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2nd Armoured Division (United Kingdom)

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2nd Armoured Division
Historian Michael Chappell wrote that "a plumed knight's helmet" was chosen as the divisional sign, which was "certainly painted on vehicles and tanks, but probably never worn on uniform, as the division left the UK … before the authorization of battle insignia."[1]
Active1939–1941
Branch British Army
TypeArmour
SizeSecond World War
10,750 men
War Establishment: 342 tanks[a]
Actual: 102 tanks (Libya)
EngagementsOperation Sonnenblume
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry

The 2nd Armoured Division was a division of the British Army, which was active during the early stages of the Second World War. The division's creation had been discussed since the beginning of 1939, with the intent to form it by splitting the 1st Armoured Division. A lack of tanks resulted in this not happening until December 1939. After its creation, the division was deprived of forces for a short while until the 1st Light Armoured Brigade was assigned to it from the 1st Armoured Division, and the 22nd Heavy Armoured Brigade from Southern Command.

In early 1940, priority for equipment was given to the 1st Armoured Division and the 2nd Armoured Division was forced to make do with leftovers. After the Battle of France, with the threat of a German invasion of the United Kingdom, priority for equipment shifted to the 2nd Armoured Division. While it was brought up to strength, it was planned to use the division to counter-attack the flanks of an invasion force. In August 1940, an armoured regiment from the division was transported to Egypt and transferred to the 7th Armoured Division but it was replaced. In October, it was decided to transfer the rest of the division to Egypt, as reinforcements for Middle East Command.

Before leaving it swapped a brigade with the 1st Armoured Division; as the new brigade consisted of only one armoured regiment, this reduced the division to three armoured regiments. The division arrived in Egypt in December 1940 and was stripped to support Operation Lustre, an expeditionary force to Greece. The rest of the division moved to the province of Cyrenaica in Italian Libya, conquered during Operation Compass; its remaining tanks were worn-out and supplemented by equally decrepit Italian models. In March, a German-Italian counter-attack led to the destruction of the division, and the ejection of the British from Cyrenaica except for those in Tobruk. The consensus of historians is there was little the division could have done to stop this.

Background

During the interwar period, the British Army examined the lessons learnt from the First World War. This included experimentation and development of theories of manoeuvre and armoured warfare, as well as the creation of the short-lived Experimental Mechanized Force.[3] The long-term impact was for the Army to start to move towards mechanisation to restore battlefield mobility.[4] By the 1930s, the army had established three types of division: the infantry division, the mobile division (later called an armoured division), and the motor division (a motorised infantry division). The military historian David French wrote: "The main role of the infantry … was to break into the enemy's defensive position". This would then be exploited by the mobile division, followed by the motor divisions that would "carry out the rapid consolidation of the ground captured by the mobile divisions" therefore "transform[ing] the 'break-in' into a 'break-through'".[5]

The Mobile Division was created in October 1937.[6] French wrote that it was "'tank-heavy' … with too few infantry and support arms. It had six cavalry light tank regiments … three medium regiments … two motorized infantry battalions and two artillery regiments. The mechanized cavalry were designed to reconnoitre, not to fight, and the infantry were intended to protect the tanks when they were resting and replenishing."[7] General John Burnett-Stuart, responsible for training the Mobile Division, stated the infantry were not "to be put on to a position by tanks and told to hold it, and they are not meant to fight side by side with your tanks in the forefront". French wrote this "stood outside the mainstream of official doctrine", which promoted combined-arms co-operation to win battles. According to French, this thinking predominated within the British armoured forces until doctrine was reformed in 1942, and created a sharp contrast between the British armoured formations and their German counterparts in the Panzerwaffe (Tank Arm). The Germans had "concluded that tanks working on their own or merely in conjunction with infantry would never be a decisive weapon" and that "the key to success lay in combining tanks and supporting arms in the same divisional organization".[7]

In the 1930s, tensions built between Germany and the United Kingdom and its allies.[8] During late 1937 and 1938, German demands for the annexation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia led to an international crisis. This was resolved in September by the Munich Agreement, which accepted that the Germans would annexe the Sudetenland.[9] Tension did not subside, and the British Government debated how best to prepare the Army for war. In January 1939, the Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha proposed splitting the Mobile Division into two smaller formations but found no support for this move.[10] The issue was broached a month later and was accepted in principle by the Cabinet.[11] Shortly after, the French were informed of a preliminary timetable for the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the event of war: "One Regular Armoured Division will become available about the middle of 1940, the second would not be available 'till a later date". The formation of a second division during this period was complicated by the slow pace of tank production.[12]

Formation and home service

Photograph of a Vickers light tank with one soldier by the gun turret and another looking through an opening in the front
A Vickers light tank of the 3rd Hussars

The 2nd Armoured Division was activated on 15 December 1939, with Major-General Frederick Hotblack as the first General Officer Commanding (GOC).[13] Hotblack joined the Royal Tank Corps in 1916, and by 1918 he had become the Army's expert on German tanks. During the 1930s, he had been posted to Germany where he witnessed and reported on the development of German armoured forces. Following the outbreak of the war, he was the BEF's senior advisor on armoured vehicles. [14] The division had no troops until the following month, when the 1st Light Armoured Brigade was transferred from the 1st Armoured Division (previously the Mobile Division), and the 22nd Heavy Armoured Brigade was transferred from Southern Command.[15] On assignment to the division, the 1st Light Armoured Brigade comprised four armoured regiments: the 1st King's Dragoon Guards (KDG), 3rd The King's Own Hussars (3H) and the 4th Queen's Own Hussars (4H).[16] The 22nd Heavy Brigade consisted of three: the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, and the 3rd and the 4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters).[17] The division had 77 Vickers light tanks.[18] The 2nd Support Group, which was to contain the supporting arms, was formed in February, but it was not until March that its troops were allocated: the 3rd Field Squadron, Royal Engineers; 12th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (12RHA); the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Light-Anti-aircraft/Anti-tank Regiment; and two motorised infantry units: the 1st Battalion, The Rangers, King's Royal Rifle Corps, and the 1st Battalion, Tower Hamlets Rifles, Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own).[19]

In early 1940, the 1st Armoured Division had priority for equipment, to bring it up to full strength. This decision was to ensure it would be operationally effective when deployed to France and not be the source of political embarrassment. As a result, the 2nd Armoured Division had to make do with what remained.[20][21] On 14 April, the 1st Light Armoured Brigade became the 1st Armoured Brigade, and the 22nd Heavy Armoured Brigade was renamed the 22nd Armoured Brigade.[22] Three days later, Hotblack ended his tenure as GOC of the division after an apparent stroke.[23] Major-General Justice Tilly took over on 10 May, having been an armoured warfare instructor and commander of the 1st Tank Brigade before the outbreak of the war.[13][24] On paper, the division had an establishment of 340 tanks, sixteen 25-pounder field guns, and twenty-four 2-pounder anti-tank guns, but by May, the division was down to 31 light tanks, all in the 1st Armoured Brigade. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had no serviceable tanks and made do with lorries. The division had two 25-pounders supplemented by four First World War-vintage 18-pounder field guns, four 4.5 in (110 mm) howitzers of similar vintage, and two anti-tank guns.[20][25][26]

Photograph of a Cruiser II tank in a museum with a second tank in the background
A Tank, Cruiser, Mk II CS (A10), as used by the division. The close support (CS) version is armed with a howitzer for firing smoke and high explosive rounds and not intended to fight other tanks.[20][27]

The division was held in reserve in the Lincolnshire area.[28] In June, the number of serviceable tanks fluctuated between 178 and 197.[29] After the Battle of France, the division was moved to a position between Northampton, Northamptonshire and Newmarket, Suffolk. The division was to strike into the flanks or the rear of any potential German landing in East Anglia or north of The Wash.[30] During July, production priority was given to the division, which received new 25-pounders. By 4 August, the division had 17 new Cruiser tanks, and the number of light tanks had increased to 226.[31] During August, despite the threat of invasion, the War Office decided to reinforce Middle East Command. The 3H was transferred to Egypt to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division, and was replaced by the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment (3RTR).[16][32][33][b] The division saw a steady increase in its tank strength and the end of September, it had 256 light tanks and 54 cruisers.[35]

By October, the threat of a German invasion had receded. The British could now spare additional forces for the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre, which included the dispatch of the 2nd Armoured Division.[c] Prior to being dispatched, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was exchanged with the 3rd Armoured Brigade of the 1st Armoured Division, but it only consisted of the 5th Royal Tank Regiment (5RTR).[37] The division departed Liverpool, in late October, on Convoy W.S. 4a.[38]

Overseas service

Arrival in the Middle East

The convoy sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in Suez at the end of December.[39][40] The division arrived in Egypt with just three armoured regiments: 4H, 3RTR and 5RTR.[41] The KDG, which had previously been equipped with light tanks, had been made the division's armoured car regiment. This had been intended as a stop-gap measure while the 1st The Royal Dragoons, based in Palestine, was mechanised to take on the role. In January 1941, after the division's arrival in Egypt, the KDG were outfitted with Marmon-Herrington Armoured Cars.[42][43] On arrival, Tilly reported to General Archibald Wavell (Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command and all British land forces in the Middle East) that "the mechanical state of his two Cruiser regiments" was in question, with "the tracks … practically worn out" and "engines [that] had already done a considerable mileage" without overhaul before being transported. The intention had been to replace the tracks once the tanks arrived in Egypt, but the spare parts in stores were found to be useless.[33][44] On 5 January, Tilly died following an air crash. He was replaced by Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry on 12 February 1941.[13][45] Gambier-Parry had served in the infantry during the First World War, transferred to the Royal Tank Corps in the 1920s, and commanded an infantry brigade in the 1930s. Prior to his appointment as GOC, he was part of a diplomatic mission to Greece.[46][47] During February, the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) converted to being solely an anti-tank unit.[19]

A Cruiser IV tank in the foreground, followed by several others.
Cruiser IV tanks of 5RTR, prior to their transfer to the division and deployment to Egypt.

While the division was en route to Egypt, Wavell had begun Operation Compass, a counter-attack to the Italian invasion of Egypt. The initial objective was to destroy forward Italian forces and advance as far as Sollum near the Libyan border, if the situation allowed. By the time the division had arrived, Compass was on the verge of defeating the Italian 10th Army. By February, the offensive had captured the Italian Libyan province of Cyrenaica.[48] Further prosecution of the offensive was discussed, but it was believed the province of Tripolitania would be too hard to defend or supply and that the captured territory in Cyrenaica would provide sufficient security for Egypt. It was also felt there was little threat until at least May, at which time additional forces would be available to reinforce the Cyrenaica garrison. British strategy had shifted to support Greece and to maintain the status-quo in the Balkans without allowing additional countries to be overrun by Germany or Italy. After discussions with the Greek government, it was decided to dispatch an expeditionary force using substantial forces under the command of Middle East Command and by reducing the garrison in Cyrenaica. The transportation of this force was codename Operation Lustre.[49][50] As part of this effort, the 1st Armoured Brigade, which included two of the division's armoured regiments, was detached from the division on 27 February. It arrived in Greece on 18 March with its 52 cruisers and 52 light tanks. The division also lost the 1st Battalion, The Rangers, the 12RHA, and the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment to the expeditionary force.[51][52][d] These units ended up fighting in the Battle of Greece.[52]

Move to Libya

A photograph showing an Italian M13/40 tank with five others in the background
Italian M13/40 tanks. Captured examples were used by several units of the division notably 6RTR.

In March, the remnants of the 2nd Armoured Division left Egypt and travelled to Libya, suffering many breakdowns en route.[13][54] The 5RTR began their journey with 58 Cruisers, but arrived with only 23.[55] Once in Libya, the division had the strength of a brigade group and consisted of the KDG, 3H, 5RTR, the 6th Royal Tank Regiment (6RTR) (which it had just taken command of), the 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles, and the 104th RHA.[54][56] The 6RTR arrived without any tanks, and was equipped with captured Italian Fiat M13/40 tanks. While equipped with a good Cannone da 47/32 (a 47mm anti-tank gun), they were found to be slow, uncomfortable, and mechanically unreliable. The British tanks had exceeded their engine lives and were also unreliable.[54][57] There was a lack of transport, workshops were understaffed and lacked spare parts, and the divisional radios lacked the equipment needed to keep them charged so they soon failed.[54][58] By the end of March, the division had 102 tanks: 3H: 26 MK VI light tanks and 12 M13s; 5RTR: 25 Cruiser Mk IVs; 6RTR: 36 M13; 3rd Armoured Brigade HQ: 3 MK VI light tanks.[59]

2nd Armoured Division (United Kingdom) is located in Libya
El Agheila
El Agheila
Tripoli
Tripoli
Benghazi
Benghazi
Tobruk
Tobruk
Mersa Brega
Mersa Brega
class=notpageimage|
Key locations in Libya, in reference to the movement of the division from Egypt.

Benghazi was the port that was closest to the frontline. However, Axis bombing had rendered it unusable for landing supplies for the 2nd Armoured Division, which therefore had to rely on overland routes back to Tobruk. A lack of transport meant the British Army had to create a series of static stockpiles to supply the forward area. This made it impossible to supply a garrison west of El Agheila, which was the most favourable position for a defensive line. It also restricted the mobility of the 2nd Armoured Division, which could not move beyond the range of their supply dumps.[60]

The terrain between El Agheila and Benghazi was optimal for armoured warfare, and there existed no easily defensible position for infantry. Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, GOC Cyrenaica Command, believed his position was untenable without a fully equipped armoured division supported by two complete infantry divisions and adequate air support. The only other major formation available to Neame was the 9th Australian Division. It was under-equipped, under-trained, and lacked direct communication with the 2nd Armoured Division. One of the 9th Australian Division's brigades remained at Tobruk. The other two were positioned well to the north of Benghazi to hold the high ground of the Jebel Akhdar. Neame was ordered to give ground if attacked, as the conservation of his force was more important. The 2nd Armoured Division had the conflicting objectives of avoiding tank losses while being ready to operate against the flanks of any Axis armoured force. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was based south-east of Mersa Brega, where the 2nd Support Group was located. Once operations got underway, Neame also predicted the 2nd Armoured Division's tank numbers would rapidly dwindle due to breakdowns.[61][62]

Axis offensive

March

Further information: Operation Sonnenblume
Photograph if a German Panzer III tank
An example of the German Panzer III, the most common tank in the German Afrika Korps during this period.

After the destruction of the 10th Army the Italians transferred the 5th Army from the border with French Tunisia towards Cyrenaica and sent the 132nd Armoured Division Ariete and the 102nd Motorised DivisionTrento from Italy.[63][64] Germany sent the Afrika Korps, consisting of the 5th Light Division and the 15th Panzer Division, under the command of Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel. At the end of March, the 5th Light Division was on the border of Cyrenaica with 25 Panzer I, 45 Panzer II, 60 Panzer III and 17 Panzer IV tanks, accompanied by the Ariete Division with about 46 M13/40s.[65][66] The British underestimated the scope of Axis reinforcements to Libya, believing they would only have four divisions available until the end of May, only two of which could be used in offensive operations due to supply constraints. Royal Air Force (RAF) aerial reconnaissance had observed Axis troop movements towards Cyrenaica and on 25 February spotted Schwerer Panzerspähwagen (eight-wheeler armoured cars). These armoured cars were superior in both speed and armament to the armoured cars of the 2nd Armoured Division, which avoided contact to minimise losses.[67] RAF reconnaissance showed further troop movements and preparations closing in on El Agheila.[68]

The forward area was patrolled by a single platoon from the 1st Tower Hamlet Rifles and elements of the KDG. On 23 March, the division had its first action. A patrol of two armoured cars from the KDG, supported by an anti-tank gun attached from the 9th Australian Division, spotted and engaged their German reconnaissance counterparts near El Agheila. The Axis force withdrew after the Australians claimed three vehicles knocked out. The following day, a platoon from the 1st Tower Hamlet Rifles moved forward to ensure that the colonial fort near El Agheila was still unoccupied, before an intended move to take up an ambush position to the west of the town. Nearing the fort, they found it occupied and came under fire while German armoured cars also moved forward. One German armoured car was knocked out and an Australian gun crew suffered casualties. The British screening force withdrew to Mersa Brega, ceding El Agheila to the Axis. One or two German tanks were lost to anti-tank mines in this area (potentially left over Italian ones, which had not been cleared by the British).[68][69]

2nd Armoured Division (United Kingdom) is located in Libya
Benghazi
Benghazi
El Agheila
El Agheila
Mersa Brega
Mersa Brega
Agedabia
Agedabia
class=notpageimage|
Key locations in Libya during this period

On 31 March, the Axis forces resumed their attack. After dawn, the first clash of the day occurred with 5RTR. Sources either describe one clash from the British or German perspective or separate events. The 5th Light Division reported engaging up to five British tanks, in two inconclusive engagements with no losses on either side. The 5RTR reported a patrol of four tanks observing the Axis advance; they then engaged resulting in one British tank damaged and three Italian M13s potentially destroyed.[70][71] By 09:00, the 3rd Armoured Brigade started to withdraw according to plan.[72] After 10:00, the Germans moved forward towards the main position held by the 2nd Support Group at Mersa Brega. Skirmishing took place between the outposts held by the Tower Hamlet Rifles and the Germans, before the forward troops fell back to the main position. During the day, the fighting increased with both sides calling upon artillery support.[73]

The Luftwaffe attacked with Junkers Ju 87 (Stuka) dive bombers. The 2nd Armoured Division anti-aircraft gunners reported two aeroplanes shot down and the Germans recorded a friendly fire incident with one bomber attacking German tanks. During this period, the 2nd Support Group reported the repulse of two attacks and driving off an advance by German armoured cars. The Germans recorded their own success in suppressing the British positions, destroying numerous vehicles that were within range of their guns and at least one tank from 5RTR. A request for the 3rd Armoured Brigade to be deployed to assist was denied. Gambier-Perry reported there was "insufficient time to get them into action from their present position before dark".[73][74] After 18:00, a German artillery barrage was fired and two attacks were launched. The first was repulsed, while the second managed to make gains in the Tower Hamlet position. A counter-attack by a scout platoon restored the position with the loss of eight universal carriers. After dark, the 2nd Support Group withdrew and by morning, had moved 30 miles (48 kilometres) to Agedabia. Under the cover of dark, the Germans carefully advanced and captured Mersa Brega without incident the next morning. The fighting had cost the division at least 59 men.[74][75]

April

Photograph of a Cruiser IV tank
An abandoned Cruiser IV of 5RTR.

During 1 April, the 3rd Armoured Brigade continued to withdraw but lost more tanks to mechanical breakdowns.[72] The Germans caught up with the 2nd Support Group at first light on 2 April. At 10:30, an attack was launched that included infantry and up to 50 tanks. At the same time, the 2nd Support Group was given the order to withdraw. A scout platoon attempted to conduct a rearguard action to allow the rest of the Tower Hamlet Rifles to get away and was lost in the process. While retreating, B Company was outflanked by eight German tanks and forced to surrender. The 2nd Support Group withdrew 30 miles (48 kilometres) to the north and took up new positions.[76] Out on the desert flank, the 3rd Armoured Brigade was still withdrawing, at 7 mph (11 km/h) to match the slowest vehicles that were towing artillery. For most of the day, their movements were shadowed by armoured vehicles they were unable to identify. During the afternoon, the withdrawal was further slowed by breakdowns, conflicting orders, as well as the need to rest and refuel allowing the nearby armoured vehicles to gain ground. Nine tanks from 5RTR were ordered to conduct a rearguard action and took hull-down positions.[77]

The 5RTR decided the shadowing tanks were Italian (they were German). The Axis tanks advanced in arrowhead formation straight at the British position. When the range was between 900–1,500 yards (820–1,370 metres), both sides opened fire. The 5RTR suffered five tank losses and 24 casualties, claiming at least eight tanks in return.[78] The historian Thomas Jentz wrote that German records show only three German tanks were destroyed, "along with an unrecorded number damaged".[79] The remaining British tanks withdrew to friendly positions farther behind and then the regiment regrouped 2 miles (3.2 kilometres) back. The brigade resumed its retreat, with no German vehicles following.[80] During the day, there were contradictory orders, sometimes delayed, from Gambier-Perry, Neame, and Wavell to the division; how and should it conduct its withdrawal, if it was capable of blocking the coastal road, and if the division should keep together or split its forces. The discussions were hampered by ignorance of events, and notably included Neame informing Gambier-Perry that the 3rd Armoured Brigade was not to be committed en masse without his permission.[81][82]

2nd Armoured Division (United Kingdom) is located in Libya
Benghazi
Benghazi
Agedabia
Agedabia
Antelat
Antelat
Msus
Msus
Mechili
Mechili
class=notpageimage|
Key locations in Libya during this period

By the morning of 3 April, the 3rd Armoured Brigade had reached Antelat (~31 miles (50 km) northeast of Agedabia, and half way to Msus), and had been located by German aerial reconnaissance. Unknown to the division, the bulk of the 5th Light Division had halted around Bir el Ageradt as it focused on moving supplies forward.[83][84] However, German and Italian detachments were ordered to probe around the southern flank of the 2nd Armoured Division, including a reconnoitre towards Msus.[83] During the early afternoon, the movements of 3H and 6RTR caused alarm and confusion within 5RTR, which at first had believed them to be German.[85] The RAF spotted Axis forces approaching Msus, site of the main divisional supply dump. The 3rd Armoured Brigade, along with some elements of the Support Group, were ordered to move to Msus to deal with the hostile force. However, the division was crippled by a breakdown in communication, the result of late, missed, and conflicting orders. None of the division arrived at Msus during the day, and it was established late in the afternoon that the RAF had mistakenly identified friendly vehicles in the area.[86] By the end of the day, the 3rd Armoured Brigade had been reduced to 18 light tanks, 26 Italian tanks, and 12 Cruisers.[85]

On 4 April, the Axis advance resumed with the ultimate objective of Tobruk. Benghazi was captured by Axis forces at dawn, having been abandoned by the 2nd Armoured Division and other Allied forces.[87] The only clash during the day occurred when artillery fire, from the divisional Support Group, halted German reconnaissance forces near Charruba.[88] At midday, Lieutenant-General Richard O'Connor (GOC British Troops in Egypt) arrived at the front and held a meeting with senior commanders in Cyrenaica, including Gambier-Perry. Gambier-Perry was of the opinion that the Axis forces would attempt no further advance now that they had captured Benghazi.[54][89] However, the decision was made to withdraw from the Jebel Achdar, and the 2nd Armoured Division would concentrate at Mechili to protect the withdrawal of the Australian infantry. The recently arrived 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Edward Vaughan, would secure Mechili, an old Italian stone and mud colonial fort ringed by trenches, to ensure it was in Allied hands when the division arrived.[90] The division spent the day withdrawing, again impeded by communication failures and tank losses through breakdowns. A supply convoy for the division was attacked by 18 Axis aircraft and destroyed, resulting in the loss of 1,600 imperial gallons (7,300 L) of fuel.[85][91] By the end of the day, 5RTR had nine cruisers left and 6RTR nine M13s.[91] The following day, alarmist reports suggested Axis armoured forces had passed Msus. The KDG, and other Allied units, verified that this was not the case. The tank sightings turned out to be the 2nd Armoured Division. By the end of the day, the nearest Axis unit was 20 miles (32 kilometres) from Msus.[92]

General withdrawal

2nd Armoured Division (United Kingdom) is located in Libya
Msus
Msus
Mechili
Mechili
Derna
Derna
Gazala
Gazala
class=notpageimage|
Key locations in Libya during this period

At first light on 6 April, the KDG reported large forces moving to the east of Msus, which were also reported by RAF reconnaissance flights.[93][94] This was part of the Axis move to concentrate on Mechili, before advancing to cut the coastal road, encircle Allied forces, and retake Tobruk.[95] The 3rd Armoured Brigade started the day with eight cruisers, 14 light tanks, and two M13s. These figures exclude 6RTR, who had abandoned all of their M13s due to mechanical breakdowns and fuel shortages.[95] The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was attached to the division during the day.[94][96][e]

Around 09:00, two Axis field guns opened fire on the fort at Mechili. Two hours later, the 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force) (11th PAVO) captured one German and twenty Italian prisoners after they ventured towards Mechili. Further prisoners were taken around the perimeter during the day, including one who had been directing artillery fire.[98] Neame, unaware of these events, set off into the desert to locate Gambier-Parry to deliver new instructions. At the same time, the attack on the fort prompted O'Connor to order a general withdrawal of all Allied forces towards Gazala via Derna.[94][99]

What followed was a series of confusing and conflicting orders that fragmented the division and omitted the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade.[100] At first, the division moved east towards Mechili. Following the new instructions, the Support Group moved north towards the coastal road to withdraw towards Gazala via Derna. The divisional headquarters, including Gambier-Parry and a battery of artillery, continued towards Mechili. The 3rd Armoured Brigade turned north for Maraura due to a lack of fuel, but found little petrol there. The brigade moved towards Derna via Giovanni Berta, as the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse) (2nd Lancers) escorted a fuel convoy from Mechili towards where they expected the division to be.[94][101] The Axis advance through the desert continued. In the early afternoon, an 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry (18th Cavalry) patrol from El Adem, moved to assist RAF personnel at Acroma, near Tobruk, and captured 18 Italians, the most advanced Axis force.[102] By 17:00, more Axis troops had reached Mechili but not enough to attack; one was expected the next day. Towards dusk, a German officer entered the British perimeter to demand the garrison's surrender and was refused.[103] German troops briefly managed to block some desert tracks near Derna before moving to take up positions near the main coastal road east of the town. German patrols intercepted and disrupted some Allied convoys, which included the capture of Neame and O'Connor, but the route east remained open until the following day.[104]

During the early hours of 7 April, Brigadier Reginald Rimington, GOC 3rd Armoured Brigade, was mortally wounded and captured following his attempt to drive to Derna via an inland desert track. By dawn, the 2nd Support Group and the 3rd Armoured Brigade were stretched out, largely stuck in traffic west of Derna and as far back as Slonta (north of Mechili). The Tower Hamlet Rifles were positioned guarding the western end of the Giovanni Berta pass, near Derna. Gambier-Perry and the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had been surrounded at Mechili.[105] Axis armoured cars had penetrated as far as Timimi (near Gazala) and ambushed some retreating Australian forces. They were repulsed following the fortunate appearance of a 5RTR cruiser tank that had been separated from the rest of the regiment.[106] At 10:00, after elements of the division had passed through Derna, a squadron from the KDG were detached to guard the Derna airfield (6 miles (9.7 kilometres) south of the town) to help keep the inland road open. Elements of the Tower Hamlet Rifles were nearby. By 14:30, 5RTR, now down to four tanks due to mechanical breakdowns, was the last of the divisional tank units to arrive near the airfield; they formed a rearguard. During the early afternoon, the KDG were engaged in a prolonged fight with the vanguard of the Axis forces. Around 15:00, the KDG and some infantry were ordered to withdraw and inadvertently isolated other parts of the rearguard, including 5RTR.[107][108]

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Drew, commander of 5RTR, led the rearguard of his four tanks, elements of the Tower Hamlet Rifles, some anti-tank guns, and elements of the 7th Armoured Division that had been moved up (A Company, 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps; and J Battery, 3rd Royal Horse Artillery).[107][108][109] Around 16:00, German forces at the airfield moved to secure the road and attacked towards Drew's forces. Within thirty minutes, two attacks had been repulsed, with up to eight armoured cars claimed to have been knocked out along with several trucks.[107][110] At 17:15, Drew tried to bypass the airfield with his force covered by the remaining tanks. As the four tanks advanced towards the German positions, fifty other vehicles containing the rearguard (including some Australian forces) moved off. While some vehicles were knocked out, the tanks were able to keep the German forces busy enough to allow the rest to move past the area after which they dispersed; the four tanks were lost.[111] Barton Maughan, author of the Australian official history for this period of the fighting, wrote "by coincidence … the 5th Royal Tanks … [were] where they were most needed and could be most effectively employed that day".[111] The British official history recorded "the action cleared the road also for any troops that remained in Derna" as well as allowing the force to break away.[107]

Demise

At Mechili, on 7 April, the Germans continued to build up their forces surrounding the position. At dawn, elements of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, supported by a battery of guns, launched a minor and unsuccessful raid on the Axis positions. It resulted in the loss of two guns, along with one man killed and another wounded. At 11:00, Axis guns opened fire from a nearby ridge. A small detachment of Indian troops attempted to silence this position, but were unable to get close enough to attack. The shelling continued, but inflicted few casualties. A Germans envoy again demanded the garrison surrender, but was rebuffed by Gambier-Parry as he believed it was a bluff to conceal the weakened German position.[112][113] In the afternoon, Italian forces launched a minor attack but were repulsed with several men and two guns captured. Axis forces then bombarded the position for thirty minutes. At some point during the day, contemporary sources differ on times, 'A' Squadron, 18th Cavalry entered the Mechili perimeter, having skirmished with Axis armoured cars en route.[113] In the evening, a second German officer approached the division to demand surrender and was also refused by Gambier-Perry.[112][113] This refusal was followed by an artillery bombardment, machine-gun fire and some skirmishing between patrols outside the main defences. At around 22:00, Gambier-Perry re-established communication with Cyrenaica Command. He was informed that the rest of his division would not be joining him nor any other reinforcements and was ordered to break-out at first light and head for El Adem.[114]

The break-out was to be led by one squadron of the 18th Cavalry along with a cruiser tank, which belonged to the divisional headquarters. This vanguard was to attack east towards the Axis defensive positions before dawn, to evade the Axis anti-tank guns in the darkness. This eastward move, towards the strongest Axis positions, would be followed by a column formed from the brigade and divisional headquarters. This, in turn, would be followed by engineers and then the remaining personnel. The 11th PAVO would provide flank protection and the 2nd Lancers would form the rearguard of the column. The anti-tank guns were spread out among the column's various units. It was hoped this attack would break through the Axis defences and provide a direct retreat route, avoiding the need to drive deeper into the desert, on a meandering route and through difficult terrain, to bypass Axis forces.[115] Maughan wrote, "If the original plan had been adhered to, if it had been boldly executed, a great measure of success might have been achieved. But the operation miscarried badly".[116]

The tank was late and the attack was delayed to allow it to move up to the start line, resulting in the loss of the cover of dark. Despite this, 24 vehicles of the 18th Cavalry achieved surprise charging an Italian battery of twelve guns. The Indians dismounted and attacked at bayonet point, scattering the battery's personnel for the loss of at least two dead and 15 wounded. With their mission achieved, they remounted their vehicles and proceeded with the escape plan. Instead of following up this move, the rest of the escape column awaited the cruiser to advance. The 11th PAVO then attacked and a large portion of their force broke through the Axis defensive positions, followed by the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade headquarters. The main body followed the cruiser, which moved towards the gun battery previously silenced by the 18th Cavalry. The Italians, having recovered from the surprise, had returned to their guns. They engaged and destroyed the tank, killing the crew. Now alert to the British attack, Axis guns from around the Mechili perimeter opened fire. The artillery and heavy machine gun fire hindered the ability of the division's non-armoured vehicles to attempt a break-out. This was followed by an attack by Axis infantry and German tanks. Two Australian anti-tank guns, part of the rearguard, opened fire in a fierce battle with the German tanks but were unable to stop their attack; the majority of the crews were killed or wounded.[112][117]

Vaughan, who had broken out, returned towards Mechili to aid the extraction of the 2nd Lancers. There was discussion of a break-out to the south or the west but Gambier-Perry made the decision to surrender to spare the men in the soft-skinned vehicles from suffering unnecessary casualties. His surrender was not immediately known to all forces still in the Mechili perimeter due to a sandstorm but by 08:00 fighting had ceased. Elements of the garrison refused to capitulate, in particular 'M' Battery 3rd RHA and portions of the 2nd Lancers who, with non-armoured vehicles, charged the Axis positions and pushed through them without a fight. This force numbered at least 150 men. Eventually, most of these troops were able to make it back to Allied lines at Tobruk, some taking prisoners en route. Those who did not attempt to escape were captured along with Gambier-Perry and Vaughan. In total, around 3,000 prisoners were taken.[112][118]

The remnants of 'C' Squadron, 6RTR, which had failed to reach Derna before it fell, moved south into the desert to avoid Axis forces. They continued to move east, before meeting British reconnaissance forces near El Adem on 10 April. They had been reduced to a force of four trucks. From there, they were escorted into Tobruk, reaching the port an hour before midnight.[119] On 10 May 1941, the 2nd Armoured Division was disbanded.[13] The units that constituted the division continued the war with other formations. In October 1941, XXX Corps was formed, with the officers largely from the remnants of the 2nd Armoured Division HQ staff.[120][121]

Assessment

Maughan wrote "at what great risk and cost had these tanks been shipped across the seas from England to the Middle East! Churchill's courage, energy and determination in sending munitions to Wavell had been frustrated because others failed to ensure that the equipment sent was at least battle-worthy." Maughan highlighted the 38 tanks lost by 5RTR: "one was destroyed by running over a thermos bomb, nine in action with the enemy. The rest were lost simply because they had reached the end of their useful life."[119] A contemporary after action report, by surviving senior officers from the division, noted "this division had not, in fact, had an opportunity for adequate training as a team. It was a collection of units, three of which had only joined shortly before the action, rather than a trained formation. The breakdown in control and administration was largely due to this fact".[122] Gambier-Parry was described as "a conventional and slow minded soldier who couldn't cope with the unexpected". David French described this critique as harsh; the divisional commander "was not a cavalryman" and had transferred from the infantry to the Royal Tank Corps.[123] French looked at "the ineptitude of [the division's] undertrained staff", as well as a lack of logistical support: "[T]he disaster that overtook [the division] was in part caused by the fact that it had no railhead and could not be provided with sufficient motor transport to enable it to build up a sufficient reserve of supplies some 350 miles (560 km) from the nearest base."[124]

The field marshal and historian Michael Carver wrote "a combination of long delays in communications, resulting in misunderstandings and changes in orders, and a general breakdown of the logistical organization within [the division], led to a collapse of any effective resistance".[81] In reviewing the defeat, including the loss of the division, Carver wrote it "must be attributed to failure to face realities at every level. The general state of the force, in terms of training, professional competence, logistical supply and serviceability of equipment, meant that it was no match for its opponent".[125] The general and historian David Fraser wrote, once "the Germans chose to drive across the chord of the Cyrenaican arc there was little to stop them", as the 2nd Armoured Division "had little fighting capacity left as a coherent formation of all arms" following the extensive breakdown of equipment. Had it been able to fight, Fraser criticised a chain of command that would have hindered its ability; the 3rd Armoured Brigade "was subjected to the orders of … Gambier-Parry; … Neame; … Wavell" and O'Connor.[126]

The historian Thomas Jentz argues that, considering the mechanical state of their tanks, the 2nd Armoured Division "didn't have anything to lose in conducting ambush counter-attacks" against their Axis opponents "as recommended in their tactical manual. At no time [was the division] a threat or a hindrance to the advancing German-Italian forces" largely as a result of how they were "tactically handled".[79] Jentz lauded the courage of the tank crews, but criticised their inflexible attitude towards combat and especially manoeuvre, which required permission from the next level in the chain of command to move even one tank. Jentz argued that this lack of flexibility, mixed with a lack of alternative firing positions, explained the rapid tank losses that occurred when the division did engage their opponents. Jentz also criticised the Germans, who showed an equal lack of flexibility against their own doctrine. This resulted in the two sides lining up to fire at one another rather than manoeuvring. The lack of understanding on the Germans' part about the intention of the 2nd Armoured Division resulted in the 5th Light Division being "decimated by mechanical breakdowns" due to "unnecessarily rushing through the desert", a move that resulted in 83 tanks having to be sent to workshops.[127]

General officer commanding

See also: General officer commanding
Appointed General Officer Commanding
15 December 1939 Major-General F. E. Hotblack[13]
17 April 1940 Brigadier C. W. M. Norrie (acting)[13]
10 May 1940 Major-General J. C. Tilly (Died on 5 January 1941)[13]
16 January 1941 Brigadier H. B. Latham (acting)[13]
12 February 1941 Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry (captured, 8 April 1941)[13]

Orders of battle

See also

Notes

Footnotes

  1. ^ These two figures are the war establishment, the paper strength, of an armoured division for 1940.[2]
  2. ^ This was in addition to two other armoured regiments, 48 anti-tank guns with 40,000 rounds, 20 light anti-aircraft guns with 30,000 rounds, 48 25-pounders and 24,000 rounds, 500 machine guns, 250 anti-tank rifles, 50,000 anti-tank mines, one million rounds of .303 ammunition, wireless equipment and 300 tons of spare parts.[34]
  3. ^ Between the end of August and the end of 1940, the following transfers took place: 76,000 men, including Australian and New Zealanders, were shipped from the UK to the Middle East; c. 50,000 troops were dispatched from Australia, India and New Zealand to the Middle East. These reinforcements included administration and supply units, Royal Air Force personnel and machines, reinforcements for depleted formations and new units including seven artillery regiments and five infantry brigades to bring existing divisions up to strength. Additional transfers included the 5th Indian Division and the 1st South African Division, although these went to East Africa.[36]
  4. ^ The dispatch of the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment, for example, deprived the division of 578 men, 168 vehicles and forty-eight 2-pounder anti-tank guns.[53]
  5. ^ The Brigade comprised the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), the 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force), and the 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry. These battalions were technically mechanised cavalry units but lacked armoured vehicles; most men had rifles and moved in trucks. The brigade lacked artillery, anti-tank weapons and had only half of its wireless sets.[96][97] The Brigade was joined by elements of the Australian 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment and the British 3rd Royal Horse Artillery (an anti-tank unit). The Brigade formed a perimeter around the fort, with the 11th Cavalry and a battery of anti-tank guns holding the eastern flank, and the 2nd Lancers and a battery of guns holding the western flank. The 18th Cavalry dispatched numerous patrols.[91]
  6. ^ Joslen lists this regiment as a divisional asset from January through May 1941, but also as part of 3rd Armoured Brigade for the period 26 February until 22 March 1941.[130][54]

Citations

  1. ^ Chappell 1987, p. 12.
  2. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 128–129.
  3. ^ French 2001, pp. 28–29.
  4. ^ French 2001, pp. 36–37.
  5. ^ French 2001, pp. 37–41.
  6. ^ Perry 1988, p. 45.
  7. ^ a b French 2001, p. 42.
  8. ^ Bell 1997, pp. 3–4.
  9. ^ Bell 1997, pp. 258–275, 277–278.
  10. ^ Gibbs 1976, pp. 503–504.
  11. ^ Gibbs 1976, p. 511.
  12. ^ Gibbs 1976, pp. 514, 525.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Joslen 2003, p. 16.
  14. ^ Hardy 2017, pp. 40–44; Pallud 2014, p. 42.
  15. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 14, 16, 168–169.
  16. ^ a b Joslen 2003, p. 144.
  17. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 168.
  18. ^ Newbold 1988, p. 408.
  19. ^ a b Joslen 2003, p. 216.
  20. ^ a b c Hughes, Broshot & Philson 1999, p. 35.
  21. ^ Evans 1942, p. 59.
  22. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 144, 168.
  23. ^ Hardy 2017, p. 40.
  24. ^ "No. 34485". The London Gazette. 18 February 1938. p. 1080.
  25. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 129.
  26. ^ Newbold 1988, pp. 68, 410.
  27. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 345.
  28. ^ Collier 1957, p. 125.
  29. ^ Collier 1957, p. 125; Newbold 1988, p. 417.
  30. ^ Collier 1957, p. 130.
  31. ^ Newbold 1988, pp. 250, 421.
  32. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, p. 190; Fraser 1999, pp. 119–120.
  33. ^ a b "No. 37638". The London Gazette (Supplement). 2 July 1946. p. 3424.
  34. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, p. 190.
  35. ^ Newbold 1988, pp. 422, 426.
  36. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 244–247, 251.
  37. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 16, 151, 168–169.
  38. ^ Higham & Knighton 1955, p. 152; Farndale 1996, p. 103.
  39. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 244–245.
  40. ^ Farndale 1996, p. 103.
  41. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 144, 151.
  42. ^ McCorquodale, Hutchings & Woozley 1950, pp. 144, 151.
  43. ^ Regimental Association. "Second World War 1939–1945". 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards, Regimental Association. Retrieved 28 October 2019. {{cite web}}: |archive-date= requires |archive-url= (help)CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  44. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, p. 478.
  45. ^ Smithers 1987, p. 82, 100.
  46. ^ Doherty 2013, p. 238.
  47. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 122.
  48. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 258–261, 355–362.
  49. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 372–376.
  50. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 2–3.
  51. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 144, 216.
  52. ^ a b Long 1953, p. 30.
  53. ^ War Office 1941, WO 106/3132.
  54. ^ a b c d e f Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 3.
  55. ^ Smithers 1987, p. 82.
  56. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 151, 216.
  57. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 85–88.
  58. ^ French 2001, p. 226.
  59. ^ Jentz 1998, p. 88.
  60. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 4–6.
  61. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 1–9.
  62. ^ Carver 2002, p. 19.
  63. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 14.
  64. ^ Bauer 2000, p. 121.
  65. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 13.
  66. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 82–86.
  67. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 10–12.
  68. ^ a b Maughan 1966, pp. 36–38.
  69. ^ Jentz 1998, p. 82.
  70. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 89–91.
  71. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 49.
  72. ^ a b Jentz 1998, p. 91.
  73. ^ a b Maughan 1966, pp. 49–50.
  74. ^ a b Jentz 1998, pp. 90–91.
  75. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 51–52.
  76. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 54.
  77. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 92–93.
  78. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 92–95.
  79. ^ a b Jentz 1998, p. 101.
  80. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 94–95.
  81. ^ a b Carver 2002, p. 21.
  82. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 57–58.
  83. ^ a b Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 25–26.
  84. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 95–96.
  85. ^ a b c Jentz 1998, p. 96.
  86. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 59–63.
  87. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 26–27.
  88. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 27.
  89. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 67.
  90. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 67, 76.
  91. ^ a b c Maughan 1966, p. 76.
  92. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 81–82.
  93. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 85.
  94. ^ a b c d Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 28.
  95. ^ a b Jentz 1998, p. 97.
  96. ^ a b c Mackenzie 1951, p. 71.
  97. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 8.
  98. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 84, 89.
  99. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 85–86.
  100. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 86, 94.
  101. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 86, 89, 102.
  102. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 87.
  103. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 89.
  104. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 90–95.
  105. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 94–95.
  106. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 95–96.
  107. ^ a b c d Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 29.
  108. ^ a b Maughan 1966, pp. 97–98.
  109. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 218.
  110. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 98–99.
  111. ^ a b Maughan 1966, p. 99.
  112. ^ a b c d Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 30.
  113. ^ a b c Maughan 1966, p. 102.
  114. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 103.
  115. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 103–104.
  116. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 104.
  117. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 104–107.
  118. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 107–108.
  119. ^ a b Maughan 1966, p. 100.
  120. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 133.
  121. ^ Playfair et al. 2004c, pp. 1, 40, 45, 68, 91.
  122. ^ French 2001, p. 227.
  123. ^ French 2001, p. 231.
  124. ^ French 2001, p. 117, 231.
  125. ^ Carver 2002, p. 22.
  126. ^ Fraser 1999, p. 151.
  127. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 101–102.
  128. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 144.
  129. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 168.
  130. ^ a b c Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 151.
  131. ^ a b c d e Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 216.
  132. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 20.
  133. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 47.

References

Further reading

  • Shales, J. (2015). A Detailed Fighting Account of the 2nd Armoured Division, 9th Australian Division, 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, 7th Support Group and 22nd Guards Brigade in Combat with the Afrikakorps and Units of the Ariete, Brescia, Bologna, Pavia and Trento Divisions: February–May 1941. Infantry, Artillery and Tank Combat in Libya and Egypt. Vol. I. Rainham, Kent: Armour. ISBN 978-0-9931732-0-2.
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