French protectorate of Tunisia

This article is about the administration of French Tunisia. For the social history of the same, see History of French-era Tunisia.

French protectorate of Tunisia Protectorat français de Tunisie لحماية الفرنسية في تونس
1881–1956
Flag
Tunisia (dark blue) French possessions in Africa (light blue) 1913
Status	Protectorate of France
Capital	Tunis
Common languages	Arabic, Berber languages French, Italian, Turkish
Religion	Muslim, Catholic, Jewish
Government	Monarchy
Bey
• 1859–1882	Muhammad III as-Sadiq (first)
• 1943-1956	Muhammad VIII al-Amin (last)
Resident-General
• 1885-1886	Paul Cambon (first)
• 1954-1955	Pierre Boyer de Latour du Moulin (last)
High Commissioner
• 1955-1956	Roger Seydoux Fornier de Clausonne
History
• Treaty of Bardo	May 12 1881
• Battle of Tunisia	1942-1943
• Independence	March 20 1956
Area
1881 est.	155,000 km2 (60,000 sq mi)
1939 est.	155,000 km2 (60,000 sq mi)
Population
• 1939 est.	2,600,000
Currency	Tunisian rial (until 1891) Tunisian franc (1891-1958)
ISO 3166 code	TN
Preceded by Succeeded by Ottoman Empire Tunisia

The French protectorate of Tunisia (French: Protectorat français de Tunisie) (Arabic: الحماية الفرنسية في تونس) was established in 1881, during the Scramble for Africa, and lasted until Tunisian independence in 1956.

Tunisia formed a province of the decaying Ottoman Empire but enjoyed a large measure of autonomy under the bey Muhammad III as-Sadiq.

In 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottomans. Russian victory foreshadowed the dismemberment of the empire, including independence for several Balkan possession and international discussions about the future of the North African provinces.

The Berlin conference of 1878 convened to resolve the Ottoman question. Britain, although opposed to total dismantling of the Ottoman empire, offered France control of Tunisia, in return for Cyprus. Germany, seeing the French claim as a way to divert French attention from revengeful action in Europe (where France had suffered defeat at Prussian hands in 1870-1) and little concerned about the southern Mediterranean, agreed to allow France overlordship in Tunisia. Italy, which had economic interests in Tunisia, strongly opposed the plan but was unable to impose its will.

The French presence in Tunisia came five decades after their occupation of neighboring Algeria. Both of these countries had been former possessions of the Ottoman Empire for three centuries, yet each had long ago attained political autonomy. Before the French arrived, Tunisia had begun a process of modern reforms, but financial difficulties mounted until the installation of a commission of European creditors. After their occupation the French government assumed Tunisia's international obligations. Major developments and improvements were undertaken by the French in several areas, including transport and infrastructure, industry, the financial system, public health, and administration. Yet French business and its citizens were favored, not to the liking of Tunisians. Their preexisting national sense was early expressed in speech and in print; political organization followed. The independence movement was already active before World War I, and continued to gain strength against mixed French opposition. Its ultimate aim was achieved in 1956.

Background

Tunisia before French occupation

Main article: History of Ottoman-era Tunisia

Muhammad III as-Sadiq

Before French occupation, Tunisia formed a province of the Ottoman Empire, but enjoyed a large measure of autonomy. The Ottoman ruler had placed a governor, a pasha, in charge of the Tunisian province. However, this pasha quickly lost control to the military commander, the dey. And the dey, in his turn, had been ousted by a civil administrator, the bey. The Sultan of the Ottoman Empire subsequently elevated the bey to the rank of dey and pasha, so that the decorum was satisfied all round. In 1705 the office fell into the hands of Al-Husayn I ibn Ali at-Turki, who founded a dynasty that was to reign over Tunisia for two and a half centuries. When European influence continued to grow during the second half of the 19th century, Tunisia became a de facto independent state. The bey had his own army and navy, struck his own coins, declared war and peace, maintained separate diplomatic relations and signed treaties. Nevertheless, the bey was officially a Turkish governor, invoked the sultan in his prayers, and on first taking office had to apply for a firman, that is official recognition by the sultan.

This complicated matters of affairs was used by the European Powers seeking influence in Tunisia, according to historian Henk Wesseling "[...] this state of affairs, however complicated, was not without practical benefits, because [the European Powers] could treat the bey, at will, either as an independent ruler or as a vassal of the Porte."

From 1859 to 1882 Tunisia was ruled by the bey Muhammad III as-Sadiq, and the powerful prime minister, Musapha Kahznadar, who according to Wesseling "had been pulling the strings ever since 1837." Khaznadar was minister of finance and foreign affairs and was assisted by the interior, defence, and naval ministers. In 1864 Tunisia was granted a constitution with a clear division of ministerial powers and responsibilities, but in practice Khaznadar was the absolute sovereign. He followed a policy of reforms, that is, of economic development, aimed at improving the infrastructure as well as the means of communication, the armed forces, and so on. The Tunisian economy did not, however, provide enough money to pay for it all, at least not after deduction of government expenses. Central administration, however, was weak. Tax collection was devolved onto tax-farmers, and only one-fifth of the revenues ever reached the national treasury. Many hill tribes and desert nomads lived in quasi-independence. Economic conditions deteriorated through the 19th century, as foreign fleets curbed corsairs, and droughts perennially wreaked ill effect on production of cereals and olives. Because of accords with foreign traders dating back to the 16th century, custom duties were limited to 3 per cent of the value of imported goods; yet manufactured products from overseas, primarily textiles, flooded Tunisia and gradually destroyed local artisan industries.

In 1861, the Tunisian prime minister, Mustapha Khaznadar made an effort to modernise administration and tried to increase revenues by doubling taxes. The major effect, only fully felt by 1864, was widespread rural insurrection, coupled with great hardship for the general population. The government had to negotiate a new loan from foreign bankers. In 1867, an attempt to secure money failed; government revenues were insufficient to meet annual interest payments on the national debt. Tunisia plunged towards bankruptcy. Two years later France, Italy and Britain set up an international finance commission to sort out Tunisia’s economic problems and safeguard Western stakes. Their actions enjoyed only partial success, largely because of opposition from foreign traders to increase in the customs levy. In 1873 Khaznadar again undertook reforms and attacked the widespread financial abuses within the bureaucracy. The result were initially promising, but bad harvests and palace intrigues led to his downfall.

The ruler of Tunisia reigned over what in fact over what was a modest territory, whose southern borders were vague and inconsequential, losing themselves into the Sahara. To the east lay Tripoli, another province of The Ottoman Empire, which had also mad itself independent until the sultan had restored his authority by force in 1835. The bey of Tunisia had observed that event with some fear and trepartiation and was therefore not to unhappy in 1830 that another country, France, had settled on his western borders. According to Wesseling, the bey considered the reconquest of his country by the Porte a much greater threat than a possible conquest by France.

At the time Tunisia had just over a million inhabitants. Half of these were sedentary farmers who lived mainly in the northeast; the other half were nomadic shepherds who roamed roamed the interior. There were several towns, including Tunis with nearly 100 000 inhabitants, and Kairouan with 15 000, where traders and artisans were active, despite being severely affected by foreign competition. The traditional Tunisian textile industry was no match for European imports. The financial world was dominated by Tunisian Jews, while a growing number of Europeans, almost exclusively Italians and Maltese, settled in Tunisia. In 1870 there were 15 000 of them. The economic situation of Tunisian townsmen may accordingly have been under pressure, but it was flourishing in comparison with that of the fellahin, the peasants who laboured under a whole series of taxes and requisitions. In the disastrous years of 1867 and 1868 famines were added to these, the result of crop failure, as well as epidemics — first cholera, then typhus — killed many thousands. During this period some 20 percent of the population perished.

These circumstances made the Tunisian government unable, despite all levies and demands, to collect the tax revenues they deemed necessary to modernise Tunisia.

Decline of the Ottoman Empire

Further information: [[:Decline of the Ottoman Empire]] and [[:Eastern Question]]

In 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottomans. Russian victory foreshadowed the dismemberment of the empire, including independence for several Balkan possession and international discussions about the future of the North African provinces.

In 1879, when Charles de Freycinet became prime minister of France and Admiral Bernard Jauréguiberry his minister of the navy, an new French colonial policy was launched: the French government began to lend more active support to military expansion in western and northern Africa.

What happened in North Africa was caught in the spotlight of world politics. Every action affected the complicated European balance of power. A balance which had been radically altered by he events of 1870. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had ended in French defeat. After it, the political map of Europe was radically altered: Germany had become the most important country in on the European continent.

Congress of Berlin

Berlin conference of 1878 convened to resolve the Ottoman question. Britain opposed total dismantling of the Ottoman empire but offered France control of Tunisia, in return for Cyprus. Germany, seeing the French claim as a way to divert French attention from revengeful action in Europe (where France had suffered defeat at Prussian hands in 1870-1) and little concerned about the southern Mediterranean, agreed to allow France overlordship in Tunisia. Italy strongly opposed the plan, but its ambassadors proved unable to impose their will, much to the discontent of the Italian public.

The history of the French expedition in Tunis in 1881 began with the Congress of Berlin in 1878. That congress was one of the most spectacular diplomatic gatherings held in the 19th century. In splendour and importance it was excelled only by the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815. The star of the second congress, was Bismarck. In addition there was a cast of other luminaries, including Disraeli and Salisbury from Britain, Gorchakov from Russia, and Waddington, the French minister of foreign affairs. The Sublime Port was represented by Mohammed Ali Pasha.

It is obvious that Turkey must be present at a congress that revolved around the "eastern question." Now, the eastern question was a strange one because it was not strictly speaking a question, or rather, because it begat its own solution. The question was the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The solution was the partition of its remains. The only problem was how the partitions should be effected, but that to was no real problem because there was more than enough to deal with. If Austria wanted Bosnia, then Russia could have Walachia, Britain could be happy with Cyprus and France compensated with Tunisia. If necessary, other arrangements were also possible. This merry game could be played for a long time, because the Ottoman Empire was so large. Its two tentacles had once stretched around the Mediterranean, on the lower side through the Near East and Egypt as far as Morocco, and on the upper into the Balkans as far as Bosnia and Herzegovina. But in the course of time a great deal had crumbled away. Czar Nicholas I had said as early as 1853 that Turkey was the sick man of Europe and that it was time to think about sharing out his estate.

Anton von Werner. Congress of Berlin.

The eastern question linked the partition of Africa to international political concerns. The strategic interests of Great Britain and Russia in the Dardanelles, the rivalry between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, the rivalry between France and Great Britain in Egypt, the tensions between France and Italy in Tunisia – all involved territories in the ottoman Empire. It was the job of diplomats to regulate the resulting tensions in such a way as to avoid conflicts between the great powers. Since the Crimean War they had been very successful at it. In a sense the eastern question was a triumph of European diplomacy.

The congress of Berlin was a new success in this series. It had been called in order to sort out affairs in the Balkans. Russia had declared war on Turkey in 1877, and trounced it decisively in 1878. With the Treaty of San Stefano Russia had collected its dues for this short but costly war, increasing its territory appreciably at the expense of the Turks. In addition, it had set up a kind of satellite state in the form of a Greater Bulgaria that was to stretch as far as the Aegean Sea. This was going too far for Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. Britain did not want to see Russia on this side of Dardanelles, not even by proxy. Austria-Hungary frowned at the creation of a Greater Bulgarian empire that might appeal to its many Slav subjects. An international congress would have to find the solution. France played no part in this conflict, but was invited all the same, as was Italy. Bismarck was to turn up in the role of ”honest broker.”

Thc congress met on 13 June 1878 in Berlin and ended on 13 July. It was a success for British diplomacy. The Disraeli-Salisbury tandem seemed invincible, not least perhaps thanks to Bismarck's support. Bismarck was in fact as honest as, in the nature of the concept, any broker could be.

Russia was thus the loser. Not much was left of the Greater Bulgarian empire. The Straits were kept firmly closed, and Anglo-Turkish relations were consolidated. There was something else: Great Britain occupied Cyprus. It had forced the sultan to accept this step and had made it clear to Russia that it was demanding this as compensation for Russian expansion in and around the Caucasus. Germany raised no objections, and Austria was reliant on British support. But Britain could of course expect protests from France, the leading Mediterranean power. France would have to be compensated, needless to say on the at the expense of Turkey. The solution seemed obvious: France could have Tunisia. Salisbury called on Waddington and said, ”You cannot leave Carthage in the hands of the barbarians.” Bismarck who was only to keen too keen to deflect French attention from the lure of the Vosges, also though this a brilliant idea.

Waddington was willing to accept the offer, but Parisian suspicions of Bismarck was formidable, and so nothing was done at the time. These suspicions were not hard to understand in the light of the recent past. Nor were they unjustified. While Bismark was urging Tunisia upon the French, the German diplomat Bülow was offering it to the Italians. As Count Corti, the Italian minister of foreign affairs, put-it, "Everybody was telling everybody else to take something which belonged to somebody else"

Corti's criticism was fair but of little account. Italy did not join in. It returned from Berlin with clean but empty hands. While Britain and Germany had made their attitude to French intervention in Tunisia more or less clear, the British even failed to inform Italy of the Cyprus coup. The Italians had to read about it in the newspapers, and were later-told by the British that there was room enough for-everyone in North Africa. Italy's anti-Austrian attitude had, moreover, not gone down very well with Bismarck. Like most statesmen he despised Italy. "Why on earth should Italy demand an increase of territory?" asked one Russian diplomat. "Has she lost another battle? Bismarck took much the same view. "The Italians," he told the French ambassador, "have a big appetite but poor teeth." Italy was thus diplomatically isolated during the years following the Congress of Berlin. France, for its part, enjoyed the support of Germany and of Britain. This accounts for the fact that Tunisia, packed though it was with Italian colonists, and lying a mere stone's throw from Italy went to France instead.

French Occupation

Main article: French occupation of Tunisia

Signing of the Treaty of Bardo

France did not enlarge its Maghreb domain beyond Algeria for half a century. The next area for expansion, at the beginning of the 1880s, was Tunisia. With an area of 155 000 square kilometers Tunisia was a small prize. But it occupied strategic importance, across the Algerian frontier and only 150 kilometers from Sicily; Tunisia offered good port facilities, especially at Bizerte. France and Italy, as well as Britain counted significant expatriate communities in Tunisia and maintained consulates there. Ties were also commercial; France had advanced a major loan to Tunisia in the mid-19th century and had trading interests.

Paris did not act immediately, parliament remained in an anti-colonial mood and no groundswell of popular opinion mandated a takeover of Tunisia. Several developments spurred France to action. In 1880, the British owners of the railway linking Tunis with the coast put their company up for sale. An Italian concern successfully bid for the enterprise, leaving France worried about possible Italian intervention. Another incident, also in 1880, concerned the sale of a 100 000 hectare property by a former Tunisian prime minister. Negotiations involved complicated arrangements to forestall preemption of the sale by the bey's government or by proprietors of adjacent tracts of land. A French consortium buying the property believed the deal had been completed, but a British citizen, ostensibly representing neighbouring landholders, preempted the sale and occupied the land (though without paying for it). A judge sent by London to investigate discovered that the British purchaser was acting on behalf of the bey's government and Italian businessmen; moreover, he discovered that the Briton had used fraud to stake his claim. The sale was canceled, and French buyers got the property. Paris moved to protect French claims, as London and Berlin gently warned that if France did not act, they might reconsider their go-ahead for French occupation.

French diplomats scrambled to convince unenthusiastic parliamentarians and bureaucrats, all the while looking for a new incident to precipitate intervention. In March 1881, a foray by Tunisian Khroumir tribesmen across the border into Algeria caused the deaths of several Algerians. Here was the incident for which the French had hoped. By mid-April, French troops had landed in Tunisia and, on 12 May 1881, forced the bey to sign the Bardo Treaty granting France a protectorate over Tunisia. Although soldiers took until May 1882 to occupy the whole country and stamp out resistance, France's empire counted a new domain. Germany and Britain remained silent; Italy was outraged but powerless.

The protectorate was different, at least on paper, from French annexation of Algeria. The bey remained in office, and Tunisia retained its legal status as an independent; existing treaties with other states continued in force. Yet the powers of the French Resident were great: he was prime minister, comptroller of the country's finances and commander of its armed forces. "The energetic Resident appointed in 1882, Paul Cambon, soon curbed the considerable prerogatives of foreign consuls, reduced the bey's government to a rubber stamp for French decisions," and brought in enough French administrators to reorganize the justice and finance systems. "France for all practical purposes ruled the country as another colony."

Organisation and administration

Paul Cambon

The La Marsa Convention, signed in 1883, by bey Ali Muddat ibn al-Husayn, formally established the French protectorate. It deprived the bey of control over internal matters by committing him to implement administrative, judicial, and financial reform dictated by France. Paul Cambon

In Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European World, Kenneth J. Perkins writes: "Cambon carefully kept the appearance of Tunisian sovereignty while reshaping the administrative structure to give France complete control of the country and render the beylical government a hollow shell devoid of meaningful powers."

French officials used several methods to control the beylical government. They urged the bey to nominate members of the pre-colonial ruling elite to such key post as prime-minister, because these people were personally loyal to the bey and followed his lead in offering no resistance to the French. At the same time the rulers obtained the dismissal of Tunisians who had supported the 1881 rebellion or had otherwise opposed the extension of French influence. A Frenchman held the office of secretary general to the Tunisian government, created in 1883 to advise the prime-minister and oversee and coordinate the work of the bureaucracy. French experts answerable only to the secretary general and the resident general managed and staffed those government offices, collectively called the Technical Services, which dealt with finances, public works, education, and agriculture. To help him implement the reforms alluded to in the La Marsa Convention, the resident general had the power to promulgate executive decrees, reducing the bey to little more than a figurehead.

Local government

The French authorities left the framework of local government intact, but deviced mechanisms to control it. Qaids, roughly corresponding to provincial governors, were the most important figures in local administration. At the outset of the protectorate, some sixty of them had the responsibility of maintaining order and collecting taxes in districts either defined by tribal membership, or by geographical limits. The central government appointed the qaids, usually choosing a person from a major family of the tribe or district to ensure respect and authority. Below the qaids were shaikhs, the leaders of tribes, villages, and town quarters. The central government also appointed them but on the recommendation of the qaids. After the French invasion, most qaids and shaikhs were allowed to retain their post, and therefore few of them resisted the new authorities.

To keep a close watch on developments outside the capital, Tunisia's new rulers organised the contrôleurs civils. These French officials replicated, at the local level, of the resident general, closely supervising the qaids and shaikhs. After 1884, a network of contrôleurs civils overlay the qaids' administration throughout the country, except in the extreme south. There, because of the more hostile nature of the tribes and the tenuous hold of the central government, military officers, making up a Service des Renseignements (Intelligence Service), fulfilled this duty. Successive residents general, fearing the soldiers' tendency toward direct rule — which belied the official French myth that Tunisians continued to govern Tunisia — worked to bring the Service des Renseignements under their control, finally doing so at the end of the century.

Shoring up the debt-ridden and plundered Tunisian treasury was one of Cambon's main priorities. In 1884, France guaranteed the Tunisian debt, paving the way for the termination of the International Debt Commission's stranglehold on Tunisian finances. Responding to French pressure, the beylical government then lowered taxes, including the majba. French officials hoped that their careful monitoring of tax assessment and collection procedures would result in a more equitable system stimulating a revival in production and commerce and generating more revenues for the state.

Judicial system

In 1883 French law and French courts were introduced, thereafter French law applied to all French and foreign residents. The other European powers agreed to give up the consular courts they had maintained to protect their nationals from the Tunisian judiciary. The French courts also tried cases in which one litigant was Tunisian, the other European. The protectorate authorities made no attempt to alter Muslim religious courts in which judges, or qadis, trained in Islamic law heard relevant cases. A beylical court handling criminal cases operated under French Supervision in the capital. In 1896, similar courts were initiated in the provinces, again under the watchful eye of the French.

Education

The protectorate introduced new ideas in education. The French director of public education looked after all schools in Tunisia, including religious ones. According to Perkins "Many colonial officials believed that modern education would lay the groundwork for harmonious Franco-Tunisia relations by providing a means of bridging the gap between Arabo-Islamic and European cultures". In a more pragmatic vein, schools teaching modern subjects in a European language would produce a cadre of Tunisians with the skills necessary to staff the growing government bureaucracy. Soon after the protectorates establishment, the Directorate of Public Education set up a unitary school system for French and Tunisian pupils designed to draw the two peoples closer together. The French language was the medium of instruction in these Franco-Arab schools, and their curriculum imitated that of schools in metropolitan France. French-speaking students who attended them studied Arabic as a second language. Racial mixing rarely occurred in schools in the cities, in which various religious denominations continued to provide elementary schools. The Franco-Arab schools attained somewhat greater success in rural areas but never enrolled more than a fifth of Tunisia's eligible students. At the summit of the modern education system was Khair al-Din's Sadiqi College. Highly competitive examinations regulated admission to Sadiqi, but its graduates were almost assured government positions by virtue of their training in modern subjects and French.

World War II

Further information: [[:Tunisia Campaign]]

Sketchmap of Tunisia during the 1942 - 1943 campaign

Many Tunisians took saisfaction in France's defeat by Germany in June 1940, but the nationalist parties derived no more substantive dividend from the colonial power's humiliation. Despite his commitment to terminate the French protectorate, the pragmatic Bourguiba had no desire to exchange the control of republican France for that of Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany, whose ideologies he abhorred. He feared that associating with the axis, might bring to the nationalist movement a short-term disaster. but result in a long-term tragedy. Following the Franco-German armistice, the government of Marshal Philippe Pétain sent to Tunis as resident general Admiral Jean Esteva, who had no intention of permitting a revival of Tunisian political activity. The arrests of Taieb Slim and Habib Thameur, central figures in the Neo-Destour political bureau and partisans of collaboration with Germany weakened the party.

Independence

Main article: Tunisian independence

Habib Bourguiba giving a speech in the city of Bizerte, 1952

Decolonisation proved a protracted and controversial affair. In Tunisia, nationalist demanded the return of the deposed bey and institutional reform. In 1945, the two Destour parties joined other dissident groups to petition for autonomy. The following year Habib Bourguiba and the Néo-Destour Party switched their aim to complete independence. Fearing arrest, Bourguiba spent much of the next three years in Cairo, where in 1950, he issued a seven-point manifesto demanding the restitution of Tunisian sovereignty and election of a national assembly. A conciliatory French government acknowledged the desirability of autonomy, although it warned that this would eventuate only at some unspecified time in the rather distant future; Paris proposed French and Tunisian ”co-sovereignty” over the protectorate. An accord signed the next year, which granted increased powers to Tunisian officials, fell short of satisfying nationalists and outraged settlers. New French prime ministers took a harder line and kept Bourguiba under house arrest from 1951 to 1954. A major general strike in 1952 led to violent confrontation between the French and Tunisians, including guerrilla attacks by nationalists. Yet another change in French government, the appointment of Pierre Mendès-France as prime minister in 1954, brought a return to gentler approaches. International circumstances — the French disaster in Indochina and growing unrest in Algeria — promoted French efforts in to solve the Tunisian question quickly and peacefully. In a speech in Carthage, Mendès-France solemnly proclaimed the autonomy of the Tunisian government, although France retained control of substantial areas of administration. In 1955, Bourguiba returned to Tunis in triumph. The next year the French revoked the clause of the Treaty of Bardo establishing a protectorate and recognised the complete independence of Tunisia on 20 March.

See also

• List of colonial heads of French Tunisia
• History of Tunisia
• History of France
• List of French possessions and colonies

Notes and references

Notes

References

Bibliography

• Aldrich, Robert (1996). Greater France. A history of French Expansion. Macmillan Press. ISBN 0 333 56740 4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ganiage, Jean (1985). "North Africa". In Olivier, Roland; Fage, J. D.; Sanderson, G. N. (eds.). The Cambridge History of Africa: From 1870 to 1905. Vol. VI. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521228034. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Perkins, Kenneth J. (2004). A History of Modern Tunisia. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0 521 81124 4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Perkins, Kenneth J. (1986). Tunisia. Crossroads of the Islamic and European World. Westview Press. ISBN 0-7099-4050-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Wesseling, Henk (1996) [1991]. Verdeel en heers. De deling van Afrika, 1880-1914. Arnold J. Pomerans (trans.). Praeger (Greenwood Publishing Group). ISBN 0275951383. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)

Further reading

• Andrew, Christopher. M.; Kanya-Forstner, A. S. (1971). "The French 'Colonial Party'. Its Composition, Aims and Influences". Historical Journal (14): 99–128.
• Andrew, Christopher. M.; Kanya-Forstner, A. S. (1976). "French Business and the French Colonialist". Historical Journal (17): 837–866.
• Andrew, Christopher. M.; Kanya-Forstner, A. S. (1974). "The groupe colonial in the French Chamber of Deputies, 1892-1932". Historical Journal (19): 981–1000.
• Andrew, Christopher. M.; Kanya-Forstner, A. S. (1981). France Overseas. The Great War and the Climax of French Imperialism.
• Cohen, William B. (1971). Rulers of Empire. The French Colonial Service in Africa. Hoover Institution Press.
• Broadley, A. M. (1881). The Last Punic War: Tunis, Past and Present. Vol. I. William Blackwood and Sons.
• Broadley, A. M. (1882). The Last Punic War: Tunis, Past and Present. Vol. II. William Blackwood and Sons.
• Issawi, Charles (1982). An economic History of the Middle East and North Africa. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231034431.
• Langer, W. (1925–1926). "The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis, 1878-1881". American Historical Review (31): 55–79 & 251–256.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)
• Ling, Dwight L. (1979). Morocco and Tunisia, a Comparative History. University Press of America. ISBN 0819108731.
• Murphy, Agnès (1948). The Ideology of French Imperialism, 1871-1881. Catholic University of America Press.
• Pakenham, Thomas (1991). The Scramble for Africa. Weidenfield and Nicolson. ISBN 0 297 81130 4.
• Persell, Stewart Michael (1983). The French Colonial Lobby, 1889-1938. Stanford University Press.
• Priestly, Herbert Ingram (1938). France Overseas. A study of Modern Imperialism.
• Roberts, Stephen Henry (1929). History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925.
• Wilson, Henry S. (1994). African Decolonization. Hooder Headline. ISBN 0 340 55929 2.