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'''Amendment II''' (the '''Second Amendment''') of the [[United States Constitution]], which is part of the [[United States Bill of Rights|Bill of Rights]], declares a well regulated militia as "being necessary to the security of a free State", and prohibits infringement of "the right of the people to keep and bear arms." |
'''Amendment II''' (the '''Second Amendment''') of the [[United States Constitution]], which is part of the [[United States Bill of Rights|Bill of Rights]], declares a well regulated militia as "being necessary to the security of a free State", and prohibits infringement of "the right of the people to keep and bear arms." |
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==Text== |
==Text== |
Revision as of 20:06, 8 November 2007
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Amendment II (the Second Amendment) of the United States Constitution, which is part of the Bill of Rights, declares a well regulated militia as "being necessary to the security of a free State", and prohibits infringement of "the right of the people to keep and bear arms."
Text
The Second Amendment, as written by the Constitutional Convention of 1787, states:
A well-regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
The hand-written copy of the Bill of Rights which hangs in the National Archives had slightly different capitalization and punctuation inserted by William Lambert, the scribe who prepared it. This copy reads:
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
Both versions are commonly used in official US Government publications.
Precedents
The philosophy behind the Second Amendment began several hundred years before its creation, originating in England. The concept of citizens or "subjects" bearing arms dates back to at least the 12th century when King Henry II obligated all freemen to possess certain arms for defense. In the following century, King Henry III required every subject between the ages of fifteen and fifty to own a weapon other than a knife. This was of such importance that Crown officials gave periodic inspections to guarantee a properly armed townspeople. This was because England did not have a police force until 1829, and in the absence of a regular army it was the responsibility and duty of the subjects to keep watch and ward at night to confront and capture "suspicious persons". This remained relatively unchanged until 1671, when Parliament created a statute that drastically raised the property qualifications needed to possess firearms. In essence, this statute disarmed all but the very wealthy. In 1686, King James II banned without exception the Protestants' ability to possess firearms, even while Protestants constituted over 95% of the English subjects. Not until 1689, with the rise of William of Orange, did the Protestants possess firearms once again with the newly enacted law that reads, "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law". The tradition of securing a military force through a duty of universal military obligation for all able-bodied males follows from the Elizabethan era militia in England.[1][2]
The English Declaration of Rights (1689) affirmed freedom for Protestants to "have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law." When Colonists protested British efforts to disarm their militias in the early phases of the Revolution, colonists cited the Declaration of Rights, Blackstone's summary of the Declaration of Rights, their own militia laws, and Common Law rights to self-defense. While British policy in the early phases of the Revolution clearly aimed to prevent coordinated action by the militia, there is no evidence that the British sought to restrict the traditional common law right of self-defense. Indeed, in his arguments on behalf of British troops in the Boston Massacre, John Adams invoked the common law of self-defense.[3]
Some have seen the Second Amendment as derivative of a common law right to keep and bear arms; Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, writing in the North Carolina Law Review, March 1997, Page 781, have stated "... Madison did not invent the right to keep and bear arms when he drafted the Second Amendment—the right was pre-existing at both common law and in the early state constitutions."[4]
Others perceive a distinction between the right to bear arms and the right to self-defense; Robert Spitzer has stated: "...the matter of personal or individual self-defense, whether from wild animals or modern-day predators, does not fall within, nor is it dependent on, the Second Amendment rubric. Nothing in the history, construction, or interpretation of the Amendment applies or infers such a protection. Rather, legal protection for personal self-defense arises from the British common law tradition and modern criminal law; not from constitutional law."[5] Heyman has similarly argued that the common law right of self defense was legally distinct from the right to bear arms.[6]
The potential connection between the right of self defense and the new constitutional protection of a right to keep and bear arms contained in the Second Amendment depends on the distinction whether 'keep and bear arms' is synonymous more broadly with the right of individual self defense or does 'keep and bear arms' pertain more narrowly towards use of arms in a military context, or, in the case of the Common Law while still under the British, in service of the king and country. This distinction was not subject to serious judicial notice until the first gun control laws were passed in the Jacksonian era. Judges in the nineteenth century split over how to interpret this connection; some saw the Common Law right and the protection of a right to keep and bear arms contained in the Second Amendment as identical; others viewed these as being legally distinct. Texts from the era of the Second Amendment are largely silent on this important question.
Origin
In 1786, a decade after the Declaration of Independence was signed, the United States existed as a loose national government under the Articles of Confederation. This confederation was perceived to have several weaknesses, among which was the inability to mount a Federal military response to an armed uprising in western Massachusetts known as Shays' Rebellion.
In 1787, to address these weaknesses, the Philadelphia Convention was convened with the charter of amending the Articles. When the convention concluded with a proposed Constitution, those who debated the ratification of the Constitution divided into two camps; the Federalists (who supported ratification of the Constitution) and the Anti-Federalists (who opposed it).
Among their objections to the Constitution, anti-Federalists feared creation of a standing army not under civilian control that could eventually endanger democracy and civil liberties as had happened recently in the American Colonies and Europe.[7] Although the anti-Federalists were ultimately unsuccessful at blocking ratification of the Constitution, through the Massachusetts Compromise they laid the groundwork to ensure that a Bill of Rights would be drafted, which would provide constitutional guarantees against encroachment by the government of certain rights.
The Federalists on the other hand held that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary, particularly since the Federal Government could never raise a standard army powerful enough to overcome the militia. Leading Federalist James Madison wrote:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops.[8]
Similarly, Federalist Noah Webster wrote:
Tyranny is the exercise of some power over a man, which is not warranted by law, or necessary for the public safety. A people can never be deprived of their liberties, while they retain in their own hands, a power sufficient to any other power in the state.[9]
One example given by Webster of a "power" that the people could resist was that of a standing army:
Another source of power in government is a military force. But this, to be efficient, must be superior to any force that exists among the people, or which they can command; for otherwise this force would be annihilated, on the first exercise of acts of oppression. Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence, raised in the United States.[8]
The controversy of a standing army for the United States existed in context of the Continental Forces that had won the American Revolutionary War which consisted of both the standing Continental Army created by the Continental Congress and of State and Militia Units. In opposition, the British Forces consisted of a mixture of the standing British Army, Loyalist Militia, and Hessian mercenaries.
Federalists, on the other hand, believed that federal government must be trusted and that the army and the militias "ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal" of federal government. This belief was fundamentally stated by Alexander Hamilton:
The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the Confederacy.[10]
The origin of the Second Amendment also occurred in context of an ongoing debate about "the people" fighting governmental tyranny, (as described by Anti-federalists); or the risk of mob rule of "the people", (as described by the Federalists). These feelings can be seen in the "a force superior" quote of Noah Webster above, and in contrast, when John Adams wrote of his fears about Antifederalists in the ongoing revolution in France:
The State is in critical Circumstances, and have been brought into them by the Heat and Impatience of the People. If nothing will bring them to consideration, I fear they will suffer[11]
Reaching a compromise between these widely disparate positions was not easy, but nonetheless, a compromise was negotiated with the result being the Second Amendment.
Creation
Conflict and compromise
In the early months of 1789, the United States was engaged in an ideological conflict between Federalists who favored a stronger central government and Antifederalists skeptical of a strong central government. This conflict was accentuated by the recent news of a brewing, potentially violent, revolution in France with similar Antifederal tensions. Also, the conflict in beliefs continued between northern states, that generally favored Federalist values, and southern states that tended to share Antifederalist values.
Intense concerns gripped the country of the potential for success or failure of these newly-formed United States. The first presidential inauguration of George Washington had occurred just a few short weeks earlier. A spirited public concern and debate from this time is captured in numerous heated newspaper articles, personal diaries and letters from this pivotal time in United States history.
Antifederalists supported the proposal to amend the Constitution with clearly-defined and enumerated rights to provide further constraints on the new government, while opponents felt that by listing only certain rights, other unlisted rights would fail to be protected. Amidst this debate, a compromise was reached, and James Madison drafted what ultimately became the United States Bill of Rights, which was proposed to the Congress on June 8, 1789.
The original text of what was to become the Second Amendment, as brought to the floor to the first session of the first congress of the U.S. House of Representatives was:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.[12]
The Bill of Rights that Madison introduced on June 8 were not numbered amendments intended to be added at the end of the Constitution. The Rights instead were to be inserted into the existing Constitution. The right to keep and bear arms was to be inserted in Article 1, section 8 that specifies Congress's power over the militia. The sentence that later became the Second Amendment was to be inserted in the First Article, Section Nine, between clauses 3 and 4, following the prohibition on suspension of habeas corpus, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws, all individual civil rights asserted by individuals as a defense against government action.[12] (Additionally, these provisions can all be interpreted as limits on congressional power, a view that has been advanced by supporters of the individual rights view of the Amendment.[13]) Debate in the House on the remainder of June 8 focused again on whether a Bill of Rights was appropriate, and the matter was held for a later time. On July 21, however, Madison raised the issue of his Bill and proposed a select committee be created to report on it. The House voted in favor of Madison's motion,[14] and the Bill of Rights entered committee for review. No official records were kept of the proceedings of the committee, but on July 28, the committee returned to the House a reworded version of the Second Amendment.[15] On August 17, that version was read into the Journal:
A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.[16]
The Second Amendment was debated and modified during sessions of the House on August 17 and August 20.[17] These debates revolved primarily around risk of "mal-administration of the government" using the "religiously scrupulous" clause to destroy the militia as Great Britain had attempted to destroy the militia at the commencement of the American Revolution. These concerns were addressed by modifying the final clause, and on August 24 the House sent the following version to the U.S. Senate:
A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.
The next day, August 25, the Senate received the Amendment from the House and entered it into the Senate Journal. When the Amendment was transcribed, the semicolon in the religious exemption portion was changed to a comma by the Senate scribe:
A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.[18]
On September 4, the Senate voted to change significantly the language of the Second Amendment by removing the definition of militia, and striking the conscientious objector clause:
A well regulated militia, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed[19]
The Senate returned to this Amendment for a final time on September 9. A proposal to insert the words "For the common defence", next to the words "Bear Arms" was defeated.[20] The Senate then slightly modified the language and voted to return the Bill of Rights to the House. The final version passed by the Senate was:
A well regulated militia being the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
The House voted on September 21 to accept the changes made by the Senate, however the Amendment as finally entered into the House journal contained the additional words "necessary to":
A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.[21]
This version was transmitted to the states for ratification.
Historical sources
The House Journal[22] and Senate Journal[23] are the official records kept by the legislature at the time debate was taking place. Because these journals are often sparse, they are frequently augmented by the Annals of Congress[24] (AoC) which were compiled forty to seventy years after the debates, using the best sources which could then be found, which at the time was primarily newspaper reports.
The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution[25] by Jonathan Elliot (1836), contains additional information concerning the desire by Antifederalists to amend the Constitution, and the intent of the amendments that were negotiated and adopted attempting to answer their concerns.
Commas
There is some question as to whether the Second Amendment contains a comma after the word "militia". In the twentieth century, it became unusual to separate a subject and verb or verb and object with a comma. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, commas were used to indicate rhetorical pauses; in the twentieth century, commas were generally used to differentiate between restrictive and nonrestrictive modifiers. This practice continues in the early twenty-first century.
On March 4, 1789, the completed, hand-written Bill of Rights was approved by the first Federal Congress, and attested to (signed) by Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and John Adams, the Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate, as well as the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate.[26]. In this original signed document, now held by the National Archives, the commas were present. Some of the later type-cast printings of the Constitution, such as those in the National Annals, delete the commas from the Second Amendment.
The U.S. Government is inconsistent in the use of the comma in publications. The Statutes at Large (the official permanent record of all laws enacted) does not include the comma.[27] The Government Printing Office (GPO) has produced versions both with and without this comma.
A second comma, after the word "State", is generally seen in printed versions. It is not controversial.
The third comma, after the phrase "to keep and bear arms", is also an example of changing customs. It is generally seen in contemporary reprints of the Amendment, but it did not appear if the Amendment had been drafted and enacted recently.
Ratification
On December 15, 1791, the Virginia legislature ratified the Bill of Rights, rounding out the requisite three-fourths of the states needed to make the Amendments part of the Constitution.
Early commentary
The earliest published commentary on the Second Amendment by a major constitutional theorist was by St. George Tucker, also known as The American Blackstone. He authored a set of law books in 1803 that annotated Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (discussed at length later, under Colonial Rights), for American use, and that formed, in many cases, the sole legal written works read by many early American attorneys.[28] Tucker, the leading Jeffersonian constitutional theorist, was widely read, even by those who rejected his interpretation of the Constitution.
In two footnotes, he wrote: "[fn40] The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 4, and this without any qualification as to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government." "[fn41] Whoever examines the forest, and game laws in the British code, will readily perceive that the right of keeping arms is effectually taken away from the people of England. The commentator himself informs us, Vol. II, p. 412, "that the prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to government by disarming the bulk of the people, is a reason oftener meant than avowed by the makers of the forest and game laws."[28] Blackstone discussed the right of individual self defense in a separate section of his treatise on the common law of crimes. Tucker's annotations for that latter section made no mention of the Second Amendment but cited the standard works of English jurists such as Hawkins.[29]
Further, Tucker writes of the English Bill of Rights:
The bill of rights, 1 W. and M, says Mr. Blackstone, (Vol. 1 p. 143), secures to the subjects of England the right of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree. In the construction of these game laws it seems to be held, that no person who is not qualified according to law to kill game, hath any right to keep a gun in his house. Now, as no person, (except the game-keeper of a lord or lady of a manor) is admitted to be qualified to kill game, unless he has 100l. per annum, &c. it follows that no others can keep a gun for their defence; so that the whole nation are completely disarmed, and left at the mercy of the government, under the pretext of preserving the breed of hares and partridges, for the exclusive use of the independent country gentlemen. In America we may reasonably hope that the people will never cease to regard the right of keeping and bearing arms as the surest pledge of their liberty.[28]
Tucker also wrote of the British,
True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to Protestants, and the words suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorise the prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to a penalty.[28]
Another one of the most important early commentaries on the Second Amendment was the 1833 book Commentaries on the U.S. Constitution authored by Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Joseph Story. Both sides in the modern gun debate have excerpted parts of this commentary to support their particular points of view:
§ 1890 of the book describes the Second Amendment:
The importance of this article will scarcely be doubted by any persons, who have duly reflected upon the subject. The militia is the natural defence of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers. It is against sound policy for a free people to keep up large military establishments and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expenses, with which they are attended, and the facile means, which they afford to ambitious and unprincipled rulers, to subvert the government, or trample upon the rights of the people. The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them. And yet, though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights.[30]
§1202 of the book describes Power over the Militia and analyzes the origins of the Second Amendment. Justice Story clearly viewed the original meaning of the Amendment as a concession to moderate Anti-Federalists who feared federal control over the militia:
It is difficult fully to comprehend the influence of such objections, urged with much apparent sincerity and earnestness at such an eventful period. The answers then given seem to have been in their structure and reasoning satisfactory and conclusive. But the amendments proposed to the constitution (some of which have been since adopted) show, that the objections were extensively felt, and sedulously cherished. The power of congress over the militia (it was urged) was limited, and concurrent with that of the states. The right of governing them was confined to the single case of their being in the actual service of the United States, in some of the cases pointed out in the constitution. It was then, and then only, that they could be subjected by the general government to martial law. If congress did not choose to arm, organize, or discipline the militia, there would be an inherent right in the states to do it. All, that the constitution intended, was, to give a power to congress to ensure uniformity, and thereby efficiency. But, if congress refused, or neglected to perform the duty, the states had a perfect concurrent right, and might act upon it to the utmost extent of sovereignty. As little pretence was there to say, that congress possessed the exclusive power to suppress insurrections and repel invasions. Their power was merely competent to reach these objects; but did not, and could not, in regard to the militia, supersede the ordinary rights of the states. It was, indeed, made a duty of congress to provide for such cases; but this did not exclude the co-operation of the states. The idea of congress inflicting severe and ignominious punishments upon the militia in times of peace was absurd. It presupposed, that the representatives had an interest, and would intentionally take measures to oppress them, and alienate their affections. The appointment of the officers of the militia was exclusively in the states; and how could it be presumed, that such men would ever consent to the destruction of the rights or privileges of their fellow-citizens. The power to discipline and train the militia, except when in the actual service of the United States, was also exclusively vested in the states; and under such circumstances, it was secure against any serious abuses. It was added, that any project of disciplining the whole militia of the United States would be so utterly impracticable and mischievous, that it would probably never be attempted. The most, that could be done, would be to organize and discipline select corps; and these for all general purposes, either of the states, or of the Union, would be found to combine all, that was useful or desirable in militia services.[31]
Historical interpretations
During its first ten or twelve decades, the intended meaning of the Second Amendment, and how the Amendment applied, drew less interest than it does in modern times. The vast majority of regulation was done by states, and the first case law on the right to bear arms dealt with state provisions, not the Second Amendment. The notable exception to this general rule was Houston v. Moore, (1820),[32] where the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned the Second Amendment in an aside, but Justice Story "misidentified"[33] it as the 5th Amendment. The Second Amendment did not attract serious judicial attention again until the Reconstruction era case of Cruikshank.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (the "Dred Scott Decision"),[34] the Supreme Court indicated that: "It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union . . .the full liberty . . .to keep and carry arms wherever they went." This may indicate that the right to carry arms was considered to be universal for citizens of the United States, though it is not clear that the terms to 'carry arms' and to 'bear arms' were considered synonymous. The term "to keep arms" may have been considered distinctly different than to "carry arms". Both actions may have been considered to be protected for "citizens in any one State of the Union". These comments were obiter dicta (non-binding).
The Dred Scott Decision contains additional significant wording.
"More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character from another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went." [emphasis added]
When the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio used the Court's own phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens" to include the first Eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights under its protection and guard these rights against state legislation.[35]
The debate in the Congress on the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War also concentrated on what the Southern States were doing to harm the newly freed slaves. One particular concern was the disarming of former slaves.
Akhil Reed Amar notes in the Yale Law Journal, April 1992, Page 1193, the basis of Common Law for the first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which would include the Second Amendment, "following John Randolph Tucker's famous oral argument in the 1887 Chicago anarchist Haymarket Riot case, Spies v. Illinois":
Though originally the first ten Amendments were adopted as limitations on Federal power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize fundamental rights—common law rights—of the man, they make them privileges and immunities of the man as citizen of the United States...[36]
Modern interpretations
During the last two decades, the intended meaning of the Second Amendment, and how the Amendment applies in the twenty-first century, is one of the most frequently debated topics in American politics. The reason may stem in part from the perceived encroachments on, or enhancements of, individual rights to arms, amidst the increased prominence of gun control positions in modern politics.
The modern Second Amendment debate centers on questions such as:
- Who does the Amendment mean by "the People"?
- Why does the Amendment protect the right to 'keep and bear arms', and not protect just the right to 'bear arms'?
- Does "bear arms" or "keep and bear arms" mean the same now as it did in 1789?
- Is there significance that the Amendment is constructed of two clauses?
- Is there significance that the phrase "defense of himself/themselves and the State" was included in some state constitutions at the time but not included in the Federal Second Amendment?
In addition, the debate often involves discussion focused on more precise details around the word "militia", such as:
- Who or what does the Amendment mean by the "militia"?
- What relationship does "militia" today have with "militia" in 1789?
- What is meant by "well regulated", relative to "militia"?
- Does the mention of "militia" in the Second Amendment mean that maintaining viable militia is the 'obvious purpose' of the Second Amendment?
It also often involves topics on differences in historical meanings and thoughts such as:
- What does "shall not be infringed" mean?
It also expands to include discussions on the impact among states, such as:
- Does the Amendment prohibit states from regulating arms?
- Does the Amendment permit some states to deviate from interpretations of the Amendment as taken by other states?
Constitutional analysis and rhetorical structures
"The Embarrassing Second Amendment" by Sanford Levinson[37] indicates the six approaches to constitutional analysis outlined in Constitutional Fate by Philip Bobbitt:
- textual argument — the unadorned language of the text
- historical argument — the historical background of the vision being considered, whether the general history (such as the American Revolution) or specific appeals to the intentions of Founding Fathers of the United States
- structural argument — inferences from the particular structures established by the Constitution, including the tripartite division of the US federal government; the separate existence of both state and nation as political entities; and the structured role of citizens within the political order
- doctrinal argument — prior cases decided by the Supreme Court
- prudential argument — consequences of adopting a proferred decision in any given case
- ethical argument — reliance on the overall ethos of limited government as centrally constituting American political culture
The legal grammar of constitutional argument comprise these six approaches — or "modalities", as Bobbitt terms them. These approaches are the rhetorical structures within which "law-talk" as a recognizable form of conversation is carried on in analysis of United States constitutional law:
"The People"
Regarding the meaning of "the People", the U.S. Supreme Court stated in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990),
"the people" seems to be a term of art used in select parts of the Constitution and contrasts with the words "person" and "accused" used in Articles of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating criminal procedures. This suggests that "the people" refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community.[38]
Applied to the first and fourth amendments, other clauses enumerating rights to "the people", this would imply the right applies to all members of this class and in some cases individually. The right of free speech, for instance, applies to all those within the class of those attached to the national community.
As Richard Primus and Jack Rakove have noted, the right of the people to assemble was generally understood not to refer to individuals in isolation. The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights affirmed a right of the people "to regulate their internal police", another formulation in which this right was used in a more collective sense.
However, as noted earlier by the Supreme Court in 1886, the Second Amendment is not restricted to American citizens. In Presser v. Illinois (1886) before the high court, Presser made an attempt to link the Second Amendment as being a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States. This attempt was found lacking when the Supreme Court stated
The plaintiff in error [Presser] next insists that the sections of the Military Code of Illinois under which he was indicted are an invasion of that clause of the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States which declares: 'No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.'
Additionally, the Supreme Court stated in Presser v. Illinois,
The constitution and laws of the United States will be searched in vain for any support to the view that these [Second Amendment] rights are privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States...
Hence, because the Second Amendment did not apply solely to citizens of the United States, "the people" mentioned in the Second Amendment are not necessarily American citizens but are instead simply "a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community".
"To keep and bear arms"
The meanings of the terms "keep" and "bear" are integral to the debate and much of the amendment jurisprudence relies on such interpretations.
Relative to the "bear arms" meanings, an extensive study found "...that the overwhelming preponderance of usage of 300 examples of the 'bear arms' expression in public discourse in early America was in an unambiguous, explicitly military context in a figurative (and euphemistic) sense to stand for military service".[39] Further, the Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles declares that a meaning of "to bear arms" is a figurative usage meaning "to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight".
The United States Declaration of Independence uses the expression "bear arms" in the sense of military duty on a ship.
He has constrained our fellow
Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their
Country.
In Amyette v. State the Tennessee Supreme Court stated in 1840 that the term "bear arms" "has a military sense, and no other" and further stated "A man in the pursuit of deer, elk, and buffaloes might carry his rifle every day for forty years, and yet it would never be said of him that he had borne arms; much less could it be said that a private citizen bears arms because he has a dirk or pistol concealed under his clothes, or a spear in a cane."[40]
The term "keep" has also been subject to scrutiny. In the recent case Parker v. District of Columbia the court analyzed two different interpretations, one claiming "keep" meant to upkeep the weapons, and another claiming "keep" meant personal retention.
From the opinion: "Turning again to Dr. Johnson's Dictionary , we see the first three definitions of keep are "to retain; not to lose," "to have custody," "to preserve; not to let go." Johnson, supra , at 540. We think "keep" is a straightforward term that implies ownership or possession of a functional weapon by an individual for private use."[41]
In a released Senate report on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, and well known gun rights proponent, states
They argue that the Second Amendment's words "right of the people" mean "a right of the state" — apparently overlooking the impact of those same words when used in the First and Fourth Amendments. The "right of the people" to assemble or to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is not contested as an individual guarantee. Still they ignore consistency and claim that the right to "bear arms" relates only to military uses. This not only violates a consistent constitutional reading of "right of the people" but also ignores that the second amendment protects a right to "keep" arms.
"When our ancestors forged a land "conceived in liberty", they did so with musket and rifle. When they reacted to attempts to dissolve their free institutions, and established their identity as a free nation, they did so as a nation of armed freemen. When they sought to record forever a guarantee of their rights, they devoted one full amendment out of ten to nothing but the protection of their right to keep and bear arms against governmental interference. Under my chairmanship the Subcommittee on the Constitution will concern itself with a proper recognition of, and respect for, this right most valued by free men."[42]
For a more recent judicial interpretation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in 2001 that
there are numerous instances of the phrase "bear arms" being used to describe a civilian's carrying of arms. Early constitutional provisions or declarations of rights in at least some ten different states speak of the right of the "people" [or "citizen" or "citizens"] "to bear arms in defense of themselves [or "himself"] and the state", or equivalent words, thus indisputably reflecting that under common usage "bear arms" was in no sense restricted to bearing arms in military service.[43]
Several scholars have challenged the 5th Circuit's history.[44] Several of the earliest state constitutions used variants of the Pennsylvania (September 28, 1776) model, affirming a right to "bear arms in defense of themselves and the state." Thus, North Carolina's declaration of rights (December 18, 1776) stated that "The people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State; and, as standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power."[45] Less than two decades later (1796), Tennessee affirmed that "The freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defence."[46]
According to these same scholars, a more individualistic formulation emerged only during the Jacksonian era.[44] Alabama's constitution of 1819 declared that "that every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the state." More recently, Stanford Law professor Robert Weissberg has noted that the shift in the language of arms bearing provisions challenges the historical accounts put forth by supporters of the collective rights and individual rights accounts.[47]
Models of interpretation
Modern legal theorists have identified three models used to interpret the Second Amendment. Professor Michael Dorf has described these models as follows:[48]
The first and second both emphasize the preamble, or "purpose" clause, of the Amendment — the words "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State." The third does not. The first model holds that the right to keep and bear arms belongs to the people collectively rather than to individuals, because the right's only purpose is to enable states to maintain a militia; it is not for individuals' benefit. The second model is similar to the first. It holds that the right to keep and bear arms exists only for individuals actively serving in the militia, and then only pursuant to such regulations as may be prescribed. Under either of the first two models, a private citizen has no right to possess a firearm for personal use. But the court rejected these two models in favor of a third, the individual rights model. Under this third model, the Second Amendment protects a right of individuals to own and possess firearms, much as the First Amendment protects a right of individuals to engage in free speech.
Until recently United States federal courts have consistently interpreted the Second Amendment per a collective right model.[49] Two recent exceptions to this trend have occurred in federal circuit courts: The 2001 Fifth Circuit court ruling United States v. Emerson and the D.C. Circuit court 2007 ruling Parker v. District of Columbia, both of which found per an individual rights model. Presently, nine of the federal circuit courts support a collective rights model, two of the federal circuit courts an individual rights model, and the Supreme Court and one federal circuit court have not addressed the question.[50]
Early commentary about the right to bear arms in state courts
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution is a Federal provision. Each of the fifty states also has its own state constitution addressing their specific state. Forty-four states have chosen to embody explicitly a right to bear arms into their state's constitution,[51] and six states have chosen explicitly not to do so.
Of the forty-four states that have chosen to embody explicitly a right to bear arms into their state's constitution, approximately thirty-one have explicitly chosen to include the right to arms for "individual right", "defense of self", "defense of home" or similarly worded reasons. Approximately thirteen states, as with the Federal Constitution, did not choose to include explicitly "individual", "self" or "home" wording associated with a right to bear arms for their specific state.
Of the forty-four states, approximately twenty-eight have explicitly chosen to include the right to bear arms for "security of a free state", "defense of state", "common defense" or similarly worded reasons, as with the Federal Constitution. Approximately sixteen states did not choose to include explicitly "free state", "defense of state" or "common defense" wording for their specific state. Whether the inclusion of these kinds of wording in state constitutions has relevance to the issue of whether implicit "individual" rights exist, or whether such rights (if any) are implicitly protected by the states' constitutions or by the Federal Constitution's Second Amendment, remains a matter of dispute.
Regarding the state constitutional rights to bear arms, the state courts have addressed the meaning of their specific state rights under their specific state's constitution. Two different models have emerged in state jurisprudence.
In Bliss v. Commonwealth (1822, KY),[52] which evaluated the right to bear arms in defence of themselves and the state pursuant to Section 28 of the Second Constitution of Kentucky (1799), the right to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state was interpreted as an individual right, for the case of a concealed sword cane. As stated by the Kentucky High Court, "But it should not be forgotten, that it is not only a part of the right that is secured by the constitution; it is the right entire and complete, as it existed at the adoption of the constitution; and if any portion of that right be impaired, immaterial how small the part may be, and immaterial the order of time at which it be done, it is equally forbidden by the constitution."[52] The "constitution" mentioned in this quote refers to Kentucky's Constitution.[42] As mentioned in this quotation "as it existed at the adoption of the constitution" would have had to have been the pre-existing right in force when Kentucky's First Constitution was drawn in 1799.[53]
The case prompted outrage in the Kentucky House, all the while recognizing that Section 23 of the Second Constitution of Kentucky (1799), which stated "That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned."[54] did guarantee individuals the right to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state.
The result was that the law of the Commonwealth of Kentucky was eventually over-turned by constitutional amendment with Section 26 in Kentucky's Third Constitution (1850), banning the future carrying of concealed weapons, while still asserting that the bearing of arms in defense of themselves and the state was an individual and collective right in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. This recognition, has remained to the present day in the Commonwealth of Kentucky's Fourth Constitution enacted in 1891, in Section 1, Article 7, that guarantees "The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons." As noted in the Northern Kentucky Law Review Second Amendment Symposium: Rights in Conflict in the 1980’s, vol. 10, no. 1, 1982, p. 155, "The first state court decision resulting from the "right to bear arms" issue was Bliss v. Commonwealth. The court held that "the right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State must be preserved entire, . . ." This holding was unique because it stated that the right to bear arms is absolute and unqualified. In contrast to this, all states currently regulate the possession and use of firearms to some extent."[55][56]
In contrast, in State v. Buzzard (1842, Ark), the Arkansas high court adopted a militia-based reading of the right to bear arms under state law, and upheld the 21st section of the second article of the Arkansas Constitution that declared, "that the free white men of this State shall have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense",[57] while rejecting a challenge to a statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons. Buzzard had carried a concealed weapon and stood "indicted by virtue of the authority of the 13th section of an act of the Legislature prohibiting any person wearing a pistol, dirk, large knife or sword-cane concealed as a weapon, unless upon a journey, under the penalties of fine and imprisonment." The Arkansas high court further declared "That the words "a well regulated militia being necessary for the security of a free State", and the words "common defense" clearly show the true intent and meaning of these Constitutions [i.e., Ark. and U.S.] and prove that it is a political and not an individual right, and, of course, that the State, in her legislative capacity, has the right to regulate and control it: This being the case, then the people, neither individually nor collectively, have the right to keep and bear arms." Joel Prentiss Bishop’s influential Commentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes (1873) took Buzzard's militia-based interpretation, a view that Bishop characterized as the “Arkansas doctrine", as the orthodox view of the right to bear arms in American law.[57]
Modern gun rights advocates have disputed this history, claiming that the individual right was the orthodox view of the right to bear arms under state law in the 19th century, citing the previously-mentioned Bliss v. Commonwealth, and even State v. Buzzard, which recognized the right of an individual to carry a weapon concealed, when upon a journey, in an affirmative defense. Since 1873, some legal and constitutional historians have sided with Bishop and not the individual rights model.[58] Other legal and constitutional historians have sided with the Individual Rights Model[59]
In 1905, the Kansas Supreme Court in Salina v. Blaksley[60] made the first collective right judicial interpretation, despite the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Presser v. Illinois which some people view as having ruled otherwise in 1886. The Kansas high court declared:
That the provision in question applies only to the right to bear arms as a member of the state militia, or some other military organization provided for by law, is also apparent from the second amendment to the federal Constitution, which says: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
The modern formulation of the debate over the Second Amendment as an individual/collective rights dichotomy entered Federal law and scholarship when it was employed in a widely-cited Harvard Law Review article in 1915 by the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Court, Lucilius A. Emery. He noted that "the right guaranteed is not so much to the individual for his private quarrels or feuds as to the people collectively for the common defense against the common enemy, foreign or domestic."[61]
Federal government
Executive branch
On December 3, 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt called for a reform of the militia system, declaring to Congress that:
our militia law is obsolete and worthless. The organization and armament of the National Guard...should be made identical with those provided for the regular forces. The obligations and duties of the Guard in time of war should be carefully defined, and a system established by law under which the method of procedure of raising volunteer forces should be prescribed in advance. It is utterly impossible in the excitement and haste of impending war to do this satisfactorily if the arrangements have not been made long beforehand.
In response, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1903, which, despite its name, essentially did away with the type of militia that had been common at the time of the Revolution. Modern warfare needed trained men with modern weaponry, and the law provided for these in a regular army as well as the National Guard, founded in 1903. Although the Guard is the descendant in many ways of the old unorganized militia, it is a far more disciplined and trained entity, since their program is now held to high standards set by the regular army. The members get their weapons from the national government and do not own them individually.
Following the assassination attempt on President-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933, President Roosevelt advocated and Congress passed the National Firearms Act of 1934. The general mood at the time of the assassination attempt was that a deranged man had committed the act.[62]
The right to bear arms was occasionally addressed by President Ulysses S. Grant who stated in an address to Congress on April 19, 1872[63] that "to deprive colored citizens of the right to bear arms" was among the goals of the Ku Klux Klan. Ulysses Grant later served as president of the National Rifle Association in 1883.
In 2001, the Justice Department under Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum opinion stating that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms.[64] Some critics have asserted that Ashcroft's objectivity is questionable, considering his lifelong membership of the National Rifle Association, an organization of individual gun right proponents (though he was not acting in an official capacity of the NRA at the time).
In 2004 the Justice Department under Ashcroft issued "Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right", a lengthy memorandum opinion tracing the historical development of the Second Amendment supporting its earlier conclusion. The opinion stated:
the Second Amendment secures a personal right of individuals, not a collective right that may be invoked only by a State or a quasi-collective right restricted to those persons who serve in organized militia units.[65]
Legislative branch
The Militia Act of 1903 created the United States National Guard by federalizing a portion of the state militias which were converted into regular troops kept in reserve for the United States Army. In 1933, Congress reorganized the National Guard under its power to "raise and support armies" in order to "create the National Guard of the United States as a component of the Army". This was done to avoid the constitutional limits on deployment of the militia which can be called forth only "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."[66]
The 1934 National Firearms Act ostensibly was brought about by the lawlessness and rise of gangster culture during prohibition, such as the St. Valentine's Day massacre on February 14, 1929. President Franklin D. Roosevelt hoped this act would eliminate automatic-fire weapons like machine guns from America's streets. Other firearms, such as short-barreled shotguns and rifles, gun accessories like silencers, and other "gadget-type" firearms hidden in canes and such were also targeted. In addition, the creation of a $200 tax for sawed-off shotguns, typically worth at most $10, which applied each and every time the firearm changed hands, would enhance tax revenue for the Federal Government. Initially, the act included handguns, but the complaints of women who could more easily handle handguns than long guns reversed this additional position, and handguns were not included in the National Firearms Act.
However, prohibition was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment on December 5 1933, and the gangster era largely ended with prohibition. (After prohibition ended, the illegal distributors of beer and whiskey, who had been some of the largest buyers of automatic weapons and sawed-off shotguns for illegal purposes, largely changed to other lines of work where automatic weapons were not needed. Legal breweries and distributors had no further need for automatic weapons for increasing market share.) According to some authors such as John Ross in his novel Unintended Consequences, the 1934 National Firearms Act was brought about instead to provide jobs during the Great Depression for government agents who previously had been enforcing prohibition laws and who otherwise would have been out of work and unable to find new jobs.
Likewise, the creation of a $200 tax for an item worth at most $10 generated almost no revenue. During the first few years after the National Firearms Act was created, less than two dozen sawed off shotguns were registered and had the tax paid. As a revenue enhancing measure, the act produced essentially no revenue while providing considerable work for government agents.
The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 was aimed at those involved in selling and shipping firearms through interstate or foreign commerce channels.
In 1964, two codes were passed. According to 18 U.S.C. § 1715, "Pistols, revolvers, and other firearms capable of being concealed on the person" became nonmailable, except in limited circumstances, in response to highly-public and televised handgun assassinations, such as of Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963. Although critics at the time deemed this an infringement of the Second Amendment right of the People to keep and bear arms, the courts ruled that this law did not preclude the People to keep and bear arms; it regulated only the purchase of concealable arms via U.S. Postal mail. With the passage of 49 U.S.C. § 1472, carrying weapons aboard aircraft, even openly, became prohibited.
The 1968 Gun Control Act (GCA68) was passed in response to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, who was killed by a mail-order rifle that belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald. The subsequent assassinations of Martin Luther King and presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy fueled its quick passage. License requirements were expanded to include more dealers, and more detailed record keeping was expected of them; handgun sales over state lines were restricted; the list of persons dealers could not sell to grew to include those convicted of felonies (with some exceptions), those found mentally incompetent, drug users, and others. The act also defined persons who were banned from possessing firearms.
The key element of this bill outlawed mail order sales of rifles and shotguns; up until this law, mail order consumers only had to sign a statement that they were over 21 years of age for a handgun to be shipped by common carrier (18 for rifle or shotgun), since the earlier 1964 law had already prohibited most handguns from the U.S. Postal mail; it also detailed more persons who were banned from possessing certain guns and further restricted shotgun and rifles sales.
In the "Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Congress, Second Session" (February 1982), a bipartisan subcommittee (consisting of 3 Republicans and 2 Democrats) of the United States Senate investigated the Second Amendment and reported upon their findings. This report included the following opinions:
The conclusion is thus inescapable that the history, concept, and wording of the second amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as its interpretation by every major commentator and court in the first half century after its ratification, indicates that what is protected is an individual right of a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a peaceful manner.[42]
It concluded that seventy-five percent of BATF prosecutions were "constitutionally improper", especially on Second Amendment issues.[67]
The 1986 McClure-Volkmer Act addressed those BATF abuses noted in the 1982 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee opinions. It re-opened interstate sales of long guns on a limited basis, allowed ammunition shipments through the U.S. Postal Service (a repeal of part of GCA68), ended record keeping on ammunition sales, except for armor piercing, permitted travel between states supportive of Second Amendment rights even through those areas less supportive of these rights, and addressed several other issues that had effectively restricted the Second Amendment rights of the People. However, the act also contained a provision that banned the sale of machine guns manufactured after the date of enactment to civilians, restricting sales of these weapons to the military and law enforcement. Thus, in the ensuing years, the limited supply of these arms available to civilians has caused an enormous increase in their price, with most costing in excess of $10,000.
The 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act initially provided a five-day waiting period for handgun purchases, which expired on November 30, 1998. It was replaced by a mandatory, computerized criminal background checking system to be conducted prior to any firearm purchase from a federally-licensed firearms dealer.
Judicial branch
The question of the U.S. Supreme Court rulings, or lack thereof, on the meaning of the Second Amendment has left supporters on all sides of the debate open to interpret the actions of the court as they see fit.
Current judicial precedents
At present, with certain exceptions and disputes, the courts generally find it acceptable under the Second Amendment for federal, state, and local jurisdictions to:
- Regulate or not regulate militias
- Enact, or not enact, child-safety lock legislation
- Ban or permit handgun possession
- Regulate or not regulate handgun possession
- Prohibit or allow the carrying of concealed firearms and/or weapons
- Regulate or not regulate the carrying of concealed firearms and/or weapons
- Ban or permit assault weapons
- Prohibit and regulate firearms on commercial aircraft.
- Prohibit possession of firearms by persons who have been:
- Involuntarily committed to a mental institution
- Convicted of a felony
- Convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence[68][69] or not, since in one jurisdiction the Gun Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence law was ruled a violation of the 2nd and 5th Amendments and was ruled unconstitutional for two years[70] though that decision was reversed on appeal[71] and the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari.
- Convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and in the military, and being unable as a soldier in uniform to handle any weapons, although per Department of Defense policy, crew-served weapons such as tanks, missiles, and aircraft are exempt from the Gun Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence law and may be handled or used by a soldier previously convicted of a crime of domestic violence[72] despite the same individual not being allowed to handle or use a pistol.[69]
- Dishonorably discharged from the military
- Require the licensing of firearms dealers
- Ban or regulate bombs, artillery, and explosives
- Require or not require the registration of firearms
- Ban or permit the possession of firearms and ammunition on county-owned property
- Ban or not ban the possession of weapons of any kind on Federal property (Although weapons are generally banned on most Federal property, National Parks in some parts of Alaska encourage hikers to carry firearms for protection against wild animals.[73])
- Prohibit firearm possession anywhere in licensed liquor establishments, or to prohibit firearm possessions only in the bar areas of some businesses, or to permit the carry of concealed weapons in any facility other than Federal facilities
- Require or not require handgun owner identification cards
- Require or not require the presentation of identification prior to buying ammunition
- Ban or permit ballistic fingerprinting databases
These rules vary between jurisdictions[74] and are subject to court decisions rendered according to local law. The Federal District courts have not ruled uniformly either for or against several of these provisions, and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled uniformly.
Although the courts permit laws and regulations as itemized above, some jurisdictions do not have these laws. For example, most jurisdictions do not require handgun owner identification cards, nor do they require the presentation of any identification to buy ammunition. Some local jurisdictions in the United States have more restrictive laws, such as Washington, D.C.'s Firearms Control Regulations Act, enacted in 1976, that bans residents from owning handguns, and that requires permitted firearms be disassembled and locked with a trigger lock. On March 9, 2007, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled this Washington, D.C. handgun ban unconstitutional.[75][76]
Second Amendment theory
In 1915, Supreme Court Chief Justice Lucilius A. Emery from Maine wrote an article in the Harvard Law Review on the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,[61] and argued that "The guaranty does not appear to have been of a common-law right" [and] "I submit that the right guaranteed is not so much to the individual for his private quarrels or feuds as to the people collectively for the common defense against the common enemy, foreign or domestic."
According to 1998 research and testimony[59] by Eugene Volokh, a UCLA law professor and a well known individual gun rights proponent; the Supreme Court has ruled in passing in 22 out of 27 times while quoting or paraphrasing only "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" language of the Second Amendment without ever mentioning the militia clause, and this treatment has evidenced clear support of the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right and not as protecting a collective right.[65] However, Akhil Reed Amar, a leading scholar of constitutional law, writes in the left-leaning journal The New Republic that the word people is also used in a collective sense in the U.S. Constitution: "The amendment speaks of a right of 'the people' collectively rather than a right of 'persons' individually.' And it uses a distinctly military phrase: 'bear arms.'"[77]
According to Volokh, the federal courts of appeal have often subscribed to the states' right approach, instead of to the individual right approach.[59] They also have not agreed upon any single interpretation of the Second Amendment. The Fifth and Ninth circuits have shown different judicial thinking, tending to favor the individual and collective rights models respectively. Most circuits have followed the Ninth's reading,[78] Despite these inconsistencies among the lower courts, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to any recent case hinging on the Second Amendment.
The Brady Center, an advocate for gun control, has stated: "No federal court in history has overturned a gun law on Second Amendment grounds."[79] (this recently changed with the Parker v. District decision[41])Also, "... the meaning of the Second Amendment has been settled since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). In that case, the Court ruled that the "obvious purpose" of the Second Amendment was to "assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness" of the state militia." These statements, however, predate the above-referenced D.C. Circuit case which struck down the District of Columbia's handgun ban. While U.S. v. Miller was a Supreme Court case, Parker v. District of Columbia only pertains to its circuit.
Those on the individual rights side of the argument point out that while United States v. Miller upheld the NFA and the government's power to tax sawed-off shotguns, it had little bearing on whether the right to keep and bear arms was individual, collective or both. Some even claim it offers substantial support for the individual rights model.[80] Because Miller was dead before his case was heard, no defense argument was made and his legal counsel failed to appear, United States v. Miller may not offer much to either side in the way of useful precedent.
Since Miller, the Supreme Court has addressed the Second Amendment twice more, upholding New Jersey's strict gun control law in 1969 and upholding the federal law banning felons from possessing guns in 1980. Furthermore, twice—in 1965 and 1990—the Supreme Court has held that the term "well-regulated militia" refers to the National Guard.[81]
These pro-collective gun rights positions are disputed by some pro-individual gun rights people:
The 1969 case in question was Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969),[82] Sills being the attorney general for New Jersey, and Burton being the individual charged with violating New Jersey's gun control law. The essential issue at question was whether New Jersey's strict gun control law violated Burton's Second Amendment right. The appeal by Burton was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question" by the U.S. Supreme Court, thereby letting stand the lower court decisions and leaving in place New Jersey's strict gun control laws. The key factor was that Burton could apply for a New Jersey gun permit, and hence his Second Amendment right was not infringed, only regulated. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed with Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86 (1968)[83] that:
...Congress, though admittedly governed by the second amendment, may regulate interstate firearms so long as the regulation does not impair the maintenance of the active, organized militias of the states.
The 1965 decision relative to the definition of militia arises in Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41 (1965). In this case, an airliner collided with a National Guard jet, and a need for a definition of National Guard arose. In this ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote,
The National Guard is the modern Militia reserved to the States by Art. I. 8, cl. 15, 16, of the Constitution.[84]
Clauses 15 and 16 of the Constitution are:
- To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
- To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
The National Guard is an example of the militia of Clauses 15 and 16. There remains an open question whether the modern National Guard was the sole version of the well-regulated militia described by the Second Amendment. Maryland v. United States does state that "The National Guard is the modern Militia". Pro-individual gun right advocates argue that an unorganized militia would be an equally "well-regulated militia". Pro-collective gun right advocates question this argument in light of the "...active, organized militias..." wording of Burton v. Sills.
Further clarification was provided in 1990, in Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990). In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, "The Dick Act divided the class of able-bodied male citizens between 18 and 45 years of age into an "organized militia" to be known as the National Guard of the several states, and the remainder of which was then described as the "reserve militia", and which later statutes have termed the "unorganized militia." ... " In 1908, however, the statute was amended to provide [496 U.S. 334, 343] expressly that the organized militia should be available for service "either within or without the territory of the United States." Hence, the National Guard is not the same as the unorganized militia.[85]
The primary Supreme Court cases that address Second Amendment issues are U.S. v. Miller (1939), U.S. v. Cruikshank (1875), and Presser v. Illinois (1886). The rulings for all three of these cases found that individual use of arms could be restricted. Yet, elements of these cases have been cited by supporters of both sides of the firearms debate to support their positions.
Important case law
United States v. Miller
United States v. Miller is the Supreme Court's fullest discussion of the Second Amendment. In Miller, the court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a federal law prohibiting the interstate transportation of unregistered Title II weapons.
Jack Miller and Frank Layton were indicted for transporting an unregistered shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 inches (45.7 cm) across state lines—in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934—which was discovered during a Federal raid searching for illegal whiskey that found only sugar. Layton made a plea bargain, but Miller moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the National Firearms Act violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms. On January 3, 1939, the District Court agreed with Miller and quashed his indictment. This decision was in turn appealed to the Supreme Court which heard the case on March 30, 1939.
Neither Miller, his co-defendant Frank Layton, nor their attorney, appeared before the Supreme Court (Miller had died before the case could be heard). The Justice Department attorneys presented their case without any opposition from the appellants.
The court upheld the federal law making it a crime to transport a short barreled shotgun in interstate commerce[86] and reinstated the indictment against Miller and Layton.[87] On May 15, 1939, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, overruled the District Court decision.
After reciting the original provisions of the Constitution dealing with the militia, the Supreme Court observed that "[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted with that end in view." The significance of the militia, the Court continued, was that it consisted of "civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." It was upon this force that the states could rely for defense and securing of the laws, on a force that "comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense", who, "when called for service ... were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time."
Therefore, "[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length' at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense." The military use of shotguns with a barrel length less than 18 inches, in World War I and in prior U.S. conflicts never entered the judicial record for this case.
United States v. Miller was remanded to the lower court to resume the process of prosecuting the defendants under the reinstated indictment. Miller was deceased by this time, and Layton pleaded guilty to the firearms charges for which the two had been indicted.
Since the time of the decision in Miller, the meaning of the Second Amendment has been addressed in more than 200 federal and state appellate cases. Those cases have consistently rejected Second Amendment challenges to firearms laws, with two exceptions[70] since overturned on appeal, and Parker v. District of Columbia.[41][75] Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the Second Amendment since 1939, by its refusal to hear appeals, its actions have been consistent with Miller. The court has consistently refused to review lower court decisions rejecting Second Amendment challenges to firearms laws, despite numerous opportunities to do so.
Supporters of the individual rights model read Miller to support the right of individuals privately to possess and bear their own firearms, while supporters of the states' right model read Miller as endorsing the view that the Second Amendment exists specifically to "assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness" of the militia.
United States v. Cruikshank
In this case, several white citizens were accused of depriving some black citizens of their Second Amendment right to bear arms, and of their First Amendment right to assemble. The U.S. Supreme Court made the following statement:
The right [claimed in this case] is that of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose." This is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes, to what is called, in The City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, the 'powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what was, perhaps, more properly called internal police', 'not surrendered or restrained' by the Constitution of the United States.
The court made similar findings with respect to the First Amendment, though since that time the Supreme Court has said that the 14th Amendment applies the bill of rights to the states.
This high court statement is the first of two cases (the other being Presser) in which the Supreme Court ruled that because "[t]he Second Amendment...has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government...", the states and municipalities may regulate arms. The courts did not recognize the doctrine of incorporation at this point in the 19th century, and though many of the federal rights delineated in the federal Bill of Rights have subsequently been incorporated by the Court as states rights, the Court has not done so for a right to keep and bear arms.
Presser v. Illinois
Presser v. Illinois[88] is one of only two post-Civil War 19th Century U.S. Supreme Court cases to address the Second Amendment, the other one being U.S. v. Cruikshank.[89]
In this 1886 case, Herman Presser was part of a citizen militia group, the Lehr und Wehr Verein (Instruct and Defend Association), a group of armed ethnic German workers, associated with the Socialist Labor Party. The group had been formed to counter the armed private armies of companies in Chicago.
The indictment charged in substance that Presser, on September 24, 1879, in the county of Cook, in the State of Illinois, "did unlawfully belong to, and did parade and drill in the city of Chicago with an unauthorized body of men with arms, who had associated themselves together as a military company and organization, without having a license from the Governor, and not being a part of, or belonging to, 'the regular organized volunteer militia' of the State of Illinois, or the troops of the United States." A motion to quash the indictment was overruled. Presser then pleaded not guilty, and both parties having waived a jury the case was tried by the court, which found Presser guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of $10.
Basically, Presser,
in December, 1879, marched at the head of said company, about four hundred in number, in the streets of the city of Chicago, he riding on horseback and in command; that the company was armed with rifles and Presser with a cavalry sword; that the company had no license from the governor of Illinois to drill or parade as a part of the militia of the State, and was not a part of the regular organized militia of the State, nor a part of troops of the United States, and had no organization under the militia law of the United States.
Presser claimed the law violated his rights under the Second Amendment.
In Presser v. Illinois, the Supreme Court stated:
But a conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment [the Second Amendment] prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of congress and the national government, and not upon that of the state.
In Presser, the Court reaffirmed the Cruikshank decision that the Second Amendment acts as a limitation upon only the federal government and not the states. Cruikshank and Presser are consistently used by the lower courts to deny any recognition of individual rights claims and provides justification to state and local municipalities to pass laws that regulate guns.
However, the high court stated that there is a limit upon state restriction of firearms ownership, in that they may not disarm the people to such an extent that there is no remaining armed militia force for the general government to call upon:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as of the States, and in view of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government. But, as already stated, we think it clear that the sections under consideration do not have this effect.
The Court emphatically disposed of Presser's argument that there exists a right to assemble, drill, or march in a militia independent of authorization by state or federal law:
The right voluntarily to associate together as a military company or organization or to drill or parade with arms, without, and independent of, an act of Congress or law of the State authorizing the same, is not an attribute of national citizenship. Military organization and military drill and parade under arms are subjects especially under the control of the government of every country. They cannot be claimed as a right independent of law. Under our political system they are subject to the regulation and control of the State and Federal governments, acting in due regard to their respective prerogatives and powers. The Constitution and laws of the United States will be searched in vain for any support to the view that these rights are privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States independent of some specific legislation on the subject.
The traditional reading of Presser is that it affirms the states' rights view articulated in Cruikshank. Modern supporters of the individual rights view have challenged this claim, viewing the case as affirming a right to keep and bear arms as a necessary condition to have a universal militia. The conflict between these viewpoints was argued in court in 1982 in the case of Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, in which it was ruled:
As we have noted, the parties agree that Presser is controlling, but disagree as to what Presser held. It is difficult to understand how appellants can assert that Presser supports the theory that the second amendment right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right which the state cannot regulate when the Presser decision plainly states that "[t]he Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed, but this . . . means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of
the National government . . . " . . . As the district court explained in detail, appellants' claim that Presser supports the proposition that the second amendment guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms is not subject to state restriction is based on dicta quoted out of context... This argument borders on the frivolous and does not warrant any further consideration.[90]
Other cases of note
In U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), discussing the meaning of "the people" in the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court commented: " '[T]he people' seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. The Preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by 'the people of the United States.' The Second Amendment protects 'the right of the people to keep and bear Arms', and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are retained by and reserved to 'the people.' See also U.S. Const., Amdt. 1 ('Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble'); Art. I, 2, cl. 1 ('The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the people of the several States'). While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community. "
The case of Perpich v. Department of Defense (1990) concerned the training of the state militia, and a dispute between the state governor of Minnesota and the Department of Defense over whose authority was plenary in doing so. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution reserves the training of the militia to the states according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, but also gives Congress the power to raise and support armies for a period not exceeding two years for a given appropriation. The National Guard was recognized as both the state militia under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution (and the Second Amendment) as well as the reserve force of the Army at the same time. The dispute arose over whether the Guard's role as the militia excludes them from being a part of the Army as well, and gives the states the power to refuse to allow them to be called up into their role as the Army's reserve and trained outside of their home state, under the reservation of the militia's training to the states. The Court held that Article I, Section 8's additional grant of power to provide for the calling of the militia into the federal service may be combined with their power to raise and support armies all at once, and hence the National Guard has no immunity from being trained as part of the Army; the power to call up the militia is not excluded as being separate from the army powers, and is simply an additional grant of power. This case is significant for Second Amendment case law in that it recognizes that the National Guard is one modern form of the militia under federal law.
Whig political philosophy
Whig political writers at the time of the writing of the Constitution stated the importance of arms possession by the people. James Burgh wrote in 'Political Disquisitions""No kingdom can be secure otherwise than by arming the people. The possession of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a slave." Prominent revolutionaries who subscribed to Burgh's writings included George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and John Hancock. Granville Sharpe wrote in "Tracts, concerning the Antient and only True Means of national Defense by a Free Militia""No Englishman can be truly loyal who opposed the principles of English law whereby the people are required to have arms of defence and peace, for mutual as well as private defense...The laws of England always required the people to be armed, and not only armed, but expert in arms." John Adams, John Jay and Benjamin Franklin communicated with Sharp frequently.[35]
Colonial right to possess arms under English Common Law
As British subjects, Protestant colonists had a conditional right to possess arms according to the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.
- "That the subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law."[91]
The rights of British subjects to possess arms was recognized under English Common Law. Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, were highly influential and were used as a reference and text book for English Common Law. In his Commentaries, Blackstone described the right to arms.
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute I W. & M. st.2. c.2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.[92]
The rights of the Colonists to possess arms was stated in Revolutionary era newspaper articles. Notably a Boston Journal of the Times printed in April 13, 1769.
Instances of the licentious and outrageous behavior of the military conservators of the peace still multiply upon us, some of which are of such nature, and have been carried to such lengths, as must serve fully to evince that a late vote of this town, calling upon its inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defense, was a measure as prudent as it was legal: such violences are always to be apprehended from military troops, when quartered in the body of a populous city; but more especially so, when they are led to believe that they are become necessary to awe a spirit of rebellion, injuriously said to be existing therein. It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made use of when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.[93]
John Adams, lead defense attorney for the British soldiers on trial for the Boston Massacre stated at the trial:
Here every private person is authorized to arm himself, and on the strength of this authority, I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that time, for their defense, not for offence...[94]
According to the Militia Act of 1792 the President as commander in chief has a right and a need to know who the militiamen are and what the militia resources are as a national resource. In the eighteenth century the public had a claim on privately owned weapons for public purposes.[95][96] This has relevance to the modern question sometimes raised, whether the Second Amendment prohibits gun registration or confiscation of private guns by the federal government. The Militia Act of 1792 required, with some exceptions, every free able-bodied white male citizen from 18 through 44 years old to enroll in the militia and provide himself with a good musket (the type of weapon in common use by the army) or firelock or a good rifle. It also required the aforesaid to hold their weapons exempted from all suits, distresses, executions, or sales for debt, or for the payment of taxes. Section 6 of the Militia Act requires the adjutant general of each state to annually report their condition to the commander in chief of the state and send a duplicate report to the President of the United States.[97]
State ratification conventions
Five of the state ratification conventions for the U.S. Constitution made explicit requests or demands for the protection of rights to keep and bear arms. Four states also clearly defined what a well-regulated militia consists of "the body of the people trained to arms" or "the body of the people capable of bearing arms". Four states attached proposed bills of rights to their approvals of the Constitution, the fifth, North Carolina, refused to approve the Constitution and submitted a bill of unalienable rights of the people that must be protected before they would sign.[98]
- "XII. Congress shall never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion."
- "17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state:"
The Virginia Ratification Convention Committee that produced Virginia's proposed bill of rights included James Madison, Patrick Henry, George Mason, James Monroe and John Marshall.
- "That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state."
- "17. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state;"
North Carolina ratified the constitution on November 21, 1789, after Congress approved the Bill of Rights and submitted them to the states for ratification.
- "XVII. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state;"
Historical quotations
The documented debate in the House and Senate over the Second Amendment is sparse, especially when compared to debate over other articles of the Bill of Rights. For this reason, contemporaneous writings and speeches of the Founding Fathers are often referenced by those who would better understand the original intent and historical context of the Second Amendment. Scholars on both sides of the debate generally cite the same texts but interpret their meaning in different ways. One important issue in this debate stems from the use of rejected or proposed amendments to reconstruct the original understanding of the Second Amendment. Jefferson's views of guns are a good case in point. Jefferson proposed language that clearly protected an individual right; but Virginia instead adopted George Mason's militia-focused language.[99] As is true for any issue in constitutional history, the problem of context is essential. Wikiquote has a collection of statements made by various founding fathers prior to the adoption of the Second Amendment. While most date from before the wording of the Second Amendment was established, four were made during the 1789 debates over its adoption.[100]
Notes and references
- ^ Breen, T. H. (1972). "English Origins and New World Development: The Case of the Covenanted Militia in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts". Past & Present. 57 (1): 74–96.
- ^ Boynton, Lindsay Oliver J. (1971). The Elizabethan Militia 1558–1638. David & Charles. ISBN 0-7153-5244-X. OCLC 8605166.
- ^ John Adams and common law of self-defense
- ^ McAffee, Thomas B. (1997). "Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the Way?". North Carolina Law Review: 781.
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ignored (help) - ^ Spitzer, Robert J. (2000). "Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment" (PDF). Chicago-Kent Law Review. 76 (1): 349–401.
- ^ Heyman, Steven J. (2000). "Natural Rights and the Second Amendment" (PDF). Chicago-Kent Law Review. 76 (1): 237–290.
- ^ Wills, Garry (1999). A Necessary Evil, A History of American Distrust of Government. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-6848-4489-3.
- ^ a b The Federalist No. 46 (at Wikisource)
- ^ An Examination of the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution
- ^ The Federalist No. 29 (at Wikisource)
- ^ John Adams second quote
- ^ a b Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 1st Congress, 1st Session: pp. 451
- ^ Rakove, Jack (2000). "The Second Ammendment: The Highest State of Originalism" (PDF). Chicago-Kent Law Review. 76 (1): 103.
- ^ Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, Volume 1: pp. 64
- ^ Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 1st Congress, 1st Session: pp. 669
- ^ Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 1st Congress, 1st Session: pp. 778
- ^ Militia debate of 1789
- ^ Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, Volume 1: pp. 63
- ^ Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, Volume 1: pp. 71
- ^ Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, Volume 1: pp. 77
- ^ Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, Volume 1: pp. 305
- ^ House Journal
- ^ Senate Journal
- ^ Annals of Congress
- ^ Jonathan Elliot Commentary
- ^ Transcript of Bill of Rights (1791)
- ^ Statutes at Large, pp. 22
- ^ a b c d St. George Tucker Commentary
- ^ For two radically different views of Blackstone on the Second Amendment, see Heyman, Chicago-Kent, and Volokh, Senate Testimony.
- ^ Story, Joseph (1833). Commentaries on the U.S. Constitution. pp. §1890.
- ^ Story, Joseph (1833). Commentaries on the U.S. Constitution. pp. §1202.
- ^ Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820).
- ^ Several public officials, including James Madison and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, retained the confusing practice of referring to each of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights by the enumeration found in the first draft; had Justice Story followed this practice, he would have described the Second Amendment as the Fourth, but in this case he simply stated the number incorrectly
- ^ Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
- ^ a b Kerrigan, Robert (June 2006). "The Second Amendment and related Fourteenth Amendment" (PDF).
{{cite journal}}
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(help) - ^ Amar, Akhil Reed (April 1992). "The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment". Yale Law Journal: pp. 1193.
{{cite journal}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - ^ Levinson, Sanford (1989). "The Embarrassing Second Amendment". Yale Law Journal. 99: pp. 637–659.
{{cite journal}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - ^ United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
- ^ Study on term "bear arms"
- ^ Amyette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840).
- ^ a b c Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (2007).
- ^ a b c Judiciary Committee Senate report, February 1982
- ^ Fifth Circuit Decision
- ^ a b Cornell, Saul (2001). "Constitutional History After the New Cultural History: A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment".
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: Cite journal requires|journal=
(help) - ^ Constitution of North Carolina: A Declaration of Rights, &c., December 18 1776}}
- ^ 1796 Constitution of the state of Tennessee
- ^ Weissberg, Robert (winter 2004). "The Utilitarian and Deontological Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America". University of Chicago Law Review. 71 (1): 333–59.
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(help) - ^ Dorf, Michael C. (2001-10-31), Federal Court Of Appeals Says The Second Amendment Places Limits On Gun Control Legislation, Findlaw's Writ
- ^ Holder, Angela Roddy (1997). The Meaning of the Constitution. Barron's Educational Series. pp. pp. 64. ISBN 0-7641-0099-8.
{{cite book}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - ^ Liptak, Adam (2007-05-06). "A Liberal Case for Gun Rights Sways Judiciary". New York Times.
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(help) - ^ State Constitutional Right to Arms Provisions
- ^ a b Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Littell 90 (KY 1882).
- ^ The Second Amendment had been in effect only since December 15, 1791, and was still a relatively new concept at the time of the drawing of Kentucky's Constitution in 1799.
- ^ Commonwealth of KY Const. of 1799, art. , x§ 23
- ^ Pierce, Darell R. (1982). "Second Amendment Survey". Northern Kentucky Law Review Second Amendment Symposium: Rights in Conflict in the 1980's. 10 (1).
{{cite journal}}
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ignored (help) - ^ Two states, Alaska and Vermont, do not require a permit or license for carrying a concealed weapon, following Kentucky's original position.
- ^ a b State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. (2 Pike) 18 (1842).
- ^ see the symposium in Chicago Kent Law Review 76 and the Fordham Law Review vol. 73
- ^ a b c Volokh, Eugene (November/December 1988). "Testimony of Eugene Volokh on the Second Amendment, Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Sept. 23, 1998". California Political Review: pp. 23.
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:|pages=
has extra text (help); Check date values in:|date=
(help) - ^ City of Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230 (1905).
- ^ a b Emery, Lucilius A. (1914–1915). "The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms". Harvard Law Review. 28: 473–477.
- ^ "Assassination Attempt on Franklin Roosevelt".
- ^ Richardson, James D. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents; volume 7, part 1: Ulysses S. Grant.
- ^ Memorandum Re: United States v. Emerson, 2001-11-09
- ^ a b Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 2004-08-24
- ^ U.S. House. Committee on Military Affairs, National Bill: Report [to Accompany H.R. 5645] Pages 2-5. May 16, 1933. 73d Cong., 1st sess. Washington: U.S. GPO, 1933. H.Rpt. 73-141.
- ^ "Gun Law News: Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986".
- ^ "Public Law 104-208: Sec. 658. Gun Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence".
- ^ a b United States Attorneys' Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual. pp. §1117 Restrictions on the Possession of Firearms by Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence.
- ^ a b United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (1999).
- ^ United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (2001).
- ^ "The Lautenberg Amendment: Soldiers Convicted of Domestic Violence".
- ^ Bear Facts: The Essentials for Traveling in Bear Country
- ^ "Gun Control in the United States: A Comparative Survey of State Firearm Laws" (PDF). Open Society Institute. April 2000.
- ^ a b "Federal Appeals Court Strikes Down D.C. Handgun Ban" Bloomberg News, March 9, 2007
- ^ For more on this case, see: Parker v. District of Columbia.
- ^ Amar, Akhil Reed (1999-07-12). "Second Thoughts: What the right to bear arms really means". The New Republic.
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(help) - ^ "Summary of Second Amendment Case Law—Federal Cases". Legal Community Against Violence.
- ^ Henigan, Denis. "Exploding The NRA's Constitutional Myth". Brady Center.
- ^ Aultice, Patrick L. "United States vs. Miller: Court Opinion & Documents".
- ^ "Myth of the Second Amendment". Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.
- ^ Burton v. Stills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969).
- ^ Burton v. Stills, 53 N.J. 86 (1968).
- ^ Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41 (1965).
- ^ Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
- ^ Dudley, William. Crime and Criminals: Opposing Viewpoints. Greenhaven Press. pp. pp. 225.
{{cite book}}
:|pages=
has extra text (help) - ^ United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
- ^ Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
- ^ United States v. Cruikshank, 116 U.S. 252.
- ^ Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
- ^ Journal of the House of Lords, volume 14, 1689-02-12
- ^ Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. p. 136.
- ^ "Boston, March 17". New York Journal, Supplement: 1, Col.3. 1796-04-13.
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(help) quoted in Halbrook, Stephen. A Right to Bear Arms: State and Federal Bills of Rights and Constitutional Guarantees. - ^ Wroth, L. Kinvin. Legal Papers of John Adams. pp. 3:248.
{{cite book}}
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ignored (|author=
suggested) (help) - ^ "US v. Timothy Joe Emerson". The Potowmack Institute.
- ^ "Return of Militia". The Potowmack Institute.
- ^ Annals of Congress, May 8, 1792, 2nd Cong., 1st sess., 1392.
- ^ Elliot, "Debates of the Several State Conventions"
- ^ "THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS".
- ^ Second Amendment to the United States Constitution (at Wikiquote)
External links
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