Operation Market Garden

Market Garden
Part of World War II
Waves of paratroops land in the Netherlands during Operation Market Garden in September 1944.
Date September 17-September 25 1944 Location Netherlands Result German victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom United States Poland	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Bernard Montgomery	Gerd von Rundstedt
Strength
XXX Corps, 35,000 airborne	20,000
Casualties and losses
17,000 casualties	8,000 casualties

Operation Market Garden (September 17-September 25, 1944) was an Allied military operation in World War II. Its tactical objectives were to secure a series of bridges over the main rivers of the German-occupied Netherlands by large-scale use of airborne forces together with a rapid advance by armoured units along the connecting roads, for the strategic purpose of allowing an Allied crossing of the Rhine river, the last major natural barrier to an advance into Germany. The operation was initially successful with the capture of the Waal bridge at Nijmegen on 20 September, but was a failure overall as the final Rhine bridge at Arnhem was never taken, and the British 1st Airborne Division was destroyed in the ensuing combat. The Rhine would remain a barrier to the Allied advance until the Allied Offensives in March 1945. The defeat of Allied forces at Arnhem is considered the last major German victory of the Western Campaign.

Background

After major defeats in Normandy in July-August 1944, remnants of German forces withdrew across the Low Countries and eastern France towards the German border by the end of August. In the north, the British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was advancing on a line running from Antwerp to the northern border of Belgium. To their south, the US 12th Army Group under General Omar N. Bradley was nearing the German border and had been ordered to orient on the Aachen gap with the US First Army. In the south, the Sixth Army Group under Gen. Jacob Devers was advancing towards Germany after their landings in southern France.

Logistical problems

The "Red Ball Express" was an attempt to resolve persistent Allied supply problems.

At the end of August 1944, logistical issues halted the Allied advance. Supply sources were limited to the shallow docks built on the original invasion beaches and the nearby deep-water port of Cherbourg at the tip of the Cotentin peninsula. The massive port of Antwerp lay intact in British hands, but the Scheldt estuary leading inland was still in German control. Other important ports on the Channel Coast such as Dunkirk would remain in German hands until May 1945.

Although over-the-beach supply operations actually outperformed expectations and enough supplies were present on the continent to support Allied operations, a shortage of transportation to move these supplies forward created a bottleneck. At the beginning of September, for example, Cherbourg had 70,000 tons of stockpiled supplies but no transport to move them. Regional railway transport was effectively nonexistent due to the effectiveness of pre-invasion air strikes; train movement out of Normandy did not resume until August 30, and was very limited. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that 1,400 British 3 ton trucks were found to be useless because of faulty pistons in their engines--this quantity of transport could have moved 800 tons per day, enough for two divisions in September, leaving three newly arrived US Infantry Divisions (the 26th, 95th, and 104th) stripped of their trucks in order to supply forces in contact with the enemy. The heavy artillery units of the 12th Army Group were left west of the Seine freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units. Organisation of the Red Ball Express did much to lessen the impact of the transportation problem, but this ad hoc operation could not solve the problem.

Competing solutions

US soldiers crossing the Siegfried Line.

The Allied dilemma was whether to pursue a broad logistical solution (clearing the waterway to Antwerp) or a decisive tactical solution (destroying German forces). Most Allied commanders were in favour of an aggressive pursuit of the seemingly shattered German armies. Both Bradley (and his subordinate, Patton) and Montgomery requested priority on supplies in order to cross the Rhine river in a single decisive thrust, in opposition to Eisenhower's plan of a broad advance, decided upon before the Normandy landings.

Bradley and Patton favoured an attack east to take the city of Metz and into the industrial area of the Saarland, requiring passage of the Siegfried Line to the heavily defended Rhine. Montgomery initially suggested Operation Comet, a limited airborne assault in front of the British XXX Corps, but this was dropped in favor of a more ambitious plan, consisting of an attack north to Arnhem, deep inside the Netherlands, bypassing the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine, and trapping the German 15th Army between Arnhem and the shores of the IJsselmeer. This would also isolate the V-2 launch sites that were bombarding London and Antwerp. However, the plan aimed the British Second Army northwards through terrain with numerous water obstacles, which had been explicitly rejected by Overlord planners, and on the British away from the US First Army. Finally, it entailed an armoured advance up a single narrow road with low-lying polder on both sides, restricting both supply lines and the ability to use numerical strength to full advantage.

Decision for Market Garden

The decision to launch Market Garden was influenced by several factors. After Normandy, the airborne forces had been withdrawn to re-form in England, forming the First Allied Airborne Army consisting of three US and two British airborne divisions, and an additional Polish Brigade. General Eisenhower had been under pressure from the US to use these forces as soon as possible; after Normandy 18 airborne operations had been planned and then cancelled at short notice when ground forces overran the intended drop zones. General Bradley favored the use of transport aircraft for supply missions, arguing that the lift required for airborne operations could have instead been used to better effect logistically.

The plan

For a more comprehensive list of Allied and German units see Operation Market Garden order of battle

The plan of action consisted of two coordinated operations:

• MARKET: airborne forces of the General Brereton's First Allied Airborne Army to seize bridges and other key terrain, under tactical command of General Browning, and
• GARDEN: ground forces of the British 2nd Army to move north spearheaded by XXX Corps under Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks.

Terrain

There were eight major water obstacles between the XXX Corps jumping-off point and the ultimate objective on the north bank of the Rhine, including several major rivers and three canals. Plans were made to seize bridges across all these obstacles nearly simultaneously. Although the smaller canals and rivers could be temporarily bridged by engineers of XXX Corps if the existing permanent bridges could not be seized, the larger rivers (the Waal at Nijmegen and the Rhine at Arnhem) could not be bridged by XXX Corps.

Highway 69 (later nicknamed "Hell's Highway") leading through the planned route was two lanes wide, generally raised above the surrounding flat terrain of polder. The ground alongside the highway was too soft to support tactical vehicle movement.

A single 100-meter high hill, the Groesbeek ridge, lay in the 82nd Airborne's zone. Seizure and defense of this hill was considered vital to holding the highway bridges.

Market

The Allied plan for Operation Market Garden

Market would employ three of the five divisions of the 1st Airborne army. The Army commander, Lewis H. Brereton, was a U.S. officer with no Airborne experience; he had recently commanded the Ninth Air Force. The US 101st Airborne Division, under Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, would drop in two locations just north of the XXX Corps to take the bridges northwest of Eindhoven at Son (mun. Son en Breugel) and Veghel. The 82nd Airborne Division, under Brigadier General James M. Gavin, would drop quite a bit northeast of them to take the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen, and finally the British 1st Airborne Division, under Major General Roy Urquhart and Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade would drop at the extreme north end of the route, to take the road bridge at Arnhem and rail bridge at Oosterbeek.

Market would be the largest airborne operation in history, delivering over 34,876 men of the 101st, 82nd, 1st and the Polish Brigade. The lack of sufficient aircraft meant that the drops had to be scheduled over several days. The Deputy Commander of the 1st Airborne Army, "Boy" Browning, added his own HQ to the first lift so that he could command from the front. 13,781 troops were transported by gliders, 20,190 by parachute, and 905 by aeroplane on a prepared landing strip. Gliders also brought in 1,689 vehicles, 290 howitzers and 1,259 tons of ammunition and other supplies.

Garden

Garden consisted primarily of XXX Corps, and initially spearheaded by the Guards Armoured Division, an elite British Armoured Formation, with the 43rd Wessex and 50th Northumbrian Infantry Divisions in reserve. They were expected to arrive at the south end of the 101st's area on the launch day, the 82nd by the second day, and the 1st by the third or fourth day at the latest. They would also deliver several additional infantry divisions to take over the defensive operations from the airborne, freeing them for other operations as soon as possible.

Four days was, and is, a long time for an airborne force to fight unsupported. In addition, the Allied paratroopers lacked adequate anti-tank weapons. Even so, it seemed to the Allied high command the German resistance at this point had broken. Most of the German 15th Army in the area appeared to be fleeing the field from in front of the Canadians, and they were known to have no Panzer-gruppen. XXX Corps would therefore be facing very limited resistance on their route up highway 69, and little armour. Meanwhile, the German defenders would be spread out over 100 km trying to contain the pockets of airborne forces, from the British 2nd Army in the south to Arnhem in the north.

German Forces

The rout of the German forces in July and August led the Allies to believe that the German army was a spent force unable to reconstitute its shattered units, but all was not what it seemed. The failure of the 21st Army Group to clear or cut off the Scheldt from the mainland allowed the German 15th Army to move 86,000 men and 600 artillery pieces back into the mainland of the Netherlands, directly into the path of the planned attack. The arrival of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt as Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief West in early September also helped stabilise the German front. Rundstedt, who replaced Field Marshal Walter Model, was generally detested by Hitler, but well-respected by his troops, whom he had back in fighting condition within the week. Rundstedt immediately began to plan a defense against what Wehrmacht intelligence said was 60 Allied divisions at full strength.

Additionally, Colonel General Kurt Student, the Wehrmacht's own airborne pioneer, was ordered to take up positions along the Albert Canal with what was euphemistically called the 'First Parachute Army'. Student's 3,000 paratroopers, scattered across the Reich, were probably the only combat-ready reserve forces in Germany at the time. Furthermore, Lieutenant General Kurt Chill, commanding the shattered 85th Division, established 'reception hairy stations' at key bridge crossings in the Netherlands. Chill's actions gathered together a miscellany of service troops into a semblance of military units, allowing Student to organize a defensive line. The German 719th Infantry Division was added to this force.

Finally, an unfortunate coincidence had resulted in German Panzer forces being sent to the Arnhem area from September 4th. Allied Command was informed of this from various sources including the Dutch resistance and their own intelligence. However, it seems that no-one in authority was prepared to accept that the German forces were of sufficient strength to trouble Uruquart's 1st Airborne division. Rundstedt and his generals had agreed that Eisenhower would favour Patton in the anticipated offensive. Accordingly, in one of his final orders as Commander-in-Chief West, Model had ordered the II. SS-Panzerkorps, including the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer divisions under the command of Lieutenant General Wilhelm Bittrich, to rest and refit in the rear. The place chosen happened to be the area around Arnhem with the 9th SS scattered in various towns and villages to the north of the city and the 10th SS stationed 15km further to the east. However, it should be noted that both SS divisions were very weak. Their combined strength amounted to no more than 7000 men. In addition they retained few heavy weapons following the retreat from Normandy. On the eve of the battle the 9th SS Panzer regiment had no tanks, the 9th SS Artillery regiment based in Dieren had no guns and neither the 19th or 20th SS Panzer Grenadier regiments, based in Zutphen and Rheden respectively, had any heavy weapons. Nevertheless, the fortuitous selection of Arnhem as a rest area meant that there was an additional 3000 combat-ready troops immediately available for commitment against the British drop - troops who had received specific training in anti-airborne assault tactics.

Problems

Several reports from the Dutch resistance reported by September 10th on the German movements, with accurate identification of German armour units. Although planning was in late stages, SHAEF Chief of Staff General Walter Bedell Smith flew to 21st Army Group headquarters to suggest several possible changes in the plan which Montgomery was unable or unwilling to institute. When an aerial reconnaissance flight returned with pictures clearly showing tanks deployed only 15 km from the British drop zones, they were actively dismissed by Montgomery, with the (unfounded) assumption that they probably could not run and were broken down.

The U.S. IX Troop Carrier Command provided 1,545 transport aircraft and 478 gliders for Market; enough capacity for approximately half of each division. Although every division commander requested two drops the first day, the inexperienced commander of 1st Allied Airborne Army scheduled a single drop on each of several days to allow for maintenance and aircrew rest. A precarious timetable at the mercy of the weather meant that the 101st Airborne Division would be without artillery for two days, the 82nd Airborne would lack artillery for one day (and its glider infantry regiment for three days) and the British 1st Airborne would be short a full brigade until the third day. The scheduling of multiple drops meant that each Division had to devote forces simply to holding the drop zones, weakening their offensive power.

Drop Zone selection was often poor, particularly at Arnhem where command inexperience placed drop zones 15 kilometres from the bridge; plans to take the bridge the first night ensured the force was split in two for over 24 hours. Unfortunately, air commanders refused to fly to the north of the target bridge because of flak guns at Deelen (Ede). Another suitable drop zone just to the south of the bridge was also rejected because it was thought to be too marshy for landing gliders containing the force's heavier equipment.

Realizing the seriousness of the problem, the plan was then hastily changed to task a small force of machine-gun equipped jeeps with seizing the bridge in a coup de main with three battalions following on foot. A fourth battalion would hold the drop zones with the glider pilots until the final two lifts arrived.

In a period of one week, preparations were declared complete; by comparison the airborne plans for Sicily and Normandy had taken months to complete. Key planning tasks were done badly or not at all. The decision to make only one drop on Sep 17th was "disastrous" in the words of the United States Army's historical study of the operation. Communications planning was poor, and the 1st Airborne Division would be out of touch with most other headquarters for most of the battle. No arrangements were made for close air support. The drops were scheduled with a south-to-north priority to ease XXX Corps' advance, but this put the units at Arnhem at a disadvantage in terms of surprise and time to complete their missions.

Gavin, commanding the US 82nd Airborne Division, was skeptical of the plan. In his diary he wrote, "It looks very rough. If I get through this one I will be very lucky." He was also highly critical of Browning, writing that he "...unquestionably lacks the standing, influence and judgment that comes from a proper troop experience....his staff was superficial...Why the British units fumble along...becomes more and more apparent. Their tops lack the knowhow, never do they get down into the dirt and learn the hard way."

The battle

British tanks cross the road bridge at Nijmegen during its capture.

Day 1, Sunday, September 17, 1944

Early Successes

Operation Market Garden opened with Allied successes all around. The first landing was in daylight for accuracy, and almost all of the troops arrived on top of their target drop zones without incident. For example, in the 82nd Airborne Division, 89% of troops landed on or within 1000 yards of their correct drop zones, and 84% of gliders landed on or within 1000 yards of their intended landing zones. This contrasted strongly with previous operations where night drops had resulted in units being scattered by up to 20 km. Losses to enemy aircraft and flak were light; German flak was described in reports as "heavy but inaccurate".

In the south the 101st met little resistance and captured four of the five bridges tasked to the Division. However, the bridge at Son was blown up as they approached it, after being delayed by a short engagement with two German anti-tank guns. Later that day several small attacks by the German 59th Infantry Division (a 15th Army unit that had escaped South Beveland due to the failure to cut off Antwerp) were beaten off, while small units of the 101st had moved south of Son.

82^nd Airborne Division drop near Grave in the Netherlands during Operation Market Garden. (National Archives)

To their north, the 82nd arrived and the small group dropped near Grave took the bridge intact in a rush. They also succeeded in taking one of the vitally important bridges over the Maas-Waal canal, the lockbridge at Heumen. The main effort of the 82nd was to seize the Groesbeek Heights and set up a blocking position there, to prevent a German armour attack out of the nearby Reichswald and to deny the height to German artillery observers. Both Gavin and Browning felt this must be the Division's top priority. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment was tasked with taking the 600-meter-long Nijmegen highway bridge if possible, but due to miscommunication they did not start until late in the day. Had they attacked earlier, they would have faced only a dozen Germans. By the time the attack was finally mounted, they were stopped by just-arriving troops of the 9th SS Reconnaissance battalion (see below). This left the Nijmegen bridge in German hands. This was of vital importance. Unlike some of the bridges to the south, which were over smaller rivers and canals and could be bridged by engineering units, the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges crossed two arms of the Rhine, and there was no possibility of easily bridging either. If either of the Nijmegen or Arnhem bridges were not captured and held then the advance of XXX Corps would be blocked and Operation Market Garden would fail.

British Landings

Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost, in the uniform of The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)

The 1st Airborne, meanwhile, had landed without major incident, but problems associated with the poor plan began almost immediately. Only half of the Division arrived with the First Lift, and only half of these, in the form of the 1st Parachute Brigade, could advance on the bridge. The remaining troops had to defend the drop zones overnight awaiting the arrival of the Second Lift on the following day. Thus the primary mission of the Division was left to less than a half Brigade. While the paratroopers marched to Arnhem, the Reconnaissance Squadron was tasked with racing to the bridge in their jeeps and holding it until the rest of the Brigade arrived. Many jeeps were lost on the 38 1st Division gliders that did not make it to the landing zone; others were unloaded with difficulty. The unit set off to the bridge late, and having travelled only a short distance, the vanguard was halted by a strong German defensive position and the Squadron could make no further progress.

This had major consequences for the operation as a whole. Five hours after the initial landing, the reconnaissance battalion of the 9th Waffen-SS Panzer Division was able to cross the Arnhem bridge and move on to Nijmegen and the Waal river bridge. No British Airborne unit was as yet present at the bridge.

Two of the three battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade found themselves slowed down by small German units of a training battalion which had quickly established a thin blocking line covering the obvious routes to Arnhem. Lieutenant Colonel John Frost's 2nd Battalion, however, were advancing far south of this position and so found their route largely undefended, and they arrived at the bridge in the evening and set up defensive positions at the north end. Of the other battalions, the 3rd had only covered half the distance to the bridge when they came to a halt for the night, the rear of their column being under attack and needing time to catch up. The 1st Battalion was similarly fragmented, yet they pushed on around the flank of the German line throughout the night, but frequent skirmishes resulted in their making little more progress. Two attempts to take the entire bridge span including the south end were unsuccessful.

Communication problems

Some loss of communication between the Bridge and the drop zones was expected as 8 miles separated them, and the main radio used at all levels throughout the Division was Type 22 set with a 5 mile radius. However, the British radios did not function at any range, some had difficulty receiving signals from just a few hundred yards and others received nothing at all. Several theories have been advanced to explain the near-total failure of the 1st Airborne Division's communcations net. Modern tests using 22 Sets have suggested that large deposits of iron in the soil could have been to blame. It is also possible that repeated operational stand-tos and cancellations (over a dozen drops were planned and then cancelled in the weeks prior to the operation) had led to sloppy battery charging procedures and lax supervision of this task.

As a consequence, communication between 1st Airborne units was poor at a time when German defences were being coordinated and reinforced. This was partially due to the fact that the British 1st Airborne Division had been given a radio frequency that was similar to one belonging to a radio station in England. Additionally, Very High Frequency (VHF) sets operated by an attached American unit were tuned to an unused frequency and were rendered useless. Despite efforts to retune them, the sets were soon destroyed by mortar fire, cutting the 1st Airborne's only link with RAF fighter-bombers. The pilots were under orders not to attack on their own initiative, as there was no easy way to distinguish friend from foe on the Airborne front.

XXX Corps advance

General Horrocks refused to commit his troops until he received confirmation that the airborne forces had landed, having had experience of previous Airborne operations that had been cancelled on short notice. XXX Corps therefore did not start its advance until 14:35, and soon ran into infantry and anti-tank units dug in on the road. The force was delayed several hours and a number of Guards Armoured division's tanks were lost. As dusk fell at 17:00, they were still 15 km south of Eindhoven and behind schedule. The common doctrine for armour at that time was to halt at night, and although some night attacks had been made with armour by 21st Army Group in Normandy during Operation Totalise, no attempt was made here. The Irish Guards commander, Col. JOE Vandeleur was told by the Guards Armoured Division Chief of Staff to "take your time..." because the bridge at Son had been blown. In fact, the loss of the bridge at Son made a fast advance more urgent, so that XXX Corps engineers could begin work on a replacement.

Enemy reactions

On the German side, it was soon clear what was going on. Model, in direct command of the forces in the area, was initially confused by the British dropping in what appeared to be the middle of nowhere, and concluded they were commandos attempting to kidnap him. Meanwhile, Bittrich, commanding the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, had a clearer head, and immediately sent a reconnaissance company of the 9th SS Panzer Division to Nijmegen to reinforce the bridge defense. By midnight, however, Model had gained a clear picture of the situation and issued orders that proved beneficial to the successful defence of Arnhem. The confusion usually attendant to defending against airborne operations was absent at Arnhem and the advantage of surprise was largely nullified by an alert reaction.

Day 2, Monday the 18th

British airborne front

British landings in Arnhem.

The 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions pushed towards the Arnhem bridge during the early hours and made good progress, but they were frequently halted in skirmishes as soon as it became daylight. With their long and unwieldy columns having to halt to beat off attacks whilst the troops in front carried on unaware, it was easy for the Germans to delay segments of the two battalions, fragment them, and mop up the remnants. Also, early in the day, the 9th SS reconnaissance battalion, sent south the day before, concluded it was not needed in Nijmegen and returned to Arnhem. Though aware of the British troops at the bridge, it attempted to cross by force and was beaten back with heavy losses, including its commanding officer, SS-Hauptsturmführer Paul Gräbner.

By the end of the day, the 1st and 3rd Para battalions had entered Arnhem and were within a mile of the bridge with approximately 200 men, one-sixth their original strength. Most of the officers and noncomissioned officers had become casualties. The second lift, delayed by fog and jumping onto a heavily disputed landing zone, landed a full strength Brigade (The 4th Parachute Brigade, consisting of the 10th, 11th and 156th Battalions of the Parachute Regiment, commanded by then-Brigadier, later General Sir John Hackett, GCB DSO MC) and C and D Company of the 2nd South Straffordshires.

American front

82nd Airborne

US landings in Nijmegen.

Grave proved to be well defended and German forces continued to press on the 82nd deployed on the Groesbeek heights to the east of Nijmegen. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment defended successfully against German attacks in Horst, Grafwegen, and Riethorst. Early in the day, German counterattacks seized one of the Allied landing zones, where the second lift was scheduled to arrive at 13:00. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attacked at 13:10 and cleared the LZ by 14:00, capturing 16 German flak pieces and 149 prisoners. Due to delay in Britain the second lift did not arrive until 15:30. This lift brought in elements of the 319th and 320th Glider Field Artillery battalions, the 456th Parachute Field Artillery battalion, and medical support elements. Twenty minutes later, 135 B-24 bombers dropped supplies, 80% of which were recovered.

101st Airborne

Map of US landings near Eindhoven.

The 101st, faced with the loss of the bridge at Son, unsuccessfully attempted to take the similar bridge a few kilometers away at Best, finding the approach blocked. Other units continued moving to the south and eventually reached the northern end of Eindhoven. At about noon they were met by reconnaissance units from XXX Corps. At 16:00, they made radio contact with the main force to the south and told them about the Son bridge, asking for a Bailey bridge to be brought forward.

XXX Corps soon arrived in Eindhoven, and by that night were bivouacked south of Son while they waited for the Royal Engineers to erect the Bailey bridge. At the end of two days the operation was 36 hours behind schedule, with both primary bridges still in German hands.

Day 3, Tuesday the 19th

Arnhem

During the early hours of the morning, the 1st Parachute Brigade began their attack towards Arnhem Bridge with the 1st Battalion leading, supported by remnants of the 3rd Battalion, with the 2nd South Staffordshires on the 1st Battalion's left flank and the 11th Battalion following on in the rear. As soon as it became light, the 1st Battalion was spotted and halted by fire from the main German defensive line. Trapped in open ground and under heavy fire from three sides, the 1st Battalion disintegrated and what remained of the 3rd Battalion fell back. The 2nd South Staffords were similarly cut off and, save for about 150 men, overcome by midday. The 11th Battalion, who had stayed out of much of the fighting, were now overwhelmed in exposed positions while attempting to capture high ground to the north. With no hope of breaking through, the 500 remaining men of these four battalions withdrew west in the direction of the main force three miles away in Oosterbeek.

The 2nd Battalion and attached units, by now amounting to approximately 600 men, were still in firm control of the northern approach ramp to the Arnhem bridge. The Germans recognised that they would not be moved by such infantry attacks as had been bloodily repulsed on the previous day, so instead they heavily shelled the small British perimeter with mortars, artillery and tanks, systematically demolishing each house to enable their infantry to exploit gaps and evict the defenders. Although in constant, heavy battle against enormous odds, the British clung fiercely to their positions, and in the main the shape of the perimeter remained unaltered.

Oosterbeek

To the north of Oosterbeek, the 4th Parachute Brigade led the 1st Airborne Division's attempt to break through the German lines there, but due to communication difficulties and considerable enemy resistance, the attack failed with heavy losses. The Division, scattered far and wide and hard pressed by the enemy on all sides, had lost its offensive capability. Unable to help Frost at the bridge, the remains attempted to concentrate into a defensive pocket at Oosterbeek and hold a bridgehead on the north bank of the Rhine.

The parachute elements of the Polish Parachute Brigade, scheduled to arrive this day, remained in England due to dense fog. Their gliders, however, consisting mainly of anti-tank guns and vehicles, were able to take-off but had the misfortune to arrive on the landing zone just as the 4th Parachute Brigade were retreating across it, and came under fire from German units closely following the withdrawal.

American front

82nd Airborne

At 0820, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment made contact with XXX Corps at Grave. This enabled the Regiment to move on to other missions and place the 3rd battalion in division reserve. By the afternoon of the 19th, advance units of XXX Corps were arriving in Nijmegen. By this time, according to the original plan, they were due in Arnhem. A combined effort to take the Nijmegen bridge was mounted by two companies from the Guards Armoured Division and the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The attack got within 400 yards of the bridge before being stopped; skirmishing continued throughout the night. A plan was developed to attack the south end of the bridge again while the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment planned to cross the river in boats a mile downstream and then attack the north end. The boats, requested for late afternoon, never arrived. Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge.

The 1st and 5th battalions, Coldstream Guards, were attached to the Division. A resupply attempt from 30 C-47s was unsuccessful; the supplies were dropped from a high altitude and could not be recovered.

101st Airborne

To their south, units of the 101st sent to take Best the day before were forced to yield to German counterattacks during the morning. British tanks arriving during the day helped push back the Germans by late afternoon. Later a small force of Panthers arrived at Son, and started firing on the Bailey bridge. These, too, were beaten back by anti-tank guns that had recently landed, and the bridge was secured.

Day 4, Wednesday the 20th

Arnhem Bridge

Lt. Colonel John Frost's force at the bridge continued to hold out, and established communication via the public telephone system with 1st Division at around noon, to learn that the division had no hope of relieving them, and that XXX Corps was stopped to the south in front of Nijmegen bridge. By afternoon, British positions around Arnhem bridge weakened considerably. Casualties, mostly wounded, were high from constant shelling. Also acute was a lack of ammunition, particularly anti-tank munitions, the absence of which enabled enemy armour to demolish British positions from point-blank range. Food, water and medical supplies were scarce and so many buildings were on fire and in such serious danger of collapse that a two-hour truce was arranged to evacuate the wounded (including Lieutenant Colonel John Frost) into German care and captivity.

The Germans overcame remaining pockets of resistance throughout the day, gaining control of the northern bridge approaches and permitting reinforcements to cross the span and reinforce units further south near Nijmegen. The remaining British troops continued to fight on fiercely, some with just fighting knives, but by early Thursday morning almost all had been taken prisoner. The last radio message broadcast from the bridge - "out of ammo, God save the King" - was heard only by German radio intercept operators.

While it was estimated that the entire 1st Airborne Division, 10,000 strong, would only need to hold the Arnhem Bridge for 4 days, in fact just 740 had held it almost as long against far heavier opposition than anticipated. While 81 British soldiers died defending Arnhem Bridge, German losses cannot be stated with any accuracy, though they were certainly extremely heavy; 11 units known to have participated in the fighting reported 50% casualties after the battle. In memory of the fighting there, the bridge has been renamed the "John Frost Bridge". General James M. Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, called Frost's stand "the outstanding independent parachute battalion action of the war."

Oosterbeek

Further west, the remnants of the 1st Airborne Division were gathering at Oosterbeek for their last stand; those already in place were not seriously challenged by the enemy throughout the day. To the east of the village, the 1st, 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffords were organised into a defensive position, and in desperate fighting later in the day they bloodily repulsed an enemy attack which threatened to cut the Division off from the Rhine and so seal the fate of their fragile bridgehead.

In the woods to the west of Oosterbeek, the 4th Parachute Brigade was fighting its way towards the Divisional perimeter but was under severe attack from German troops, supported by artillery, mortars and tanks, some mounting flame-throwers. Their casualties were heavy; the 10th Battalion reached Oosterbeek in the early afternoon but with only 60 men.

Further in the rear, the 156th Parachute Battalion was being more hard pressed and was forced to fight off numerous enemy attacks before mounting counter-attacks of their own; indeed it is a credit to the battalion that they were so successful in these respects that the Germans never had any idea that they were fighting men who were in full retreat. The Battalion, down to 150 men, mounted a desperate bayonet charge to gain possession of some hollow ground in the woods, in which they remained pinned by enemy attacks for the next 8 hours. Towards the end of the day the 75 men who could, fixed bayonets and made a highly successful break through the German lines and into the Oosterbeek pocket.

Nijmegen

Boats ordered by the 82nd Airborne the day before failed to arrive until afternoon, and a hasty daylight assault crossing was ordered. At about 1500, the 3rd Battalion, 504th PIR made the crossing in 26 canvas assault boats into well-defended positions. The unit had never seen the British-made boats before, and had no training on them. A shortage of paddles required some troopers to paddle the craft with rifle butts. About half the boats survived the crossing under heavy fire; survivors then assaulted across 200 meters of open ground on the far bank and seized the north end of the bridge. German forces withdrew from both ends of the bridge, which was then rushed by Guards tanks and the 2nd Battalion, 505th PIR, securing the bridge after four days of struggle. The costly attack was nicknamed "Little Omaha" in reference to Omaha Beach.

To the east, German attacks on the heights made significant progress, capturing the only remaining bridge suitable for tanks. A counterattack at Mook by elements of the 505th PIR and 4th Battalion, the Coldstream Guards forced the Germans back to their line of departure by 2000. However, the 508th PIR lost ground at Im Thal and Legewald when attacked by German infantry and tanks. By now it was evident that the Germans' plan was to cut the highway, which would split up the Airborne units and cut off the advance elements of XXX Corps.

To the south the running battles between the 101st and various German units continued, eventually with several Panthers cutting off the roads but pulling back when low on ammunition.

When General Dempsey of the 2nd Army met General Gavin, commander of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, he is reported to have said (in reference to the Nijmegen attack), "I am proud to meet the commander of the greatest Division in the world today."

Day 5, Thursday the 21st

Oosterbeek

Approximately 3,600 survivors of the 1st Airborne Division established themselves in the buildings and woods around Oosterbeek with the intention of holding a bridgehead across the Rhine until XXX Corps could arrive. Throughout the day their position was heavily attacked on all sides. In the south-east, the Lonsdale Force (the remnants of the 1st, 3rd, 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffords) repulsed a major attack aided by the fire of the Division's light artillery. In the north, the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers were almost overrun during the afternoon, but a counter-attack with bayonets restored the situation and the heavily depleted battalion moved further south to occupy a narrower front. The most serious attack of the day was made at dawn against "B" Company, 1st Border, who controlled a vital area of high ground in the south-western tip of the perimeter overlooking a ferry crossing which was the Division's only straight-forward means of receiving reinforcements from the south. The company was overwhelmed by enemy armour and infantry and the heights were lost. Counter-attacks failed, and the remnants of the company were redeployed. The Division was left in a precarious position, controlling just 700 metres of the riverbank. The Division refused to yield ground to similar attacks elsewhere on their front.

Polish paras enter the battle

File:Poles Arnhem.jpg

Polish anti-tank artillery at Arnhem.

After two days' delay due to weather, the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade finally landed opposite the 1st Airborne Division's position in the afternoon, on a new drop zone south of the Rhine near the village of Driel. Their supplies, due to poor co-ordination by the RAF, were dropped 15 kilometers in the opposite direction. Planning to use the ferry to reinforce the Division, they soon discovered the opposite bank dominated by the enemy and that the ferry itself was missing; it had earlier been sunk by its operator to deny its use to the Germans. Unable to help the British, the Poles withdrew to Driel for the night. The 1st Airborne made radio contact during the day with guns of the 64th Medium Regiment of XXX Corps Artillery who had advanced with the ground forces and were assigned to provide the Division with artillery support. Unlike many others, this radio link endured throughout the battle and the Regiment provided valuable fire support to the 1st Airborne in the coming days.

Nijmegen

Despite the capture of Nijmegen Bridge and the clearning of the town itself on the previous evening, the Guards Armoured Division did not begin their advance until some eighteen hours later, at noon. General Brian Horrocks claimed he needed this delay to sort out the confusion among his troops that had resulted from the battle in Nijmegen. This was a controversial decision that has been examined often in the years since. Half of the Division had been detached to assist the 82nd Airborne Division elsewhere as the Germans sought to cut off the tip of the advance. What remained was short of petrol and exhausted from their difficult fight to secure Nijmegen. The Market/Garden plan depended upon a single highway as the route of advance and resupply. This imposed a delay as other units could not be deployed on alternate routes to sustain the forward momentum. Gavin's diary comment was: "Had Ridgway been in command at that moment, we would have been ordered up that road in spite of all our difficulties, to save the men at Arnhem." The historian Max Hastings wrote "It reflected poorly on the British Army...".

In the event, this delay enabled the Germans to considerably shore up their defences to the south of Arnhem, aided by their capture of both ends of the bridge. The advance of the Guards, hindered by marsh land that prevented off-road movement, was soon halted by a firm defensive line. Not possessing the strength to outflank it, the 43rd Division was called up to take over the lead, work their way around the enemy positions and make contact with the Poles at Driel. However, the 43rd was 20 miles away and had an enormous traffic jam in front of them. It was not until the following day that they finally crossed the River Waal and began their advance.

The Germans, clearly starting to gain the upper hand, continued their counterattacks all along the path of XXX Corps, though the British and 101st continued to exploit their gains.

About 1500, over 400 C-47s carried out a resupply mission for the 82nd. About 60% of the supplies were recovered, partially with the help of Dutch civilians. At this point, most of the 82nd and 101st, reinforced with British armor units, were engaged in defensive missions with the objective of holding the highway corridor. Small attacks seesawed back and forth all along the corridor.

Day 6, Friday the 22nd (Black Friday)

Arnhem

The Germans, wary after unsuccessful and costly attacks the previous day, shelled and mortared the Airborne positions heavily in lieu of additional direct assaults. By the end of the battle some 110 artillery pieces had been brought into place around Oosterbeek as the Germans shifted to the tactics that had worked so well at the Arnhem Bridge. Direct attacks were now limited in nature, conducted against specific positions and even individual houses. Numerous well-sited British anti-tank guns also caused German reluctance to attack directly. The survivors of the 1st Airborne were now outnumbered by a 4:1 ratio.

File:Polish Paratroopers.jpg

Polish paratroopers in positions on the southern bank of Rhine (Arnhem).

The Poles at Driel, unable to cross the Rhine, nonetheless caused a major redeployment of German forces. Fearing a Polish attempt to recapture Arnhem Bridge or, worse, cut the road to the south and trapping the 10th SS Panzer Division then blocking the path of the Guards Armoured Division, the Germans withdrew 2,400 troops from Oosterbeek. They were moved south of the river and engaged at Driel, making attacks with little real effect throughout the day.

Linkup between Poles and XXX Corps

During the morning, a small reconnaissance unit of XXX Corps managed to slip through fog around Nijmegen and link up with the Poles at Driel. This linkup had been planned to take place at 1500 hours on Sep 19th. The fog lifted as leading elements of the 43rd Division attempted to follow, exposing them to German fire. They arrived in Driel during the evening. That night, lacking assault craft, an unsuccessful attempt was made to put elements of the Polish Brigade across the River. British and Polish engineers on both sides of the Rhine had worked throughout the day to improvise a crossing using small boats linked by signals cable, but the cable consistently broke, forcing the Polish troops to slowly row across against the strong current. The attempt was made under enemy observation and fire, and only 52 soldiers of the 8th Polish Parachute Company survived the crossing before a halt was called at dawn.

While much of the corridor along Hell's Highway was now firmly in Allied hands, German counterattacks were still being mounted along its length. During the previous night two mixed armored formations on either side of Highway 69 attacked between Veghel and Grave; one group managed to cut the highway and prevent any further advance on Arnhem.

Day 7, Saturday the 23rd

The Germans had figured out what the Poles were attempting to do, and spent the rest of the day trying to cut the British off from the riverside. The British managed to hold on, and both sides suffered heavy losses. The Germans also attacked the Poles on the south side in order to tie them down, but several tanks arrived from XXX Corps and they were beaten off. Boats and engineers from the Canadian army arrived that day, and another river crossing that night landed another 150 troops of the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion.

To the south several more German attacks from their road crossing were stopped, but the road was still cut. XXX Corps then sent a unit of the Guards Armoured south the 20 km and re-took the road. The rest of the force to the north continued to wait for infantry to move up, still only a few kilometers from Arnhem.

Day 8, Sunday the 24th

Another German force successfully attacked the road to the south of Veghel, and set up defensive positions for the night. It was not clear to the Allies at this point how much of a danger this represented, but the operation was essentially stopped this day and the decision made to go over to the defensive with a new front line in Nijmegen. Nevertheless, an attempt was made on Sunday night to reinforce the 1st Airborne Division with the 4th Battalion the Dorsetshire Regiment. Two companies were put across the river, however the location of the crossing point was ill-advised and the Dorsets landed amongst prepared German positions. Fragmented by their landing and immediately pinned down, of the 315 men who crossed, only 75 reached Oosterbeek, the remainder were taken prisoner. As a result of this failure, the decision was made to withdraw the 1st Airborne Division.

Day 9, Monday the 25th

At dawn, the 1st Airborne Division received their orders to withdraw across the Rhine. This could not be effected until nightfall, and in the meantime the Division struggled to survive. In a departure from their cautious, attritional tactics of the previous days, the Germans formed two potent SS battlegroups and made a significant thrust along a narrow front in the eastern sector. This succeeded in breaking through the thin front line and for a time the Division was in some peril. However, the attack met with increasing resistance as it pushed deeper into the British lines where it was finally broken up by a heavy bombardment by the 64th Medium Regiment.

Employing every ruse to give the Germans the impression that their positions were unchanged, the 1st Airborne Division began its withdrawal at 22:00. British and Canadian engineer units ferried the troops across the Rhine, covered by the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion on the north bank. By early the next morning they had withdrawn 2,398 survivors, leaving 300 men to surrender on the north bank at first light when German fire prevented their rescue. Of the approximate 10,600 men of the 1st Airborne Division and other units that fought north of the Rhine, 1,485 had died and 6,414 were taken prisoner, of whom one third were wounded.

To the south, the newly arrived 50th (Northumbrian) Division attacked the Germans holding the highway and secured it by the next day. Allied positions in the Nijmegen Salient, as it became to be known, were manned throughout the rest of September and October by Airborne units, then handed over to the First Canadian Army in November 1944 and remained unchanged until February 1945 when Operation Veritable was launched on the Rhineland, advancing east instead of north towards Arnhem.

Conclusions

Operation Market Garden has remained a controversial battle since 1944 for several reasons. The operation was the result of a strategy debate at the highest levels of Allied command in Europe. Much post-war analysis has thus probed the alternatives that were not taken. The operation also led to high losses in the elite Allied Airborne units. After the offensive operation was called off, these light units were left holding defensive positions, a role for which they were not equipped. The frontage held by 21st Army Group doubled, making it difficult to mass forces for offensive operations.

Losses

Casualties	KIA	WIA	MIA	POW	Total	Grand Total
Germany	2,000	6,000			8,000	8,000
British	1,130 (Market) + 5,354 (Garden) = 6,484		851	6,450	13,785
American	3,664				3,664
Polish	102	276			378	17,827

In addition to Allied and German losses, a number of Dutch were also killed, including several soldiers and officers in British service as well as resistance fighters and civilians. A green area near the bridge, Jacob Groenewoud plantsoen, was named after one Dutch officer.

Optimistic Planning

Among the controversial aspects of the plan was the necessity of all the major bridges being taken in order for success. Little contingency had been made in the event of blown bridges along the route. The terrain was also ill-suited for the mission of XXX Corps. It is therefore surprising in retrospect that the plans placed so little emphasis on capturing the important bridges immediately with forces dropped directly on them. In the case of Veghel and Grave, where this was done, the bridges were captured with only a few shots being fired. The decision to drop the US 82nd Airborne Division on the Groesbeek Heights, several kilometres from the Nijmegen Bridge, has been questioned as it resulted in a critical delay of the capture of the span. Brereton had ordered that the bridges along XXX Corps' route should be captured with "thunderclap surprise". Both Browning and Gavin considered holding a defensive blocking position on the ridge a prerequisite for holding the highway corridor. Gavin generally favored accepting the higher inital casualties involved in dropping as close to objectives as possible in the belief that distant drop zones would result in lower chances of success. However, in this case, with the 82nd responsible for holding the center of the salient, he and Browning decided the ridge must take priority. Combined with the 1st Airborne Division's delays within Arnhem, which left the Arnhem bridge open to their traffic, the Germans were given vital hours to reinforce their hold on the bridge.

The actions of XXX Corps have also been questioned. Their advance was characterized by what was widely perceived, at the time, as a lack of drive. For example, XXX Corps did not jump off until midafternoon of the first day, and were delayed by pockets of German resistance and the need for engineers to replace the bridge destroyed at Son. They arrived at Nijmegen on 19 September when the plan called for them to be in Arnhem by that afternoon. Their major unexpected delay arose from the need to support the 82nd's assaults on Nijmegen and its bridges. After the river had been crossed, the Guards waited 18 hours to resume their advance; in the words of Lt-Colonel Reuben Tucker (commander of the 504th) the Guards "...stopped for tea.". While not literally true, Tucker's statement summed up the view some US troops had of the XXX Corps units. Ridgway added that he was "much dissatisfied with the apathy and lack of aggressiveness of the British forces".

Priority of Operation

Several weeks prior to the plan taking shape the British had captured Antwerp and its all-important port facilities. This action had the potential to greatly shorten the Allies' supply lines and trap Von Zangen's 15th Army of 80,000 men on the south side of the Scheldt Estuary. Instead, Von Zangen's men, with most of their heavy equipment including their artillery, escaped by boat to the South Beveland peninsula. In September, the peninsula could have been sealed by a short advance of only 15 miles past Antwerp. Instead, because priority on supplies went to Market Garden, the First Canadian Army paused at Antwerp and then fought the Battle of the Scheldt in October at the cost of thousands of casualties. In the aftermath of Market-Garden, Antwerp was not made operational until November 28. By October 1, over 240 Allied supply ships were waiting, unable to unload their cargo because of the limited port facilities on the continent.

Unseized Tactical Initiative

Arnhem bridge was not the only available Rhine crossing. In fact, had the Market Garden planners realized that a ferry was available at Driel, Frost's paratroops might well have secured that instead of the Arnhem bridge, making a profound difference in the campaign. At a minimum, had XXX Corps pushed north, they would have arrived at the south end and secured it, leaving the way open for another crossing to the north at some other point. There was the smaller possibility of arriving with Frost's force intact. This perceived "lack of guts" caused some bitterness at the time.

The commander of XXX Corps asked for another course of action. About 25 km to the west of the action was another bridge similar to Arnhem, at Rhenen, which he predicted was undefended due to all efforts being directed on Oosterbeek. This was in fact the case, but the Corps were never authorised to take the bridge; if they had, it is almost certain they would have crossed unopposed, into the rear of the German lines. By this time it appears that Montgomery was more concerned with the ongoing German assaults on Market Garden's lengthy 'tail'.

File:General3.jpg

Gen. Stanisław Sosabowski during Operation Market Garden

Despite the heroism, bad choices were made throughout, and opportunities ignored. The commander of the Glider Pilot Regiment had asked for a small force with gliders to land on the southern side of the bridge at Arnhem, to quickly capture it, but he was denied. This was surprising in light of the fact that in Normandy, the British 6th Airborne Division had used such coup-de-main tactics successfully to take smaller bridges. In Britain, the commander of the British 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division, whose troops were slated to fly into a captured airfield, pleaded with his superiors to allow a Brigade to fly in with gliders to assist Gen. Urquhart's trapped forces; this was also denied, though in the circumstances probably sensibly as glider landings on undefended landing zones before the eyes of an alert enemy could result in catastrophe. However, there was another airfield near Grave, and if the 52nd Lowland had been landed there, they might have freed up British Units that was supporting the 82nd Airborne, and might have allowed them to reach Arnhem sooner. Polish 1st Parachute Brigade commander, Gen. Stanisław Sosabowski was prepared to be dropped dangerously through the fog which held up his drop, but again was refused.

The Dutch resistance was ignored by the British forces at Arnhem, although they did work with the U.S. Airborne Divisions. There was a very good reason for this, in that Britain's spy network in the Netherlands had been thoroughly and famously compromised — the so-called England game, which had only been discovered in April 1944. Perhaps assuming that the Dutch resistance would be similarly penetrated, British intelligence took pains to minimise all civilian contact. U.S. units, without this bad experience, made active use of Dutch help. As things turned out, the simple knowledge of the Driel ferry, or of the Underground's secret telephone network could have changed the outcome of the operation, much the more as the Allied radio equipment was malfunctioning, having to rely on messengers. The latter was very important: it would have given the XXX Corps and Airborne High Command knowledge about the dire situation that had enveloped Col. Frost and Gen. Urquhart at Arnhem.

Market-Garden was a very high-risk plan that required a willingness to take risks at the tactical, small-unit level. Unfortunately, the detailed planning and leadership required at the small unit level was not always present. The 1st Airborne Division, least experienced when working together as a whole division, was given the most difficult, distant objective. XXX Corps was also criticized for its inability to keep to the operation's timetable. Its lead unit, the Guards Armoured Division, was led by a commander (Adair) whom Montgomery had sought to remove prior to D-Day. This action was blocked due to Adair's popularity. Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, regretted giving his Division's most critical tasks (Groesbeek ridge and Nijmegen) to the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment rather than his best regiment, Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

Reflections

Eisenhower believed until his death that Market Garden was a campaign that was worth waging. Even so, Cornelius Ryan quotes Eisenhower as saying, "...I don't know what you heard in Britain, but the British have never understood the American system of command... I never heard from the British any golden paeans of praise. And you're not going to hear it now, particularly from people like Montgomery." But Eisenhower kept these views to himself, not revealing them until long after hostilities had ended.

For his part, Montgomery called Market Garden "90% successful" and said:

In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.

Dutch Prince Bernhard responded directly to this to Cornelius Ryan:

My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success.

Liberation

The city of Arnhem was finally liberated by I Canadian Corps on 14 April 1945 after two days of fighting. The prized Arnhem bridge did not survive the war. It was replaced with a bridge of similar appearance after the war, and was renamed John Frostbrug ("John Frost Bridge") for Colonel Frost in September 1978.

Legacy

A memorial near Arnhem reads: "To the People of Gelderland; 50 years ago British and Polish Airborne soldiers fought here against overwhelming odds to open the way into Germany and bring the war to an early end. Instead we brought death and destruction for which you have never blamed us. This stone marks our admiration for your great courage remembering especially the women who tended our wounded. In the long winter that followed your families risked death by hiding Allied soldiers and Airmen while members of the resistance led many to safety"

The operation is also memorialized at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, home of the 82nd Airborne Division. Each of the major drop zones on the post is named for a major WW2 jump; the Holland, Nijmegen, and Netherlands Drop Zones commemorate Operation Market-Garden.

The grave of an "unknown English soldier" of the British 1st Airborne Division, 15 April 1945. He was buried by Germans.

Commemoration at bridge Grave.

Popular culture

File:Abtfgame.jpg

The most readable history of Operation Market Garden is Cornelius Ryan's book A Bridge Too Far. The book was later adapted to a film of the same name directed by Richard Attenborough and featuring an ensemble cast of stars. The Devil's Birthday by Geoffrey Powell, who was a serving officer at Arnhem, is a thorough and slightly more accurate analysis of Market Garden, although in contrast to A Bridge Too Far it is a book about commanders and command decisions and doesn't dwell on the stories of individuals. Martin Middlebrook's Arnhem 1944 is, like his work on the Battle of the Somme, told to a fair degree by the veterans themselves. A more recent account of the battle was written by Robert J. Kershaw in 1990. At the time he was a serving officer in the Parachute Regiment. Kershaw's book, It never snows in September, provides a German view of both Operation Market Garden and the battle of Arnhem.

General Sir John Hackett, GCB DSO MC, who raised 4th Parachute Brigade, wrote I Was a Stranger (1977) about his part in Market Garden commanding 4th Parachute Brigade and his experiences thereafter. Then-Brigadier Hackett, like a number of others, was wounded in Arnheim. He eluded the Germans and was hidden by the Dutch Resistance until he could make his way to the coast and return to the UK.

The first film made about the battle for Arnhem bridge was Theirs Is the Glory from 1946. Facets of the Operation were also featured in Episode 4 of Band of Brothers. The battle was well represented as a board wargame in the 1981 game Storm Over Arnhem by Avalon Hill (simulating the battle for Arnhem bridge) and in the 1985 game by Strategic Simulations, Inc. (SSI), Operation Market Garden. A historical module for Advanced Squad Leader was released, depicting the fighting at the bridge, also called A Bridge Too Far. In 2004, Multiman Publishing released Monty's Gamble: Market Garden, a boardgame ala Storm Over Arnhem but depicting the whole operation. Target Arnhem: Across Six Bridges is a free game, also by Multiman Publishing, which is currently working on Devil's Cauldron, another boardgame based on the operation.

There are many computer games based on this battle. Real-time strategy games include Close Combat: A Bridge Too Far, Microsoft's second title in its Close Combat series. Matrix Games released Airborne Assault: Highway to the Reich which is completely about this operation. In addition the World War II PC wargame, Panzer General, included a scenario depicting the Market Garden operation.

The battle is also depicted in the first-person shooter Brothers in Arms: Hell's Highway (scheduled for release for Xbox360 in late 2006). Other FPS games like Battlefield 1942, Medal of Honor: Frontline, Call of Duty, and Return to Castle Wolfenstein also feature locations after this battle.

See also

To see more pictures visit WikiCommons - the link is to your right.

References

• Cornelius Ryan (1974). A Bridge Too Far. Coronet Books. ISBN 0-340-19941-5.
• Russel Weigley (1990 (reprint)). Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 1944-1945. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0253206081. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
• Max Hastings (2005 (reprint)). Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-45. New York: Vintage Books. ISBN 0375714227. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help); Unknown parameter |authorlihk= ignored (help)CS1 maint: year (link)

Further reading

• Ryan, Cornelius. Un puente lejano. Plaza & Janés, Barcelona, 1978.
• Clark, Lloyd. Arnhem: operation Market Garden, September 1944. Sutton Publishing, 2003. ISBN 0-7509-2835-2
• Kershaw, Robert J. It never snows in September. The German view of Market-Garden and the battle of Arnhem. Ian Allan Publishing, Surrey, Inglaterra, 1994. ISBN 0-7110-3062-6
• MacDonald, Charles Brown. The Siegfried line Campaign. The US army in World War 2. Center of Military History, US Army, 1982. ASIN B00070YFEU
• Ryan, Cornelius. A bridge too far. The classic history of the greatest battle of World War II. Simon & Schuster, Nueva York, 1974. ISBN 0-684-80330-5
• Keegan, John. Six armies in Normandy. Penguin (non-classics), 1994. ISBN 0-1402-3542-6
• Powell, Geoffrey The Devil's Birthday. Leo Cooper, 1984. ISBN 0-85052-352-4
• Powell, Geoffrey Men at Arnhem(first published under 'Tom Angus'). Leo Cooper, 1976. ISBN 0-907675-71-9
• Frost, John A Drop Too Many. Cassell, 1980, ISBN 0-304-30717-3