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[[File:Latin alphabet world distribution.svg|thumb|right|300px|The current distribution of the [[Latin alphabet]] (dark green: sole main script; light green: co-exists with other scripts) shows where the colonial empires of the [[Latin West]] exerted lasting influence during the [[Modern period]].]]
[[File:Latin alphabet world distribution.svg|thumb|right|300px|The current distribution of the [[Latin alphabet]] (dark green: sole main script; light green: co-exists with other scripts) shows where the colonial empires of the [[Latin West]] exerted lasting influence during the [[Modern period]].]]


The '''Great Divergence''', coined by [[Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington]]<ref name=Frank>Andre Frank. "[http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/pomeranz.html Review of The Great Divergence ]", JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES .</ref>(also known as the '''European miracle''', a term coined by [[Eric Jones (economic historian)|Eric Jones]] in 1981<ref name= Jones>{{cite book | last =Jones | first =Eric | authorlink =
The '''Great Divergence''', coined by [[Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington]]<ref name=Frank>{{harvnb|Frank|2000}}</ref>(also known as the '''European miracle''', a term coined by [[Eric Jones (economic historian)|Eric Jones]] in 1981<ref name= Jones>{{harvnb|Jones|2003}}</ref>), refers to the process by which the [[Western world]] (i.e. [[Western Europe]] and the parts of the [[New World]] where its people became the dominant populations) during the [[Modern period]] (16th to 19th centuries) clearly emerged as the most powerful world [[civilization]], eclipsing the [[Islamic empire]]s (the [[Ottoman Empire]], [[Mughal Empire|Mughal India]]), [[Tokugawa shogunate|Tokugawa Japan]], and [[Qing Dynasty|Qing China]].
| coauthors =
| title =[[The European Miracle]]: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia
| publisher =
| date =(2003 (1st ed 1987))
| location =
| pages =
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn = ISBN 0-521-52783-X}}</ref>), refers to the process by which the [[Western world]] (i.e. [[Western Europe]] and the parts of the [[New World]] where its people became the dominant populations) during the [[Modern period]] (16th to 19th centuries) clearly emerged as the most powerful world [[civilization]], eclipsing the [[Islamic empire]]s (the [[Ottoman Empire]], [[Mughal Empire|Mughal India]]), [[Tokugawa shogunate|Tokugawa Japan]], and [[Qing Dynasty|Qing China]].
The process was accompanied and reinforced by the [[Age of Discovery]] and the subsequent rise of the [[colonial empires]], the [[Age of Enlightenment]], the [[Commercial Revolution]], the [[Scientific Revolution]] and finally the [[Industrial Revolution]]. The Great Divergence was affected by several factors, including technology, industrialization and economics, politics and leadership, and specific ideologies.
The process was accompanied and reinforced by the [[Age of Discovery]] and the subsequent rise of the [[colonial empires]], the [[Age of Enlightenment]], the [[Commercial Revolution]], the [[Scientific Revolution]] and finally the [[Industrial Revolution]]. The Great Divergence was affected by several factors, including technology, industrialization and economics, politics and leadership, and specific ideologies.


Technological advances in [[railroads]], [[steamboats]], [[mining]], and [[agriculture]] were embraced to a higher degree in the West than the East during the Great Divergence. High wages in the West caused businesses to focus efforts on engineering labor-saving machinery, while the East continued to rely on their sources of cheap labor. This economic pressure on the West caused them to refine their processes, leading to a heightened global standing relative to countries of the East. Technology led to increased industrialization and economic complexity in the areas of agriculture, trade, fuel and resources, further separating the East and the West. Europe’s industrial advantages allowed them to surpass the East. Europe's use of [[coal]] as an energy substitute for wood in the mid-1880s gave Europe a major head start in modern energy production. On the other hand, China did not begin using coal until the 20th century.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225">Pomeranz (2000), pp. 219–225.</ref> The West also had the advantage of larger quantities of [[raw materials]] and a substantial trading market. China and Asia did participate in trading, however [[colonization]] brought a distinct advantage to the West.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 242–243">Pomeranz (2000), pp. 242–243.</ref>
Technological advances in [[railroads]], [[steamboats]], [[mining]], and [[agriculture]] were embraced to a higher degree in the West than the East during the Great Divergence. High wages in the West caused businesses to focus efforts on engineering labor-saving machinery, while the East continued to rely on their sources of cheap labor. This economic pressure on the West caused them to refine their processes, leading to a heightened global standing relative to countries of the East. Technology led to increased industrialization and economic complexity in the areas of agriculture, trade, fuel and resources, further separating the East and the West. Europe’s industrial advantages allowed them to surpass the East. Europe's use of [[coal]] as an energy substitute for wood in the mid-1880s gave Europe a major head start in modern energy production. On the other hand, China did not begin using coal until the 20th century.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225">{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp=219–225}}</ref> The West also had the advantage of larger quantities of [[raw materials]] and a substantial trading market. China and Asia did participate in trading, however [[colonization]] brought a distinct advantage to the West.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 242–243">{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp=242–243}}</ref>


Politics and leadership, a staple in almost every country at the time of the Great Divergence, were influenced and executed in distinct manners in both the East and the West. Political ideas and lack thereof warranted either progression into the modern world, regression, or no change at all. Strong countries like [[Great Britain]] set the model for representative governments in the West. On the other hand, [[Japan]], with its retention of traditional values and incorporation of western views was a model for countries in the East.<ref name="Perry 2007 pp. 206-209">Perry (2007), pp. 206-209, 363-365.</ref> Other countries of interest include [[France]], [[Spain]], [[China]], and the [[Netherlands]].
Politics and leadership, a staple in almost every country at the time of the Great Divergence, were influenced and executed in distinct manners in both the East and the West. Political ideas and lack thereof warranted either progression into the modern world, regression, or no change at all. Strong countries like [[Great Britain]] set the model for representative governments in the West. On the other hand, [[Japan]], with its retention of traditional values and incorporation of western views was a model for countries in the East.<ref name="Perry 2007 pp. 206-209">{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=206–209, 363–365}}</ref> Other countries of interest include [[France]], [[Spain]], [[China]], and the [[Netherlands]].


The most important ideologies include [[laissez-faire]], [[socialism]], [[materialism]], [[nationalism]], and [[imperialism]]. Ideologies reflected a shift towards [[secularism]] in the West due to Europe’s [[industrialization]]. Europe's economic and social ideologies both resonated from this transition. [[Laissez-faire]], an economic ideology, was created during the [[Industrial Revolution]] as a belief that trade and economics should exist without government interference.<ref name=Roberts336>Roberts (1996), p. 336.</ref><ref name=Roberts>Roberts, J.M. (1996) ''A History of Europe'', The Penguin Group, ISBN 978-1-85986-178-3. p. 335.</ref> [[Socialism]] emphasizes the desire to change both the power and the [[social dynamics]] within a society.<ref name=Roberts338>Roberts (1996), p. 338.</ref> [[Materialism]] illustrated a shift towards secular thinking.<ref name=Roberts341>Roberts (1996), p. 341.</ref> [[Nationalism]] fostered personal and collective identity. It was one of the most successful revolutionary forces of modern politics.<ref name= Grosby>Grosby, Steven Elliott (2005) ''Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction'', Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-284098-1, p. 5.</ref> [[Imperialism]], an economic and social ideology, fostered the expansion of empires for economic gain and dubiously used as an excuse justifying the expansion of empires.<ref>Roberts (1996), p. 283-385.</ref>
The most important ideologies include [[laissez-faire]], [[socialism]], [[materialism]], [[nationalism]], and [[imperialism]]. Ideologies reflected a shift towards [[secularism]] in the West due to Europe’s [[industrialization]]. Europe's economic and social ideologies both resonated from this transition. [[Laissez-faire]], an economic ideology, was created during the [[Industrial Revolution]] as a belief that trade and economics should exist without government interference.<ref name=Roberts336>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=336}}</ref><ref name=Roberts>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=335}}</ref> [[Socialism]] emphasizes the desire to change both the power and the [[social dynamics]] within a society.<ref name=Roberts338>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=338}}</ref> [[Materialism]] illustrated a shift towards secular thinking.<ref name=Roberts341>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=341}}</ref> [[Nationalism]] fostered personal and collective identity. It was one of the most successful revolutionary forces of modern politics.<ref name= Grosby>{{harvnb|Grosby|2005|p=5}}</ref> [[Imperialism]], an economic and social ideology, fostered the expansion of empires for economic gain and dubiously used as an excuse justifying the expansion of empires.<ref>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|pp=283–385}}</ref>


==Terminology and definition==
==Terminology and definition==
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Broadly, both terms are meant to signify a [[socioeconomic]] shift in which Western countries advanced ahead of Eastern countries during the [[Modern period]].<ref name= Frank/>
Broadly, both terms are meant to signify a [[socioeconomic]] shift in which Western countries advanced ahead of Eastern countries during the [[Modern period]].<ref name= Frank/>
Pomeranz argues in his book that the period of most rapid divergence was during the 19th century.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225">Pomeranz (2000), pp. 219–225.</ref>
Pomeranz argues in his book that the period of most rapid divergence was during the 19th century.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225">{{harvnb|Pomeranz |2000|pp=219–225}}</ref>


==Technological factors leading to the Great Divergence==
==Technological factors leading to the Great Divergence==


Beginning in the early 1800s, economic prosperity rose greatly due to improvements in technological efficiency.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/> This increase in technology is evidenced by the advent of new conveniences including the [[railroad]], steamboat/steam engine, and [[coal]] as a fuel source. These innovations accelerated the Great Divergence, elevating [[Europe]] and the [[United States]] to high economic standing relative to the East.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/> Though these inventions were founded in [[the West]], the Eastern countries still employed their uses in trade and transportation. So, a disparity arose. Both the Western and Eastern countries had access to the same technology, yet the West benefited more from its presence due to a difference in use between the two areas. The concept of comparative use-efficiency levels is used to help corroborate the West's progression ahead of [[the East]].<ref name=clarkfeenstra>Clark, Gregory and Feenstra, Robert C. (2003) "Technology in the Great Divergence". ''Globalization in Historical Perspective''. Ed. Michael D. Bordo. University of Chicago Press. pp. 277-320. ISBN 978-0-226-06600-4.</ref>
Beginning in the early 1800s, economic prosperity rose greatly due to improvements in technological efficiency.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/> This increase in technology is evidenced by the advent of new conveniences including the [[railroad]], steamboat/steam engine, and [[coal]] as a fuel source. These innovations accelerated the Great Divergence, elevating [[Europe]] and the [[United States]] to high economic standing relative to the East.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/> Though these inventions were founded in [[the West]], the Eastern countries still employed their uses in trade and transportation. So, a disparity arose. Both the Western and Eastern countries had access to the same technology, yet the West benefited more from its presence due to a difference in use between the two areas. The concept of comparative use-efficiency levels is used to help corroborate the West's progression ahead of [[the East]].<ref name=clarkfeenstra>{{harvnb|Clark|Feenstra|2003|pp=277–320}}</ref>


===Total factor productivity analysis===
===Total factor productivity analysis===


When analyzing comparative use-efficiency, the economic concept of [[Total Factor Productivity]] (TFP) is applied to quantify differences between countries.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/> TFP analysis assumes similar raw material inputs across countries and is then used to calculate [[productivity]]. The difference in productivity levels, therefore, reflects efficiency of input use rather than the inputs themselves.<ref name=TotalFactorProductivity>Diego Comin. "[http://www.people.hbs.edu/dcomin/def.pdf Total Factor Productivity]", ''[[The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics]]''. [[Steven N. Durlauf]] and [[Lawrence E. Blume]] (eds.), [[Palgrave Macmillan]], Second Edition, 2008. pp. 1. ISBN 978-0-333-78676-5.</ref> TFP analysis has shown that the Western countries had higher TFP levels on average in the 1800s than Eastern countries such as [[India]] or [[China]]. From this one can conclude that the West was making better use of their resources than the East, accelerating the socioeconomic Great Divergence.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/>
When analyzing comparative use-efficiency, the economic concept of [[Total Factor Productivity]] (TFP) is applied to quantify differences between countries.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/> TFP analysis assumes similar raw material inputs across countries and is then used to calculate [[productivity]]. The difference in productivity levels, therefore, reflects efficiency of input use rather than the inputs themselves.<ref name=TotalFactorProductivity>{{harvnb|Comin|2008|p=1}}</ref> TFP analysis has shown that the Western countries had higher TFP levels on average in the 1800s than Eastern countries such as [[India]] or [[China]]. From this one can conclude that the West was making better use of their resources than the East, accelerating the socioeconomic Great Divergence.<ref name=clarkfeenstra/>


===Importance of technological advances to divergence===
===Importance of technological advances to divergence===
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===Possible efficiency influencing factors===
===Possible efficiency influencing factors===


A number of factors contribute to why the West was able to optimize its usage of new technology while the East fell behind. First of all, geographically, Europe and the United States have a large number of inland ports due to extensive, deep rivers. Steamboats were therefore not limited solely to coastal ports. [[Pittsburgh, PA]] for example, became an epicenter for steel distribution towards the end of the 1800s due to its rivers.<ref>Edward K. Muller, "Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh, 1870-1920," ''Journal of Historical Geography'' 2001 27(1): 58-73</ref> This argument is difficult to make, however, because China had a very extensive system of internal canals at the time linking the inland land masses to the coast.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence/> Also, due to regional climate, European coal mines were wetter than the arid Chinese mines. Water could easily be pumped out of European mines using steam engines, but ventilating Chinese mines to prevent explosions was much more difficult.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence>{{cite book |last= Pomeranz |first = Kenneth |title= The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy |publisher= [[Princeton University Press]] |year= 2000 |pages= 31–69 |isbn= 978-0-691-09010-8}}</ref>
A number of factors contribute to why the West was able to optimize its usage of new technology while the East fell behind. First of all, geographically, Europe and the United States have a large number of inland ports due to extensive, deep rivers. Steamboats were therefore not limited solely to coastal ports. [[Pittsburgh, PA]] for example, became an epicenter for steel distribution towards the end of the 1800s due to its rivers.<ref>{{harvnb|Muller|2001|pp=58–73}}</ref> This argument is difficult to make, however, because China had a very extensive system of internal canals at the time linking the inland land masses to the coast.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence/> Also, due to regional climate, European coal mines were wetter than the arid Chinese mines. Water could easily be pumped out of European mines using steam engines, but ventilating Chinese mines to prevent explosions was much more difficult.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence>{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp= 31–69}}</ref>


Compounding the coal advantage was the managerial prowess of the West.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence/> The railroad efforts in the United States were spearheaded by experienced business tycoons such as [[Cornelius Vanderbilt]] and [[Johns Hopkins]]. These millionaires were able to focus their finances on distinct, organized projects which increased the efficiency of track building. The East did not have investment on the same level.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence/>
Compounding the coal advantage was the managerial prowess of the West.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence/> The railroad efforts in the United States were spearheaded by experienced business tycoons such as [[Cornelius Vanderbilt]] and [[Johns Hopkins]]. These millionaires were able to focus their finances on distinct, organized projects which increased the efficiency of track building. The East did not have investment on the same level.<ref name=TheGreatDivergence/>
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==Effects of industrialization and economics==
==Effects of industrialization and economics==
The Old World methods of agriculture and production could only sustain certain lifestyles. In order to make such a dramatic shift from the rest of the world, Industrialization had to take place at many levels. There were many advantages present in Europe that allowed them to industrialize at such a quick pace.<ref>Pomeranz (2000), pp. 7-8.</ref>
The Old World methods of agriculture and production could only sustain certain lifestyles. In order to make such a dramatic shift from the rest of the world, Industrialization had to take place at many levels. There were many advantages present in Europe that allowed them to industrialize at such a quick pace.<ref>{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp=7–8}}</ref>


===Agriculture===
===Agriculture===
Prior to, and even within the 19th century, much of European agriculture was underdeveloped compared to the rest of the world. This left Europe with abundant idle resources ready to be taken advantage of. In the 1800s, rather than adopting more advanced farming techniques for greater crop production, [[France|French]] and [[Germany|German]] farmers were able to put on the market more of their product by laboring longer and curbing their own consumptions. There was also a large agricultural shift from [[crop rotation]] to farming for market demand. [[England]], on the other hand was already at its limit in terms of agricultural productivity well before the beginning of the 19th century. Rather than taking the costly route of improving soil fertility, the English opted to increase labor productivity by embracing industrialization in the agricultural sector. From 1750 to 1850, European nations experienced population booms, however European agriculture was able to barely meet the dietary needs. A few ways in which England was able to cope with the food shortage include: imports from the Americas, less caloric intake required by the newly forming [[proletariat]], and the consumption of appetite suppressants such as tea.<ref>Pomeranz (2000), pp. 215–219.</ref> By the turn of the 19th century, much European farmland had been eroded and depleted of nutrients required to grow crops. Fortunately, through improved farming techniques, the import of [[fertilizers]], and [[reforestation]], Europeans were able to recondition their soil and prevent setbacks to their industrialization efforts. Meanwhile, many other formerly [[hegemonic]] areas of the world were struggling to feed themselves&nbsp;— notably China.<ref>Pomeranz (2000), pp. 223–225.</ref>
Prior to, and even within the 19th century, much of European agriculture was underdeveloped compared to the rest of the world. This left Europe with abundant idle resources ready to be taken advantage of. In the 1800s, rather than adopting more advanced farming techniques for greater crop production, [[France|French]] and [[Germany|German]] farmers were able to put on the market more of their product by laboring longer and curbing their own consumptions. There was also a large agricultural shift from [[crop rotation]] to farming for market demand. [[England]], on the other hand was already at its limit in terms of agricultural productivity well before the beginning of the 19th century. Rather than taking the costly route of improving soil fertility, the English opted to increase labor productivity by embracing industrialization in the agricultural sector. From 1750 to 1850, European nations experienced population booms, however European agriculture was able to barely meet the dietary needs. A few ways in which England was able to cope with the food shortage include: imports from the Americas, less caloric intake required by the newly forming [[proletariat]], and the consumption of appetite suppressants such as tea.<ref>{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp=215–219}}</ref> By the turn of the 19th century, much European farmland had been eroded and depleted of nutrients required to grow crops. Fortunately, through improved farming techniques, the import of [[fertilizers]], and [[reforestation]], Europeans were able to recondition their soil and prevent setbacks to their industrialization efforts. Meanwhile, many other formerly [[hegemonic]] areas of the world were struggling to feed themselves&nbsp;— notably China.<ref>{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp=223–225}}</ref>


===Fuel and resources===
===Fuel and resources===
The global demand for wood, a major resource required for industrial growth and development, was increasing in the first half of the 19th century. A lack of interest of [[silviculture]] in western Europe primarily attributed the wood shortages due to lack of forested land. By the mid 1800s, most western European and European low countries had below 15% forested land area. Affected countries felt tremendous [[inflation]] in fuel costs throughout the 18th century and many households and factories were forced to ration their usage, and eventually adopt forest conservation policies. It was not until the mid 1800s, much earlier in England, that [[coal]] began providing much needed relief to energy starving Europeans. China had not begun to use coal until around the turn of the 20th century, giving Europe a huge head start on modern energy production.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225"/>
The global demand for wood, a major resource required for industrial growth and development, was increasing in the first half of the 19th century. A lack of interest of [[silviculture]] in western Europe primarily attributed the wood shortages due to lack of forested land. By the mid 1800s, most western European and European low countries had below 15% forested land area. Affected countries felt tremendous [[inflation]] in fuel costs throughout the 18th century and many households and factories were forced to ration their usage, and eventually adopt forest conservation policies. It was not until the mid 1800s, much earlier in England, that [[coal]] began providing much needed relief to energy starving Europeans. China had not begun to use coal until around the turn of the 20th century, giving Europe a huge head start on modern energy production.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225"/>


Through the 19th century, Europe had vast amounts of unused [[arable land]] with adequate water sources. However, this was not the case in China; most idle lands suffered from a lack of water supply, so forests had to be cultivated. Since the mid 1800s, northern China's water supplies have been declining at an alarming rate, dampening their agricultural output. By growing [[cotton]] for [[textiles]], rather than importing, China exacerbated the effects of their water shortage.<ref>Pomeranz (2000), pp. 230–238.</ref>
Through the 19th century, Europe had vast amounts of unused [[arable land]] with adequate water sources. However, this was not the case in China; most idle lands suffered from a lack of water supply, so forests had to be cultivated. Since the mid 1800s, northern China's water supplies have been declining at an alarming rate, dampening their agricultural output. By growing [[cotton]] for [[textiles]], rather than importing, China exacerbated the effects of their water shortage.<ref>{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp=230–238}}</ref>


===Trade===
===Trade===
[[Image:Triangle trade2.png|thumb|right|19th century triangular trade between Europe, the New World, and Africa.]]
[[Image:Triangle trade2.png|thumb|right|19th century triangular trade between Europe, the New World, and Africa.]]
During the era of European imperialism, [[periphery countries]] were often set up as specialized producers of specific resources. Although these specializations brought the periphery countries temporary economic benefit, the overall effect inhibited the industrial development of periphery territories. Cheaper resources for [[core countries]] through trade deals with specialized periphery countries allowed the core to advance a much greater pace and widen their gap from the rest of the world both economically and industrially.<ref name=williamson>Williamson, Jeffery G. (2008) "Globalization and the Great Divergence: terms of trade booms, volatility and the poor periphery, 1782–1913" ''European Review of Economic History'', 12, pp. 355–391. {{doi|10.1017/S136149160800230X}}.</ref> Europe's access to a much larger quantity of raw materials and a larger market to sell its manufactured goods gave it a distinct industrial advantage through the 19th century. In order to further industrialize, it was imperative that the developing core areas be able to acquire resources from less densely populated areas, since they lacked the lands required to supply themselves with necessary raw materials. Europe was able to trade manufactured goods to their [[colonies]], including the Americas, in turn the colonies traded their raw materials. The same sort of trading could be seen throughout regions in China and Asia, however colonization brought a distinct advantage. As these sources of raw materials began to [[proto-industrialization|proto-industrialize]], they would turn to [[import substitution]], depriving the hegemonic nations of a market for their manufactured goods. Since Europe had control over their colonies, they were able to prevent this from happening; keeping the supply lines flowing.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 242–243"/> Britain was able to use import substitution to their benefit when dealing with textiles from [[India]]. Through industrialization, Britain was able increase cotton productivity enough to make it lucrative for domestic production, and overtaking India as the world's leading cotton supplier.<ref name=Broadberry>{{cite journal |last1= Broadberry |first1= Stephen N. |last2=Gupta |first2=Bishnupriya |title= Cotton textiles and the great divergence: Lancashire, India and shifting competitive advantage, 1600-1850 |journal= INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS and ECONOMIC HISTORY Initiative |publisher= [[Centre for Economic Policy Research]] |year= 2005 |url= http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5183.asp}}</ref> Western Europeans were also able to establish profitable trade with neighboring eastern Europeans. Countries such as Prussia, Bohemia, and Poland had very little freedoms in comparison to those to the west. Forced labor left much of Eastern Europe with little time to work towards proto-industrialization and ample manpower to generate raw materials. However, these areas were not large consumers of the Western Europe's manufactured products, leaving Western Europe to pay for much of its raw materials from eastern Europe.<ref>Pomeranz (2000), pp. 257–258.</ref>
During the era of European imperialism, [[periphery countries]] were often set up as specialized producers of specific resources. Although these specializations brought the periphery countries temporary economic benefit, the overall effect inhibited the industrial development of periphery territories. Cheaper resources for [[core countries]] through trade deals with specialized periphery countries allowed the core to advance a much greater pace and widen their gap from the rest of the world both economically and industrially.<ref name=williamson>{{harvnb|Williamson|2008|pp=355–391}}</ref> Europe's access to a much larger quantity of raw materials and a larger market to sell its manufactured goods gave it a distinct industrial advantage through the 19th century. In order to further industrialize, it was imperative that the developing core areas be able to acquire resources from less densely populated areas, since they lacked the lands required to supply themselves with necessary raw materials. Europe was able to trade manufactured goods to their [[colonies]], including the Americas, in turn the colonies traded their raw materials. The same sort of trading could be seen throughout regions in China and Asia, however colonization brought a distinct advantage. As these sources of raw materials began to [[proto-industrialization|proto-industrialize]], they would turn to [[import substitution]], depriving the hegemonic nations of a market for their manufactured goods. Since Europe had control over their colonies, they were able to prevent this from happening; keeping the supply lines flowing.<ref name="Pomeranz 2000, pp. 242–243"/> Britain was able to use import substitution to their benefit when dealing with textiles from [[India]]. Through industrialization, Britain was able increase cotton productivity enough to make it lucrative for domestic production, and overtaking India as the world's leading cotton supplier.<ref name=Broadberry>{{harvnb|Broadberry|Gupta|2005}}</ref> Western Europeans were also able to establish profitable trade with neighboring eastern Europeans. Countries such as Prussia, Bohemia, and Poland had very little freedoms in comparison to those to the west. Forced labor left much of Eastern Europe with little time to work towards proto-industrialization and ample manpower to generate raw materials. However, these areas were not large consumers of the Western Europe's manufactured products, leaving Western Europe to pay for much of its raw materials from eastern Europe.<ref>{{harvnb|Pomeranz|2000|pp=257–258}}</ref>


==Eighteenth century politics and leadership==
==Eighteenth century politics and leadership==
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===Great Britain===
===Great Britain===
{{See|British Empire}}
{{See|British Empire}}
At the end of the 17th century, Britain's government was considerably altered due to the [[Glorious Revolution]]. This was England's last revolution, attesting to the soundness of a democratic government.<ref>Perry (2007), pp. 206-209.</ref> A monarch no longer controlled with absolute rule; instead authority was held by parliament and state officials. Through gradual and peaceful reforms, Parliament's wishes along with the will of the people were expressed amply in England's democratic society. A pivotal achievement for the West, as the British system of government would become a model for other types of representative government, including France and the United States.<ref>Perry, Marvin (2007) ''Western Civilization A Brief History: Volume II: from the 1400s'', Sixth Edition, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, ISBN 978-0-618-80714-7, pp. 206–209.</ref>
At the end of the 17th century, Britain's government was considerably altered due to the [[Glorious Revolution]]. This was England's last revolution, attesting to the soundness of a democratic government.<ref>{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=206–209}}</ref> A monarch no longer controlled with absolute rule; instead authority was held by parliament and state officials. Through gradual and peaceful reforms, Parliament's wishes along with the will of the people were expressed amply in England's democratic society. A pivotal achievement for the West, as the British system of government would become a model for other types of representative government, including France and the United States.<ref>{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=206–209}}</ref>


From the period 1707 to 1801, Great Britain was known as The [[Kingdom of Great Britain]]. Britain's ability to dominate war allowed them to retain their colonies and prevent France from seizing them.<ref>Greene, pp. 485-518.</ref> This enabled Britain to establish an imperial supremacy. However, the colonies under British rule were subject to several acts of Parliament thus jarring the imperial-colonial relations. These acts include the [[Sugar Act]] and the [[Currency Act]].<ref>Greene, Jack and Jellison, Richard. (1961) "The Currency Act of 1764 in Imperial-Colonial Relations, 1764-1776", ''The William and Mary Quarterly'', Third Series, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 1961), pp. 485–518, Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture.</ref>
From the period 1707 to 1801, Great Britain was known as The [[Kingdom of Great Britain]]. Britain's ability to dominate war allowed them to retain their colonies and prevent France from seizing them.<ref>{{harvnb|Greene|Jellison|1961|pp=485–518}}</ref> This enabled Britain to establish an imperial supremacy. However, the colonies under British rule were subject to several acts of Parliament thus jarring the imperial-colonial relations. These acts include the [[Sugar Act]] and the [[Currency Act]].<ref>{{harvnb|Greene|Jellison|1961|pp=485–518}}</ref>


===France===
===France===
{{See|Ancien régime}}
{{See|Ancien régime}}
Throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century, France's system of authority was overlapping and confusing.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 203–206">Perry (2007), pp. 203–206.</ref> Cardinals [[Cardinal Richelieu|Richelieu]] and [[Mazarin]]'s attempt to centralize France's government was unsuccessful. Towns and provinces had their own parliaments, laws and local estates. The [[aristocracy]] also commanded authority from those beneath them. [[Louis XIV]] used France's traditional values and manipulated them for his own means. He did not achieve absolute monarchy but his success lay in both his cleverness and his manipulation. When Louis XIV died in 1715, he left behind a country in financial disarray. However, Louis XIV's reign was one worth remembering. First, he set the standard for monarchies all over Europe with his lavish lifestyle at his [[Palace of Versailles]].<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 203–206"/>
Throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century, France's system of authority was overlapping and confusing.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 203–206">{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=203–206}}</ref> Cardinals [[Cardinal Richelieu|Richelieu]] and [[Mazarin]]'s attempt to centralize France's government was unsuccessful. Towns and provinces had their own parliaments, laws and local estates. The [[aristocracy]] also commanded authority from those beneath them. [[Louis XIV]] used France's traditional values and manipulated them for his own means. He did not achieve absolute monarchy but his success lay in both his cleverness and his manipulation. When Louis XIV died in 1715, he left behind a country in financial disarray. However, Louis XIV's reign was one worth remembering. First, he set the standard for monarchies all over Europe with his lavish lifestyle at his [[Palace of Versailles]].<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 203–206"/>


Until the [[French Revolution]], French society revolved around the system of [[ancien régime]]. A society under which the first and second [[Estates of the realm|estates]] are entailed certain rights and have absolutely no accountability. The first estate consists of clergy, the second state of nobility, and the third estate is everyone else. The Revolution's leaders used [[The Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] ideals to justify their attack on the ancien régime. The French Revolution was viewed as the promise of a new era for both participants and observers. A time when the ideals of the Enlightenment would come into view including, justice, reason, liberty, and equality. France's use of these Enlightenment principles set the country apart from countries in the East. The French people were rebelling as a whole, as a means for mutual happiness and fulfillment in life. It is said that a rebellion kills men but a revolution kills ideas.<ref name=Perry>Perry (2007), pp. 251-256</ref>
Until the [[French Revolution]], French society revolved around the system of [[ancien régime]]. A society under which the first and second [[Estates of the realm|estates]] are entailed certain rights and have absolutely no accountability. The first estate consists of clergy, the second state of nobility, and the third estate is everyone else. The Revolution's leaders used [[The Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] ideals to justify their attack on the ancien régime. The French Revolution was viewed as the promise of a new era for both participants and observers. A time when the ideals of the Enlightenment would come into view including, justice, reason, liberty, and equality. France's use of these Enlightenment principles set the country apart from countries in the East. The French people were rebelling as a whole, as a means for mutual happiness and fulfillment in life. It is said that a rebellion kills men but a revolution kills ideas.<ref name=Perry>{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=251–256}}</ref>


At the turn of the century, France's government was seized by [[Napoleon Bonaparte]], who pushed the Revolution in a new direction, to extreme nationalism and its lasting repercussions in the twentieth century.<ref>Perry (2007), pp. 264-270</ref>
At the turn of the century, France's government was seized by [[Napoleon Bonaparte]], who pushed the Revolution in a new direction, to extreme nationalism and its lasting repercussions in the twentieth century.<ref>{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=264–270}}</ref>


====Meaning of the French Revolution====
====Meaning of the French Revolution====
The [[French Revolution]] reshaped the modern West. First, innovative ideas of Enlightenment thinkers were put into action. Second, career opportunities for the bourgeois opened up vastly. Jobs were awarded based on talent not birth. Also, the middle class was no longer kept from high ranking jobs. Third, the French upper class perceived a decline of the aristocracy as a result of their lost special privileges and rights. French [[bourgeois]] served as a model for other bourgeois around the world. Their commitment to change and challenging of the old authority transformed the modern state.<ref>Perry (2007), pp. 271–273.</ref>
The [[French Revolution]] reshaped the modern West. First, innovative ideas of Enlightenment thinkers were put into action. Second, career opportunities for the bourgeois opened up vastly. Jobs were awarded based on talent not birth. Also, the middle class was no longer kept from high ranking jobs. Third, the French upper class perceived a decline of the aristocracy as a result of their lost special privileges and rights. French [[bourgeois]] served as a model for other bourgeois around the world. Their commitment to change and challenging of the old authority transformed the modern state.<ref>{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=271–273}}</ref>


===Spain===
===Spain===
{{See|Spanish Empire}}
{{See|Spanish Empire}}
Spain attempted very few independent foreign policies during the eighteenth century. As a result of a strain on the Spanish government as well as a general lack of confidence in Spain’s economic policies, Spain lost its control of the sea to several counties, including, France, Britain, and the Netherlands.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203">Perry (2007), pp. 199–203.</ref> This suggests that in order to maintain oversea interests a country must both possess and occupy them effectually. <ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203"/> This idea greatly affects European [[imperialism]] in the nineteenth century. Imperialism set the West apart from the East.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203"/> European nations believed that in order to make their country better than others they must acquire more territories.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203"/>
Spain attempted very few independent foreign policies during the eighteenth century. As a result of a strain on the Spanish government as well as a general lack of confidence in Spain’s economic policies, Spain lost its control of the sea to several counties, including, France, Britain, and the Netherlands.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203">{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=199–203}}</ref> This suggests that in order to maintain oversea interests a country must both possess and occupy them effectually. <ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203"/> This idea greatly affects European [[imperialism]] in the nineteenth century. Imperialism set the West apart from the East.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203"/> European nations believed that in order to make their country better than others they must acquire more territories.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 199–203"/>


===Netherlands===
===Netherlands===
{{See|Dutch Empire}}
{{See|Dutch Empire}}
The Dutch invention of the [[flyboat]] allowed them to capture the Baltic trade propelling the Netherlands into a great commercial expansion lasting a hundred years.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 217–219">Perry (2007), pp. 217–219.</ref> They were even able to takeover Portugal’s spot in the East Indies spice trade. The [[United East India Company]] began trading posts that would stay a part of the Dutch empire until World War II. Dutch government promoted business interests. However, the government lay in the hands of merchants and manufacturers who proceeded to make policies that served their personal interests. It was the beginning of [[capitalism]], the modern economic system, a huge change towards a global economy.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 217–219"/>
The Dutch invention of the [[flyboat]] allowed them to capture the Baltic trade propelling the Netherlands into a great commercial expansion lasting a hundred years.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 217–219">{{harvnb|Perry|2007|pp=217–219}}</ref> They were even able to takeover Portugal’s spot in the East Indies spice trade. The [[United East India Company]] began trading posts that would stay a part of the Dutch empire until World War II. Dutch government promoted business interests. However, the government lay in the hands of merchants and manufacturers who proceeded to make policies that served their personal interests. It was the beginning of [[capitalism]], the modern economic system, a huge change towards a global economy.<ref name="Perry 2007, pp. 217–219"/>


==Ideologies==
==Ideologies==
[[Image:FrameBreaking-1812.jpg‎|thumb|alt|Workers during the Industrial Revolution]]
[[Image:FrameBreaking-1812.jpg‎|thumb|alt|Workers during the Industrial Revolution]]
Throughout the nineteenth century, a number of ideologies burgeoned and shaped the state of the Great Divergence. Specifically, the “industrialization” of Europe was fostered by the social and economic ideologies mentioned: the social ideologies illustrate a shift towards the secular, the desire to dismantle status quo sentiments, and the emergence of a personal and collective identity; the economic ideologies highlight the widening economic gap between Europe and the rest of the world, enabling the continent to expand empires and justify the methods by which they acquired them.<ref name= Abernethy>Albernethy, David B. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415-1980. Yale University Press. 2000. p 95.</ref>
Throughout the nineteenth century, a number of ideologies burgeoned and shaped the state of the Great Divergence. Specifically, the “industrialization” of Europe was fostered by the social and economic ideologies mentioned: the social ideologies illustrate a shift towards the secular, the desire to dismantle status quo sentiments, and the emergence of a personal and collective identity; the economic ideologies highlight the widening economic gap between Europe and the rest of the world, enabling the continent to expand empires and justify the methods by which they acquired them.<ref name= Abernethy>{{harvnb|Albernethy|2000|p=95}}</ref>


===Laissez-faire===
===Laissez-faire===
[[Laissez-faire]], a phrase created by Frenchmen in the eighteenth century, was an economic ideology. It was advocated by Great Britain, appealed to intellectuals across many countries and overall had wide European support.<ref name="Roberts"/> The theory was that a positive outcome would result if the market economy was left to operate independently from politicians and civil servants. In addition, if certain economic resources follow the typical demands of the market, then the production of wealth and the general well-being will accelerate and increase respectively.<ref name=Roberts336>Roberts (1996), p. 336.</ref> Laissez-faire accommodated the newfound trend of restructuring society around the liberties and welfare of individuals; however, the main beneficiaries of this trend were the wealthy.<ref name=Roberts336>Roberts (1996), p. 336.</ref>
[[Laissez-faire]], a phrase created by Frenchmen in the eighteenth century, was an economic ideology. It was advocated by Great Britain, appealed to intellectuals across many countries and overall had wide European support.<ref name="Roberts"/> The theory was that a positive outcome would result if the market economy was left to operate independently from politicians and civil servants. In addition, if certain economic resources follow the typical demands of the market, then the production of wealth and the general well-being will accelerate and increase respectively.<ref name=Roberts336>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=336}}</ref> Laissez-faire accommodated the newfound trend of restructuring society around the liberties and welfare of individuals; however, the main beneficiaries of this trend were the wealthy.<ref name=Roberts336/>


===Socialism===
===Socialism===
As new cities emerged during the nineteenth century, new and unique economic patterns emerged that highlighted the contrasts in wealth. This blatancy caused the emergence of a new social ideology known as [[socialism]]. Economic and social egalitarianism is fundamental to the concept of socialism.<ref name=Roberts338>Roberts (1996), p. 338.</ref> To socialists, property is not sacred and some socialists, called communists, desired the abolition of property. The word "socialism" first appeared in France around 1830 to describe a theoretical opposition to a society run on market principles and to an economy organized on laissez-faire lines.<ref name=Roberts338>Roberts (1996), p. 338.</ref> Before this, a minority of eighteenth century thinkers, such as Henri Compte de Saint-Simon, [[Charles Fourier]], [[Robert Owen]], noted the great and irrational discrepancies of wealth; they concluded that a global community is capable of and responsible for generating the greatest good for the greatest number of people.<ref name=Roberts338>Roberts (1996), p. 338.</ref> Once societies struggled with the problematic economic and social changes introduced by industrialization, egalitarian ideas became a modern form of socialism.<ref>Roberts (1996), p. 339.</ref>
As new cities emerged during the nineteenth century, new and unique economic patterns emerged that highlighted the contrasts in wealth. This blatancy caused the emergence of a new social ideology known as [[socialism]]. Economic and social egalitarianism is fundamental to the concept of socialism.<ref name=Roberts338>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p= 338}}</ref> To socialists, property is not sacred and some socialists, called communists, desired the abolition of property. The word "socialism" first appeared in France around 1830 to describe a theoretical opposition to a society run on market principles and to an economy organized on laissez-faire lines.<ref name=Roberts338/> Before this, a minority of eighteenth century thinkers, such as Henri Compte de Saint-Simon, [[Charles Fourier]], [[Robert Owen]], noted the great and irrational discrepancies of wealth; they concluded that a global community is capable of and responsible for generating the greatest good for the greatest number of people.<ref name=Roberts338/> Once societies struggled with the problematic economic and social changes introduced by industrialization, egalitarian ideas became a modern form of socialism.<ref>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=339}}</ref>


===Materialism===
===Materialism===
Though the nineteenth century marked an advance of [[materialism]] in the typical sense (the taste for material gratification), a new and deeper level of materialism emerged and illustrated cultural change. Beliefs in the supernatural declined and church going dwindled throughout several European countries in the first half of century.<ref name=Roberts341>Roberts (1996), p. 341.</ref> Large numbers of people from various social classes looked to natural science rather than traditional religion to explain the human world. To some, materialism meant that an individual's life is dictated by certain material facts that naturally and thoughtlessly create one's fate; regardless of individual efforts, rational choices, and informed will, neither people nor God can determine their future.<ref name=Roberts341>Roberts (1996), p. 341.</ref>
Though the nineteenth century marked an advance of [[materialism]] in the typical sense (the taste for material gratification), a new and deeper level of materialism emerged and illustrated cultural change. Beliefs in the supernatural declined and church going dwindled throughout several European countries in the first half of century.<ref name=Roberts341>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=341}}</ref> Large numbers of people from various social classes looked to natural science rather than traditional religion to explain the human world. To some, materialism meant that an individual's life is dictated by certain material facts that naturally and thoughtlessly create one's fate; regardless of individual efforts, rational choices, and informed will, neither people nor God can determine their future.<ref name=Roberts341/>


===Nationalism===
===Nationalism===
[[Image:Eugène Delacroix - La liberté guidant le peuple.jpg|200px|thumb|left|''[[Liberty Leading the People]]'' ([[Eugène Delacroix]], 1830) is a famous example of nationalist art]]
[[Image:Eugène Delacroix - La liberté guidant le peuple.jpg|200px|thumb|left|''[[Liberty Leading the People]]'' ([[Eugène Delacroix]], 1830) is a famous example of nationalist art]]
[[Nationalism]], the most successful revolutionary force of modern politics, redefined personal and collective identities. Nationalism is a set of beliefs held by a nation.<ref name="Grosby"/> By the late nineteenth century, nationalism represented a system of European states characterized by identifiable nations.<ref name=Roberts396>Roberts (1996), p. 396.</ref> A [[nation]] is characterized by common identity, language, culture, an allegiance and uniformed citizenship.<ref name= Landes>Landes, David S. The Wealth and Property of Nations. WW Norton & Company. 1998. p219</ref> Increasing literacy rates, wider newspaper circulations, and faster global communication created an immediate sharing of information and emotion. A communal sentiment helped establish national identity. Though nationalism united individuals and created a stronger social structure, it also had negative consequences. Politicians used national awareness to push their agendas and conceal interests and [[demagogy]].<ref name=Roberts396/> Nationalism provoked revolutions and encouraged antagonism that led to [[World War I]].
[[Nationalism]], the most successful revolutionary force of modern politics, redefined personal and collective identities. Nationalism is a set of beliefs held by a nation.<ref name="Grosby"/> By the late nineteenth century, nationalism represented a system of European states characterized by identifiable nations.<ref name=Roberts396>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=396}}</ref> A [[nation]] is characterized by common identity, language, culture, an allegiance and uniformed citizenship.<ref name= Landes>{{harvnb|Landes|1998|p=219}}</ref> Increasing literacy rates, wider newspaper circulations, and faster global communication created an immediate sharing of information and emotion. A communal sentiment helped establish national identity. Though nationalism united individuals and created a stronger social structure, it also had negative consequences. Politicians used national awareness to push their agendas and conceal interests and [[demagogy]].<ref name=Roberts396/> Nationalism provoked revolutions and encouraged antagonism that led to [[World War I]].


===Imperialism===
===Imperialism===
[[Imperialism]] surfaced towards the end of the nineteenth century.<ref>Roberts (1996), p. 384.</ref> Imperialism is the continuous political and economical domination exerted by a nation over another country and their territory by either occupation or settlement.<ref>Roberts (1996), p. 283.</ref> Europeans argued that imperial expansion was necessary because of the negative impact of industrialization upon society, particularly employment and would resolve population pressure and discontent. Racism justified by "distorted Darwinian biology" was also used to suggest the inevitability of imperialism because whites were genetically predisposed to rule the world.<ref>Roberts (1996), p. 385.</ref>
[[Imperialism]] surfaced towards the end of the nineteenth century.<ref>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=384}}</ref> Imperialism is the continuous political and economical domination exerted by a nation over another country and their territory by either occupation or settlement.<ref>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=283}}</ref> Europeans argued that imperial expansion was necessary because of the negative impact of industrialization upon society, particularly employment and would resolve population pressure and discontent. Racism justified by "distorted Darwinian biology" was also used to suggest the inevitability of imperialism because whites were genetically predisposed to rule the world.<ref>{{harvnb|Roberts|1996|p=385}}</ref>


==See also==
==See also==
Line 132: Line 122:


==References==
==References==
;Notes
{{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}
{{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}
;Bibliography
{{refbegin}}
*{{citation |last=Albernethy |first=David B. |title=The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires 1415–1980 |publisher=Yale University Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-0300073041}}
*{{citation |last1= Broadberry |first1= Stephen N. |last2=Gupta |first2=Bishnupriya |title=Cotton textiles and the great divergence: Lancashire, India and shifting competitive advantage, 1600-1850 |journal= International Macroeconomics and Economic History Initiative |publisher=[[Centre for Economic Policy Research]] |year=2005 |url=http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5183.asp}}
*{{citation |last1=Clark |first1=Gregory |last2Feenstra |first2=Robert C. |year=2003 |contribution=Technology in the Great Divergence |title=Globalization in Historical Perspective |editor=Bordo, Michael D. |publisher=University of Chicago Press |pages=277–320 |isbn=ISBN 978-0-226-06600-4}}
*{{citation |last=Comin |first=Diego |url=http://www.people.hbs.edu/dcomin/def.pdf |format=[[PDF]] |contribution=Total Factor Productivity |title=[[The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics]] |editors=[[Steven N. Durlauf|Durlauf, Steven N.]] and [[Lawrence E. Blume|Blume, Lawrence E.]] |publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |edition=2nd |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-333-78676-5}}
*{{citation |last=Frank |first=Andre |url=http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/pomeranz.html |title=Review of The Great Divergence |journal=Journal of Asian Studies |year=2000}}
*{{citation |last1=Greene |first1=Jack |last2=Jellison |first2=Richard |year=1961 |title=The Currency Act of 1764 in Imperial-Colonial Relations, 1764–1776 |journal=The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series |volume= 18 |number=4 |month=October |year=1961 |pages=485–518 |publisher=Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture}}
*{{citation |last=Grosby |first=Steven Elliott |year=2005 |title=Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-284098-1}}
*{{citation |last=Jones |first =Eric |title=[[The European Miracle]]: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia | publisher =Cambridge University Press |year=2003 |origyear=1987 |isbn = ISBN 0-521-52783-X}}
*{{citation |last=Landes |first=David S. |title=The Wealth and Property of Nations |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |year=1998}}
*{{citation |last=Muller |first=Edward K. |title=Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh, 1870–1920 |journal=Journal of Historical Geography |year=2001 |volume=27 |issue=1 |pages= 58–73}}
*{{citation |last=Perry |first=Marvin |year=2007 |title=Western Civilization A Brief History: Volume II: from the 1400s |edition=6th |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Company |location=New York |isbn=978-0-618-80714-7}}
*{{citation |last= Pomeranz |first = Kenneth |title= The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy |publisher= [[Princeton University Press]] |year= 2000 |isbn= 978-0-691-09010-8}}
*{{citation |last=Roberts |first=J.M. |year=1996 |title=A History of Europe |publisher=The Penguin Group |isbn==978-1-85986-178-3}}
*{{citation |last=Williamson |first=Jeffery G |year=2008 |title=Globalization and the Great Divergence: terms of trade booms, volatility and the poor periphery, 1782–1913 |journal=European Review of Economic History |volume=12 |pages=355–391}} {{doi|10.1017/S136149160800230X}}
{{refend}}


{{Economics}}
{{Economics}}

Revision as of 18:55, 4 July 2010

The current distribution of the Latin alphabet (dark green: sole main script; light green: co-exists with other scripts) shows where the colonial empires of the Latin West exerted lasting influence during the Modern period.

The Great Divergence, coined by Samuel Huntington[1](also known as the European miracle, a term coined by Eric Jones in 1981[2]), refers to the process by which the Western world (i.e. Western Europe and the parts of the New World where its people became the dominant populations) during the Modern period (16th to 19th centuries) clearly emerged as the most powerful world civilization, eclipsing the Islamic empires (the Ottoman Empire, Mughal India), Tokugawa Japan, and Qing China. The process was accompanied and reinforced by the Age of Discovery and the subsequent rise of the colonial empires, the Age of Enlightenment, the Commercial Revolution, the Scientific Revolution and finally the Industrial Revolution. The Great Divergence was affected by several factors, including technology, industrialization and economics, politics and leadership, and specific ideologies.

Technological advances in railroads, steamboats, mining, and agriculture were embraced to a higher degree in the West than the East during the Great Divergence. High wages in the West caused businesses to focus efforts on engineering labor-saving machinery, while the East continued to rely on their sources of cheap labor. This economic pressure on the West caused them to refine their processes, leading to a heightened global standing relative to countries of the East. Technology led to increased industrialization and economic complexity in the areas of agriculture, trade, fuel and resources, further separating the East and the West. Europe’s industrial advantages allowed them to surpass the East. Europe's use of coal as an energy substitute for wood in the mid-1880s gave Europe a major head start in modern energy production. On the other hand, China did not begin using coal until the 20th century.[3] The West also had the advantage of larger quantities of raw materials and a substantial trading market. China and Asia did participate in trading, however colonization brought a distinct advantage to the West.[4]

Politics and leadership, a staple in almost every country at the time of the Great Divergence, were influenced and executed in distinct manners in both the East and the West. Political ideas and lack thereof warranted either progression into the modern world, regression, or no change at all. Strong countries like Great Britain set the model for representative governments in the West. On the other hand, Japan, with its retention of traditional values and incorporation of western views was a model for countries in the East.[5] Other countries of interest include France, Spain, China, and the Netherlands.

The most important ideologies include laissez-faire, socialism, materialism, nationalism, and imperialism. Ideologies reflected a shift towards secularism in the West due to Europe’s industrialization. Europe's economic and social ideologies both resonated from this transition. Laissez-faire, an economic ideology, was created during the Industrial Revolution as a belief that trade and economics should exist without government interference.[6][7] Socialism emphasizes the desire to change both the power and the social dynamics within a society.[8] Materialism illustrated a shift towards secular thinking.[9] Nationalism fostered personal and collective identity. It was one of the most successful revolutionary forces of modern politics.[10] Imperialism, an economic and social ideology, fostered the expansion of empires for economic gain and dubiously used as an excuse justifying the expansion of empires.[11]

Terminology and definition

The term Great Divergence was coined by Samuel Huntington [1] (1996) and popularized by Kenneth Pomeranz in his book The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (2000).[citation needed] It describes the same phenomenon as discussed by Eric Jones', whose 1981 book The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia popularized the alternate term European Miracle.[12]

Broadly, both terms are meant to signify a socioeconomic shift in which Western countries advanced ahead of Eastern countries during the Modern period.[1] Pomeranz argues in his book that the period of most rapid divergence was during the 19th century.[3]

Technological factors leading to the Great Divergence

Beginning in the early 1800s, economic prosperity rose greatly due to improvements in technological efficiency.[13] This increase in technology is evidenced by the advent of new conveniences including the railroad, steamboat/steam engine, and coal as a fuel source. These innovations accelerated the Great Divergence, elevating Europe and the United States to high economic standing relative to the East.[13] Though these inventions were founded in the West, the Eastern countries still employed their uses in trade and transportation. So, a disparity arose. Both the Western and Eastern countries had access to the same technology, yet the West benefited more from its presence due to a difference in use between the two areas. The concept of comparative use-efficiency levels is used to help corroborate the West's progression ahead of the East.[13]

Total factor productivity analysis

When analyzing comparative use-efficiency, the economic concept of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is applied to quantify differences between countries.[13] TFP analysis assumes similar raw material inputs across countries and is then used to calculate productivity. The difference in productivity levels, therefore, reflects efficiency of input use rather than the inputs themselves.[14] TFP analysis has shown that the Western countries had higher TFP levels on average in the 1800s than Eastern countries such as India or China. From this one can conclude that the West was making better use of their resources than the East, accelerating the socioeconomic Great Divergence.[13]

Importance of technological advances to divergence

Some of the most striking evidence for the Great Divergence comes from data on per capita income.[13] The West rising to power directly coincides with per capita income in the West rising relative to the East. This change in per capita income can be attributed largely to the mass transit technology such as railroads and steamboats that the West embraced in the 1800s.[13] First of all, construction of enormous boats, trains, and railroads required large numbers of steelworkers and engineers, all of which had to be paid. Secondly, the railroads and boats made moving huge amounts of coal, corn, grain, livestock and other goods across countries more efficient. This is one of the chief differences between the East and West in the 1800s. The West had more efficient boats and railroads which had a trickle-down effect on the efficiency of other industries.[13]

Possible efficiency influencing factors

A number of factors contribute to why the West was able to optimize its usage of new technology while the East fell behind. First of all, geographically, Europe and the United States have a large number of inland ports due to extensive, deep rivers. Steamboats were therefore not limited solely to coastal ports. Pittsburgh, PA for example, became an epicenter for steel distribution towards the end of the 1800s due to its rivers.[15] This argument is difficult to make, however, because China had a very extensive system of internal canals at the time linking the inland land masses to the coast.[16] Also, due to regional climate, European coal mines were wetter than the arid Chinese mines. Water could easily be pumped out of European mines using steam engines, but ventilating Chinese mines to prevent explosions was much more difficult.[16]

Compounding the coal advantage was the managerial prowess of the West.[16] The railroad efforts in the United States were spearheaded by experienced business tycoons such as Cornelius Vanderbilt and Johns Hopkins. These millionaires were able to focus their finances on distinct, organized projects which increased the efficiency of track building. The East did not have investment on the same level.[16]

The advancements in railroads were compounded by advances in agriculture, causing the West to be fed to the point of huge surpluses. This meant less time spent feeding nations and more time spent on per capita income increasing business ventures for the West.[16]

Perhaps the most important difference between the East and the West which drove the West to such success was the difference in wages.[16] Wages in the West were much greater than those in the East.[16] This put economic pressure on the West. In order to compete the United States and European countries would have to find ways to reduce the amount of labor needed to run their businesses. This meant investing in and searching for new technology to reduce the need for people.[16] This focused engineers on adapting to new machinery and to efficient land use practices. Instead of using wood for fuel which would take up too much land and require too much labor, the West turned to coal as a fuel source. In the agricultural industry advances in technology eliminated the need to pay a high number of farmers. The East, which never really reduced labor because their wage rate was already so low, never felt the optimizing pressure that the West did.[16] By the time the East did feel the need to use technology to lessen their reliance on pricey human labor, the West had already gained an incredible competitive advantage.[16] Both the East and the West had the technology, but from earlier on the West had more of an incentive to use and refine it.[16]

Effects of industrialization and economics

The Old World methods of agriculture and production could only sustain certain lifestyles. In order to make such a dramatic shift from the rest of the world, Industrialization had to take place at many levels. There were many advantages present in Europe that allowed them to industrialize at such a quick pace.[17]

Agriculture

Prior to, and even within the 19th century, much of European agriculture was underdeveloped compared to the rest of the world. This left Europe with abundant idle resources ready to be taken advantage of. In the 1800s, rather than adopting more advanced farming techniques for greater crop production, French and German farmers were able to put on the market more of their product by laboring longer and curbing their own consumptions. There was also a large agricultural shift from crop rotation to farming for market demand. England, on the other hand was already at its limit in terms of agricultural productivity well before the beginning of the 19th century. Rather than taking the costly route of improving soil fertility, the English opted to increase labor productivity by embracing industrialization in the agricultural sector. From 1750 to 1850, European nations experienced population booms, however European agriculture was able to barely meet the dietary needs. A few ways in which England was able to cope with the food shortage include: imports from the Americas, less caloric intake required by the newly forming proletariat, and the consumption of appetite suppressants such as tea.[18] By the turn of the 19th century, much European farmland had been eroded and depleted of nutrients required to grow crops. Fortunately, through improved farming techniques, the import of fertilizers, and reforestation, Europeans were able to recondition their soil and prevent setbacks to their industrialization efforts. Meanwhile, many other formerly hegemonic areas of the world were struggling to feed themselves — notably China.[19]

Fuel and resources

The global demand for wood, a major resource required for industrial growth and development, was increasing in the first half of the 19th century. A lack of interest of silviculture in western Europe primarily attributed the wood shortages due to lack of forested land. By the mid 1800s, most western European and European low countries had below 15% forested land area. Affected countries felt tremendous inflation in fuel costs throughout the 18th century and many households and factories were forced to ration their usage, and eventually adopt forest conservation policies. It was not until the mid 1800s, much earlier in England, that coal began providing much needed relief to energy starving Europeans. China had not begun to use coal until around the turn of the 20th century, giving Europe a huge head start on modern energy production.[3]

Through the 19th century, Europe had vast amounts of unused arable land with adequate water sources. However, this was not the case in China; most idle lands suffered from a lack of water supply, so forests had to be cultivated. Since the mid 1800s, northern China's water supplies have been declining at an alarming rate, dampening their agricultural output. By growing cotton for textiles, rather than importing, China exacerbated the effects of their water shortage.[20]

Trade

19th century triangular trade between Europe, the New World, and Africa.

During the era of European imperialism, periphery countries were often set up as specialized producers of specific resources. Although these specializations brought the periphery countries temporary economic benefit, the overall effect inhibited the industrial development of periphery territories. Cheaper resources for core countries through trade deals with specialized periphery countries allowed the core to advance a much greater pace and widen their gap from the rest of the world both economically and industrially.[21] Europe's access to a much larger quantity of raw materials and a larger market to sell its manufactured goods gave it a distinct industrial advantage through the 19th century. In order to further industrialize, it was imperative that the developing core areas be able to acquire resources from less densely populated areas, since they lacked the lands required to supply themselves with necessary raw materials. Europe was able to trade manufactured goods to their colonies, including the Americas, in turn the colonies traded their raw materials. The same sort of trading could be seen throughout regions in China and Asia, however colonization brought a distinct advantage. As these sources of raw materials began to proto-industrialize, they would turn to import substitution, depriving the hegemonic nations of a market for their manufactured goods. Since Europe had control over their colonies, they were able to prevent this from happening; keeping the supply lines flowing.[4] Britain was able to use import substitution to their benefit when dealing with textiles from India. Through industrialization, Britain was able increase cotton productivity enough to make it lucrative for domestic production, and overtaking India as the world's leading cotton supplier.[22] Western Europeans were also able to establish profitable trade with neighboring eastern Europeans. Countries such as Prussia, Bohemia, and Poland had very little freedoms in comparison to those to the west. Forced labor left much of Eastern Europe with little time to work towards proto-industrialization and ample manpower to generate raw materials. However, these areas were not large consumers of the Western Europe's manufactured products, leaving Western Europe to pay for much of its raw materials from eastern Europe.[23]

Eighteenth century politics and leadership

Distribution of colonial empires by the end of the 18th century.

A deeper look into the politics and leadership of the West reveals an assortment of insights into the Great Divergence. Political ideas and lack thereof warranted either progression into the modern world, regression, or no change at all. Strong countries like Great Britain set the model for representative governments in the West.

Great Britain

At the end of the 17th century, Britain's government was considerably altered due to the Glorious Revolution. This was England's last revolution, attesting to the soundness of a democratic government.[24] A monarch no longer controlled with absolute rule; instead authority was held by parliament and state officials. Through gradual and peaceful reforms, Parliament's wishes along with the will of the people were expressed amply in England's democratic society. A pivotal achievement for the West, as the British system of government would become a model for other types of representative government, including France and the United States.[25]

From the period 1707 to 1801, Great Britain was known as The Kingdom of Great Britain. Britain's ability to dominate war allowed them to retain their colonies and prevent France from seizing them.[26] This enabled Britain to establish an imperial supremacy. However, the colonies under British rule were subject to several acts of Parliament thus jarring the imperial-colonial relations. These acts include the Sugar Act and the Currency Act.[27]

France

Throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century, France's system of authority was overlapping and confusing.[28] Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin's attempt to centralize France's government was unsuccessful. Towns and provinces had their own parliaments, laws and local estates. The aristocracy also commanded authority from those beneath them. Louis XIV used France's traditional values and manipulated them for his own means. He did not achieve absolute monarchy but his success lay in both his cleverness and his manipulation. When Louis XIV died in 1715, he left behind a country in financial disarray. However, Louis XIV's reign was one worth remembering. First, he set the standard for monarchies all over Europe with his lavish lifestyle at his Palace of Versailles.[28]

Until the French Revolution, French society revolved around the system of ancien régime. A society under which the first and second estates are entailed certain rights and have absolutely no accountability. The first estate consists of clergy, the second state of nobility, and the third estate is everyone else. The Revolution's leaders used Enlightenment ideals to justify their attack on the ancien régime. The French Revolution was viewed as the promise of a new era for both participants and observers. A time when the ideals of the Enlightenment would come into view including, justice, reason, liberty, and equality. France's use of these Enlightenment principles set the country apart from countries in the East. The French people were rebelling as a whole, as a means for mutual happiness and fulfillment in life. It is said that a rebellion kills men but a revolution kills ideas.[29]

At the turn of the century, France's government was seized by Napoleon Bonaparte, who pushed the Revolution in a new direction, to extreme nationalism and its lasting repercussions in the twentieth century.[30]

Meaning of the French Revolution

The French Revolution reshaped the modern West. First, innovative ideas of Enlightenment thinkers were put into action. Second, career opportunities for the bourgeois opened up vastly. Jobs were awarded based on talent not birth. Also, the middle class was no longer kept from high ranking jobs. Third, the French upper class perceived a decline of the aristocracy as a result of their lost special privileges and rights. French bourgeois served as a model for other bourgeois around the world. Their commitment to change and challenging of the old authority transformed the modern state.[31]

Spain

Spain attempted very few independent foreign policies during the eighteenth century. As a result of a strain on the Spanish government as well as a general lack of confidence in Spain’s economic policies, Spain lost its control of the sea to several counties, including, France, Britain, and the Netherlands.[32] This suggests that in order to maintain oversea interests a country must both possess and occupy them effectually. [32] This idea greatly affects European imperialism in the nineteenth century. Imperialism set the West apart from the East.[32] European nations believed that in order to make their country better than others they must acquire more territories.[32]

Netherlands

The Dutch invention of the flyboat allowed them to capture the Baltic trade propelling the Netherlands into a great commercial expansion lasting a hundred years.[33] They were even able to takeover Portugal’s spot in the East Indies spice trade. The United East India Company began trading posts that would stay a part of the Dutch empire until World War II. Dutch government promoted business interests. However, the government lay in the hands of merchants and manufacturers who proceeded to make policies that served their personal interests. It was the beginning of capitalism, the modern economic system, a huge change towards a global economy.[33]

Ideologies

File:FrameBreaking-1812.jpg
Workers during the Industrial Revolution

Throughout the nineteenth century, a number of ideologies burgeoned and shaped the state of the Great Divergence. Specifically, the “industrialization” of Europe was fostered by the social and economic ideologies mentioned: the social ideologies illustrate a shift towards the secular, the desire to dismantle status quo sentiments, and the emergence of a personal and collective identity; the economic ideologies highlight the widening economic gap between Europe and the rest of the world, enabling the continent to expand empires and justify the methods by which they acquired them.[34]

Laissez-faire

Laissez-faire, a phrase created by Frenchmen in the eighteenth century, was an economic ideology. It was advocated by Great Britain, appealed to intellectuals across many countries and overall had wide European support.[7] The theory was that a positive outcome would result if the market economy was left to operate independently from politicians and civil servants. In addition, if certain economic resources follow the typical demands of the market, then the production of wealth and the general well-being will accelerate and increase respectively.[6] Laissez-faire accommodated the newfound trend of restructuring society around the liberties and welfare of individuals; however, the main beneficiaries of this trend were the wealthy.[6]

Socialism

As new cities emerged during the nineteenth century, new and unique economic patterns emerged that highlighted the contrasts in wealth. This blatancy caused the emergence of a new social ideology known as socialism. Economic and social egalitarianism is fundamental to the concept of socialism.[8] To socialists, property is not sacred and some socialists, called communists, desired the abolition of property. The word "socialism" first appeared in France around 1830 to describe a theoretical opposition to a society run on market principles and to an economy organized on laissez-faire lines.[8] Before this, a minority of eighteenth century thinkers, such as Henri Compte de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, noted the great and irrational discrepancies of wealth; they concluded that a global community is capable of and responsible for generating the greatest good for the greatest number of people.[8] Once societies struggled with the problematic economic and social changes introduced by industrialization, egalitarian ideas became a modern form of socialism.[35]

Materialism

Though the nineteenth century marked an advance of materialism in the typical sense (the taste for material gratification), a new and deeper level of materialism emerged and illustrated cultural change. Beliefs in the supernatural declined and church going dwindled throughout several European countries in the first half of century.[9] Large numbers of people from various social classes looked to natural science rather than traditional religion to explain the human world. To some, materialism meant that an individual's life is dictated by certain material facts that naturally and thoughtlessly create one's fate; regardless of individual efforts, rational choices, and informed will, neither people nor God can determine their future.[9]

Nationalism

Liberty Leading the People (Eugène Delacroix, 1830) is a famous example of nationalist art

Nationalism, the most successful revolutionary force of modern politics, redefined personal and collective identities. Nationalism is a set of beliefs held by a nation.[10] By the late nineteenth century, nationalism represented a system of European states characterized by identifiable nations.[36] A nation is characterized by common identity, language, culture, an allegiance and uniformed citizenship.[37] Increasing literacy rates, wider newspaper circulations, and faster global communication created an immediate sharing of information and emotion. A communal sentiment helped establish national identity. Though nationalism united individuals and created a stronger social structure, it also had negative consequences. Politicians used national awareness to push their agendas and conceal interests and demagogy.[36] Nationalism provoked revolutions and encouraged antagonism that led to World War I.

Imperialism

Imperialism surfaced towards the end of the nineteenth century.[38] Imperialism is the continuous political and economical domination exerted by a nation over another country and their territory by either occupation or settlement.[39] Europeans argued that imperial expansion was necessary because of the negative impact of industrialization upon society, particularly employment and would resolve population pressure and discontent. Racism justified by "distorted Darwinian biology" was also used to suggest the inevitability of imperialism because whites were genetically predisposed to rule the world.[40]

See also

Books

References

Notes
  1. ^ a b c Frank 2000
  2. ^ Jones 2003
  3. ^ a b c Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225 Cite error: The named reference "Pomeranz 2000, pp. 219–225" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  4. ^ a b Pomeranz 2000, pp. 242–243
  5. ^ Perry 2007, pp. 206–209, 363–365
  6. ^ a b c Roberts 1996, p. 336
  7. ^ a b Roberts 1996, p. 335
  8. ^ a b c d Roberts 1996, p. 338 Cite error: The named reference "Roberts338" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  9. ^ a b c Roberts 1996, p. 341
  10. ^ a b Grosby 2005, p. 5
  11. ^ Roberts 1996, pp. 283–385
  12. ^ Eric Jones (1936-)
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h Clark & Feenstra 2003, pp. 277–320
  14. ^ Comin 2008, p. 1
  15. ^ Muller 2001, pp. 58–73
  16. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Pomeranz 2000, pp. 31–69
  17. ^ Pomeranz 2000, pp. 7–8
  18. ^ Pomeranz 2000, pp. 215–219
  19. ^ Pomeranz 2000, pp. 223–225
  20. ^ Pomeranz 2000, pp. 230–238
  21. ^ Williamson 2008, pp. 355–391
  22. ^ Broadberry & Gupta 2005
  23. ^ Pomeranz 2000, pp. 257–258
  24. ^ Perry 2007, pp. 206–209
  25. ^ Perry 2007, pp. 206–209
  26. ^ Greene & Jellison 1961, pp. 485–518
  27. ^ Greene & Jellison 1961, pp. 485–518
  28. ^ a b Perry 2007, pp. 203–206
  29. ^ Perry 2007, pp. 251–256
  30. ^ Perry 2007, pp. 264–270
  31. ^ Perry 2007, pp. 271–273
  32. ^ a b c d Perry 2007, pp. 199–203
  33. ^ a b Perry 2007, pp. 217–219
  34. ^ Albernethy 2000, p. 95
  35. ^ Roberts 1996, p. 339
  36. ^ a b Roberts 1996, p. 396
  37. ^ Landes 1998, p. 219
  38. ^ Roberts 1996, p. 384
  39. ^ Roberts 1996, p. 283
  40. ^ Roberts 1996, p. 385
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