2002 Venezuelan coup attempt

File:Hugo Chavez in Guatemala.jpg

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.

The Venezuelan coup attempt of 2002 (11-13 April 2002) was a failed coup d'état against President Hugo Chávez. The military detained Chávez and installed businessman Pedro Carmona as transitional president, who by a decree dismantled political changes introduced under Chavez and promised to restore the previous system. After the decree Carmona was faced with pro-Chávez uprisings in Caracas and criticism from parts of his civilian allies and the military leadership, eventually forcing him to resign. The Presidential Guard, still loyal to Chávez, eventually retook the Miraflores presidential palace, leading to the re-installation of Chávez as president.

The coup was publicly condemned by Latin American nations (the Rio Group presidents were gathered together in San José, Costa Rica, at the time, and were able to issue a joint communiqué) and international organizations. The United States and Spain quickly acknowledged the Carmona government, but ended up condemning the coup after it had been defeated.

Background

Further information: [[:Bolivarian Revolution and Hugo Chávez]]

Chávez was first elected president in 1998. One of his campaign promises was to convene a new constitutional convention, and on 15 December 1999 he put the new Constitution of Venezuela to the voters in a referendum, which passed with 71.78% of the popular vote. Opposition to the Chávez government was particularly strong in the private media, the business community and among the upper and middle classes who feared losing economic and political power as a result of Chávez's reforms. The new policies of subsidizing basic foodstuffs, redistributing oil revenue and breaking-up large land estates were particularly contentious. Following the 1999 constitutional referendum, Chávez was reelected in 2000 under the terms of the new constitution.

Geopolitically, Venezuela under Chávez has shifted its alignment away from the United States in favor of more sovereignty and cooperation with other Latin American countries through, amongst other organisations, Mercosur. It forged links with Cuba, providing the island with 160,000 barrels (25,000 m³) of oil a day and assisting the nation's fledgling oil industry. In return, Venezuela received 10,000 doctors and other health care workers, to jump-start Chávez's effort (Barrio Adentro) to reduce infant mortality and the occurrence of treatable diseases. Private media companies and newspapers continued without censorship or state interference, despite their often virulent hostility to the government.

In early 2002, Chávez's attempts to end the functional independence of the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), to bring its oil revenues under state control were met with strong resistance from PDVSA officials and managers. The case of the PDVSA management received a great deal of attention from the private media. In February 2002, Chávez replaced several of PDVSA's top officials with people more in sympathy with his economic program. Tensions between the Chávez government and PDVSA management continued to escalate through March and early April, culminating on 8 April 2002, when Chávez fired seven top PDVSA executives (and several other managers of lesser status) during a televised address. The fired PDVSA managers received immediate support from the private media and the upper and middle classes.

Events leading up to the coup

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A still from footage showing pro-Chávez shooters on Puente Llaguno. Both sides still contest at whom shots were fired.

The first hints of disturbance emerged when Venezuela Air Force Colonel Pedro Vicente Soto and National Reserve Captain Pedro Flores Rivero led a small rally protesting the Chávez government's allegedly undemocratic and authoritarian practices. They were sent home in uniform and placed under investigation by a joint civilian and military board.

On 9 April 2002, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) — the country's largest trade-union federation, traditionally affiliated with the opposition Democratic Action (Acción Democrática) party, led by Carlos Ortega — called for a two-day strike. Fedecámaras joined the strike/lockout and called on all of its affiliated member businesses to shut down for 48 hours. Two days later, amid rapidly escalating tensions, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people marched to the PDVSA headquarters in defense of its recently dismissed management board. Unexpectedly, the organizers decided to re-route the march to Miraflores, the presidential palace, where a pro-Chávez demonstration was taking place. The march was re-routed without consultation with the Police, who legally had to approve the changed route, and in spite of protests from organisers from the pro-Chávez march who feared a confrontation. Twenty people were killed and more than 100 wounded, with victims on both sides.

There is no consensus as to who was responsible for the deaths on 11 April 2002, and this remains one of the most controversial issues in Venezuelan politics today. The opposition version of events puts the blame on Chávez, or at least on his supporters. Several private television channels in Venezuela showed footage of people using handguns to shoot from the pro-Chávez counter-march being held on Puente Llaguno, an overpass that crosses one of central Caracas's busiest avenues; it is unclear who they are shooting at but the commentary and juxtaposition with separate video of the dead made for a clear story. These shooters were four pro-Chávez political activists identified as Rafael Cabrices, Richard Peñalver, Henry Atencio, and Nicolás Rivera. They were captured by the police and jailed for one year as they awaited trial, but charges were dropped before the trial began. Rafael Cabrices died from a heart attack three years later, 30 August 2005.

There are a number of problems with this version of events. The anti-Chávez commercial stations repeatedly showed only a small part of the scene (see still shot), of pro-Chávez supporters firing, claiming they were firing at unarmed demonstrators. The documentary The Revolution Will Not Be Televised included footage captured by an amateur cameraman that showed the gunmen firing while the street below was empty (except for an armoured police which had previously been firing at the bridgevehicle) and not filled with demonstrators.

The gunmen - Cabrices, Peñalver, Atencio and Rivera - argue that they were, in fact, returning fire at unknown snipers firing towards them. An eyewitness with military experience, who was shot himself, reported most victims being killed with precise head shots, and alerted the crowds to the danger of snipers. Some of the victims (which included both opposition and Chavistas) were shot in locations not reachable from the bridge, being around corners from the main street. El Nacional reported that the presidential honour guard arrested 3 snipers, while other reports claim 7 arrests at the Hotel Ausonia of men later freed in the chaos of the coup, and empty shells found at the Hotel Edén. A reconstruction of the events is the basis for the film Llaguno Bridge: Keys to a Massacre which provides video and photographic evidence that most victims were shot between 3.20pm and 3.55pm, while the Chavistas on the Bridge did not begin firing until 4.38pm. Finally, CNN correspondent Otto Neustald has said that on the morning of 11 April he recorded a video message from a number of high-ranking military officers which was broadcast later in the day. The message, recorded at least two hours before the killings started, accused Chávez of massacring innocent people using snipers, referring to at least 6 dead and dozens wounded.

Several times in the early afternoon, Chávez took to the airwaves in several cadenas (government announcements or addresses broadcast over all public and private airwaves), some of which asked protesters to return to their homes while others featured lengthy pre-recorded discourses led by the president. The last of these cadenas began just minutes after shots were fired at the crowds of protesters and continued throughout the massacre. The private television reacted by splitting the screen between the president's address and scenes of the massacre. Chávez then ordered private outlets to be taken off the air in a forced blackout. The measure managed to block coverage of the crisis in Caracas only, as the private television stations continued to broadcast in the rest of the country and via satellite.

Coup

Chávez's detention

In reaction to the situation, President Chávez ordered the military to apply Plan Ávila, a contingency plan designed to deal with major disturbances. However, high ranking military officers chose to disobey the order. In the evening of 11 April the military high command entered the palace, where Chávez and his ministers were staying. According to General Manuel Rosendo, chief of the National Unified Army Command (CUFAN) at the time, the officers disagreed about further proceedings, with the army favouring exiling the President while the Defense Ministry and the other military commanders called Chávez facing trial for the 11 April killings inside the country. Presented with his options by Rosendo, Chávez immediately agreed to being exiled, provided that he would depart via Maiquetía's airport and Rosendo would personally guarantee the safety his relatives. Chávez suggested Cuba as a place of exile. Afterwards, however, the military leadership insisted on keeping Chávez within the country. In the early hours of 12 April, General-in-Chief Lucas Rincón announced that Chávez had been asked for his resignation, and had accepted.

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Chávez, under arrest in Turiamo.

Chávez himself has stated that he negotiated an agreement to resign only after he realized that many top military leaders opposed his policies, on the condition of a his resignation being constitutionally tendered before the National Assembly and the vice-president would succeed him. Chávez stated that he was assured by the rebel generals that they would comply with these conditions but that shortly after Rincón's announcement, the assurances were abruptly rescinded and he was formally taken into custody. Spanish newspaper El Mundo reported that "Chávez is under arrest after rejecting to sign his resignation".

After the resignation had been announced, Chávez was escorted under military guard to Fort Tiuna, where he met with representatives of the Roman Catholic Church. Chávez was also met by army officers, who by then had determined that he was indeed not to be sent to Cuba. Instead, Chávez would be taken to La Orchila, a military base off the coast of Venezuela, until rebel leaders could decide Chávez's fate. On 13 April, Chávez wrote a note from his captivity in Turiamo stating specifically that he had not resigned.

Carmona's presidency

After Chavez' detention, businessman Pedro Carmona, president of the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Fedecámaras), was sworn in as transitional president. Carmona immediately isssued a decree dismantling several political changes introduced under Chavez, dissolving the National Assembly and other high-ranking institutions in the judicial and administrative sector, revoking the Bolivarian constitution introduced in 1999 and promised to restore the previous bicameral parliamentary system, with parliamentary and presidential elections within one year. Carmona also repealed several measures regarding government control of the economy, including the state oil company PDVSA.

Despite these promises, the sweeping measures fragmented the broad anti-Chavez coalition which had supported the coup, with many anti-Chavez groups viewing it as "the triumph of a small oligarchic elite." The military leadership, as well as by parts anti-Chávez opposition. especially criticized the dissolution of the institutional framework. One academic later desribed it the decress as "leaving the country effectively without the rule of law". Additional strategic errors (the failure to include labour leaders in the government, and the appointment of Admiral Hector Ramirez Perez as minister of defence, ahead of army General Efran Vazquez) contributed to the inability of the interim government to withstand the backlash against it.

Pro-Chávez uprisings of occured all over Caracas and were suppressed by the Metropolitan Police. Hundreds of thousands still demonstrated outside the Presidential Palace when the presidential Guard, loyal to Chávez, retook the palace. Since Chávez was being held in a secret location, the ministers in the palace turned to the Vice President Diosdado Cabello.

Carmona meanwhile, having lost the military's support eventually forced Carmona to go back on his decree and resign in favour of vice-president Diosdado Cabello.

The situation remained unclear to the public, as the state television, deserted afer the coup and occupied by the military, had not yet resumed transmission while Carmona described the situation as "under control". Chavez loyalists contacted a international news organisations who re-broadcast the actual situation back to Venezuela via satellite. Only by 8 o'clock that evening the reinstalled government managed to inform the people through state television channels. Because there were difficulties getting Chávez back, to restore order, two hours later vice-president Cabello was sworn in as interim president on television. Chávez returned the next day.

Aftermath

Allegations of U.S. involvement

Chavez has asserted numerous times that U.S government officials knew about plans for a coup, approved of them and assumed they would be successful. Chávez also further alleged that "two military officers from the United States" were present in the headquarters of coup plotters.

According to a report in The New York Times, US Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich warned Congressional aides that there was more at stake in Venezuela than the success or failure of Chávez. He accused Chávez of meddling with the historically government-owned state oil company, providing a haven for Colombian guerrillas, and bailing out the Cuban dictatorship with preferential rates on oil. Reich, a Cuban American and anti-Fidel Castro activist with a background in covert political and propaganda operations against left-wing groups in Latin America, also announced that the administration had received reports that "foreign paramilitary forces", who they claimed were Cuban, were involved in the bloody suppression of anti-Chávez demonstrators. No proof was offered. Eva Golinger published an article and several official documents claiming that a number of US agencies, including the CIA, had previous knowledge of the coup. She maintains that the USAID was being used by the CIA in the coup.

Upon news of Chávez's return, Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Advisor to U.S. President George W. Bush, said: "We do hope that Chávez recognizes that the whole world is watching and that he takes advantage of this opportunity to right his own ship, which has been moving, frankly, in the wrong direction for quite a long time." Bush denied any involvement of the U.S. government in the coup attempt and asked Chávez to "learn a lesson" from it.

Bush Administration officials acknowledged meeting with some of the planners of the coup in the several weeks prior to 11 April, but have strongly denied encouraging the coup itself, saying that they insisted on constitutional means. [2] Because of allegations, an investigation conducted by the U.S. Inspector General, at the request of U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd, requested a review of U.S. activities leading up to and during the coup attempt. The OIG report found no "wrongdoing" by U.S. officials either in the State Department or in the U.S. Embassy.

In 2009 former U.S. President Jimmy Carter told Colombian newspaper El Tiempo that he believed that Washington knew about the abortive coup, and may have been involved.

Criminal penalties for coup participants

Under the 1999 Constitution, military officers are entitled to a pre-trial hearing before the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice to rule on whether they should be charged with a crime. In such a hearing on 14 August 2002, the Tribunal ruled by an 11–9 margin (with two justices recused) that four high-ranking military officers charged with rebellion should not stand trial, arguing that what took place was not a "coup" but a "vacuum of power" that had been generated by the announcement of Chávez's resignation made by Gen. Lucas Rincón Romero. On 12 March 2004, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that the recusals were unconstitutional, the hearing was invalid, and the military officers (by then retired) may stand trial.

On 18 November 2004, leading state prosecutor Danilo Anderson was assassinated, shortly before he was scheduled to bring charges against 400 people who allegedly participated in the coup. Meanwhile Carmona and several other participants in the events of 11 April went into exile.

In April 2009, after a trial that had begun in March 2006 and which saw "265 expert testimonies, 5,700 photos, 20 videos and 198 witnesses", ten police officers were convicted for their involvement in the deaths of 3 demonstrators on 11 April 2002. Six, charged with homicide, were sentenced to 30 years in prison. One other officer was found not guilty. A lawyer for the victims of the violence described the Caracas Metropolitan Police on 11 April 2002 as "the armed wing of the opposition".

Irish documentary

Main article: The Revolution Will Not Be Televised (documentary)

A television crew from Ireland's RTE, which happened to be recording an unrelated documentary about Chávez at the time, was caught at the heart of the coup as it unfolded in the presidential palace. Their subsequent documentary film The Revolution Will Not Be Televised features footage shot after the short coup that was based largely in the presidential palace with members of both rival governments and their supporters. The film contradicts explanations by opponents of Chávez, the Venezuelan private media and the United States.

The film has won awards at many film festival screenings where it was shown. While some organizations argued for the accuracy of the documentary Others consider that the film omits and misrepresents important events., others, including the Venezuelan opposition, have disputed the film's narrative, decrying that it is used by the Venezuelan government for propaganda purposes.

Due to opposition pressure, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised was withdrawn from an Amnesty International film festival in Vancouver in November 2003. The decision to withdraw the film was taken because of threats to the physical safety of Amnesty staff in Caracas if the film was shown in the festival.

External links

• Google Video, Documentary, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised on Google Video.
• U.S. Department of State and Office of Inspector General. A Review of U.S. Policy toward Venezuela, November 2001 - April 2002. Accessed 26 May 2006. A full-text PDF report of the U.S. Inspector General report of U.S. involvement.
• U.S. Embassy, Caracas, Venezuela. State Dept. Issues Report on U.S. Actions During Venezuelan Coup: (Inspector General finds U.S. officials acted properly during coup). Accessed 26 May 2006. A summary from the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela of the report on U.S. actions during the events of April, 2002.
• "The US and the Coup in Venezuela". www.thirdworldtraveler.com. Retrieved 30 June 2006. Includes six articles arguing that the US assisted in the coup.
• "The Proof Is In The Documents: The CIA Was Involved In The Coup Against Venezuelan President Chavez". venezuelafoia.info. Retrieved 30 June 2006. CIA briefings from before, during, and after the coup, released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. The 6 April brief states: "Dissident military factions... are stepping up efforts to organize a coup, possibly as early as this month."