Pointblank directive

Operation Pointblank was the code name for the primary portion of the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive of the United States Army Air Forces and the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force. It ordered Arthur 'Bomber' Harris, head of RAF Bomber Command, and Carl Andrew Spaatz, head of the U.S. Eighth Air Force, to bomb specific targets in support of the run-up to Operation Overlord in order to destroy the German air force (Luftwaffe) before D-Day. The techniques and specific tactics were decided upon by the commanders and subsequently followed differing bombing doctrines. The RAF mainly carried out night-time area bombing and the USAAF carried out daytime precision attacks against small targets.

Casablanca directive

In January 1943 the Casablanca Conference, with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in attendance, decided to carry out a combined bomber offensive against Germany and other occupied territories.

The Casablanca directive was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 65th meeting on 21 January 1943 and issued by the Royal Air Force and Army Air Force commanders on 4 February.

After listing a series of targets and their priorities the directive stated that the objective Combined Bomber Offensive was

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. Every opportunity to be taken to attack Germany by day to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on German day fighter force and to conserve German fighter force away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war.

A Combined Strategic Targets Committee was established in October 1944.

An RAF Avro Lancaster during Operation Pointblank.

A USAAF Boeing B-17H Flying Fortress during Operation Pointblank.

A USAAF P-51 Mustang during Operation Pointblank.

Planning for the Combined Bomber Offensive

In response to the Casablanca directive, Gen. Ira C. Eaker setup a team led by his 1st Bomb Wing commander, Haywood S. Hansell, to draft a plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). including a priority list of types of targets:

1. single-engine fighter aircraftTemplate:Fn
2. ball bearings
3. petroleum
4. grinding wheels and abrasives
5. non-ferrous metals
6. synthetic rubber and tires
7. submarine construction plants and bases
8. military transport vehicles
9. transportation
10. coking plants
11. iron and steel
12. machine tools
13. electric power
14. electrical equipment
15. optical precision instruments
16. chemicals
17. food
18. nitrogen
19. anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery

Around-the-clock bombing was called for, with the RAF continuing its night-time raids, and USAAF complementing them with daylight strikes.

The Eighth Air Force gradually increased its strength. Increasing the number of units in action, and testing various strategies of bomber defence.irrelevant?

Pointblank directive

On 14 June 1943 the Pointblank directive was issued, modifying the Casablanca directive of February 1943. In line with the list drawn up for the CBO plan, it gave highest priority to the destruction to the Luftwaffe's fighter force and the factories producing fighters because it was realised that the Western Allied invasion of France could not take place without fighter superiority. In August 1943 at the Quebec Conference upheld this change of priorities.

Operations

The "combined bomber offensive" began on 10 June 1943.

After "Black Thursday" (14 October), the USAAF discontinued unescorted strikes deep into Germany, until an escort was created that could follow the bombers to and from their targets. In 1944 the USAAF bombers, now escorted by P-51 Mustangs, renewed their operation. Gen Eaker gave the order to "Destroy the enemy air force wherever you find them, in the air, on the ground and in the factories."

Between February 20 and February 25 1944, as part of the Combined Bomber Offensive, the USAAF launched Operation Argument, a series of missions against Third Reich that became known as Big Week. As the American planners intended the Luftwaffe was lured into a decisive battle for air superiority by launching massive attacks by the bombers of the USAAF, protected by squadrons of P-51 Mustangs, on the German aircraft industry. By defeating the Luftwaffe, the Allies achieved air superiority and the invasion of Western Europe could proceed.

The wording of the Casablanca directive and the Pointblank directive allowed Bomber Harris sufficient leeway to continue his campaign of Area Bombardment. The Battle of the Ruhr and the Battle of Hamburg took place sequentially from March to early August. During the winter months from 18 November 1943 until 30 March, the Royal Air Force (RAF) fought the Battle of Berlin. RAF Bomber Command organized sixteen major attacks on the German capital. During these sixteen attacks the RAF destroyed over 6,000 acres (24 km²) and lost 450 aircraft. Arthur Harris planned to reduce most of the city to rubble to achieve victory. During the battle of Berlin, the British lost 1,047 bombers, with a further 1,682 damaged, culminating in the disastrous raid on Nuremberg on 30 March 1944. The campaign did not achieve its strategic objective.

At the end of Battle of Berlin Harris was obliged to commit his heavy bombers to the bombardment of communications in France as part of the preparations for the Normandy Landings and the RAF would not return to begin the systematic destruction of Germany until the last quarter of 1944.

Outcome

During the period between the opening of the Operation Pointblank in June 1943 and the switching of the Strategic bomber for to tactical targets in the build up to the Normandy Landings in Early April 1944, William R. Emerson, mentioned in the USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture in 1962 that

German single-engine fighter production, the priority target for POINTBLANK, rose- if not steadily, notably at any rate. Single-engine fighter production for the first quarter of 1944 was 30% higher than for the third quarter of 1943, which we may take as a base figure. In the second quarter of 1944, it doubled; by the third quarter of 1944, it had tripled, in a year's time. In September 1944, monthly German single-engine fighter production reached its wartime peak – 3031 fighter aircraft. Total German single-engine fighter production for 1944 reached the amazing figure of 25,860 ME-109s and FW-190s.

— William R. Emerson

However although the USAAF and the RAF failed to destroy the means of production of single seater fighters, The USAAF did manage to destroy the Luftwaffe's ability to control the skys over Western Europe. The USAAF was able to do this because once the P-51 Mustang became available in quantity, the Germans faced a dilemma. If they did not engage the bombers then the bombers would destroy the means of production and the Luftwaffe on the ground, but in engaging the USAAF P-51s they lost many experienced pilots that could not easily be replaced and so the Luftwaffe ceased to be an effective fighting force. By D-Day the Luftwaffe had only 80 operational aircraft on the North French Coast, which managed about 250 combat sorties. By contrast the Allied air forces flew 13,743 sorties.

The official UAAF history concludes its account of "Big Week" with:

The Allied victory in the air in early 1944 … did more to defeat the Luftwaffe than did the destruction of the aircraft factories.

— Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate

and the RAF official history, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945, states that:

…the achievement of "Big Week" and the subsequent attack on the aircraft industry was to reduce not the production of aircraft but the fighting capacity of the Luftwaffe. The attack on the aircraft industry was, in fact, another example of the failure of selective bombing. This combat was provoked by the American heavy bombers which carried the threat of the bomb to the heart of Germany by reaching out to targets of deep penetration and leaving the German fighters with no alternative other than to defend them. But the combat was primarily fought and certainly won by long-range fighters of VIII Fighter Command….

— Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland

See also

• Strategic bombing during World War II#The British attack
• Operation Crossbow - On July 18 1943, Eisenhower ruled that attacks on long-range weapon targets take precedence over everything except the urgent requirements of the battle across the Channel.

Notes and References

Template:FnbFollowing Operation Pointblank, Nazi Germany dispersed the 27 larger works of the German aircraft industry across 729 medium and very small plants (some in tunnels, caves, and mines).

• Harris, Arthur Travers; Cox, Sebastian (1995). Despatch on War Operations: 23rd February, 1942, to 8th May, 1945, Routledge, ISBN 071464692X.
• Hansell, Jr, Haywood S (1972). The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler. Atlanta: Higgins-McArthur/Longino and Porter. ISBN 0405121784. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameters: |origdate=, |coauthors=, and |origmonth= (help)
• Emerson, William R. Operation POINTBLANK: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture, 1962.