Talk:Boeing 737 MAX groundings

Lead problem

You are very active on the article and have made many edits to it. I have made almost no changes to your many edits in the body of the article. However, you have repeatedly made significant rewrites to the Introduction of the article, which is a very important section, and should remain relatively stable, with only incremental and necessary changes. I have accepted a lot of your changes to the Introduction, but I have also found many of your edits to that highly visible section to be problematic, because of issues with accuracy, loss of information, pov and grammar, and therefore I have reverted or revised those changes. Your edit summary about not respecting another's work is false and amounts to a personal attack, which I urge you to refrain from doing. You can be Bold in making your preferred changes, but I advise using more restraint if editing the Introduction. DonFB (talk) 00:13, 28 September 2019 (UTC)

@DonFB:, we have been involved for as long as the planes have been grounded; I have observed a repetitive pattern of you pasting over a preferred version of the lead without using the undo function, retaining some changes while losing others-- it seems to be provocative, dominating, your remark about it being the most visible section, says why you would be compelled to do this and pay little attention to the rest of the article-- why would anyone play with a microphone that isn't broadcast on air?

Thank you for starting the discussion; my gripe with your so-tagged ce edits is that, each time the lede grows, you trim it out in a way that our "pizza" has a little bit of all toppings-- like a quarter piece of pepperoni, making me question the importance of such statements as "airlines canceled thousands of flights" -- over 180 days and 390 aircraft that comparison looks like a daily figure, not over six months. Insignificant compared to Boeing's quarterly loss of 4 billion dollars. If the lede is to be useful there has to be an importance filter. Shencypeter (talk) 01:11, 28 September 2019 (UTC)

You mention "a preferred version of the lead". In fact, I have noticed that the lead seems to be "preferred" by all other editors without change for many days or longer, and suddenly you rewrite it, sometimes with the loss of information (especially dates) or with grammar, usage or clarity problems. As soon as you rewrite it, the lead becomes "preferred"? Depending on problems that I see in the rewrite, I either revise or Undo, whichever is more efficient. If the lead is stable for many days or longer, I believe the kind of sudden rewrite you have repeatedly done is problematic. Your changes often appear to be primarily for stylistic reasons. Some of those changes are fine, but not all of them. If I see a loss of information (for example, the 'who' of 'who grounded?'), I will restore the information when I believe it to be vital to an informative lead. Fact-wise, airlines did cancel thousands of flights within weeks of grounding; I believe that's an important and very clear metric which shows the impact of the groundings, and should be included explicitly in the lead. You said cancellations are "insignificant" compared to Boeing's financial loss. That's a non-sequitur: both impacts are significant; they're not directly comparable, nor need they be; they're two separate negative aspects of the groundings, and both are worthy of mention in the lead. Since you used the word "provocative," I'll respond that your repeated rewrites of a generally stable lead could be construed as provocative; my editing responses are intended to restore some, perhaps not all, of the pre-existing text that was supported by consensus, as indicated by stability of the text over a preceding period of many days or longer, until you changed it. You're probably not aware of edits I made to other parts of the article before you began contributing to it. DonFB (talk) 02:29, 28 September 2019 (UTC)

@DonFB: At least three other editors "Thanked" me when I revert you. You have never allowed time to see how others think of the lead. By now the grounding article should summarize the scandal and how it compares to unforeseen problems with other jets that led to grounding and repairs, not elementary information like "March 11 and March 13" or the FAA being the Max's certifier. Your most recent contribution added "After the first accident" and " After the second accident " despite the last paragraph begins with "Following the grounding orders".......... You have repeatedly gamed the system by copy-pasting old content to conceal the fact that you are reverting major parts of other people's work. And that is dominating and unacceptable. Shencypeter (talk) 23:43, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

I also have been thanked multiple times for reverting or revising your changes to the lead. I don't agree with your concept that basic information can now be omitted from the lead. This is an encyclopedia, not a newspaper. When you want to make changes to the lead, I recommend a more incremental approach. . DonFB (talk) 02:25, 2 November 2019 (UTC)

An example of the kind of problem introduced by your over-eagerness to repeatedly rewrite the lead is seen in the very first phrase, incorrectly punctuated, of your recent revision: "On March 10 2019". Aviation authorities did not begin grounding on that date, as shown by referenced entries in the "Regulators" table of the article. China was the first regulator, on March 11; Ethiopian Airlines was first to ground, on March 10. Both facts formerly resided in the lead until you eliminated them. Therefore, I also recommend that you be more careful, both with facts and writing. DonFB (talk) 03:03, 2 November 2019 (UTC)

---

I'm not really following this article day-to-day, I find it bloated and evolving too fast. It has to maintain a balance between brevity and precision, and right now it seems it doesn't achieve either one. The lead section is a good example. It's always changing and often too long. It needs stability and conciseness. I don't know which editor is right or wrong and I don't care, I care about the resulting text. The lead section should be a summary of the article body, not the place for each minute detail. I hope for the end of the MAX crisis soon, to be able to examine the whole article without it changing before the end of my read.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 07:15, 2 November 2019 (UTC)

---

Take it easy guys! That the lead section is always changing and often too long shows the editor's creativity and it has also three good reasons: 1. The problem to be described is a complicated type, which involves a sophisticated engineering feature (MCAS) of a best selling aircraft (MACS or MAX) from the world largest manufacturer. 2. The timeline is quite long with many milestones worth to be mentioned => difficult to shorten it! 3. Jargon is to be avoided so that editors have to use plain English as short as possible to describe the point 1 => really a challenge! So, just have fun in completing the article before the end of the MAX crisis!! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2001:8F8:1749:7D64:257F:13DC:878C:5C65 (talk) 12:04, 2 November 2019 (UTC)

Inline remark from DonFB: For your consideration: I included "appointed by the FAA" purely to be informative, though I recognize it could conceivably be construed as casting doubt. Not a huge deal; however, omitting its origin (from the Intro) can give impression that it is a standing organization, rather than, in fact, one convened ad hoc by the FAA for the express purpose of reviewing MCAS (and reached conclusions unfavorable to the FAA, belying idea that it might be biased in favor of the agency.)

This is just one example where multiple editors have preferred brevity while you keep restoring it. I made an anchored link to how JATR was formed instead. Shencypeter (talk) 17:25, 29 November 2019 (UTC)

You misunderstand the issue. An editor expressed no objection related to brevity; the editor evidently felt that "appointed by the FAA" could imply doubt might exist whether JATR would be neutral. I believed those four words added to the reader's understanding of the investigation, but I'm not insisting that they be restored to the lede. I have, however, made some new edits to the lede, correcting an inaccuracy you introduced, and claritying the timeline of events that your edits made less clear. DonFB (talk) 09:08, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Your trimming of Seattle Times is inexcusable, the JATR also cited that the FAA was unaware of the changes.Shencypeter(talk) 23:20, 4 January 2020 (UTC)

I trimmed it, because it's the kind of addition you chronically make during your repeated rewrites of the lede that have contributed to the section becoming too long. I've accepted your revert, but corrected an inaccuracy in your text. DonFB (talk) 01:36, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

@Shencypeter: What made you write "In March, Seattle Times reported that MCAS gained more power and lost safeguards after it was certified. " That is not my understanding. Didn't MCAS gain more power concurrent with the flight testing process, not after certification. An aircraft system such as the Flight Control Computer with its software cannot be changed after certification without a change impact analysis followed by re-certification of the updated software. What is the exact citation of the Seattle Times ? --Pierre5018 (talk) 23:34, 4 January 2020 (UTC)

Yes, the exact citation from the Seattle Times needs to be fully understood. I assume you meant even after certification. This should all be fully explained in the main body of the article anyway. Martinevans123 (talk) 23:42, 4 January 2020 (UTC)

Full text is here: the FAA was oblivious to a late change of MCAS to emcompass low speed flight. Originally MCAS relied on an AOA sensor and high G-force.

[ https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/] Shencypeter (talk) 00:02, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

@Shencypeter: I do not read that changes were made after certification. What happened is that Boeing submitted a safety analysis document to the FAA and later changed the requirements and principle of operation without updating the analysis. However all of this probably happened before certification. Please find exact reference or delete. Let's not make assumptions about the sequence of events.

We could probably write "after approval of the initial version of MCAS". Moreover, NYTimes wrote "While the F.A.A. officials in charge of training didn’t know about the changes, another arm of the agency involved in certification did. But it did not conduct a safety analysis on the changes.

The F.A.A. had already approved the previous version of MCAS. And the agency’s rules didn’t require it to take a second look because the changes didn’t affect how the plane operated in extreme situations." --Pierre5018 (talk) 01:21, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

Pierre, do you accept my recent revision: "changes not adequately communicated to the FAA during certification"? DonFB (talk) 01:38, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

@DonFB: Don, I had written summary statements about the shortcomings of the system safety assessment, and sadly those were eventually erased by other editors. In my opinion, the safety analysis not being updated to the a final configuration of MCAS is of top importance. It is not only a problems of poor communication between the applicant Boeing ant the certification authority FAA. The core issue is that the safety assessment wasn't adequate. Per the JATR report, the process did not satisfy the objectives of SAE ARP 4754A.

"Recommendation R8.12: The FAA should ensure that agreement of any limited application of a development assurance process includes the requirement for the applicant’s safety analysis processes to satisfy the ARP 4754A safety assessment objectives. o Observation O8.12-A: The limited application of a development assurance process agreed between the FAA and Boeing did not adequately consider the applicant’s safety analysis process and how that integrates with the tailored development assurance process for complex and integrated systems."--Pierre5018 (talk) 02:02, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

Yikes, a classic example of impenetrable bureaucratic gobbledygook. Anyway, hopefully my adjustment will work; I'm also amenable to your suggestion: "after approval of the initial version of MCAS". I think we agree the changes did not happen after certification, which I also cannot find in the sources, but during the process. DonFB (talk) 02:24, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

I don't understand what is your continued obsession to suppress the lead content ambiguously.

Boeing released more than 100 pages of internal messages on Jan. 9. In the communications, provided to the Federal Aviation Administration, lawmakers and the public, employees talked about pushing regulators and airlines — including Lion Air, the carrier whose 737 Max first crashed in October 2018 — to approve the new planes without requiring pilots to undergo simulator training. Other workers raised safety concerns and complained about lax standards.

In one of the messages, from April 2017, one Boeing employee told another, “This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys.” Another showed a Boeing employee hopeful they could “gang up” on regulators and steer them “in the direction we want.” Boeing, earlier this month, said the messages “do not reflect the company we are and need to be, and they are completely unacceptable.” Shencypeter (talk) 23:39, 1 February 2020 (UTC)

Correct. And very little of that information was included in your unhelpful change to the lede. Regarding "obsession": you are the person who chronically changes the lede, all too often introducing wrong or unsourced information. Numerous of those edits have been reverted by other editors. You can edit anything you want here, but I note that 64 percent of your total edits are to this article, so you might look in the mirror when it comes to "obsession". DonFB (talk) 00:01, 2 February 2020 (UTC)

DC-10 groundings

Hi. Re these groundings there is a suggestion from sources of problems with certification procedures, echoing findings related to DC-10 groundings in the 1970s, which is important information to include in the article.

However.

From the given links and some more ferreting about I couldn't identify a source that groups the three DC-10s (as they have been grouped here), nor any source connecting that group of three to the "blue ribbon panel" written about here, nor further linking that to the current 737 Max issues. For us to select these three incidents and present them as direct precursors of the blue ribbon panel's criticisms of government and then to contrast that with the subject of this article when no reliable source does so, is WP:SYNTHESIS even if it's true.

The separately linked and presented items of information are highly pertinent and need to be appropriately woven into the article, probably the Certification inquiries section would be the place.

It's obvious that the "See also" section is not the place for it. The "See also" section is for "A bulleted list of internal links..." with (maybe) "a brief annotation". Not a paragraph of editorial in progress linking three articles and externally sourced. Someone remove it, shape it nicely, and pop it in the right place please? Cheers! Captainllama (talk) 21:36, 23 October 2019 (UTC)

Hi Capt'n, A subsection under reactions by experts could be a suitable place. The subsection could refer to articles by experts linking the DC-10 with the MAX.--Pierre5018 (talk) 02:55, 24 October 2019 (UTC)

The relevance of the DC-10 is not the Chicago accident of 1979 but The Windsor Incident of 1972 where a cargo door came off a DC-10 in flight resulting in the aircraft almost crashing. After the incident the FAA was going to make an Airworthiness Directive (AD) ordering the cargo door design to be fixed but in a 'gentleman's agreement' with McDonnell Douglas the AD - with-which compliance would have been mandatory - was changed to an advisory only, with the result that a DC-10 crashed in Paris two years later, after a cargo door blew open in flight.

An AD in 1972 would have effectively grounded each DC-10 until the doors could be modified, but McDonnell Douglas would have lost money, so they persuaded the FAA to make the requirement non-urgent.

If an AD had been issued, as was required for such an incident with such drastic safety implications, the deaths in 1974 would not have occurred. The costly litigation resulting from the crash effectively led to the decline of McDonnell Douglas such that it was unable to afford the development of any entirely new passenger aircraft designs. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.172.212 (talk) 10:39, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

Fail to find any relevance to the MAX from something that happened in the last century and a different company, have we actually any reliable sources that link MAX and DC-10, if not it has no place. MilborneOne (talk) 13:48, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

The relevance is in the current accusations of the FAA not doing its job, Re; the 737 Max, and thereby allegedly allowing an unsafe aircraft to carry passengers resulting in several hundred avoidable deaths. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.172.212 (talk) 16:05, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

But that has nothing to do with decison many decades ago, you need a reliable source to link the actions taken over the DC-10 and the 737 MAX. MilborneOne (talk) 16:17, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

I think See Also should focus on airliner groundings--the subject of this article--not on accident causes. Articles on similar causes can be linked at the individual accident articles. DonFB (talk) 20:18, 1 November 2019 (UTC)

Clip from a new Channel 4 documentary showing what the pilots had to cope with, here: [1] The difficulty in operating the manual trim is the factor that was not replicated in the original simulator software and had to be upgraded with a patch after the Ethiopian accident.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 12:14, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Cargo doors blowing off are not really comparable with hidden software that changes flight control logic. Martinevans123 (talk) 12:34, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Perhaps not, but both occurred on aircraft that had supposedly been 'certified' as 'safe' by the FAA. And in both cases the FAA allegedly 'bowed to pressure' from the manufacturer.

... aviation certification authorities exist to ensure the safety of the aircraft crews and travelling public, not to assist a company in making money from a particular aircraft design. As it is, here both the certifying authority, and the manufacturer, have in effect shot themselves in the foot, and will be lucky if the rest of the world is willing to take them at their word for the foreseeable future. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 12:44, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

You make a perfectly valid point. Maybe this could be brought out somewhere in the text? Martinevans123 (talk) 12:57, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Possibly, but I prefer to leave that to others to decide. Unfortunately for both the organisations concerned, I suspect their troubles may not yet be over.

The FAA (and CAA before it) has a dual mandate that has historically been subject to discussion and debate: the agency's mandate is both to promote and regulate air commerce. So, although the FAA does not literally "assist a company in making money from a particular aircraft design", the agency, according to its founding legislation, has two goals that are in tension and probably, at times, in conflict with each other. I believe "foster" was the term used in the first enabling legislation of 1926. The FAA act of 1958 explicitly uses the words "promote" and "promotion" and "regulation". In any case, if an explicit linkage in the article text is made between grounding of the DC 10 (or any U.S. grounding order) and the MAX case, that comparison must have RS referencing. DonFB (talk) 14:16, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Don't fret. I'm sure the Donald will make it all better. Martinevans123 (talk) 14:31, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

The point about the DC-10 is that it wasn't grounded after the Windsor Incident, and as a result over 300 people died. It wasn't grounded because the manufacturer persuaded the FAA not to ground it, but instead to give the manufacturer and airlines a time period in which to allow the modifications to be made. The THY aircraft that crashed near Paris supposedly had had all the required door modifications incorporated when it left the McDonnell Douglas factory - it was delivered to Turkish Airlines new. Upon examination of the wreckage however it was discovered that they hadn't all been carried out. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 14:50, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

So clearly has no relevance to the MAX grounding. MilborneOne (talk) 17:37, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Both incidents might be seen as relevant to the topic of aircraft certification, generally, in the USA? Martinevans123 (talk) 17:46, 30 November 2019 (UTC)

Quite so. The current controversy is not confined solely to the aircraft themselves, but to the method by which commercial air transport aeroplanes are certificated as safe in the US. It is because of this controversy that the various other aviation authorities are currently declining to accept the FAA's word when it comes to the 737 Max aircraft and are instead insisting on performing their own separate and impartial checks. This situation is a result of changes in the certification system introduced independently by the US in 2013 by which manufacturers are allowed to effectively 'self-certify' new aircraft, a situation which, had it been widely known outside the US, would probably have led to this same 'lack of trust' situation earlier. [2]

The current certification systems as implemented by most of the rest of the world were devised in the 1920s to provide checks-and-balances such that (honest) mistakes in design and faulty manufacturing could be caught and corrected before the aircraft ever got near fare-paying passengers. At a stroke the US has negated their implementation of this impartial system in the eyes of the rest of the world.

Certification requirements are meant to ensure that an average pilot on an average day can operate the aeroplane to a high degree of safety, and the reason for this requirement is so that a company's highly-skilled test pilots, who get to fly any new aeroplane first, and who may become so used to a bad or potentially dangerous characteristic over time such that they no longer see it as a problem, are not the final judge of an aircraft being capable of being flown safely by other less-experienced pilots - who make up the bulk of the pilots out there.

The consequences of negating such a well-thought out and long-practised system, both in terms of lost lives, and in subsequent impact on a company's balance sheet, and reputation, should by now be self-evident. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 09:38, 8 December 2019 (UTC)

All true and makes it clear that mention of the pre-2013 DC-10 accidents are not relevant here. MilborneOne (talk) 10:48, 8 December 2019 (UTC)

Yet more unpleasant revelations from leaked manufacturer's e-mails in a NY Times article here: [3] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.164 (talk) 07:04, 10 January 2020 (UTC)

The NY Times article gives no indication as to the credentials of the sources of those emails and internal messages or that they have determined the authors to be authoritative sources of valid complaints. Does the janitor’s personal opinion on the airplane’s design hold the same weight as the Chief Engineer’s? The media has shown no discernment between the two—indeed that has been the media’s MO for the entire 737 MAX story—and Wikipedia seems to be following in their footsteps, resulting in Wiki information that is at best “fake news.” Pete.pereira (talk) 10:37, 19 January 2020 (UTC)

Which news articles specify a janitor's opinion as a source? Which text in this article is "fake"? The term "fake news" is as you've used it is a foolish demagogic epithet. Reasonable and intelligent people can discern between news in the National Enquirer (fake) and news in the Seattle Times or New York Times (legitimate). Recommended reading: wp:V, wp:RS. DonFB (talk) 02:32, 21 January 2020 (UTC)

Too long: Section Reactions to sub-article

Says it all. 2001:16B8:4877:7B00:AC25:D0A4:697F:8217 (talk) 12:07, 3 November 2019 (UTC)

AoA disagree alert: sources contradicting each other?

@Shencypeter: Is there a contradiction between sources that should be considered in the article ? --Pierre5018 (talk) 11:42, 13 November 2019 (UTC)

Transclusion of summary

I have transcluded the introduction from this article Boeing 737 MAX groundings into the section at page Boeing 737 MAX Worldwide groundings. This achieves the following:

• Reduces the length of the Boeing 737 MAX groundings section, which has been marked as overlong.
• Allows the overlength comment to be removed
• Ensures that the two articles Boeing 737 MAX and Boeing 737 MAX groundings are always coordinated and up to date and eited only in one place. Ex nihil ^(talk) : Ex nihil (talk) 14:04, 21 November 2019 (UTC)

Thanks man Shencypeter (talk) 16:54, 29 November 2019 (UTC)

Repeated activation

To: user 217.165.89.108: Your edit summary shows a misunderstanding of MCAS. Your summary was:

"The logic is that MCAS forced only once to a nosedive. The repetition was due to the counteract "climb/pitch-up" by the pilots".

Yes, pilots counteracted, but MCAS repeatedly activated after the pilot counteractions. MCAS did not "force only once". It repeatedly forced dives. This is a key element in the serious controversy over the the design and approval of MCAS. It did NOT act "once"; it acted Repeatedly, as explained by numerous sources cited in this article. The Introduction to the article should include this essential fact about MCAS and the accidents. DonFB (talk) 06:51, 10 December 2019 (UTC)

Yes, you are right! Actually, I wanted to say: it can be also seen that MCAS forced (only once) to a nosedive until crash and it would repeat the action as many times as the pilots tried to counteract. Mathematically it can be described (nosedive + climb + nosedive + climb + nosedive + climb + ... + climb + nosedive + climb + nosedive + climb) + nosedive => It is effectively only "one unstoppable nosedive". By the way, as you said "repetition is a key element", it could be actually applied also to MCAS functionality, i.e. to provide another MCAS "disable function" through repetition, e.g., three subsequent pilot's climb counteract additionally to pulling back on the control column. In case of the updated MCAS will be unintentionally activated again due to a defect on both AOA sensors (low possibility but consider that EASA requires triple redundancies), pilot will instinctively try to counteract nosedive with climbing as they might forget the standard recovery procedure in a panic situation, IMHO. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2001:8F8:1749:7F3D:45CB:6A6A:89EF:7217 (talk) 06:33, 11 December 2019 (UTC)

Glad that we now agree on the revised text. DonFB (talk) 06:56, 11 December 2019 (UTC)

Once activated the MCAS system operates for ten seconds followed by a five second pause, during which normal pitch control is handed back to the pilots. If then the AofA nose-high condition still persists (as will appear to be the case to the system if the AofA sensor is faulty or damaged) the sequence will then be repeated, i.e., ten seconds of MCAS on, followed by etc., .... [4] This mode of operation was only revealed by the manufacturer after the second accident.

BTW, the 737 Max only had one AofA sensor feeding MCAS as-built. The requirement for a second sensor was introduced after the Ethiopian Airlines accident.

For anyone who's interested, "FAA head testifies before House committee on Boeing 737 MAX concerns" here: [5] - although I can't say it makes for particularly edifying viewing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.140 (talk) 09:44, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

References

Article too long – discussion of possible splitting strategies

The {{too long}} tag has been added to this article again, and rightly so IMHO. I've tweaked the hidden note so as to direct discussion here in the hope of achieving consensus before anyone goes for a WP:BOLD (and likely contentious) split!

Some of the historical content (e.g. the timelines or the repeated return-to-service projections) could no doubt be condensed without losing anything important, but I think there is still too much information for a single article. The big question, then, is how best to organise the split. For me the main criterion (beside readability of the main article, of course) is that we need to avoid the risk of content being duplicated between the sub-articles – in other words, the split needs to be well-defined, so that there is little possibility of hesitation as to which content belongs in which sub-article. Suggestions welcome! Rosbif73 (talk) 07:42, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Suggest reversing the transclusion of Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which currently relies on this article, so that it contains details of its investigations and the grounding article highlights only the most important points from it. Shencypeter (talk) 09:58, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Not sure what you meant.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 11:10, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System was the first well-intended split that became an orphaned article. 80% of its content has been transcluded from here; it really should be the other way around, if we transclude at all. Organization Designation Authorization was also created from this article. We should not be defining what delegation is from within the groundings article anyway. Further, the ICAO conventions, below -- I've already hinted with a {{seealso}} linking to aviation accident analysis which could explain where the investigations are conducted. The snippet got restored. Shencypeter (talk) 13:39, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

It does not matter if only 1 article links to MCAS, it's not orphaned then. You are confusing moving content (cutting and pasting) and transcluding (automatic inclusion of an article part in another one), usually of the WP:LEAD section to avoid maintenance problems. It was the case initially for MCAS but not anymore. I'm not sure what the ICAO have anything to do with our discussion, the subject is to organize Wikipedia, not discuss its content.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 15:10, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

A simple methodology:

• Accidents (29k) should only have 1 paragraph briefly presenting each accident with a link to each article. The intro should be kept at minimum, most material should be moved to each accident article, as well as State investigations per ICAO convention
• Groundings (76k) the lists of regulators and airlines groundings should be moved to a new List of Boeing 737 MAX groundings
• Certification inquiries (34k) could be kept but should be simplified or expanded in a new Boeing 737 MAX Certification inquiries
• Systems (was Avionics): (76k) most MCAS material should be moved in the relevant Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. Other could be kept but most could go in MCAS too as they are closely related (the AoA obviously)
• Reactions (86k) should be summarised or split to a separate Reactions to the Boeing 737 MAX groundings
• Financial impact (39k) could be summarised or split to a separate Financial impact of the the Boeing 737 MAX groundings
• Return to service (56k) could be summarised or split to a separate Return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX

Of course not all splits are necessary, the order by size is 1. Reactions (86k) 2. (tie) Groundings and Systems(76k), 4. Return to service (56k) 5. Financial impact (39k) 6. Certification inquiries (34k) 7. Accidents (29k). 1., 2. and 3. should be done immediately. Note all have the approximate recommended size. And at least, some reserve from editors to avoid adding every little new article should be welcome, WP:NOTNEWS.--Marc Lacoste (talk) 11:10, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Reduction of nesting

I proceeded to elevate heading levels above unnecessary super headings, to ensure that each section's header is prominently displayed in bold-face in Desktop and Mobile.Shencypeter (talk) 01:04, 7 January 2020 (UTC)

Released internal Boeing messages that disparage 737 MAX, regulators

Hi all! There was attempt to put the internal Boeing messages released in January 2020, showing employee mockery of the aircraft and its regulators by saying "the MAX aircraft was designed by "..owns" and supervised by "...keys". Though it describes the situation before MAX crashes simply but precisely through figurative way so that it says more than our thousand words in the article, but it is obsolete and will have minimum effect on the current re-certification process, where the regulator has already revoked its authority to issue individual airworthiness certificate, i.e. they are not "...keys" any more but really take back the "main keys" to the regulation process. Furthermore the design owner are not more "..owns" as they are providing adequate access for the regulatory compliance. Furthermore the message is already reflected in phrase by editor Pierre: "...inadequately communicated the changes to the FAA, which poorly understood them" but also the body of article reflects the message in depth. This is my opinion as nobody (anonymous) and please feel free to give your expert opinions in order to come to best conclusion...ciao! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.200.162.14 (talk) 13:47, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I think one sentence about these messages is appropriate for the Lede. The issue is not whether the messages are "obsolete" and thus will not affect recertification, but rather, that they relate directly to the MAX, the grounded airplane, and are reported as representing a degraded safety culture at the company. DonFB (talk) 14:14, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

It is vital to include them because this is the history of how we got to here. Ex nihil ^(talk) : Ex nihil (talk) 15:55, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I see, score 3:0 for YES, it should be in the Lede! And I have to put it back as I am the one, who removed it. One question, are the internal messages same as the new batch of messages disclosed at the day the CEO resigned in December 2019: Boeing Discloses ‘Very Disturbing’ Messages on Max to FAA?87.200.162.14 (talk) 17:15, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I think messages just released are the same ones referred to, but not publicly quoted, earlier. Suggested text: "In January 2020, Boeing revealed derogatory messages exchanged by some of its employees about the FAA and the airplane's design and safety." DonFB (talk) 17:24, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

I put back the removed "mockery messages" with same formulation but in the different position / timeline: "In December 2019, Boeing ousted its CEO over mismanagement of the crisis and the same day released its internal messages to FAA showing employee mockery of the aircraft and its regulators." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.200.162.14 (talk) 04:03, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

"...inadequately communicated the changes to the FAA, which poorly understood them" - unfortunately this is only correct as regards the MCAS system, the leaked e-mails reveal that Boeing management and employees appear to have deliberately misled the FAA inspectors and their own airline customers in order to remove the requirement for simulator training, and this is I suspect the reason for the FBI's confiscation of these documents back in March-April 2019 pending possible criminal charges, it being a felony apparently, to lie to a federal (i.e. FAA) official. [6] [7] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.164 (talk) 10:22, 13 January 2020 (UTC)

"Boeing Persuaded Lion to Drop Simulator Training for 737 Max" - news item here: [8] and "Boeing Mocked Lion Air’s Calls for 737 Max Training Before Deadly Crash" here: [9]

One suspects that it is not a good idea to refer to your customer's crews as "idiots" if you want that airline customer to continue to buy more aeroplanes off you, especially when, after a horrendous crash(es), you then try and blame those same crews for being 'inadequately trained' when it was you yourself who had previously persuaded them not to receive more training that might have averted the accident(s).— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.164 (talk) 09:03, 14 January 2020 (UTC)

Government-speak in lede

Pierre, my purpose in using the "inadequately explained" phrasing was to try to avoid any further engineering-style text in the lede and simply to condense the issue to its simplest terms: inadequate communication, poor understanding. That wording covers the broad topic of the failure to update. With the re-addition of the analysis text, it is now redundant to have both sentences. I recognize you want more specific technical wording, but I believe bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo in the lede like, "development assurance objectives for civil aviation systems" is very reader-unfriendly and is not even informative, except to engineers and government bureaucrats who habitually use that kind of opaque langugage. A major reason why the lede keeps re-growing, like a salamander leg, is due to the repeated addition of overly dense government-speak, which should be confined (and explained) in the body of the article. DonFB (talk) 18:49, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

@DonFB:

Don, thanks for the message. Key points for the lede include: (1) MCAS was changed and the required engineering update to the safety analysis was not done; (2) safety analysis and other engineering processes were poorly executed and did not meet the objectives for developing aircraft systems, as required by law; (3) the engineering data was poorly communicated and understood by the certification authority. Your update only covered point (3). As to the mumbo jumbo, anyone familiar with certified avionics and flight systems understands "development assurance objectives for civil aviation systems". If you update the lede, please make sure that you cover (1) and (2).

Ok, let's look at the issues. 1) The required update was not done. Result: inadequate communication to FAA of the revised state of MCAS. 2) Safety analysis was poorly executed. This can be expressed far more simply than by relying on the unhelpful mouthful, "development assurance objectives for civil aviation systems". See below for my suggested wording. 3) Re: mumbo jumbo. You said: "anyone familiar with certified avionics and flight systems understands..." I'm sure you're correct about that, and you make my point precisely. My point, once again, is that the vast majority of readers of the lede section are not, in fact, people who are "familiar" with such things. Note carefully the following excerpt from the Wikipedia guideline, Make technical articles understandable: "the lead should not assume that the reader is well acquainted with the subject of the article". I will slightly extrapolate that idea as follows: In the lede, do not assume readers are familiar either with the overall subject, or with specific concepts in the subject.

Now, replacing government-speak with Plain English, we can have:

"Media and government investigations found that Boeing's documentation did not adequately explain MCAS to the FAA, which poorly understood the system, and Boeing's engineering on the MAX failed to meet regulatory standards."

DonFB (talk) 22:11, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

@DonFB: The order of importance is (1) not doing proper engineering and (2) communication to the FAA. It is not just about complying to standards, but failure to fully assess the hazards of MCAS and mitigating the risks.

Text suggestion:

"Media and government investigations found that Boeing failed to fully assess the hazards of MCAS and mitigate its risks. MCAS was redesigned with much more control authority, late changes that were not followed by an update to the safety analysis submitted for certification. Boeing's development assurance did not comply with the standards for civil aviation systems. The JATR questionned whether the MAX met the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Finally, Boeing did not adequately explain MCAS to the FAA, which in turn poorly understood it."--Pierre5018 (talk) 23:23, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

Pierre, the fact that FAA poorly understood them should be clear in the statements: that they are unaware. Besides we now have evidence that Boeing wanted to underplay MCAS and minimize training, it's abundantly clear that a lot of the technical aspects of certification were skipped during the Jedi mind tricks. Shencypeter (talk) 03:28, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

Pierre, you're correct about all those problems. We just don't have enough space in the lede to include so much detail. Our challenge is to summarize and condense the most important issues, and do it in ordinary language. DonFB (talk) 04:29, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

IMHO. no problem to briefly formulated the issues in the lede but please do not miss the precision, e.g. where can I read that FAA "poorly understood" the changes? Then, otherwise the mockery messages would only say: designed by "..owns" without - supervised by "....keys". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.200.162.14 (talk) 05:35, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

I'm reasonably satisfied with the wording at this moment <holds breath>. And I'm ok not including the "poorly understood" phrase in the lede, but if you want to see sources for that idea, search some of the media articles about the JATR report from around Sept-Oct 2019. DonFB (talk) 05:44, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

Safety analysis and delegation

@DonFB:, You wrote : "Investigations found that Boeing, under delegation from the FAA, did not properly analyze the safety of late design changes to MCAS nor adequately inform the FAA."

Aircraft or systems safety assessment is part of engineering done by the applicant (Boeing), not a task to be done by the certification authority (FAA). The document must be approved by the certification authority, or by its delegate. Safety analysis was not delegated, but its approval was. At least, this is my understanding.--Pierre5018 (talk) 21:22, 13 January 2020 (UTC)

Actually, that was written by another editor. I reverted to the earlier phrasing. I agree with your comment, that analysis is not delegated, but approval is. DonFB (talk) 21:27, 13 January 2020 (UTC)

"Panel Clears 737 MAX’s Safety-Approval Process at FAA " here: [10] and "Independent panel says process for certifying 737 Max was safe" here: [11]

This is likely to ensure that the UK CAA, EASA, and other international aviation authorities will insist on their own separate certification of every new US-produced commercial transport category aeroplane for the foreseeable future. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 09:08, 17 January 2020 (UTC)

That's just speculation. Buffs (talk) 21:32, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

"European and Middle Eastern aviation regulators plan to conduct their own certification reviews of the next new Boeing plane" here: [12] and here: [13] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 09:10, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

Former NTSB Chairman Jim Hall commenting on suspicions that Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, which crashed in 2009 due to the failure of a single sensor (i.e., a radio altimeter) feeding the flight control system, may be relevant to the current investigations, here: [14] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.147 (talk) 09:08, 23 January 2020 (UTC)