Operation Wooden Leg

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Operation "Wooden Leg"
Part of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Map of Tunisia
Map of Tunisia
Operational scope Strategic
Planned by Israel Air Force Flag.svg Israeli Air Force
Objective Destroy PLO headquarters in Hammam al-Shatt, Tunisia
Date October 1, 1985
Executed by Eight F-15 Eagles
Outcome United Nations Security Council Resolution 573.
The UN Security Council voted to condemn the attack on Tunisian territory as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and consider that Tunisia had the right to appropriate reparations. The United States abstained.
Casualties between 100 and 271 killed

Operation "Wooden Leg" (Hebrew: מבצע רגל עץMivtza Regel Etz) was an attack by Israel on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Hammam al-Shatt, near Tunis, Tunisia, on October 1, 1985. With a target 1,280 miles (2,060 km) from the operation's starting point, this was the most distant action undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces since Operation "Entebbe" in 1976.

Background[edit]

After the 1982 Lebanon War, the PLO had been based in Tunisia. On September 25, 1985, during the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, gunmen from the PLO's elite Force 17 unit hijacked an Israeli yacht off the coast of Larnaca, Cyprus, and killed the three Israeli tourists on board. The Israelis were allowed to write down their final thoughts before being shot. The nature of the killings provoked widespread shock in Israel. The PLO claimed that the victims were Mossad agents monitoring Palestinian naval traffic out of Cyprus. The attack was a response for the capture and imprisonment of senior Force 17 commander Faisal Abu Sharah by the Israeli Navy two weeks earlier. Sharah had been sailing on the Opportunity, a small ship that regularly shuttled between Beirut and Larnaca, when it was stopped by an Israeli naval patrol boat with Mossad agents on board. Sharah was arrested, taken to Israel and interrogated. He was then tried and given a heavy prison sentence. Since then, the Israeli Navy and the Mossad had intercepted several other vessels and arrested passengers suspected of terrorist activity.[1][2]

The Israeli cabinet and the Israeli Air Force desired immediate retaliation, and chose the Tunis headquarters of the PLO as their target. Intelligence supplied to Israel by Jonathan Pollard on the Tunisian and Libyan air defense systems greatly facilitated the raid.[3] Following the incident, the Arab press had published numerous warnings of Israeli retaliation. Many of the stories were planted by LAP, the Mossad's department of psychological warfare.[1]

On the eve of the attack, Tunisia expressed concern to the United States that it may be attacked by Israel. However, the United States, according to a high-ranking Tunisian official, assured Tunisia there was no reason to worry.[4]

Operation[edit]

The strike was carried out by eight F-15 Eagles. At 07:00 on October 1, the aircraft took off from Tel Nof Airbase. A Boeing 707 heavily modified for refueling operations refueled the F-15s in mid-flight over the Mediterranean Sea in order to allow the operation to be executed over such a distance. The Israeli Navy stationed a helicopter-carrying vessel near Malta to recover downed pilots, but these were never needed. The route was designed to avoid detection by Egyptian and Libyan radars, and United States Navy vessels patrolling the Mediterranean. IAF commander Amos Lapidot saw little chance of resistance from the Tunisian Air Force or from Tunisian air defenses, but believed that on such a long flight, technical problems could arise.[5]

The F-15s flew low over the shore, and fired precision-guided munitions on the PLO headquarters, a cluster of sand-colored buildings along the seaside. The planes attacked the southern location first, so that the northern wind would not pull smoke over the northern targets.[6] The attack lasted for six minutes, after which the F-15s flew back to Israel, refueled again by the Boeing 707.

The PLO headquarters was completely destroyed, although Yasser Arafat, the head of the organization, was not there at the time and escaped unharmed. Israel claimed that some 60 PLO members were killed, including several leaders of Force 17, and several of Arafat's bodyguards. In addition, the operation resulted in casualties among civilian bystanders.[4] According to other sources, 56 Palestinians and 215 Tunisians were killed and about 100 wounded.[7]

Because the attack was conducted so far from Israel, Tunisian sources believed that attack must have been known by the United States, if not actually involving American collaboration.[4]

Aftermath[edit]

The attack provoked a strong outcry, even in the United States, Israel's strongest ally. Though initially labeling the strike a "legitimate response to terror," the Reagan administration later said the attack "cannot be condoned." The attack also harmed relations between the US administration and the Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba. Believing the US knew about the attack, and was possibly involved, Tunisia considered breaking diplomatic ties with the US.[4]

Egypt suspended negotiations with Israel over the disputed border town of Taba. Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was quoted as saying "It was an act of self-defense. Period."

In the United Nations Security Council Resolution 573 (1985) the Security Council voted (with the United States abstaining) to condemn the attack on Tunisian territory as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and considered that Tunisia had the right to appropriate reparations.[8]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Thomas, Gordon: Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad
  2. ^ Seale, 1993. p237
  3. ^ Black, Edwin (20 June 2002). "Does Jonathan Pollard Deserve a Life Sentence?". History News Network. Retrieved 24 November 2009. 
  4. ^ a b c d W. Seelye, Talcott (March 1990). "Ben Ali Visit Marks Third Stage in 200-Year-Old US-Tunisian Special Relationship". The Washington Report. p. 7. 
  5. ^ Black, Ian: Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services
  6. ^ http://www.iaf.org.il/46940-33087-en/IAF.aspx
  7. ^ Seale, 1993. p.238
  8. ^ United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/573(1985) 4 October 1985. Retrieved 2007-08-10.

Sources[edit]

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