Talk:Erwin Rommel

The Glider Didn't Fly?

"Rommel, Patton, Montgomery", by Terry Brighton, contradicts the statement that "At the age of 14, Rommel and a friend built a full-scale glider and were able to fly it short distances", saying the glider never flew, but young Rommel embellished the story and a reference to the embellished story was found later and made it into several biographies. That's all I've found on it so far, no verification for sure either way. Statalyzer (talk) 22:12, 8 July 2015 (UTC)

The source you cite affirms that Rommel and his friend Kietel built the glider when Rommel was age 14. It states Rommel told people that it flew for short distances. It asserts that Rommel had "no way to get it off the ground", but does not provide any evidence as to why that would be so. It states that Rommel's later biographers, who never spoke directly with Rommel, believed that Rommel had flown the glider. The source does not say directly that Rommel didn't fly the glider. It says he did not have a way to get it airborne. One would think if Rommel had the wherewithal to build a glider at age 14 he could figure out a way to get a little air under its wings (roll it down a hill, have it towed by a car, etc). Rommel did not posses a pilots licence, and yet he was an amateur pilot who flew his own Stork. He tended to be forthright, and he tended to succeed with what he put his mind to. With multple biographers stating Rommel did in fact fly the glider (Lewin for one is cited after the following sentence) and without clear evidence to the contrary I believe we should leave it as it is for now. Gunbirddriver (talk) 23:48, 8 July 2015 (UTC)

Churchill Quotation

The article attributes a quotation about Rommel to Churchill, "on hearing of Rommel's death." But the quotation is from Volume 3 of Churchill's memoir, which was published in the 1950s. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.249.6.237 (talk) 21:27, 12 February 2011 (UTC)

Inconsistencies

In the section "The Battle of Arras", the second paragraph seems to say Rommel was directing the Allied fire at the Germans. Someone needs to fix that. Noghiri (talk) 18:58, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

I didn't see how that inferred that he was firing on the Germans, but if its confusing, what do you think it should say?--Jojhutton (talk) 19:09, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

I'm a bit concerned by the "a British sniper could have killed Rommel" section that was inserted in the middle of the description of D-Day fighting. The only source cited for this claim doesn't seem that reliable, there aren't any corroborating sources that I could find, and in fact the article on Operation Gaff, would seem to directly contradict many aspects of the claim. Sorry if this has already been addressed or if this isn't the proper place to discuss it. 96.240.160.221 (talk) 02:01, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

I have taken it out. Thank you, well spotted. -- Dianna (talk) 03:21, 19 May 2012 (UTC)

Missing Information

I have a biography at home which I can't remember the exact title of offhand which in the conclusion mentions that there is evidence that Rommel's intelligence at the time had cracked Allied codes and likely was a huge contributor to his military success. I think this is a major point that should be referenced, and I'd be happy to write about it and cite the book, but where should this write up be placed in the article? 98.118.97.122 (talk) 19:46, 7 March 2011 (UTC)LRobertson

This is perhaps covered in this section already:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rommel#Role_of_Signals_Intelligence_.28SIGINT.29_in_North_Africa--Nwinther (talk) 20:27, 8 March 2011 (UTC)

See Bonner Fellers in wikipedia. I THINK THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE INCLUDED TO EXPLAIN ROMMEL'S SUCCESS IN THE NORTH AFRICA CAMPAIGN. SUCH INFO GIVES THE PLANNER THE HUGE ADVANTAGE OF BEING ABLE TO CONCENTRATE ALL HIS FORCES AT THE ENEMY'S WEAKEST POINT, LEAVING NONE IN RESERVE OR FOR FLANK PROTECTION, ETC. Churchill withheld the info until something like 25 yrs after WWII. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.150.215.88 (talk) 16:39, 1 October 2013 (UTC)

The statement about intervening on behalf of a Polish priest is unclear (contained in the "Poland 1939" section). It says that the Gestapo had no knowledge of the man. This is left hanging. Does this mean he was released, since he did not "exist" in the Gestapo's eyes, or does it mean the priest had already been killed. Being asked to intervene is hardly a unique perspective on Rommel that would merit inclusion in an encyclopedia, but if he had been successful it might offer insight into his nature. 65.32.49.77 (talk) 17:24, 12 August 2012 (UTC)

Rommel killed on Bormann's orders?

In "With Hitler to the End: The Memoir of Hitler's Valet" Heinz Linge (Hitler's valet) claims that Rommel was killed on orders from Bormann because of a personal grudge the latter held towards Rommel from an incident in 1939 in Poland (Rommel, as head of Hitler's security detail, had refused to allow Bormann to accompany Hitler at one point), and that Hitler had made inquiries about having Rommel's body exhumed and an autopsy performed (because Hitler didn't believe the version of Rommel's death Bormann told him). Historian932 (talk) 15:55, 23 March 2011 (UTC)

Did all of this come from the one source? Thanks! Hesweeney (talk) 04:12, 27 September 2013 (UTC)

I work with a man who said that Rommel was his great-grandfather and that Rommel changed his and his family name first to Wagner and then later to (?) and came to the USA. This man looks exactly like his great-grandfather Rommel. Could this be true? I'll gather more info. 99.110.70.82 (talk) 23:07, 9 January 2015 (UTC) 1/9/2015

Sounds unlikely. His son did NOT change his name and (as the article says) did not disappear from Germany - he was long-time mayor of Stuttgart. --John (User:Jwy/talk) 03:01, 10 January 2015 (UTC)

Absent on D-Day

Worth mentioning that he was absent from his post on D-Day because he'd promised to go to Paris to buy new shoes for his wife for her birthday? 86.181.153.97 (talk) 00:57, 8 July 2011 (UTC)

Sounds dubious, but even if verified I doubt it is in any way essential for the article.Mediatech492 (talk) 08:27, 19 April 2012 (UTC)

He left for the purpose of meeting with Hitler in an attempt to convince him to move 12th SS Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr Division up to the Normandy coast, which he felt was imperative. From his notes: "The most urgent need was to speak personally with the Fuhrer on the Obersalzberg, convey to him the extent of the manpower and materiel inferiority we would suffer in the event of a landing, and request the dispatch of two panzer divisions, an anti-aircraft corps, and a Nebelwerfer Brigade to Normandy..." (The Rommel Papers, p. 470) Though he believed an invasion would occur at any time, he had been assured that the tides and heavy weather would preclude a landing in the next few days. As it was his wife's birthday, he planned on stopping to see her first, before attempting to get a meeting with Hitler. The proponent for the plan of early counterattack in the first 24 hours while the invaders were still on the beach, his absence was a significant aid to the Allies, and just one of many command problems the German defenders operated under. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:42, 27 September 2013 (UTC)

potential bias

This article seems to be weighted to show Rommel in a positive light. Potential rewrite? 76.169.132.142 (talk) 21:17, 18 July 2011 (UTC)dom

Not sure a "rewrite" is necessary, but I would encourage changes supported by reliable sources and challenges (perhaps by tagging the article phrases with {{fact}}) where you believe the information is incorrect/unduly "positive." --John (User:Jwy/talk) 21:41, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

A re-write isn't necessary, but there are some mainstream historians which do not portray Rommel in as positive a light as depicted here (Antony Beevor, for example). 069952497a (U-T-C-E) 22:01, 15 September 2013 (UTC)

It does seem to portray Rommel in a positive light - especially if you come into the article thinking he deserves a negative portrayal, because he's a Nazi and thus "one of the bad guys." Agree with John, attack specific innaccuracies or over-the-top glorifications, but there's no call for a re-write. Most of this article just tells it how it is (or was). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.177.14.151 (talk) 21:11, 24 August 2011 (UTC)

    Not a Nazi, according to this article: While Rommel developed an admiration for Hitler, he never joined the Nazi Party. Moioci (talk) 06:45, 12 February 2016 (UTC)

Bengasi

User Kirrages edited the phrase "Rommel won many battles in Africa in 1941 and 1942 against British forces that always outnumbered him and generally had better supply lines" by deleting the "better supply line" part. I beg to respectfully disagree with Kirrages comment "Not true. For most of the time he had had Benghazi and a short sea route to Italy. 8th Army had a line to Cairo and then a sea route to either India or round the African cape to UK or US - much longer. ". Besides the fact that the original text didn't contain any statement about the *lenght* of the supply lines, but about their quality ("better", not "shorter"), Bengasi was not-operational for most of the time during the campaign, and even when it was it couldn't usually handle more than two ships (hand-unloaded!) at the same time. it's usual best turn-around time from late 1940 was two half-loaded ships per week, *when open*. Neither it was used (execpt in extreme emergency) for direct convoys from Italy, as it was more exposed to CW interceptions and interdiction than Tripoli. Most of the traffic to Bengasi - when available - were barges and costal lighters coming from Tripoli, and - in a few cases - from Greece, so it was the end of a trans-shipment or staged route, much longer in transit time and distance space than the usual direct route to Tripoli, that was the only reasonably effective supplyhead for the Axis during the whole campaign but hundreds of kms away from the frontline. So the availability of Bengasi wasn't absolutely a critical or even barely a substantial factor in the NA logistical balance. I would therefore advise to return to the original text or - probably better - to amend the last phrase in "and generally was in a better logistical situation" that - while still quite generic - is an accurate statement all the same. But before starting to cancel or correct another contibutor work I would like very much to hear Kirrages' and other contributors' opinion. Best regards --Arturolorioli (talk) 15:51, 8 August 2011 (UTC)

I second that. Axis supply routes were under constant attack on the sea by aircraft/ships and on the land at coastline, while the Allied supply flow was nearly unhindered for most of the time, and only determined by its lenght. I reinserted an altered version about the supply situation. StoneProphet (talk) 17:26, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

It's about maintaining supply lines, not about how long they are. Teh Germans had a shorter Supply lines which also was better, but they did not manage to maintain it because of teh Ally navy. In that case the British had the better supply line, because they could maintain it. --Arsaces (talk) 13:58, 7 November 2011 (UTC)

How about "unreliable supply lines"? Rklawton (talk) 11:10, 12 February 2016 (UTC)

Relation Heinrich Kirchheim and Rommel

Food for thought: Rommel and Heinrich Kirchheim did not get along very well at all. Kirchheim was accused of cowardice by Rommel in Africa. Accusing a general at the time of cowardice was as close to a personal insult you can get. This relationship is crucial to understanding the outcome of the Cout of Honour decision of 1944. The choice to expel Rommel was actually a choice between Hans Speidel and Rommel, and Kirchheim advocated to expel Rommel and not Speidel (personal interest?) MisterBee1966 (talk) 10:07, 23 November 2011 (UTC)

File:Rommel im Stabswagen 1941.jpg Nominated for Deletion

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Erwin Rommel, John Boyd and the OODA loop

It strikes me that Rommel's thinking on combat and maneuver is similar to the ideas developed by John Boyd for fighter aircraft (Energy-Maneuverability Theory), which Boyd subsequently broadened to all combat in his OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act). His influence upon the combat doctrine of the US Marine Corps is remarkable, not the least of which because Boyd was retired Air Force. The general idea that Boyd advanced was that to be successful you need to be ahead of your opponent. You are acting and the opponent is placed in the position of reacting. The psychology of warfare was a big part of what Boyd was advancing (understanding your enemy, influencing the way he thinks, his perception of the battlefield, placing the enemy under psychological pressure). The implementation of these same ideas are clearly seen in Rommel's use of force in France and North Africa. To be ahead of the enemy, arrive before he expects you to be there, where he does not expect you to be, to put him under pressure, and defeat him mentally. This is all very non-traditional, and so it is not surprising that there would be critics within the German military, or expressed by opponents that were unable to keep up with the pace of combat that he was creating. Rommel was often in a Storch and would fly forward and land near an advancing column to be close to the point of contact. This dangerous practice nearly got him captured once when he landed alongside a retreating 8th Army column, but the point was to be in a position to make decisions faster than his opponent, and keep the opponent in turmoil. This he did very successfully for a number of years. The first and second battles of El Alamian did not allow for maneuver and surprise, and so were not fought in the manner Rommel desired. Supply issues were central to the outcome of the desert campaign as well, but I do not believe Rommel was unthinking in respect to this so much as frustrated by what the allies were able to do. Ultra intercepts and increasing allied air strength played a big role in this regard. I do not believe there are any sources that tie these threads together, but if I can find some time I may try locate what might be available. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:13, 18 January 2013 (UTC)

This Bio

Although some editing has been done to this bio, it's sources still include a totally discredited work by D. Irving. Any use of this source, either by direct attribution or as a source of quotes is a FUNDAMENTAL flaw that cannot be overcome. Also the general tenor appears positive but a careful examination shows a bias against the subject which goes beyond the sourcing failures and misuse of sources. ie. Repeated negative commentary on Rommel's command style flies in the face of success and that it became the norm for accomplished panzer leaders be "at the front" after the 1940 French Campaign. Criticism from Halder, von Rundstedt and especially Guderian could only be charitably considered as being in the category of professional "sour grapes". The onerous task of using the lame editing mechanisms of Wikipedia discourage both the layman and serious historian and until that is changed it's unlikely anyone will want to take on the task of fixing this mess of a bio. Hesweeney (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 10:38, 26 January 2013 (UTC)

Is there expert opinion you could cite that would support removal of the work by Irving? Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:25, 26 January 2013 (UTC)

Well, to answer my own question, there is this on David Irving from the Wiki page on him:

Irving's reputation as an historian was widely discredited after he brought an unsuccessful libel case against the American historian Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books.[4] The English court found that Irving was an active Holocaust denier, antisemite, and racist, who "associates with right-wing extremists who promote neo-Nazism",[5] and that he had "for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence".

Alright, I would recommend we remove him as a source from the article. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:23, 31 January 2013 (UTC)

I'm with you on that. --John (User:Jwy/talk) 03:07, 1 February 2013 (UTC)

David Irving's The Trail of the Fox has been removed as a source from the Bibliography. If there are additional comments about this please make them here. We will still need to go through and take down those statements in the article that were supported by Irving's work if no other source can be found to support them. That's a big job. I am beginning to look at sourcing materials to see what is available. Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:36, 9 February 2013 (UTC)

Since I was the main complainer I will try to help find sources. I do have a personal source in Germany (former aide to Gen. Spiedel) that I will try to get on board but he is quite old and not well. Hesweeney (talk) 06:08, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

I do believe that the sentence appearing after citation marker 36 is not only incorrect but a complete opposite of what is true, also it may have been derived from the work of D. Irving who appears to be the citation at no 36. 'With Rommel's campaign in North Africa to view in retrospect, Hoth's reservations can be seen as unfounded.' There is little doubt that Rommel was an excellent tactician, but his campaign in Africa proved that he had plenty of strategic failings.141.138.54.228 (talk) 20:42, 16 January 2014 (UTC)

The Rommel Papers

One of the references the article lists and cites many times is The Rommel Papers. I do believe this is a diary Rommel kept, supplemented by letters he wrote home to his wife. Rommel had thoughts of writing a book about command and his experiences after the war, but he did not survive to do so. BH Liddell-Hart took up the project, acting as editor with the assistance of Rommel's family members (wife and son) and Fritz Bayerlein, who for a time acted as Rommel's Chief of Staff in North Africa. Thus the author of The Rommel Papers is Erwin Rommel, and it should be noted as such in the reference section and in those citations refering to this work. If there are no objections, I will make the changes necessary. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:37, 26 January 2013 (UTC)

Rommel's involvement in the 20 July Plot

It's put forth in the article that, based on the writings of Hans Speidel, Rommel was aware of the plan to assassinate Hitler and wanted to instead arrest him and put him on trial. In Rommel: The End of a Legend Ralf Georg Reuth claims that Speidel's claims were fabricated in order to portray Rommel as a member of the resistance so that his image could be used as a role model for the newly-formed Bundeswehr. Reuth claims that Rommel remained loyal to Hitler and the extent of his involvement in the resistance was that he wanted to negotiate a peace in the West so that Germany could more effectively fight against Russia, which Rommel had made known to Hitler several times after the Allied invasion of Normandy. Elpolloverde (talk) 07:27, 19 February 2013 (UTC)

Josef Goebbels made every effort to protray Rommel as a loyal Nazi, which he clearly was not. He had had multiple interactions with Hitler and was not afraid to challenge him or confront him, which in Nazi Germany took a great deal of courage to do. It is difficult to know the truth of the members of a secret society plotting to kill the ruthless tyrant of a police state, especially when some five thousand people were tortured and executed following that attempt. That there was unrest in Germany and that people looked to Rommel as a possible leader in a post Hitler Germany is well established. He would receive a great deal of mail from common citizens "bearing witness to their trust in the Field Marshall as their potential savior." (Wheeler-Bennet, The Nemisis of Power, p. 607) Lewin in "Rommel as Military Commander" states "In a closed circle he was prepared to say things like 'Hitler's orders are nonsense. The man must be mad.' or "Every day is costing lives unnecessarily. We must make peace at once." but in all his thinking about Hitler and what was happening to Germany he never - publically or privately - went beyond the notion that Hitler should be arrested by the army and brought to trial. He was obsessed with the idea that if only the Germans could have the truth about Hitler revealed to them they would understand and reject him." (pp. 231-232) After the attempt was made he complained bitterly to Hitler over the arrest of his chief of staff, the aforementioned Hans Speidel. Strangely enough, though Speidel was a member of the plot, he survived the event, whereas Rommel, whose involvement was peripheral, did not. It is going to be challenging to try to represent the events accurately and honestly, and source them all reliably. Gunbirddriver (talk) 20:23, 19 February 2013 (UTC)

Very informative; you're a lot more knowledgeable on this than I am. I know it's difficult to relate history with complete accuracy, but I figured I would point out something I noticed just in case it had been overlooked. Elpolloverde (talk) 03:08, 20 February 2013 (UTC)

Oh, well, I've just been trying to improve the article, adding detail when possible, clarifying, adding images. Everything you said above was true, as far as I can tell. Speidel certainly was instrumental in involving Rommel, speaking to him about the need to preserve Germany, bringing him into contact with members of the plot. Those involved wanted Rommel to play a part of the post-Hitler Germany, but as far as I have been able to find Rommel had no idea they were planning on leaving a bomb in Hitler's bunker. Rommel's loyalties were with Germany. He was never a Nazi, or a sycophantic follower of Adolf Hitler. Speidel clearly lied and got away with it to the Gestapo (that's not easy to do). Did he point the finger at Rommel? Did he give them the prize they were looking for? He ended up Supreme Commander of NATO Forces Central Europe, Germany. Did he after the war expand Rommel's involvement, to deflect attention from himself? It's hard to know. If you can improve what we have and feel confident in the source, go for it. Gunbirddriver (talk) 05:47, 20 February 2013 (UTC)

Gen. Spiedel was a loyal friend to Rommel. He and Rommel discussed the need to end Hitler's leadership but Rommel was opposed to murdering him. A Patriotic German, Rommel knew the war was lost and had seen the damage being done to his country, which was all the more horrific to him. His son, in a flak battery, was now in the line of fire in the pointless struggle. Spiedel did not want to press Rommel too hard because he was focusing on the mess of the Atlantic Wall and after D-Day trying to contain it with limited resources and Hitler's idiotic orders. (I witnessed this conversation between Gen. Spiedel and my father in 1957 at Kelly Barracks, SE of Stuttgart) Hesweeney (talk) 06:23, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

Reports of such conversations should be recorded somewhere and I am glad to hear of them, but (unfortunately, I believe, in this case) we can't use it directly here as it amounts to a WP:Primary Source and some WP:Original Research is required to incorporate the details into the bigger picture. I am not questioning your honesty, but the problem is if someone did, there wouldn't be anything to back you up. Hopefully there is something more "on the record" about this? --John (User:Jwy/talk) 15:46, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

Yes, well, there seems to be a large degree of agreement, with multiple supporting sources on the rough details of what happened and why. Ralf Georg Reuth's claims in Rommel: The End of a Legend that Rommel was "loyal to Hitler" are not supported. What happened between Spiedel and the Gestopo, and how did he escape them is not known. Speidel has an explanation, and it may very well be the truth. Spiedel was a loyal friend of Rommel's, but he was the conduit that allowed the conspirators to contact Rommel, and when the attempt failed, an attempt that Rommel does not appear to have been aware of, it ended up resulting in Rommel's death. I know that a movie was made that alleged Speidel was responsible, and that Speidel sued for libel and won his case, but how it all goes together I do not believe we can actually know for certain.Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:28, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

The British government just recently released tapes from the wiretapped cells of German generals who were captured in France talking to each other. The National Geographic Channel did a special on it as part of their Nazi Underground series. These tapes show Rommel was telling other generals that Hitler and his associates needed to be killed for Germany's survival.

Here is a short You Tube clip I made of the special showing that the British knew a month before Rommel died that he wanted and was openly building support for the other throw and death of Hitler and the Nazi leadership.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9SFwVMlMIc

and a photo below from later in the hour long program.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/IMG_0791.jpg

I looked in the news achieves and the BBC in early 1945 announced that Rommel was one of the July Plotters and planned to attempt to negotiate an armistice with the allies once Hitler was dead.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/23da.png

Rommel's relationship with the July plotters is often poorly understood. But, to simplify it the July Plotters had to be the ones to kill Hitler and Rommel was the only one who the Western Allied generals might be willing to sit down with and negotiate a decent surrender that ends the war early with the Western Allies occupying all of Western Europe before the Soviets and prevents the worst months of the Final Solution. But, the rank and file of the German Army in the West would only follow Rommel's orders to surrender if both Hitler was dead and they didn't think Rommel killed him.

As for Rommel's Chief of Staff Hans Speidel according to Manfred Rommel's transcribed and signed document he did for the English a few days before Hitler killed himself. Rommel was told that his Chief of Staff Speidel had informed the SS that he was part of the July 20th plot and he was only prevented from taking a bigger role by his injuries. He wasn't the only one according to Manfred.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/manfred1_zps815655bf.jpg http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/manfred2_zps9ad82332.jpg

Given the amount of information the SS had on Speidel and the skullduggery he was up to against the regime and the fact he wasn't executed leaves little doubt in my mind that Speidel did talk to save himself and potentially his family as well which the SS had the legal right to send to a concentration camp. I don't hold it too much against him as the vast majority of men would in his situation. I don't think Rommel would have, but the reason we talk about Rommel to this day is in large part because he was a unique military commander who viewed his sense of honor and protecting his country above his own life. His family life was the hard thing for Rommel in my view as he had a large family he loved very much and how does one weigh their survival against doing what you know is treason, but think is right for your country?

Anyway I have some interesting quotes from different books over years if anyone is interested in using them.

Rommel's stance on the SS's massacre of civilians in France.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/desk.png

From the book to the side page 241 http://books.google.com/books?id=0TrWrxxDkf8C&pg=PA241&dq=Rommel+the+massacre+of+oradour&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ohovUeXBLZKe8QS5k4DgDQ&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Rommel&f=false

Rommel told Guderian he opposed the attack on Kursk and supported a defensive strategy from the book the Devil's Virtuosos by David Downing p 177. http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/g3.png

Rommel disobeying OKWs orders to kill the Jews of the Jewish battalion captured by his forces. Rommel's Desert Commanders: The Men Who Served the Desert Fox, North Africa By Samuel W. Mitcham p 73.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/jews2.jpg

or a direct link to the book page. http://books.google.com/books?id=MN6ZMOdrcKcC&pg=PA73&dq=Hecker+Rommel+Jewish&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ax0vUdKmHJDQ9ASz9oHoBw&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Hecker%20Rommel%20Jewish&f=false

Finally Rommel in early 1943 at a meeting with Hitler urging him to appoint a Jewish Gauleiter.

From: Jews by George E. Berkley p 209 http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/rom1-1.jpg

http://books.google.com/books?id=BeFC9bAG2B0C&pg=PA209&dq=rommel,+jews&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hLL1UMLxBuLN0AHY_oG4Dg&sqi=2&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=rommel%2C%20jews&f=false

If anyone wants any other particular quotes about Rommel's views on a matter at any given time or his discussions with any other generals... I find his 1943 discussion with Von Manstein quite interesting if one reads between the lines of what Rommel is saying its pretty clear what he is trying to convince him of.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Amn_pandW3MC&pg=PA405&dq=von+manstein,+Rommel&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ACMvUYOyH6Tz0gGDjYC4DQ&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=von%20manstein%2C%20Rommel&f=false

But, I have done my research quite well and have looked up sources both old and new and have been able to come up with a pretty good grasp of what Rommel knew when about what the Nazi Party was doing in the East and how his views and his willingness to act against the regime evolved. If anyone wants help on Rommel related sources or info just ask. I hope I was helpful.

User:ech1969|ech1969]] (talk) 4:36, 28 February 2013 (UTC)

That is helpful and I look forward to going through those when time allows, but I would prefer you would refrain from deleting my comments from the Talk page discussion. I have added them back. From what you say Rommel had a larger role then previously thought, but he was fighting a war in June and July, so I am not sure how much time he could have allowed himself to plan an assassination, nor do I think he would have failed in his purpose if he had. A letter he wrote to his wife while in hospital expressed shock at hearing of the attempt to assassinate Hitler, but was this real surprise or a ruse? What happened between Speidel and the Gestapo, how is that ever to be known? Those were very dark days for all parties involved. We know that Speidel says he did not implicate Rommel, and I do not believe it can be proved otherwise. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:51, 28 February 2013 (UTC)

My personal history with this cannot be considered in any way definitive and is provided as background to the the two men's personalities. Since we will never be able to show what actually happened we get to be tantalized by this bit of history. The Allies failure to do a proper De-nazification allowed these sort of events to fall by the wayside, the history was kept close and not frequently talked of. Rommel's entire life as a soldier was honorable, nothing but a hard driving officer working toward national goals in the most thorough but decent manner.Hesweeney (talk) 23:01, 28 February 2013 (UTC)

Thanks for your comments, Hesweeney. John is right, if we cannot source something we cannot put it into the article, but it helps to hear from people who have had actual contact with the people involved, and it is appreciated. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:44, 1 March 2013 (UTC)

Sorry if I deleated anything you wrote I am new at using some of these features. One thing one its important to understand about him sending letters to his wife, he knew it would always be a party line meaning the SS will be reading them. Given the SS was sending whole families to concentration camps at that point over the July Plot if I were in his shoes I would certainly do that much at that point.

Oh and the few survivng members of the July Plot testified at the Nuremberg trials that Rommel told them to kill not just Hitler, but Goering and Himmler as well.

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f132/jmc247/Misc/1b.png

So how and why did Rommel's support for killing Hitler and the Nazi leadership all the sudden start to change a few years later to he didn't want Hitler killed, but instead put on trial or other ideas that he wasn't involved at all. It was pushed at virtually the same time the Cold War went into high gear and the WAllies decided to allow West Germany to rearm. In the early Cold War there wasn't a great deal of support for the actual attempt to kill Hitler at that time in Germany even among those who felt something needed to happen. A nice middle option NATO and West Germany promoted was that he wanted Hitler tried not killed.

At this point they were fully using Rommel as an apolitical unifying symbol to support German rearmament. And, at the time the July Plot was still very divisive among Germans so they wanted him connected to it and not fully connected to it. Thus, I think the Western Allies and West Germany went about tweaking history for Cold War reasons. That has sort of left the history of Rommel and his connection to the July Plot a bit of a mess to this day and I have found the only way to clear up the mess is go back to what was said an written before the Cold War started. The funny thing is alot of people today think his links to the July Plotters were overplayed for Cold War reasons when my studies of the primary sources show pretty much the exact opposite.

Also from what I hear there are still a ton of files on Rommel and several other german generals locked away In England and might not all be released until Churchill's 100 year cassification stamp on the documents is up. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ech1969 (talk • contribs) 03:52, 1 March 2013 (UTC)

Well then we should consider changing the lead from "was linked to the conspiracy" to "was a part of the conspiracy", and do a re-write of the section on the July 20 Plot. But let us see if we can source things well. That last clip states essentially:

Gisevius said that Rommel participated in the July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life, "but it is incorrect to picture Rommel as a fighter against Hitler. It left a bad taste when this Johnny-come-lately came along with his suggestion that we kill not only Hitler, but Himmler and Goering too." And when Goering heard this testimony, he laughed broadly.

Hmmm. The quoted sentences seem to be in conflict, plus the testimony was most certainly in German, so the phrase Johnny-come-lately seems unlikely. By the way, the suggestion to kill Himmler and Goering at the same time makes sense. Those are the heads of the Nazi Party, and if the Army is to take over you've got to take all of them out. If that was Rommel's thought it was a good one. Gunbirddriver (talk) 17:34, 1 March 2013 (UTC)

I still haven't seen anything that goes toward "proof" that Rommel wanted to "kill" anyone. It is hear-say and any comments by ex-nazi/Wehrmacht officers about what Rommel might have said or not begs the question of their veracity and/or CYA. Remember Rommel was a man to keep his own council. No I don't think there is any evidence Rommel was in fact part of the conspiracy other than having knowledge of it's existence. So making him "part of the conspiracy" is going too far. Beyond the obvious political leaders like Himmler and Goering, I would have thought that the entire staff of OKW were on a list for arrest, toadies like Keitel and Jodl couldn't be left out. It would have to be a huge list, you can't kill everyone!

Despite it being a "popular" biography, don't forget about Desmond Young's book. He actually TALKED to all the people involved, he held documents in his hand which is more than irving, et al could say.Hesweeney (talk) 03:53, 2 March 2013 (UTC)

Alright then. No change for now. We can look into it further as time allows. As to Young's biography, that looks to be a very good source. I have been reading Rommel As Military Commander by Ronald Lewin, and he refers to Young's biography of Rommel frequently. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:33, 2 March 2013 (UTC)

Hesweeney of course the German military sources after the war had reasons to lie, especially during the Cold War. But, its interesting how the two sources with the least reason to lie were stricken from the history books on him during the Cold War. That was of course the transcript from the Nuremberg trial (and yes the English version of the transcript was turned into Americanized words for the American readers at the time I couldn't find the words in German). But, even he had some potental reason to lie... ie the Allies put him up to it as they liked Rommel. But, General Heinrich Eberbach who was close to Rommel in France quotes on the subject are the only quotes on Rommel's view on killing Hitler in 1944 that I see zero possible reason for him to lie about as he was talking from one German general to another in a house in England that he had no idea was bugged.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9SFwVMlMIc

And, this was a month before Rommel was offically implicated by the Nazis in the July Plot and suicided. Why did these tapes take so many decades to come out? My personal view is nations as the Cold War got started decided that Rommel would be a non-political unifying symbol to support German rearmament Rommel doing more then support overthrowing and putting him on trial once the Cold War started. Is there an objective truth? Sure there is and while I view the German general in the link above talking to another German general secretly being wiretapped a month before Rommel's death the closest we may come (unless the British documents Churchill had classified for 100 years revel alot more), then really we are stuck in a loop and there will be no 'truth' just people citing different sources who say vastly different things about the subject.

Will there ever be an agreed upon objective truth that the vast majority of historians and the public agrees upon with Rommel in relation to the July 20th Plot? Not really unless as I said before deep in the British or American archives there exist further files on the subject which there may be. Its shocking it took so many decades for the audio tapes above to come out and I can dissect every source on Rommel's involvement in the July Plot for tons of reasons to lie except that one where I have nothing. Rommel was still very much alive and it was one German general known to be close to Rommel in France talking to another about what he was directly told by Rommel quite a bit before anyone knew he would be implicated and suicided for involvement in the July Plot.

For me I have looked at all the different sources and seen what their views, opinions, and statements are on each and I can tear apart the credibility of all of them even the July Plotter brought to the Nuremberg trials, but not the audio tape made at a time when it was impossible for the General in question to know Rommel would be personally implicated in the plot and he wasn't trying to push anything or any view on the public and he wasn't speaking to the public. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ech1969 (talk • contribs) 11:06, 2 March 2013 (UTC)

Grave location?

Should the picture that shows his grave add the caption of where his grave is? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Vulix14 (talk • contribs) 05:00, 16 August 2013 (UTC)

Rommel's grave is in Herrlingen as already noted in the paragraph adjacent to the picture. Mediatech492 (talk) 05:28, 16 August 2013 (UTC)

Recent edit additions

These edits had a number of problems, including being placed inside a citation that does not support them, lacking neutral pov and being of questionable encyclopedic value to the article. When adding information you need to be careful that the addition is not placed before the citation in the text, as it would appear that the citation listed supports the addition when in fact it does not. New information should have its own citations that support the addition. Lastly, an editorial decision needs to be made as to whether or not the addition helps the article. More is not necessarily better, even if it were true and could be citated. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:03, 19 November 2013 (UTC)

Member of the NSDAP?

The last paragraph of the 'Career between the world wars' section says that Rommel was never a party member. However, the statement doesn't appear to be referenced and I can't, in my admittedly brief look, find a reputable source. Is there one? For the avoidance of doubt, I'm not trying to make a point or provoke a debate. It's simply a question about a reference for a factual statement. Dalliance (talk) 22:47, 28 November 2013 (UTC)

He was never a member of any political party that I am aware. Lewin states unequivocally that he was not a member of the Nazi party, and I have provided the citation. I also took the liberty of removing his name from the wiki list of Nazi Party members. I was surprised that he would have been found there, as his interests were in soldiering and Germany, not party politics, and his views and actions repeatedly placed him at odds with Nazi party officials. He exposed himself to significant risks on multiple occasions. In 1942 he concluded that the war could not be won for Germany, and on multiple occasions he endeavored to present the facts that would make that case clear to Hitler in the belief that he would draw the only conclusion possible and attempt to sue for terms to stop the conflict. Clearly he did not understand Hitler's mind on these matters. Politically naive is the term used in conjunction with Rommel by both Lewin and Liddell-Hart. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:52, 29 November 2013 (UTC)

Yes, I came here via that list for the same reasons you removed his entry. Thanks for adding the reference. Dalliance (talk) 08:43, 29 November 2013 (UTC)

Allied to this question is that of contemporary perception of Rommel's association with the Nazis. The London Times published an obituary (which may have been written with the aim of maintaining public morale against Germany) that, as far as I recall, stated Rommel was allied to the rise of the Nazi party and that he put down a demonstration (or was it a strike?) in Coburg in the early 1930s. At the time of publication, it was not known to the British public or government that Rommel had committed suicide under pressure from the regime, nor was he then publicly associated with the 20 July plot that had recently occurred. A look at the obituary may provide material for the Assessment section.Cloptonson (talk) 21:11, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

88 Flak Gun

"This was the first time the 88 mm Flak gun was used in an anti-tank role.[33]"

I thought the properties of this gun became evident in the Spanish Revolution? Jokem (talk) 18:11, 30 November 2013 (UTC)

Could be. The wiki page on the 88 indicates so, but the statement there is not supported with a reference. Lewin is the author in the cite quoted above, and he could be in error here. If you could find a citation supporting that the first use of the 88 in an anti-tank role was in Spain then we could support the statement made on the 88 page and it would justify our removing the citated statement here. Thanks. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:12, 30 November 2013 (UTC)

There's no citation on the 88 page for the statement it was used in a ground combat role.

Hesweeney (talk) 01:39, 1 February 2014 (UTC)

I think Guderian said the 88 was discovered in Spain to be a great AT gun in Panzer Leader. Good luck finding that as my copy of the book is buried somewhere. Maybe someone else is vigorous enough to research? Jokem (talk) 09:28, 26 January 2015 (UTC)

I found this

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/88mm-flak-series-flugabwehrkanone.htm

German 88mm gun is probably the best known artillery piece of World War II. First time 88mm saw combat was in Spain during the Civil War in 1936, where it proved itself to be not only excellent anti-aircraft gun but also ideal tank killer due to its high muzzle velocity and efficient heavy projectile. Jokem (talk) 08:19, 31 January 2015 (UTC)

Yes. The information appears good, but I am not sure the source qualifies for wikipedia. Is the source getting its information from wikipedia, or does it have it's own sources, and if so what are they? I believe we are still looking for our reliable source. Gunbirddriver (talk) 06:25, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

I know I read this somewhere stated by people with military 'gravitas', maybe it is Von Mellenthin's book. I will try to dig it up, but I am not sure how to cite a reference here that is not electronic media. Also, a statement by someone with Von Mellenthin's credentials would have enough weight to merit a citation here, right? Jokem (talk) 13:08, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

I'm not sure it would. His book is a memoir of his experiences as an officer in the German army, so it is valid for his experience but less so for details on equipment used, when and how. I will see if I can find something. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:24, 2 February 2015 (UTC)

I found the book, it starts with the Polish campaign, so that is a loss. If there is a German Officer memoir stating it was discovered to be useful in Spain, that would at least show it was noted as an effective AT gun at that point (but maybe not the first time). If you find something, OK. Jokem (talk) 00:37, 3 February 2015 (UTC)

Here is a US Military Intelligence Report from 1943: US Military Intelligence Report: German Anti-Aircraft Artillery; February 8th 1943 (page 37)

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 88-mm Dual-Purpose Gun

(1) Development

The German 8.8-cm gun was introduced in 1934 as the standard mobile AA gun. It was then known as the 8.8-cm Flak 18. In 1936, during the Spanish War, it proved a very effective weapon against tanks, which were at that time relatively lightly armored. In order to develop still further this dual-purpose employment, the Germans produced armor-piercing ammunition for the weapon, a telescopic sight suitable for the engagement of ground targets, and a more mobile carriage; an HE shell with a percussion fuse was also produced so that the weapon could, when necessary, be employed in a field-artillery role.

Gunbirddriver (talk) 09:14, 3 February 2015 (UTC)

Photo correction

Under 'Summer Standoff' referring to events of 1942, is in fact a photo from 1941 showing Rommel with Wilhelm Bach (centre in white shirt), the defender of the Halfaya Pass garrison (which fell in January 1942 after Rommel's retreat in November 1941), and his then-ADC Heinz Werner Schmidt who used this photo to illustrate his post-war memoir, 'With Rommel In The Desert'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.101.71.153 (talk) 21:43, 22 January 2014 (UTC)

Photo correction

The photo used in subheading Summer Standoff detailing events of 1942, File:Rommel at a staff conference in the Western Desert.jpg, is in fact from 1941 and shows Rommel (L) with Wilhelm Bach (Centre in white shirt) with Rommel's then-ADC Heinz Werner Schmidt (R, mapcase under arm). Bach was caprtured with the surrender of the Halfaya Pass garrison in January 1942, left stranded by Rommel's retreat in November 1941 following Operation Crusader. Schmidt used the photo as an illustration for his book, 'With Rommel In The Desert'. 77.101.71.153 (talk) 21:47, 22 January 2014 (UTC)

Neutrality dispute

I have found a lot of non-neutral language regarding the article subject, and after a cursory skim I've removed or edited statements like "Rommel possessed tremendous energy and drive," "Rommel was clearly the possessor of a great deal of physical courage" and "Rommel was manifestly a soldier's general." The article itself should be written in a dispassionate tone, and avoid stating opinions as fact. Non-neutral statements should be attributed to the appropriate sources instead of being made in Wikipedia's voice. Breadblade (talk) 20:35, 14 May 2014 (UTC)

Rommel clearly did possess "tremendous energy and drive", and there is a lot of evidence that he was a "soldier's general", if by that it is meant that he inspired admiration and loyalty in other soldiers. Of course uncited statements may be removed, but much of what you removed was clearly cited, for example the physical courage" comment, which is clearly supported by the citation [1]. You are also misrepresenting what is meant by non-neutral language. There is no policy which says the article should not include evaluate material, including assessments of such matters as skill, courage or whatever else may be relevant. Indeed we should have content. We are not just listing facts. In any case the distinction between a fact and an evaluation is never clear or straightforward - you seem to be wanting to remove what you consider to be positive comments, even though some of the (like his energy) have no moral dimension (Hitler had energy and drive too). Paul B (talk) 20:27, 16 May 2014 (UTC)

I am saying that such details should be attributed appropriately as per WP:SUBSTANTIATE, by making factual statements about these opinions. A phrase like "Rommel's leadership skills have been praised by military historians such as ___ and ___" is written from a neutral point of view, but "Rommel was a strong and effect leader" is not. Breadblade (talk) 21:30, 16 May 2014 (UTC)

I agree with Paul B: there is nothing wrong with evaluating the subject and presenting judgements which are properly cited and uncontroversial. If there were cited contrary opinions, saying that Rommel was a lazy coward, for instance, then WP:NPOV would be engaged. The tone used should be encyclopaedic, however, and of the words Breadblade objected to, i think "soldier's general" deserves looking at as more laudatory than descriptive. Cyclopaedic (talk) 08:37, 17 May 2014 (UTC)

The article should have a dispassionate voice, certainly. Some of the apparent problems are statements that are broadly commented on by military historians and are also found in the commentarys of those he commanded. For instance, Rommel's physical courage is mentioned by Young (p.116) and Lewin (p. 242). Said Hoffman: "Rommel earned his reputation by the bravura nature of his fighting." (p. 119) In Liddell Hart's "The German Generals Talk" Runstedt is quoted commenting on Rommel, saying: Quote: "He was a brave man, and a very capable commander..."(p. 234)

Others that had direct knowledge of Rommel in the war include von Mellenthin and von Luck. In their case they remark on the impression Rommel's physical courage had on his men, and they are speaking as those very men he commanded. Said von Luck on the Meuse crossing: Quote: "Rommel was slightly wounded but hurried forward on foot - in the midst of enemy fire. 'Is Rommel immune?' we asked ourselves. It made a strong impression on all the officers and men; his courage spurned us on." (p.38) Said von Mellenthin: Quote: "What I admired most were his courage and resourcefulness."(p.48) Thus, it would seem to me inappropriate for wikipedia to make a statement such as "Rommel has been praised by military historians such as ___ and ___ as being the possessor of a great deal of physical courage" as the qualifier is too limiting and argues against the record.

Nevertheless, the article is improved if we go through and cite things better, and endeavor to present a neutral voice. Gunbirddriver (talk) 19:49, 18 May 2014 (UTC)

Agreed, my "military historians" example wasn't great considering that there is so much commentary from his contemporaries to draw from. I don't doubt the veracity of these accounts at all, but it would do a lot to fix the POV issues to move from statements like "Rommel was clearly brave [relevant citation]" to "Accounts from soldiers under his command made note of his bravery under fire. [relevant citation]" Breadblade (talk) 14:46, 20 May 2014 (UTC)

Sounds good. Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:31, 20 May 2014 (UTC)

Sometimes an overly "neutral" voice guts the reality of a subject. Clearly Rommel was well beyond the ordinary officer on either side in both World Wars and this Bio should reflect that amalgam of skill, bravery, dash, commonsense and "leadership." Removing comments by his contemporaries that have citations is wrong.

Hesweeney (talk) 19:35, 19 August 2014 (UTC)

ideology/humanitarianism

"During Rommel's time in France, Hitler ordered him to deport the country's Jewish population; Rommel disobeyed. Several times he wrote letters protesting against the treatment of the Jews."

I can't believe that this is the sum total of the available knowledge in this area. I think it needs expanding, certainly with citations, but in any case it goes directly to what motivated him, & we're left with a chasm in our understanding of the man if this area is not properly dealt with.

duncanrmi (talk) 10:39, 14 October 2014 (UTC)

Early life and career

Manfred Rommel

Details about the late life of son Manfred being well outside the scope of Erwin Rommel's "Early Life", I moved that text into a parenthetical paragraph at the end of this section. As this information is already provided, and more relevant, on Manfred's own Wikipedia page, I suggest that it simply be deleted from here.

Zulu Kane (talk) 00:37, 3 April 2015 (UTC)

North Africa Campaign - Rommel's last meeting with Hitler - ambiguity

The article states that:

On 9 March he returned to Germany in an effort to get Hitler to comprehend the reality of the changing situation.

It is not clear to me as a "naive reader" whether Rommel was once again trying to inform Hitler that an overall victory was impossible, or was there to argue for evacuation of the remaining German (and Italian) forces, or to try to get significant reiforcement. I suspect it is for one of the first two options, or something like them, but to someone who is unfamiliar with the North Afrrica campaign or WWII, it is not clear what is meant by "the reality of the changing situation" other than Rommel was loosing battles and in retreat. Ileanadu (talk) 00:55, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

The position was untenable, and Rommel knew it. Since his victory at the Battle of Gazala the Afrika Korps had been deprived of supplies, outnumbered, constantly harrassed from the air, and had lost the mobility and strength to contend with the British, let alone the Americans now advancing from French Morroco toward Tunisia. Rommel thought the best thing to do was extract as much of the Afrika Korps as possible, thereby saving experienced personnel for the next battle, which would be for the South of France or perhaps Italy. The idea of just letting them all be lost there seemed inconceivable to him, and he thought that Hitler would realize this if Hitler could be separated from the sway of the officers advising him from the security of the Wolf's Lair, who were not fighting the war at the front and did not understand what was happening. In truth it was Hitler that thought the Afrika Korps should fight and die where it was, and who could not understand the advantages of preserving the strength to fight another day. Hitler had the same attitude to his forces threatened with encirclement and destruction in the East, and later in Northern France. Rommel felt it was his duty as a soldier to tell Hitler the bald truth of the situation. To his surprise and disgust Hitler was completely unwilling to listen to him, and shouted that it was cowardice speaking, and defeatism. The OKW felt that they could tie up significant Allied resources in a prolonged operation against the Axis defenders in Tunisia, which is what Hitler intended. The course of events proved that the forces there could not be supplied, could not maneuver and could do nothing but surrender, which the survivors ultimately did, as Rommel well knew would be their only option. Gunbirddriver (talk) 22:53, 17 May 2015 (UTC)

The Myth of Rommel - a reevaluation may be in order?

I think it's about time we dented the "myth" of the great Rommel, a myth largely created by his adversaries, the British themselves in order that they wouldn't have to own up to defeats by the Italians. I know how deeply entrenched the Myth of Rommel is in the historiography of the North African campaign and the popular psyche, but we do a disservice to our readers if some aspects of the great "Rommel Myth" remains unchallenged. I'd like to cite Dr Sadkovich and a couple of others, who have a somewhat divergent view of the man and his abilities as a commander. 86.26.26.107 (talk) 20:23, 29 June 2015 (UTC)

People have been critical of Rommel since the 1930s. He was a very energetic, aggressive, insightful commander who fought on the wrong side of the war. The Italian command disapproved of him, his subordinates at times disapproved of him, the German General Staff disapproved of him. I believe it is already in the article. And yet he is taught today at the Army`s Command and General Staff College in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, among others. Things can be added, of course, but wikipedia would want the additions to be useful in gaining an insight into the subject. Gunbirddriver (talk) 02:31, 30 June 2015 (UTC)

Rommel's view of the SS

Rommel had very strong views on correct behavior on the part of soldiers in war. Among these were sparing the lives of men when possible, both his and the enemies, and the decent treatment of prisoners taken in combat. He felt both sides should abide by a soldier's code. He could appreciate the willingness of the SS to fight stubbornly, but felt they accepted casualties too readily. More importantly, he was aware that they often shot captured soldiers and did other acts to civilians that infuriated Rommel. He believed such actions were vile and far from the professional actions that he believed was the tradition of German arms. An example of his belief in a German soldier following a soldier's code was his burning of Hitler's "Commando Order", which he felt was against the laws of war. This type of action very well could have resulted in his being court-martialed, or shot. It was a chance he took, and he might not have escaped punishment for disregarding it if his command had not been away in Africa. The clearest example of his willingness to challenge the SS was his protest of the 2nd SS Panzer division Das Reich, which in an act of retribution had massacred the citizens of the French town of Oradour-sur-Glane. At his meeting with Hitler at Margival 17 June 1944 Rommel asked to be allowed to punish the division. Wehrmacht officers did not have authority over SS units, and asking to be allowed to punish the SS was a dangerous action for him to take. Hitler told Rommel the actions of Das Reich were none of his business, but Hitler took no further action against him.(Lewin p=225) Rommel's refusal to allow his son to join the SS was over his fear that Manfred would be forced to partake in atrocities, and he did not want his son placed in a position where refusing to do so would cost him his life, as the reference and quote provided indicate. Gunbirddriver (talk) 00:08, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

I will watch for more content on this as I work my way through the sources. (not all books are well indexed) -- Diannaa (talk) 02:26, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

Very good. I will be interested in what you might find. As a German general who had a personal relationship with Hitler, many assume he was a Nazi, but this was not the case. However, what survives of his writings is unlikely to state clearly and unequivocally what he thought of the SS. Germany had become a police state, and though politically naïve he was not an imperceptive man. Though a capable and prolific writer, large sections of his writings he destroyed, such as those that recorded the events around the Battles of El Alamein. Here he had been critical of the German leadership, and he later perceived that what he had wrote down was a risk to himself and his family, so he destroyed them. In "The Rommel Papers" these sections are filled in by Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel's Chief of Staff at the time. Still, his conflict with the Hitler Youth leadership, his row with Goebbels and "Das Reich" over the phony history the propaganda ministry wrote of him portraying him as a Nazi poster-child published in the newspaper "Das Reich", his well known standards of behavior he imposed upon the Afrika Korps in contrast to the well known actions of the SS, his willingness to punish 2nd SS Panzer and most significantly his curt refusal to allow Manfred to join the Waffen-SS I believe allow us to know his mind on the matter. I will look around a bit more as well. Gunbirddriver (talk) 18:11, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

Rommel did not seem to want to spare lives when attacking Tobruk. A TV documentary states that he scolded an officer for not continuing attacking after losing half the force (officer replied "over my dead body"). That documentary also shows Manfred saying that Erwin opposed Hitler due to Nazi concentration camps (knowledge from Strölin), but I could not find sources for that. TGCP (talk) 15:36, 2 November 2015 (UTC)

Role of intelligence intercepts in North Africa

I copied the erased content to Role of intelligence intercepts in North Africa, as it seems quite notable as an element in Rommel's success. TGCP (talk) 15:36, 2 November 2015 (UTC) deleting; text is better at North_African_Campaign#Axis TGCP (talk) 15:49, 2 November 2015 (UTC)

Primary sources

Books by Friedrich von Mellenthin, von Luck and Rommel himself are being used extensively in the article. These are WP:Primary sources and should be used with caution. Further, Mellenthin's works have been described as "uncritical studies" by the historian Wolfram Wette. The historians Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies classify Luck's and Mellenthin's works belonging to the "exculpatory memoir" genre in The Myth of the Eastern Front (see in the Google preview). I've found them potentially unreliable for the following statements:

• Once the bridge was functional, [Rommel] was in the second tank across.

  Across early, certainly. The point is forward control of the attacking force. A number of secondary sources do state this. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• [Rommel] was not open to objections to his plans, and he did not tolerate incompetence. -- This is cited to Rommel himself?

• General Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel's chief of staff through much of the campaign, noted that risks taken were made only after carefully weighing the potential dangers and rewards. -- Also cited to Rommel. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  The citation is not formated correctly. I believe it is from a note made by Liddell Hart who edited the work. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• Aggressive subordinate commanders, such as Hans von Luck, praised his leadership from the front. -- Luck describes himself as "aggressive commander", besides heaping praise on Rommel.

• The Afrika Korps was never accused of any war crimes; indeed, during the desert campaign, interactions between German and British troops encountering each other between battles were sometimes openly friendly. -- "openly friendly" is dubious, unless can be confirmed by reliable secondary sources. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  I believe that is Young's statement. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• The German attack, which began with only 100 operational tanks remaining,

• Although [the British] were almost as exhausted and disorganised as Rommel's force, -- how would Mellenthin know that the British were disorganized? K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  How would anyone know? In his book he cites a number of works on the battles of North Africa written by British officers. He also lived in South Africa after the war, and personally knew a number of Eighth Army veterans from South Africa. The fact that Eighth Army was badly disorganized following the Gazala battles is widely acknowledged (Jackson, Playfair), if that is what this comment is referring to.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• [Rommel] strongly argued that the Panzerarmee should advance into Egypt and drive on Alexandria and the Suez. -- Can this be independently confirmed? K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  Yes.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• When asked what he thought of James Mason's portrayal in the film The Desert Fox, von Mellenthin smiled before replying "Altogether too polite". Here, Mellenthin is reporting on himself. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  He is commenting on his impression of Rommel, and contrasting it with the manner in which James Mason portrayed him.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• Friedrich von Mellenthin, who was a key aide on Rommel's staff during the Africa campaign, wrote that Rommel was willing to take chances, sometimes gambling an entire battle on a decision made at the point of contact. Rommel first displayed this type of initiative during the First World War as a junior officer in Belgium and later in the mountains of northern Italy. There he found a sudden, bold, decisive move could reap large dividends. This was reinforced by Rommel's experiences at the head of the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France in 1940, where it was clear that his presence at the forefront of the battle was instrumental in creating successful outcomes. But at times in North Africa his absence from a position of communication made command of the battles of the Afrika Korps very difficult. Rommel's counterattack during Operation Crusader is one such instance. -- The discussion should include a few "According to Mellenthin,..." throughout the para to make clear that this is Mellenthin's opinion, rather than a statement of fact. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  Agree.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

• Long absences from contact with headquarters meant that at times subordinate commanders had to make decisions without first consulting Rommel. Even when Rommel was present at headquarters, his impatient personality made it difficult for his subordinates—and sometimes his superiors—to work with him. -- Should be presented as Mellenthin's opinion.K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

  Agree.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

References

Any thoughts on this? K.e.coffman (talk) 04:39, 3 February 2016 (UTC)

I am answering off the top of my head, but these things can be looked into and fixed. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

It appears there are no objections, so I will proceed with the edit where applicable this weekend. Per WP:MILMOS, it's recommended that articles on military history be cited to secondary WP:RS sources by reputable historians. Rommel, Mellenthin and Luck fail the test. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:35, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

Primary sources can and are used, they are just not preferred. Secondary sources are subject to bias as well, as I pointed out elsewhere. Butler is fine, but there are a number of factual errors in his work (for example, he mistakes the Mareth position, which Rommel did not want to defend, with the Gabes position, which he did). Still can be useful though. We'll get it right. It's a process. I am happy to work on it with you.Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:24, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

I have been working my way slowly through the article replacing the citations and updating the content using the new book by Butler along with a couple of other books, and intend to get more done on the long weekend (February 12 to 15). I got to El Alamein, will be resuming somewhere around "End of Africa campaign". I agree totally that primary sources should be used sparingly if at all. Your proposed edits look good, no objections from me. — Diannaa (talk) 20:23, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

Excellent, thank you both. I was not aware that Diannaa was working on a rewrite -- this is good to hear. It will be welcome. I went ahead and did my edits, so any improvements / revisions to that are welcome. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:35, 6 February 2016 (UTC)

Secondary sources

As I went through the portions of the article, I noticed that passages attributed to Lewin could be somewhat biased, bordering on wp:peacock, as in:

• Rommel is regarded as having been a humane and professional officer.
• Rommel led by example. In 1933 when he became commander of a Hanoverian. He felt a commander should be physically more robust than the troops he led, and should always show them an example.
• Rommel understood and accepted that with war would come casualties, but he was not one to accept the unnecessary loss of life. "Germany will need men after the war as well" was a comment he frequently made.
• In terms of making tactical decisions quickly, he believed the commander needed to be at the crucial place at the crucial time.
• To succeed he had to accept risks that commanders like Montgomery were never forced to take.

Etc.

I came across this chapter by Alaric Searle in Rommel: A Reappraisal (Ian F. Beckett. ed.), where he refers to "effusive and often uncritical biographies, extolling the virtues of Rommel as commander and master of maneuver" (p. 7), but missing the larger point of Rommel's service to the regime and his myopic views of Germany's strategic situation. Searle offers example of such biographies (p. 26, note 1):

• Ronald Lewin: Rommel as Military Commander
• David Irving: On the Tail of the Fox (I believe it's already been purged from the article)
• David Fraser: Knight's Cross : A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

Further, passages attributed to Liddell Hart sound quite effusive as well. I don't have a critique of his work as related to Rommel, but Smelser & Davies in The Myth of the Eastern Front discuss him offering a '"lauditory foreword'" to Mainstein's memoirs Lost Victories. This sounds similar to what he is offering here:

• Quote from Liddell Hart in his intro: Awe for his dynamic generalship developed into an almost affectionate admiration for him as a man...
• He is regarded as one of the most skilled commanders of desert warfare in the conflict.
• Said B. H. Liddell Hart, the Blitzkrieg method could not be better epitomised in a single sentence.|group=N}}
• A major aspect of his success was his grasp of the psychological shock such attacks had upon the morale and fighting spirit of the enemy forces.

Etc.

References

I would suggest that these sources be minimized if possible, especially as they related to Rommel's character, leadership abilities and "humanitarianism". Hope this is helpful! K.e.coffman (talk) 02:45, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

I have to say I do not find this helpful. "The Myth of the Eastern Front" by Smelser & Davies should not drive the editing of an article. I have not been impressed by what I have read. It strikes me as highly biased in its own right. It gets 2 1/2 stars at Amazon. Some of the review comments:

While the first five chapters of "The Myth of the Eastern Front" are in general soundly and fairly dispassionately presented, the next three chapters are far from dispassionate or unvested. The authors lose much if not all of their objectiveness and in their presentation of this portion of the book so overstate issues as to make a parody of their own thesis.

And now you propose we dispense with secondary sources? Because they are "effusive and often uncritical"? Have you read Desmond Young? Jackson? They look at the war from a British point of view. Would Lewin's works on Ciphers, Wavell or Montgomery also be suspect of the same sort of distortions? People like Brigadier Desmond Young, Ronald Lewin and William Jackson were officers of the British Army that fought against the Germans in North Africa and elsewhere. They did not come under some sort of spell. What's more, Erwin Rommel was not a Nazi. Thus he is an absurd target for the opinions of Smelser & Davies. It's nonsense. Gunbirddriver (talk) 10:56, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

The section "Rommel's style as military commander" is far too long (1988 words) and needs to be trimmed substantially. I think most of the POV stuff is in that section? This is the sort of content that will have to be removed. Many of the notes need to be removed as well. I have Fraser here and it seems okay as far as basic facts - there's nothing in it so far that's contradicted in the other three books I have on hand for the re-write. My plan was to nominate for Good Article, at which point I need to be able to vouch for and defend every statement in the article, so I am not keen to leave material in unless I can confirm it using books I have on hand. Everything I've updated so far has been checked in this manner, from early life through El Alamein, so any content cited to Lewin up to that point also appears in at least one of the other sources I have here (Butler, Fraser, Douglas-Home, and Hoffmann). — Diannaa (talk) 05:37, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

Thank you both for your comments. Yes, most of the "effusive" language comes from Lewin and Liddell Hart, and primarily in the Leadership/Character sections, as well as in the lead. Fraser did not raise any issues for me as I was scanning the article. In Lewin's case, he's citing Mellenthin in one instance ("Said staff officer Friedrich von Mellenthin: "The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them...") and Liddell Hart in another ("Said B. H. Liddell Hart, the Blitzkrieg method could not be better epitomised in a single sentence.") -- I think these tertiary references should go.

On The Myth of the Eastern Front, I personally enjoyed reading this book. It was the first source I came across that answered the question for me "why do I feel like I've entered a parallel universe when I'm reading WWII wikipedia, specifically the Waffen-SS/Wehrmacht personnel and unit articles?" For example, such language as a Wehrmacht general being praised for his humanitarianism; "the consummate SS man"; and Manstein disobeying the Commissar order, along with a Waffen-SS general who disapproves of it. The examples are too numerous to list here; I've been keeping a tally on my user page, if you are interested: Dubious unsourced claims and non-NPOV language and Alternate History Department.

I was so overwhelmed by the volume of these examples, that I felt compelled to research post-war Waffen-SS revisionism and rewrite the article on HIAG, the Waffen-SS lobby group in the 1950-1990s.

After The Myth of the Eastern Front, I've read other sources that support Smelser and Davies's findings:

• Citino, Robert M. (2012). The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1826-2.
• Wette, Wolfram (2007). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674025776. (see my discussion with another editor on Mellenthin's talk page re Citino & Wette)
• Alaric Searle in Rommel: A Reappraisal (the language on "effusive" and "uncritical" in ref to Lewin & al. comes from Searle, not from Smelser & Davies)
• MacKenzie, S.P. (1997). Revolutionary Armies in the Modern Era: A Revisionist Approach. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-09690-4.
• Kienle, Polly (2005). "Still Fighting for the Myth: German Wehrmacht Officers' Reports for the U.S. Historical Division". H-net.com. {{cite web}}: |archive-date= requires |archive-url= (help)

The latter article references a German-language work by Bernd Wegner that defines the post-war efforts by former generals as "erschriebene Siege"--"victories through writing". The works by Citino, Wette, MacKenzie and Wegner highlight how such writing impacted the post-war Western historiography to create a "mystification" of the German officer corps.

So yes, my BS antennas come up when I see a section named "Humanitarianism". Definition of a humanitarian is "a person promoting human welfare and social reform"; I don't think that applies to a general whether he's American, British or German.

In any case, Diannaa appears to be taking care of that, so I just wanted to raise my concerns. I do believe that a critical attitude to WWII sources written in the first couple of decades after the war may be in order, as much of the WWI historiography has been reevaluated in the recent decades. K.e.coffman (talk) 20:29, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

Well, we are not speaking of all German officers. We are speaking here of Rommel. Everyone loves a revisionist. You seem very uncritical of the critics. In the passage of Searle you link to he argues Rommel does not deserve credit because he was not at his headquarters when the D-Day invasion occurred, thus he could not move his forces forward when the invasion occurred. Does he know why Rommel was not there? He went to argue with Hitler over the necessity to move the mobile formations forward into the Normandy area. He could not move them forward without Hitler's permission. Why does Searle not make that point clear in his criticism? Seems pertinent. It's a rather dishonest criticism, and answering these is a bit like chasing your tail.

Still you have not answered the question. Why did British officers who fought in the war or led the war write about Rommel in a favorable light? This would include Wavell, Auchenlick, Alexander and Winston Churchill, for heaven's sake. According to the theory we are to accept from Smelser and Davies it is because they feared the Soviet Union, unnecessarily apparently, and had their heads turned by German officers who were dishonest in their recollections. They go on to argue that all German soldiers should be looked at critically because Hitler ran an evil regime. They are all to be held accountable. A communal guilt. It's a rather presumptive view which I do not agree with. As to the British officers mentioned above, the comments from them all came either during the war or immediately after. No time to befriend the defeated Germans. How does that work in terms of the Smelser and Davies theory, exactly? Gunbirddriver (talk) 01:12, 8 February 2016 (UTC)

I got the Rommel Reconsidered by Searle & al. (that's how it was issued in the U.S.); it provide interesting insights regarding the "Rommel myth", as "the necessary image manufactured to serve the German rearmament" (Searle, p. 9) and driven by "different agencies [that] adopted Rommel for their own ends". (Connelly, p. 157) The question "why the British had such a positive attitude towards Rommel" is addressed as follows:

• Rommel had already achieved fame in the U.S. and Britain even during the war, with "the press repeatedly pointing out [Rommel's] great, quasi-mythical strength", so turning him into an icon was not difficult. (Connelly, p. 158)

• The 1950s German rearmament was highly dependent on the image boosting that the former Wehrmacht generals needed. Journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart was one of the first proponents of these two interconnected initiatives. In his 1948 book on Hitler's generals, he devoted a chapter to Rommel, portraying him as an outsider to the Nazi regime. Additions published in 1951 show that Liddell Hard played his role in the creation of the Rommel myth, concluding by: "... his gifts and performance ... qualified him for a place in the role of the 'Great Captains' of history" (Searle, pp. 8, 27)

• "The Rommel myth came to be cemented through the mutual self-interest and cooperation between former German generals and the British," writes Searle. One of the results of this was the 1950 biography by Desmond Young, who collaborated with Hans Speidel among others, with Liddell Hart also supporting the project. Speidel had already written in 1946 that he planned to turn Rommel into "the hero of the German people", for which Rommel was a suitable candidate since his forced suicide lead to the assumption that he had not been a supporter of Nazism. Young subscribed to this "generous view", subtly conveying that Rommel served the regime, but was not part of it. (Searle, p. 9)

• However, even the "Rommel apologists" were faced with a challenge of explaining away Rommel's duties as a liaison between the Wehrmacht and the 'Hitler Youth in 1937. Young described Rommel's involvement in strictly military terms and alluded to a falling out between Baldur von Schirach and Rommel, with the former supposedly referring to Rommel as "not ideologically sound enough" (per Young). The reality was different, however, with Rommel proposing a plan that would have subordinated HJ to the Wehrmacht, removing it from the NSDAP control. Schirach was outraged; he appealed to Hitler, and Rommel was quietly removed from the project. (Searle, pp. 19-20)

• Searle points out that Young's claim that Rommel was brought into close proximity to Hitler in October 1938 "for the first time" is "patently untrue", as Rommel had been seconded to Hitler's personal protection during the March 1938 Anschluss. Young simply omits this fact casting doubts on the veracity of his other accounts. (p. 21)

• Searle provides further discussion on Rommel's relationship with Hitler and the regime, noting that Rommel had not only "found favor with the Nazi regime, but also ... was delighted with the preferential treatment he was receiving". He wholly subscribed to the Nazi view of reality, writing to his wife in Oct 1939 from the devastated Warsaw: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them." (p. 24)

• Connelly discusses Liddell Hart's Rommel Papers (first published in German under a "revealing title" War Without Hate) as one of the two "crucial texst" that lead to the "Anglophone rehabilitation" and a "Rommel renaissance" (the other being Young). Both Young and Liddell Hart "set the stage for all post-war interpretations of Rommel", which consisted of three themes (1) Rommel's ambivalence about Nazism; (2) his military genius; and (3) the chivalrous nature of fighting in North Africa. This tradition included uncritical works by Sir John Squire, Ronal Lewin, David Irving, and General Sir John Hackett. For example, David Fraser described Rommel as a "Soldier without Politics" (chapter title). In contrast, German biographies, such as by Wolf Heckmann, are far less sympathetic. (p. 163-164)

• Fraser gets the nod from Connelly as the writer who "pushed furthest" "romanticising of Rommel", in "dramatic, swirling prose that encapsulates the post-1945 hagiographic approach". From Fraser: "great master of manoeuvre in war", whose personality "transcends time" and "cuts like [a] sabre through the curtains of history", etc. (almost half a page of Fraser is quoted on p. 169).

This is from a quick glance. I would recommend this book for a contemporary view on Rommel from British historians. Besides Searle and Connelly, the volume includes chapters by Niall Barr, Peter Lieb, Claus Telp and Russel A. Hart, covering campaigns in 1941 and 1942 in Africa and in 1944 in Normandy.

On the topic of The Myth of the Eastern Front, since there were concerns about its veracity, here are two reviews: one by a professional historian, and another one, surprisingly nuanced, from feldgrau.net of all places. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:49, 21 February 2016 (UTC)

Wüstenfuchs

Rommel was never known in English speaking countries as the "Wüstenfuchs", so there's zero point in including it in an article written for English speaking people. Desert Fox, yes. It would be different, of course, if we had a section in this article dedicated to Rommel's reputation in his own country. In that case, it would be appropriate to note that they called him the Wüstenfuchs at home. The bottom line is - readers are here for information about Rommel and not for a lesson in German vocabulary. Rklawton (talk) 01:31, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

I have removed it. — Diannaa (talk) 06:09, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

About the revert of my 1 Feb 2016 correction

Hello, Rklawton, could you please explain why you reverted my edit? You wrote, "Let's not provide readers with bad translations," and I went back and double checked what I wrote, and I was correct as far as I can see. If I misunderstood something, could you please explain what it is? Thanks. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 02:57, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

You mistranslated the german ranks. Furthermore, with linked ranks, it's not necessary to provide a translation. Rklawton (talk) 03:30, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Rklawton I'm sorry, but you're still being vague. Could you please be specific, with something like, "When you translated 'xxxxxx' as 'yyyyyy' it was incorrect, because of 'zzzzzz'". That would probably clear up the confusion. Thanks. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 04:53, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Just check out the article's edit history and compare revisions. Level up! Rklawton (talk) 12:54, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Oh, for Pete's sake. Are you deliberately being obstinate? Can't you answer a simple question with a simple answer? And since this may be an extended round of 20 Questions, are you in fact competent to question another person's edit on this subject? I'm beginning to think you aren't. (By the way, what does "Level Up!" mean?) __209.179.86.123 (talk) 17:25, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

I realize I'm being less helpful than you would like. However, you are putting less effort into this than I would like, so it's a wash. Go see what changed via the article's edit history, read my comments and edit summaries, and figure it out. If you aren't willing to put that much effort into this, then you should probably find something else to do with your time. Rklawton (talk) 17:48, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Well all right then. I guess a better use of my time will be to seek Dispute Resolution since you clearly are not willing to cooperate in a meaningful way. Is that what you want? By the way, this is not a wash, as YOU, as the person challenging the veracity of another person's edit, are responsible for justifying YOUR action by providing an explanation of YOUR actions. (It funny you didn't know that already. Maybe you just forgot?) I honestly don't understand your behavior on this matter. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 19:15, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

I did explain it, and my explanation was quite clear. Rklawton (talk) 19:19, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

Your "explanation" was anything but. It's like a teacher who gives an essay back to a student and simply says, "you put a comma in the wrong place," without any explanation as to where. The way we keep going around in circles reminds me of that movie Groundhog Day, where everything seems to keep happening again and again. Say, when is Groundhog Day? Whatever. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 21:15, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

My interpretation of the revert is that the German and American/English(?) ranks added are not exactly equivalent and it is better to have the reader click the link to the German rank to understand the subtleties. But that's just me. --John (User:Jwy/talk) 22:50, 2 February 2016 (UTC)

- - - -

Hello, Rklawton, I thought I'd try one more time to get you to explain specifically what you believe was wrong about my corrections. Thanks in advance. __209.179.86.123 (talk) 21:47, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

I agree that there should not be translations, so the revert is OK. The reason why the ranks should not be translated is obvious from the edit you made, you changed one rank to "General der Panzertruppe", which is obviously not translated. It's simply so that not all ranks can be translated, so it's better not to translate them. --OpenFuture (talk) 08:19, 19 February 2016 (UTC)

Crossing of Meuse and Mersa Matruh

It is not clear to me why are we interested in mentioning Guderian when speaking of 7th Panzer's crossing of the Meuse. 7th Panzer was on the right shoulder of the drive. Guderian was south at Sedan. Between the two was Reinhardt's XXXXI Army Corps, which also crossed. It seems to me we would be better off describing 7th Panzer's role in the plan and how Rommel handled it, and leave Guderian to the main article on the Battle of France.

Also, the notes on the Battle of Mersa Matruh mentioned in the article are factually in error. Butler should not be used as a source here because his brief description on pp 343-344 is not correct. For example, though Butler states the 2nd New Zealand and 50th British Infantry were nearly cut off, in fact both were, in different locals. 2nd New Zealand was on the upper escarpment and its retreat was blocked when 21st Panzer got to the east of them. 50th British Infantry was cut off when 90th Light reached the coast road. Also Butler asserts the wounded killed by 2nd New Zealand were in an aide station that happened to be in their path. 2nd New Zealnd went right through 21st Panzer's line, and did not go through an aide station. Clifton's explanation to Rommel, as retold by Desmond Young who knew him and asked him about it, does not ascribe the killing to an unrecognized aide station. The wounded killed were grenadiers of 21st Panzer who were unable to get up and show their hands, so they were killed where they lay. Rommel did except the explanation, and no like order was issued to DAK regarding the Kiwis, which would have been the result if Clifton's explanation did not answer. Also the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was not cut off and destroyed in Matruh, but was destroyed at Fuka, the town where the British were to regroup at 47 miles to the east. Read Jackson pp. 238-244, Mellenthin pp. 122-129, or Playfair pp. 284-295. All three are in agreement on the facts, and go into quite a bit greater detail than Butler does. My preference would be that the events would be presented correctly. Rommel's own writings are interesting, but Liddell Hart's notes are needed to straighten out the story, as Rommel's intel was not correct and thus his description was off. I don't want to go back and forth in editing the article. Please look into the other sources listed above. Playfair will not steer you wrong here. Thanks. Gunbirddriver (talk) 23:44, 7 February 2016 (UTC)

One problem is that the material that I removed with this diff is sourced entirely to von Mellenthin, which has been challenged by K.e.coffman as not being a reliable source. There's no book by Jackson in the bibliography so I am not sure which book you are referring to. I don't have Playfair and it's not available for inter-library loan, no Alberta libraries possess a copy. Your edit changed the wording from "The 2nd New Zealand Division and 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division were almost caught, with 50th Division fleeing on the 27th and 2nd Division escaping after a short engagement during the pre-dawn hours of 28 June" to "the Afrika Korps was able to get behind both of the two British Corps fighting there and blocked their retreat eastward, however it was too weak following hte Gazala battles to prevent them from braking out". I don't agree that your version is better, as it is in my opinion not any more correct that saying they were "almost caught" (my version) or "temporarily cut off" (Butler's wording). They weren't corps, they were divisions, and there's no reason not to name them. Butler does not give a precise location for the loss of 29th Indian. — Diannaa (talk) 20:39, 10 February 2016 (UTC)

I sourced it to Rommel and von Mellenthin, but the point is the description von Mellenthin writes in 1956 matches Jackson and Playfair very well. Multiple sources, all researched and edited, written from different sides of the conflict and stating the same thing: seems reliable. Playfair by himelf is considered a reliable source. In that case I think one would ask for further sourcing rather than delete it. As to corps and divisions, Rommel was attempting to destroy the infantry formations of the Eighth Army, thus he wanted to encircle, destroy or capture as much as he could. He was thinking he was trapping four infantry divisions in Mersa Matruh. In fact X Corps was in Mersa Matruh (10th Indian Infantry Division and 50th Northumbrian Infantry Division). XIII Corps was to the south of Mersa Matruh above the upper escarpement (5th Indian Infantry Division (29th Brigade), 1st Armoured Division and 2nd New Zealand Division). Gott became uneasy when 21st Panzer got to the east of 2nd New Zealand and scattered it's transport. Thus he elected to withdraw. 1st Armoured moved south into the desert, but 2nd New Zealand was missing much of its transport and the division commander elected to fight their way through. Meanwhile, X Corps's commander (Holmes) did not get notification of XIII Corps' withdrawal until early the next morning, thus X Corps was left on its own in the Mersa Matruh garrison. This was a near disaster for 8th Army, and looked to be a repeat of Tobruk ten days before. In the end more than half of X Corps did get out (Holmes estimated 60% of his corps made it back), but they lost a division's worth of equipment, a great deal of supplies, and some 8,000 men. In my view, "almost caught" doesn't quite catch what happened.

As to Butler's comments on the 29th Indian Brigade, he states "the Germans were now sitting astride the coast road and blocking the retreat of X Corps, composed now of brigade groups from four different divisions.(that is a false statement, btw) Auchenlick ordered the corps to follow 2nd New Zealand Division's example and force a way through the Germans, but the brigade movements were poorly coordinated, leading to the 29th (Indian) Infantry Brigade being nearly destroyed, losing more than 6,000 troops and 40 tanks." The 6,000 troops captured at Mersa Matruh were from the 10th Indian Division which was in Mersa Matruh. 29th Brigade was a part of XIII Corps and was on the upper escarpment until they withdrew on the night of the 27th/28th, reaching Fuka on the afternoon of the 28th. 21st Panzer showed up shortly thereafter. Despite measures taken to keep the transport close, 29th Indian Brigade was unable to get away and the brigade was lost there in Fuka on the 28th. X Corps left Mersa Matruh on the night of July 28/29. Thus when X Corps attempted to break out of Mersa Matruh the 29th Brigade had already been lost, some 50 miles to the east of Mersa Matruh.

It is not clear to me what K.e.coffman was looking at this article for, but if you have to ask if it can be sourced that Rommel argued to forgo the invasion of Malta and press on to Egypt you are not familiar with the subject. That is the key decision that most historians focus on to question whether or not Rommel had a good handle on overall strategy, and those arguing against concede that he was a great tactician but a poor strategist. Thus, everyone writing on Rommel comes to this decision point, mark Rommel's role in it and make a defense or attack, depending on their opinion. If then you are that unfamiliar with the subject as to not know this it makes me wonder what interest one has in editing the article. Reading about the subject is something I believe one should consider doing prior to offering edits on a page.

Playfair wrote the Official British History of the war through the end of the campaigns in the Mediterranean, and is a primary source for many of the articles on the Western Desert Campaign. I could write the same paragraph and source it entirely to Playfair, or Jackson, if need be. We should describe it correctly though. As to von Mellenthin, he did not write an autobiography, but a study in the use of armour in WWII. He used works written by Commonwealth authors to source his statements on the Allies, in addition to using notes from the German officers and units involved. It is a clear read, and is reliable, as much as Jackson or Playfair are, and it is more accurate than Butler and many others that I have read.Gunbirddriver (talk) 05:14, 11 February 2016 (UTC)

I am confused as to why Playfair is such a definitive source on Rommel that you have not seen fit to use it as a source for this article in your over five years and 400 edits to the page, until you added it as a citation in January 2016. I still don't know who Jackson is or what book you might be talking about, as there's no such source used in the article at present either. Posting a bunch of unsourced material on the talk page and saying in effect "Go read Playfair if you don't believe me" is not a very helpful approach when I have already said I don't have access to that book. I haven't found anything in Butler that is contradicted by the other sources I have on hand, so I respectfully disagree that it's not a reliable source. — Diannaa (talk) 21:24, 11 February 2016 (UTC)

I did not use Playfair five years ago because at that time I had not yet read it. Playfair is not a definitive source on Rommel. He does, however, give a detailed presentation of British efforts and what the British command were thinking during the battles for North Africa. I purchased a copy maybe a year ago because another editor was using it and I wanted to check out what they were reading. It is not my cup of tea, but it is very detailed on the British efforts to win the war.

If the argument is that we cannot rely on sources such as Rommel's writings or the writings of other German officers because of a tendency to write a narrative favorable to themselves and a tendency to white-wash the Nazi party, then the easy counter is to include British sources such as Playfair's contributions to the Official British History, or other sources such as Sir William Jackson's The Battle for North Africa, 1940–43 (1975) or Ronald Lewin's Rommel As Military Commander (1968). These are British officers, not German, are reliable sources, and they give a consistent and clear presentation of the events.

You do not have to have the same sources as I do, editors will have different sources, but if I have access to reliable sources that contradict a cited source, then we should attempt to resolve the issue. If multiple sources report events one way and a number of others are vague on the issue or are found to be in error elsewhere, then we should use the best sources available.

Butler writes an interesting narrative, but from time to time he makes some significant errors, errors which in my mind place other things from his work into question. For example, on page 241 he tells us that Halder was the Chief of Staff of OKW. He was not. He was Chief of Staff of OKH. OKH was the command section of the German Army and had a long tradition, while OKW was a new organization brought into existence by Hitler to help secure his power by undermining the general staff at OKH. OKW was made up of men who would agree with Hitler without question. OKH was not. A struggle went on between OKH and OKW to exert influence on the conduct of the war. The distinction is significant. Say what you will about Mellenthin, but he would never make that error. Another example is on page 402, where Butler tells us Rommel wanted to defend at the Mareth Line, apparently confusing the Gabes position and the Mareth Line, but the Gabes position was 43 kilometers up the coast road toward Tunis. On p. 406 Butler goes to some length to tell us what an excellent defensive position the Mareth Line was. His comments are at odds with Rommel. Lewin states on page 192 Rommel wanted to set up his defense at the Gabes position, 43 kilometers up the coast road from the Mareth Line. Jackson says the same on page 329. But the best for this question is to look at Rommel's papers themselves. On page 360 he lays out that he wants to defend at the Gabes position. On page 392 he goes through a thorough explanation of the shortcomings of the Mareth Line, and why he did not want to defend there (the construction was not up to modern standards, the bunkers could protect infantry from an artillery barrage but little else, high ground was in front of the position, making it subject to artillery fire and necessitating the holding of the ground in front of the line, and though the southern flank was protected by "impassable mountains", Rommel was of the opinion that they were not impassable, and that the position could be outflanked to the southwest). In the course of events the position was in fact outflanked by 2nd New Zealand Division to the southwest. Those are just two, but there are other examples. All that being so I think we should take what Butler says with a grain of salt, and if other sources contradict him we should consider looking into the matter to discover where the truth lies. Gunbirddriver (talk) 08:10, 15 February 2016 (UTC)

The Rommel myth

I plan to add the below content to the article in the next few days. Since it would be a large addition, I'm posting it here first, in case there are critiques or commentary. Content starts below:

The Rommel myth

The larger-than-life persona of Rommel continues to intrigue both scholars and the general public. The military historian Peter Caddick-Adams in his 2012 work Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives writes that Rommel's "image, carefully cultivated during his lifetime, was also carefully reworked after his death". He notes three stages that led to the firm establishment of the Rommel myth, starting with the inter-war period that saw Rommel in a self-promotion mode. During the early war campaigns, Rommel's successes made him indispensable to Nazi propaganda. Finally, following a forced suicide, Rommel emerged as the "acceptable face of German militarism, the 'good' German who stood apart from the Nazi regime".

Origins

The origins of the myth can be first found in Rommel's drive for success as a young World War I German officer who won the prestigious Pour le Mérite award despite initial setbacks. His popular 1937 book Infantry Attacks was a "determined effort" in self-promotion, contrary to the established tradition of the German military studies. Rommel's military successes were then played up by the Nazi propagandists Karl Hanke in France in 1940 and Alfred Berndt during the Desert Campaign of 1941. In November 1941 Goebbels wrote about his intention to have Rommel "elevated to a kind of popular hero", even though his success was achieved in the least strategically important theatre of World War II. Rommel, with his innate abilities as a military commander and love of spotlight, was a perfect fit for the Nazi "sandcastle illusion built on propaganda".

Rommel image was splashed across mass media throughout the Reich and reached as far as the U.S. and Britain. During the war, Rommel already achieved fame in the West, with its press describing his "great, quasi-mythical strength". The ground was fertile for the myth to be reborn after the war, resulting in a "renaissance of Rommel's name and reputation".

In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, it became clear to the Americans and the British that a German army would have to be revived to help face off against the Soviet Union. Many former German officers were convinced, however, that no future German army would be possible without the rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht. To this end, in October 1950, a group of former senior officers produced a document, which became known as the Himmerod memorandum, for West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Intended as both a planning and a negotiating document, the memorandum included the foundational principles for the future German army and a key demand for "measures to transform domestic and foreign public opinion" with regards to the German military.

Thus, in the atmosphere of the Cold War, Rommel's former enemies, especially the British, played a key role in the manufacture and propagation of the myth. The German rearmament was highly dependent on the image boosting that the Wehrmacht needed. The journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart, an early proponent of these two interconnected initiatives, provided the first widely available source on Rommel in his 1948 book on Hitler's generals. He devoted a chapter to Rommel, portraying him as an outsider to the Nazi regime. Additions to the chapter published in 1951 concluded with laudatory comments about Rommel's "gifts and performance" that "qualified him for a place in the role of the 'Great Captains' of history".

Foundational works

File:Desertfoxdvd.jpg "The Rommel myth came to be cemented through the mutual self-interest and cooperation between former German generals and the British," notes the British historian Alaric Searle.

This is a common meme that is false on its face. The high regard Rommel was held in by the West predates any interaction between former German generals and “the British.” British soldiers in the Western desert held Rommel in high regard from late 1941. This idea about Rommel persisted after the war. Thus there was an idea of the man in the mind of the common British soldier long before anyone could make a valid claim that individuals were “creating” a story about Rommel out of mutual self-interest.

One of the results of this was the 1950 "influential, laudatory" biography Rommel: The Desert Fox by Brigadier Desmond Young. Young had served in North Africa in the Indian Army in a public relations capacity, and was once taken prisoner by Rommel's troops.

How does a public relations person manage to become taken prisoner by Rommel’s troops? Young was an officer in the British Indian Army, and was captured along with his troops when they were overrun by 15th Panzer Division in June 1942 during the Battle of Gazala. He escaped briefly but was recaptured. Then he relates when the area through which he and the other prisoners came under fire he was ordered by a German officer to go under a flag of truce to tell the firing battery to hold their fire, as they were injuring and killing British prisoners. Young declined to do so. He was then told that he had to order a junior officer of his to do so. He again declined. That was when another German officer arrived and inquired what was going on. After a short discussion the first officer returned to Young and informed him “The general rules that if you do not choose to obey the order I have given you, you cannot be compelled to do so”. This, such as it was, was the first and only meeting between Young and Rommel. Young spent the next sixteen months in captivity. In December 1944 after he was returned to the British Indian Army he was made Director of Public Relations for Army HQ, India.

Young collaborated with former Wehrmacht general Hans Speidel, among others, with Liddell Hart also supporting the project.

Collaborated with Speidel? Young wrote a biography of Rommel, and of course researched it. This included speaking with a number of former commanders involved in the war. One would not say Young collaborated with Claude Auchinleck or G.H. Clifton, though he spoke with both about the desert war and their impressions of Rommel. With Speidel he was most interested in the events surrounding the German resistance and Rommel’s death. Speidel had been arrested before Rommel was forced to take his own life, and Rommel had protested the arrest to Hitler. For the events immediately before and after Rommel’s death Young spoke through an interpreter with Rommel’s long-time friends Hermann Aldinger and Karl Strolin, and family members Manfred and Lucie Rommel. This would be called “research.”

The manner in which you have phrased the above presumes a conspiracy which never existed. It projects clearly what your frame of mind is, but it tells us nothing of the frame of mind of Desmond Young. I have to wonder if you have actually troubled to read any of Desmond Young’s biography of Rommel. Based on your comments here and elsewhere I would surmise you have not. If you had you would know Young certainly does have a bias, but it is not pro-Nazi, or pro-German for that matter. It is strikingly pro-British, and presumes a British superiority of arms, which Young grudgingly admits Rommel frustrated for a time. To his credit he is not as partisan as Playfair, and his frequent antidotes of life during the desert war are a great pleasure. There is a connection to time and place that is utterly lacking in Fraser or worse, Butler.

Speidel had already written in 1946 that he planned to turn Rommel into "the hero of the German people", to give them a positive role model.

Speidel is likely speaking here of Speidel’s involvement with the German resistance. Speidel and other leaders in the resistance viewed Rommel as a possible leader the German nation could look to in the period immediately following the assassination of Hitler. He felt Rommel’s fame and reputation among the German population would add legitimacy to a new German leadership. Others in the resistance did not want an officer, any officer, involved.

Rommel was a suitable candidate since the manner of his death had lead to the assumption that he had not been a supporter of Nazism.

Rommel was not a supporter of Nazism. After Rommel’s death he was no longer in the discussion for the leadership of a post-war Germany.

Young subscribed to this "generous view", subtly conveying that Rommel served the regime, but was not part of it. Young's biography "assisted in developing a new version of the truth" – with Rommel now an active, in not a leading, plotter. Speidel contributed as well, starting, from the early 1950s, to "talk up the Rommel legend" and his own "anti-Nazi credentials", thus boosting his suitability for a future command role in NATO.

Young’s biography of Rommel probably overstates Rommel’s ideas regarding a regime change in Germany, but it does not portray him as an active or leading plotter. As to Speidel, he had a doctorate in philosophy and was teaching at a German university in 1950. He did not need a job in NATO, and re-militarizing Germany following the war was an idea that had a fair amount of opposition in Germany. Speidel was aware of this. Impugning his motives here is a reach.

The 1951 movie "The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel", based on Young's biography, portrayed Rommel in a sympathetic way, as a loyal, humane soldier and a firm opponent Hitler's policies. The movie played up Rommel's disputed role in the conspiracy against Hitler, while omitting Rommel's early association with the dictator.

A movie?! The only thing of interest here was von Mellenthin’s reaction. When asked what he thought of James Mason’s portrayal of Rommel, he responded “Altogether too polite”

Critics and the public were hostile in the U.S., but the movie was a success in Britain, along with a less known 1953 movie "The Desert Rats", where Mason resumed his portrayal of Rommel.

Apparently 20th Century Fox thought a sequel would be a profitable course of action. This is just silliness. I don’t think we can include Hollywood in the conspiracy theory. Quentin Tarantino’s Inglorious Bastards showed Hitler murdered in a theater. I don’t believe it happened that way, nor am I concerned about the apparent assault on history.

1953 saw the publication of Rommel's writings of the war period as The Rommel Papers, edited by Liddell Hart. Romme's widow and son, and the former Wehrmacht officer Fritz Bayerlein first published them in German in 1950 under a "revealing title" War Without Hate. With a glowing introduction by Liddel Hart, The Rommel Papers was one of the two "crucial texts" that lead to the "Anglophone rehabilitation" and a "Rommel renaissance", the other being Young's biography.

Meanwhile, Liddel Hart had a personal interest in the work: he had coaxed Rommel's widow into admitting that his theories on mechanised warfare had influenced Rommel.

In all that I have read on the Second World War and Rommel I have never come across Frau Rommel making any comment whatsoever on military tactics, nor have I ever read her asserting anything about those military texts that had been an influence on Rommel, other than her noting that Rommel always carried a copy of Wavell’s *** Lectures with him. This was confiscated by US Forces. A second copy was sent to her years later by Wavell himself shortly before his death. In it he wrote a short inscription for her.

Thus, Rommel emerged as his "pupil", giving Liddel Hart credit for Rommel's dramatic successes in 1940. (The controversy around Liddell Hart's actions is covered by the political scientist John Mearsheimer in Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. A review of Mearsheimer's work, published by Strategic Studies Institute, points out that Mearsheimer "correctly takes 'The Captain' [Liddel Hart] to task for [...] manipulating history".)

Mearsheimer gives an opinion, the accuracy of which is debatable. Liddle Hart always presumed he had more influence then he probably did, but he believed what he asserted was true, which is a different thing than knowing something is false and then trying to pass it off as truth.

Anyway, none of this is new, and not particularly helpful. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:13, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Uncritical accounts

Young and Liddell Hart "set the stage for all post-war interpretations of Rommel", which consisted of three themes: Rommel's ambivalence towards Nazism; his military genius; and the chivalrous nature of the fighting in North Africa. Their works lent support to the image of the "clean" Wehrmacht and were generally not questioned, since they came from British authors, rather than German revisionists. The trend continued with the "effusive and often uncritical biographies, extolling the [military] virtues of Rommel", such as Rommel as Military Commander by the military historian Ronald Lewin and Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel by the high-ranking British officer David Fraser.

Fraser's account "pushed furthest" the "romanticising of Rommel", in "dramatic, swirling prose that encapsulates the post-1945 hagiographic approach". For example, he includes Rommel among the "great masters of manoeuvre in war", whose personalities "transcend time" and "cut like [a] sabre through the curtains of history". This tradition also included uncritical works by Sir John Squire and General Sir John Hackett. In contrast, German biographies, such as by Wolf Heckmann, were far less sympathetic.

Even the "Rommel apologists" were faced with a challenge of explaining away Rommel's duties as a liaison between the Wehrmacht and the Hitler Youth in 1937–38. Young's 1950 biography described Rommel's involvement in strictly military terms and alluded to a falling out between the Hitler Youth leader Baldur von Schirach and Rommel, with the former supposedly referring to Rommel as "not ideologically sound enough". In fact, Rommel had proposed a plan (twice) that would have subordinated Hitler Youth to the Wehrmacht, removing it from the NSDAP control. Schirach was outraged; he appealed directly to Hitler, and Rommel was quietly dismissed from the project in 1938.

Searle points out Young's claim that Rommel was brought into close proximity to Hitler in October 1938 "for the first time" as "patently untrue". Rommel had previously been seconded to command the unit in charge of Hitler's personal protection during the March 1938 Anschluss. Young omits this fact, casting doubts on the veracity of his other statements. In contrast to the apologist accounts, Searle notes that Rommel had not only "found favor with the Nazi regime, but [...] was delighted with the preferential treatment he was receiving", as evidenced by Rommel's letters to his wife. Rommel fully subscribed to the Nazi worldview, writing to his wife in October 1939 from the devastated Warsaw: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them."

Reevaluation

The myth of Rommel came about as "the necessary image manufactured to serve the German rearmament", driven by "different agencies [that] adopted Rommel for their own ends". Recent historiography called for a reevaluation of the Rommel myth. In 2002, Philip Remy produced a three-part documentary for the German TV called Mythos Rommel ("The Rommel Myth"). The documentary, along with a book of the same name, "chipped away at the Rommel legend dramatically".

Contemporary military practitioners have been critical of Rommel as an operational level commander. While an accomplished tactician, Rommel was a "poor operational leader", according to a paper published by Naval War College. Rommel's "personal relationship with Hitler put him in a position of authority he was not qualified to fulfill"; he lacked "the proper personality, military education, and military experience" of a successful operational leader, concludes the author, United States Navy Commander Charles M. Gibson. Gibson credits Rommel with the German defeat in North Africa due to his failure to appreciate the strategic dimensions of the conflict.

The picture that emerges is much more complex than the post-war myth of a "noble" man and a "military genius who, but for bad fortune and the faults of others, might have changed the course of World War II". Caddick-Adams notes that, over the years, Rommel "has been portrayed variously as a model officer, folk hero, dashing combat leader, strong-willed Swabian, remarkable tactician, chivalrous knight, enthusiastic Hitler supporter, war criminal, resistance fighter, representative of a clean Wehrmacht and, finally, sacrifial victim of the Third Reich". Instead, Rommel was a "complicated man of many contradictions."

In a 2012 interview with Reuters, the German historian Sönke Neitzel noted: "On the one hand he didn't commit war crimes that we know of and ordered a retreat at El Alamein despite Hitler's order. But he took huge German casualties elsewhere and he was a servant of the regime. He was not exactly a shining liberal or Social Democrat. Mostly, he was interested in his career".

References

Sources

• Caddick-Adams, Peter (2012). Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. New York, NY: The Overlook Press. ISBN 9781590207253. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Chambers, Madeline (2012). "The Devil's General? German film seeks to debunk Rommel myth". Reuters. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
• Connelly, Mark (2014). "Rommel as icon". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gibson, Charles M., Commander, USN (2001). "Operational Leadership as Practiced by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel During the German Campaign in North Africa 1941–1942: Success of Failure?" (PDF). Naval War College. Retrieved 8 February 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Luvaas, Jay (1990). "Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A "Pupil's" Retrospective" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
• Mearsheimer, John (1988). Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801420894. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Robinson, James R. (1997). "The Rommel Myth". Military Review Journal. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
• Searle, Alaric (2014). "Rommel and the rise of the Nazis". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)

References

K.e.coffman (talk) 03:06, 28 February 2016 (UTC)

You have neglected to include any contrary opinion from the revisionist view. Do contrary opinions exist, and what are they? What work have you done to look into this further? If you have not yet done so then proceed now. Needs more work. Regardless, this material is large enough to be broken off as its own article. However, as it is it is WP:Biased. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:54, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

I agree that the above is too lengthy for this article, though a two or so para summary would be relevant. It's certainly the case from what I've seen that modern historians take a more sceptical view of Rommel (for instance, I've seen scathing analysis of his mismanagement of supplies in North Africa, as well as his leadership in Normandy). Nick-D (talk) 04:43, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

When I searched for "Rommel legend" or "Rommel myth", the above sources are what I found. I have not found sources that state that the "Rommel myth" is the invention of contemporary historians that are trying to take Rommel down a notch. If you have such sources, please share them so that I can include them.

Regarding WP:Biased, this content is built on multiple WP:RS sources (books, articles, studies, etc). This is what the sources said. If you have contemporary sources that state the opposite, I would be glad to review them.

I will condense as suggested, and create a separate article for the in-depth discussion. BTW, I'm reading a new book on the topic (The Rommel Legend) and it is in agreement with the findings of the above scholars. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:53, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

Attitude to casualties

I've just changed the first sentence of the "Views on the conduct of war" section again. My rationale is that the claim that "he was not one to accept the unnecessary loss of life" is essentially WP:PEACOCK language as 1) no competent and non-criminal military leader of any rank accepts the unnecessary loss of life among the personnel under their command or defeated enemy forces, so the implication that he was somehow unusual in this regard is entirely false 2) as is also normal for all military leaders he sought to maximise thee losses of the enemy forces he fought through casualties or prisoners: he may not have wanted to kill or injure more Allied troops than he had to, but this doesn't make him unusual - it just means he obeyed the laws of warfare by encouraging and honouring surrenders. Nick-D (talk) 00:19, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

actually, fair point. Tweaked. The notion that Rommel was "not one" do do what all competent military officers do is WP:PEACOCK

Of course it was a fair point. That is why I changed it back. It would have been better for you to come to the talk page and discuss rather than to keep reverting. What you have been doing generates edit warring, and for an administrator it is a strange behavior to exhibit. I can accept your final version, but I do not think it is any improvement over what was there before, and am disappointed it took you so long to realize you were changing the wording contrary to the wording in the source citated.

As to the facts, Rommel did take a tremendous number of prisoners in both wars. He treated them as fellow soldiers. Prisoners were not mistreated if Rommel had anything to say over it. His behavior in this regard was different than what I have read of any other officer, either side of the conflict. Granted, his efforts to encourage opponents to surrender worked towards achieving his goals, and if they would not surrender he would do what was necessary to achieve his goal, but that is different than just doing what any competent officer would do. When the Italians started shipping oil across the Mediterranean in the hulls of hospital ships Rommel was extremely angry with them. Why was that, do you suppose? Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:12, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

Well, we all make mistakes, admins included: at least I ended up semi-reverting myself. If you'd also like some feedback, blanket reverting problematic text back in without considering alternate wording also isn't best practice. Western Allied commanders routinely also regularly treated prisoners well. Nick-D (talk) 04:32, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

It did not need to be reworded, and the changes you were making were contradicted by the text that was used as the citation, so your edits needed to be reverted. Once reverted you should have gone to the talk page to discuss. It is bold edit-revert-discuss. You failed to do that, and now seem to think by characterizing your edits being reversed as blanket reverting is some sort of equivalence. It is not. I was attempting to bring to your attention the fact that the sentence was supported as it stood, and added the citation as a necessary proof. That would not be blanket reverting. Regardless, you should not change the text to remove something the citation supports, and my including the direct quotation in the citation should not have been necessary. You should have looked at the citation yourself (i.e. looked it up and found out what it said) rather than reverting two more times. It appears you finally read the quote I included, and finally decided to "tweak" your wording. That is nothing to ballyhoo. Administrators should be held to a higher standard. Gunbirddriver (talk) 21:26, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

Please see Foundational works above for the contemporary assessment of Young's 1950 work on Rommel. It's a WP:Biased source, and potentially unreliable, as discussed by Searle. The other source (Luck) is WP:Primary as the participant in the events, and biased at that (as described in The Myth of the Eastern Front). I will add citations to this effect to Hans von Luck; that's another problematic article in the WWII mythology genre, with 24 citations to Luck's memoirs, more than all other sources combined. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:52, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

I've tweaked my wording a bit per the quoted source. The notion that Rommel was unusual in doing this is clearly false. Nick-D (talk) 03:56, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

From looking further at this section, it says that " The Afrika Korps was never accused of any war crimes". This may or may not be true (and the Holocaust was going on behind the German front line), but it certainly isn't the case for the German forces in Normandy which Rommel also led. Nick-D (talk) 04:03, 4 March 2016 (UTC)

No, that is true, and I believe it is mentioned. 2nd SS Panzer Division's killing of civilians at Oradour-sur-Glane. Rommel asked to be allowed to punish the division. Officers of the Herr had operational control of SS units in their area of command, but they had no authority over them in regards to their behavior. Anyway, Rommel protested and requested permission to discipline the division. He was told by Hitler it was none of his concern. I believe his efforts here show a certain degree of moral courage, as certainly officers challenging Hitler's decisions and those of the SS were often arrested or shot. It is easy for us in a quiet study to say what one should or should not do. It was a lot harder to do so in Nazi Germany. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:47, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Rommel's style as military commander section

This section is entirely about Rommel's performance in France during 1940 and North Africa during the successful period of German operations there. His subsequent performance is not discussed, and it gives a misleading impression to readers (for instance, he didn't lead from the front in Normandy). Nick-D (talk) 05:41, 5 March 2016 (UTC)

Normandy was a defensive battle, so it was handled differently. Same could be said at El Alamein. In each case the attacker is coming towards you, so the decisive point is in your defensive line at the point of the attacker's choosing. He was frequently at the front during the battle for Normandy, and traveled back and forth quite often. It was Rommel that set up the defense in depth south of Caen that resulted in the check of Montgomery's Operation Goodwood. His contributions in Normandy were all blunted by the stifling restrictions put upon all commanders from Hitler and OKW. Forward control was a concept of the panzerwaffe that was largely put in place by Guderian, and was made possible by the communication arrangements Guderian made which allowed the commander to control the division from any unit in the division. Rommel took it farther than most, and in some cases too far. Could be expanded, certainly. Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:36, 7 March 2016 (UTC)