Civilian control of the military in communist states
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Civilian control of the military in communist states have differed from country to country. There are typically three models of civilian control of the military: party-run, state-run, and hybrid. In all three models, the communist party has an internal organisation in the military.
Party-run
[edit]In the party-run model, the military is entirely run through the organ on military affairs of the central committee of the communist party. This was the case in China from 1975 to 1983, when there existed no state counterpart to the Central Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[1] Since 1982, under the principle of "one institution with two names", a state counterpart with an identical name, personnel and organisation has existed alongside its party counterpart.[2] The party's authority is stated in law, Article 19 of the "Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defence" states, "The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China is subject to the leadership of the Communist Party of China."[3]
State-run
[edit]In the state-run model, the highest organ on military affairs is an organ of the highest organ of state power, with no party counterpart. This model was practised by the Soviet Union, in which the Council of Defence, appointed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, led the Soviet armed forces. However, party leadership was ensured by the Soviet party leader, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, serving ex officio as chairman of the Council of Defence.[4]
Hybrid
[edit]In the hybrid model, both the state and the party have organs on military affairs. This model is practised in Vietnam, in which the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has an internal organ on military affairs led by the party leader and the highest organ of state power, the National Assembly of Vietnam, having a state counterpart led by the President of Vietnam. Despite this, the Vietnamese political system stresses that the Vietnamese armed forces are under the absolute leadership of the CPV.[5]
Examples
[edit]People's Republic of China
[edit]- Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (party)
- Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (state counterpart)
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
[edit]- Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea (party)
- National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (state counterpart)
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
[edit]- Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of Vietnam (party)
- Council for National Defense and Security (Vietnam) (state counterpart)
References
[edit]Articles
[edit]- "Lãnh đạo, quản lý quốc phòng" [Defense leadership and management] (in Vietnamese). Ministry of Defence of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Archived from the original on 28 September 2023. Retrieved 6 January 2024.
Books
[edit]- Fu, Zhengyuan (1993). Autocratic tradition and Chinese politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521442282.
- Li, Cheng (2016). Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership. Brookings Institution. ISBN 9780815726937. JSTOR 10.7864/j.ctt15hvr7t.
- Han, Zhai (2021). The Constitutional Identity of Contemporary China: The Unitary System and Its Internal Logic. Brill Publishers. ISBN 9789004388147.
Journals
[edit]- Karlsson, Håkan (1988). "The Defense Council of the USSR". Cooperation and Conflict. 23 (2): 69–83. JSTOR 45084370.
- Lowsen, Ben (26 February 2021). "China's Updated National Defense Law: Going for Broke" (PDF). China Brief. 21 (4): 6–12. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 January 2024. Retrieved 6 January 2014.
Footnotes
[edit]- ^ Fu 1993, p. 194; Han 2021, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Li 2016, pp. 46–47.
- ^ Lowsen 2021, pp. 6–7.
- ^ Karlsson 1988, pp. 69–70.
- ^ Ministry of Defence 2024.