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'''Andrew Michael Spence''' (born November 7, 1943) is an [[United States|American]] [[economist]] and recipient of the 2001 [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences]], along with [[George Akerlof|George A. Akerlof]] and [[Joseph E. Stiglitz]], for their work on the dynamics of [[Information flow (information theory)|information flows]] and market development. He conducted this research while at [[Harvard University]].
'''Andrew Michael Spence''' (born November 7, 1943) is an [[United States|American]] [[economist]] and recipient of the 2001 [[Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences]], along with [[George Akerlof|George A. Akerlof]] and [[Joseph E. Stiglitz]], for their work on the dynamics of [[Information flow (information theory)|information flows]] and market development. He conducted this research while at [[Harvard University]].


Spence is probably most infamous for his job-market [[Signaling (economics)|signaling]] model, which essentially triggered the enormous volume of literature in this branch of [[contract theory]]. In this model, employees signal their respective skills to employers by acquiring a certain degree of education, which is costly to them. Employers will pay higher wages to more educated employees, because they know that the proportion of employees with high abilities is higher among the educated ones, as it is less costly for them to acquire education than it is for employees with low abilities. For the model to work, it is not even necessary for education to have any intrinsic value if it can convey information about the sender (employee) to the recipient (employer) and if the signal is costly.
Spence is probably most famous for his job-market [[Signaling (economics)|signaling]] model, which essentially triggered the enormous volume of literature in this branch of [[contract theory]]. In this model, employees signal their respective skills to employers by acquiring a certain degree of education, which is costly to them. Employers will pay higher wages to more educated employees, because they know that the proportion of employees with high abilities is higher among the educated ones, as it is less costly for them to acquire education than it is for employees with low abilities. For the model to work, it is not even necessary for education to have any intrinsic value if it can convey information about the sender (employee) to the recipient (employer) and if the signal is costly.


Spence did his middle and high school education at the [[University of Toronto Schools]] of the [[University of Toronto]]. In 1966, he was awarded a [[Rhodes Scholarship]] at [[Oxford University]] upon graduation from [[Princeton University]] with a degree in [[Philosophy]]. He studied [[Mathematics]] at Oxford. Spence is a former Dean of the [[Stanford Graduate School of Business]] and is presently the Chairman of the [[Growth Commission|Commission on Growth and Development.]]
Spence did his middle and high school education at the [[University of Toronto Schools]] of the [[University of Toronto]]. In 1966, he was awarded a [[Rhodes Scholarship]] at [[Oxford University]] upon graduation from [[Princeton University]] with a degree in [[Philosophy]]. He studied [[Mathematics]] at Oxford. Spence is a former Dean of the [[Stanford Graduate School of Business]] and is presently the Chairman of the [[Growth Commission|Commission on Growth and Development.]]

Revision as of 16:33, 8 May 2013

Michael Spence
Born (1943-11-07) November 7, 1943 (age 80)
NationalityUnited States
Academic career
FieldMicroeconomics
InstitutionHarvard University
Stanford University
SDA Bocconi School of Management
New York University
Alma materHarvard University, (Ph.D.)
University of Oxford, (B.A.)
Princeton University, (B.A.)
InfluencesKenneth Arrow
Thomas Schelling
Richard Zeckhauser
ContributionsSignaling theory
AwardsJohn Bates Clark Medal (1981)
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (2001)
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Andrew Michael Spence (born November 7, 1943) is an American economist and recipient of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, along with George A. Akerlof and Joseph E. Stiglitz, for their work on the dynamics of information flows and market development. He conducted this research while at Harvard University.

Spence is probably most famous for his job-market signaling model, which essentially triggered the enormous volume of literature in this branch of contract theory. In this model, employees signal their respective skills to employers by acquiring a certain degree of education, which is costly to them. Employers will pay higher wages to more educated employees, because they know that the proportion of employees with high abilities is higher among the educated ones, as it is less costly for them to acquire education than it is for employees with low abilities. For the model to work, it is not even necessary for education to have any intrinsic value if it can convey information about the sender (employee) to the recipient (employer) and if the signal is costly.

Spence did his middle and high school education at the University of Toronto Schools of the University of Toronto. In 1966, he was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship at Oxford University upon graduation from Princeton University with a degree in Philosophy. He studied Mathematics at Oxford. Spence is a former Dean of the Stanford Graduate School of Business and is presently the Chairman of the Commission on Growth and Development.

Spence joined the faculty of New York University Stern School of Business on September 1, 2010.[1]

He is currently a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

He has also been a consistent contributor to Project Syndicate, an international newspaper syndicate, since 2008. Among his beliefs are that high-frequency trading should be banned.[2]

Selected works

  • Spence, A. M. (1973). "Job Market Signaling". Quarterly Journal of Economics. 87 (3). The MIT Press: 355–374. doi:10.2307/1882010. JSTOR 1882010. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |month= and |coauthors= (help)
  • Spence, A. M. (1974). Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Spence, A. M. (May 2011). The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)

See also

References

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