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The '''Spanish transition to democracy''' ({{lang-es|Transición española a la democracia}}), or simply '''the Transition''' ({{lang-es|La Transición}}) refers to the restoration of democracy in [[Spain]] after the death of [[Francisco Franco]] in 1975. The transition began shortly after Franco's death on 20 November 1975, while its completion has been variously said to be marked by the [[Spanish Constitution of 1978]], the failure of [[23-F|an attempted coup]] on 23 February 1981, or the electoral victory of the [[Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]] (PSOE) on 28 October 1982. Though faced with political and economic crises<ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/24/world/after-franco-s-death-spain-returned-to-turmoil.html AFTER FRANCO'S DEATH, SPAIN RETURNED TO TURMOIL] by [[Serge Schmemann]], ''[[The New York Times]]'', February 24, 1981</ref> at the time, the transition to democracy was one of the factors that allowed Spain to join the [[European Economic Community]] and [[NATO]]. |
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== Political role of Juan Carlos I == |
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Francisco Franco came to power in 1939 following the [[Spanish Civil War]] and ruled as a dictator until his death in 1975. In 1969, he designated [[Juan Carlos I of Spain|Prince Juan Carlos]], grandson of Spain's former king, [[Alfonso XIII]], as his official successor. For the next six years, Prince Juan Carlos initially remained in the background during public appearances and seemed ready to follow in Franco's footsteps. Once in power as [[King of Spain]], however, he facilitated the development of a [[constitutional monarchy]] as his father, Don [[Juan de Borbón]], had advocated since 1946. |
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The transition was an ambitious plan that counted on ample support both within and outside of Spain. [[Western world#The Cold War|Western]] governments, headed by the [[United States]], now favoured a Spanish [[constitutional monarchy]], as did many Spanish and international [[Economic liberalism|liberal]] [[capitalism|capitalists]].<!-- Most of those within Spain who had Franco's regime and many of those who had supported embraced Juan Carlos's plan as a chance for beneficial political and economical change.--> |
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Nevertheless, the transition proved challenging, as the spectre of the [[Spanish Civil War|Civil War]] (1936–1939) still haunted Spain. [[Francoist]]s on the [[far right]] enjoyed considerable support within the [[Spanish Army]], and people of the [[left-wing politics|left]] distrusted a king who owed his position to Franco. |
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* [http://openmultimedia.ie.edu/openproducts/caso_espana_i/caso_espana_i/index.html Tihe economy during the transition] |
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The realisation of the democratic project required that the leftist opposition restrain its own most radical elements from provocation, and that the army refrain from intervening in the political process on behalf of Francoist elements within the existing government. |
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[[Juan Carlos I of Spain|King Juan Carlos]] began his reign as head of state without leaving the confines of Franco's legal system. As such, he swore fidelity to the Principles of the ''[[Falange|Movimiento Nacional]]'', the sole legal party of the Franco era; took possession of the crown before the Francoist ''[[Cortes Generales#The Cortes Generales under the Franco's regime (1939-1978)|Cortes Generales]]''; and respected the [[:es:Ley Orgánica del Estado|''Ley Orgánica del Estado'']] (Organic Law of the State) for the appointment of his first [[head of government]]. Only in his speech before the ''Cortes'' did he indicate his support for a transformation of the Spanish political system. |
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== First government of Adolfo Suárez (July 1976 - June 1977) == |
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[[File:Adolfo Suarez 03 cropped.jpg|thumb|Adolfo Suárez in 1981.]] |
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[[Torcuato Fernández-Miranda]], the president of the Council of the Kingdom, obtained [[Adolfo Suárez]]'s placement on the new list of three candidates for King Juan Carlos to choose to become the new head of government. The king chose Suárez because he felt he could meet the challenge of the difficult political process that lay ahead: persuading the Cortes (Spanish parliament), which was composed of installed [[Francoist]] politicians, to dismantle Franco's system. In this manner he would formally act within the Francoist legal system and thus avoid the prospect of military intervention in the political process. Suárez was appointed as the 138th Prime Minister of Spain by Juan Carlos on 3 July 1976, a move opposed by leftists and some centrists given his Francoist history. |
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As Prime Minister, Suárez quickly presented a clear political program based on two points: |
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* The development of a ''Law for Political Reform'' that, once approved by the Cortes and the Spanish public in a referendum, would open the constituent process for creating a liberal democracy in Spain. |
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* A call for democratic elections in June 1977 to elect a Cortes charged with drawing up a new democratic constitution. |
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This program was clear and unequivocal, but its realization tested the political capacity of Suárez. He had to convince both the opposition to participate in his plan and the army to allow the process to run uninterrupted, and at the same time needed to bring the situation in the [[Basque Country (autonomous community)|Basque Country]] under control. |
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Despite these challenges, Suárez's project was carried out without delay between July 1976 and June 1977. In this short period of time Suárez had to act on many fronts to achieve his aims. |
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=== The Law for Political Reform === |
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[[File:MITING CNT MONTJUÏC.jpg|thumb|200px|left|[[Federica Montseny]] speaks at the meeting of the [[w:Confederación Nacional del Trabajo|CNT]] in Barcelona in 1977 after 36 years of exile.]] |
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The draft of the Law for Political Reform (''Ley para la Reforma Política'') was written by [[Torcuato Fernández-Miranda|Don Torcuato Fernández-Miranda]], speaker of the Cortes, who handed it over to the Suárez government in July 1976. The project was approved by the Suarez Government in September 1976.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928130049/http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm|archivedate=28 September 2007|title=Historia de un Cambio|publisher=Ayuntamiento de Dúrcal}}</ref> To open the door to parliamentary democracy in Spain, this legislation could not simply create a new political system by eliminating the obstacles put in place by the Franco regime against democracy: it had to liquidate the Francoist system through the Francoist Cortes itself. Throughout the month of November the Cortes, under the able presidency of Fernández-Miranda, debated this law, which it ultimately approved with 425 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions. |
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The Suárez government sought to gain further legitimacy for the changes through a popular referendum. On 15 December 1976, with a 77.72% participation rate, 94% of voters indicated their support for the changes. From this moment, it was possible to begin the electoral process (the second part of the Suárez program), which would serve to elect the deputies of the [[Constituent Cortes]], the body that was to be responsible for creating a democratic constitution.<ref>Jiménez-Díaz, José-Francisco (2016): “Adolfo Suárez González”, in Jiménez-Díaz, José-Francisco & Delgado-Fernández, Santiago -Editors-: ''Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975-1982)''. Nueva York: Nova Science Publishers, 2016, pp. 41-58.</ref> |
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With this part of his plan fulfilled, Suárez had to resolve a crucial issue: should he include the opposition groups who had not participated at the beginning of the transition? Suárez also had to deal with another delicate issue: coming to terms with the anti-Francoist opposition. |
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=== Relations of the Suárez government with the opposition === |
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Suárez adopted a series of measured policies to add credibility to his project. In July 1976 he issued a partial political amnesty, freeing 400 prisoners. He extended this in March 1977, and finally granted a blanket amnesty in May of the same year. In December 1976 the [[Tribunal de Orden Público]] (TOP), a sort of Francoist [[secret police]], was dissolved. In March 1977, the right to [[strike action|strike]] was legalized, with the right to [[trade union|unionize]] being granted the following month. Also in March a new electoral law (''Ley Electoral'') introduced the necessary framework for Spain's electoral system to be brought into accord with those of other countries that were [[liberal democracy|liberal]] [[parliamentary democracy|parliamentary democracies]]. |
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Through these and other measures of government, Suárez complied with the conditions that the opposition groups first demanded in 1974. These opposition forces met in November 1976 to create a platform of democratic organizations. |
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Suárez had initiated political contact with the opposition by meeting with [[Felipe González]], [[secretary general]] of the [[Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]] (PSOE), in August 1976. The positive attitude of the socialist leader gave further support for Suárez to carry forward his political project, but everyone clearly perceived that the big problem for the political normalization of the country would be the legalization of the [[Communist Party of Spain (main)|Communist Party of Spain]] (''Partido Comunista de España'', PCE), which had, at the time, more activists and was more organized than any other group in the political opposition. However, in a meeting between Suárez and the most important military leaders in September, the officers strongly declared opposition to the legalization of the PCE. |
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The PCE, for its part, acted ever more publicly to express its opinions. According to the Communists, the Law for Political Reform was anti-democratic, and, moreover, the elections for the Constituent Cortes should be called by a provisional government that formed part of the political forces of the opposition. The opposition did not show any enthusiasm for the Law for Political Reform. Suárez had to risk even more to involve the opposition forces in his plan. |
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In December 1976, the PSOE celebrated its 27th Congress in [[Madrid]], and began to disassociate itself from the demands of the PCE, affirming that it would participate in the next call for elections for the Constituent Cortes. At the beginning of 1977, the year of the elections, Suárez decided to confront the problem of legalizing the PCE. After the public indignation aroused by the [[1977 Massacre of Atocha|Massacre of Atocha]] in January 1977 against trade-unionists and Communists, Suárez decided to talk with PCE secretary general [[Santiago Carrillo]] in February. Carrillo's willingness to cooperate without prior demands and his offer of a "social pact" for the period after the elections pushed Suárez to take the riskiest step of the transition: the legalization of the PCE in April 1977. However, throughout this critical period the government began a strategy of providing greater institutional space to the [[Unión General de Trabajadores]] (UGT) Socialist union in comparison to the then Communist-oriented [[CCOO]]. The manner in which a unified trade union was strategically countered is an important feature of the Spanish transition as it limited radical opposition and created the basis for a fractured industrial relations system. |
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=== Relations of the Suárez government with the Spanish army === |
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Adolfo Suárez knew well that the "[[Búnker]]"—a group of hard-line Francoists led by [[José Antonio Girón]] and [[Blas Piñar]], using the newspapers ''[[El Alcázar]]'' and ''[[Arriba (newspaper)|Arriba]]'' as their mouthpieces— had close contacts with officials in the army and exercised influence over important sectors of the military. These forces could constitute an insurmountable obstacle if they brought about military intervention against political reform. |
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To resolve the issue, Suárez intended to support himself with a liberal group within the military, centered on General [[Díez Alegría]]. Suárez decided to give the members of this group the positions of authority with the most responsibility. The most notable personality of this faction within the army was General [[Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado]]. But in July 1976, the Vice President for Defense Affairs was General Fernando de Santiago, a member of a hardline group within the army. De Santiago had shown his restlessness before, during the first amnesty in July 1976. He had opposed the law granting the right to unionize. Suárez dismissed Fernando de Santiago and nominated instead Gutiérrez Mellado. This confrontation with General de Santiago caused a large part of the army to oppose Suárez, opposition that further intensified when the PCE was legalized. |
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Meanwhile, Gutiérrez Mellado promoted officials who supported political reform and removed those commanders of security forces (''[[Policía Armada]]'' and the ''[[Guardia Civil (Spain)|Guardia Civil]])'' who seemed to support preserving the Francoist regime. |
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Suárez wanted to demonstrate to the army that the political normalization of the country meant neither [[anarchy (word)|anarchy]] nor revolution. In this, he counted on the cooperation of Santiago Carrillo, but he could in no way count on the cooperation of terrorist groups. |
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=== Resurgence of terrorist activity === |
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{{see also|Neofascist terrorism in Spain}} |
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The Basque Country remained, for the better part of this period, in a state of political turbulence. Suárez granted a multi-stage amnesty for numerous Basque political prisoners, but the confrontations continued between local police and protesters. [[ETA (separatist group)|ETA]], which in the middle of 1976 seemed open to a limited truce after Franco's death, resumed armed confrontation again in October. 1978–1980 would be ETA's three deadliest years ever.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/acciones/estadistica07.jsp |title=Acciones Terroristas: Víctimas Policiales de ETA |publisher=La Guardia Civil}}</ref> But it was between December 1976 and January 1977 that a series of attacks brought about a situation of high tension in Spain. |
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The Maoist [[GRAPO]] (''Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre'') began its armed struggle by bombing public locations, and then continued with the kidnapping of two important figures of the regime: the President of the Council of the State [[José María de Oriol y Urquijo|José María de Oriol]], and General Villaescusa, President of the Superior Council of the Military Justice. From the right, during these kidnappings, members of the neo-fascist ''[[Triple A (Spain)|Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista]]'' [[1977 Massacre of Atocha|murdered five members of the PCE]], three of them labor lawyers, in an office on Atocha Street in Madrid in January 1977. |
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In the midst of these provocations, Suárez convened his first meeting with a significant number of opposition leaders, who published a condemnation of terrorism and gave their support to Suárez's actions. During this turbulent time, the Búnker capitalized on the instability and declared that the country was on the brink of chaos. |
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Despite the increased violence by the ETA and GRAPO, [[Spanish general election, 1977|elections]] for the [[Constituent Cortes]] were carried out in June 1977. |
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== First elections and the draft of the Constitution == |
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[[Image:TransicionCartelesCongreso1.jpg|200px|thumb|Political posters in an exhibition celebrating 20 years of the Spanish Constitution of 1978.]] |
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[[Spanish general election, 1977|The elections]] that were held on June 15, 1977, confirmed the existence of four important political forces at the national level. The votes broke down in the following manner: |
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*[[Democratic Centre Union (Spain)|Union of the Democratic Centre]] (UCD, ''Unión de Centro Democrático''): 34.61% |
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*[[Spanish Socialist Workers' Party]] (PSOE, ''Partido Socialista Obrero Español''): 29.27% |
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*[[Communist Party of Spain (main)|Communist Party of Spain]] (PCE, ''Partido Comunista de España''): 9.38% |
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*[[Popular Alliance (Spain)|Popular Alliance]] (AP, ''Alianza Popular''): 8.33%<ref>{{cite web |url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/spain/es_appen.html#table2 |title=Appendix A: Table 2. Selected Election Results for the Congress of Deputies, 1977-86 |work=Country Studies: Spain |publisher=Library of Congress}}</ref> |
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With the success of the [[Basque Nationalist Party]] (PNV, ''Partido Nacionalista Vasco'') and the [[Democratic Pact for Catalonia]] (PDC, ''Pacte Democrátic per Catalunya'') in their respective regions, [[Nationalisms and regionalisms of Spain|nationalist]] parties also began to show their political strength in these elections. |
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The Constituent Cortes (elected Spanish parliament) began to draft a constitution in the middle of 1977. In 1978 the [[Moncloa Pact]] was passed: an agreement amongst politicians, political parties, and trade unions to plan how to operate the economy during the transition.<ref>[[Gonzalo Garland]] study case Spain: from Transition to modern times http://openmultimedia.ie.edu/OpenProducts/caso_espana_i/caso_espana_i/pdf/pdf_casoespana.pdf</ref> The [[Spanish Constitution of 1978]] went on to be approved in a referendum on December 6, 1978. |
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== Governments of the UCD == |
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<!-- Deleted image removed: [[Image:Tejero golpe.jpg|right|thumb|300px|Antonio Tejero, breaking into the Congress of Deputies 23 February 1981, attempting a coup. Below to the right is the defense minister [[Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado]].]] --> |
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The UCD received a [[Plurality (voting)|plurality]], but not an [[absolute majority]], in both the June 1977 and [[Spanish general election, 1979|March 1979]] elections. To exercise power, the UCD had to form [[Coalition government|parliamentary coalitions]] with other political parties. |
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[[File:ToledoElecciones15Jun77.jpg|275px|thumb|[[Toledo, Spain|Toledo]] during the election process in 1977.]] |
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The government spent much of its time from 1979 working to hold together the many factions within the party itself, as well as their coalitions. In 1980, the Suárez government had for the most part accomplished its goals of transition to democracy and lacked a further clear agenda. Many UCD members were fairly conservative and did not want further change. For example, a bill to legalize divorce caused much dissension inside the UCD, in spite of being supported by the majority of the populace {{Citation needed|date=February 2007}}. The UCD coalition fell apart. |
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The clashes among the several factions inside the party eroded Suárez's authority and his role as leader. The tension exploded in 1981: Suárez resigned as the head of government, and [[Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo]] was appointed, first to lead the new cabinet and later to the presidency of the UCD; [[social democrats]] led by [[Francisco Fernández Ordóñez]] defected from the coalition, later joining the [[PSOE]], while [[Christian democracy|Christian democrats]] left to form the [[Democratic Popular Party (Spain)|People's Democratic Party]]. |
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While the democratic normalization had succeeded in convincing [[ETA (pm)]], the "political-military" faction of ETA, to abandon arms and enter parliamentary politics, it did not stop the continuation of terrorist attacks by [[ETA (m)]] ("ETA Military"; later simply "ETA"), and, to a lesser extent, by GRAPO. Meanwhile, restlessness in various sections of the armed forces created fear of an impending [[military coup]]. The attempted coup known as [[23-F]], in which Lieutenant Colonel [[Antonio Tejero]] led an occupation by a group of ''[[Guardia Civil (Spain)|Guardia Civil]]'' of the [[Spanish Congress of Deputies|Congress of Deputies]] on the afternoon of 23 February 1981 failed, but demonstrated the existence of insurrectionary elements within the army. |
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== The PSOE in government == |
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Calvo Sotelo dissolved parliament and called elections for October 1982. In the 1979 election the UCD had achieved a plurality, but in 1982 it suffered a spectacular defeat. The [[Spanish general election, 1982|elections]] gave an absolute majority to the PSOE, which had already spent many years preparing its image of an alternative government. |
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At the 28th Congress of the PSOE (May 1979), secretary-general Felipe González resigned rather than ally with the strong revolutionary elements that seemed to dominate the party. A special congress was called that September, and realigned the party along more moderate lines, renouncing [[Marxism]] and allowing González to take charge once more. |
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Throughout 1982, the PSOE confirmed its moderate orientation and brought in the social democrats who had just broken from the UCD. |
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Winning an absolute majority in parliament in two consecutive elections ([[Spanish general election, 1982|1982]] and [[Spanish general election, 1986|1986]]), and exactly half the seats in [[Spanish general election, 1989|1989]], allowed the PSOE to legislate and govern without establishing pacts with the other parliamentary political forces. In this way, the PSOE could make laws to achieve the goals of its political program, "''el cambio''" ("the change"). At the same time, the PSOE led many local and regional administrations. This comfortable political majority allowed the PSOE to give the country a long period of tranquility and stability, after the intense years of the transition. |
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== See also == |
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* [[1977 Massacre of Atocha]] |
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* [[Metapolitefsi|Greece transition to democracy (Metapolitefsi)]] |
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* [[Chilean transition to democracy]] |
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* [[Portuguese transition to democracy]] |
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* [[Spanish 1977 Amnesty Law]] |
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* [[Spanish society after the democratic transition]] |
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* [[Turno pacifico]] |
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==References== |
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{{Reflist}} |
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==Bibliography== |
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* Josep M. Colomer. Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy. The Spanish Model, Edward Elgar, 1995. |
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* Daniele Conversi. 'The smooth transition: Spain's 1978 Constitution and the nationalities question', ''National Identities'', vol. 4, no 3, November 2002, pp. 223–244 |
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* Richard Gunther ed. Politics, Society, and Democracy: The Case of Spain. Boulder, Co.: Westview. |
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* Paul Preston. The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. London: Routledge, 2001. |
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* Javier Tusell. Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy. London: Blackwell, 2007. |
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*''[http://www.adurcal.com/iu/historia/historia_de_un_cambio.htm Historia de un Cambio]'' (in [[Spanish Language|Spanish]]). Retrieved on August 24, 2006. |
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* [[Gonzalo Garland]]. Spain: from Transition to modern times, Instituto de Empresa, 2010. |
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* José-Francisco Jiménez-Díaz & Santiago Delgado-Fernández -Editors-: ''Political Leadership in the Spanish Transition to Democracy (1975-1982)''. Nueva York: Nova Science Publishers, 2016 (Series: Political Leaders and Their Assessment). |
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== External links == |
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*[http://countrystudies.us/spain/25.htm LOC Country Studies-Spain Post-Franco Era] |
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*[http://www.voicesofthetransition.net/ Voices of the Transition - A Political History of Spain, 1975-1982] |
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*[http://nick.frejol.org/democracy-and-after/ Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy and After, 1975–2007] |
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*[http://openmultimedia.ie.edu/openproducts/caso_espana_i/caso_espana_i/index.html The economy during the transition] |
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