Sweden during World War II
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The policy of Sweden during World War II was to remain neutral. The Swedish neutrality had been in use for more than a century, since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.
When hostilities began on 1 September 1939, the fate of Sweden was unclear. Eventually, only five European nations were capable of sustaining a policy of neutrality throughout the entire war, even though 20 nations had held a policy of neutrality in September 1939. Sweden was one of those countries able to maintain this delicate balance and avoid engagement in the European Theatre. Sweden owed this to its northerly location in the Scandinavian Peninsula, its long-held neutral stance in international relations, a dedicated military build-up and to an unpredictable course of events which went in its favour. Another factor was that the Swedish government was forced to make concessions to Germany, such as allowing the Wehrmacht to use Swedish railways to transport an infantry division from Norway to Finland and to transport soldiers on leave between Norway and Germany. These concessions were made out of fear of invasion. However, Sweden's inability to take a stand was partly related[citation needed] to her geographical position (as opposed to that of Great Britain), and can also be related[citation needed] to what is a typical cultural tendency in Sweden, to avoid conflict and confrontation as much as possible, which for non-Swedes is and was difficult to understand. Sweden's cooperation with Germany was not worse[citation needed] than that of many other countries in Europe, and one might argue that Sweden, while never invaded, was more or less occupied by default. Also, it is notable that Sweden secretly collaborated with the Allies, by allowing their intelligence units to spy in Sweden, and was eventually very close to joining the Allied war effort. Sweden would have prefered[citation needed] to help the Allies, as they were opposed to Nazi policies, but reality of the situation provided a different scenerio. Sweden's choice has been the subject of much debate in Sweden, but at the time it was considered[citation needed] to be the most feasible option.
Sweden's long-standing policy of neutrality was severely tested on numerous occasions during the 1930s. The challenges came from a strongly rejuvenated, nationalistic Germany. From 1919 until 1935, Sweden had been an active supporter of the League of Nations. Most of Sweden's energy in the international arena had been directed towards preservation of the League. However, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (AGNA) of 1935 seriously jeopardised both Sweden's independence and its long-standing policy of peaceful neutrality. Signed on June 18, 1935, the agreement was a great shock to many Swedes. AGNA allowed Germany to increase the size of its navy to one-third the size of the British Royal Navy, despite the provisions agreed in the Treaty of Versailles. At the same time, Britain agreed to withdraw its navy from the Baltic Sea, leaving the Kriegsmarine the dominant power in that sea. This became a potential threat to Sweden and other countries in the region.
Pre-war preparations
Beginning in 1936, the Swedish government regularly increased its defense budget to strengthen its military preparedness as the international situation was seen to worsen. Military spending went from $37 million in 1936, to $50 million in 1937, to $58.575 million in 1938, and then increased over five-fold to $322.325 million in 1939. During the war itself, military spending peaked in 1942 at $527.575 million.
During European hostilities, Swedish industry had to supply an increased share of domestic goods, due the German blockade of the North Sea, as well as to satisfy the vastly increased demand for armaments. Before the war, annual production of armaments typically totalled tens of millions of Swedish kronor, but during the war, output exceeded SEK 1 billion (US$240 million).
Not only was the Swedish government buying materiel to strengthen its defences, it began drafting conscripts. On May 6, 1938, the government called up the entire conscript class of 1923, then at the age of 35, for short periods of training. In addition to this, the Swedish Cabinet ordered that one quarter of the 1938 military draft intake be retained for further training.
In 1940, the Swedish Home Guard (Hemvärnet), was created. Its units comprised small groups of former soldiers who were equipped with rifles, machine guns, ammunition, medicine and uniforms. They had the option to buy additional materials such as skis, sweaters and marching boots. The Swedish Women's Voluntary Defence Service, or Lottorna, had been created in 1924.
While arming itself, Sweden felt that it was necessary to articulate and enforce its policy of neutrality. Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson stated shortly before the Second World War began: "Friendly with all other nations and strongly linked to our neighbors, we look on no one as our enemy. There is no place in the thoughts of our people for aggression against any other country, and we note with gratitude assurances from others that they have no wish to disturb our peace, our freedom, or our independence. The strengthening of our defence preparations serves merely to underline our fixed determination to keep our country outside the conflicts among others and, during such conflicts, to safeguard the existence of our people." Other members of the Swedish government expressed similar sentiments. However, in the first years of the war, Sweden's geographical position required her to reluctantly cooperate with Nazi Germany and provide it with important goods like iron ore, essential to the war effort.
Georg Homin, a captain on the General Staff, said, "without a defensive force we cannot follow any policy of our own, our declarations become merely empty words, and we leave the country's fate to chance or to the decision of others. With a defence as strong as Swedish conditions allow we secure for ourselves the basis of a continued independent Swedish policy."
The defence of Finland
(Borders as of 1920–1940.)
When the Soviet Union attacked Finland in 1939, many Swedes favoured some sort of involvement in the conflict, both on a humanitarian and a military basis. Sweden's interest in Finland lay in the fact that Finland had been an integrated part of Sweden for more than six hundred years, Sweden losing control of the eastern provinces in 1809. Despite several pleas from the Finnish government, the Swedish government chose to not engage military when the Red Army advanced during the Winter War.
However, Sweden was declared nonbelligerent rather than neutral during the conflict and did accept that as many as 8,000 Swedes voluntarily went to Finland. The Swedish government did send food, clothing, medicine and a small quantity of weapons and ammunition to aid the Finns at the beginning of the war, but avoided any official military involvement. Sweden was later unable to provide the same assistance to Norway, as they had given so much to Finland, but also because it was felt it would upset Germany if they aided Norway. In addition, some 70,000 Finnish children were sent to safety from Finland to Sweden during the 1940s [1].
Press freedom and public perceptions
The public's sentiments were widely published in the Swedish press, causing many protests from the German government and prompting the Swedish government to censor areas of the press on a limited basis. In Sweden, the press fell under the control of several councils, despite contemporary claims that the Swedish press was free. The Swedish Government War Information Board determined what military information was released and what information remained secret. The Swedish Press Council served as a "promotion of good relations between the press and the public authorities and to serve as an instrument of self-discipline for the press." The Press Council issued warnings, public or confidential, to those who abused the freedom of the press.
To say that Sweden had a truly free press was somewhat false. Sweden was concerned that its neutrality might run the risk of being unbalanced should its press be too vocal in its opinions. Both the Press Council and the Information Board issued comments such as "As far as the material received permits, attempts should be made not to give prominence to the reports of one side at the expense of the other", or "headlines, whether on the billboards or in the newspapers, should be worded in such a way as to avoid favouring one side or the other", and finally, "editorials and surveys as well as articles discussing military events or the military situation, should be strictly objective...".
During the war the Communist press was de-facto banned from distribution. A ban on transport of the concerned newspapers was imposed (since printing of the newspapers is protected in the Swedish constitution, this was a means to avoid openly breaking the constitutional limits).[2]
Foreign trade
A vital factor in Sweden's relations with the great powers, particularly Germany and Britain, was trade. Prior to the war Sweden had important trade connections with both countries. If Sweden had shown preference to either side, it would have threatened its neutrality and even its independence. Maintaining such trading partnerships was not only important politically, but in an economic sense as well. For example, in 1938 24 percent of Sweden's total exports went to Britain and another 18 percent to Germany.
The outbreak of war greatly affected trade with both countries. At the beginning of the war, agreements were signed between Sweden and the two great powers in order to sustain these vital export markets. However when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway in April 1940, coupled with a German blockade of the North Sea, Sweden's trade with Britain was cut by a total of 70 percent. Within the blockade trade with Germany increased, until 37 percent of Sweden's exports were shipped to Germany. Actually this included large quantities of Swedish steel, sold to Hitler for making weapons.
Potential Allied invasion
There was much speculation as to whether the Allies would consider an invasion of the European continent by way of Scandinavia rather than across the English Channel. Hitler was very concerned by such a prospect and was almost convinced that the Allies would invade Europe by way of Norway. Hitler's letter to Sweden's King Gustaf V, dated April 24, 1940, said, "I have no doubt that our action (the invasion of Norway and Denmark), which at the last moment forestalled the execution of the Allied plan and which under all circumstances will stop France and England from getting a foothold in Scandinavia, will have consequences which will be a blessing to the Scandinavian peoples."
Had such an Allied invasion of Norway occurred, Sweden would have undoubtedly been grievously affected. Sweden was considered to be situated in a prime location for air bases for Allied planes to effect air raids into Germany. Even towards the end of the war, when German capitulation seemed imminent, the Allies considered an invasion of Sweden, due in large part to Sweden's strategic location in relation to Germany.
German pressure
When Germany invaded Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940, demands were made stating that Sweden was to keep neutral and refrain from mobilizing to aid her neighbours. German communications were to continue uninterrupted through Swedish channels and the trade with iron ore was not to be disturbed. The Swedish government agreed, but secretly increased her armed forces during the following weeks, from 100,000 men to 320,000. More demands followed during the spring and summer, particularly for the transit of medical personnel, later stepped up to include ammunition and soldiers on leave. During the summer of 1941, the Swedish government was forced to accept the transit of a fully equipped German division headed to Finland, bound for the recently opened eastern front.
In February 1942, German presence in Norway was stepped up in preparation of an invasion of Sweden. Hitler was dissatisfied with Swedish cooperation and doubted its ability to defend against an allied attack through Norway, threatening ore resources. 300,000 Swedish soldiers were sent to the western border to train and prepare, but no invasion came and the crisis dissipated. The German High Command considered an invasion of Sweden again in 1943 (Operation Polar Fox), in the event of success on the Eastern Front. When the Battle of Kursk did not end in a German victory, the plan was once more shelved.
New research released on April 4, 2006 has shown that Sweden helped Germany to stop Germans from marrying Jews. Stockholm University historian Klas Amark coordinated the research commissioned by Prime Minister Göran Persson in 2000 in connection with a Holocaust conference. The research showed that from 1937, Swedes wanting to marry Germans of so-called Aryan blood had to give written assurance that none of their grandparents belonged to the Jewish race or religion. This was a result of an order from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), saying that a Hague Convention of 1902 required its signatories to enforce other countries' marriage laws on those countries' citizens. The order "lacked historic and democratic legitimacy and was also foreign to Swedish law", according to Professor Anders Jarlert, one of the researchers involved [3]. Some marriages between "Aryan" Germans and Jews were annulled by the courts. However, many priests married such couples in defiance of the order [4].
As part of the governmental policy of censorship to avoid angering the Germans, newspapers avoided printing any criticism of Germany and information about Germany's actions. This policy of censorship was very unpopular among many Swedes, and today it is considered to be the worst breech of the free press in Sweden's history.
After 1943
From 1943 onwards, Germany began to meet with a greater amount of misfortune after its losses at Stalingrad and elsewhere. Germany was forced into a more defensive position, while Allied forces met with greater success on the battlefield, such as in North Africa. Such a position allowed Sweden to be more decisive in its own policies and actions. Prior to 1943, Sweden's policy of neutrality was largely under the influence of German politics and the course of events that involved Germany, and it has been said that of the neutral nations in Europe during the war, only Switzerland and Portugal were completely neutral at that time. Following August and September 1943, Sweden was able to resist German demands and soften its stance to Allied pressure. However, despite Germany's defensive posture, Sweden was in constant fear that "the whole course of events suggested that the unexpected might happen," an attitude that was sustained until the very end of the war. With Germany's weakening position came stronger demands from the Allies. The Allies pushed for Sweden to abandon its trade with Germany, and to stop all German troop transit over Swedish soil. Sweden initially turned down such requests out of fear of inciting Germany, but over time gradually gave in to the demands.
Sweden's Humanitarian Effort
In 1943 Sweden received thousands of Jewish immigrants from Denmark. With the dissolution of the Danish government in the summer of 1943, the German authorities had decided to deport the Danish Jewish population to concentration camps. However, the Danes successfully transported the vast majority to Sweden in a vast rescue effort. There, they were granted asylum, and taken in by Swedes. Many stayed in Sweden after the war. Sweden also received refugees from Finland and Norway. This, as well as the protection of Sweden's own Jewish population, was made possible due to Sweden's neutrality.
Neutrality also made it possible for Sweden to have access to Germany, which was not only useful to Swedish intelligence but also to the Allies. King Gustav V attempted to use his diplomatic connections to German leaders to convince them to treat the Jews more humanely, though he had little influence. Count Folke Bernadotte, a relative of the royal family, was able to communicate with the German government, and relay information back to Sweden, as did other spies. He also contributed to saving 15,000 prisoners from concentration camps, including some Jews, as did the famous Raoul Wallenberg, who saved perhaps 100,000 Hungarian Jews.
Sweden's concessions to the Germans
Perhaps the most important aspect of Sweden's concessions to Germany during the Second World War was the extensive export of iron ore to be used in the German weapons industry. As Germany's preparations for war became more apparent and the risk of another war became obvious, international interest in Swedish ore increased. At the time, German industry relied heavily on Swedish iron ore and a decrease or stop in Swedish ore exports could have been disastrous for German military efforts. Ralph Glynn, a member of the UK parliament, indicated in a message just how dependent Germany was of Sweden. If Sweden stopped their exports it could lead to an end of the war within six months. Should German troops attack Sweden, the British would come to their rescue. The Swedish government was not convinced that the British could protect them, and opted to continue exports however, as iron ore provided much needed income and coal from Germany, as well as preventing an invasion. The Allies tried to get Sweden to reduce the export, and finally the country came to an agreement about a yearly iron export to Germany. The Germans were still co-operative, as Sweden continued its exports off the record. In addition to iron ore, Germany required Swedish ball bearings (some of the best available at the time). In 1944, Sweden promised the Allies to reduce the ball bearing export as well, but found a loophole in the agreement and started to export ball bearing steel and ball bearing machines. Sweden was very concerned about facing the same economic hardship that they had faced during World War I, when they were cut off from all trade except with Germany.
Responding to German appeals for volunteers, a handful of Swedes ignored neutrality to enlist in Germany's elite Waffen-SS, and saw combat against Soviet troops on the Eastern Front. This was a choice made by the individual Swedish soldiers involved, and not Swedish policy.
Sweden's collaboration with the Allies
Sweden made a willing effort to help the Allies when they could. In 1945, as the Allies were planning to liberate Denmark and Norway, the United States wanted Sweden to cooperate in this action. Sweden began preparing for "Operation Rädda Danmark" (Operation Save Denmark), in which Sweden was to invade Zealand from Scania. After Denmark had been liberated, Sweden was to assist the Allies in the invasion of Norway. Though this was not necessary in the end, US planes were allowed to use Swedish military bases during the liberation of Norway, from spring of 1944 to 1945. The Allies were also collaborating with C-byrån, the Swedish military intelligence. Sweden allowed Allied spies to listen to German radio signals from a station on Öland, and in Malmö a location was established for British military to lead bombing actions in Germany. Also, since 1943, Norwegian and Danish soldiers (Den danske Brigade) were being trained at Swedish military bases. This part of the story is rarely mentioned, but it is important to note because it shows how Sweden was very close to abandoning her neutrality in favor of the Allied cause, making Sweden almost an ally. The collaboration with the Allies was considered a far greater breach of neutrality than the concessions to the Germans, but it is often overshadowed by these concessions. Sweden's collaboration with the Germans was only out of necessity and in the end Sweden was willing to participate in the Allied liberation of her neighbors, once the threat of a German invasion was gone. On the other hand, it might also seem that Sweden's collaboration with the Allies during the latter part of the war was also out of necessity. Swedish neutrality remains a hotly contested topic today. However, although Sweden did cooperate with Germany, it was out of fear rather than preference, and Sweden's government and the vast majority of Swedes were ideologically and morally alligned with the Allies, and were very fearful of a German victory and of the German government's attacks on democracy and its inhumane practices.
Afterward
Sweden's neutrality has been criticized by those who say it proved to be inneffectual in reality. Many feel ashamed that the government did not stand up to Germany, and many felt this way at the time as well. However, the government believed that protecting its people was of highest importance, and believed that Sweden could remain uninvolved. Ultimately it can be said that Sweden's government faced a "Catch-22" dilemma: help their close neighbors and the war effort, or protect their own people from invasion by remaining outside. While it proved impossible to remain entirely uninvolved, they did manage to avoid invasion, at the cost of being seen as "cowardly" by some. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously referred to Sweden during the war as "that small, coward country"[1]. The lack of military support for Norway has caused some distance between the two nations, yet they have managed to maintain close relations, as most are aware of the complexity of the situation.