Talk:People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran: Difference between revisions

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*::I think some of the options discussed so far would be appropriate for an RFC, although "Option B" has little weight with relation to the US disarmament. [[User:Alex-h|Alex-h]] ([[User talk:Alex-h|talk]]) 18:33, 23 July 2023 (UTC)
*::I think some of the options discussed so far would be appropriate for an RFC, although "Option B" has little weight with relation to the US disarmament. [[User:Alex-h|Alex-h]] ([[User talk:Alex-h|talk]]) 18:33, 23 July 2023 (UTC)
::::{{u|Alex-h}}: Thanks. I'll consolidate these in the sources list. I see some of the ones you listed were already included, others were not, and others could use a longer quote. Best, [[User:MarioGom|MarioGom]] ([[User talk:MarioGom|talk]]) 20:42, 24 July 2023 (UTC)
::::{{u|Alex-h}}: Thanks. I'll consolidate these in the sources list. I see some of the ones you listed were already included, others were not, and others could use a longer quote. Best, [[User:MarioGom|MarioGom]] ([[User talk:MarioGom|talk]]) 20:42, 24 July 2023 (UTC)
:::::{{u|Iskandar323}}: I listed sources and commentary here that challenge your changes and constitute [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=People%27s_Mojahedin_Organization_of_Iran&diff=prev&oldid=1166785096 significant explanation]. Please attend to them before blindly restoring your edits. Also your other recent modifications -- "Iraqi officials", "have touted it as fighting for", "militant". The previous version had more weight. [[User:Alex-h|Alex-h]] ([[User talk:Alex-h|talk]]) 11:39, 25 July 2023 (UTC)


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Revision as of 11:40, 25 July 2023

On Douglas MacArthur II kidnapping attempt

This paragraph on Douglas MacArthur II kidnapping attempt could be improved:

According to Jamestown Foundation the MEK tried to kidnap the U.S. Ambassador to Iran Douglas MacArthur II in 1970.[1] Some sources attribute the attempted kidnap to other groups.[2][failed verification][3][4][5][failed verification][6]

I don't think it needs in-text attribution, but it lacks a lot of context. What I could grasp is that there was a kidnapping attempt on 30 November 1970 (some sources seem to get the date, even year wrong) by unnamed gunmen. Then there is a disparity in sources when it comes to attribution. And it could have played a role in Rajavi's later arrest. Anyone up to helping with gathering sources about this event? --MarioGom (talk) 19:00, 16 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

the MEK was responsible for the killing of six Americans in Iran in the 1970s.387 The same terrorist group wounded Air Force General Harold L. price and attempted to kidnap U.S. ambassador Douglas MacArthur II.[7]
Ambassador Douglas MacArthur … was in Iran, where his harrowing escapes from kidnapping at the hands of the militant People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI, or MEK in Farsi) presaged the growing inner turmoil which would erupt into the Iranian Revolution.[8]
Il 30 novembre del 1971 fallì un attentato condotto dal MeK contro l'ambasciatore americano a Tehran40, Douglas MacArthur, mentre nel maggio del 1972 venne ferito in un agguato il generale dell'Usaf Harold Price41.[1]

Ghazaalch (talk) 08:57, 18 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

MarioGom, would you add the new sources to the article? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:55, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I plan to, but I'm thinking about changing the text to add the exact date, a bit of context, and a better description of the disputed attribution. MarioGom (talk) 16:26, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Sources

  1. ^ Abedin, Mahan. "Mojahedin-e-Khalq: Saddam's Iranian Allies - Jamestown". Jamestown. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  2. ^ Rahnema, Ali (2021), Call to Arms: Iran's Marxist Revolutionaries: Formation and Evolution of the Fada'is, 1964–1976 (Radical Histories of the Middle East), Simon & Schuster, ISBN 9781786079862
  3. ^ Taheri, Amir (1986), The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution, Adler & Adler Pub, p. 168, ISBN 9780917561047
  4. ^ Steele, Robert (2021), The Shah's Imperial Celebrations of 1971: Nationalism, Culture and Politics in Late Pahlavi Iran, I.B. Tauris, p. 118, During this period the threat from militant organizations in Iran was high. An attack on a military outpost in the village of Siahkal, by a radical Marxist-Leninist urban guerrilla group named Fadaiyan-e Khalq (Martyrs for the Masses), on 8 February 1971, ushered in a new phase of opposition to the Shah's regime. Moreover, and alarmingly for the security services, the group made it one of their principal objectives to disrupt the Celebrations. Around the time of the festivities, US Ambassador Douglas Macarthur was almost kidnapped by gunmen who ambushed his limousine, and a plan to kidnap the British ambassador, Peter Ramsbotham, was also uncovered. More attempted kidnappings prompted an increase in security, as the Dutch ambassador explained in a report in early October... SAVAK later claimed that sixty members of the Iranian Liberation Organization were charged with plotting to carry out kidnappings during the Celebrations.
  5. ^ "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972 - Office of the Historian". history.state.gov.
  6. ^ Zanchetta, Barbara (2013), The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s, Cambridge University Press, p. 254
  7. ^ Alexis, Jonas (2013). Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism: A History of Conflict Between Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism from the Early Church to Our Modern Time. WestBow Press. ISBN 1449781594.
  8. ^ Hutson, Thomas R. (2012). Doug & Wahwee: Douglas MacArthur II, the General's Nephew, and His Unconventional Wife: Their Life in the Foreign Service Hardcover. River Junction Press, LLC. ISBN 0985017805.

Unexplained revert of attack on MEK base in Iraq by US-led coalition

Fad Ariff, In this edit, you removed the following items from the lead. Why?Ali Ahwazi (talk) 22:26, 22 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

  • Attacks on Iranian targets were intermittent until May 2003, but ended during the US-led invasion of Iraq,[1][2][3] when Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases. The leadership of MEK ordered its members not to resist.[4][5]
The conflicts between the I.R. and the MEK were already in the lead (and more neutral), as well as the 2003 ceasefire agreement between the MEK and the US. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:26, 24 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, there is currently a vague sentence in the lead (In 2003, the MEK signed a ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and put down their arms in Camp Ashraf.[70][71]) with no explanation as to what events led to that ceasefire and why the U.S. should sign a ceasefire with the MEK. Also, there is no information about the activities of MEK from 1988 to 2002 in the lede. Don't you think we should at least have parts of the deleted sentences in the lead?Ghazaalch (talk) 09:03, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Since many of these lead discussions are going nowhere, I encourage everyone to view the The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism to understand what sort of material is due or not in an encyclopedic summary of the group. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:24, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Iskandar323, concerning the text that Fad Ariff removed, I found the following in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism:
  • In the 1990s the MEK carried out and claimed responsibility for a number of attacks ...In April 1992, in a large-scale attack ...In 1998 a member of the MEK tried to ...In February 2000 the group claimed that it had launched over 12 attacks against Iran, .... Later that year, the MEK regularly accepted responsibility for mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids along the Iraq-Iran border;...It also accepted responsibility for for six mortar attacks on government and military buildings in Tehran. During this period, the MEK received the majority of its funding from the Saddam ...
  • After Iraq was invaded and Hussein was overthrown by the United States in 2003, MEK members surrendered to the coalition forces and were held in a special prison, Camp Ashraf...
Ghazaalch (talk) 07:05, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, the intersection between the MEK and Saddam's Iraq is currently a bit minimalized on the page at present. The MEK was essentially an Iraqi proxy group from 1981 through to 2003, so that's more than two decades of this activity. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:24, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Sources

  1. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  2. ^ Katzman 2001, p. 105. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  3. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  4. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. p. 105. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  5. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.

Unexplained revert about US designation

Iskandar323, In this edit, you removed the following items from the lead. Why? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:06, 23 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

  • In June 2004, the U.S. designated MEK members in Camp Ashraf ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War[1][2][3][4] which expired in 2009 after the attainment of the full sovereignty of Iraq.[5]
Because it's obviously extremely undue and irrelevant. Who gives rat's arse what the MEK's nominal status was in the eyes of the US between 2004 and 2009, and how is that incredibly transient and US jurisdiction-specific detail lead-worthy? I can't think of a reason to include it. It's 100% irrelevant in 2023, one way or another. The real question is how could it be WP:DUE due? Iskandar323 (talk) 12:25, 23 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's WP:DUE because there are many sources that support it, and there aren't any sources that contradict it. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:18, 24 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
WP:DUE is about neutrally balancing sources, not weighting the contents of the lead, which reflects the article. This information is borderline irrelevant in the article as a whole; it is therefore borderline irrelevant in the lead. Iskandar323 (talk) 19:08, 24 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I think it might be due in the article, perhaps in the section about de-listing. But definitely not in the lede. In the context of the lede (a summary), this paragraph is just minutiae. MarioGom (talk) 20:09, 24 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I don't see how it's related to the US delisting, which was in 2012, but yes, minutiae. Iskandar323 (talk) 17:11, 25 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
We'd have to check if reliable sources discuss this in relation to de-listing. I just assumed it had some relevance in the context of the long campaign to de-list the MEK. But it was just a guess. MarioGom (talk) 21:24, 25 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
No, it is ironically even more irrelevant than that. It's just a temporary status that the US put in place over the residents of Camp Ashraf after the Iraq invasion, presumably to stop Baghdad bombing the place. Iskandar323 (talk) 05:39, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I see. Then Post-U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003–2016) sounds like the right place, where it currently is. MarioGom (talk) 06:42, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, and given that there is only a sentence or two about it in the body - let's generously call it 50 words out of 16,700 words - it is owed 0.02% of the lead, or about 1.5 words = nada. Iskandar323 (talk) 07:04, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Reputable and uncontradicted sources support this statement, which demonstrates that the information is neither fringe or disputed but rather a recognized aspect of the MEK's history. This is also a key element in the MEK's history and its developing transition, and holds significance in understanding the MEK's international standing. Including the information in the lead section is undoubtedly appropriate. Iraniangal777 (talk) 09:02, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Huh? How is it a key element of anything? What source says that? Why is the temporary status of Camp Ashraf residents relevant to anything? I am at a loss to see how. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:48, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Being verifiable is a requirement for all content, in the lede and outside the lede. However, being verifiable is not sufficient condition to be in the lede. This passage is not disputed, but it's irrelevant to the lede. I don't think you'll find it in any of the shorter form tertiary sources, which are a great tool to assess due weight in summaries (except for recent events that happened after the publication of such tertiary sources). MarioGom (talk) 10:36, 27 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Iraniangal is not only saying this is WP:DUE (which it clearly is), but also that "This is also a key element in the MEK's history and its developing transition, and holds significance in understanding the MEK's international standing." (similarly, this assertion remains applicable). Fad Ariff (talk) 12:29, 28 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, someone is saying this, and yes, it is an assertion; an unsupported one. So, the only full and final way to settle confusion over what is balanced or not in a certain context is to draw upon tertiary resources, to which end I found this entry in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, which, to my surprise, includes this material, to the tune of six words "and promised protection under the Geneva Convention". - after the line on them surrendering at Camp Ashraf. So, according to an independent tertiary source, that is what is due, and - short of any producing a tertiary source that expands further on this in a 500-word summary - that is what we can have here. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:20, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I'm getting about 1500 hits in Google scholar about the MEK becoming protected persons under the Geneva Convention. Iskandar323, your edit removed information about the cease fire agreement and the group becoming 'protected persons' under the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Given its significance, I'll reinstate this information back because it's important. ParadaJulio (talk) 15:12, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I didn't remove it; I moved it and balanced it to match the emphasis in an actual academic tertiary source, not some mindless numbers game. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:21, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@ParadaJulio: You've reverted more than what you have explained above. Why have you relocated the material away from the events it relates to, why do you think it should be emphasized above and beyond the emphasis in academic tertiary sources? Also, why did you revert other, things at the same time in that edit, like placing the countries who no longer regards it as a terrorist organization (old news) back in front of the countries that do regards it as such (current information), when it obviously makes more sense to have it the other way around? Why also did you re-expand the EU and US, which just wastes space? You have explained none of this in the comment above in the slightest. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:29, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Furthermore, your comment above is highly misleading. MEK+"Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War" gets just 66 scholar hits; MEK+"Fourth Geneva Convention" 80 hits; MEK+"ceasefire agreement" gets 62 hots; so, wherever you have got your 1,500 hits numbers from, your methodology was clearly bogus. Contrast this with, say "MEK"+"cult", which gets 7,000+ hits. Based on your understanding of google scholar numbers, what does that mean for the emphasis we should place on that in the lead? Iskandar323 (talk) 15:37, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Google hits is pretty much irrelevant for assessing weight in the lede. The discussion is way past that point and we're analyzing actual sources. MarioGom (talk) 16:19, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It is better to remove less important issues from the lead and replace them with more important issues.GharaDash (talk) 08:14, 30 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Iskandar323, countries that delisted it are named first, followed by countries that have not. There is no need to modify this. The specific wording of "EU" and "US" is also frivolous. If your intention is solely to obtain sources that demonstrate this information has due weight, these seem to demonstrate that

  • [2] Masters, Jonathan. "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)." Council on Foreign Relations 28 (2014).
  • [3] Wills, Siobhán. "The Obligations Due to Former ‘Protected Persons’ in Conflicts that have Ceased to be International: The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran." Journal of Conflict & Security Law 15.1 (2010): 117-139.
  • [4] Goulka, Jeremiah, et al. The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA, 2009.
  • [5] De Boer, Tom, and Marjoleine Zieck. "From internment to resettlement of refugees: on US obligations towards MeK defectors in Iraq." Melbourne Journal of International Law 15.1 (2014): 21-108.
  • [6] Bahgat, Gawdat. "United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge." The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 38.4 (2008): 1.
  • [7] Shay, Shaul. "ALBANIA AND THE IRANIAN TERROR THREAT." Security Science Journal 1.1 (2020): 35-44.
  • [8] Elsea, Jennifer K. "US Treatment of Prisoners in Iraq: Selected Legal Issues." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2005.
  • [9] Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "Legal status of US forces in Iraq From 2003-2008." Chi. J. Int'l L. 11 (2010): 1.
  • [10] Marinova, Nadejda K. "Policymakers and Diasporas in Informal Public Diplomacy." Routledge International Handbook of Diaspora Diplomacy. Routledge, 2022. 230-242.
  • [11] Hassani, Sara. "“Maniacal slaves:” normative misogyny and female resistors of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Iran." International Feminist Journal of Politics 19.3 (2017): 281-295.
  • [12] Warren, Marc. "The" Fog of Law": The Law of Armed Conflict in Operation Iraqi Freedom." International Law Studies 86.1 (2010): 12.
  • [13] Anglin, Leighton W. The Effect Terrorist Labels Have On Military Operations. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, 2012.
  • [14] Bahgat, Gawdat. "Iran and the United States: Reconcilable Differences?." Iranian studies 41.2 (2008): 139-154.

ParadaJulio (talk) 15:10, 30 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Your comment seems to be bear no relation with the change being discussed here. MarioGom (talk) 15:53, 30 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
What is frivolous is the level of detail being maintained here above and beyond that of far more relevant details. A list of random sources has zero bearing on the fundamental balance issue here. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:28, 30 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
My intention is to reduce the text involved here to what is due based on the balance of overall sources, instead of the overwrought and misplaced text that currently stands. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:42, 30 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Why do you think these sources are "random" or "bear no relation"? They are all about the MEK's disarmament by the US, which is important to say. It's beyond me why anyone would seek to remove this considering the multitude of supporting sources available.
  • The MEK surrendered weapons to U.S. forces after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

    [6]
  • U.S. gets Iranian rebels in Iraq to disarm

    [7]
  • disarmed after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

    [8]
  • The MeK disarmed in 2003 as part of an agreement with the United States

    [9]
  • U.S. troops in Iraq disarmed members of the Iranian group, the Mujahidin-e-Khalq or MEK, earlier this year

    [10]
  • the MEK disarmed, and the organisation was relocated from Camp Ashraf to Camp Liberty

    [11]
  • In Iraq, after Saddam was toppled in 2003 the Mojahedin were officially disarmed and regrouped in the Ashraf camp to the northeast of Baghdad.

    [12]
  • PMOI leaders eventually agreed a ceasefire and its members were disarmed.

    [13]
  • In 2003, the U.S. military disarmed Ashraf.

    [14]
  • After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, American troops disarmed the fighters and confined them to the camp."

    [15]
  • In July 2004, the United States granted the Ashraf detainees "protected persons" status under the 4th Geneva Convention.

    [16]
ParadaJulio (talk) 15:02, 31 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
ParadaJulio: What we are discussing here is that the following text, In June 2004, the U.S. designated MEK members in Camp Ashraf ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War which expired in 2009 after the attainment of the full sovereignty of Iraq. is excessively detailed for the lede. I think Iskandar323 has done a good job explaining this, and you have not even tried to refute his arguments at all. You have added a set of quotes that, for the most part, do not address the issue. Only one, the last one, refers to the 4th Geneva Convention status grant in 2004, and none refers to its expiration in 2009. I think mentioning that the US disarmed the MEK in 2003 is due in the lede. The rest is minutiae. MarioGom (talk) 18:11, 31 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
MarioGom: Iskandar323 argues that the information provided is "borderline irrelevant" to the overall article, and therefore, it should also be considered as such in the lead. However, ParadaJulio presented a range of sources demonstrating not only the relevance and significance of this content but also its extensive coverage in reliable sources. This effectively challenges Iskandar323's claim of its irrelevance. Iskandar323 removed the statement "MEK signed a ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and put down their arms in Camp Ashraf" from the lead without any justifiable reason. Iskandar323 also incorrectly stated in the lead that the MEK "were promised protection under the Geneva Convention," while in reality, the MEK was granted protection under the Geneva Convention. These changes lean more towards vandalism rather than anything commendable. Iraniangal777 (talk) 09:04, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iraniangal777: Please can you look at the diff more closely. I just trimmed and moved the statement. My edit actually clarified that they were promised protection in 2003, after the invasion, and then the status was conveyed by the US in June 2004. That is what you will see two if you read the sources that I referenced. Iskandar323 (talk) 11:27, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Iraniangal777: These changes lean more towards vandalism rather than anything commendable. Not at all. I think there is a fair amount of policy-based arguments and sources here, both by Iskandar323 and me, to recognize this is a fair beta and not vandalism. ParadaJulio presented a range of quotes that, as I explained, were mostly not on-point, and not invalidating the edit, and then you come calling out the edit as vandalism. You've been involved in this topic long enough to know this is unacceptable. MarioGom (talk) 15:18, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323 and MarioGom: Did you go through the 24 citations that ParadaJulio provided? Is your argument still that this is "borderline irrelevant" to the article? Why was "MEK signed a ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and put down their arms in Camp Ashraf" removed from the lead if this marks a pivotal transition of the MEK going from being an armed group to becoming a disarmed group? Iraniangal777 (talk) 09:04, 2 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's not about random lists of sources; it's about establishing what the balance of sources say, and the way the material is presented in concise summaries of the group, which is what the aim of the lead is. This is exemplified by other tertiary sources. Yes, they surrendered and disarmed. That's important. No one's disputing that. It's the excessive peripheral detail being included that is unwarranted in the lead summary. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:12, 2 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323: "That's important. No one's disputing that.": you disputed it. Now about the sources I provided, how exatly are they "random"?
  • Masters, Jonathan. "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)." Council on Foreign Relations 28 (2014):

    U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated the group as civilian "protected persons" under the Geneva Convention

  • Wills, Siobhán. "The Obligations Due to Former ‘Protected Persons’ in Conflicts that have Ceased to be International: The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran." Journal of Conflict & Security Law 15.1 (2010): 117-139.:

    During this period the United States repeatedly asserted that the camp's inhabitants were 'protected persons' under the Geneva Conventions

  • Goulka, Jeremiah, et al. The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA, 2009.:

    After a cease-fire was signed, the U.S. Secretary of Defense designated this group's members as civilian “protected persons” rather than combatant prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.

  • De Boer, Tom, and Marjoleine Zieck. "From internment to resettlement of refugees: on US obligations towards MeK defectors in Iraq." Melbourne Journal of International Law 15.1 (2014): 21-108.:

    US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated the members of the MeK as ‘protected persons’ under the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (‘Geneva Convention IV’)

  • Bahgat, Gawdat. "United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge." The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 38.4 (2008): 1.:

    The US military designated MEK figher in Iraq as "protected persons" consistent with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. These provisions stipulate, "In the case of armed conflict, persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria"

  • Shay, Shaul. "ALBANIA AND THE IRANIAN TERROR THREAT." Security Science Journal 1.1 (2020): 35-44:

    the MEK in Iraq was disarmed and thousands of its members isolated at Camp Ashraf, near the Iranian border in eastern Iraq, as "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions.

  • Elsea, Jennifer K. "US Treatment of Prisoners in Iraq: Selected Legal Issues." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2005.:

    However, the Coalition forces in Iraq have determined that members of the rebel group Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group designated by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization, are to be treated as protected persons within the meaning of the GC.

  • Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "Legal status of US forces in Iraq From 2003-2008." Chi. J. Int'l L. 11 (2010): 1.:

    Some 3,400 members of the People's Mohaedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) reside at Camp Ashraf, Iraq. Since 2003, they ha been protected by unites of the Multinational orce-Iaq, and in 2003, they were officially declared to be "protected persons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

  • Warren, Marc. "The" Fog of Law": The Law of Armed Conflict in Operation Iraqi Freedom." International Law Studies 86.1 (2010): 12.

    After a year of interagency wrangling and debate, it was decided that they were simply "protected persons" under the Fourth Convention.

  • Anglin, Leighton W. The Effect Terrorist Labels Have On Military Operations. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, 2012.:

    The legal dichotomy reached the zenith in 2004 when the Secretary of Defense designated the MEK protected persons

  • Bahgat, Gawdat. "Iran and the United States: Reconcilable Differences?." Iranian studies 41.2 (2008): 139-154.:

    Approxiamtely 3,300 MEK fighters residing in Iraq were given the status of "protected persons" under the Geneva Convetion, which promises human treatment for non-nationals in a country at war.

MarioGom In what way are these sources considered "not on-point" when they explicitly address the "protected persons" status? ParadaJulio (talk) 15:05, 2 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's called discussion and it evolves. Hard concept to grasp, I know. I saw the status mentioned in the sage encyclopedia, so I accepted it's inclusion - to the level mentioned by that tertiary source. If you can find a respectable academically published tertiary source that mentions any more than that then I'll accept that too. You are just quoting sources that confirm what you want to hear, otherwise known as cherry picking; you are not doing a proper source analysis to establish weight or balance. But it's also probably not worth it for a lead detail this minor. Hence the utility of deferring to the tertiary sources that have already established weight and balance. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:12, 2 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ "URGENT ACTION DETAINEES HELD INCOMMUNICADO RISK TORTURE" (PDF). Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  2. ^ "FACTBOX-Who are the People's Mujahideen of Iran?". Reuters. 26 January 2009. Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  3. ^ Wills, Siobhán (2010). "The Obligations Due to Former 'Protected Persons' in Conflicts that have Ceased to be International: The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran". Journal of Conflict and Security Law. 15 (1): 117–139. doi:10.1093/jcsl/krq002.
  4. ^ Said, Wadie (2015). Crimes of Terror: The Legal and Political Implications of Federal Terrorism Prosecutions. OUP USA. ISBN 978-0199969494. Retrieved 2 April 2022. in 2004 obtained 'protected person' status under the Fourth Geneva Convention for all PMOI members at Camp Ashraf based on the U.S. investigators' conclusions that none was a combatant or had committed a crime under any U.S. laws; disbanded its military units and disarmed the Pmoi members at Ashraf, all of whom signed a document rejecting violence and terror
  5. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".
  6. ^ "U.S. to drop Iranian MEK group from terrorist list - officials". Reuters. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  7. ^ "U.S. gets Iranian rebels in Iraq to disarm". Chicago Tribune. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  8. ^ "US removes militant Iranian group from terror list". France 24.
  9. ^ "Iranian 'terror group' divides Washington". UPI. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  10. ^ "US Calls on Iran to Hand Over al-Qaida Members - 2003-12-09". VOA. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  11. ^ Allan Hassaniyan (2021). Kurdish Politics in Iran: Crossborder Interactions and Mobilisation since 1947. Cambridge University Press. p. 172. ISBN 978-1316516430.
  12. ^ "The People's Mojahedin: exiled Iranian opposition". France 24. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  13. ^ "Iranian PMOI exiles 'must leave Iraq by end of year'". BBC. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  14. ^ "An Anti-Iranian Enclave in Iraq Fights to Stay". Time. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  15. ^ "Iraq denies killings in Iran exile camp raid". NBC. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
  16. ^ Douglas Lovelace Jr.; Kristen Boon; Aziz Huq (2011). TERRORISM: COMMENTARY ON SECURITY DOCUMENTS VOLUME 116: Assessing President Obama's National Security Strategy. Oxford University Press. p. 582.

Revert about MEK attack on Iranian embassies

  • Fad Ariff, you deleted In April 1992, the MEK attacked 10/13 Iranian embassies which has numourous reliable sources from the lede but insist on keeping this one in the lede? Why? Ghazaalch (talk) 09:36, 28 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ghazaalch if you want a quick answer, the prevailing sentiment on this talk page suggests that the lead section is already excessively lengthy. If you wish to engage in a more comprehensive discussion on this matter, please direct your comments to the relevant talk page discussion. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:29, 28 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
There is no consensus that material cannot be added to the lead, so this is a non-reason. Iskandar323 (talk) 18:20, 28 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I moved this to a separate discussion, since the one above is about a different topic. I hope you don't mind. MarioGom (talk) 16:21, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

Including MEK attacks on 13 Iranian embassies in the lede(WP:RFCBEFORE)

Should we include MEK attacks on 13 Iranian embassies in the lede? Ghazaalch (talk) 08:52, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I would suggest closing this and continuing the already open active discussion. This talk is already overly plagues by RFCs, and I do not think the existing discussion has fully played out, nor is it substantive to the level of WP:RFCBEFORE. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:14, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Iskandar, I am closing this per your comment but my experience tell me that we could never add anything critical of MEK this article without starting a RfC.

Proposal

I propose including the following in the lede:

  • In April 1992, the MEK attacked 10/13 Iranian embassies including the Iranian Mission to the United Nations in New York.[a][2][3][4]

Notes

  1. ^ MEK said the attacks were a way to protest the bombing of a MEK military base in Iraq. Iran, acknowledging the air raid, said it was carried out in retaliation for attacks on two villages in the west of Iran by the Iraq-backed MEK guerrillas.[1]

Alternative proposal

If above sentence is too long for the lede we could summarize it as bellow; and we could also delete the footnote:

  • In April 1992, the MEK attacked 10/13 Iranian embassies.[5][6][7]


I tried to add this to the lede but Fad Ariff reverted it and wrote in the edit summary that This is not "new information". I explained above that the information was not included in the lede and tried to reach consensus but they did not give me a satisfying explanation. I am open to more explanation here. Ghazaalch (talk) 09:23, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

For obvious reasons related to this material being related to a multinational attack on diplomatic missions, this was a significant event. However, I'm not entirely sure it is due in the lead. The material is not particularly expanded upon even in the body. It would be worth finding reports from all 10 countries in question and determining if the attacks resulted in any further ramifications or repercussions. As it stands, this event is not on the same order as other bombings and operations that are notable to the extent of having their own pages. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:24, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: I've changed my mind after seeing it in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:26, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
No. The point under discussion holds a relatively low level of notability compared to other well-documented aspects. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:42, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Why would you assert that, without source, immediately after a tertiary source has been provided saying otherwise? Part of the discussion process is absorbing new information and reacting to it, otherwise it's not collegiate. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:06, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Here are ten sources for the text, including the one suggested by Iskandar323, but I'm sure there are more:
In April 1992, the MEK attacked 13 Iranian embassies.[8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17]


Sources

  1. ^ Mcfadden, Robert D. (6 April 1992). "Iran Rebels Hit Missions in 10 Nations". The New York Times.
  2. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  3. ^ Mcfadden, Robert D. (6 April 1992). "Iran Rebels Hit Missions in 10 Nations". The New York Times.
  4. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".
  5. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  6. ^ Mcfadden, Robert D. (6 April 1992). "Iran Rebels Hit Missions in 10 Nations". The New York Times.
  7. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".
  8. ^ Martin, Gus. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition. SAGE Publication. p. 405.
  9. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  10. ^ Mcfadden, Robert D. (6 April 1992). "Iran Rebels Hit Missions in 10 Nations". The New York Times.
  11. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".
  12. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  13. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran: Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. p. 80. ISBN 978-0-415-77396-6.
  14. ^ "FACTBOX-Who are the People's Mujahideen of Iran?". Reuters. 26 January 2009. Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  15. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  16. ^ Harb, Ali (17 July 2019). "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  17. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. p. 105. Retrieved 21 July 2022.

Replacing a text with one source with a similar one that has four(WP:RFCBEFORE)

Since above discussion became a mess and Fad Ariff stopped replying me, I am opening a new straightforward discussion here.

I am going to replace this one-sourced material:

  • Five weeks later, the MEK announced that its Politburo and Central Committee had asked Rajavi and Azondalu, who was already married, to marry one another to deepen and pave the way for the "ideological revolution. At the time Maryam Azodanlu was known as only the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi. According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate this 'great revolution'. According to Ervand Abrahamian "in the eyes of traditionalists, particularly among the bazaar middle class, the whole incident was indecent. It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister. It involved women with young children and wives of close friends – a taboo in traditional Iranian culture;" something that further isolated the Mojahedin and also upset some members of the organization. Also according to Ervand Abrahamian, "the incident was equally outrageous in the eyes of the secularists, especially among the modern intelligentsia. It projected onto the public arena a matter that should have been treated as a private issue between two individuals."[1]

with the following which has four sources:

  • During the "ideological revolution" Rajavi forbade marriage and mandated "eternal" divorce for all members, who had to divorce their wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu.[2] Rajavi declared in 1985 that he had chosen Maryam Azodanlu, the spouse of his close friend Mehdi Abrishamchi, to serve as co-leader of the MeK.[3] According to Ervand Abrahamian, when Abrishamchi announced his own engagement to Khiabani's younger sister, it strongly reeked of wife swapping.[4] persuading members to divorce their spouses, Cohen believes, Rajavi wanted to make sure that members' sexual identities would be suppressed in order to win their total loyalty to him as their leader. The justification concerning Rajavi's marriage with Maryam Azodanlu was that "Maryam chose to divorce her husband in favour of her marriage to the Mojahedin's ideological leader so that she could work with him as cooperating leading partners."[5] According to Abrahamian, with Rajavi's recent marriage the Mojahedin had transformed from a populist movement into an exclusive sect that resembled religious cults around the globe in many ways.[6]

Any comment? Ghazaalch (talk) 10:07, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

The forbidding of marriage and eternal divorce line at the beginning corrects important omissions, but I'm not sure about the wider changes. I do not mind much of the original material and the extended commentary from Abrhamian, which is pretty insightful as to the reaction from the wider society at the time. I think some smaller changes or just simple additions might be preferable. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:29, 26 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you Iskandar323, so you agree that we could add the sentence "During the "ideological revolution" Rajavi forbade marriage and mandated "eternal" divorce for all members, who had to divorce their wives."[7] before the starting this paragraph: "Five weeks later, the MEK announced that ...".

@Fad Ariff, MarioGom, and Iraniangal777:, do you see any problem with adding this sentence? Ghazaalch (talk) 08:59, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

There is another discussion already addressing this material. Could you please clarify the rationale behind initiating a separate section to discuss the same topic? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:45, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's an RFCBEFORE discussion along entirely different lines - what's to understand exactly? Iskandar323 (talk) 13:09, 29 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Done.Ghazaalch (talk) 02:48, 10 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Sources

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 251–253. sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  2. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Rajavi, as the head of the organization, launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.
  3. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 60, 71. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. In 1985, Rajavi announced that he had appointed Maryam Azodanlu, the wife of his close associate Mehdi Abrishamchi, as co-leader of the MeK. She would soon divorce her husband and marry Rajavi. Together, they would launch a new "ideological revolution" that would, over time, transform the MeK into a cult group… As a part of the "ideological revolution," the Rajavis mandated divorce.
  4. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 251–255. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. Until then, Mojahedin activists had known Maryam Azodanlu as merely the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, one of Rajavi's close colleagues…proclamation also mentioned almost in passing that Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to pave the way for this 'great revolution...It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister...
  5. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 32–39. ISBN 978-1845192709. At the Neshest it took Rajavi five days to convince members of his main revolutionary demand - that they should divorce their spouses. He wanted to ensure that members' sexual identity would be denied and thus bring about their complete devotion to himself as their leader... Massoud and Maryam Rajavi were married in February 1985. Members were given an ideological explanation: "Maryam chose to divorce her husband in favour of her marriage to the Mojahedin's ideological leader so that she could work with him as cooperating leading partners."
  6. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 251–255. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. the Mojahedin had raetamorphized from a mass movement into an inward-looking sect in many ways similar to religious cults found the world over. This metamorphosis rapidly crystallized in early 1985 with Rajavi's new marriage
  7. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Rajavi, as the head of the organization, launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.

Lack of name until 1972

Currently the article states The group had no name until February 1972.[1]. This is an interesting aspect that could use some further context. I vaguely recall reading something about this in another source, but I lost track of it. Any idea about other sources? If they had no name for ~7 years, how they were known or how did they call themselves, even if informally? MarioGom (talk) 17:18, 28 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]


References

  1. ^ Vahabzadeh 2010, p. 100, 167–168.

Designating MeK as a terrorist organization

In my opinion, using the word "previously" in The European Union, Canada, the United States, and Japan have previously listed the MEK as a terrorist organization is to downplay the importance of designating MEK as a terrorist organization. Not mentioning the reason for the designation, and the reason for delisting is another reason for downplaying the importance. I suggest replacing it with:

  • From 1997 to 2012, the MEK was on the list of terrorist organizations of the U.S. (and other countries) for its string of international assassinations[1] including killing of U.S. personnel in Iran during the 1970s.[2]

What do you think? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:52, 1 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Since no objection, I am restoring this proposal.Ghazaalch (talk) 02:29, 10 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I object, this doesn't align what is in the article. Alex-h (talk) 13:20, 11 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Which part does not align? should it align with what in the article or it should align with what is in the sources? Ghazaalch (talk) 15:56, 11 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's more precise to outline the period, whereas 'previously' is vague. It might need phrasing slightly more carefully to reflect the fact that the US was 1997 to 2012, but the other countries were different years + Japan till 2013. Iskandar323 (talk) 17:29, 11 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Alex-h: Could you elaborate? MarioGom (talk) 22:07, 15 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Khanlari, Sam (2018). "Western signs of support for Iranian dissident group will only deepen the divide with Tehran". CBC News.
  2. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. xi. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.

Cult of personality

The current version of this section is just a shambles; it needs completely rewriting based on the quality academic sources such as Abrahamian and Katzman or restoring from an earlier version that already deferred to these sources. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:00, 9 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Agreed. Also the section title is misleading. Many reliable sources describe the MEK as a cult or a religious-political sect, not merely an organization practicing "cult of personality". I planned to rewrite various parts as a section for "cultic practices", but feel free to take the lead. MarioGom (talk) 13:42, 9 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
This proposal by Vice regent might be of some help.Ghazaalch (talk) 03:48, 10 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yep. That looks pretty good. Certainly better than the mess that was already there. Iskandar323 (talk) 17:38, 10 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Why is the current version of this section in "shambles"? The proposal by Vice regent was made in a previous RFC and it did not achieve consensus because it does not present opposing views accurately or in due weight. It also used sources like ex MEK member Masoud Banisadr, or wikivoicing that "They must suppress all sexual thoughts" or "The MEK is believed to have become a cult to survive", which contradicts WP:NPOV.
The MEK has barred children in Camp Ashraf in an attempt to have its members devote themselves to their cause of resistance against the Iranian regime, a rule that has given the MEK reputation of being "cultish"."[1][2] Various sources have also described the MEK as a "cult",[3][4] "cult-like",[5][6] or having a "cult of personality",[7] while other sources say the Iranian regime is running a disinformation campaign to label the MEK a "cult".[8][9] -- The first paragraph is due and not too long.
According to a RAND Corporation policy report, while in Paris, Massoud Rajavi began to implement an "ideological revolution", which required members an increased study and devotion that later expanded into "near religious devotion to the Rajavis". After its settlement in Iraq, however, it experienced a shortfall of volunteers. This led to the recruitment of members including Iranian dissidents, as well as Iranian economic migrants in countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, through "false promises of employment, land, aid in applying for asylum in Western countries, and even marriage, to attract them to Iraq". MEK also gave free visit trips to its camps to the relatives of the members. According to the RAND report, the recruited members were mostly brought by MEK into Iraq illegally and then were asked to submit their identity documents for "safekeeping", an act which would "effectively trap" them. With the assistance of Saddam's government, MEK also recruited some of its members from the Iranian prisoners of the Iran-Iraq war.[10] -- The second paragraph can be summarized according to its weight, maybe to -- While in Paris, Massoud Rajavi implemented an "ideological revolution" which required devotion from its members.[10]. Or what other summaries could we consider? Alex-h (talk) 11:14, 25 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
On what planet could the second paragraph of that version be good encyclopedically? It is just single sourced the RAND report, which is good to have in there as one voice, but it clearly only one of many voices on the subject. Otherwise, ok, let's have a discussion about source quality and wikivoicing - that's reasonable. Sure, that BBC quote shouldn't be Wikivoiced. Very true. I've attributed the former members. Iskandar323 (talk) 11:32, 25 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ "Iranian dissidents plot a revolution from Albania". Japan Times. Archived from the original on 18 September 2020.
  2. ^ "An Iranian mystery: Just who are the MEK?". BBC.
  3. ^ Cite error: The named reference Cro13 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 144, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  5. ^ "France lashes out at Iranian opposition group". The Associated Press. 27 June 2014.
  6. ^ Rubin, Elizabeth (13 July 2003). "The Cult of Rajavi". The New York Times. Retrieved 9 March 2016.
  7. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 139 sfnm error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help); Clark 2016, p. 65.
  8. ^ "Iran's Heightened Fears of MEK Dissidents Are a Sign of Changing Times". 12 December 2018.
  9. ^ "Arab News". 18 November 2018.
  10. ^ a b Goulka et al. 2009, p. 38. sfn error: multiple targets (5×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)

Is it a "violation of primary source"?

In the section related to human rights, we have this sentence, "Yonah Alexander also claimed that the HRW had been deceived by former MEK members then working for Iran's Ministry of Intelligence". A sentence by Yonah Alexander was referenced by a source written by him. This is an example of violation of primary source, "materials that are close to an event, and are often accounts written by people who are directly involved." Isn't it? GharaDash (talk) 09:43, 10 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]

His book is a primary source for his views, but attributed, as an expert, it's ok. However, the paragraph attributed to him, basically as a quote, should probably be paraphrased down into a brief sentence noting his opinion. More than that is not due. Iskandar323 (talk) 08:45, 11 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for the thorough reply!GharaDash (talk) 13:08, 13 June 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Summarizing the article

@MarioGom and Iskandar323: I am trying to summarize the article but need your help. I have started with the first sub-section, "Early years (1965–1971)", which I think could include some of the information of the next subsection "Schism (1971–1978)", except that we should change the titles to something like "Early years (1965–1975)" and "Schism (1975–1978". What do you think? Ghazaalch (talk) 09:53, 1 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I think the period of the Marxist schism is well differentiated. Keeping them separate probably makes sense. MarioGom (talk) 18:06, 6 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes. Agree. I did not merged the sections. Just summarized.Ghazaalch (talk) 20:39, 8 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
In what manner? Doesn't the Schism component start with By 1973, the members of the Marxist–Leninist MEK launched an "internal ideological struggle"? The internal ideological struggle is part of the Schism. ParadaJulio (talk) 14:00, 7 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
ParadaJulio: Fair. The title could be changed from 1971 to 1973. My point is that it's a series of events that mark an important period of the MEK history and there's enough content for a subsection. Do you think it should be merged? MarioGom (talk) 08:48, 8 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • @MarioGom and Ghazaalch: Why was "Vahid Afrakhteh, a founding member of Peykar, confessed to the killings of Americans, and later was executed" taken out of the article? Alex-h (talk) 17:19, 7 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Alex-h: I didn't do that change, so I don't know. MarioGom (talk) 08:50, 8 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Ghazaalch: a substantial amount of vital information was removed by you, for example "Vahid Afrakhteh, a founding member of Peykar, confessed to the killings of Americans, and later was executed.[1][2][3] Bahram Aram and Vahid Afrakhteh both belonged to the (Marxist) rival splinter group Peykar that emerged in 1972, and not the (Muslim) MEK.[4] Despite this, some sources have attributed these assassinations to the MEK.[5][6][7] In 2005, the Department of State also attributed the assassinations of Americans in Iran to Peykar. The Country Reports issued in April 2006 stated: "A Marxist element of the MEK murdered several of the Shah's US security advisers prior to the Islamic Revolution".[8]" Please explain your changes. ParadaJulio (talk) 14:30, 8 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Tho whole purpose of Vahid Afrakhteh's confess is to say that not all the assassination is carried out by Islamist branch of MEK, which is diffyed by other sayings from other sources. That is why I summarized it to These assassinations were carried out either by the Marxist[116][117][118][119] or Islamist branch of the MEK.[106][107][112]. What is wrong with it? why you reverted it? Ghazaalch (talk) 20:39, 8 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
What is the main topic? Vahid Afarakhte, who is considered a member of Peykar rather than a member of MEK or assassination of U.S. military personnel and civilians working in Iran? It is important that, according to some sources, the assassination of Americans was carried out by MEK. Now, those who are accused other than MEK, have no place in this article.GharaDash (talk) 14:21, 9 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@ParadaJulio: are you going to self revert, or I should do that? Ghazaalch (talk) 12:57, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: Your summar' fails to mention that there were people who confessed and were executed for the killings. ParadaJulio (talk) 11:54, 14 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Extended content

References

  1. ^ Shirali, Mahnaz (28 July 2017). The Mystery of Contemporary Iran. ISBN 978-1-351-47913-4. The most notable actions of the Marxist Mojahedin were assassinations of Savak general, of two American military advisers, and a failed attempt against an American diplomat, all in 1975
  2. ^ Camp Ashraf: Iraqi Obligations and State Department Accountability: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, December 7, 2011. 2011. ISBN 978-0-16-090501-8. Referred to in the Iranian press as the "Iranian People's Strugglers", and later known as Peykar, this group led by Tagui Shahram, Vahid Arakhteh and Bahram Aram was one o several underground groups waging a covert war against the Shah's secret police, SAVAK. Afrakhteh, who later confessed to the killings of Americans, was executed
  3. ^ Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, Volumen 15. 1976. Ten terrorists were sentenced to death... The condemned terrorists were Vahid Afrakhteh... The terroirsts were charged with the murders of Brigadier-general Reza Zandipur, United States Colonels Hawkins, Paul Shaffer and ack Turner, the U.S. Embassy's translator Hassan Hossnan
  4. ^ Reisinezhad, Arash (2018). The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 8. ASIN B07FBB6L8Y.
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference state.gov was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference Infobase Publishing was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference crt was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ "Chapter 8 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations". U.S. Department of State.

Review of recent modifications in the lead

A lot of reliably sourced information was removed from the lead and substituted with cherry-picking or fringe-ness. I am reinstating some of the previous (established) lead in light of the following NPOV concerns --

Removals

  • Its revolutionary interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy as well as the populist version developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s.[1] It is also Iran's largest and most active political opposition group.[2][3][4]
  • In 1986, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) requested France to expel the MEK from its Paris headquarters,[9][10] so in response it re-established its base Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

This is WP:DUE and WP:MOSLEAD information and removing it would need a proper explanation first.

  • The lead used to say that the MEK is a "political-militant" group, but this was changed to only "militant". I don’t know if the MEK are still a militant group today, but they surely are a political group. The short description in the article uses "Iranian opposition group", and I suggest changing it to that. Alex-h (talk) 16:07, 10 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Additions

  • They accepted a combination of Marxism and Islamism as the base of their belief -- The infobox says the group is Shia Muslim and the the MEK is primarily characterized as either "Muslim", "Islamic", or "left-wing":

"The Islamic-leftist People’s Mojahedin of Iran".[14]; "left-wing Muslim group".[15]; "the Mujahedin-i Khalq, a leftist Islamic group."[16]; "the leftist-Islamic opposition group People’s Mujahedin"[17]; "Though a Muslim organization, the MEK seeks a secular republic in Iran based on democracy and political pluralism."[18]; "The leftist Islamic group, Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MKO), declared an armed struggle in 1981"[19]; "the leftists Islamic group, the Mujahedn"[20]; "the MEK, a leftist group of Iranian exiles pushing for the overthrow of the regime."[21]; "The most important leftist orgniazation supporting Bani Sadar was the Mujahedin e Khalq"[22]; "The MEK began as a leftist organization opposed to the rule of the shah, and it initially supported the Iranian revolution."[23]; "A number of prisoners affiliated with banned opposition groups, like the leftist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization"[24]; "The news comes amid mounting pressure on the left-leaning Islamist group that has long opposed Iranian governments, from the monarchy of Shah Reza Pahlavi to the current theocratic state that gained power in 1979."[25]; "Following an attack during the Iran-Iraq War by Iraq-based members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), also known as the People's Mujahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI), Iran's then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued an order to execute all prisoners who were loyal to or sympathised with the leftist opposition group."[26]; "It began as a leftist-Islamist opposition to the late shah of Iran"[27]; "The MEK, a leftist group founded in the 1960s,"[28]; "Sazman Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran), a religious orgnaization with leftist programs."[29]

Being Muslim is what distinguishes it from its Marxist counterpart (or Organization of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class). Even Ervand Abrahamian makes that distinction saying that "The Marxist and the Muslim Mojahedin have produced their explanations for the 1975 Schism. According to the Marxist Mojahedin, their 'political consciousness' had been raised once they began to study systematically 'dialectical materialism' especially the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. Hence, they claimed, Marxism had revealed to the fallacies of Islam."[30] "Meanwhile, the Muslim Mojahedin survived partly in the provinces, partly in sections of the Tehran bazaar, but mainly in the gaols.[31] The "killing of US personnel in Iran during the 1970s" was designated to a member of the Marxist Mojahedin, important information that also formed part of the article but was also inexplicably taken out. Also their Muslim identity is clearly described by Abrahamian:"Its revolutionary interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy as well as the populist version developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s."

  • Following the occupation of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003, the U.S. did not hand over MEK fighters to Iran. -- Why would the U.S. not handing over MEK members to the IRI in 2003 need to replace the current information in the lead?
  • Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney argued that the MEK should be used against Iran. -- Which part of the RAND source supports this? And why would these claims need to replace the current information in the lead?
  • Since 2009, when the Iraqi government became openly hostile to MEK, the U.S. led efforts to get the group's members out of Iraq. -- This excludes "amid growing Iranian influence in Baghdad." Better sources also say "Led by politicians sympathetic to Iran, the Iraqi authorities tacitly allowed Iran-allied militias to attack the group."[32] Why cherry-pick certain parts of that information in the lead? Alex-h (talk) 14:10, 6 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    "Its revolutionary interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy as well as the populist version developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s." - is not accessible at all. It sounds extremely dated, and, to most readers, Khomeini's Islam is also conservative Islam of the traditional clergy; it is therefore not intuitive what 'populist' is meant to mean in the context. Most sources simply state some variation on the theme of "the MEK combined Marxism and Islamism" at the outset. Iskandar323 (talk) 17:42, 6 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    It is undeniable that the MEK's interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy and Khomeini. This is affirmed by the authoritative historian as Ervand Abrahamian is. Alex-h (talk) 17:23, 7 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Ok, but what does that mean? Contrasts how? What is a reader meant to understand from that? This is meant to be an encyclopedia. It should accessible. How is Khomeini populist? This is not the sort of simple explanation required of a lead. What's the actual Abrahamian quote? Does he use the term "revolutionary interpretation" for example? I don't see that quoted directly anywhere in the body. The better and clearer explanation that I do see from Abrahamian in the body is that the group used a "combination of Muslim themes; Shii notions of martyrdom; classical Marxist theories of class struggle and historical determinism; and neo-Marxist concepts of armed struggle, guerilla warfare and revolutionary heroism" - sounds a lot like Marxism and Islamism ... Iskandar323 (talk) 19:37, 7 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Alex-h: what you have to say in Iskandar323's response?Ghazaalch (talk) 20:56, 8 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • If you're asking how I interpret Abrahamian's quote, I interpret it as written -- the MEK’s interpretation of Islam is "revolutionary", and is different from the clergy’s more "conservative" interpretation of Islam or Khomeini's "populist" Islam. The article previously provided further details about this information, but I see that a lot has been changed or removed from the article recently. I will review the recent modifications in the body and provide an update about this. Alex-h (talk) 16:07, 10 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Sorry, are you saying that you are extracting the word "revolutionary" from the phrase "revolutionary heroism" and converting that into "revolutionary interpretation of Islam", or at least saying that this material as presented in the past is justified? Because it isn't. This is a massive piece of WP:OR. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:32, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    I reviewed the first part of the history section and reliably sourced information about the MEK's relation with Islam was removed. Alex-h (talk) 17:24, 15 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

More additions to the lead

  • In 1985, Rajavi launched an "ideological revolution" banning marriage and enforced divorce on all members who were required to separate from their spouses. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azdanlou, who became his senior lieutenant. -- There were many aspects about the "ideological revolution", and something with more notability would be that "Throughout the revolution, the MEK played a major role in developing the "revolutionary Muslim woman", which was portrayed as "the living example of the new ideal of womanhood". According to Ervand Abrahamian, the MEK "declared that God had created men and women to be equal in all things: in political and intellectual matters, as well as in legal, economic, and social issues"." (see "Ideological revolution and women's rights")
  • In April 1992, MEK carried out attacks against Iranian embassies in 13 countries. -- WP:CHERRY-PICK that cuts out information like the incident was a way to protest the bombing of a MEK military base where several people had been killed and wounded.[33]
  • At the same time the MEK paid Western political influencers to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organizations. -- WP:CHERRY-PICK, there were many aspects about the "Removal of designation" like "In 2008, the Luxembourg European Court of First Instance upheld that there was no justification for including the MEK in the EU terrorist list and freezing its funds. The Court then allowed an appeal to delist the MEK from the EU's terror list. An attempt by EU governments to maintain the MEK in the terror list was rejected by the European Court of Justice, with ambassadors of the 27 member states agreeing that the MEK should be removed from the EU terrorism list. The MEK was removed from the EU terror list on 26 January 2009, becoming the first organization to have been removed from the EU terror list."[34] "The Council of the European Union removed the group's terrorist designation following the Court of Justice of the European Union's 2008 censure of France for failing to disclose new alleged evidence of the MEK's terrorism threat."[35] "Secretary of State Clinton said in a statement that the decision was made because the MEK had renounced violence and had cooperated in closing their Iraqi paramilitary base."[36] "An official denied that lobbying by well-known figures influenced the decision."[36][37]"
  • During its life in exile, MEK was financed by Saddam Hussein or fake charities based in European countries. -- Terrornomics and Newsweek make an attribution (to an U.S. official or the U.S. State department) for a claim of "support" from Iraq ("support" could mean different things like allowing them to base in Iraq). The sources at the end of the sentence say "Recognizing that most Western countries would not allow it to solicit funding publicly under its name, the MEK had its members engage in street solicitation as representative of front organizations (author's conversations at the Nejat Society)", "Although a large portion of the NCRI's funding was provided by Saddam Hussein and some came from Saudi Arabia, the NCRI also raised money through fraud.", and the third source is in Dutch and talks about an alleged fake charity where money goes to the MEK). Please provide the quotes from "The United States and Iran: Policy Challenges and Opportunities" and "Debating the Iran-Iraq War in Contemporary Iran".
  • the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016. -- The part "the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members" is only given in the first Guardian source. The second source is by the American Herald Tribune? The second Guardian source says "From March 2013 to September 2016, about 3,000 MeK members are believed to have been sheltered in Albania, after being transferred from Iraq". "The US was able to convince Albania" is WP:UNDUE.
  • On June 20, 2023, the Albania police raided an operation at the MEK camp in Tirana, on the orders of the Albanian judiciary due to the investigation of the SPAK ( Special Anti-Corruption Structure). The police claimed that the MEK violated the 2014 agreement which let them stay in Tirana. -- The MEK has had several raids in their camps. Why was this one in particular picked for the lead? Alex-h (talk) 16:07, 10 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    @Alex-h: You changed a lot more than just this. In future, if you are making mass reversions to a prior version of the page, please make sure to provide a page version number so that editors can refer to it. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:35, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    @Iskandar323: "Notably included Donald Trump's inner circle" is WP:UNDUE -- it included much more than this. "Between 1997 and 2013, the MEK was also on the lists of terrorist organizations of the US, Canada, EU, UK and Japan" -- ruins the flow of the previous version and the MEK was designated and delisted in different years depending on the country. "The European Union, Canada, the United States, and Japan have previously listed the MEK as a terrorist organization. The MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran and Iraq." is more generic but also more faithful paraphrasing. Alex-h (talk) 18:41, 23 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Alex-h:, I restored the longstanding material that you deleted. You should have built consensus before implementing the changes into article. Note that the longstanding materials were added to the article one month before the date you reverted them; and you should have considered them as longstanding.Ghazaalch (talk) 15:22, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: With all of that restored material it's getting too long. I hope you've got some ideas on how to reduce it as well, because there are limits to how much it should contain. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:30, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323: I will propose a summarized version soon. And some materials need to be moved to the body of the article.Ghazaalch (talk) 16:36, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch the changes you restored are being called into question (and they are not the "longstanding version" because they were made just over a month ago). You need to respond to the questions if you want those changes implemented. ParadaJulio (talk) 15:41, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Calling into question is not enough. We should reach consensus. And they are longstanding. I made the changes on June 10 and Alex-h reverted them on July 10. So it is a month. Ghazaalch (talk) 16:36, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: If you want to reach consensus, start by acknowledging and then attending to the mentioned challenges. Just because your edits were made a month ago doesn't mean they can't be challenged, that's not how this works. Please attend to the identified problems with your edits. Alex-h (talk) 11:25, 25 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Sumarization proposal

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) or Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) (Persian: سازمان مجاهدين خلق ايران),[a] is an Iranian militant organization.[46] that advocates overthrowing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and installing its own government.[47][48][49]

The MEK was founded on 5 September 1965 by leftist Iranian students affiliated with the Freedom Movement of Iran to oppose the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,[50][51] and contributed to overthrowing the Shah during the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[52][53][54] The MEK boycotted the 1979 constitutional referendum, which led to Khomeini barring MEK leader Massoud Rajavi from the 1980 presidential election.[b][56][57] On June 20, 1981, the MEK organized a demonstration against Khomeini with the aim of overthrowing the regime.[58][59][56] On June 28, the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party was blown up, allegedly by MEK, and more than 70 members of the leadership were killed.[60][61][62][63][64] Facing the subsequent repression of the MEK by the IRP, Rajavi fled to Paris.[65][66][67] During the exile, the underground network that remained in Iran continued to plan and carry out attacks[68][69] and it allegedly conducted the August 1981 bombing that killed Iran's president and prime minister, Rajai and Bahonar.[70][71][69]

In 1985, Rajavi launched an "ideological revolution" banning marriage and enforced divorce on all members who were required to separate from their spouses. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azdanlou, who became his senior lieutenant.[72][73][74][75] In 1986 when France expelled the MEK from the country,[9][10] it located in Iraq’s Camp Ashraf near the border with Iran.[76] In 1987, MEK sided with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War; a decision that caused it to lose support within Iran.[77][78] It took part in several actions against Iran during the Iran–Iraq War, including Operation Mersad,[79][80] and Operation Forty Stars[81][82][83][84], as well as the suppression of the 1991 uprisings in Iraq.[85][86][87] Following Operation Mersad, Iranian officials ordered the execution of the prisoners said to support the MEK.[88][89][90]

In April 1992, MEK carried out attacks against Iranian embassies in 13 countries.[91][11][92] Between 1997 and 2013, the MEK was on the lists of terrorist organizations of the US, Canada, EU, UK and Japan for various periods for its use of terror tactics,[93] including the killing of US personnel in Iran during the 1970s.[94] In 2003, the MEK signed a ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and put down their arms in Camp Ashraf.[95][96] Then MEK paid Western political influencers to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[59][97][98][99] After it was no longer designated as a terrorist group, the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016.[59][100][101] During its life in exile, MEK was financed by Saddam Hussein[102][103][104][105] or fake charities based in European countries.[106][107][108]

The contested material that should be put in its context in the body

Its revolutionary interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy as well as the populist version developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s.[1] The MEK was at one point Iran's "largest and most active armed dissident group",[109][110] and some sources today still present it as a major political opposition group,[2][111][112] though it is known to be unpopular within Iran.[113][114]

Critics have described the group as "resembling a cult",[115][116][117] while its backers have touted it as fighting for a free and democratic Iran.[118]

The parts that are not lede-worthy

In June 2004, the U.S. designated MEK members in Camp Ashraf ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War[119][120][121][122] which expired in 2009 after the attainment of the full sovereignty of Iraq.[123]

In 2002, the MEK was a source for claims about the nuclear program of Iran.[11]

Review of recent modifications in Early years (1965–1971)

More reliably sourced information was removed here.

Removals

  • Their views aligned with what was a common tendency in Iran at the time – a kind of radical, political Islam influenced by Marxism
  • During the 1970s, while MEK publications were banned in Iran, they propagated radical Islam through some of Ali Shariati's works. The MEK and Shariati claimed that Islam should oppose feudalism and capitalism; should eradicate inhumane practices; should treat all as equal citizens, and should socialize the means of production.[124][125]
  • Up until the death of the then leader of the MEK in June 1973, Reza Rezai, there was no doubt about the group's Islamic identity.[126] -- This is reliably sourced information about the MEK's relation with Islam, which makes the "contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy" more accessible.
  • Its members mainly belonged to the Iranian intelligentsia, particularly the salaried middle class, college students, teachers, civil servants, and other professionals. According to Ervand Abrahamian, the MEK's "modernist interpretation of Islam appealed to the educated youth, who, while still culturally attached to Islam, rejected its old-fashioned clerical interpretations". Unlike the clergy, it accepted Western concepts (especially in the social sciences).[127] -- This is more reliably sourced information about the MEK's Islam and the clergy's Islam, which was changed to "it attracted primarily young, well-educated Iranians".
  • Leftist Iranian students affiliated with the Freedom Movement of Iran to oppose the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[50][51] -- If the affiliation with the Freedom Movement of Iran is in the lead, then it needs to be also in the article.
  • The organization engaged in armed conflict with the Pahlavi dynasty in the 1970s[48] and contributed to the overthrow of the Shah during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It subsequently pursued the establishment of a democracy in Iran, particularly gaining support from Iran's middle class intelligentsia.[52][53][54] -- explains what the group set out to do.

Additions

  • They aimed to establish a socialist state in Iran based on a modern and revolutionary interpretation of Islam -- which source supports this?
  • During the 1970s, the MEK carried out a series of attacks against the Iranian and Western targets, including the assassination of US military officers and US civilian contacts in Tehran. -- covered in Schism (1971–1978)
  • a puppet of the United States -- this excludes that in those days many Iranians (including these students) considered Pahlavi responsible for Western influence in Iran. Why cherry-pick certain parts of that information? Please list pages for the cited "Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University". Alex-h (talk) 17:24, 15 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Some of these "removals" were simply summarization based on the same source material. But to be honest, I don't have the energy to endlessly argue over this. Feel free to keep the long-standing, ridiculously redundant, chronologically chaotic and disorganized text. MarioGom (talk) 22:25, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Largest and most active political opposition group?(WP:RFCBEFORE)

@Alex-h: why you are insisting on restoring It is also Iran's largest and most active political opposition group.[19][20][21] which is contested by many sources? Ghazaalch (talk) 19:50, 10 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Sources defying the claim:

  • The M.E.K. advocacy campaign has included full-page newspaper advertisements identifying the group as “Iran’s Main Opposition” — an absurd distortion in the view of most Iran specialists...[128]
  • Analysts say it has little support inside Iran today, where it is regarded as a terrorist organisation and has been accused of assassinating senior politicians and targeting civilians.[129]
  • "When [MEK] lost, it became the tool of Saddam Hussein until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and is now little more than a Rajavi cult with little influence in Iran and even less popularity."[130]
  • "While the Mujahedin remains the most widely feared opposition group because of period raids across the Shatt al-Arab, it is also the most discredited among the Iranian people who have not forgotten the Mujahedin's support of Iraq in the war against Iran."[131]
  • "the US and UK politicians loudly supporting a tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania ... a fringe Iranian revolutionary group that has been exiled to Albania, known as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran..."[132]
  • the organization as a fringe group... Their population in Iran hovers between negligible and nill[133]
  • "the M.E.K...a fringe Iranian opposition group, long an ally of Saddam Hussein, that is designated as a terrorist organization... "[134]
  • "a fringe Iranian diaspora group, Mujahideen-e Khalq, or MEK"[135]
  • "a fringe group of militant Iranian exiles known as the Mujahedin-e Khalj (MEK)..."[136]

Ghazaalch (talk) 20:26, 10 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Oops. I didn't see this before posting. I have opened #Workshop for RFC on claim about MEK being largest/main opposition below to prepare an RFC, since this will probably require it. MarioGom (talk) 22:17, 10 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
No problem. I'll withdrew this discussion.Ghazaalch (talk) 04:09, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ a b Abrahamian 1989, p. 1. sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  2. ^ a b Katzman 2001, p. 97. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  3. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group
  4. ^ "The People's Mujahidin: the Iranian dissidents seeking regime change in Tehran". The Times. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group
  5. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7658-0255-2. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  6. ^ Piazza 1994: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
  7. ^ "Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mojahedin, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"
  8. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7658-0255-2. Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
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  49. ^ Cohen 2009, p. 23. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFCohen2009 (help)
  50. ^ a b Chehabi, Houchang E. (1990). Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini. I.B. Tauris. p. 211. ISBN 978-1-85043-198-5.
  51. ^ a b Newton, Michael (2014). "Bahonar, Mohammad-Javad (1933–1981)". Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 28. ISBN 978-1-61069-286-1.
  52. ^ a b "The People's Mojahedin: exiled Iranian opposition". France24. Archived from the original on 25 May 2019. Retrieved 24 September 2018.
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  54. ^ a b Katzman 2001, p. 100. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  55. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 198. "The Mojahedin also refused to participate in the referendum held in December to ratify the Constitution drafted by the Assembly of Experts [...] Once the Constitution had been ratified, the Mojahedin tried to field Rajavi as their presidential candidate [...] Khomeini promptly responded by barring Rajavi from the election by declaring that those who had failed to endorse the Constitution could not be trusted to abide by that Constitution." sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  56. ^ a b Katzman 2001, p. 101. "Khomeini refused to allow Masud Rajavi to run in January 1980 presidential elections because the PMOI had boycotted a referendum on the Islamic republican constitution." harvnb error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  57. ^ Goulka et al. 2009, p. 2. sfn error: multiple targets (5×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)
  58. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 206-207,219. "by the fateful day of 20 June, the Mojahedin - together with Bani-Sadr - were exhorting the masses to repeat their 'heroic revolution of 1978-9'...The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime." sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  59. ^ a b c Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. On 20 June 1981, the MEK organised a mass protest of half a million people in Tehran, with the aim of triggering a second revolution… 50 demonstrators were killed, with 200 wounded. Banisadr was removed from office...
  60. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-138-85364-5. The most drastic show of terror instigated by the MKO was the blast of a bomb placed in the IRP headquarter on 28 June 1980 that killed more than seventy prominent members of the IRP, including Ayatollah Beheshti, founder of the IRP and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four cabinet ministers; and twenty-seven members of the Majles.
    *Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. pp. 79–80. ISBN 978-0-203-94620-6. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
    *Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0-313-32485-7. the MEK leaders found that they had no role in the new regime…In response, supporters launched a terror campaign against Khomeini's regime. On June 28, 1981, two bombs killed 74 members of the Khomeini Islamic Republic Party (IRP) at a party conference in Tehran.
    *Pedde, Nicola. "ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE MOJAHEDIN E-KA". ojs.uniroma1.
    *McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
  61. ^ Colgan, Jeff (31 January 2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press 2013. p. 167. ISBN 978-1-107-02967-5.
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  63. ^ Newton, Michael (17 April 2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO (2014). p. 27. ISBN 978-1-61069-286-1.
  64. ^ Goulka et al. 2009, p. 57. "The most ambitious attack attributed to the MeK was the bombing of the IRP's Tehran headquarters on June 28, 1981. This attack killed more than 71 members of the Iranian leadership, including cleric Ayatollah Beheshti, who was both secretary-general of the IRP and chief justice of the IRI's judicial system." sfn error: multiple targets (5×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)
  65. ^ Goulka et al. 2009, p. 58. "Khomeini's Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps brutally suppressed the MeK, arresting and executing thousands of members and supporters. The armed revolt was poorly planned and short-lived. On July 29, 1981, Rajavi, the MeK leadership, and Banisadr escaped to Paris" sfn error: multiple targets (5×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)
  66. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 219. "The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime" sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  67. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0-313-32485-7. These attacks led to a brutal crackdown on all dissidents. Throughout 1981 a mini - civil war existed between the Khomeini regime and the MEK . By the end of 1982, most MEK operatives in Iran had been eradicated . By the time, most MEK leaders left Iran for refugee in France.
  68. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 220-221,258. "By the autumn of 1981, the Mojahedin were carrying out daily attacks...The number of assassinations and armed attacks initiated by the Mojahedin fell from the peak of three per day in July 1981 to five per week in February 1982, and to five per month by December 1982." sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  69. ^ a b Goulka et al. 2009, p. 85. sfn error: multiple targets (5×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)
  70. ^ Newton, Michael (2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 27. ISBN 978-1-61069-286-1. Retrieved 19 July 2019. On August 30, 1981, a bomb exploded in the Tehran office of Iranian prime minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. The blast killed Bahonar, as well as President Mohammad-Ali Rajai...Survivors described the explosion occurring when one victim opened a briefcase, brought into the office by Massoud Kashmiri, a state security official. Subsequent investigation revealed that Kashmiri was an agent of the leftist People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK)
  71. ^ Katzman 2001, p. 101. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  72. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Rajavi, as the head of the organization, launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.
  73. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 60, 71. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. In 1985, Rajavi announced that he had appointed Maryam Azodanlu, the wife of his close associate Mehdi Abrishamchi, as co-leader of the MeK. She would soon divorce her husband and marry Rajavi. Together, they would launch a new "ideological revolution" that would, over time, transform the MeK into a cult group… As a part of the "ideological revolution," the Rajavis mandated divorce.
  74. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 32–39. ISBN 978-1845192709. At the Neshest it took Rajavi five days to convince members of his main revolutionary demand - that they should divorce their spouses. He wanted to ensure that members' sexual identity would be denied and thus bring about their complete devotion to himself as their leader... Massoud and Maryam Rajavi were married in February 1985. Members were given an ideological explanation: "Maryam chose to divorce her husband in favour of her marriage to the Mojahedin's ideological leader so that she could work with him as cooperating leading partners."
  75. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 251–255. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. the Mojahedin had raetamorphized from a mass movement into an inward-looking sect in many ways similar to religious cults found the world over. This metamorphosis rapidly crystallized in early 1985 with Rajavi's new marriage...Until then, Mojahedin activists had known Maryam Azodanlu as merely the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, one of Rajavi's close colleagues…proclamation also mentioned almost in passing that Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to pave the way for this 'great revolution...It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister...
  76. ^ Regencia, Ted (2018). "MEK's violent past looms over US lobby for regime change in Iran". Aljazeera.
  77. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 102. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. By 1987, the PMOI had formally established the NLA, set up base camps along the Iran Iraq border, and began conducting military exercises and attacks inside Iran. Many analysts believe the PMOI's decision to ally with Iraq caused its support inside Iran to evaporate.
  78. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Prior to its exile, the MeK was the most popular dissident group in Iran. It lost much of its popularity due to its willingness to fight with Saddam—the instigator of the destructive Iran-Iraq War—and to kill Iranian conscripts.)
  79. ^ Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (2 July 2018). "Who is the Iranian group targeted by bombers and beloved of Trump allies?". The Guardian. ...by then sheltered in camps in Iraq, fought against Iran alongside the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein...
  80. ^ Farrokh, Kaveh (20 December 2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78096-221-4.
  81. ^ Buchan, James (15 October 2013). Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences. Simon and Schuster. p. 317. ISBN 978-1-4165-9777-3. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  82. ^ Al-Hassan, Omar (1989). Strategic Survey of the Middle East. Brassey's. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-08-037703-2. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  83. ^ Alaolmolki, Nozar (1991). Struggle for Dominance in the Persian Gulf: Past, Present, and Future Prospects. University of Michigan. p. 105. ISBN 9780820415901. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
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  86. ^ Graff, James (14 December 2006). "Iran's Armed Opposition Wins a Battle — In Court". Time. Archived from the original on 28 April 2011. Retrieved 13 April 2011.
  87. ^ "Behind the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK)". Archived from the original on 28 September 2009. Retrieved 3 August 2009.
  88. ^ "Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 February 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
  89. ^ "I was lucky to escape with my life. The massacre of Iranian political prisoners in 1988 must now be investigated". The Independent. Archived from the original on 25 May 2022.
  90. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  91. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  92. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 978-0-203-94620-6.
  93. ^ Khanlari, Sam (2018). "Western signs of support for Iranian dissident group will only deepen the divide with Tehran". CBC News.
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  95. ^ Jehl, Douglas; Gordon, Michael R. (29 April 2003). "American Forces Reach Cease-Fire With Terror Group". The New York Times.
  96. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  97. ^ Shane, Scott (Nov 27, 2011). "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." The New York Times. New York Times.
  98. ^ Milani, Abbas (August 18, 2011). "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest.
  99. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times. 2018.
  100. ^ ALGHURABI, REZA. "Terrorism and Corruption: Albania's Issues with EU Accession". Archived from the original on 5 December 2019. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
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  110. ^ Cimment, James (2011). World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era, 2nd Edition. Routledge. pp. 276, 859. doi:10.4324/9781315697994. ISBN 978-0765682840. The strength of the movement inside Iran is uncertain [...] MEK is the largest and most active Iranian dissident group; its membership includes several thousand well-armed and highly disciplined fighters.
  111. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group
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  115. ^ Erlich, Reese (2018). The Iran Agenda Today: The Real Story Inside Iran and What's Wrong with U.S. Policy. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-429-94157-3. Retrieved 14 January 2020. But critics question that commitment given the cult of personality built around MEK's leader, Maryam Rjavi.
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Workshop for RFC on claim about MEK being largest/main opposition

Note: This is NOT an RFC. It is a preparation workshop. No !voting needed here.

RFC, 15 December 2022 was a RFC proposing some wording changes in the lede about how sources describe MEK size or support (largest/main opposition, largest armed group, fringe group, etc). I would like to create a new RFC on this topic that better captures the possible options. My current draft looks as follows

The lede currently states It is also Iran's largest and most active political opposition group.[1][2][3], and it recently stated It is Iran's largest and most active armed dissident group.[4][1]. What should be done with this statement?
  • Option A (current): Keep the current text: largest and most active political opposition group
  • Option B (previous): Keep the previous text: largest and most active armed dissident group
  • Option C (remove): Remove this claim from the lede.

Do you think these options are appropriate? Is there any other option you would like to see listed in the RFC?

As supporting material, I also prepared a list of independent, secondary sources that are related to the topic, sorted chronologically and including relevant quotes.

Source list
  • Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. [...] And many foreign diplomats considered it to be by far the largest, the best disciplined, and the most heavily armed of all the opposition organizations. As the main foe of the Islamic Republic [...]
  • Mackey, Sandra (1998). The Iranians. p. 372. While the Mujahedin remains the most widely feared opposition group because of period raids across the Shatt al-Arab, it is also the most discredited among the Iranian people who have not forgotten the Mujahedin's support of Iraq in the war against Iran.
  • Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. [...] Iran's most active opposition group [...] (TBD: quote not verified)
  • Kazemzadeh, Masoud (2002). Islamic Fundamentalism, Feminism, and Gender Inequality in Iran Under Khomeini. University Press of America. p. 58. From 1985, Rajavi transformed the PMOI from a mass movement into a cult with himself as its guru. [...] From 1985, however, under the terrible leadership of Rajavi, the PMOI had been reduced to a strange cult.
  • Alaedini, Pooya; Namazi, Siamak; Potter, Lawrence G. (2006). "Iran". In Schlager, Neil; Weisblatt, Jayne (eds.). World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties (4 ed.). Facts on File. p. 626. ISBN 978-0-8160-5953-9. [...] Mojahedin has become the most cohesive Iranian opposition group in exile [...] The Mojahedin was a respected organization in Iran because of its long guerrilla struggle against the shah. Its ideology, emphasizing Shiite Islam, socialism, and Iranian nationalism, proved to have strong appeal to the lower classes, who carried out the revolution. However, this appeal has been seriously compromised because of disillusionment with the group's leaders who have built personality cults around themselves, its violent tactics that kill civilians, its ties with Iraq, and the apparent lack of a viable platform.
  • Dyer, Clare (18 February 2008). "Government fights to keep ban on main Iranian opposition group". The Guardian. [...] the People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI), the main Iranian opposition organisation [...]
  • Rozenberg, Joshua (23 October 2008). "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". The Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group [...]
  • Cimment, James (2011). World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era, 2nd Edition. Routledge. pp. 276, 859. doi:10.4324/9781315697994. ISBN 978-0765682840. The strength of the movement inside Iran is uncertain [...] MEK is the largest and most active Iranian dissident group; its membership includes several thousand well-armed and highly disciplined fighters.
  • Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 173–174. ISBN 978-1-84519-270-9. The Mojahedin organization was the largest opposition movement that the Islamic Republic had to cope with even when it was still operating in Iran [...] ince 1981 until the mid 1980s, the organization lost its social hold in Iran. It was no longer considered a political alternative.
  • Rubin, Elizabeth (13 August 2011). "An Iranian Cult and Its American Friends". The New York Times. Mrs. Clinton should ignore their P.R. campaign. Mujahedeen Khalq is not only irrelevant to the cause of Iran's democratic activists, but a totalitarian cult that will come back to haunt us.
  • Ramsey, Jasmin (30 August 2011). "Facts vs. Fiction and the MEK's PR Campaign". [...] More recently, the MEK's attempts to paint itself as Iran's "main opposition" [...]
  • Shane, Scott (26 November 2011). "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. [...] a fringe Iranian opposition group, long an ally of Saddam Hussein, that is designated as a terrorist organization under United States law and described by State Department officials as a repressive cult despised by most Iranians and Iraqis. [...] The M.E.K. advocacy campaign has included full-page newspaper advertisements identifying the group as "Iran's Main Opposition" — an absurd distortion in the view of most Iran specialists; leaders of Iran's broad opposition, known as the Green Movement, have denounced the group. The M.E.K. has hired high-priced lobbyists like the Washington firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld. Its lawyers in Europe won a long fight to persuade the European Union to drop its own listing of the M.E.K. as a terrorist group in 2009.
  • McGreal, Chris (28 September 2012). "MEK supporters push for recognition by US as official Iranian opposition". The Guardian. A Texas congressman, Bob Filner, who has been among the most vigorous proponents of delisting the MEK, has described it as "Iran's main opposition" and a US "ally" against the Tehran government. Filner was the author of a pro-MEK resolution in Congress in favour of unbanning the organisation.
  • Cordesman, Anthony H.; Gold, Bryan; Coughlin-Schulte, Chloe (2014). Iran: Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change. Rowman & Littlefield / Center for Strategic and International Studies. p. 145. When [MEK] lost, it became the tool of Saddam Hussein until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and is now little more than a Rajavi cult with little influence in Iran and even less popularity.
  • Rezai, Hamid (2014). "Mujāhidīn-i Khalq". In Shahin, Emad (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics. Oxford University Press. The group has strong support in the European Parliament and US Congress, which both played key roles in removing the MEK from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations both in the European Union and, most recently, in the US. Although it is still the largest well-organized group in exile among the opposition to the Islamic Republic, the organization has not been able to launch noteworthy activities in the country due to the strict measures of the regime.
  • Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (22 April 2014). "Iranian prisoners allegedly forced to run gauntlet of armed guards". The Guardian. The MEK, which is based in Paris, remains unpopular in Iran because of its support for the late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war.
  • Torbati, Yeganeh (16 January 2017). "Former U.S. officials urge Trump to talk with Iranian MEK group". Reuters. The MEK's supporters present the group as a viable alternative to Iran's theocracy, though analysts say it is unpopular among Iranians for its past alignment with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and attacks on Iranian soldiers and civilians.
  • Bozorgmehr, Najmeh; Manson, Katrina (2 April 2018). "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times. Analysts say it has little support inside Iran today, where it is regarded as a terrorist organisation and has been accused of assassinating senior politicians and targeting civilians.
  • Erlich, Reese (2018). The Iran Agenda Today: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and What's Wrong with U.S. Policy. p. 85. MEK developed a significant base of support in Iran immediately after the revolution, but [...] [its] alliance with the hated Saddam Hussein embitered most Iranians and largely eliminated whatever respect the MEK may have won from its earlier resistance.
  • Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". The Guardian. [...] the MEK lost nearly all the support it had retained inside Iran. Members were now widely regarded as traitors.
  • Jannessari, Sohail; Loucaides, Darren (27 April 2019). "Spain's Vox Party Hates Muslims—Except the Ones Who Fund It". Foreign Policy. Since that moment, the group has been widely seen as a pariah among the Iranian public.
  • Rezaian, Jason (11 June 2019). "Opinion | Why does the U.S. need trolls to make its Iran case?". The Washington Post. That didn't stop Forbes, the Hill, Daily Caller and even the Voice of America from amplifying Alavi's platform as a voice on Iran policy. [Note: Forbes and Voice of America have since removed "Alavi's" pieces from their websites.] All of these outlets, and several more, have published articles by Alavi that claimed the MEK is the main opposition to the current Iranian regime.
  • Broder, Jonathan (27 August 2019). "Iran's Opposition Groups are Preparing for the Regime's Collapse. Is Anyone Ready?". Newsweek. [...] The MEK, whose name means the "People's Holy Warriors," is the oldest, best organized and best known of several Iranian opposition movements waiting in the wings. But there are others. [...] The MEK has been the leading opposition voice against the Islamic Republic for years. [...]
  • Hudson, John (23 September 2019). "Trump, Iran's Rouhani descend on same corner of New York but remain far apart". The Washington Post. Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution said in a statement to The Washington Post that she "would never knowingly engage with the Mujahideen-e Khalq, a cultlike terrorist organization that is despised by many Iranians."
  • Ainsley, Julia; Lehren, Andrew W.; Schapiro, Rich (17 October 2019). "Giuliani's work for Iranian group with bloody past could lead to more legal woes". NBC News. Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the organization as a fringe group with mysterious benefactors that garners scant support in its home country. "Their population in Iran hovers between negligible and nill," Sadjadpour said.
  • Pressly, Linda; Kasapi, Albana (11 November 2019). "The Iranian opposition fighters who mustn't think about sex". BBC. [...] one of Iran's main opposition groups, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, or MEK. [...]
  • Lansford, Tom (2020). "Iran". Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021. Vol. 1. CQ Press. p. 775. ISBN 978-1-5443-8471-9. The largest guerrilla group—which at one time claimed some 100,000 members but is now considered to have much less support— is the Mujaheddin-e Khalq
  • Friedman, Matt (10 June 2020). "Patrick Kennedy's ties to Iranian exile group becomes campaign issue in South Jersey". Politico. [...] a controversial group that opposes the current regime in Iran but was considered a terrorist organization by the United States until 2012 [...]
  • Campbell, Matthew (22 August 2021). "People's Mujahidin Seeking Regime Change in Tehran". The Times. [...] Mujahidin-e-Khalq — the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group [...]
  • "Iran's 1988 Mass Executions". Human Rights Watch. 8 June 2022. On July 18, 1988, the Iranian government accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, calling for a cease-fire in the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. On July 25, the largest Iranian armed opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO or MEK), based in Iraq since 1986, launched an incursion named "Eternal Light" into Iran in an attempt to topple the government.

Do you think these sources are comprehensive? Is there any other that should be included? Is there any that should be removed (e.g. clearly not reliable)? Are the quotes relevant enough?

I have also a draft for a summary table:

Summary table
Ref. Main/largest? Main/largest past?
Abrahamian 1989 harvnb error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help) "main foe"
Mackey 1998 No
Katzman 2001 harvnb error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help) most active
Kazemzadeh 2002 "reduced to a strange cult" "mass movement"
Alaedini, Namazi & Potter 2006 No "most cohesive [...] opposition group in exile"
Dyer 2008 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFDyer2008 (help) Yes
Rozenberg 2008 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRozenberg2008 (help) Yes
Cohen 2009 harvnb error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFCohen2009 (help) No "largest opposition movement"
Cimment 2011 harvnb error: multiple targets (4×): CITEREFCimment2011 (help) largest and most active [...] dissident group
Rubin 2011 irrelevant
Ramsey 2011 No
Shane 2011 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFShane2011 (help) "fringe"
McGreal 2012 harvnb error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFMcGreal2012 (help) Partial
Cordesman, Gold & Coughlin-Schulte 2014 No
Rezai 2014 Partial
Dehghan 2014 No
Bozorgmehr & Manson 2018 No
Torbati 2017 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFTorbati2017 (help) Partial
Erlich 2018 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFErlich2018 (help) No "significant base of support"
Merat 2018 harvnb error: multiple targets (5×): CITEREFMerat2018 (help) No
Jannessari & Loucaides 2019 No
Rezaian 2019 Partial no
Broder 2019 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFBroder2019 (help) Yes
Hudson 2019 No
Ainsley, Lehren & Schapiro 2019 "fringe"
Pressly & Kasapi 2019 "one of"
Lansford 2020 Partial "largest guerrilla group"
Friedman 2020 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFFriedman2020 (help)
Campbell 2021 Yes
HRW 2022 largest [...] armed opposition group

Is the summary fair?

Any feedback about the RFC question, the source list, or the summary table will be very appreciated. Since this might be a controversial RFC, and these tend to descend into chaos, I would like to start with a common ground where orderly discussion can happen. Thank you. --MarioGom (talk) 22:13, 10 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@MarioGom: the experience from the previous RFCs tell us that when we have more than two options, the votes are divided between them and no consensus could be derived . In this RFC for example, pro-Mek votes would go to the option A. Anti-MEK votes would be divided between option B and C. So it is clear the again no consensus would aquire. But if we have a yes/no question (should the claim be removed? Yes or No?) It would be clear the current claim is contested by many sources and have no place in the lede. When it is removed, then we could start another RFC on adding a new text.Ghazaalch (talk) 05:01, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fair. Reducing it to Yes/No might make sense, since they have been the fundamental positions defended before, and they might make parsing consensus easier. MarioGom (talk) 06:19, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I've got a simpler solution since this discussion appears to be going around in circles due to the A) the group's altered existence over time, and B) the false sense of prominence recently given to the group by Trump et al. To have a balanced statement we need to simply include all of the relevant information past and present to provide an overall summary of the group's relative size, significance and popularity, and to this end, I have already balanced the old text on the page with some much needed past and present context:
The MEK was at one point Iran's "largest and most active armed dissident group",[5][6] and some sources today still present it as a major political opposition group,[1][7][8] though it is known to be unpopular within Iran.[9][10]
This summarizes the group's past activity (a major militarized dissident group that aimed at the overthrow of the government through armed coup, later in league with Iraq), the claim presented in various media sources that it remains a significant opposition group + the subject-matter expert-backed statement that it is deeply unpopular in Iran. The behind-paywall Times and Telegraph sources for the middle statement are incidentally entirely needless for this and should be replaced with better options. There are plenty of open access sources for this sort of statement, including plenty of scholarly material options. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:17, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I think your proposed text is a decent assessment. Most reliable sources that discuss MEK history in depth agree that, at its peak, the MEK was the largest guerrilla group and/or had significant support. Most of them also agree that their support rapidly declined with the main factor being their exile and alliance with Iraq. The phrase "the MEK, the main opposition of Iran" (when discussing the present) is mostly a MEK slogan, propagated primarily by the MEK itself, connected sources (e.g. paid lobbyists), and eventually caught up by some generalist press. Maybe your proposal could replace Option B. The reason I've been leaning towards deletion is that capturing the nuances about MEK's rise and fall is not trivial, and I would prefer the defer to the body of the article to discuss it in depth rather than having a bad summary. But if the text in the lede is something along the lines of your proposal, I think it would be a good outcome. MarioGom (talk) 06:32, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Iskandar323, I agree that your proposal is fair enough, but would they accept it? Could we reason with them and reach consensus? I believe No. If they revert you again, I think we should remove the claim via RFC and then add a fair replacement like yours, again via RFC. Our experience from previous RFCs shows that we cannot do it at once.Ghazaalch (talk) 12:19, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I think the main priority is that the options represent the choices that multiple editors will reasonably accept (not that everyone accepts the same). Also, RFCs are not strict !votes. So it is possible for someone to say something like "Prefer A, oppose C" or "Prefer C, oppose A". Hopefully the closer can parse the consensus appropriately after that. In my opinion, part of the chaos of the previous RFC can be prevented if we start with a shared list of sources, rather than bringing up new source lists in the middle of the discussion. It's ok that each of us post a different assessment of sources, but at least we should agree on which are the main we'll consider.
ParadaJulio, Alex-h: What are your thoughts on the RFC options and the sources? MarioGom (talk) 13:09, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I'll get to this as soon as I can, but thanks for the ping! ParadaJulio (talk) 15:24, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • We all apparently agree that the MEK was the Islamic Republic's main rival during the 1980s. Even after the Iran-Iraq War Abrahamian was still referring to the MEK "as the main foe of the Islamic Republic".[11] Posing a question to those who argue that this is no longer true: When did the MEK cease to be the main foe of the Islamic Republic, and according to which source? Alex-h (talk) 15:30, 13 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Very simple. When they got the beat down during the 2003 Iraq invasion and their main fighting force was disarmed and imprisoned for six years, at which point the organization as a whole went a bit loony. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:00, 13 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Alex-h: A few of the listed sources describe a decline in support and size. Kazemzadeh (2002) mentions 1985 as a tipping point, Cohen (2009) mentions 1981 to "mid 1980s" as the decline, Cordesman (2003) is less specific, but mentions 2003 as another point of decline, Dehghan (2014), Torbati (2017) and quite a few others mention the alliance with Saddam Hussein as the primary factor of declining support which, while it's not an explicitly stated year, represents a well-known historical period, etc.
    Different sources might have different weight. But the point of this thread is preparing a common ground for discussion: 1) do you think the options discussed so far would be appropriate for an RFC? and 2) if there is an RFC, do you think the above list of sources includes every source that should be assessed during an RFC? Best, MarioGom (talk) 16:49, 13 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    It's also sitting there on the page in sentences such as "In the operation, the U.S. reportedly captured 6,000 MEK soldiers and over 2,000 pieces of military equipment, including 19 British-made Chieftain tanks. By most accounts, that was essentially the MEK's entire fighting force. Everything after that was clandestine. Iskandar323 (talk) 17:14, 13 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    MarioGom: Kazemzadeh (2002) doesn't mention a "tipping point" in relation to the MEK being the the Islamic Republic's main foe/rival/opposition, he critiques Rajavi for (according to him) transforming/reducing the MEK into a cult. Torbati (2017) gives brief comment about supporters and analysts. Dehghan (The Guardian) mentions that the MEK lost popularity in Iran because of its support for Saddam Hussein, and Cordesman (2014) also mentions something similar, but the MEK's cult of personality or its alleged popularity as a banned organization in Iran does not determine whether or not the MEK ceased to be the Islamic Republic's main foe/rival/opposition after the Iran-Iraq war. For instance, you cite Cohen (2009) mentioning that the MEK had lost its social hold in Iran, but then you take out of the article "that this is hard to prove because of the nature of the government in Iran" (you only needed to Google the quote to see that it was written by Cohen). Or consider James Cimment (2011) full quote that "The strength of the movement inside Iran is uncertain: hundreds of MEK supporters have been executed and many more tortured and jailed."[12] Or consider the 1988 executions of Iranian political prisoners when many were executed just for pledging support for the MEK, all things to consider when assessing MEK support inside Iran, but we're instead assessing if the MEK is still being considered the Islamic Republic's main foe after the Iran-Iraq war. I've prepared a list of sources including relevant quotes.
Source list
  • I think some of the options discussed so far would be appropriate for an RFC, although "Option B" has little weight with relation to the US disarmament. Alex-h (talk) 18:33, 23 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Alex-h: Thanks. I'll consolidate these in the sources list. I see some of the ones you listed were already included, others were not, and others could use a longer quote. Best, MarioGom (talk) 20:42, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Iskandar323: I listed sources and commentary here that challenge your changes and constitute significant explanation. Please attend to them before blindly restoring your edits. Also your other recent modifications -- "Iraqi officials", "have touted it as fighting for", "militant". The previous version had more weight. Alex-h (talk) 11:39, 25 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ a b c Katzman 2001, p. 97. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  2. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group
  3. ^ "The People's Mujahidin: the Iranian dissidents seeking regime change in Tehran". The Times. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group
  4. ^ Martin, Gus, ed. (2011). Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization (2nd ed.). Sage. ISBN 9781412980166. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |work= ignored (help)
  5. ^ Martin, Gus, ed. (2011). Mujahideen-e-Khalq Organization (2nd ed.). Sage. ISBN 9781412980166. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |work= ignored (help)
  6. ^ Cimment, James (2011). World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era, 2nd Edition. Routledge. pp. 276, 859. doi:10.4324/9781315697994. ISBN 978-0765682840. The strength of the movement inside Iran is uncertain [...] MEK is the largest and most active Iranian dissident group; its membership includes several thousand well-armed and highly disciplined fighters.
  7. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group
  8. ^ "The People's Mujahidin: the Iranian dissidents seeking regime change in Tehran". The Times. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group
  9. ^ Saeed Kamali Dehghan (22 April 2014), "Iranian prisoners allegedly forced to run gauntlet of armed guards", The Guardian, retrieved 15 June 2018, The MEK, which is based in Paris, remains unpopular in Iran because of its support for the late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq war.
  10. ^ Torbati, Yeganeh (16 January 2017), "Former U.S. officials urge Trump to talk with Iranian MEK group", Reuters, Reuters, retrieved 20 July 2017, The MEK's supporters present the group as a viable alternative to Iran's theocracy, though analysts say it is unpopular among Iranians for its past alignment with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and attacks on Iranian soldiers and civilians.
  11. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. [...] And many foreign diplomats considered it to be by far the largest, the best disciplined, and the most heavily armed of all the opposition organizations. As the main foe of the Islamic Republic [...]
  12. ^ Cimment, James (2011). World Terrorism: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era: An Encyclopedia of Political Violence from Ancient Times to the Post-9/11 Era, 2nd Edition. Routledge. pp. 276, 859. doi:10.4324/9781315697994. ISBN 978-0765682840.

1988 execution of MEK prisoners

A substantial amount of vital information was removed from "1988 execution of MEK prisoners".

[1] Information about the accused:

  • The executions were carried out by several high-ranking members of Iran's current government. According to the US State Department, the "death commissions" responsible for the 1988 executions of Iranian political prisoners started on 19 July (1988) and included the current head of the Iranian judiciary and current Minister of Justice.

[2] Information about the victims, and the treatment they received. The information about women and children was also removed:

  • Most of the prisoners executed were serving prison terms on account of peaceful activities (distributing opposition newspapers and leaflets, taking part in demonstrations, or collecting donations for political oppositions) or holding outlawed political views. In order to eliminate potential political oppositions, the Islamic Republic started "coordinated extrajudicial killings" in Iran. Under International law, the killings were considered a "crime against humanity". The commissions including judicial, prosecution, intelligence and prison officials proceeded executions that were not approved by their own existing legislation, and sentenced prisoners to death despite any proven "internationally recognized criminal offence". The Prisoners were questioned if they were willing to give written repentance for their political activities and beliefs.

[3] An attestation from a main government official challenging the fatwa:

  • Ayatollah Montazeri wrote to Ayatollah Khomeini saying "at least order to spare women who have children ... the execution of several thousand prisoners in a few days will not reflect positively and will not be mistake-free ... A large number of prisoners have been killed under torture by interrogators ... in some prisons of the Islamic Republic young girls are being raped ... As a result of unruly torture, many prisoners have become deaf or paralysed or afflicted with chronic decease.

[4] Information about the executions:

  • identify phoney repenters, or go to the war front and walk through enemy mindfields. According to Abrahamian, the questions were designed to "tax to the utmost the victim's sense of decency, honor, and self-respect". The Mojahedin who gave unsatisfactory answers were promptly taken to a special room and later hanged in batches of six.

[5] Fatwa:

  • through a fatwa

[6] Information from government officials:

  • In 2016, an audio recording was posted online of a high-level official meeting that took place in August 1988 between Hossein Ali Montazeri and the officials responsible for the mass killings in Tehran. In the recording, Hossein Ali Montazeri is heard saying that the ministry of intelligence used the MEK's armed incursion as a pretext to carry out the mass killings, which "had been under consideration for several years". Iranian authorities have dismissed the incident as "nothing but propaganda", presenting the executions as a lawful response to a small group of incarcerated individuals who had colluded with the MEK to support its 25 July 1988 incursion.

[7] Information about cover-up:

  • Those executed were put in collective graves containing multiple corpses at the Khavaran cemetery, which the Iranian government tried to cover up by changing the cemetery into a park."

[8] An attestation from MEK leadership:

  • In 2019, Maryam Rajavi, released a book named "Crime Against Humanity". The book is about the 1988 massacres of political prisoners in Iran, listing the location of 36 Iranian mass graves and explaining that about 30,000 people were executed, with the majority being MEK members.

I am recovering this information because "trimming" is an insufficient rationale to exclude it from the article. If there is still an interest in trimming this section (rather than removing substantial amounts of vital information), then we can workshop it (a draft proposal below).

Workshop for trimming 1988 executions information

A draft proposal:

On 19 July 1988, Iranian authorities suddenly isolated major prisons, having its courts of law go on an unscheduled holiday to avoid relatives finding out about those imprisoned.[1] Many of the prisoners killed during this time were "subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in the process."[2] The commissions proceeded executions that were not approved by their own existing legislation, and sentenced prisoners to death despite any proven "internationally recognized criminal offence".[2][3] Those executed included women and children.[4][5][6]

Most of the prisoners executed were serving prison terms on account of peaceful activities (distributing opposition newspapers and leaflets, taking part in demonstrations, or collecting donations for political oppositions) or holding outlawed political views. Under International law, the killings were considered a "crime against humanity".[2][3] The executions were carried out by several high-ranking members of Iran's current government.[7][8][9] According to the US State Department, the "death commissions" responsible for the mass executions and included the current head of the Iranian judiciary and current Minister of Justice.[10]

Ayatollah Montazeri wrote to Ayatollah Khomeini saying "at least order to spare women who have children ... A large number of prisoners have been killed under torture by interrogators ... in some prisons of the Islamic Republic young girls are being raped."[11] The Iranian government accused those investigating the executions of "disclosing state secrets" and threatening national security". According to Amnesty International, "there has also been an ongoing campaign by the Islamic Republic to demonize victims, distort facts, and repress family survivors and human rights defenders.[2][3] In 2016, an audio recording was posted online where Hossein Ali Montazeri is heard saying that the ministry of intelligence used Operation Mersad as a pretext to carry out the mass killings, which "had been under consideration for several years". Iranian authorities have dismissed the incident as "nothing but propaganda", presenting the executions as a lawful response to a small group of incarcerated individuals who had colluded with the MEK to support its 25 July 1988 incursion.[2][3]

Those executed were put in collective graves containing multiple corpses at the Khavaran cemetery, which the Iranian government tried to cover up by changing the cemetery into a park.[12] In 2019, Maryam Rajavi, released a book named "Crime Against Humanity". The book is about the 1988 massacres of political prisoners in Iran, listing the location of 36 Iranian mass graves and explaining that about 30,000 people were executed, with the majority being MEK members.[13]

ParadaJulio (talk) 15:24, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Material was removed because very little of it needs to be here. It is also present at the child article. All that should be here is a brief executive summary after the link. It needs cutting further from what it was, not re-expanding. Any quotes and statements not specifically related to the MEK should also go, as they have no place here. The executions did not only involve the MEK; MEK members and those accused of MEK membership just made up a large part of those executed. Iskandar323 (talk) 17:27, 11 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
You can't just remove substantial amounts of vital information from the article only because you want that section shorter. You're stripping it from very important points. Start with this workshop where we can discuss any defined issues you may have about the content, including a proposal draft for making it shorter. ParadaJulio (talk) 11:43, 14 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I means, yes you can, and that is in fact exactly what you should do if the material is already WP:SPLIT to a child article. The whole point of Wikipedia is that pages link to each other, so that material doesn't need to be copied over and over again in different places. All we need here is a brief summary and the main article link. Your edit also didn't just restore material that has been gone for months, but also deleted the first paragraph, which was totally unexplained in the edit summary. I'm not sure why you are doing this, but it is exactly the same thing that Fad Ariff was doing nearly a year ago before they were blocked for sockpuppetry - they were refusing to allow this section to be condensed, while, mysteriously, trying to get away with deleting the first sentence on the sly. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:07, 14 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Oh no, my mistake, you've actually buried the first sentence in the second paragraph, which was similarly actually what Fad Ariff kept doing. But same question, why are you blindly reverting to a version that has been edit warred into existence by a sockpuppet, and which clearly ruins the flow? Iskandar323 (talk) 12:24, 14 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I placed back the longstanding content and then gave you a list of the information you took out. I explained to you why I think the information should not be removed from the article and suggested we discuss it. "Trimming" is an insufficient rationale to exclude it from the article. Without resorting to further unnecessary hostility, what rationale for example do you have for wanting to remove "Most of the prisoners executed were serving prison terms on account of peaceful activities (distributing opposition newspapers and leaflets, taking part in demonstrations, or collecting donations for political oppositions) or holding outlawed political views. Under International law, the killings were considered a "crime against humanity".[2][3] The executions were carried out by several high-ranking members of Iran's current government.[14][8][15] According to the US State Department, the "death commissions" responsible for the mass executions and included the current head of the Iranian judiciary and current Minister of Justice."[16]? ParadaJulio (talk) 13:03, 15 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
This material is principally hosted elsewhere now. No other reason is required. All that is needed here is a bare minimum summary. The version, before you re-expanded it, was still too long. Per WP:SPLIT, step 6: If material is split from an article, consider whether a summary section should be created - this material is on its own article. And this article is overlength, so you are re-adding duplicated material to an overlength article? That is making the encyclopedia, the project here, worse. Why would you want to do that? Trimming is exactly the rationale here, because WP:TOOLONG applies here. This section is also clearly bloated. Aside from the fact that you literally cannot include all the detail on anything on every page, this information is already elsewhere, so nothing is actually being deleted: it is simply hosted at the main-linked page. That is how an interlinked wiki article is supposed to work. You are asking why removed the material, but that is not the question here; the question is: why keep it? Iskandar323 (talk) 14:58, 15 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
So in response to this proposal: no, it's too long, and this article is WP:TOOLONG. This material has all been split, so does not need to be duplicated here. All we need is a brief summary of the key highlights particularly pertinent to the MEK. We do not need granular details, excessive tangential quotes or other bloating dross. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:00, 15 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
So let's trim it. I just trimmed some of it. We can trim more about the accused, victims and the treatment they received, attestation from main government officials and cover-up, but do not just remove it all. Since the article is WP:TOOLONG, why have you re-expanded some sections? What rationale for example do you have for re-expanding about Saddam or "Cult of personality"? That section needs work, but what you replaced it with is loaded with POV and has a terrible imbalance of suppressed information. I also placed back previous section titles ("Assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists" in this article is egregiously WP:UNDUE) and merged the "Iraqi government's crackdown (2009–2010)" with "Relocation from Iraq". IMO, there should be substantive reasons for contentious re-expansions that are exempt from WP:TOOLONG. ParadaJulio (talk) 17:28, 18 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Why are you inviting me to trim it? It was already trimmed: you actively untrimmed it. And I never removed it all - it was still about five, very long paragraphs - though, even if there was only a single paragraph, it wouldn't matter, because it has its own page. WP:TOOLONG does not mean the only way is down, but that it should be the general direction of travel. I'm not going to discuss the cult section here; again, the only reason why the cult section was shrunken in the first place was due to the activity of the tendentious socks that have some weird love affair with the MEK. Iskandar323 (talk) 05:30, 19 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Extended content

References

  1. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1999). Tortured Confessions. University of California Press. pp. 209–214. ISBN 978-0-520-21866-6.
  2. ^ a b c d e f "Blood-soaked secrets with Iran's 1998 Prison Massacres are ongoing crimes against humanity" (PDF). 4 December 2018. Retrieved 14 December 2018.
  3. ^ a b c d e "Iran: Top government officials distorted the truth about 1988 prison massacres". 12 December 2018. Retrieved 14 December 2018.
  4. ^ "Iran still seeks to erase the '1988 prison massacre' from memories, 25 years on". Amnesty International.
  5. ^ "DEATH OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IN IRAN IN 1988". UK Parliament.
  6. ^ "Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 February 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
  7. ^ "Iran: Top government officials distorted the truth about 1988 prison massacres". 12 December 2018. Archived from the original on 12 December 2018. Retrieved 14 December 2018.
  8. ^ a b Abrahamian, Ervand (4 May 2017). "An Interview with Scholar and Historian Ervand Abrahamian on the Islamic Republic's "Greatest Crime"". Center for Human Rights in Iran. Archived from the original on 5 May 2017.
  9. ^ "Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran'". The Telegraph. 2 February 2001. Archived from the original on 10 February 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
  10. ^ "Blood-Soaked Secrets Why Iran's 1988 Prison Massacres Are Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity". Retrieved 13 May 2022.
  11. ^ Basmenji, Kaveh (2005). Tehran Blues: Youth Culture in Iran. Saqui Books. ISBN 978-0-86356-582-3.
  12. ^ "The Bloody Red Summer of 1988". pbs. theguardian.com.
  13. ^ Lyman, Eric J. (23 October 2019). "New book details atrocities by Iranian regime in the 1980s". The Washington Times. Retrieved 12 December 2021.
  14. ^ "Iran: Top government officials distorted the truth about 1988 prison massacres". 12 December 2018. Archived from the original on 12 December 2018. Retrieved 14 December 2018.
  15. ^ "Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran'". The Telegraph. 2 February 2001. Archived from the original on 10 February 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
  16. ^ "Blood-Soaked Secrets Why Iran's 1988 Prison Massacres Are Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity". Retrieved 13 May 2022.

Mohammad-Reza Kolahi

Revert/contest [15] and [16] because some looks like vandalism and some is already in the page. Mohammad-Reza Kolahi could be added if others think WP:TOOLONG is not applicable. ParadaJulio (talk) 17:34, 18 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

ParadaJulio: I have moved this thread to the top level, since it is a change by a different user than the changes discussed in the previous thread. Please, avoid indiscriminately expanding the scope of previous threads. Best, MarioGom (talk) 22:20, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Verification of material

@MarioGom: which of your citations says that The campaign to delist the MEK in the European Union counted with Spanish MEP Alejo Vidal-Quadras as one of its main lobbyists? ParadaJulio (talk) 17:40, 18 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

ParadaJulio: Vidal-Quadras role is well-established, and back in the day it was publicly notorious (e.g. as part of Friends of a Free Iran):
  • El Confidencial [17]: La relación de Vidal-Quadras con el grupo viene de lejos: hace una década, sus esfuerzos consiguieron que la Unión Europea sacase a los MeK de su lista de organizaciones terroristas. Roughly translated as Vidal-Quadras relation with the group [MEK/NCRI] goes back a long way: a decade ago, his efforts achieved that the European Union dropped the MEK from their list of terrorist organizations.
  • Foreign Policy [18]: The organization started an intense lobbying campaign to have itself removed from terrorist lists in the United States and European Union. A vast and impressive range of current and former U.S. politicians and officials ended up being linked to this effort, from Giuliani and Bolton on the right to Democratic Sen. Bob Menendez and former Democratic National Committee chairman Howard Dean on the left. In Europe, the list included Alejo Vidal-Quadras, a now-retired Spanish politician, who previously served as one of the 14 vice presidents in the EU Parliament. The MEK was finally delisted by the U.S. government in 2012 and by the EU in 2009.
  • eldiario.es [19]: Cuando la Unión Europea decidió retirar de la lista europea de organizaciones terroristas a los Muyahidines del Pueblo de Irán (OMPI), principal grupo de oposición al régimen islámico de Teherán, Maryam Rajavi, presidenta del Consejo Nacional de la Resistencia de Irán (considerado el brazo político de los Muyahidines), agradeció el apoyo de un grupo de miembros del Parlamento Europeo, en especial de Vidal-Quadras. Era frecuente que el entonces político del PP participase activamente en todo tipo de actos del lobby en Bruselas de la oposición iraní en el exilio Roughly translated as When the European Union decided to drop the main opposition group to the islamic regime of Tehran, the MEK from the european list of terrorist organizations, Maryam Rajavi, president of the NCRI (considered the political arm of the MEK), thanked their support to a group of members of the European Parliament, in particular to Vidal-Quadras. It was frequent that the then PP politician participated actively in all kinds of events of the Iranian opposition in exile's lobby in Brussels
--MarioGom (talk) 20:36, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

MEK ideology in the lede (WP:RFCBEFORE)

Is "Its revolutionary interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy as well as the populist version developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s."[1] something for the lede? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:26, 19 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

As discussed above by Iskandar323, it is a cherry-picked material with no context. It should go to the body of the article to be discussed thoroughly.Ghazaalch (talk) 06:34, 19 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think so. It's far from being a fair summary of People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran § Ideology. MarioGom (talk) 22:18, 24 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Cite error: There are <ref group=lower-alpha> tags or {{efn}} templates on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=lower-alpha}} template or {{notelist}} template (see the help page).

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 1. sfn error: multiple targets (7×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)