Battle of Jenin (2002)

Battle of Jenin
Part of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Operation Defensive Shield
IDF D9L and D9N armored bulldozers, instrumental in changing the style of combat and the outcome of the battle.
Date April 2002 Location Jenin, West Bank
Belligerents
Israel IDF	File:Fateh-logo.jpg Fatah (Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Tanzim) Hamas Islamic Jihad
Commanders and leaders
Yedidia Yehuda	Mahmoud Tawallbe†
Strength
1,000	200-250
Casualties and losses
23 soldiers killed	52 killed (38 armed men, 14 civilians according to IDF; 30 militants, 22 civilians according to HRW) 685 persons arrested (mostly released)

The Battle of Jenin, also referred to as the Jenin Massacre, took place between the 3rd and 11th of April 2002 in Jenin's Palestinian refugee camp as part of Israel's Operation Defensive Shield.

It involved what Israel, termed a large-scale counter-terrorist offensive in the West Bank by IDF forces. Israel targeted Jenin's refugee camp.

Palestinian and some international sources alleged that the camp and its dwellings were attacked indiscriminately by Israel with heavy military equipment, combat helicopters, rockets and missiles, and raised allegations of massacre, initially reported in the international media and subsequently rejected by outside observers, and of war crimes, which major human rights organizations maintained had taken place on both sides. The Palestinian death toll was estimated at 52 (including 22 civilians), while 23 Israeli soldiers were killed.

Template:Arab-Israeli conflict 2002

Background

From the beginning of March until the first week in May 2002, there were approximately 16 bombings in Israel, mostly suicide attacks. More than 100 civilians were killed and scores wounded. 18 Israelis were killed in two separate Palestinian attacks on March 8 and March 9, and a terrorist attack in Netanya killed 30 and injured 140 on March 27. Within 24 hours Israel called up 30,000 reserve soldiers and launched Operation Defensive Shield in Ramallah and Bethlehem, entering Tulkarm and Qalqilyah a day later.

The second largest UNRWA refugee camp in the West Bank, the Jenin camp existed since 1953 and housed 13,055 in an area of 548 metres squared, forming a neighbourhood of densely packed buildings alongside Jenin-proper and not far from the Green Line. It had come under Palestinian civil and security control with the rest of the city as part of the Oslo Accords in 1995, which dictated a prevention of attacks on Israelis. According to Israeli and Palestinian observers who gave information to the UN, 200 armed men from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas had been using the camp as a base, known as "the martyrs' capital", and of the 100 suicide bombers who had launched attacks since the Second Intifada began in October 2000, 23 or 28 attacks had been launched from there. On of the key planners of attacks was Mahmoud Tawalbe, Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander of the camp.

Limited Israeli forces had entered the camp along a single route twice in the previous month; they had encountered heavy resistance and quickly departed. The command decided to this time send in three thrusts comprised mainly of the reservist 5th Infantry Brigade/Nachshon from the town of Jenin to the north, as well as a company of the Nahal Brigade from the southeast and Battalion 51 of the Golani Brigade from the southwest. The force of 1,000 troops also included elements of the Naval commando and Duvdevan Unit special forces, the Armoured Corps, and Combat Engineers with armored bulldozer for neutralising the roadside bombs that would line the alleys of the camp according to Military Intelligence. Anticipating the heaviest resistance in Nablus, IDF commanders sent two regular infantry brigades there, assuming they could take over the Jenin camp in 48-72 hours with just the one reservist brigade, an assessment which turned out to be overly optimistic. The force's entry was delayed until April 2 due to rain.

Since the previous Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian militants had prepared by boobytrapping both the town and camp's streets in a bid to trap the Israeli soldiers, some of them as large as 113 kilograms. They had also cut tunnels between homes to maintain mobility without exposing themselves to the street.

The battle

Israeli forces entered on 2 April, and had secured the town of Jenin by the second day. Israeli intelligence estimated that half the population of noncombatants had left before they arrived, and 90% had done so by the third day, leaving around 1,300 people. The EU's contribution to the UN report said "at least 4,000 remained inside and did not evacuate the camp."

Palestinian militants had expected an air strike since their security forces' barracks in the Gaza Strip and West Bank had been repeatedly bombed by an Israeli military that didn't want to risk the casualties of Close Quarters Combat. However in Jenin, the IDF chose not to bomb the spots of resistance using aircraft in order to minimize civilian losses, even with the risk of increased losses to infantry, although there was limited use of helicopters.

A leader of Fatah gunmen in the camp told Time that it was only when his forces saw the Israelis advancing on foot that they decided to stay and fight. Palestinian Islamic Jihad militant Tabaat (or Thabet) Mardawi enthusiastically told CNN from his prison in Israel, that after learning the IDF was going to use troops, and not planes, "It was like hunting ... like being given a prize... The Israelis knew that any soldier who went into the camp like that was going to get killed... I've been waiting for a moment like that for years." Mardawi told CNN that Palestinian fighters had spread "between 1000 and 2000 bombs and booby traps" throughout the camp.

An IDF Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozer driving along a 1.2 km stretch of the main street to clear booby traps set off 124 separate explosions.

By the third day, despite previous Israeli assessments, the Palestinians were still dug in, and seven Israeli soldiers had been killed. As the IDF advanced, the Palestinians fell back to the heavily defended camp centre - the Hawashin district. The Israelis began to call in AH-1 Cobra helicopters to hit rooftop positions along with Caterpillar D9 armoured bulldozers to detonate the booby traps and clear a path for tanks.

On the seventh day, 9 April, 13 Israeli soldiers were killed when Palestinian fighters used civilians to lure an Israeli patrol into a booby-trapped ambush, and then opened fire on those retrieving wounded. When another soldier was killed on the camp's edge, it became the deadliest day for the IDF since the end of the 1982 Lebanon War.

Change in Israeli tactics

File:D9R-idf.jpg

A Caterpillar D9R armored bulldozer used by the IDF during the battle.

After the April 9 ambush, the IDF changed tactics, presumably in order to continue the operation without risking more Israeli deaths, and increased to a dozen the Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozers in operation. The IDF maintained that the heavy bulldozers were mainly used to clear walls and streets of booby traps, open routes and widen alleyways for armored fighting vehicles, and to secure locations and movement for IDF troops. Time reported that while houses were knocked down by the bulldozers, they could not have buried the amount of people alleged by Palestinians since it takes a half-hour to fully wreck a building, and because Israeli soldiers say they always called any residents to leave in advance. Even if civilians were too frightened to leave initially, they surely would once the D9 started working. A senior Palestinian military officer told Time that the gunmen's own booby traps probably buried some civilians and fighters alive, some of the larger charges capable of more devastation than a D9.

A day later, Mahmoud Tawallbe and two other militants went into a house so as to get close enough to a tank or armoured D-9 bulldozer to plant a bomb. According to a British military expert working in the camp for Amnesty International, a D9 driver probably saw him and rammed a wall down onto him. Tawallbe's name subsequently became familiar in the Arab world.

The D9s led Israeli forces deeper into the camp until on the ninth day, a D9 sliced the wall off a house in the heavily defended Hawashin district, and 39 dazed gunmen surrendered with their hands in the air. Among the militants were Palestinian Islamic Jihad members Tabaat Mardawi and Ali Suleiman al-Saadi, known as Safouri, Israeli targets responsible for a number of attacks and whose incarceration meant the combat would soon end.

According to Time, "It was real urban warfare, as a modern, well-equipped army met an armed and prepared group of guerrilla fighters intimately familiar with the local terrain. For both sides, Jenin has been added to the memories that invest the conflict in the Middle East with such bitterness." A total of 23 Israeli soldiers were killed in the street fighting.

Aerial photograph of the area demolished in the Jenin camp's central Hawashin district.

Aftermath

The introduction of the heavily armored bulldozers, which shrugged off explosives and RPGs alike, and the threat of being buried alive, caused the Palestinian militants to surrender. Later, IDF forces withdrew gradually from the refugee camp under international pressure.

After the conflict Israeli reports claim that 8-9% of the houses within the refugee camp were destroyed. This was largely within an area of intense fighting of approximately 100 m by 100 m according to the IDF. . An area within the refugee camp, 100 m by 200 m according to some (up to 400 m by 500 m by other estimates) was reported to have been flattened. Reports added that six (globalsecurity.org) or ten (BBC) percent of the camp were destroyed in the fighting.

Most of the demolition occurred in the Hawashin neighborhood, where most of the militants and explosives remained. Israel states that it demolished those houses because they were densely rigged with explosives.

In October 2002, according to the Walla news agency, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas websites reported that their forces in Jenin before the Israeli entry included 250 armed militants. The official Kol Yisrael radio station reported that 15,000 explosive charges were at the militants' disposal, as well as a large number of handguns. The militants were well organized and had an extensive system of communications.

Al-Ahram Online interviewed with "Omar the Engineer", a Palestinian bombmaker who claimed that some 50 homes were booby trapped. "We chose old and empty buildings and the houses of men who were wanted by Israel because we knew the soldiers would search for them," he said.

According to Lt. Colonel Adir Haruvi of the IDF, numerous buildings, passages and even bodies were booby-trapped, often prompting Israelis to use armored bulldozers to level numerous buildings. The Israelis also claimed to have found more than a dozen explosive-making labs.

Body count estimates

Initial fatalities estimates put forward by both Palestinian and Israeli officials were high, measuring in the hundreds. In examples cited in the timeline below, figures include both civilians and armed combatants unless otherwise indicated.

• April 2 - Jenin is cut off and the incursion begin the following day.

• April 6 - in an Arab League emergency meeting Nabil Shaath, at the time a Palestinian chief negotiator, delivers a speech in which he claims the IDF soldiers were commanded to completely destroy Jenin and compares Israeli actions in the West Bank towns of Jenin and Nablus to the Sabra and Shatila Massacre.

• April 7 - Saeb Erekat, a Palestinian minister and chief Palestinian negotiator is quoted in the Washington Post making the first allegation of a massacre.

• NBC News hears from Secretary-General of the Palestinian Authority Abdel Rahman that "over 250 Palestinians killed".

• April 10 - BBC reports that Israel estimates 150 Palestinians died in Jenin but Palestinians say the number is far higher.

• Saeb Erekat estimates 500 or more dead in the whole Israeli offensive

• April 11 - negotiated surrender of 34 Palestinian militants.[4]

• April 12 - Fighting ends

• IDF spokesman Brigadier-General Ron Kitrey reports on Israeli Army Radio that there are apparently hundreds killed, the IDF quickly clarify he meant hundreds of casualties (killed or injured).
• An IDF source reportedly puts the number of dead at 250
• Palestinian Information Minister, Yasser Abed Rabbo, accuses Israel of digging mass graves for 900 Palestinians in the camp, whilst Secretary-General of the Palestinian Authority, Ahmed Abdel Rahman claimed that "thousands" had died.

• April 14 - After the IDF reportedly estimate 250 and 188, a final figure of 45 is given.

• April 16 - Observers were allowed into the camp.

• April 18 - Zalmon Shoval, adviser to Prime Minister Sharon, defended Israel's actions, saying it was fighting for its life; estimating that only about 65 bodies had been recovered, of which five were civilians.

• April 30 - Kadoura Mousa Kadoura, the director of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement for the northern West Bank set the total dead at 56.

According to the United Nations (which was prevented from making a visit), "at least 52" Palestinian deaths were confirmed. Human Rights Watch "confirmed that at least fifty-two Palestinians were killed ... This figure may rise". No other Palestinian deaths from the battle have been confirmed since this time. The IDF estimate the number at 52. The designation of combatants differs (IDF counts 38 "armed men", HRW counts 30 "militants"). Palestinian Fatah investigators claimed the death toll is 56, announced by Kadoura Moussa, the Fatah director for the Northern West Bank. 23 Israeli soldiers were also killed.

Allegations of a massacre

The battle attracted widespread international attention due to Palestinian claims that war crimes were committed (these claims were repeated in the HRW report), and as a result of inflated reports on body counts by Palestinian officials and Jenin residents. The IDF barred journalists from entering the camp during the fighting on safety grounds and it's at one point reported casualties as high as 150, yet many journalists gave some credence to Palestinian claims that a massacre of Palestinian civilians may have taken place during the fighting, and claims that hundreds, or even thousands, of bodies had been secretly buried in mass graves by the IDF were spread. These allegations were aired widely in the Arab world, eliciting strong criticism of Israel. Critics in conservative American publications responded by alleging a "Big Jenin Lie".

Many Arabs and Palestinians continue to use the term "Jenin Massacre" (Arabic: مجزرة جنين).

Post-fighting investigations

In an article about the battle in Jenin, Time ruled out Palestinian allegations of massacre, writing that:

A Time investigation concludes that there was no wanton massacre in Jenin, no deliberate slaughter of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers. But the 12 days of fighting took a severe toll on the camp.

United States Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Jenin during the month of the battle, and upon returning to the States testified to a congressional panel that there was no evidence of mass graves or a massacre.

Several months later, the UN concluded an investigation into the events and found claims of a "massacre" to be baseless. Human Rights Watch found no evidence for a massacre, but said "Israeli forces committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war crimes." The human rights organization also criticized Palestinian militants for having endangered the lives of Palestinian civilians in part by "intermingling" with them.

Human Rights Watch also criticized the UN investigation for presenting a "watered-down account of the very serious violations in Jenin," for presenting "competing" claims while drawing "almost no conclusions on the merits of those claims," and for failing to address the "issue of accountability for serious violations that may have been committed, some of which rise to the level of war crimes":

[The UN report] refers to the fact that civilians died in the operation, without examining the circumstances of their deaths. It makes no mention of the strong evidence suggesting that some were willfully killed, such as Jamal Fayid, a 37-year old paralyzed man, who was crushed in the rubble of his home on April 7 after Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers refused to allow his family time to remove him from their home before a bulldozer destroyed it.

The U.N. report mentions that missiles were "at times" fired from helicopters, minimizing evidence suggesting that their use was intense and indiscriminate in Jenin camp, particularly on April 6 when missiles caught many sleeping civilians.

Derek Holley, a military advisor to Amnesty International, corroborated that there was no massacre. "Talking to people and talking to witnesses, even very credible witnesses, it just appears there was no wholesale killing." he added. Holley concluded that the Israelis had however committed war crimes, saying it was a "hard fact" that water and electricity to the town had been shut off, and that medical access to the wounded had been blocked. Holley also said told the BBC that "some very credible witnesses have come forward who have told stories of how they have seen executions."

International statements and human rights reports

In late April and on May 3, 2002, the UN, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch released reports about the Israeli military incursions into Jenin. The reports documented that approximately 30 Palestinian militants, 22 Palestinian civilians, and 23 Israeli soldiers were killed in the fighting and thus felt no evidence that a massacre took place. However, HRW did say that Israel "committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war crimes," while Amnesty International similarly alleged evidence that Israel had committed war crimes.

The Anti-Defamation League questioned how HRW and AI could both acknowledge the lack of a supposed Israeli massacre and the endangerment of Palestinian civilians by Palestinian gunmen and still maintain its accusation of Israel, and labelled the reports prejudiced.

UN visiting mission

The United Nations visiting mission ordered by the UN Commission on Human Rights on 5 April 2002 and headed by Mary Robinson, ex-President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was refused entry to Israel.

UN fact finding mission

The United Nations Security Council unanimously proposed a fact finding mission with resolution 1405 on April 19, 2002 (ie 8 days after the surrender of the majority of the militants). The Government of Israel considered the intitiative to set up the mission as "an anti-Israeli diplomatic offensive".

While formally agreeing to co-operate with the inquiry, the government of Israel set a list of preconditions, three being most important to them:

• That the mission should include anti-terrorism experts. Derek Holley, an Amnesty International military advisor went public saying that this was necessary in a report posted by the BBC.
• That the UN agree not to prosecute Israeli soldiers for any violations of international law which might be uncovered during by the mission.
• And that the mission limit its scope exclusively to events in Jenin.

These conditions were justified by the Israeli government's legal experts on the grounds that "the conditions under which the UN proposed the mission were unfair, as the UN did not agree to give the anti-terrorism expert full membership, would not give the mission a strict mandate, nor declare the mission solely investigatory (as opposed to having a judicial purpose)". According to the Israeli legal experts, all three positions violate of the UN's own principles (as stated in the "Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations", A/RES/46/59 of December 9, 1991).

The UN refused to accept the last two conditions, whereupon the Israeli authorities announced that they would not allow the mission entry into any Israeli-controlled territory, nor cooperate with its activities in any way. Some commentators ascribed this to an agreement with Bush, who on 18th April told the world's press that Sharon "gave me a timetable and he’s met the timetable."

The members of the UN mission waited for several days in Switzerland. As described in several commentaries on the Israeli and international press at the time, the United Nations had several choices:

• Accept the Israeli conditions. Palestinian and other Arab diplomats at the UN headquarters made clear they would condemn such a move;
• Proceed with the investigation without Israeli cooperation and without physical access to Jenin. This would have meant relying largely on Palestinian eye-witnesses who had been able to exit the West Bank;
• Continue pressure on the Israeli Government to change its stance. This was felt to have little possibility of success in light of US support for Israel's position on the mission's team.

On the May 3 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan announced that he was disbanding the fact-finding mission.

On the May 7 2002, the UN General Assembly passed, condemning both the Israeli operations and Israel's refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team. At the same time, the UN issued a press release repeating the points made and including statements made by the representatives of individual nations. The GA requested the Secretary-General to present a report, drawing upon available resources and information.

UN report

The UN report stated that fifty-two Palestinian deaths had been confirmed by the end of May 2002, which mirrored the IDF report, but fell short of the estimate by a senior Palestinian Authority official who had claimed that about five hundred were killed which was not corroborated by evidence. This report was criticized by the group Human Rights Watch as being "flawed" due to a lack of first-hand evidence. The report itself states that a fact-finding team led by Martti Ahtisaari was unable to visit the area as planned due to concerns of the Israeli government, which meant that the report had to rely on papers submitted by different nations and NGOs, and other documents.

The report explains the rising violence of the first two years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, with particular reference to the suicide bombings that had been carried out. It describes all the operations carried out in the West Bank.

On the subject of Jenin, it says the "IDF urged civilians in Arabic to evacuate the camp. Some reports, including of interviews with IDF soldiers, suggest that those warnings were not adequate ..... Estimates vary on how many civilians remained in the camp throughout but there may have been as many as 4,000."

The UN report confirmed that "at least 52 Palestinians" deaths were reported by the Jenin hospital by the end of May 2002 and that Palestinian reports of 500 dead had not been substantiated.

Following the ambush of April 9 the IDF changed tactics and began bombardment with tanks and missiles, and demolished parts of the camp using armoured bulldozers. The report says "Witness testimonies and human rights investigations allege that the destruction was both disproportionate and indiscriminate, some houses coming under attack from the bulldozers before their inhabitants had the opportunity to evacuate."

According to the report, supplies of food and water were delivered to the camp starting on April 16th but this was impeded by the large amounts of explosives present. Negotiations began to bring in specialist equipment and workers to remove the explosives, but in the several weeks it took to negotiate the entry of these teams, at least two Palestinians were killed in explosions.

Human Rights Watch report

See also: Criticism of Human Rights Watch § Battle of Jenin

The Human Rights Watch report found "no evidence to sustain claims of massacres or large-scale extrajudicial executions by the IDF". The report agreed with the total casualty figures provided by the IDF but documented a higher proportion of civilian casualties. Amnesty International concurred. The HRW report documented instances of unlawful or willful killing by the IDF, some of which could have been avoided if proper procedures were followed, as well as instances of summary executions. It also documented use of Palestinians as 'human shields', by the IDF, and prevention of humanitarian organizations from accessing the camp despite the great need. The report concluded:

Israeli forces committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war crimes. Human Rights Watch found no evidence to sustain claims of massacres or large-scale extrajudicial executions by the IDF in Jenin refugee camp. Ultimately, Human Rights Watch verified the deaths of 52 Palestinians, of whom it concluded that 27 were suspected to be armed combatants, 22 were civilians, and the status of the remaining 3 could not be determined.

While focusing mainly on the actions of the IDF, the report also stated that:

Palestinian gunmen did endanger Palestinian civilians in the camp by using it as a base for planning and launching attacks, using indiscriminate tactics such as planting improvised explosive devices within the camp, and intermingling with the civilian population during armed conflict, and, in some cases, to avoid apprehension by Israeli forces.

The report notes that:

The presence of armed Palestinian militants inside Jenin refugee camp, and the preparations made by those armed Palestinian militants in anticipation of the IDF incursion, does not detract from the IDF's obligation under international humanitarian law to take all feasible precautions to avoid harm to civilians ... Unfortunately, these obligations were not met.

Amnesty International

Amnesty sent 15 "research missions" to the region between Sept 2000 and April 2002, and issued eight reports. Their research included reviewing Israeli High Court cases and examining medical records, statements, and video documentation. Delegates conducted numerous interviews. Testimony and other evidence were cross-checked for accuracy.

Amnesty accepts Israel's security concerns: "Israel has the right and responsibility to take measures to prevent unlawful violence. .... As the occupying power of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, Israel has an obligation to respect and protect the human rights of all people in these areas."

Amnesty's research included reviewing Israeli High Court cases and examining medical records, statements, and video documentation. Delegates conducted numerous interviews. Testimony and other evidence were cross-checked for accuracy. Amnesty criticises Israel for their use of human shields, damage to electric and water grids, and inconsistent access to external relief and medical agencies. It also says that much of the destruction took place after April 11, the date it argues combat died down.

• During the battle, Dr. David Zangen, chief medical officer of the Israeli paratroop unit that was fighting in Jenin, reported that the IDF had worked to keep the local Palestinian hospital open and that Israeli doctors had offered the Palestinians blood for their wounded, who then refused to be given "Jewish blood". Col. Arik Gordin of the IDF Office of Military Spokesmen has stated Israel subsequently flew in 2,000 units of blood from Jordan and arranged 40 more units of blood from the Muqased Hospital (East Jerusalem), which were sent to the Ramallah and Tulkarm hospitals, and also facilitated the delivery of 1,800 units of anti-coagulants that had come from Morocco.

See also

• Jenin, Jenin
• Media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Pallywood
• Urban warfare
• Violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 2002

External links

Reports by human rights groups, the UN, the IDF and the PA

• The Battle of Jenin: A Case Study in Israel's Communications Strategy The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
• Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations
• Full Text of UN Report
• The Secretary General's report on Jenin
• Human Rights Watch: Jenin War Crimes Investigation Needed
• Full Text of Human Rights Watch Report
• Executive Summary, The Battle in Jenin – The Israel Defence Force’s , Response to the Report by Amnesty International (IDF spokesman's official response to the report)
• Human Rights Watch - Jenin: IDF Military Operations
• Israeli aerial photographs of the combat area
• Collection of Israeli statements regarding Operation Defensive Shield, at Israel's Foreign Ministry website

Press reports, opinions and articles about Jenin battle

Whilst considering these press and news reports, it is important to consider the date. At first, many international newspapers reported the possibility of a massacre, whereas 3-4 weeks on, they often describe the massacre as particularly unlikely.

• Anatomy of Anti-Israel Incitement: Jenin, World Opinion and the Massacre That Wasn't, Anti-Defamation League report, June 2002.
• Urban Warfare and the Lessons of Jenin, analysis in Azure magazine.
• Amid the ruins of Jenin, the grisley evidence of a war crime The Independent
• The media tries to mop up its horrific coverage of Jenin. Honest Reporting
• The Weekly Standard - The Big Jenin Lie
• TIME magazine writeup on Jenin
• A Study in Palestinian Duplicity and Media Indifference Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting
• The Road to Jenin - A documentary by Pierre Rehov
• Jenin War Diary of a Hasidic Soldier - April 25, 2002 - Sergeant Major Rami Meir
  • Part I, Part II.
  • Reprint: Part I, Part II.
• "Palestinian fighter describes 'hard fight' in Jenin. Says he didn't see large numbers killed", CNN interview with Palestinian Islamic Jihad militant Tabaat Mardawi (April 23, 2002)
• The Truth about Jenin - Testimony of General Eyal Shlein, IDF Spokesperson, April 12, 2002
• Asia Times: A street fight called Jeningrad by Paul Belden
• The story of D9 bulldozer driver from Yediot Ahronot with Gush Shalom comments
• Palestinian view of UN report

Articles from The Observer and The Guardian

• Ten-day ordeal in crucible of Jenin, Peter Beaumont (April 14, 2002)
• The lunar landscape that was the Jenin refugee camp, Suzanne Goldenberg (April 16, 2002)
• 'We fight like girls and we are accused of a massacre', Ewen MacAskill (April 20, 2002)
• Battle for truth in Jenin, Bryan Whitaker (April 23, 2002)
• Israel accused over Jenin assault, Chris McGreal in Jerusalem and Brian Whitaker (April 23, 2002)
• Not a massacre, but a brutal breach of war's rules, Peter Beaumont in Jenin (April 25, 2002)

Articles from the BBC

• Forensic expert barred from Jenin (17 April 2002)
• Jenin camp 'horrific beyond belief' (18 April 2002)
• Jenin 'massacre evidence growing' (18 April 2002)
• Expert weighs up Jenin 'massacre' (29 April 2002)
• 'No Jenin massacre' says rights group (3 May 2002)
• UN condemns Israel over Jenin (8 May 2002)

Articles from Ha'aretz

• Palestinians: IDF tanks enter Nablus; reservist killed in Jenin (4 April 2002)
• Peres calls IDF operation in Jenin a 'massacre' (9 April 2002)
• Court: IDF can't move bodies; Lieberman: Barak must be ousted (13 April 2002)
• Court rejects petitions demanding IDF not remove Jenin dead (14 April 2002)
• IDF bulldozers buried Jenin dead, Palestinians claim
• Court told: IDF leaving dead to rot in Jenin
• Security Council meets after Israel denies entry to UN team (29 April 2002)
• Ticking bomb

Published personal accounts

The books below present contrasting Israeli and Arab views of the battle. Each is a collection of personal anecdotes, based on the authors' interviews with eyewitnesses / participants:

Israeli Accounts

• Goldberg, Brett (2003). A Psalm in Jenin. Israel: Modan Publishing House [5]. p. 304. ISBN 965-7141-03-6. {{cite book}}: External link in |publisher= (help) is a sketch of the experiences of several Israeli soldiers who participated in the battle (either as combatants or auxiliaries such as field medics), based on their accounts and/or accounts of families and friends, in the case of soldiers who fell in the battle.

Arab Accounts

• Baroud, Ramzy Mohammed, editor (January, 2003). Searching Jenin: Eyewitness Accounts of the Israeli Invasion 2002. Seattle, Washington: Cune Press. p. 256. ISBN 1885942346. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) is a series of interviews with Arab children and adults who either hid during the battle, or who worked during the battle (such as a Red Crescent ambulance driver,) and describe what they saw and felt. None of the interviewees admit to having fought in the battle.

Related issues to Jenin battle

• Jenin - center of Terrorism
  • "Jenin Al Kassam" A Hothouse of Terrorism
  • Israel Defense Forces' briefing on terrorist activity in Jenin
  • List of suicide bombings originating in Jenin
• Photos of fake funeral in Jenin
  • Israel Defense Forces' footage of the fake burial in Jenin (original link, not working)
  • Israel Defense Forces' footage of the fake burial in Jenin (reprint + video)
• MYTH & FACT of Jenin "massacre"
• 60 Minutes: Pallywood
• Muhammed Bakri's film Jenin Jenin:
  • The Guardian: Israeli censors ban film about battle of Jenin
  • Ha'aretz: Censor bans movie on Jenin offensive
  • Reuters: Israeli Film Board Bans Jenin Camp Documentary
  • "Seven Lies About Jenin", by David Zangen, a combat paramedic and doctor who fought in Jenin slams Bakri movies for telling lies (Maariv - repprint, November 8, 2002)
  • Pictures from Jenin refugee camp
• The Road to Jenin Film by Pierre Rehov, intended in part to expose alleged "propaganda and misinformation spread by Bakri".
• IMEMC:Jenin child tells the story of how soldiers killed his father in 2002