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Adlertag

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Battle of Britain
Part of the Western Front of World War II
A picture of a piece of sky with several clouds and many condensation trails caused by many aircraft. Each trail curves around the other indicated an air battle
An air battle, 1940. Adlertag was the largest engagement to date at the time
Date13 August 1940[1]
Location
England and English Channel
Result British victory[2]
Belligerents
United Kingdom British Empire Nazi Germany Germany
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Hugh Dowding
United Kingdom Keith Park
United Kingdom Charles Portal		 Nazi Germany Hermann Göring
Nazi Germany Albert Kesselring
Nazi Germany Hugo Sperrle
Units involved
RAF Fighter Command
RAF Bomber Command		 Luftflotte 2
Luftflotte 3
Casualties and losses
Fighter Command:
13 fighters (air)[3]
1 fighter (ground)[2]
3 fighter pilots killed[2]
RAF Bomber Command:
11 bombers (air)[2]
24 aircrew killed[2]
9 captured[4]
Other:
47 miscellaneous aircraft (ground)[2]
c. several hundred civilians		 47[3][5]—48[6] aircraft destroyed (air)
39 severely damaged[6]
circa 200 killed or captured including:
44 killed
23 wounded
45 missing[7]
captured unknown

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Adlertag ("Eagle Day")[8][9][10][11][12] was the first day of Unternehmen Adlerangriff ("Operation Eagle Attack"), which was the codename of a German military operation by the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) to destroy the British Royal Air Force (RAF). By June 1940 the Allies had been defeated in the Netherlands, Belgium and in France. It was decided by Adolf Hitler, the supreme commander of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme High Command) that if Britain would not come to terms it was to be defeated by force. By the 16 July all overtures for peace had been rejected by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his government.

Hitler gave the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) a directive (Directive No. 16) which ordered the preparation for the aerial attack and pacification of the United Kingdom in order to prevent it from becoming a base from which the Western Allies could continue the war against the Greater German Reich and German-occupied Europe.[13] The military invasion of the United Kingdom was codenamed Operation Sealion (Unternehmen Seelöwe). Before this could be carried out, Air superiority or air supremacy were required before any further sea or land operation. The Luftwaffe was to destroy the RAF in order to prevent it from attacking the invasion fleet or providing protection for the Royal Navy's Home Fleet which might attempt to prevent a landing by sea. Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe's commander-in-chief, Reichsmarschall (Empire Marshal) Hermann Göring and the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (High Command of the Air Force) to prepare the German air arm for the assault. The essential target was RAF Fighter Command. The services' destruction would deny the British their air superiority asset. Throughout July and early August the Germans made preparations for Adlertag. The date of the assault was postponed several times because of bad weather. Eventually it was carried out on 13 August 1940. Adlertag was meant to be decisive; the beginning of the end of RAF Fighter Command.[14] The German attacks on 13 August inflicted significant damage and casualties on the ground, but failed to cripple Fighter Command. Adlertag had failed to deliever the blow the Germans had hoped for. Marred by poor intelligence, strategic planning and communication, the German formations did not make any impression on Fighter Command's ability to defend British air space.

Göring had promised Hitler that Adltertag and Adlerangriff would achieve the results required within days, or at worst weeks.[15] Adltertag and the following operations failed to destroy the RAF. The engagements resulting from Adertag became known as the Battle of Britain. During the course of that campaign the Luftwaffe was prevented from gaining air superiority or air supremacy by the RAF. As a result, Sealion was cancelled.

Background

Main articles: German occupation of Luxembourg in World War II, Battle of the Netherlands, Battle of Belgium, and Battle of France

After the declaration of war on Nazi Germany by Great Britain and France in the aftermath of the German invasion of Poland, nine months of stalemate took place along the Western Front. It was named the Phoney War. The only military action was the French Army's Saar Offensive which was terminated in controversial circumstances. After the Polish Campaign, in October 1939, the planners of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High Command) and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) turned their attentions to Western Europe.[16]

General Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the Army, presented the first plan for Fall Gelb ("Case Yellow") on 19 October 1939, the pre-war codename of plans for campaigns in the Low Countries: the Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb, or "Deployment Instruction No. 1, Case Yellow".[17] This was a limited operation in which Luxembourg and the Low Countries were to be conquered in order to provide a base for further operations against France at a later date.[18] The plan was a less ambitious re-run of the infamous Schlieffen Plan which failed during the First World War in 1914.[18] It was rejected by Adolf Hitler. At the turn of the year, Heinz Guderian's chief of staff, Erich von Manstein secured Hitler's attention. An ambitious thrust through the Ardennes was suggested. It would be the main attack which would use up the majority of the motorised and tank divisions (Panzer Divisions). A diversion operation in Belgium and the Netherlands would precede this thrust, to lure the Allied Armies, including the British Expeditionary Force, into a trap.[19][20]

Launched on 10 May 1940, the revised version of Unternehmen Gelb (Operation Yellow), also known as the Manstein Plan, succeeded. The British Expeditionary Force escaped during the Battle of Dunkirk but the Belgian Army, Dutch Army and most of the elite French forces were destroyed in the encirclement. This left just second rate French units to combat the entire German Army. The Germans began preparations for the conquest of the rest of France under the codename Fall Rot, (Case Red). It was also successful. The Wehrmacht captured Paris on 14 June and the French surrendered on 25 June 1940.[21]

Both the Luftwaffe and RAF had suffered significant losses throughout the campaign. The RAF lost 959 aircraft; 477 fighter aircraft and 381 bomber aircraft. Human casualties were 915 aircrew killed and 185 wounded. Equipment worth £1,000,000 was abandoned. The victory was not cheap for the Luftwaffe. Some 28 percent of its force was destroyed, a loss of 1,428 aircraft. If aircraft that were damaged are included, which amounted to 488, this loss total reaches 36 percent of the force negatively effected. Of the losses 1,129 were lost to enemy action.[22][23]

With Western Europe neutralised, the OKL and OKW turned their attention to Britain which was now home to the Allied base of operations in Europe. Most of the exiled European governments set up offices there and made their forces available to the British. Hitler hoped Britain would negotiate for an armistice, for which he was prepared to offer generous terms. The tentative offers made by Hitler were rejected by the Churchill coalition government. Hitler now ordered the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to prepare for an amphibious assault of Britain, codenamed Operation Sealion. The Luftwaffe was to eliminate enemy air power and the Kriegsmarine was ordered to make all the necessary preparations for transporting the Heer (Army) across the English Channel. The Luftwaffe's task came first. Once the RAF had been rendered impotent, the Luftwaffe would have just two functions to perform; support of the Army and the prevention of enemy sea power interdicting the sea-borne forces and supplies. Göring ordered preparations be made for Operation Eagle Attack (Adlerangriff).

Luftwaffe preparations

Strategic and Operational issues

A group of men sitting and lying on a grass field reading maps, with a bomber aircraft in the background
A Dornier Do 17 crew rest and plan the next sortie in France towards the end of the campaign, 21 June 1940.

The serious losses of the spring campaign had weakened the Luftwaffe before the Battle of Britain.[24] Embarking on a fresh campaign immediately thereafter was a daunting task. However, this was not the only German problem. A series of strategic, technological and tactical problems had to be tackled and solved before the OKL could solve the "British question". Matters were made worse by the lax attitude of the OKW and Hitler himself. With Hitler busy enjoying the success in France there was no one with the strategic vision to take the initiative—a state of affairs precisely in accordance with his wishes. Hitler was convinced Britain would sue for peace. Even if the British forced the issue, the belief in the superiority of German arms, dominant among the General Staff, meant victory was only a matter of time. However, while Germans had mastered the tactical and operational lessons of the First World War, they failed to understand or grasp the essentials of strategy, as they had also failed to do in the first conflict. The Kriegsmarine had squandered its assets in the battles of the Norwegian Campaign for little strategic gain; the Army drew up a plan for an amphibious assault without regard for the disparity in naval forces and the Luftwaffe paid minimal attention to supporting a cross-channel landing in the belief that once the RAF was defeated it would be unnecessary. To that end, Goring ordered his service to destroy the RAF in its entirety. RAF Bomber Command would be destroyed as well as RAF Fighter Command. Should this be achieved, the ability of the British to defend important industry, ports, shipping and its Navy would be diminished.[25]

However, air superiority represented a difficult task to achieve. German medium bombers could only hit targets in southern England during daylight as the limited range of the Luftwaffe's premier fighter, the Messerschmitt Bf 109, permitted only a short journey into enemy territory. The bombers could not travel outside of this range and expect to suffer acceptable attrition rates. This state of affairs allowed the RAF to create a reserve area where crews could be trained, and the industrial heartland of the West Midlands and Manchester could continue production undisturbed. The limited range of the Bf 109 also allowed another important option; should the pressure become too great on Fighter Command, the RAF could withdraw northwards. When Sealion was launched they could resume the struggle to support the Royal Navy after reorganising.[26][27]

The pause between the defeat of France and the air offensive over Britain was due to more than just German overconfidence that Britain would accept peace terms. The losses of the spring demanded considerable time to replace. Crews needed to be integrated with new units and surviving crews needed rest. The transfer to permanent French bases along the English Channel coast required a large logistical effort which involved considerable difficulties. These were gradually overcome.[28] However, even so, the Luftwaffe began Adlertag with only 71 percent of its bomber force, 85 percent of its Bf 109 units, and 83 percent of its Bf 110 units operational. From this point on all three unit types declined. The Bf 110 units declined slowly but the Bf 109 units had reached 81 percent a week after Aldertag while the bomber units strength fell to just 61 percent.[29]

Intelligence

A map of the United Kingdom showing the range of its radar. The ranges reach out into the North Sea, English Channel and over northern France
Radar covered the indicated air space.

Intelligence was also a problem for the Luftwaffe, which would was a core reason for the failure of Adlertag. While the gap between the British and Germans was not yet wide in this regard, the British were starting to gain a decisive lead in intelligence. The breaking of the Enigma machine and poor Luftwaffe signals discipline allowed the British easy access to German communications traffic. The impact of ULTRA on the Battle of Britain is a matter of dispute. Official Histories claim there was no direct impact. Whatever the truth, ULTRA and the Y service gave the British an increasingly accurate picture of German order of battle deployments. Advances in technological and tactical advances were also monitored. In particular, the use of (through interrogation and bugging) prisoners of war enabled German innovations such as the Knickebein (crooked leg) blind bombing device to be discovered and counter measures prepared. Conversely the Germans remained opaque to Allied developments.[28]

Joseph "Beppo" Schmidt was the Luftwaffe's Intelligence Officer and made a series of errors. During July 1940 Schmidt grossly overestimated the strengths of the Luftwaffe and underestimated the RAF. Schmidt claimed; the Bf 109 was superior to the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire; suggested the Spitfire could only match the performance of the Messerschmitt Bf 110 when a skilful pilot was at the controls; asserted that the number of operational airfields in southern England were severely limited; estimated that the British could produce only 180—330 fighters per month (the true figure was 496) and that figure would decrease. During the summer this changed. Schmidt then estimated only 250 fighters per month were produced in July—September. The actual figure was 500. German production ran at only 300 new fighters a month (plus 150 repaired). Schmidt also claimed the command at all levels was rigid and inflexible with fighters being tied to home bases. In the reverse, Schmidt overestimated British airfield anti aircraft artillery (AAA) by a factor of two. Coupled with the knowledge that Luftwaffe's low-level flak was effective Schmidt deduced that German formations should not undertake low strikes. In his list of omissions, Schmidt fails to mention the RAF maintenance and organisation operations which put back damaged aircraft with rapid effect. Crucially of all, Schmidt failed to mention radar at all.[30][31]

In the event, Schmidt correctly identified the major aircraft production sites. His argument that they should be knocked out as key to gaining air superiority were well founded. However, Schmidt also concluded that British fighter armament was poor and that German bombers would be able to go about their task with relative ease. His report gave an overall impression of massive German superiority in qualtity and number. This inaccurate picture was to mislead the OKL throughout the battle as Schmidt's incorrect assessments started to gain more and more distance from the truth.[30] On Adlertag, most of the targets on the Luftwaffe's list, which, if destroyed, would not have impaired Fighter Command in the slightest.[32]

Targets and order of battle

Main articles: Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–1945), RAF Fighter Command Order of Battle 1940, and Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940

The following targets were chosen for attack on 13 August 1940:

Head-and-shoulders portrait of a uniformed Nazi German air force general in his 50s wearing an Iron Cross
Albert Kesselring commanded Luftflotte 2.
Head-and-shoulders portrait of a uniformed Nazi German air force general in his 50s wearing an Iron Cross
Hugo Sperrle, commanded Luftflotte 3.
Targets for the 13 August 1940
German bomber unit Target
Kampfgeschwader 1 (Bomber Wing 1) or (KG 1) RAF Biggin Hill[33]
Kampfgeschwader 76 (KG 76)[34] RAF Kenley[34]RAF Debden[34]/RAF Biggin Hill[35]/ Other unknown targets[36]
Kampfgeschwader 2 (KG 2) RAF Hornchurch[37]/RAF Eastchurch[38]/RAF Manston
Kampfgeschwader 3 (KG 3) RAF Eastchurch [33][Notes 1][39]
Kampfgeschwader 53 (KG 53) RAF North Weald[40]
Eprobungsgruppe 210 Radar Stations; Rye, Pevensey, Dover. RAF Hawkinge/RAF Manston/RAF Kenley[41]
Kampfgeschwader 4 (KG 4) Unknown targets (lack of records)/some mine laying operations in English Channel[42]
Kampfgeschwader 40 (KG 40) RAF Dishforth
Kampfgeschwader 26 (KG 26) RAF Dishforth[43]/Linton-on-Ouse[39]
Kampfgeschwader 30 (KG 30) RAF Driffield[44]
Kampfgeschwader 27 (KG 27) Ports of Bristol/Birkenhead/Liverpool[45]
Lehrgeschwader 1 (Learning Wing 1) or (LG 1)[46] RAF Worthy Down[46]/ Ports of Southampton, Portsmouth and surrounding airfields[47]/RAF Detling[48][49]/Other unspecified operations[50]
Sturzkampfgeschwader 3 (StG 3) StG 3 was to take part. For unknown reasons it was removed from the order of battle on 13 August.[51] Another source asserts that the unit had its missions cancelled owing to poor weather.[52]
Kampfgeschwader 51 (KG 51) RAF Bibury[53]/Spithead harbour[54]/Ventnor radar station
Kampfgeschwader 54 (KG 54) Fleet Air Arm base Gosport[55]/RAF Croydon[56]RAF Farnborough[57]
Kampfgeschwader 55 (KG 55) Plymouth[58]/Feltham[59]/RAF Middle Wallop[60]
Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 (StG 1) RAF Warmwell[14]/RAF Detling[49]
I., and II./Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 (StG 2) Portland area and airfields[14]/RAF Middle Wallop/RAF Warmwell[14]/Yeovil
Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 (StG 77) RAF Warmwell/Portland[57]

RAF preparations

C3: Command, control, communication

Head-and-shoulders portrait of a uniformed British air force general in his 50s wearing
Hugh Dowding, C-in-C Fighter Command.

The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection, command, and control that ran the battle. This was the "Dowding System", after its chief architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir H.C.T. "Stuffy" Dowding, the commander-in-chief of RAF Fighter Command. Dowding modernised a system created up from 1917 by Major General E B Ashmore.[61] The core of Dowding's system was implemented by Dowding himself: the use Radio Direction Finding (RDF, later called radar, for radio direction finding and ranging) was at his behest, and its use, supplemented by information by the Royal Observer Corps (ROC), was crucial to the RAF's ability to efficiently intercept incoming enemy aircraft. The technology was named RDF with misleading intent, to disguise the nature of the system to the enemy.[62][63]

The first indications of incoming air raids were received by the Chain Home Radio Direction Finding (RDF) facilities which were located along the coastlines of the UK. In most circumstances, RDF could pick up formations of Luftwaffe aircraft as they organised over their own airfields in northern France and Belgium. Once the raiding aircraft moved inland the formations were also plotted by the ROC. The information from RDF and the Observer Corps were sent through to the main operations room of Fighter Command Headquarters at RAF Bentley Priory. The plots were assessed to determine whether they were "hostile" or "friendly". If hostile, the information was sent to the main "operations room", which was in a large underground bunker.[64]

Here the course information of each raid was plotted by Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) who received information by telephone.[65] Additional intelligence was provided by the "Y" Service radio posts, which monitored enemy radio communications, and the "Ultra" decoding centre based at Bletchley Park, which gave the RAF intelligence on the German order of battle.[66] Colour coded counters representing each raid were placed on a large table, which had a map of the UK overlaid and squared off with a British Modified Grid. As the plots of the raiding aircraft moved, the counters were pushed across the map by magnetic "rakes". This system enabled the main "Fighter Controller" and Dowding to see where each formation was heading, at what height, and in what strength. This allowed an estimate to be made of possible targets. The age of the information was denoted from the colour of the counter. The simplicity of the system meant decisions could be made quickly.[64]

This information was simultaneously sent to the headquarters of each Group where it was cross-checked through a filter room before being sent through to another operations room, housed in an underground bunker. Because Group had tactical control of the battle the operations room was different in layout from main Headquarters at Bentley Priory. The main map on the plotting table represented the Group command area and its associated airfields. Extensive radio and telephone equipment transmitted and received a constant flow of information from the various sector airfields as well as the Observer Corps, AA Command and the navy. The "Duty fighter controller" was the Group GOC's personal representative, whose job was to control how and when each raid would be intercepted. If the telephone system failed engineers would be on site within minutes to repair the broken links.[64]

Limitations

The system had two weaknesses. The first was the operational direction of the RAF was conducted in unarmoured locations above ground. This made them vulnerable to air attack. The service also lacked air-to-sea rescue for its pilots, should they bail out over water (English Channel).[67]

HQ at Bently Priory and No. 11 Group RAF at Uxbridge were located in protected underground shelters. However sector stations were in ordinary buildings above ground. RAF Tangmere was the only location with a concrete bunker. The saving grace of these buildings was that they were hard to hit.[67]

The loss of pilots was an even more serious. The temperatures of the Channel rarely rose above 14°C in the summer. A pilot could be expected to last four hours. German pilots were given flares to mark their position and a dinghy to keep them out of the water. On 22 August 1940 mobile vessel launches were handed over to local naval authorities. RAF Fighter Command received 12 Lysander aircraft for searching out downed pilots. No proper air-sea rescue service was introduced until 1941.[67]

Battle

Morning

In the morning of the 13 August the weather was bad and Goring ordered a postponement of raids.[57] However, Dornier Do 17s of KG 2 took off at 04:50 for their target. They were to meet with their escorts from ZG 26 over the Channel. ZG 76 received the cancellation order but II., and III./KG 2 did not. Fortunately the RAF radar stations missed the Dorniers. KG 2 bombed RAF Eastchurch claiming ten Spitfires on the ground. In fact no Fighter Command fighters were lost.[68] This fed the Germans' belief the airfield was a Fighter Station. In fact it was used by RAF Coastal Command which lost five Bristol Blenheim's in the attack and one Coastal Command Spitfire. Much equipment, ammunition were destroyed and 16 of the Command's personnel were killed.[69] KG 2 lost five Dorniers in the attempt. The raid convinced German intelligence that Eastchurch was a fighter station and would launch seven fruitless raids on it in the coming weeks. Added to this mistake was the failure to keep up pressure; raids were spaced out and the field time to recover.[70] Six Dorniers were also badly damaged. In return, accurate fire from the Dornier gunners shot down two Hurricanes from the attacked No. 111, No. 151 and No. 74 Squadron RAF lead by Adolph Malan. Malan himself shot down one Dornier.[71] Another source suggests the destruction of five Dorniers and the another seven damaged.[72] Manpower losses amounted to 11 killed in action and nine prisoners of war.[52]

Most units of Luftflotte 2 received the order. KG 76 abandoned its attack on Debden[73] but struck at RAF Kenley and other airfields in Kent and Essex. Losses and results are unknown.[34] KG 27 also abandoned most of its operations. III./KG 27 did attempt to make it through to Bristol, losing one He 111 to No. 87 Squadron RAF.[74]

The order had not reached Luftflotte 3 HQ. It's commander, Hugo Sperrle ordered attacks to commence. At 05:00 20 Junkers Ju 88s of I./KG 54 took off to bomb the Royal Aircraft Establishment's airfield at RAF Farnborough. At 05:05 18 Ju 88s from II./KG 54 took off for RAF Odiham. At 05:50 88 Junkers Ju 87s of StG 77 began heading for Portland Harbour. The raids were escorted by about 60 Bf 110s of Zerstörergeschwader 2 (Destroyer Wing 2), and V./LG 1 and 173 Bf 109s from Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG 27), Jagdgeschwader 53 (JG 53) and Jagdgeschwader 3 (JG 3), which all flew ahead of the bomber stream to clear the airspace of enemy fighters. StG 77's target was obscured by cloud but KG 54 continued to their target. RAF fighters from RAF Northolt, RAF Tangmere and RAF Middle Wallop. Four Ju 88s and one Bf 109 from JG 2 was shot down. The German fighters claimed six RAF fighters and the bombers another 14. In reality the bombers only damaged five. The Bf 109s destroyed only one and damaged another. Of the five damaged RAF fighters inflicted by the bombers, two were write-offs. Of the 20 claimed just three fighters were lost and just three pilots were wounded and none were killed.[57][75]

Further missions by II./KG 54 to RAF Croydon were cancelled.[56] I./KG 54 struck at the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) base at Gosport.[55] ZG 2 was supposed to provide escort during one these attacks, and in a break down of communications, arrived over the target without their Ju 88s, which had been ordered to stand down. One Bf 110 was shot down by No. 238 Squadron RAF.[76]

At 11:10, V./LG 1 Bf 110s took off in advance of a raid by KG 54, possible to tempt RAF fighters into battle before the main assault, so the RAF would be out of position. The bomber's mission was cancelled. The order did not reach V./LG 1 who continued to their targets. The 23 Bf 110s continued to the target of Portland. They ran into No. 601 Squadron RAF Hurricanes. LG 1 lost six Bf 110s destroyed and three damaged. Only one Hurricane was shot down and another damaged.[57] One sources states only four Bf 110s were destroyed,[77] whilst another gives the loss of five destroyed and five damaged.[78] The Zerstörergeschwader optimistically claimed 30 RAF fighters destroyed (in reality RAF fighter losses in aerial combat amounted to 13 throughout the entire day), for a loss of 13 Bf 110s.[79] The morning's effort had been a fiasco.[14] The attacks showed a serious German technical failure in air-to-air communication.[15]

Afternoon

The official go-ahead was given at 14:00. At 15:30 some 58—80 Ju 88s from I., II., and III./LG 1, escorted by 30 Bf 110s of V./LG 1, took off to bomb Boscombe Down and Worthy Down. RAF Andover was to be bombed as well, with the support of 52 Ju 87s from StG 1 and StG 2 who were to strike at RAF Warmwell and Yeovil. I./JG 53 flew a fighter sweep ahead of the bombers from Poole to Lyme Regis in order to tempt the RAF into battle. I./JG 53 made landfall at 16:00. The sweep failed to attract and divert RAF squadrons. Instead, all it succeeded in doing was to alert the RAF defences a critical five minutes earlier. When the main wave of LG 1 and StG 2 arrived over the coast they were greeted by 77 RAF fighters.[80]

II., and III./JG 53 and III./ZG 76 flew escort for the Ju 87s. ZG 2 and JG 27 flew escort for LG 1. In response the whole of No. 10 Group RAF intercepted. One Staffel (Squadron) of II./StG 2 was badly hit by No. 609 Squadron RAF; six out of nine Ju 87s were shot down. StG 1 and 2 gave up on their original targets owing to cloud. Both headed for Portland. I./LG 1 abandoned Boscombe Down and bombed Southampton instead. One III./LG 1 dropped its bombs by RAF Middle Wallop Sector Station by mistake. Only Andover airfield was hit, and it was used for bomber operations, not fighters.[14] III./LG 1 lost two Ju 88s.[52] The 13 Ju 88 Gruppen (Groups) had lost six destroyed and many damaged. They had escaped lightly.[81] The bombing succeeded in destroying a Bicycle factory, a furniture warehouse and a refrigerated meat depot.[82] The Luftwaffe intelligence had not identified the Southampton Spitfire factory, on the water front near the docks, as an important target. Poor intelligence suggested it was a bomber factory. Only later, in September, was it attacked and severely damaged. However, even then the Germans were unaware of the damage inflicted to Spitfire production. The factory would later be broken up and production dispersed.[83]

StG 77 was also in action, escorted by JG 27 Bf 109s. StG 77s 52 Ju 87s were joined by 40 Ju 88s of KG 54. Both formations were heading for No. 10 Group RAF's airfields. StG 77 was targeting RAF Warmwell. The Geschwader failed to find its target, dropping its bombs at random. The other Ju 87 units had attracted much attention and StG 77 escaped unnoticed.[84]

Eprobungsgruppe 210 were sent further east for an operation to attack targets near Southend. They took off at 15:15 and were escorted by ZG 76. Unfortunately they found unbroken cloud over Essex. No. 56 Squadron RAF intercepted but Eprobungsgruppe 210 dropped their bombs over Canterbury. II./StG 1 was sent to bomb airfields near Rochester. It failed to find the target and returned without incident. IV./LG 1, also with Ju 87s, was sent after RAF Detling. JG 26 went out on a fighter sweep. JG 26 lost one Bf 109 over Folkestone from an unknown cause. The Ju 87s bombed the station, killing the commander and 67 others without loss.[2] Along with the 86 Ju 87s, 40 Bf 109s strafed the airfield. The operations block was hit, causing the high casualties. The losses were disastrous for No. 53 Squadron RAF, which lost a number of Bristol Blenheims on the ground.[85] The commander killed was Group Captain E P M Davis.[86] However, Delting was not an RAF Fighter Command station and the attack did not effect No. 11 Group RAF in any way.[87]

I., II., and III./KG 55 were also in action. III./KG 55 bombed Heathrow Airport. Results are unknown and losses are unclear. KG 55 suffered heavy losses the previous day so its operations seemed limited. On 12 August it lost 13 Heinkel He 111s and their crews. The next day, 14 August, they would lose their Geschwaderkommodore (Wing Commander) Alois Stoeckl.[88][89]

In the afternoon a force of 80 Do 17s of KG 3, escorted by JG 51, JG 52, JG 54 and 60 from JG 26 (some 270 aircraft in all), headed for Eastchurch airfield and the Short Brothers factory at Rochester. III./KG 3 attacked Eastchurch while II./KG 3 headed for Rochester. Significant damaged was done to the factory producing the Short Stirling heavy bomber. No. 3 Squadron RAF, No. 64 Squadron RAF, No. 111 Squadron RAF, No. 151 Squadron RAF, No. 234 Squadron RAF, No. 249 Squadron RAF, No. 601 Squadron RAF and No. 609 Squadron RAF intercepted. According to the account of JG 26, the British fighters made little impression on the bombers.[90] However, three JG 51 Bf 109s were shot down in skirmishes with RAF fighters.[91]

RAF Bomber Command also took part in the day's fighting. Although Charles Portal, GOC (General Officer Commanding), had protested against the pointlessness of attacking airfields in Scandinavia, the Air Ministry insisted on such raids. No. 82 Squadron RAF sent 12 Bristol Blenheims to bomb KG 30 airfields at Aalborg, Denmark. One pilot turned back complaining of "fuel problems" and was court-martialled. That bomber was the only one to return. The rest fell to AAA fire and fighters.[2] Some 24 airmen were killed and nine were captured.[4]

Night raids

As darkness fell at the close of Adlertag, Sperrle sent nine Kampfgruppe 100 (Bombing Group 100) He 111s to conduct a strategic bombing raid against the Supermarine Spitfire factory at Castle Bromwich, Birmingham. Despite the group being a specialist night strike unit which involved having high expertise in night navigation, only four of the crews found their targets. The 11 250 kg bombs dropped were not sufficient to disrupt fighter production. Another group, led by Gruppenkommandeur Hauptmann (Captain) Friedrich Achenbrenner, dispatched 15 He 111s from bases in Brittany across the Irish Sea to strike at the Short Brothers factory at Queen's Island, Belfast Northern Ireland. Five Short Stirling aircraft were destroyed. KG 27 also took part in the missions, and bombed Glasgow during the night although their specific target is unclear. Other bombers, commencing the night stage of Adlertag, resolutely flew the length and breadth of the United Kingdom, bombing Bristol, Cardiff, Swansea, Liverpool, Sheffield, Norwich, Edinburgh and Aberdeen. Very little damage was done, though some rail tracks were cut temporarily and around 100 casualties were suffered.[92][93]

Aftermath

Overclaiming

Main article: Confirmation and overclaiming of aerial victories

Overclaiming in aerial warfare is not uncommon. During the Second World War and Battle of Britain both sides claimed to have shot down and destroyed more enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air than they had in reality. RAF Fighter Command claimed 78 German aircraft shot down on 13 August 1940.[2] Another source states official RAF claims amounted to 64.[94] Actual German losses amounted to 47[3]—48[6] aircraft destroyed and 39 severely damaged.[6] Conversely the Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed 70 Hawker Hurricanes and Spitfires in the air and a further 18 Blenheim bombers in the air alone. This was an exaggeration of 700 percent.[95][96] Another 84 RAF fighters were claimed on the ground.[14] Actual RAF losses in the air amounted to 13 fighters and 11 bombers with 47 aircraft of various kinds on the ground.[2]

Battle of Britain

The failure of Adlertag did not deter the Luftwaffe from continuing its campaign. The assault against RAF airfields continued throughout August and into September 1940. The battles involved large numbers of aircraft and heavy losses on both sides. The Luftwaffe still failed to develop any focused strategy for defeating RAF Fighter Command. It attempted to achieve the destruction of several British industries at the same time, switching consistently from bombing aircraft factories, to attacking supporting industries, import or distribution networks such as coastal ports. An attempt was even made towards unrelated targets such as the morale of the British population.[97]

The failure of the Luftwaffe to identify the radar chain and distinguish RAF fighter bases from those of other RAF commands undermined its ability to destroy the British fighter defences. The Luftwaffe underestimated British radar, and had not realised its importance in the British operational system.[98][99] To the contrary, the OKL believed that the radar stations would benefit the German effort by sending RAF forces into large-scale air battles for the Luftwaffe to decimate in battles of attrition. The RAF aircraft industry supported the losses and its pilots were replaced sufficiently to limit the RAF’s decline in strength and deny the Germans victory. Conversely the RAF were able to ensure the serviceability rates and aircrew numbers of the Luftwaffe declined in August—September.[100][101][102][103]

Having failed to defeat the RAF, the Luftwaffe adopted for a different and clearer strategy of strategic bombing known as The Blitz. However, as with the campaign against the RAF, the types of targets differed radically and no sustained pressure was put under any one type of British target.[104] Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy.[105] This method condemned the offensive to failure before the offensive over Britain had even begun.[106] The end result of the air campaign against Britain in 1940 and 1941 was a decisive failure to end the war. As Hitler committed Germany to ever increasing military adventures, the Wehrmacht became increasingly overstretched and was unable to cope with a multi-front war. By 1944 the Allies were ready to launch Operation Overlord, the invasion of Western Europe. The Battle of Britain ensured that the Western Allies had a base from which to launch the campaign and that there would be a Western Allied presence on the battlefield to meet the Soviet Red Army in central Europe at the end of the war in May 1945.[107][108]

Notes

  1. ^ de Zeng writes there is nothing published on KG 3. It was one of the most obscure bomber units owing to the loss of most of its records at the end of the war. There work is the most detailed available

References

Citations

  1. ^ Bungay 2000, p. 207.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j Bungay 2000, p. 211.
  3. ^ a b c Bungay 2000, p. 371.
  4. ^ a b Donnelly 2004, pp. 88—89.
  5. ^ Taylor and Moyes 1968, p. 23.
  6. ^ a b c d Hough and Richards 2007, p. 162.
  7. ^ Mason 1969, pp. 235—243.
  8. ^ Hough and Richards 2007, p. 154.
  9. ^ Murray 1983, p. 50.
  10. ^ Bungay 2000, p. 203.
  11. ^ Fiest 1993, p. 28.
  12. ^ Mason 1969, p. 236.
  13. ^ Trevor-Roper 2004, pp. 74—79.
  14. ^ a b c d e f g Bungay 2000, p. 210.
  15. ^ a b Mackay 2003, p. 71.
  16. ^ Healy 2007, pp. 3—5.
  17. ^ Healy 2007, pp. 5—8.
  18. ^ a b Bond 1990, p.42.
  19. ^ Healy 2007, pp. 8—11.
  20. ^ Bond 1990, pp. 43—44.
  21. ^ Hooton 2007, pp. 47—48, p. 77, p. 86.
  22. ^ Hooton 2007, p. 90.
  23. ^ Murray 1983, p. 40.
  24. ^ Murray 1983, p. 44.
  25. ^ Murray 1983, pp. 39, 44—45.
  26. ^ Murray 1983, p. 46.
  27. ^ Hooton 1994, p. 20.
  28. ^ a b Murray 1983, p. 47.
  29. ^ Murray 1983, p. 51.
  30. ^ a b Bungay 2000, pp. 187—188.
  31. ^ Hooton 1994, pp. 19—20.
  32. ^ Mason 1969, pp. 236—237.
  33. ^ a b de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 14.
  34. ^ a b c d de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 228.
  35. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 225.
  36. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 236.
  37. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 24.
  38. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 33.
  39. ^ a b de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 48.
  40. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 171.
  41. ^ Bungay 2000, pp. 203—212.
  42. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, pp. 49—54.
  43. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 75.
  44. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 118.
  45. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 104.
  46. ^ a b de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 360.
  47. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 266.
  48. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 370.
  49. ^ a b Ward 2004, p. 105.
  50. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 354.
  51. ^ de Zeng 2010, p. 100.
  52. ^ a b c Goss 2000, p. 79.
  53. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 155.
  54. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 146.
  55. ^ a b de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 179.
  56. ^ a b de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 184.
  57. ^ a b c d e Bungay 2000, p. 208.
  58. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 195.
  59. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 198.
  60. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 1, p. 193.
  61. ^ Bungay 2000, pp. 62, 447 Note 23.
  62. ^ Hough and Richards 2007. p. 51.
  63. ^ Parker 2000, p. 117.
  64. ^ a b c Bungay 2000, pp. 61—69.
  65. ^ Parker 2000, p. 123.
  66. ^ Bungay 2000, p. 192.
  67. ^ a b c Bungay 2000, pp. 67—68.
  68. ^ Hough and Richards 2007, p. 157.
  69. ^ Mason 1969, p. 238.
  70. ^ Bungay 2000, pp. 207—208.
  71. ^ Hough and Richards 2007, pp. 155—157.
  72. ^ Goss 2005, p. 60.
  73. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 232.
  74. ^ Mason 1969, p. 241.
  75. ^ MacKay 2001, p. 31.
  76. ^ Mason 1969, pp. 238—239.
  77. ^ de Zeng 2007 Vol 2, p. 372.
  78. ^ Mackay 2000, p. 51.
  79. ^ Weal 1999, p. 47.
  80. ^ Mason 1969, p. 239.
  81. ^ Weal 2000. p. 54.
  82. ^ Korda 2009, p. 167.
  83. ^ Mason 1969, p. 237.
  84. ^ Mason 1969, pp. 239—240.
  85. ^ Warner 2005, p. 258.
  86. ^ RAF Station Commanders - South East England
  87. ^ Mason 1969, p. 240.
  88. ^ Dierich 1975, p. 39.
  89. ^ Hall and Quinlan 2000, p. 18.
  90. ^ Baker 1996, p. 113.
  91. ^ Mason 1969, p. 242.
  92. ^ Mason 1969, p. 243.
  93. ^ Goss 2000, p. 80.
  94. ^ Bishop 2010, p. 179.
  95. ^ Addison and Crang 2000, p. 58.
  96. ^ Terraine 1985, p. 186.
  97. ^ Murray 1983, p. 54.
  98. ^ Parker 2000, p. 311.
  99. ^ Bungay 2000, pp. 68—69.
  100. ^ Bungay 2000, p. 298.
  101. ^ Murray 1983, p. 52
  102. ^ Wood and Dempster 2003, p. 306.
  103. ^ Parker 2000, p. 309.
  104. ^ Overy 1980, pp. 34, 36.
  105. ^ Hooton 1997, p. 38.
  106. ^ Bungay 2000, p. 379.
  107. ^ Addison and Crang 2000, p. 270.
  108. ^ Bungay 2000, pp. 393—394.
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