaku, and 61 aircrew members. Total Japanese aircraft losses included 33 Zeros, 23 Vals, eight Kates, seven float planes (scouts), one Betty bomber, two Emilys, and one Mavis. Of the aircrew losses, 27 were from Shokaku, 21 from Zuikaku, and 13 from Ryūjō.
  5. ^ Hogue, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 235–236.
  6. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 150. Not all of the ships were U.S. warships; attached to TF 18 was Task Force 44, commanded by Victor Alexander Charles Crutchley, and included the Australian navy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Hobart (source: Lundstrom, Guadalcanal campaign, p. 96 and 99).
  7. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 41–42.
  8. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 43–99.
  9. ^ Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 89 and Hammel, Carrier Clash, 106.
  10. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 111–129.
  11. ^ Hammel, Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea, 400
  12. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 121.
  13. ^ Evans, Japanese Navy, p. 161–162, 169, Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 33–34. Tanaka says there were 1,000 SNLF troops.
  14. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 159, Evans, Japanese Navy, p. 160–162. Tanaka in Jintsu and Kagero had departed Japan for Truk on August 11 in response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal. At Truk, Tanaka was given command of the Guadalcanal Reinforcement Force (later called Tokyo Express by the Allies), an ad hoc unit under the IJN 8th Fleet with ships from various units assigned to deliver reinforcements to Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. The four patrol boats were the former destroyers Shimakaze, Nadakaze, Suzuki, and Tsuta converted to transport troops. The three transports were Kinryu Maru, Boston Maru, and Daifuku Maru. A "First Element" of 917 soldiers from the Ichiki Regiment, including Ichiki himself, was delivered by six destroyers to Guadalcanal on the morning of August 19.
  15. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 122.
  16. ^ Coombe, Derailing the Tokyo Express, p. 55, Hammel, Carrier Clash, 148.
  17. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 167–172.
  18. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 123.
  19. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 160.
  20. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 124–125, 157.
  21. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 147.
  22. ^ Office of Naval Intelligence, Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 47
  23. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 154–156.
  24. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 158; Also early on August 22, U.S. destroyer Blue was torpedoed off Guadalcanal by Japanese destroyer Kawakaze which had been sent by Tanaka from his convoy along with Yunagi to try interdict a small Allied supply convoy to the island. Blue was heavily damaged, with eight crewmen killed, and sank the next day near Tulagi (09°17′S 160°02′E / 9.283°S 160.033°E / -9.283; 160.033 (USS Blue (DD-387))). Because this action happened separately, it usually is not regarded as a direct loss as a result of the battle of August 24–25. (Evans, Japanese Navy, p. 165, Frank, Guadalcanal, 163–166 and Coombe, Derailing the Tokyo Express, p. 56–57.).
  25. ^ Evans, Japanese Navy, p. 165–166, Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 103, Frank, Guadalcanal, 161–165, and Hammel, Carrier Clash, 160–167. Tanaka received conflicting orders this day. Mikawa ordered him to turn to the north to avoid Allied air attacks and land the troops on August 25, but Nishizō Tsukahara, commander of the 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul and Mikawa's superior officer ordered Tanaka to conduct the landing on August 24, which Tanaka replied was now impossible. Tsukahara and Mikawa apparently weren't coordinating their orders.
  26. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 168.
  27. ^ Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 102, Coombe, Derailing the Tokyo Express, p. 67.
  28. ^ Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, 107–115
  29. ^ a b Frank, Guadalcanal, 176
  30. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 168–175.
  31. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 175–184.
  32. ^ Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 116 and Hammel, Carrier Clash, 175, 186–187 and 192–193.
  33. ^ Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 119 and Hammel, Carrier Clash, 188–191.
  34. ^ Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 123 and Hammel, Carrier Clash, 202–208. Five of the Zeros turned-back to guard the Japanese carriers because of this attack by the U.S. scout aircraft. Seven B-17s from Espiritu Santo also attacked Zuikaku and Shōkaku between 17:50 and 18:19, but caused no damage except for shooting down one Zero (Frank, Guadalcanal, 177)
  35. ^ Before ditching, several Ryūjō Zeros attacked these B-17s, causing some damage but not shooting any of them down. After the B-17s returned to base at Espiritu Santo, one of them crashed upon landing, killing four of its crew. These four killed personnel are counted among the total losses from the battle.
  36. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 209–225.
  37. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 226–232, 240–245 and Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 127.
  38. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 233–235
  39. ^ a b Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 137.
  40. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 240–262. The U.S. screening ships for Enterprise that assisted her in firing anti-aircraft artillery at the attacking Japanese aircraft included: battleship USS North Carolina, heavy cruiser USS Portland, light cruiser USS Atlanta, and six destroyers. (navweaps.com)
  41. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 278–279
  42. ^ a b c Frank, Guadalcanal, 183
  43. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 266–276 and Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 137.
  44. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 295
  45. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 185
  46. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 300–305
  47. ^ Lundstrom, Guadalcanal Campaign, 157 and Hammel, Carrier Clash, 310–311
  48. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 187–188. Chitose was towed back to Truk and then went to Japan for repairs which were completed on September 14, 1942 (Hackett, IJN Seaplane Tender CHITOSE: Tabular Record of Movement, Imperial Japanese Navy page, [2])
  49. ^ Hammel, Carrier Clash, 318–319
  50. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 187, Hammel, Carrier Clash, 320
  51. ^ Evans, Japanese Navy, p. 167, Hammel, Carrier Clash, 324. Tanaka in Evans gives 06:00 as the time, but this is apparently because Japanese naval forces used Japan Standard Time. The five destroyers who joined the convoy this morning included Mutsuki, Yayoi, Kagero, Kawakaze, and Isokaze.
  52. ^ Evans, Japanese Navy, p. 168–169, Coombe, Derailing the Tokyo Express, p. 58–59, Hammel, Carrier Clash, 326–327, Parshall, HIJMS JINTSU: Tabular Record of Movement, Imperial Japanese Navy page, [3]. Jintsu was forced to go to Japan for repairs which were completed on January 9, 1943.
  53. ^ Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, 119
  54. ^ Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, 114–115
  55. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 193
  56. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 191–193.
  57. ^ Hara, Japanese Destroyer Captain, 118–119, Frank, Guadalcanal, 201–203, Peattie, p. 180 & 339. Of the aircrew losses, 27 were from Shokaku, 21 from Zuikaku, and 13 from Ryūjō
  58. ^ Evans, Japanese Navy, p. 171, Frank, Guadalcanal, 199–200.
  59. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 191.
  60. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, 370–371.

References

  • Coombe, Jack D. (1991). Derailing the Tokyo Express. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole. ISBN 0-8117-3030-1.
  • Evans, David C. (Editor) (1986 (2nd Edition)). "The Struggle for Guadalcanal". The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-316-4. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); Check date values in: |year= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  • Frank, Richard B. (1990). Guadalcanal : The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Penguin Group. ISBN 0-14-016561-4.
  • Hammel, Eric (1999). Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal & The Battle of the Eastern Solomons August 1942. St. Paul, MN, USA: Zenith Press. ISBN 0-7603-2052-7.
  • Hammel, Eric (1988). Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea : The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Nov. 13–15, 1942. (CA): Pacifica Press. ISBN 0-517-56952-3.
  • Hara, Tameichi (1961). Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York & Toronto: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-345-27894-1. First-hand account of the battle by the captain of the Japanese destroyer Amatsukaze.
  • Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). The First Team And the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-472-8. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  • Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-58305-7.
  • Peattie, Mark R. (1999). Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power 1909-1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-664-X.
  • Smith, Michael T. (2000). Bloody Ridge: The Battle That Saved Guadalcanal. New York: Pocket. ISBN 0-7434-6321-8.

Further reading

  • D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
  • Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
  • Lacroix, Eric (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Lundstrom, John B. (2006). Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Seas, Midway & Guadalcanal. Annapolis, Maryland, USA: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-475-2.
  • Smith, Douglas V. (2006). Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591147948.
  • Stafford, Edward P. (2002 (reissue)). The Big E: The Story of the USS Enterprise. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-998-0. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  • Stille, Mark (2007). USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942. New York: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-248-6.
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