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{{Buddhism}}
{{Buddhism}}
Prasaṅgika ("Consequentialist") [[Madhyamaka]] is a [[Tibetan]] category of Madhyamaka viewpoints ascribed to the [[India|Indian]] author [[Buddhapalita]] and his defender [[Candrakirti]]. The viewpoints ascribed to Buddhapalita's critic, [[Bhavaviveka]] is termed [[Svatantrika]] ("Autonomous").
"{{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} Emptiness" is the theory that all things and phenomena lack (or are empty of) any type of inherent identity or self-characterizing essence. This lack of inherent existence does not mean that all phenomena are non-existent; inherent non-existence is also negated by {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} emptiness. In the philosophy of [[Mahayana]] [[Buddhism]], specifically in the [[Madhyamaka]] view, '''{{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} Emptiness''' is a category of [[Madhyamaka]] viewpoints attributed primarily to Indian scholar [[Candrakirti]], but which is based also on Buddhapalita's commentaries on [[Nagarjuna]]. Nagarjuna and later commentators use the method of [[logical consequence]] (''prasanga'' in Sanskrit) to refute flawed views. By using this type of [[reductio ad absurdum]], Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita, Candrakirti, and, later on, Lama Tsongkhapa, simultaneously refute incorrect/opposing viewpoints and establish the position of {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}}.


Buddhapalita's commentary on [[Nagarjuna|Nagarjuna's]] [[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]] used the method of [[logical consequence]] (''prasanga'' in Sanskrit) to refute the [[Samkhya|Samkhyas]]. Bhavaviveka criticized this approach as he preferred autonomous arguments.
"Emptiness," in the {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} sense, does not mean space, lack of physical obstruction, non-existence, or the simple not-finding of a conventional identity for the object or phenomenon being scrutinized. {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} is the conclusive analytic absence of any findable internal quality of an object or phenomenon that is a sufficient condition to provide a name, identity, function, and/or discreteness to that object or phenomenon. The strong implication is that the mind of the observer (technically, a conceptually designating consciousness) provides the name, identity, function, and conventional discreteness to that object, i.e., imposes such a characterization to that seeming object. The relationship between the mind and object is commonly described as "Co-dependent arising, dependent arising, and dependent origination." The mind is also viewed as dependently arising on the basis of the object of which that mind is aware. This relationship explains why, when one analyzes a material object, a mind, or an abstract phenomena (like time, non-composed space, coming, going, causality, etc) nothing self-characterizing or identity-providing is found.<ref>''Ocean of Reasoning'', [[Oxford University Press]] (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-514732-2</ref>


==Buddhapalita's Rebuttal of the Samkhyas==
==History==
In his rebuttal of [[Samkhya]], Buddhapalita states:
The Madhyamaka views generally were expounded as commentaries upon the work of [[Nagarjuna]], who wrote about the ''[[Prajnaparamita]] sutras''. [[Buddhapalita]] was an early adopter of [[Syllogism|syllogistic]] methods in his teachings, although of a particularly limited form. He commented upon Nagarjuna's discourses by basing himself on their logical consequences. [[Bhavaviveka]] later commented upon and critiqued Buddhapalita's interpretation of Nagarjuna. [[Candrakirti]] later responded to Bhavaviveka's criticisms. His response became regarded as exemplary of the Prasangika approach and view.<ref>''Ocean of Nectar'', [[Tharpa Publications]] (1995) ISBN 978-0-948006-23-4</ref>
{{quote|Entities do not arise from their own intrinsic nature, because their arising would be pointless and because they would arise endlessly. For entities that [already] exist as their own intrinsic nature, there is no need to arise again. If they were to arise despite existing [already], there would be no time when they do not arise; [but] that is also not asserted [by the Enumerators]. <ref>Brunnholzl, Karl. ''The Center of the Sunlit Sky.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 393. </ref></blockquote><br />}}


==Bhavaviveka's Critique of Buddhapalita==
When Buddhism was established in Tibet, however, the primary philosophic viewpoint established there was that of Shantarakshita – a synthesis of Yogacara and Madhyamaka – in the 9th century. Much later [[Je Tsongkhapa]] established Candrakirti's work as primary, and it continues as the main approach to Madhyamaka taught in the Gelug school. Other masters of the various lineages of Tibetan Buddhism also contemplate {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} views but hold different opinions with regard to the best way to describe the experience of emptiness (i.e. Prasaṅgika, Svatantrika, Chittamatra, and their sub-schools).<ref>''Ocean of Reasoning'', [[Oxford University Press]] (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-514732-2</ref>
Bhavaviveka did not like the consequentialist manner in which Buddhapalita argued against the Samkhyas. Bhavaviveka states:
{{quote|This [refutation by Buddhaplita] is inappropriate, (1) because he does not state a reason and an example, (2) because he fails to eliminate the [possible] flaws adduced by others [against him], and (3) because it is a [consequential] statement that affords an opportunity [for objections by an opponent]. The [third reason] means that, through reversal of the meaning stated [in Buddhaplita’s consequence], a probandum and a reason with reversed meanings would appear. Thus, entities would arise from something other, because their arising would be fruit-ful and because their arising would come to an end. [However, this]
would contradict [Buddhaplita’s own] position. <ref>Brunnholzl, Karl. ''The Center of the Sunlit Sky.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 394. </ref></blockquote><br />}}


==Candrakriti's Defense of Buddhapalita and Rebuttal of Bhavaviveka's Critique==
==Svatantrika debate==
In the ''Prasannapadā'', Candrakırti declares that Bhvaviveka’s entire critique of Buddhaplita is unfounded. He starts with the former’s accusation (1) that the latter “does not state a reason and an example.” He says that the Centrists’ own system does not state a reason and an example that are established through valid cognition but that this is not a fault. He explains why by saying that the system of Centrists means to be free from all discursiveness—including valid cognition—on both levels of reality. This does not prevent Centrists from stating reasons and examples that are acknowledged by others. However, in the case of the Enumerators who assert that entities arise from themselves, it is possible to put an end to their wrong ideas by just confronting them with the internal contradictions of their position.<ref>Brunnholzl, Karl. ''The Center of the Sunlit Sky.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 396. </ref> Thus, the Enumerators are challenged by their own consequences that demonstrate the internal contradictions of their system and have the same effect of negating arising from itself as the autonomous arguments and examples of someone who chooses the Autonomist approach.<ref>Brunnholzl, Karl. ''The Center of the Sunlit Sky.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 396. </ref> Candrakırti gives examples from the [[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]], to show that Nagarjuna also eliminates the theses of others mostly by means of
Bhavaviveka was later categorized - most prominently by Lama Tsongkhapa - as presenting a [[Svatantrika]] view , in opposition to Candrakirti's {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}}. While this was a later distinction, it was useful for students to study the viewpoints as a set of tenets and subsequent metaphysical consequences that could be debated and discussed. This usage is sometimes referred to as the "{{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} school" and the "Svatantrika school", even though no schools with those names existed. Some masters of the Gelug argue that Je Tsongkhapa's description of the views various schools of emptiness are meant to be a psychologically reflexive tool for identifying when we are falling into those schools of thought during our ordinary activities, and that they are not meant to be a historical doxography. Ordinary activity here refers to the ethical choices we make under the influence of the understanding of emptiness, during our path practice as a Bodhisattva. ([[Bodhisattva#Ten_grounds|See Paths and Grounds of a Bodhisattva]])<ref>''Ocean of Reasoning'', [[Oxford University Press]] (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-514732-2</ref>
adducing consequences.<ref>Brunnholzl, Karl. ''The Center of the Sunlit Sky.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 404. </ref>


The {{IAST|Prasaṅgika-Svatantrika}} distinction included both a technical component and a set of [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] implications. On one level, the disagreement centered around the role of ''prasanga'' in formal debate. While the Prasangika view holds it to be the only valid method of demonstrating [[Shunyata|emptiness of inherent existence]], the Svatantrika felt that assertions about the nature of the ultimate were also necessary. The {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} counter that when attempting to find the correct object of understanding - which is a mere absence or mere negation of impossible modes of existence - one should not use positivist statements about the nature of reality. Positing an essencelessness rather than merely negating inherent identity creates a subtle linguistic and analytic barrier to finding the correct understanding.

In the [[Lam Rim|Lam Rim Chen Mo]], [[Tsongkhapa|Je Tsongkhapa]] writes extensively<ref>[[Tsongkhapa]] (author); [[Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee]] (translators)(2002). ''The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume Three)'' Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9, Chapters 18-21</ref> on the Prasaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction and also addresses several contemporary analyses, several of which are shown by Elizabeth Napper to be pertinent to modern scholarship.<ref>Elizabeth Napper (1989) ''Dependent-Arising and Emptiness''; Boston/London: Wisdom Publications ISBN 0-86171-057-6, Chapters 4-6</ref>

Tsongkhapa's thesis is that<ref>[[Tsongkhapa]]; ''The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume Three)''; ISBN 1-55939-166-9, pp225-275</ref> after a very lengthy and well-referenced debate, strongly relying upon [[Candrakirti]]'s (a Prasaṅgika) analysis of [[Bhāvaviveka]] (a Svātantrika) in the Prassana-padā<ref>('Clear Words' La Vallée Poussin (1970) 28.4-29; sDe dGe [[Kanjur]] (Kanakura 1956) 3796: Ha 9a7-b3)</ref>{{quote|The opponents of Candrakirti's Prassana-padā (a seminal text regarding the Prasaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction) are both (a) the essentialists, who accept that things ultimately have intrinsic nature, and (b) the Svātantrikas, who refute that, but accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature.|quote}}

However, from [[Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso|Ju Mipham]]'s view, [[Tsongkhapa]] himself is considered to be a Svatantrika. Blankleder/Fletcher write:
<blockquote> The Gelugpa interpretation of Prasangika has often been described by its critics as a form of Svatantrika in disguise, since its presentation of "conventional," as distinct from "true," existence seems very close to the "existence according to characteristics" that Bhavya had ascribed to phenomena on the relative level.<ref>[[Shantarakshita]] (author); [[Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso|Ju Mipham]] (commentator); [[Padmakara Translation Group]] (translators)(2005). ''The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham.'' Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Shambhala Publications, Inc. ISBN 1-59030-241-9 (alk. paper), p.23; Translator's introduction.</ref> </blockquote>

This position is, however, also refuted conclusively in Lama Tsongkhapa's "Ocean of Reasoning." The Svatantrika posit that a unique, conventionally existing identity arises on the part of each individual phenomenon which makes that phenomenon a natural basis for the designation of a particular term or identity. The {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} reject this idea given that, even if such an natural identity were findable with analysis (which it is not) such an identity cannot account for the various properties of identity and fails in a very similar way to inherent identity to provide an explanatory picture for our normal everyday experience.

For example, since a specific table has a unique conventionally arising characteristic of 'being that unique and specific object,' that unique characteristic does not provide the object with the natural identity of being "Table." That unique characteristic does not have an element to its natural identity which allows it to belong to the general class of objects. Since this is the case, it does not provide that object with a table identity or make it a natural base to be a table. This and many other arguments by the {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} show that there are legitimate ontological differences between the two schools of thought and that they are not really one school of thought that has a division in terms of how they describe the conventional and empty natures of phenomena.<ref>''Ocean of Reasoning'', [[Oxford University Press]] (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-514732-2</ref>

==Logical Consequence & Negation==
A prominent and important feature of the {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} approach is their use of the non-affirming negation. A non-affirming negation is a negation which does not leave something in the place of what has been negated. For instance, when one says that a Buddhist should not drink alcohol, they are not affirming that a Buddhist should, in fact, drink something else. We are merely negating the consumption of alcohol under a particular circumstance and not affirming the consumption of anything else. The {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} argue that emptiness (lack of inherent existence, the nature of all existent phenomenon) is itself a non-affirming negation.

Emptiness a mere absence of impossible modes of existence. So, if one were to describe emptiness as the presence of some quality (essencelessness, selflessness, tao, the ultimate nature which exists 'out there somewhere,' etc) it linguistically contradicts the nature of the object. Emptiness is the simple absence of inherent existence, true existence, occult entities, inherent identities, etc as having any role in the arising or existence of any object or phenomenon. It is not the presence of some other quality which is being affirmed in the place of the absence of those modes of existence.<ref>[[Tsongkhapa]] (author); [[Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee]] (translators)(2002). ''The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment</ref>

The criticism of this approach by other schools of thought within Buddhism, and much later by Western scholars, is that it slides into [[Nihilism]]. Since we have negated the inherent identity of object, but we have not affirmed anything else, haven't we negated the object's existence completely? Lama Tsongkhapa's argues that we have not negated the object completely, but rather have merely eliminated an impossible mode of existence misattributed to the object (see [[Avidyā (Buddhism)|Ignorance]].<ref>[[Tsongkhapa]] (author); [[Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee]] (translators)(2002). ''The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment</ref> By negating inherent existence, we have negated a mode of existence which would have made the valid conventional arising and existence of the object impossible. Therefore, we have provided argumentation in favor of the conventional arising and existence of the object.

An affirming negation is the opposite. When you negate that someone is a Senator in a situation where you know they must be either a Senator or a Representative, then you have affirmed they are a Repesentative. This is a very important point which gets at the heart of a number of issues, particularly in the {{IAST|Prasaṅgika-Svatantrika}} debate. The Svatantrika are primarily using syllogistic reasoning to arrive at emtpiness. While this approach is also effective, it leaves room to affirm that there is a "real, true, and inherent essenceless or emptiness out there" which has major philosophical problems from the {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} point of view.<ref>[[Tsongkhapa]] (author); [[Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee]] (translators)(2002). ''The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment</ref>

===Nagarjuna's Merely Designated Causality===

In Nagarjuna's own words, causality itself is not findable as existing inherently.
'''[[Catuṣkoṭi|Four Diamond Slivers]]''':

<blockquote><poem>"Neither from itself, nor from other,
Nor from both,
Nor without a cause
Does anything anywhere, ever arise."</poem></blockquote><ref>Pg. 47 "Ocean of Reasoning." [[Oxford University Press]] (2006)</ref>

The implied modifying phrase in this passage according to Lama Tsongkhapa is "inherent." So, the negations in this passage would read:

<blockquote><poem>Not from inherent self,
not from inherent other,
not from inherent both,
not from inherent nothingness/causelessness.</poem></blockquote>

Notice that each one of these statements is a non-affirming negation which merely negates the subject (some type of inherent cause for the arising of any given conventional phenomenon) and does not affirm some other mode of arising in its place. These four possibilities include all possible ways that a conventional phenomenon could arise if, in fact, they arose through some type of inherent arising process. Each one of these modes is negated in sequence (from self, from other, from both, from no cause) leaving you with a mere absence: the absence of inherent modes of causality. All these arguments are flushed out individually in Lama Tsongkhapa's commentary to Nagarjuna "Ocean of Reasoning."<ref>"Ocean of Reasoning." [[Oxford University Press]] (2006)</ref>

The causality of the {{IAST|Prasaṅgika}} is one of mere designation. For example, in a [[Flowchart|flow chart]] of the process of a seed turning into a sprout: if we selected 5000 photographs of all the intermittent stages from seed to sprout and independently asked 50 people, "Where does the seed become the sprout?" There would probably be 50 different answers. Nagarjuna's argument according to Lama Tsongkhapa is that if the sprout arose (came into existence) inherently in any of the four ways listed above, then all 50 people would independently have no choice but to say, "Yes, on slide 2199 the sprout arose. That is clearly and definitely the case." On the other hand, since the arising of a sprout is something which is merely nominally designated by the conceptual mind, when we independently question 50 people, we get 50 different answers. This is a strong indication that the sprout and all other objects are not something which arise and exist objectively or inherently. It indicates that human beings do not passively experience phenomena, but that the content of our experiences is something which is validly conceptually designated by mind.

The mind aspect of reality provides the name, identity, function, and conventional discreteness to phenomena, according to the Prasangkia. In the flowchart example, the moment mind validly decides that the object "seed" is no longer a valid basis for the term and concept "seed," it labels the term-concept "sprout" and that object becomes a sprout. When mind validly applies the term and concept "sprout" to its experience, that experience becomes a sprout. The arising of the sprout is causally linked to the valid designation of the term-concept "sprout," and not some causal force that existed previously in the seed, nor some identity of sproutness that existed somewhere prior to the arising of the sprout.<ref>"Ocean of Reasoning." [[Oxford University Press]] (2006)</ref>

Designation is - in the basic Buddhist sense - the application of a conceptual (or in some cases non-conceptual) image and a term to a selected object of experience. Once the object is validly designated as a sprout, that object of experience exists as a sprout (for more information see also [[Ship_of_Theseus#Prasangika_.26_Buddhism|7-point analysis of a chariot]]). It is important to note that there are also invalid ways to designate objects, which will be talked about in the next section. The rules for valid vs invalid designation are clearly laid out.<ref>"Ocean of Reasoning." [[Oxford University Press]] (2006)</ref>

|''Lam Rim Chen Mo''}} A Prasaṅgika asserts that something ''exists conventionally'' (synonym: validly designated) if it meets all of the following three conditions:
* if it is known to a conventional consciousness
* if no other conventional cognition contradicts its being as it is thus known
* if reason that accurately analyses reality (that is, analyses whether something intrinsically exists) does not contradict it
Whatever fails to meet those criteria does not exist.<ref>[[Tsongkhapa]] (author); [[Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee]] (translators)(2002). ''The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume Three)'' Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9, p178.</ref> Therefore Prasaṅgikas cannot accept that intrinsic nature exists, even conventionally.

====Indo-Tibetan Rope Snake: Valid & Invalid Designation====

When most people hear that all phenomenon only arise because they are designated by a mind, they skeptically ask, "Well, if that is the case, then can't anything be anything? Can't a table be a wall and a rabbit be an elephant?" According to Lama Tsongkhapa, the answer to all of those questions is no. There is an example which makes valid and invalid conceptual designation easy to understand.

This is the Rope-Snake example:

<blockquote><poem>A coiled rope's speckled color and coiling are similar to those of a snake,
and when the rope is perceived in a dim area, the thought arises, “This is a snake.”
As for the rope, at that time when it is seen to be a snake,
the collection and parts of the rope are not even in the slightest way a snake.
Therefore, that snake is merely set up by conceptuality.</poem></blockquote>[http://www.katinkahesselink.net/tibet/dalai2.html]

This example is more often used when trying to help Buddhist philosophers and practitioners find the absence of inherent "I, me," but it is also helpful in the discussion of valid and invalid designation. If we refer back to Lama Tsongkhapa's guidelines, this rope cannot be validly designated a snake for several reasons. First off, at a later period of time and under different conditions, you will not designate that object as a snake, you will validly designate it as a rope based upon the socially agreed upon use of the term-concept rope. Therefore, a subsequent conventional consciousness in the same continuum of mind contradicts the object being currently known as a snake. Also, the object cannot fulfill the conventionally agreed upon function of a snake, so it violates the rule that the term-concept designated must stay within the agreed upon use of the term-concept. Since this is the case, according to the social arena in which the term "rope" means one thing and "snake" means something else, the use of the term-concept to designate and describe that experience is invalid.

As a side note, in the same way that there is nothing inherent to that object that is providing the snake identity, there is nothing inherent to that object which is providing a "rope" identity. The rope identity is something which is validly imputed later by a designating consciousness. Even after the rope is conceptually designated as a rope, there is no rope identity happening among the material parts of that object. From the side of the object, it is absent any inherent quality or conventional quality which forces us to label and experience that mere phenomena as a rope.

This is consequently why it is possible to misattribute the identity of a snake to a rope in the first place. This is also the reason the term-concept rope can be validly applied to a unique object of experience and cause that object (when there are no qualities which would socially or ultimately disqualify that object from being a rope) to exist and function as a rope conventionally. This discussion may also provide evidence for the case that Prasangika and Svatantrika have huge differences. There is a difference between the mere absence of inherence and valid conventional existence according to the Prasangika, and the absence of true existence and existence according to characteristics of the Svatantrika.


== See also ==
== See also ==
Line 90: Line 25:
{{reflist}}
{{reflist}}


==Additional Reading==
==Commentaries==
* [http://books.google.com/books?id=JBsWlwkjN2EC The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment], Vol. 3 by Tsong-Kha-Pa, Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9
* Brunnholzl, Karl. ''The Center of the Sunlit Sky.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2004.
* Lopez, Donald. ''A Study of Svatantrika''. Snow Lion Publications. Ithaca, New York. (1987)
* Lopez, Donald. ''A Study of Svatantrika''. Snow Lion Publications. Ithaca, New York. (1987)
* della Santina, Peter. ''Madhyamaka Schools in India''. Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi. (1986)
* della Santina, Peter. ''Madhyamaka Schools in India''. Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi. (1986)

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Prasaṅgika ("Consequentialist") Madhyamaka is a Tibetan category of Madhyamaka viewpoints ascribed to the Indian author Buddhapalita and his defender Candrakirti. The viewpoints ascribed to Buddhapalita's critic, Bhavaviveka is termed Svatantrika ("Autonomous").

Buddhapalita's commentary on Nagarjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā used the method of logical consequence (prasanga in Sanskrit) to refute the Samkhyas. Bhavaviveka criticized this approach as he preferred autonomous arguments.

Buddhapalita's Rebuttal of the Samkhyas

In his rebuttal of Samkhya, Buddhapalita states:

Entities do not arise from their own intrinsic nature, because their arising would be pointless and because they would arise endlessly. For entities that [already] exist as their own intrinsic nature, there is no need to arise again. If they were to arise despite existing [already], there would be no time when they do not arise; [but] that is also not asserted [by the Enumerators]. [1]


Bhavaviveka's Critique of Buddhapalita

Bhavaviveka did not like the consequentialist manner in which Buddhapalita argued against the Samkhyas. Bhavaviveka states:

This [refutation by Buddhaplita] is inappropriate, (1) because he does not state a reason and an example, (2) because he fails to eliminate the [possible] flaws adduced by others [against him], and (3) because it is a [consequential] statement that affords an opportunity [for objections by an opponent]. The [third reason] means that, through reversal of the meaning stated [in Buddhaplita’s consequence], a probandum and a reason with reversed meanings would appear. Thus, entities would arise from something other, because their arising would be fruit-ful and because their arising would come to an end. [However, this] would contradict [Buddhaplita’s own] position. [2]


Candrakriti's Defense of Buddhapalita and Rebuttal of Bhavaviveka's Critique

In the Prasannapadā, Candrakırti declares that Bhvaviveka’s entire critique of Buddhaplita is unfounded. He starts with the former’s accusation (1) that the latter “does not state a reason and an example.” He says that the Centrists’ own system does not state a reason and an example that are established through valid cognition but that this is not a fault. He explains why by saying that the system of Centrists means to be free from all discursiveness—including valid cognition—on both levels of reality. This does not prevent Centrists from stating reasons and examples that are acknowledged by others. However, in the case of the Enumerators who assert that entities arise from themselves, it is possible to put an end to their wrong ideas by just confronting them with the internal contradictions of their position.[3] Thus, the Enumerators are challenged by their own consequences that demonstrate the internal contradictions of their system and have the same effect of negating arising from itself as the autonomous arguments and examples of someone who chooses the Autonomist approach.[4] Candrakırti gives examples from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, to show that Nagarjuna also eliminates the theses of others mostly by means of adducing consequences.[5]


See also

References

  1. ^ Brunnholzl, Karl. The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 393.
  2. ^ Brunnholzl, Karl. The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 394.
  3. ^ Brunnholzl, Karl. The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 396.
  4. ^ Brunnholzl, Karl. The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 396.
  5. ^ Brunnholzl, Karl. The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Snow Lion Publications. 2004, pg. 404.

Additional Reading

  • Brunnholzl, Karl. The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Snow Lion Publications. 2004.
  • Lopez, Donald. A Study of Svatantrika. Snow Lion Publications. Ithaca, New York. (1987)
  • della Santina, Peter. Madhyamaka Schools in India. Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi. (1986)
  • Shantarakshita and Ju Mipham (2005) The Adornment of the Middle Way Padmakara Translation ISBN 1-59030-241-9

[clarification needed][clarification needed]

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