United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine
UN General Assembly
Resolution 181 (II)
|Date:||November 29 1947|
|Vote:||For: 33 Abs.: 10 Against: 13|
|Result:||Recommendation to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out in the resolution|
|Annex A, showing the Partition Plan|
|Wikisource has original text related to this article:|
The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a plan for the future government of Palestine. The Plan was described as a Plan of Partition with Economic Union which, after the termination of the British Mandate, would lead to the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem. On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the adoption and implementation of the Plan as Resolution 181(II).
Part I of the Plan contained provisions dealing with the Termination of the Mandate, Partition and Independence. The Mandate would be terminated as soon as possible and the United Kingdom would withdraw from Palestine no later than the previously announced date of 1 August 1948. The new states would come into existence two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements: Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism (Zionism). Part II of the Plan included a detailed description of the proposed boundaries for each state. The Plan also called for Economic Union between the proposed states, and for the protection of religious and minority rights.
The Plan was accepted by the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine, through the Jewish Agency. The Plan was rejected by leaders of the Arab community, including the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee, who were supported in their rejection by the states of the Arab League. The Arabs argued that it violated the rights of the majority of the people in Palestine, which at the time was 65% non-Jewish (1,200,000), and 35% Jewish (650,000), most of them European born, who immigrated in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries as a result of the Zionist movement (see Zionism).
Earlier proposals for partition 
The League of Nations granted Britain a mandate over Palestine as part of the Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. A British census of 1918 estimated 700,000 Arabs and 56,000 Jews.
In the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the British foreign secretary stated that the British government viewed “with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people [with the understanding that] nothing should be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine . . . .” . Neither partition nor statehood was mentioned as the means of accomplishing the National Home. Lord Curzon, who later succeeded Balfour as foreign secretary, wrote a memorandum expressing concern about what would become of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine who had “occupied the country for the best part of 1,500 years” and would “not be content either to be expropriated for Jewish immigrants, or to act merely as hewers of wood and drawers of water to the latter." 
In 1937, the Peel Commission proposed a Palestine divided into a small Jewish state (about 15%), a much larger Arab state, and an international zone. The Arab leadership rejected the plan, while the Jewish Agency rejected the plan's borders and established its own committees on borders and population transfer, drawing up alternative proposals. These proposals contained provisions for the relocation of Arab population to areas outside the borders of the new Jewish state, modeled on the population exchange between Greece and Turkey; they were also rejected by the Arab side.
The British Woodhead Commission considered several additional plans for partition. In 1938 the British government issued a policy statement declaring that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable". Representatives of Arabs and Jews were invited to London for the St. James Conference, which proved unsuccessful.
The MacDonald White Paper of May 1939 declared that it was "not part of [the British government's] policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State" and sought to eliminate Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Jewish Agency hoped to persuade the British to restore Jewish immigration rights, and cooperated with the British in the war against Fascism. Aliyah Bet was organized to spirit Jews out of Nazi controlled Europe, despite the British prohibitions. The White Paper also led to the formation of Lehi, a small Jewish terrorist organization which opposed the British, and, at one time, sought to make an agreement with the Nazis. However Lehi had less than 100 members and after an investigation by a minor official, the Nazis lost interest. Nothing was ever decided.
UN involvement 
After World War II, despite pressure to allow the immigration of large numbers of Jewish Holocaust survivors to Palestine, the British maintained limits on Jewish immigration in line with the 1939 White Paper. The Jewish community rejected the restriction on immigration and also organized an armed resistance. These and United States pressure to end the anti-immigration policy led to the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. In April 1946, the committee reached a unanimous decision. The Committee approved the American condition of the immediate acceptance of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine. It also recommended that there be no Arab, and no Jewish State. US President Harry S. Truman angered the British government by issuing, without forewarning, a statement supporting the 100,000 refugees, but refusing to acknowledge the rest of the committee's findings. The British government had conditioned the implementation of the report's recommendations on the US providing assistance if force would be required to do so, but that was not offered. The US War Department had issued an earlier report which stated that an open-ended US troop commitment of 300,000 personnel would be necessary to assist the British government in maintaining order against an Arab revolt.
On 7 February 1947, Britain announced its intent to terminate the Mandate for Palestine. On 2 April 1947, Britain formally asked the United Nations to make recommendations regarding the future government of Palestine. On 15 May 1947, the UN appointed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), composed of representatives from eleven states. To make the committee more neutral, none of the Great Powers were represented. The UNSCOP spent three months conducting hearings and a general survey of the situation in Palestine.
On 18 July 1947, the SS Exodus, a ship packed with Holocaust Survivors wanting to immigrate to Palestine, arrived off the coast. The ship was intercepted by the Royal Navy and a struggle ensued in which two passengers and a crew member died. UNSCOP members watched as the Exodus passengers were forcibly transferred to ships bound for France. The passengers refused to disembark in France, and the British ultimately decided to transfer the passengers to Hamburg, Germany. The voyage resulted in spectacularly bad press for the British and was followed by UNSCOP members as they deliberated in Geneva.
On 3 September 1947, the Committee reported to the General Assembly. CHAPTER V: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (I), Section A of the Report contained eleven proposed recommendations (I - XI) approved unanimously. Section B contained one proposed recommendation approved by a substantial majority dealing with the Jewish problem in general (XI). CHAPTER VI: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (II) contained a Plan of Partition with Economic Union to which seven members of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), expressed themselves in favour. CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS (III) contained a comprehensive proposal that was voted upon and supported by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia for a Federal State of Palestine. In CHAPTER VIII A number of members of the Committee expressed certain reservations and observations.
Proposed division 
Both the Arab State and the Jewish State proposed by the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out in CHAPTER VI: RECOMMENDATIONS (III) of the UNSCOP report of 3 September 1947 were composed of three major sections, linked by extraterritorial crossroads. The Arab State would receive the Western Galilee, with the town of Acre, the hill country of Samaria and Judea, and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now Ashdod) and encompassing what is now the Gaza Strip, with a section of desert along the Egyptian border. The Jewish State would receive the Coastal Plain, stretching from Haifa to Rehovot, the Eastern Galilee (surrounding the Sea of Galilee and including the Galilee panhandle) and the Negev, including the southern outpost of Umm Rashrash (now Eilat). The Corpus Separatum included Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the surrounding areas.
The Plan tried its best to accommodate as many Jews as possible into the Jewish State. In many specific cases, this meant including areas of Arab majority (but with a significant Jewish minority) in the Jewish state. Thus the Jewish State would have an overall large Arab minority. Areas that were sparsely populated (like the Negev), were also included in the Jewish state to create room for immigration. According to the plan, Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state.
The Plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945). This data does not reflect the actual land ownership by Jews, local Arabs, Ottomans and other land owners. This data also excludes the land designated to Arabs in Transjordan.
|Territory||Arab and other population||% Arab and other||Jewish population||% Jewish||Total population|
|Data from the Report of UNSCOP: 3 September 1947: CHAPTER 4: A COMMENTARY ON PARTITION|
The land allocated to the Arab State in the final plan included about 43% of Mandatory Palestine[unreliable source?] and consisted of all of the highlands, except for Jerusalem, plus one-third of the coastline. The highlands contain the major aquifers of Palestine, which supplied water to the coastal cities of central Palestine, including Tel Aviv.[unreliable source?] The Jewish State was to receive 56% of Mandatory Palestine, a slightly larger area to accommodate the increasing numbers of Jews who would immigrate there.[unreliable source?] The Jewish State included three fertile lowland plains – the Sharon on the coast, the Jezreel Valley and the upper Jordan Valley. The bulk of the proposed Jewish State's territory, however, consisted of the Negev Desert. The desert was not suitable for agriculture, nor for urban development at that time. The Jewish State would also be given sole access to the Red Sea.
Ad Hoc Committee 
On 23 September 1947 the General Assembly established an ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to consider the UNSCOP report. Representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and Jewish Agency were invited and attended.
During the committee's deliberations, the British government endorsed the report's recommendations concerning the end of the mandate, independence, and Jewish immigration. However, the British did "not feel able to implement" any agreement unless it was acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, and asked that the General Assembly provide an alternative implementing authority if that proved to be the case.
The Arab Higher Committee rejected both the majority and minority recommendations within the UNSCOP report. They "concluded from a survey of Palestine history that Zionist claims to that country had no legal or moral basis". The Arab Higher Committee argued that only an Arab State in the whole of Palestine would be consistent with the UN Charter.
The Jewish Agency expressed support for most of the UNSCOP recommendations, but emphasized the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine. The Jewish Agency criticized the proposed boundaries, especially in the Western Galilee and Western Jerusalem (outside of the old city), arguing that these should be included in the Jewish state. However, they agreed to accept the plan if "it would make possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign control of its own immigration."
Boundary changes 
The ad hoc committee made a number of boundary changes to the UNSCOP recommendations before they were voted on by the General Assembly.
The predominantly Arab city of Jaffa, previously located within the Jewish state, was constituted as an enclave of the Arab State. This move increased the Jewish percentage in the Jewish state from 55% to 61%.
The Bedouin settlement and population figures were revised in a report submitted by a representative of the government of the United Kingdom on 1 November 1947. The Palestine Administration conducted an investigation and used the Royal Air Force to perform an aerial survey of the Beersheba District. They reported that the Bedouins had the greater part of two million dunams under cereal grain production. The administration counted 3,389 Bedouin houses together with 8,722 tents. The report explained that:
"It should be noted that the term Beersheba Bedouin has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it."
On the basis of that investigation, the Palestine Administration estimated the Bedouin population at approximately 127,000. The report noted that the earlier population "estimates must, however, be corrected in the light of the information furnished to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the Bedouin population. According to the statement, 22,000 Bedouins may be taken as normally residing in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the UNSCOP's majority plan, and the balance of 105,000 as resident in the proposed Jewish State. It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State." The boundary of the Arab state was modified to include Beersheba and a large section of the Negev desert within the Arab State while a section of the Dead Sea shore was added to the Jewish State.
The proposed boundaries would also have placed 54 Arab villages on the opposite side of the border from their farm land. In response, the United Nations Palestine Commission was empowered to modify the boundaries "in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary". These modifications never occurred.
The vote 
Passage of the resolution required a two-thirds majority of the valid votes, not counting abstaining and absent members, of the UN's then 56 member states. On 26 November, the vote was postponed. According to multiple sources, had the vote been held at that time, it would have received a majority, but less than the required two-thirds.
Reports of pressure in favour of the Plan 
Proponents of the Plan reportedly put pressure on nations to vote yes to the Partition Plan. A telegram signed by 26 US senators with influence on foreign aid bills was sent to wavering countries, seeking their support for the partition plan. Many nations reported pressure directed specifically at them:
- United States (Vote: For): President Truman later noted, "The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me."
- India (Vote: Against): Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke with anger and contempt for the way the UN vote had been lined up. He said the Zionists had tried to bribe India with millions and at the same time his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, had received daily warnings that her life was in danger unless "she voted right".
- Liberia (Vote: For): Liberia's Ambassador to the United States complained that the US delegation threatened aid cuts to several countries. Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., President of Firestone Natural Rubber Company, with major holdings in the country, also pressured the Liberian government
- Philippines (Vote: For): In the days before the vote, the Philippines' representative General Carlos P. Romulo stated "We hold that the issue is primarily moral. The issue is whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which is clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippines Government holds that the United Nations ought not to accept such responsibility". After a phone call from Washington, the representative was recalled and the Philippines' vote changed.
- Haiti (Vote: For): The promise of a five million dollar loan may have secured Haiti's vote for partition.
Final vote 
On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions and 1 absent, in favour of the modified Partition Plan. The final vote was as follows:
- In favour, (33 countries, 72% of voting):
- Latin American and Caribbean (13 countries): Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
- Western European and Others (12 countries): Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States
- Eastern European (5 countries): Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, Soviet Union
- African (2 countries): Liberia, South Africa
- Asia-Pacific (1 country): Philippines
- Against, (13 countries, 28% of voting):
- Asia-Pacific (9 countries): Afghanistan, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
- Western European and Others (2 countries): Greece, Turkey
- African (1 country): Egypt
- Latin American and Caribbean (1 country): Cuba
- Abstentions, (10 countries):
- Latin American and Caribbean (6 countries): Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico
- Asia-Pacific (1 country): Republic of China
- African (1 country): Ethiopia
- Western European and Others (1 country): United Kingdom
- Eastern European (1 country): Yugoslavia
- Absent, (1 country):
- Asia-Pacific (1 country): Thailand
Votes by region 
What later came to be known as the United Nations Regional Groups showed relatively aligned voting styles in the final vote. All Western nations voted for the resolution, with the exception of the United Kingdom (the Mandate holder), Greece and Turkey. The Soviet bloc also voted for partition, with the exception of Yugoslavia, which was to be expelled from Cominform the following year. The majority of Latin American nations voted for partition, with a sizeable minority abstaining. Asian countries voted against partition, with the exception of the Philippines.
|Regional Group||Members in UNGA181 vote||UNGA181 For||UNGA181 Against||UNGA181 Abstained|
|LatAm and Caribb.||20||13||1||6|
|Western Eur. & Others||15||12||2||1|
|Total UN members||56||33||13||10|
Jewish reaction 
Jews in Palestine and around the world reacted to the UN resolution with jubilation. The Jewish Agency, which was the recognized representative of the Jewish community, praised and accepted the resolution despite its dissatisfaction with such matters as Jewish emigration from Europe and the territorial limits set upon the proposed Jewish State. Mainstream Zionist leaders emphasized the "heavy responsibility" of building a modern Jewish State, and committed to working towards a peaceful coexistence with the region's other inhabitants:
Some Revisionist Zionists rejected the partition plan as a renunciation of legitimately Jewish national territory. Menachem Begin's Irgun Tsvai Leumi and the Lehi (The Stern Group, also known by their opponents as the Stern Gang), which had been fighting the British, rejected the plan. Begin warned that the partition would not bring peace because the Arabs would also attack the small state and that "in the war ahead we'll have to stand on our own, it will be a war on our existence and future". He also stated that “the bisection of our homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized.” Begin was sure that the creation of a Jewish state would make territorial expansion possible, “after the shedding of much blood."
According to Simha Flapan, it is a myth that Zionists accepted the partition as a compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned ambitions for the whole of Palestine and recognized the rights of the Palestinians to their own state. Rather, Flapan says that his research suggests that the acceptance was only a tactical move aimed at thwarting the creation of the Palestinian state and increasing the territory assigned by the UN to the Jewish state.
Addressing the Central Committee of the Histadrut (the Eretz Israel Workers Party) days after the UN vote to partition Palestine, Ben-Gurion expressed his apprehension stating:
"…the total population of the Jewish State at the time of its establishment will be about one million, including almost 40% non-Jews. Such a [population] composition does not provide a stable basis for a Jewish State. This [demographic] fact must be viewed in all its clarity and acuteness. With such a [population] composition, there cannot even be absolute certainty that control will remain in the hands of the Jewish majority... There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%".
Arab reaction 
The Arabs opposed partition and continued to demand independence in all of Palestine, promising to respect the rights of the Jewish minority. The Arabs argued that it violated the rights of the majority of the people in Palestine, which at the time was 67% non-Jewish (1,237,000) and 33% Jewish (608,000).
A few weeks after UNSCOP released its report, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, was quoted by an Egyptian newspaper as predicting that Palestine would be overrun by Muslim volunteers. According to the reporter, he said "Personally I hope the Jews do not force us into this war because it will be a war of elimination and it will be a dangerous massacre which history will record similarly to the Mongol massacre or the wars of the Crusades." This statement from October 1947 has often been incorrectly reported as having been made much later on 15 May 1948.
Arab leaders threatened the Jewish population of Palestine, speaking of "driving the Jews into the sea" and ridding Palestine "of the Zionist Plague".On 16 February 1948, UN Palestine Commission to the security council reported that: "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein." On 20 May 1948, Azzam told reporters "We are fighting for an Arab Palestine. Whatever the outcome the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy."
John Wolffe says that while Zionists tend to attribute Palestinian rejection of the plan to a mere intransigence, Arabs have always reiterated that it was rejected because it was unfair: it gave the majority of the land (56 percent) to the Jews, who at that stage legally owned only 7 percent of it, and remained a minority of the population. Mehran Kamrava also notes the disproportionate allocation under the plan, and adds that the area under Jewish control contained 45 percent of the Palestinian population. The proposed Arab state was only given 45 percent of the land, much of which was unfit for agriculture. Jaffa, though geographically separated, was to be part of the Arab state.
Ian Bickerton says that few Palestinian Arabs joined the Arab Liberation Army because they suspected that the other Arab States did not plan on an independent Palestinian state. Bickerton says for that reason many Palestinians favored partition and indicated a willingness to live alongside a Jewish state. He also mentions that the Nashashibi family backed King Abdullah and union with Transjordan. Abdullah appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as the Governor of the Arab areas occupied by troops of the Arab League. He was a former Prime Minister of Transjordan who supported partition of Palestine as proposed by the Peel Commission and the United Nations. Fakhri Nashashibi and Ragheb Bey Nashashibi were leaders of the movement that opposed the Mufti during the mandate period. Both men accepted partition. Bey was the mayor of Jerusalem. He resigned from the Arab Higher Committee because he accepted the United Nations partition proposal. Fu’ad Nasar, the Secretary of Arab Workers Congress, also accepted partition. The United States declined to recognize the All-Palestine government in Gaza by explaining that it had accepted the UN Mediator's proposal. The Mediator had recommended that Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate including Transjordan, might form a union. Bernadotte's diary said the Mufti had lost credibility on account of his unrealistic predictions regarding the defeat of the Jewish militias. Bernadotte noted "It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Transjordan."
British reaction 
The plan was vigorously debated in the British parliament. Britain ultimately announced that it would accept the partition plan, but refused to implement the plan by force because it was not acceptable to both sides. On 11 December 1947 Britain announced the Mandate would end at midnight 14 May 1948 and its sole task would be to complete withdrawal by 1 August 1948. During the period in which the British withdrawal was completed, Britain refused to share the administration of Palestine with a proposed UN transition regime, to allow the UN Palestine Commission to establish a presence in Palestine earlier than a fortnight before the end of the Mandate, to allow the creation of official Jewish and Arab militias or to assist in smoothly handing over territory or authority to any successor.
Subsequent events 
The partition plan was never fully implemented. On May 14, 1948, the day on which the British Mandate over Palestine expired, the Jewish People's Council gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum, and approved a proclamation, declaring "the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel". The 1948 Arab–Israeli War began with the invasion of, or intervention in, Palestine by the Arab States on 15 May 1948.
The Resolution as a legal basis for Palestinian statehood 
In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization published the Palestinian Declaration of Independence relying on Resolution 181, arguing that the resolution continues to provide international legitimacy for the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence. A number of scholars have written in support of this view.
A General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, Resolution ES-10/14 (2004), specifically cited resolution 181(II) as a "relevant resolution", and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) what are the legal consequences of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Judge Abdul Koroma explained the majority opinion: "The Court has also held that the right of self-determination as an established and recognized right under international law applies to the territory and to the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the exercise of such right entitles the Palestinian people to a State of their own as originally envisaged in resolution 181 (II) and subsequently confirmed." In response, Prof. Paul De Waart said that the Court put the legality of the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate and the 1947 UN Plan of Partition beyond doubt once and for all.
See also 
- 1949 Armistice Agreements
- Balfour Declaration of 1917
- Churchill White Paper, 1922
- Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel
- Faisal-Weizmann Agreement
- Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Lausanne Conference, 1949
- Minority Treaties
- Proposals for a Palestinian state
- Sykes-Picot Agreement
- Two-state solution
- "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. 1947. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
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- Part II. – Boundaries recommended in UNGA Res 181 Molinaro, Enrico The Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements Page 78
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- Lenczowski, George (1962). The Middle East in World Affairs. Cornell University Press. p. 396. ISBN 62-16343 Check
- Report of UNSCOP – 1947
- Ilan Pappe, Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, p.29-30
- Article "History of Palestine", Encyclopædia Britannica (2002 edition), article section written by Walid Ahmed Khalidi and Ian J. Bickerton.
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- Mansfield, Peter (1992), The Arabs, pp. 172–175, ISBN 0-14-014768-3
- Partner to Partition: The Jewish Agency's Partition Plan in the Mandate Era, Yosef Kats, Chapter 4, 1998 Edition, Routledge, ISBN 0-7146-4846-9
- Palestine. Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. November, 1938. Cmd. 5893. 
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- A/AC.14/32, dated 11 November 1947, page 41
- Hansard, 11 Dec 1947
- Servant of God: a personal narrative, Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, 1983
- Before & after: U.S. foreign policy and the 11 September crisis By Phyllis Bennis
- Lenczowski, George (1990). American Presidents and the Middle East. Duke University Press. p. 157. ISBN 0-8223-0972-6., p. 28, cite, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs 2, p. 158.
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- History of the Middle East by Saul S Friedman
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- Begin, Menachem, The Revolt 1978, p. 412.
- Begin, Menachem, In The Underground: Writings and Documents 1977,vol 4,p. 70.
- 'Aviezer Golan and Shlomo Nakdimon, Begin, Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1978", p.172, cited in Shima Flapan, The Birth of Israel, Pantheon Books, New York, 1988' p.32
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- 'Jamal K Kanj, Children of Catastrophe, UK 2010'
- The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)
- Akhbar el-Yom, 11 October 2011, p9. The literal English translation is somewhat ambiguous, however the overall meaning is that the coming Arab defeat of the Jews will be remembered in the same way as the past Arab defeats of the Mongols and Crusaders are remembered.
- Tom Segev (21 October 2011). "The makings of history / The blind misleading the blind". Haaretz.
- Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, Yale University Press, 2008
- UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION First Special Report to the Security Council
- Palestine Post, 21 May 1948, p. 3.
- Wolffe, John (2005). Religion in History: Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence (Paperback). Manchester University Press. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-7190-7107-2.
- Bickerton, Ian J., Klausner, Carla L. (2001) A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th edition, Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-090303-5, page 88.
- Bickerton & Klausner (2001), page 103
- See memo from Acting Secretary Lovett to Certain Diplomatic Offices, Foreign relations of the United States, 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI, pages 1447–48
- See Folke Bernadotte, "To Jerusalem", Hodder and Stoughton, 1951, pages 112–13
- Roza El-Eini (2006). "Mandated landscape: British imperial rule in Palestine, 1929–1948". History (Routledge). p. 367. ISBN 978-0-7146-5426-3. "They accordingly announced on 11 December 1947, that the Mandate would end on 15 May 1948, from which date the sole task ... would be to ... withdrawal by 1 August 1948."
- Arthur Koestler (March 2007). Promise and Fulfilment – Palestine 1917–1949. READ BOOKS. pp. 163–168. ISBN 978-1-4067-4723-2. Retrieved 13 October 2011.
- Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel: 14 May 1948
- Cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 15 May 1948: Retrieved 4 May 2012
- See "Request for the admission of the State of Palestine to Unesco as a Member State", UNESCO, 12 May 1989 
- See The Palestine Declaration To The International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue  and Silverburg, Sanford R. (2002), "Palestine and International Law: Essays on Politics and Economics", Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co, ISBN 0-7864-1191-0, pages 37–54
- See Chapter 5 "Israel (1948–1949) and Palestine (1998–1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States", in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, and Stefan Talmon, eds., The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999)
- Sourcebook on public international law, by Tim Hillier, Routledge, 1998, ISBN 1-85941-050-2, page 217; and Prof. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “Collective Responses to the Unilateral Declarations of Independence of Southern Rhodesia and Palestine, An Application of the Legitimizing Function of the United Nations”, The British Yearbook of International Law, l990, pp.l35-l53
- See paragraph 5, Separate opinion of Judge Koroma
- See De Waart, Paul J.I.M., "International Court of Justice Firmly Walled in the Law of Power in the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process", Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), pp. 467–487
- Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN
- Arieh L. Avneri (1984). The Claim of Dispossession: Jewish Land Settlement and the Arabs, 1878–1948. Transaction Publishers. ISBN
- Fischbach, Michael R. (2003). Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Columbia University Press. ISBN
- Gelber, Yoav (1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations: Alliance of Bars Sinister. London: Routledge. ISBN-X
- Khalaf, Issa (1991). Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration,. University at Albany, SUNY. ISBN
- Louis, Wm. Roger (1986). The British Empire in the Middle East,: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford University Press. ISBN
- "Palestine". Encyclopædia Britannica Online School Edition, 15 May 2006.
- Sicker, Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922. Praeger/Greenwood. ISBN
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