Battle of Leyte Gulf

Battle of Leyte Gulf
Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
The light aircraft carrier Princeton afire, east of Luzon, 24 October 1944.
Date 23 October 1944 – 26 October 1944 Location The Philippines Result Decisive Allied victory
Belligerents
United States Australia	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
William Halsey, Jr (3rd Fleet) Thomas C. Kinkaid (7th Fleet)	Takeo Kurita (Centre Force) Shoji Nishimura † (Southern Force) Kiyohide Shima (Southern Force) Jisaburo Ozawa (Northern Force)
Strength
17 aircraft carriers 18 escort carriers 12 battleships 24 cruisers 141 destroyers and destroyer escorts Many PT boats, submarines and fleet auxiliaries About 1,500 planes	4 aircraft carriers 9 battleships 19 cruisers 34 destroyers About 200 planes
Casualties and losses
3,500 dead; 1 light aircraft carrier, 2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers, 1 destroyer escort sunk	10,000 dead; 4 aircraft carriers, 3 battleships, 8 cruisers, 12 destroyers sunk

The Battle of Leyte Gulf, also known as the the Battle for Leyte Gulf and formerly as the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea, was arguably the climactic battle of the Pacific War, the largest naval battle of World War II, and — by some criteria — the largest naval battle in history.

It was fought in waters near to the Philippine island of Leyte from 23 October to 26 October 1944, between the Allies and the Empire of Japan. On October 20, United States troops invaded Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at cutting off Japan from countries it occupied in South East Asian, and depriving its forces and industry of crucial oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) gathered nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to repel the Allied invasion, but were repelled by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets, which at the time included some Royal Australian Navy warships. The IJN failed to achieve its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never again sailed to battle in force. The majority of its capital ships, deprived of fuel, were to remain inactive in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf consisted of four interrelated major battles — the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle of Cape Engaño and the Battle off Samar — and other actions, such as the "Fight in Palawan Passage".

The first use of kamikaze aircraft took place following the Leyte landings. A kamikaze hit the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia on 21 October, and organized suicide attacks by the "Special Attack Force" began on 25 October.

Background

The Pacific campaigns of August 1942 to early 1944 had driven Japanese forces from many of their island bases in the south and central Pacific — while isolating many of their other bases (in particular the bastion of Rabaul) — and in June 1944 a series of Allied amphibious landings supported by the US Fifth Fleet's Fast Carrier Task Force captured the Northern Mariana Islands breaching Japan's inner strategic ring of defenses and giving the Allies a base from which long range B-29 Superfortress bombers could threaten the Japanese islands. The Japanese counterattacked in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in which the Allies destroyed three Japanese aircraft carriers and approximately 600 Japanese aircraft, establishing Allied air and sea superiority over the central Pacific.

For subsequent operations, Admiral Ernest J. King and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored blockading Japanese forces in the Philippines and attacking Formosa to give the Allies control of the sea routes between Japan and southern Asia. General Douglas MacArthur favoured an invasion of the Philippines, which also lay across the supply lines to Japan. Leaving the Philippines in Japanese hands would be a blow to American prestige and a personal affront to General MacArthur, who in 1942 had famously vowed to return. Also, the considerable air power the Japanese had amassed in the Philippines was considered too dangerous to bypass by many high-ranking officers outside the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including Admiral Chester Nimitz. However, Nimitz and MacArthur initially had opposing plans, with Nimitz's plan initially centered on an invasion of Formosa, since that could also cut the supply lines to Southeast Asia. Formosa could also serve as a base for an invasion of mainland China, which MacArthur felt unnecessary. A meeting between MacArthur, Nimitz, and President Franklin Roosevelt helped confirm the Philippines as a strategic target, but had less to do with the final decision to invade the Philippines than sometimes claimed. Nimitz eventually changed his mind and agreed to MacArthur's plan.

Perhaps the most decisive consideration against the Formosa-China plan, as envisaged by Admiral King and others, was that the invasion of Formosa was expected to require much larger ground forces than were available in the Pacific in late 1944, and would not have been feasible until the defeat of Germany had released the necessary additional Allied divisions for service in the east (See Morison History of United States Naval Operations in World War II - Volume XII 'Leyte').

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The four main actions in the battle of Leyte Gulf. 1 Battle of the Sibuyan Sea 2 Battle of Surigao Strait 3 Battle of (or 'off') Cape Engaño 4 Battle off Samar

The Allied options were equally apparent to the Imperial Japanese Navy. Combined Fleet Chief Toyoda Soemu prepared four "victory" plans: Shō-Gō 1 (捷１号作戦 Shō ichigō sakusen) was a major naval operation in the Philippines, while Shō-Gō 2, Shō-Gō 3 and Shō-Gō 4 were responses to attacks on Formosa, the Ryukyu and Kurile Islands respectively. The plans were complex, aggressive operations committing all available forces to a decisive battle, ignoring Japan's strategic immobility because of a lack of oil.

Thus, when on 12 October 1944, Nimitz launched a carrier raid against Formosa to make sure planes based there could not intervene in the Leyte landings, the Japanese put Shō-Gō 2 into action, launching waves of attacks against the carriers, losing 600 planes in three days, almost their entire air strength in the region. Following the American invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese Navy transitioned to Shō-Gō 1.

Shō-Gō 1 called for Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's fleet, known as Northern Force, to lure the U.S. Third Fleet away from the landings using an obviously vulnerable force of carriers, which were in fact almost devoid of aircraft. The Allied landing forces, lacking air cover, would then be attacked from the west by three Japanese forces: Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita's command, Center Force, based in Brunei, would enter Leyte Gulf and destroy the Allied landing forces. Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura's and Vice-Admiral Kiyohide Shima's fleets, collectively called Southern Force, would act as mobile strike forces. All three forces would consist of surface ships.

The plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the forces, but Toyoda later justified it to his American interrogators as follows:

Should we lose in the Philippines operations, even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the loss of the Philippines.

Battle of the Sibuyan Sea

Musashi departing Brunei in October 1944 for the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

As it sortied from its base in Brunei Kurita's powerful 'Center Force' consisted of five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna), ten heavy cruisers (Atago, Maya, Takao, Chōkai, Myōkō, Haguro, Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma, and Tone), two light cruisers (Noshiro and Yahagi) and fifteen destroyers.

The Fight in Palawan Passage - As Kurita passed Palawan Island shortly after midnight on 23 October, his force was spotted by the submarines USS Dace and USS Darter. Although the submarines' report of the sighting was picked up by the radio operator on Yamato, the Japanese failed to take anti-submarine precautions. 'Darter' sank Kurita's flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago, with four torpedo hits and seriously damaged the heavy cruiser Takao, and Dace torpedoed and sank the heavy cruiser Maya. Kurita transferred his flag to the battleship Yamato. Takao turned back to Brunei with two destroyers, shadowed by the two submarines. On 24 October, as the submarines continued to tail the damaged cruiser, Darter grounded on the Bombay Shoal. All efforts to get her off failed, and she was abandoned; her entire crew was rescued by Dace.

At about 08:00 on 24 October, the Center Force was spotted entering the narrow Sibuyan Sea by planes from USS Intrepid. Despite its great strength Halsey's fleet was much less well-placed to deal with the threat than it could - and should - have been. On 22 October Halsey had detached two of his carrier groups to the fleet base at Ulithi to provision and rearm. When the Darter's contact report came in Halsey recalled Davison's group but allowed McCain, with the strongest of Task Force 38's carrier groups, to continue towards Ulithi. Halsey finally recalled McCain on 24 October - but the delay meant that the most powerful American carrier group played little part in the coming battle, and that Third Fleet was therefore effectively deprived of nearly 40% of its air strength for most of the battle. On the morning of 24 October only three groups were available to hit Kurita's force, and the one best positioned to do so - Bogan's Task Group 38.2 - was by mischance the weakest of the groups, containing only one large carrier - Intrepid - and two light carriers.

Yamato hit by a bomb near her forward gun turret in the Sibuyan Sea.

Planes from carriers Intrepid and Cabot of Bogan's group attacked at about 10:30, scoring hits on Nagato, Yamato, Musashi and severely damaging Myōkō. A second wave from the USS Intrepid, Essex and Lexington later attacked, with Helldivers from USS Essex Air Group 15 (the so called "fabled fifteen" led by David McCampbell), scoring another 10 hits on Musashi. As she retreated, listing to port, a third wave from USS Enterprise and USS Franklin hit her with eleven bombs and eight torpedoes. Kurita turned his fleet around to get out of range of the planes, passing the crippled Musashi as he retreated. He waited until 17:15 before turning around again to head for the San Bernardino Strait. Musashi finally rolled over and sank at about 19:30.

Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Onishi Takijiro had directed his First Air Fleet of 80 planes based on Luzon against the carriers USS Essex, USS Lexington, USS Princeton and USS Langley of Task Group 38.3 (whose planes were being used to attack airfields in Luzon to prevent Japanese land based aircraft attacks on the Allied ships in the Leyte Gulf). Princeton was hit by an armor-piercing bomb and burst into flames. At 15:30, the aft magazine exploded, killing 200 sailors on Princeton and 80 on the cruiser USS Birmingham which was alongside assisting with the firefighting. Birmingham was so badly damaged that she was forced to retire, and other nearby vessels were damaged as well. All efforts to save Princeton failed, and she was scuttled at 17:50.

Kurita made his way through the San Bernardino Strait in the night, to appear off Samar in the morning.

The Battle of Surigao Strait.

Battle of Surigao Strait

Nishimura's "Southern Force" consisted of the battleships Yamashiro and Fusō, the cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers. They were attacked by bombers on 24 October but sustained only minor damage.

Because of the strict radio silence imposed on the Central and Southern Forces, Nishimura was unable to synchronise his movements with Shima and Kurita. When he entered the narrow Surigao Strait at about 02:00 Shima was 25 miles (40 km) behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea, several hours from the beaches at Leyte.

As they passed the cape of Panaon Island, they ran into a deadly trap set for them by the 7th Fleet Support Force. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had six battleships (West Virginia, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania, all but the Mississippi having been resurrected from Pearl Harbor), eight cruisers (heavy cruisers USS Louisville (Flagship), Portland, Minneapolis and HMAS Shropshire, light cruisers USS Denver, Columbia, Phoenix, Boise), 28 destroyers and 39 Patrol/Torpedo (PT) boats. To pass the strait and reach the landings, Nishimura would have to run the gauntlet of torpedoes from the PT boats, evade two groups of destroyers, proceed up the strait under the concentrated fire of six battleships in line across the far mouth of the strait, and then break through the screen of cruisers and destroyers.

The battleship USS Tennessee

At about 03:00, Fusō and the destroyers Asagumo, Yamagumo, and Mishishio were hit by torpedoes launched by the destroyer groups. Fusō broke in two but did not sink. Then at 03:16, USS West Virginia’s radar picked up Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yards (38 km) and had achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yards (27 km). She tracked them as they approached in the pitch black night. At 03:52, West Virginia unleashed her eight 16 inch (406 mm) guns of the main battery at a range of 22,800 yards (21 km), striking the leading Japanese battleship with her first salvo. At 03:54 California and Tennessee opened fire. Radar fire control allowed these American battleships to hit targets from a distance at which the Japanese could not reply because of their inferior fire control systems. Yamashiro and Mogami were crippled by a combination of 14-inch (356 mm) and 16-inch (406 mm) armor-piercing shells. Shigure turned and fled but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro sank at 04:19, with Nishimura on board. His surviving ships retreated west.

At 04:25, Shima's two cruisers (Nachi and Ashigara) and eight destroyers reached the battle. Seeing what they thought were the wrecks of both Nishimura's battleships (actually the two halves of Fusō), he ordered a retreat. His flagship, Nachi, collided with Mogami, flooding the latter's steering-room. Mogami fell behind in the retreat and was sunk by aircraft the next morning. The bow half of Fusō was destroyed by Louisville, and the stern half sank off Kanihaan Island. Of Nishimura's seven ships, only Shigure survived.

The Battle of Surigao Strait was the last battle-line action in history - Yamashiro and her American opponents were the last battleships to engage another battleship in combat. If Yamashiro was sunk by battleship fire alone (which is unlikely), then she was one of only two during the Second World War for which this may be claimed (the other being the Kongō-class battleship Kirishima - in the Battle of Guadalcanal. However, Yamashiro had been hit by as many as four torpedoes from American destroyers, and Kirishima was scuttled because the US battleship Washington's gunfire had wrecked her steering and left her in a hopeless position. It is in fact doubtful whether during that war any battleship was sunk by gunfire alone (although the battlecruiser Hood was destroyed by gunfire in the Battle of the Denmark Strait).

Surigao Strait was also the last battle in which one force (the Americans, in this case) was able to cross the T of its opponent, enabling the U.S. ships to bring all their firepower to bear on the Japanese ships. By the time the battleship action was joined the Japanese line was out of formation and consisted only of the battleship Yamashiro, one heavy cruiser and one destroyer.

Battle of (or 'off') Cape Engaño

The Japanese aircraft carriers Zuikaku, left, and (probably) Zuihō come under attack by dive bombers early in the battle off Cape Engaño.

The crew of Zuikaku salute as the flag is lowered, and the Zuikaku ceases to be the flagship of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Ozawa's "Northern Force" had four aircraft carriers (Zuikaku — the last surviving carrier of the Attack on Pearl Harbor — Zuihō, Chitose, and Chiyoda), two World War I battleships partially converted to carriers (Hyūga and Ise — the aft turrets had been replaced by hangar, deck and catapult, but neither carried any planes in this battle), three cruisers (Ōyodo, Tama, and Isuzu), and nine destroyers. He had only 108 planes.

Ozawa's force was not spotted until 16:40 on 24 October, because the Americans were too busy attacking Kurita and dealing with the air strikes from Luzon. On the evening of 24 October, Ozawa intercepted a (mistaken) American communication of Kurita's withdrawal and began to withdraw as well. But at 20:00, Toyoda Soemu ordered all forces to attack.

Halsey was convinced that the Northern Force was the main threat, and was determined to seize what he saw as a golden opportunity to destroy Japan's remaining carrier strength. Believing that the Japanese Center Force had been neutralized by Third Fleet's air strikes on 24 October air strikes in the Sibuyan Sea, and that its remnants were retiring to Brunei, Halsey radioed "Central Force heavily damaged according to strike reports. Am proceeding north with three groups to attack carrier forces at dawn."

Admiral Kinkaid and his staff assumed that Task Force 34 under Willis Lee had now been formed , and that Halsey was leaving this battleship force guarding San Bernadino Strait (and covering Seventh Fleet's northern flank) while he took his three available carrier groups in pursuit of the Japanese carriers. But Task Force 34 had in fact not yet been formed, and Lee's battleships were on their way northwards with the Third Fleet's carrier groups. Halsey had quite consciously left San Bernadino Strait entirely unguarded.

He and his staff officers resolutely ignored reports from a night snooper aircraft flown from the light carrier USS Independence that Kurita's powerful surface force had turned back towards San Bernardo Strait, and that the navigation lights in the Strait had been turned on. When Admiral Gerald F. Bogan, commanding TG 38.2, radioed this information to Halsey's flagship, he was rebuffed by a staff officer, who tersely replied "Yes, yes, we have that information." Admiral Willis A. Lee, who had correctly deduced that Ozawa's force was a decoy and indicated the same in a blinker message to Halsey's flagship, was similarly rebuffed.

The Third Fleet was overwhelmingly stronger than the Japanese Northern Force. Halsey had five large fleet carriers (Intrepid, Franklin, Lexington, Enterprise, and Essex), five light fleet carriers (Independence, Belleau Wood, Langley, Cabot, and San Jacinto - a sixth, Princeton, had been destroyed by a Japanese air attack on 24 October just as its aircraft were taking off to attack Kurita's Center Force), six battleships (Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington), seventeen cruisers and sixty-three destroyers. The air groups of the ten US carriers present contained a total of more than six hundred aircraft.

On the morning of 25 October, Ozawa launched 75 planes to attack the Americans, doing little damage. Most were shot down by the American covering patrols. A handful of survivors made it to Luzon.

Halsey had passed tactical command of Task Force 38 to Admiral Marc Mitscher, who ordered the American carrier groups to launch their first strike wave, of 180 aircraft, at dawn - before the Northern Force had been located. The search aircraft made contact at 07:10. At 08:00, the American fighters destroyed the defensive screen of 30 aircraft. Air strikes began and continued until the evening, by which time the American aircraft had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force, sinking Zuikaku and Zuihō, "seaplane tender" Chiyoda, and the destroyer Akitsuki. "Seaplane tender" Chitose was disabled, as was the cruiser Tama. Ozawa transferred his flag to Ōyodo.

With all the Japanese carriers sunk or disabled, the main targets remaining were the converted battleships Ise and Hyūga. Their massive construction proved resistant to the air strikes, so Halsey sent Task Force 34 forward to engage them directly. During the entire battle, Halsey had been ignoring repeated calls for help from Taffy 3 and the other escort groups. At 10:00, Halsey received two messages. The first was from Kinkaid, which read: "MY SITUATION IS CRITICAL. FAST BATTLESHIPS AND SUPPORT BY AIR STRIKES MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP ENEMY FROM DESTROYING CVES AND ENTERING LEYTE." Halsey recalled in his memoirs that he was shocked at this message, recounting that the radio signals from the Seventh Fleet had come in at random and out of order due to a backlog in the signals office. Halsey claimed that he knew Kinkaid was in trouble, but had not dreamed of the scale. From 3,000 miles (5,000 km) away in Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz had been monitoring the desperate calls from Taffy 3 and sent Halsey a terse message: "TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS" The first four words and the last three were "padding" used to confuse enemy listeners (the beginning and end of the true message was marked by double consonants, followed by nonsense words.) The communication's technician on Halsey's flagship correctly deleted the first section of padding but mistakenly kept the last three words in the message draft that was handed to Halsey. The last three words, probably selected by a communication's officer at Nimitz' headquarters, may have been meant as a loose quote from Tennyson's poem on "The Charge of the Light Brigade," in honor of the 25 October anniversary of the Battle of Balaklava and was not intended as a commentary on Halsey's current situation. Halsey, however, upon reading the message, thought that the last four words comprised a biting piece of criticism from Nimitz and broke into "sobs of rage." Realizing their mistake, the communications staff on Halsey's ship later explained to Halsey what had happened.

Halsey reluctantly abandoned the pursuit and turned south, detaching only a small force of cruisers and destroyers under Laurence T. DuBose to sink the disabled Japanese ships. It was too late; Kurita had already turned for home. In what became known as the "Battle of Bull's Run", Halsey accomplished nothing except sinking a crippled Japanese cruiser. Ise and Hyūga returned to Japan, where they were sunk at their moorings in 1945.

Battle off Samar

Main article: Battle off Samar

The battle off Samar.

The Yamato and a heavy cruiser, possibly Tone or Chikuma, in action off Samar.

Halsey's decision to take all the available strength of Third Fleet northwards to attack the Japanese carriers left San Bernadino Strait completely unguarded. As C. Vann Woodward remarks, 'not so much as a picket destroyer was left.'

It was generally assumed by senior officers in Seventh Fleet (including Kinkaid) that Halsey was taking his three available carrier groups northwards (McCain's group, the strongest in Third Fleet, was still returning from the direction of Ulithi) but leaving the battleships of Task Force 34 covering San Bernadino Strait against the Japanese Center Force. In fact Halsey had not yet formed Task Force 34, and all six of Lee's battleships were on their way northwards with the carriers.

Kurita's Center Force was therefore able to pass through San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on 25 October and then steam southwards along the coast of Samar, hoping that Halsey had taken the bait and led most of his fleet away - a hope that was amply fulfilled. At this stage, despite the losses in the Palawan Passage and Sibuyan Sea actions Center Force was still very powerful indeed, consisting of 4 battleships including the giant Yamato, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and a dozen destroyers.

To stop them, there were only the three escort carrier groups of Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet. These contained a total of sixteen small escort carriers, with their escorting lightly armed (and entirely unarmoured) destroyers and smaller 'destroyer escorts'. Admiral Thomas Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.1 ("Taffy 1") consisted of the escort carriers Sangamon, Suwannee, Santee, and Petrof Bay. (The remaining two escort carriers from Taffy 1, Chenango and Saginaw Bay, had departed for Morotai, Indonesia on October 24, carrying "dud" aircraft from other carriers for transfer ashore. They returned with replacement aircraft after the battle.) Admiral Felix Stump's Task Unit 77.4.2 ("Taffy 2") consisted of Natoma Bay, Manila Bay, Marcus Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Island, and Ommaney Bay.

Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") consisted of Fanshaw Bay, St Lo, White Plains, Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay, and Gambier Bay.

Each escort carrier carried about 30 planes, making available more than 500 planes in all, though many were armed with machine guns, depth charges and general purpose bombs as their task had been supporting troops fighting ashore. The escort carriers were slow and lightly armored and stood little chance in an encounter with a battleship. They were, however, "screened" by destroyers and destroyer escorts affectionately known as "tin cans."

The Japanese came upon Taffy 3 at 06:45, taking the Americans completely by surprise. Kurita, not seeing the silhouettes of the tiny escort carriers in his identification manuals, mistook the escort carriers for light fleet carriers of the Independence Class, and thought that he had the whole of the American Third Fleet under guns of his battleships including the 18.1-inch (460 mm) guns of the Yamato.

When Taffy 3 discovered they were coming under attack, Clifton Sprague (no relation to Thomas Sprague) directed his Taffy 3 carriers to turn to launch their aircraft and flee towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and ordered the destroyers to make smoke to mask the retreating carriers, which drew fire from the Japanese ships. The History Channel's 2006 Dogfights called it the naval mismatch of the century, wherein David would send Goliath fleeing for home. Yamato was the largest and most powerful battleship to ever see combat; it alone displaced as much as all of Taffy 3 put together.

Concerned about the splashes of incoming fire, Lieutenant Commander Ernest E. Evans, skipper of the destroyer USS Johnston, which was the closest to the attackers, suddenly took the initiative to order his ship to "flank speed, full left rudder," ordering Johnston to directly attack the greatly superior oncoming Japanese ships on his own in what would appear to be a suicidal mission.

The Johnston was a 2100-ton destroyer of the Fletcher Class, armed with five 5-inch (127 mm) guns, 40mm and 20mm light anti-aircraft guns, and ten 21-inch Mark-15 torpedoes. Only the torpedoes gave her any chance of inflicting serious damage on an enemy battleship.

Weaving to avoid shells, and steering towards splashes, the Johnston approached the Japanese heavy cruiser Kumano for a torpedo run. When Johnston was 10 miles (17 km) from Kumano, her 5-inch (127 mm) guns rained shells on Kumano’s bridge and deck (where they could do some damage — the shells would simply bounce off the enemy ship's armored hull). Johnston closed to within torpedo range and fired a salvo, which blew the bow off the cruiser squadron flagship Kumano and also took the cruiser Suzuya out of the fight as she stopped to assist.

From seven miles (11 km) away, the battleship Kongo sent a 14 inch shell through the Johnston’s deck and engine room. Johnston’s speed was cut in half to only 14 knots (), while the aft gun turrets lost all electrical power. Then three 6-inch shells, possibly from Yamato's secondary batteries, struck Johnston’s bridge, killing many and wounding Comdr. Evans. The bridge was abandoned, and Evans steered the ship from the aft steering column. Evans nursed his ship back towards the fleet, when he saw the other destroyers attacking as well. Emboldened by the Johnston's attack, Sprague gave the order "small boys attack", sending the rest of Taffy 3's destroyers on the assault. Even in her heavily damaged state, damage-control teams restored power to 2 of the 3 aft turrets, and Evans turned the Johnston around and re-entered the fight.

The other destroyers attacked the Japanese line with suicidal determination, drawing fire and scattering the Japanese formations as ships turned to avoid torpedoes. The powerful Yamato found herself between two spreads of torpedoes fired from the destroyer USS Heermann which were on parallel courses, and for ten minutes, she headed away from the action, unable to turn back for fear of being hit. Heermann, meanwhile, closed with the other Japanese battleships, advancing so close to her huge targets that they could not fire for either inability to depress their main guns enough or fear of hitting their own men and ships.

The Japanese cruiser Chikuma maneuvering after sustaining torpedo damage.

At 07:35, the even smaller destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts turned and headed toward the battle. On the way, the Roberts passed by the mangled Johnston and saw an inspirational sight in the person of Comdr. Evans standing on the Johnston’s stern, his left hand wrapped in a bandage, saluting the captain of the Roberts. With only two 5-inch (127 mm) guns, one fore and aft, and just 3 Mark-15 torpedoes, her crew lacked the weapons and training in tactics to take on the much larger attackers. Still, she charged in to attack the heavy cruiser Chokai. With smoke as cover, the Roberts steamed to within two and a half miles (4 km) of Chokai, coming under fire of her two forward 8-inch turrets. But Roberts was so close that the shells passed overhead. Once in torpedo range, Roberts' 3-torpedo salvo struck the cruiser. Following this Roberts dueled with the Japanese ships for an hour, firing over 600 5-inch shells and raking the upper works with 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns while maneuvering at close range. At 08:51, the Japanese finally landed two hits, the second of which destroyed the aft gun turret. With her remaining 5-inch (127 mm) gun, she set the bridge of the cruiser Chikuma afire and destroyed the number 3 gun turret, before being pierced again by three 14 inch shells from the Kongo. With a 40-foot (12 m) hole in her side, the Roberts took on water, and at 09:35, the order was given to abandon ship, sinking 30 minutes later with 89 of her crew.

Meanwhile, Sprague had ordered all three Taffy groups to launch their planes with whatever they had, even if they were machine guns or depth charges. Even after many aircraft expended their ammunition they made dry runs to threaten and distract Japanese warships and their gunners. Instead of being easily overrun, the Americans had turned it into a bloody all-out brawl with their attackers.

File:Samar (AWM 302773).jpg

USS Kitkun Bay prepares to launch her Wildcat fighters while USS White Plains is straddled by 14 inch shells

The carriers of Taffy 3 turned south and fled through shellfire. The armor-piercing (AP) shells intended for Halsey's battleships flew right through the thin-skinned escort carriers without triggering their fuses. A switch to High Explosive (HE) shells holed, slowed, and sunk the Gambier Bay at the rear, while most of the others were also damaged. Their single stern-mounted five-inch (127 mm) anti-aircraft guns returned fire, though they were ineffective against surface ships. Yet, the St. Lo scored a hit on the magazine of a cruiser, the only known hit inflicted directly by a gun on an aircraft carrier against an opposing surface vessel.

The tide soon turned against Taffy 3's destroyers. Two hours into the attack, Comdr. Evans aboard the Johnston spotted a line of four destroyers led by the light cruiser Yahagi making a torpedo attack on the fleeing carriers and moved to intercept. Johnston poured fire on the attacking group, forcing them to prematurely fire their torpedoes, missing the carriers. Their gunfire then turned to the weaving Johnston. At 09:10 the Japanese scored a direct hit on one of the forward turrets, knocking it out and setting off many 5-inch shells that were stored in the turret, and her damaged engines stopped, leaving her dead in the water. The Japanese destroyers closed in on the sitting target, and the Johnston was hit so many times that one survivor recalled "they couldn't patch holes fast enough to keep her afloat." At 09:45 (2 hours and 45 minutes into the battle), Comdr. Evans finally gave the order to abandon ship. The Johnston sank 25 minutes later with 186 of her crew. Commander Evans abandoned ship with his crew but was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Just as it seemed the end was near for the Taffy 3 and the other two Taffy groups, at 09:20 Kurita suddenly broke off the fight and, giving the order "all ships, my course north, speed 20", retreated north. Though many of his ships were not even damaged, the air and destroyer attacks had broken up his formations, and he had lost tactical control. Three heavy cruisers (Chōkai, Kumano, Chikuma) had been sunk, and the ferocity of the determined concentrated sea and air attack had led him to calculate that continuing was not worth further losses.

Signals from Ozawa had disabused him of the notion that he was attacking the whole of the 3rd Fleet, which meant that the longer he continued to engage, the more likely it was that he would suffer devastating air strikes from Halsey's main attack carriers which were even more threatening than the tiny force of Taffy 3. He retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait. Nagato, Haruna and Kongō were severely damaged from the torpedoes of Taffy 3's destroyers. Kurita had begun the battle with five battleships. On return to Japan, only Yamato remained combat-worthy, and she had not even taken a major part in the battle.

The spirit of Taffy 3 was shown when, while watching the Japanese retreat, Sprague heard a nearby sailor exclaim: "Dammit boys, they're getting away!"

The American destroyers Hoel and Johnston, and destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts were sunk, and four others were damaged. The destroyer Heermann, despite her duel with Japanese battleships many times her size, finished the battle with only six of her crew dead. In total, over one thousand American sailors and pilots were killed.

Taffy 3 was awarded the following Presidential Unit Citation: "For extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet during the Battle off Samar, Philippines, October 25, 1944. ...the gallant ships of the Task Unit waged battle fiercely against the superior speed and fire power of the advancing enemy ...two of the Unit's valiant destroyers and one destroyer escort charged the battleships point-blank and, expending their last torpedoes in desperate defense of the entire group, went down under the enemy's heavy shells ... The courageous determination and the superb teamwork of the officers and men who fought the embarked planes and who manned the ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 were instrumental in effecting the retirement of a hostile force threatening our Leyte invasion operations and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Aftermath

A 60th Anniversary ceremony in Tacloban, Philippines, on October 20, 2004

The battle of Leyte Gulf secured the beachheads of the U.S. Sixth Army on Leyte against attack from the sea. However, much hard fighting would be required before the island was completely in Allied hands at the end of December 1944: the Battle of Leyte on land was fought in parallel with an air and sea campaign in which the Japanese reinforced and resupplied their troops on Leyte while the Allies attempted to interdict them and establish air-sea superiority for a series of amphibious landings in Ormoc Bay — engagements collectively referred to as the Battle of Ormoc Bay.

The Imperial Japanese Navy was not destroyed or eliminated, as some accounts have described, since the greater part of the fleet survived the battle. However, their failure to dislodge the Allied invaders from Leyte meant that Japan would be cut off from her colonies in Southeast Asia, which provided crucial war resources such as oil for their ships, and the problem was compounded because the shipyards and ammunition were in Japan. The fleet returned home to sit inactive for the remainder of the war. The loss of Leyte opened the way for the invasion of the Ryukyu Islands in 1945. The only significant Japanese naval operation for the rest of the war was the disastrous Operation Ten-Go in April 1945.

Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi had put his "Special Attack Force" into operation launching kamikaze attacks against the Allied ships in Leyte Gulf, but it was hampered by bad weather and fuel shortages. On 25 October, Australia was hit for a second time and forced to retire for repairs, while the escort carrier St. Lo was sunk. Because of communication errors, the Taffy 3 survivors of the Battle off Samar who had abandoned ship were not rescued for a few days, by which time many more had gone mad or died because of sharks or thirst. Finally, the captain of a LST took his ship to rescue the Americans, using a rather peculiar method of identifying who was American, as survivor Jack Yusen related:

"We saw this ship come up, it was circling around us, and a guy was standing up on the bridge with a megaphone. And he called out 'Who are you? Who are you?' and we all yelled out 'Samuel B. Roberts!' He's still circling, so now we're cursing at him. He came back and yelled 'Who won the World Series?' and we all yelled 'St. Louis Cardinals!' And then we could hear the engines stop, and cargo nets were thrown over the side. That's how we were rescued."

Criticism of Halsey

File:Halsey.JPG

Admiral William F. 'Bill' Halsey - Commander of the US Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf

Halsey was criticized for his decision to take Task Force 34 north in pursuit of Ozawa, and for failing to detach it when Kinkaid first appealed for help. U.S. Navy slang for Halsey's action has ever since been Bull's Run, a phrase combining Halsey's newspaper nickname "Bull" (in the US Navy he was instead known as 'Bill' Halsey) with an allusion to the Battle of Bull Run in the American Civil War. In his dispatch after the battle, Halsey justified the decision as follows:

Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the Northern carrier force on the afternoon of 24 October, which completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack the Northern Force at dawn. I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet.

Furthermore, to leave Task Force 34 to defend the strait without carrier support would have left them vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft. From previous experience, Halsey knew that the Japanese had the ability to move planes from Japan into the area very quickly. Leaving one of Third Fleet's three remaining Task Groups behind to cover the battleships would have significantly reduced the amount of air power, although Admiral Lee would later state that "one or two light carriers" might have been sufficient cover, and the naval historian S.E. Morison states that Lee told him that he would have been prepared for his battleships to cover San Bernadino Strait without any carrier support at all.

The fact that Halsey was aboard one of the battleships, and would have had to remain behind with Task Force 34 (while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards to attack the Japanese carriers) might also have contributed to his decision. Halsey seems, as well, to have been strongly influenced by his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Mick Carney, who was also wholeheartedly in favour of taking all of Third Fleet northwards to attack the Japanese carrier force.

Clifton Sprague, commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar, was later critical of Halsey's decision:

In the absence of any information that this exit [of the San Bernardino Strait] was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning.

Naval historian Samuel Morison wrote:

If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force… Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have crossed Kurita's T and completed the destruction of Center Force.

References

• Cutler, Thomas (2001). The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-243-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
• Drea, Edward J. (1998). "Leyte: Unanswered Questions". In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-1708-0. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1.
• Field, James A. (1947). The Japanese at Leyte Gulf;: The Sho operation. Princeton University Press. ASIN B0006AR6LA. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Friedman, Kenneth (2001). Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-756-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Hornfischer, James D. (2004). The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. Bantam. ISBN 0-553-80257-7.
• Hoyt, Edwin P. (2003). The Men of the Gambier Bay: The Amazing True Story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Lyons Press. ISBN 1-58574-643-6. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Lacroix, Eric (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Morison, Samuel Eliot (2004 (reissue)). Leyte, June 1944-January 1945, vol. 12 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A.: University of Illinois Press; Reprint edition. ISBN 0-252-07063-1. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Potter, E. B. (2005). Admiral Arleigh Burke. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-692-5. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Potter, E. B. (2003). Bull Halsey. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-691-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Sauer, Howard (1999). The Last Big-Gun Naval Battle: The Battle of Surigao Strait. Glencannon Press. ISBN 1-889901-08-3. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Thomas, Evan (2006). Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941-1945. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-5221-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Willmott, H. P. (2005). The Battle Of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-34528-6. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Woodward, C. Vann (2007). The Battle for Leyte Gulf: The Incredible Story of World War II's Largest Naval Battle. Skyhorse Publishing. ISBN 1602391947. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

External links

• Animated History of The Battle of Leyte Gulf
• Battle Experience: Battle for Leyte Gulf [Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 22]
• Task Force 77 Action Report: Battle of Leyte Gulf
• "Turkey Trots to Water" — detailed description of the battle from battleship.org
• Orders of battle: Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, Cape Engaño, Samar.
• "Glorious Death: The Battle of Leyte Gulf" by Tim Lanzendörfer
• battle-of-leyte-gulf.com
• Leyte Gulf - a Brief Account of the Battle
• The Battle Off Samar — Taffy III at Leyte Gulf by Robert Jon Cox
• Leyte Gulf Naval Chess Game, a free, educational boardgame of the battle, to print off, assemble, and play
• Return to the Philippines: public domain documents from ibiblio.org
• The Battle for Leyte Gulf Revisited by Irwin J. Kappes
• Timeline for USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE 413)
• Japan's TA-Operation: A Blueprint for Disaster by Irwin J. Kappes

Audio/visual media

• Lost Evidence of the Pacific: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. History Channel TV
• Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy. History Channel. TV