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2nd Armoured Division (United Kingdom)

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2nd Armoured Division
Historian Michael Chappell wrote that "a plumed knight's helmet" was chosen as the divisional sign, which was "certainly painted on vehicles and tanks, but probably never worn on uniform, as the division left the UK … before the authorization of battle insignia."[1]
Active1939–1941
Branch British Army
TypeArmour
SizeSecond World War
10,750 men
War Establishment: 342 tanks[a]
Actual: 102 tanks (Libya)
EngagementsOperation Sonnenblume
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry

The 2nd Armoured Division was a division of the British Army, which was active during the early stages of the Second World War. The division's creation had been discussed since the beginning of 1939, with the intent to form it by splitting the 1st Armoured Division. A lack of tanks delayed this until December 1939. After its creation, the division had no units to command for a short period until the 1st Light Armoured Brigade was assigned to it from the 1st Armoured Division, and the 22nd Heavy Armoured Brigade from Southern Command.

In early 1940, priority for equipment was given to the 1st Armoured Division leaving the 2nd Armoured Division understrength and equipped largely with light tanks. After the Battle of France, with a threat of a German invasion of the United Kingdom, priority for equipment shifted to the 2nd Armoured Division. It was brought up to strength and it was planned to use the division to counter-attack the flanks of an invasion force. In August 1940, an armoured regiment from the division was transported to Egypt and transferred to the 7th Armoured Division, but it was replaced. In October, it was decided to transfer the rest of the division to Egypt, as reinforcements for Middle East Command.

Before leaving it swapped a brigade with the 1st Armoured Division. As the new brigade consisted of only one armoured regiment, this reduced the division to three armoured regiments. The division arrived in Egypt in December 1940, and was further reduced in order to support Operation Lustre, an expeditionary force to Greece. This included two-thirds of the division's tanks, a battalion of infantry, as well as artillery support. The renments of the division then moved to the province of Cyrenaica in Italian Libya, conquered during Operation Compass. The remaining tanks were worn-out, and were supplemented by equally decrepit captured Italian models. In March, a German-Italian counter-attack led to the destruction of the division, and the ejection of the British from Cyrenaica except Tobruk. The consensus of historians is there was little the division could have done to prevent this.

Background

During the interwar period, the British Army examined the lessons learnt from the First World War. This included experimentation with and development of theories of manoeuvre and armoured warfare, as well as the creation of the short-lived Experimental Mechanized Force.[3] The long-term impact was for the Army to start to move towards mechanisation, to restore battlefield mobility.[4] By the 1930s, the army had established three types of division: the infantry division, the mobile division (later called an armoured division), and the motor division (a motorised infantry division). The military historian David French wrote: "The main role of the infantry … was to break into the enemy's defensive position". This would then be exploited by the mobile division, followed by the motor divisions that would "carry out the rapid consolidation of the ground captured by the mobile divisions" therefore "transform[ing] the 'break-in' into a 'break-through'".[5]

The Mobile Division was created in October 1937.[6] French wrote that it was

"'tank-heavy' … with too few infantry and support arms. It had six cavalry light tank regiments … three medium tank regiments … two motorized infantry battalions and two artillery regiments. The mechanized cavalry were designed to reconnoitre, not to fight, and the infantry were intended to protect the tanks when they were resting and replenishing."[7]

General John Burnett-Stuart, responsible for training the Mobile Division, stated the infantry were not "to be put on to a position by tanks and told to hold it, and they are not meant to fight side by side with your tanks in the forefront". French wrote this "stood outside the mainstream of official doctrine", which promoted combined-arms co-operation to win battles. According to French, Burnett-Stuart's thinking predominated within the British armoured forces, and lasted until doctrine was reformed in 1942. This delay in change, created a sharp contrast between the British armoured formations and their German counterparts. French wrote the Germans had "concluded that tanks working on their own or merely in conjunction with infantry would never be a decisive weapon" and that "the key to success lay in combining tanks and supporting arms in the same divisional organization".[7]

In the 1930s, tensions increased between Germany and the United Kingdom and its allies.[8] During 1937 and 1938, German demands for the annexation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia led to an international crisis. This was resolved in September 1938 by the Munich Agreement, which accepted that Germany would annexe the Sudetenland.[9] Tension did not subside, and the British Government debated how best to prepare the Army for war. In January 1939, the Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha proposed splitting the Mobile Division into two smaller formations but found no support for this move.[10] The issue was broached again a month later, and was accepted in principle by the Cabinet.[11] Shortly after, the French were informed of a preliminary timetable for the arrival of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the event of war: "One Regular Armoured Division will become available about the middle of 1940, the second would not be available 'till a later date". The formation of a second division during this period was complicated by the slow pace of tank production.[12]

Formation and home service

Photograph of a Vickers light tank with one soldier by the gun turret and another looking through an opening in the front
A Vickers light tank of the 3rd Hussars

The 2nd Armoured Division was activated on 15 December 1939, with Major-General Frederick Hotblack as the first general officer commanding (GOC).[13] Hotblack joined the Royal Tank Corps in 1916, and by 1918 he had become the Army's expert on German tanks. During the 1930s, he had been posted to Germany where he witnessed and reported on the development of German armoured forces. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, in September 1939, he was the BEF's senior advisor on armoured vehicles. [14] The division had no sub-units until the following month, when the 1st Light Armoured Brigade was transferred from the 1st Armoured Division (previously the Mobile Division), and the 22nd Heavy Armoured Brigade was transferred from Southern Command.[15] On assignment to the division, the 1st Light Armoured Brigade comprised three armoured regiments: the 1st King's Dragoon Guards (KDG), the 3rd The King's Own Hussars (3H), and the 4th Queen's Own Hussars (4H).[16] The 22nd Heavy Brigade consisted of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, and the 3rd and the 4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters).[17] The 2nd Support Group, which would contain the division's supporting arms, was formed in February. It did not have sub-units allocated until March, it then composed: the 3rd Field Squadron, Royal Engineers; the 12th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (12 RHA); the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Light-Anti-aircraft/Anti-tank Regiment; and two motorised infantry units: the 1st Battalion, The Rangers, King's Royal Rifle Corps, and the 1st Battalion, Tower Hamlets Rifles, Rifle Brigade (The Prince Consort's Own).[18]

The war establishment, the intended strength, for a light armoured brigade was 108 light tanks and 66 cruiser tanks. The heavy armoured brigade's war establishment was 157 cruiser tanks.[19] British doctrine defined light tanks as reconnaissance vehicles armed only with machine guns. Cruiser tanks were swift moving, more heavy armoured, and equipped with both a machine gun and an anti-tank gun. The primary role of the cruiser tank was to engage and destroy opposing armoured forces. The main weapon, a 2-pounder anti-tank gun, was only supplied with armour-piecing rounds. This meant that these tanks were ineffective against entrenched infantry, or suppressing hostile artillery.[20][21] Despite the war establishment, the division comprised a total of 77 Vickers light tanks in January 1940.[22]

In early 1940, the 1st Armoured Division had priority for equipment, to bring it up to full strength. This decision was to ensure it would be operationally effective when deployed to France and not be the source of political embarrassment. As a result, the 2nd Armoured Division strength increased slowly and was not immediately issued with cruiser tanks.[23][24] On 14 April, the 1st Light Armoured Brigade became the 1st Armoured Brigade, and the 22nd Heavy Armoured Brigade was renamed the 22nd Armoured Brigade.[25] The renaming followed a change in the war establishment of the armoured regiment. Regiments and brigades were to be homogeneous, with each brigade comprising 166 cruiser tanks.[26] In total, including tanks assigned to headquarter units, an armoured division had an establishment of 340 tanks, sixteen 25-pounder field guns, and twenty-four 2-pounder anti-tank guns. By May, the division had 31 light tanks in the 1st Armoured Brigade. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had no serviceable tanks, and made do with lorries in lieu. The division had two 25-pounders, supplemented by four First World War-vintage 18-pounder field guns, four 4.5 in (110 mm) howitzers of similar vintage, and two anti-tank guns.[23][27][28] On 10 May, Major-General Justice Tilly took command after Hotblack ended his tenure as GOC of the division after an apparent stroke. Tilly took over on 10 May, having been an armoured warfare instructor and commander of the 1st Tank Brigade prior to the outbreak of the war.[13][29][30]

Photograph of a Cruiser II tank in a museum with a second tank in the background
A Tank, Cruiser, Mk II CS (A10), as used by the division. The close support (CS) version was armed with a howitzer for firing smoke and high explosive rounds, and not intended to fight other tanks.[23][31]

During this period, the division was held in reserve in the Lincolnshire area.[32] In June, the number of serviceable tanks fluctuated between 178 and 197.[33] After the Battle of France, the division was moved to a position between Northampton, Northamptonshire and Newmarket, Suffolk. The division's role was to strike into the flanks or the rear of any potential German landing in East Anglia or north of The Wash.[34] During July, production priority was given to the division, which received new 25-pounders. By 4 August, the division had 17 new cruiser tanks, and the number of light tanks had increased to 226.[35] During August, despite the threat of invasion, the War Office decided to reinforce Middle East Command. The 3H was transferred to Egypt to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division. The regiment was replaced by the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment (3RTR).[16][36][37][b] The division had a steady increase in tank strength, and at the end of September it had 256 light tanks and 54 cruisers.[39]

By October, the threat of a German invasion had receded. The British were now able to spare additional forces for the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre, which included the dispatch of the 2nd Armoured Division.[c] Prior to being dispatched, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was exchanged with the 3rd Armoured Brigade of the 1st Armoured Division. The 3rd Armoured Brigade consisted of only one regiment, the 5th Royal Tank Regiment (5RTR).[41] The division departed Liverpool in late October, on Convoy W.S. 4a.[42]

Overseas service

Arrival in the Middle East

The convoy sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in Suez at the end of December.[43][44] The division arrived in Egypt with just three armoured regiments: the 4H, the 3RTR, and the 5RTR.[45] The KDG, which had previously been equipped with light tanks, had been made the division's armoured car regiment. This had been intended as a stop-gap measure while the 1st The Royal Dragoons, based in Palestine, was mechanised to take on the role. In January 1941, after the division's arrival in Egypt, the KDG were outfitted with Marmon-Herrington Armoured Cars.[46][47] On arrival, Tilly reported to General Archibald Wavell (Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command and all British land forces in the Middle East) that "the mechanical state of his two Cruiser regiments" was in question, with "the tracks … practically worn out" and "engines [that] had already done a considerable mileage" without overhaul before being transported. The intention had been to replace the tracks once the tanks arrived in Egypt, but the spare parts available were found to be useless.[20][37] On 5 January, Tilly died following an air crash. He was replaced by Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry on 12 February 1941.[13][48] Gambier-Parry had served in the infantry during the First World War, transferred to the Royal Tank Corps in the 1920s, and commanded an infantry brigade in the 1930s. Prior to his appointment as GOC, he was part of a diplomatic mission to Greece.[49][50]

A Cruiser IV tank in the foreground, followed by several others.
Cruiser IV tanks of the 5RTR, prior to their transfer to the division and deployment to Egypt.

While the division was en route to Egypt, Operation Compass had been launched. This was a counter-attack against the Italian invasion of Egypt. The initial objective was limited, to destroy forward Italian forces and advance as far as Sollum near the Libyan border if the situation allowed. By the time the division had arrived, Compass was on the verge of defeating the Italian 10th Army. By February, the offensive had captured the Italian Libyan province of Cyrenaica.[51] Further prosecution of the offensive was discussed, but it was believed the province of Tripolitania would be too hard to defend or supply if captured and that the occupation of Cyrenaica would provide sufficient security for Egypt. The British believed that there would not be an Axis threat to their gains until at least May, by which point additional Allied forces would be available to reinforce the Cyrenaica garrison. British strategy had also shifted to support Greece, and to maintain the status-quo in the Balkans to prevent additional countries from being occupied by Germany or Italy. After discussions with the Greek government, it was decided to dispatch a substantial expeditionary force. This was partly made up by reducing the garrison in Cyrenaica. The transportation of this force was codenamed Operation Lustre.[52][53] On 27 February, as a result, the 1st Armoured Brigade was detached from the division and assigned to the expeditionary force. It arrived in Greece on 18 March with two armoured regiments, which included 52 cruisers and 52 light tanks. The division also lost the 1st Battalion, The Rangers, the 12RHA, and the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Regiment to the expeditionary force.[54][55][d] These units subsequently fought in the Battle of Greece.[55]

Move to Libya

A photograph showing an Italian M13/40 tank with five others in the background
Captured Italian M13/40 tanks – similar to those shown above – were used by several units of the division notably the 6RTR.

In March, the remnants of the 2nd Armoured Division departed Egypt and travelled to Libya, suffering many breakdowns en route.[13][57] The 5RTR began the journey with 58 cruisers, but arrived with 23.[58] Once in Libya, the division consisted of the KDG, the 3H, the 5RTR, the 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles, and the 104th RHA. The 6th Royal Tank Regiment (6RTR), based in Cyrenaica, was assigned to the division.[57][59] The 6RTR had been involved in Operation Compass, and towards the end of the operation had been stripped of its remaining serviceable tanks to reinforce other British units. It was then re-equipped with captured Italian Fiat M13/40 tanks. While equipped with a good 47mm anti-tank gun, the M13 was slow, uncomfortable, and mechanically unreliable. The British tanks had exceeded their engine lives and were also unreliable.[57][60][61] Other division deficiencies included a lack of transport, understaffed workshops, a lack of spare parts, and radios that lacked the required equipment to remain functional.[57][62] By the end of March, the division had 102 tanks: 3H: 26 MK VI light tanks and 12 M13s; 5RTR: 25 Cruiser Mk IVs; 6RTR: 36 M13s; 3rd Armoured Brigade HQ: 3 MK VI light tanks.[63]

Benghazi was the port closest to the frontline. However, Axis bombing had rendered it unusable for landing supplies. The 2nd Armoured Division therefore had to rely on overland routes from Tobruk, around 500 miles (805 km) away via the coastal road or 400 miles (644 km) via desert tracks. A lack of transport meant the British Army created a series of static stockpiles to supply their forward area. This made it impossible to supply a garrison west of El Agheila, which was the most favourable defensive position. It also restricted the mobility of the 2nd Armoured Division, which could not move beyond the range of their supply dumps.[64][65]

The terrain between El Agheila and Benghazi was optimal for armoured warfare, and no easily defensible infantry position existed. Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, GOC Cyrenaica Command, believed his position was untenable without a fully equipped armoured division supported by two complete infantry divisions and adequate air support. The only other major formation available to Neame, was the 9th Australian Division. It was under-equipped, under-trained, and lacked direct communication with the 2nd Armoured Division. One of the 9th Australian Division's brigades remained at Tobruk. The other two were positioned north of Benghazi to hold the high ground of the Jebel Akhdar. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was based south-east of Mersa Brega, where the 2nd Support Group was located. Neame was ordered to give ground if attacked, as the conservation of his force was more important. The 2nd Armoured Division had the conflicting objectives of avoiding tank losses while being ready to operate against the flanks of any Axis armoured force. Neame also predicted that once operations got underway, the 2nd Armoured Division's tank numbers would rapidly dwindle due to breakdowns.[66][67]

Axis offensive

March

Map of Cyrenaica depicting the disposition of the 2nd Armoured Division, and the movement of Axis forces during March and April (click to enlarge).

After the destruction of the 10th Army, Italy dispatched reinforcements to the frontline. This included four infantry divisions, a motorised infantry division, and the 132nd Armoured Division Ariete.[68][69] Germany supplemented this effort with the two-division strong Afrika Korps, under the command of Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel. At the end of March, the German 5th Light Division (147 tanks) and the Ariete Division (46 M13/40s) were on the border of Cyrenaica.[70][71][e] The British underestimated the size of the Axis effort, and believed that only four divisions would be available until the end of May, of which only two could be used in offensive operations due to supply constraints. Royal Air Force (RAF) aerial reconnaissance observed Axis troop movements towards Cyrenaica, and on 25 February spotted German armoured cars. These armoured cars were superior in both speed and armament to the models used by the 2nd Armoured Division. The reconnaissance elements of the latter, avoided contact with their German counterparts in order to minimise losses.[72]

The forward area was patrolled by a single platoon from the 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles, supported by an anti-tank gun attached from the 9th Australian Division, and elements of the KDG. On 23 March, the division had its first action when a German reconnaissance patrol was engaged and forced to withdraw near El Agheila. The Australians claimed three vehicles knocked out. Axis forces took up position in an abandoned colonial fort near El Agheila, and ambushed a patrol from the 1st Tower Hamlets Rifles the following day. German armoured cars also attacked, and one was knocked out by the Australian gun crew. The latter also suffered casualties. The British screening force then withdrew to Mersa Brega, ceding El Agheila to the Axis. German tanks followed, and one or two were lost to anti-tank mines (potentially left over Italian mines, which had not been cleared).[73][74]

On 31 March, the Axis resumed their advance with the first clash taking place just after dawn. Sources either describe one clash from the British or German perspective, or two separate events. The 5th Light Division reported engaging up to five British tanks, in two inconclusive engagements with no losses on either side. The 5RTR reported a patrol of four tanks observing the Axis advance, which they engaged. They claimed three Italian tanks potentially destroyed, with one British tank damaged in return.[75][76] By 09:00, the 3rd Armoured Brigade started a planned withdraw.[77] After 10:00, German forces attacked the 2nd Support Group. Fighting lasted through the day, with the British fending off several assaults. German Junkers Ju 87 Stukas attacked. The 2nd Armoured Division claimed two aircraft destroyed and the Germans recorded their own tanks being subjected to friendly fire. A request for the 3rd Armoured Brigade to be deployed to reinforce the 2nd Support Group was denied. Gambier-Parry reported there was "insufficient time to get them into action from their present position before dark".[78][79] After dark, the 2nd Support Group withdrew 30 miles (48 kilometres) to Agedabia. The Germans captured Mersa Brega the next morning, without further incident. The fighting cost the division 59 men, one tank, eight universal carriers, and numerous other vehicles.[79][80]

April

Photograph of a Cruiser IV tank
An abandoned Cruiser IV of the 5RTR.

The Germans followed, and attacked the 2nd Support Group on 2 April. The latter withdrew a further 30 miles (48 kilometres), and lost men in rearguard actions or who had been surrounded.[81] On the desert flank, the 3rd Armoured Brigade continued to withdraw, although only at 7 mph (11 km/h) in order to match the slowest vehicles that were towing artillery. For most of the day, their movements were shadowed by armoured vehicles they were unable to identify. During the afternoon, the withdrawal was further slowed by breakdowns, conflicting orders, and the need to rest and refuel. This allowed the shadowing armoured vehicles to gain ground. Nine tanks from the 5RTR were ordered to conduct a rearguard action and took up hull-down positions.[82] The 5RTR believed the shadowing tanks were Italian, although they were actually German. The German tanks advanced in an arrowhead formation towards the 5RTR. When the range was between 900–1,500 yards (823–1,372 metres), both sides opened fire. The 5RTR suffered five tank losses and 24 casualties. An after action report from the 5RTR, reported that they claimed at least eight tanks in return.[83] The historian Thomas Jentz wrote that the German records indicate only three German tanks were destroyed, "along with an unrecorded number damaged".[84] The remaining British tanks withdrew to friendly positions, and the regiment regrouped 2 miles (3.2 kilometres) further back. The brigade resumed its retreat, with no German vehicles following.[85] During the day, Gambier-Parry, Neame, and Wavell all issued contradictory orders and queries to the division. These concerned: how and should it conduct its withdrawal, if it was capable of blocking the coastal road, and if the division should remain cohesive or split its forces. The discussions were hampered by ignorance of events, and notably included Neame informing Gambier-Parry that the 3rd Armoured Brigade was not to be committed en masse without his permission.[86][87]

Early on 3 April, the 3rd Armoured Brigade reached Antelat (~31 miles (50 km) northeast of Agedabia, and half way to Msus), and had been located by German aerial reconnaissance. Unknown to the division, the bulk of the 5th Light Division had halted near Bir el Ageradt as it focused on resupplying.[88][89] German and Italian detachments were ordered to probe around the southern flank of the 2nd Armoured Division and reconnoitre towards Msus.[88] In the afternoon, the movements of the 3H and the 6RTR caused alarm and confusion within the 5RTR, which at first believed them to be German.[90] The RAF spotted Axis forces approaching Msus, site of the main divisional supply dump. The 3rd Armoured Brigade, along with some elements of the Support Group, were ordered to move to Msus to deal with the hostile force. However, the division was crippled by a breakdown in communication, resulting in late, missed, and conflicting orders. None of the division arrived at Msus during the day. It was established late in the afternoon that the RAF had mistakenly identified friendly vehicles in the area.[91] By the end of the day, the 3rd Armoured Brigade had been reduced to 18 light tanks, 26 M13s, and 12 cruisers.[90]

On 4 April, the Axis entered Benghazi, which had been abandoned by Allied forces, and had the ultimate objective of reaching Tobruk.[92] During the day, divisional artillery fire halted German reconnaissance forces near Charruba.[93] At midday, Lieutenant-General Richard O'Connor (GOC British Troops in Egypt) arrived at the front and held a meeting with the senior commanders in Cyrenaica, including Gambier-Parry. Gambier-Parry opined that the Axis forces would not attempt a further advance now that Benghazi had been taken.[57][94] However, the decision was made to withdraw from the Jebel Achdar, and for the 2nd Armoured Division to concentrate at Mechili to protect the withdrawal of the Australian infantry. Brigadier Edward Vaughan's recently arrived 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was ordered to secure Mechili, an old Italian stone and mud colonial fort ringed by trenches, to ensure it was in Allied hands when the division arrived.[95] Communication failures impeded the division's withdraw during the day, and further tanks were lost from breakdowns. A supply convoy dispatched for the division was attacked by 18 Axis aircraft, and destroyed with the loss of 1,600 imperial gallons (7,300 L) of fuel.[90][96] By the end of the day, the 5RTR had nine cruisers and the 6RTR had nine M13s.[96] The following day, alarmist reports suggested Axis armoured forces had passed Msus. The KDG, and other Allied units, verified that this was not the case. The tank sightings turned out to be the 2nd Armoured Division. In reality, the nearest Axis unit was 20 miles (32 kilometres) from Msus.[97]

General withdrawal

Photograph if a German Panzer III tank
An example of the German Panzer III, the most common tank in the German Afrika Korps during this period.

On 6 April, Axis forces moved towards Mechili. They inteded to advance towards the coast, and thereby encircle the retreating Allied forces. This move was reported by the KDG and the RAF. The division started the day with 8 cruisers, 14 light tanks, and 2 M13s. During the day, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was attached to the division.[98][f] Mechili was subjected to Axis artillery fire, and Indian patrols took numerous Axis prisoners around the perminter throughout the day.[101] Neame, unaware of these events, set off into the desert to locate Gambier-Parry to deliver new instructions. At the same time, the attack on the fort prompted O'Connor to order a general withdrawal of all Allied forces towards Gazala via Derna.[102][103]

Confusing and conflicting orders were issued, which fragmented the division. These orders failed to address the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, and did not order them to withdraw.[104] At first, the division moved east towards Mechili. Following the instructions, the 2nd Support Group turned north towards the coastal road. The divisional headquarters, including Gambier-Parry and a battery of artillery, continued towards Mechili. The 3rd Armoured Brigade, which had ran low on fuel, moved north to Maraura, but found little petrol. The brigade then moved towards Derna, via Giovanni Berta. At the same time, the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade escorted a fuel convoy from Mechili towards where they expected the division to be.[102][105] In the afternoon, a patrol of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, based at El Adem, intercepted advanced Italian troops at Acroma, near Tobruk, and took 18 prisoners.[106] At Mechili, a build-up of Axis forces took place. Towards dusk, a German officer demanded the garrison's surrender and was refused.[107] Near Derna, German troops briefly managed to block some desert tracks, before moving to a position near the coastal road east of the town. German patrols intercepted and disrupted some Allied convoys, which included the capture of Neame and O'Connor, but the route east remained open until the following day.[108]

Early on 7 April, Brigadier Reginald Rimington, GOC 3rd Armoured Brigade, was mortally wounded and captured after an ambush on a desert track en route to Derna. By dawn, the 2nd Support Group and the 3rd Armoured Brigade were stretched out, stuck in traffic west of Derna; Gambier-Parry and the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade had been surrounded at Mechili; and other elements of the division were positioned near Derna to control the road and desert tracks and engaged in fighting with Axis forces on and off throughout the day. At Timimi, near Gazala, Axis armoured cars had ambushed retreating Australian forces, but had been repulsed by a lone cruiser tank from the 5RTR. The 5RTR's remaining tanks arrived at Derna in the afternoon. By 14:30, the majority of the division had moved through Derna. To the south of Derna, German forces had captured the town's airfield and established a blocking position. The division's rearguard, now separated from the rest of the division, fought an afternoon-long battle with this German force. Several German attacks were fended off,with eight German armoured cars claimed as destroyed. Around 17:15, the 5RTR attacked the German position and lost their remaining tanks. This action covered the withdrawal of the remainder of the rearguard.[109][110] Barton Maughan, author of the Australian official history for this period of the fighting, wrote "by coincidence … the 5th Royal Tanks … [were] where they were most needed and could be most effectively employed that day".[111] The British official history recorded "the action cleared the road also for any troops that remained in Derna" as well as allowing the rearguard to get away.[109]

Demise

At Mechili, on 7 April, the Germans continued to build up their forces surrounding the position. The garrison was subjected to intermittent artillery fire, and skirmishing took place around the perimeter. Two separate German envoys demanded the garrison surrender, and both were refused by Gambier-Parry.[112][113] Around 22:00, Gambier-Parry re-established communication with Cyrenaica Command. He was informed that the rest of his division nor any other force would be joining him, and was ordered to break-out at first light with a destination of El Adem.[114]

The planned break-out was to be led by a single cruiser tank, part of the divisional headquarters, and supplemented by infantry from the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade. The intent was to use a small force to punch a hole through the Axis defensive positions prior to dawn, to negate the Axis anti-tank gun advantage, that would then be followed by the rest of the force east into the desert. Maughan wrote, "If the original plan had been adhered to, if it had been boldly executed, a great measure of success might have been achieved. But the operation miscarried badly".[115] On 8 April, the tank was delayed and the cover of dark lost. Despite this, 24 vehicles of the 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry (18th Cavalry) achieved surprise when they charged an Italian battery of twelve guns. At the position, the Indians dismounted, attacked at bayonet point, and scattered the battery's personnel for the loss of 17 casualties. With their mission achieved, they remounted and proceeded with the escape plan. Instead of exploiting this success, the rest of the escape column awaited the cruiser to advance. A second attack was launched by the 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force), who likewise broke through the Axis defenses. However, the cruiser tank was destroyed when it advanced towards the battery silenced by the 18th Cavalry; the Italians had recovered and returned to their guns. Following this failure, Axis positions fired on the garrison, and impeded further escape efforts. Axis infantry and German tanks then assaulted. Despite the best effort of the supporting Australian anti-tank gun crews, they were unable to stop the German tanks.[112][116] While other escape plans were discussed, Gambier-Parry decided to surrender to spare further casualties. His surrender was not immediately known to all forces still in the Mechili perimeter due to a sandstorm, but all fighting had ceased by 08:00. A force of at least 150 men, from the 3rd RHA and the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), refused to capitulate. They charged, unmolested, through Axis positions in non-armoured vehicles. The majority of this small force made it to Tobruk, and took prisoners en route. Roughly 3,000 Allied troops were captured at Mechili, including Gambier-Parry and Vaughan.[112][117]

Elements of the 6RTR, which had failed to reach Derna prior to the Axis arrival, moved south into the desert to avoid contact. They continued east, before meeting British reconnaissance forces near El Adem on 10 April, and reached Tobruk just prior to midnight.[118] On 10 May 1941, the 2nd Armoured Division was disbanded.[13] The units that constituted the division continued the war with other formations. In October 1941, XXX Corps was formed with officers largely from the remnants of the 2nd Armoured Division HQ staff.[119][120]

Assessment

Maughan wrote "at what great risk and cost had these tanks been shipped across the seas from England to the Middle East! Churchill's courage, energy and determination in sending munitions to Wavell had been frustrated because others failed to ensure that the equipment sent was at least battle-worthy." He pointed to the 38 tanks lost by the 5RTR: "one was destroyed by running over a thermos bomb, nine in action with the enemy. The rest were lost simply because they had reached the end of their useful life."[118] A contemporary after action report, by 2nd Armoured Division senior officers, stated "this division had not, in fact, had an opportunity for adequate training as a team. It was a collection of units, three of which had only joined shortly before the action, rather than a trained formation. The breakdown in control and administration was largely due to this fact".[121] Gambier-Parry was described as "a conventional and slow minded soldier who couldn't cope with the unexpected". David French described this critique as harsh; the divisional commander "was not a cavalryman" and had transferred from the infantry to the Royal Tank Corps.[122] French looked at "the ineptitude of [the division's] undertrained staff", as well as a lack of logistical support: "[T]he disaster that overtook [the division] was in part caused by the fact that it had no railhead and could not be provided with sufficient motor transport to enable it to build up a sufficient reserve of supplies some 350 miles (563 km) from the nearest base."[123]

The field marshal and historian Michael Carver wrote "a combination of long delays in communications, resulting in misunderstandings and changes in orders, and a general breakdown of the logistical organization within [the division], led to a collapse of any effective resistance".[86] In reviewing the defeat, Carver wrote it "must be attributed to failure to face realities at every level. The general state of the force, in terms of training, professional competence, logistical supply and serviceability of equipment, meant that it was no match for its opponent".[124] The general and historian David Fraser wrote, once "the Germans chose to drive across the chord of the Cyrenaican arc there was little to stop them", as the 2nd Armoured Division "had little fighting capacity left as a coherent formation of all arms" following the extensive breakdown of equipment. Had it been able to fight, Fraser criticised a chain of command that would have hindered its ability; the 3rd Armoured Brigade "was subjected to the orders of … Gambier-Parry; … Neame; … Wavell" and O'Connor.[125]

The historian Thomas Jentz argued that, considering the mechanical state of their tanks, the 2nd Armoured Division "didn't have anything to lose in conducting ambush counter-attacks" against their Axis opponents "as recommended in their tactical manual. At no time [was the division] a threat or a hindrance to the advancing German-Italian forces" largely as a result of how they were "tactically handled".[84] Jentz lauded the courage of the tank crews, but criticised their inflexible attitude towards combat and especially manoeuvre, which required permission from the next level in the chain of command to move even one tank. Jentz argued that this lack of flexibility, mixed with a lack of alternative firing positions, explained the rapid tank losses that occurred when the division did engage their opponents. Jentz also criticised the Germans, who showed an equal lack of flexibility against their own doctrine. This resulted in the two sides lining up to fire at one another rather than manoeuvring. The lack of understanding on the Germans' part about the intention of the 2nd Armoured Division resulted in the 5th Light Division being "decimated by mechanical breakdowns" due to "unnecessarily rushing through the desert", a move that resulted in 83 tanks having to be sent to workshops.[126]

General officer commanding

Appointed General Officer Commanding
15 December 1939 Major-General F. E. Hotblack[13]
17 April 1940 Brigadier C. W. M. Norrie (acting)[13]
10 May 1940 Major-General J. C. Tilly (Died on 5 January 1941)[13]
16 January 1941 Brigadier H. B. Latham (acting)[13]
12 February 1941 Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry (captured, 8 April 1941)[13]

Orders of battle

See also

Notes

Footnotes

  1. ^ These two figures are the war establishment, the paper strength, of an armoured division for 1940.[2]
  2. ^ This was in addition to two other armoured regiments, 48 anti-tank guns with 40,000 rounds, 20 light anti-aircraft guns with 30,000 rounds, 48 25-pounders and 24,000 rounds, 500 machine guns, 250 anti-tank rifles, 50,000 anti-tank mines, one million rounds of .303 ammunition, wireless equipment, and 300 tons of spare parts.[38]
  3. ^ Between the end of August and the end of 1940, the following transfers took place: 76,000 men, including Australian and New Zealanders, were shipped from the UK to the Middle East; c. 50,000 troops were dispatched from Australia, India and New Zealand to the Middle East. These reinforcements included administration and supply units, Royal Air Force personnel and machines, reinforcements for depleted formations and new units including seven artillery regiments and five infantry brigades to bring existing divisions up to strength. Additional transfers included the 5th Indian Division and the 1st South African Division, although these went to East Africa.[40]
  4. ^ The dispatch of the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment, for example, deprived the division of 578 men, 168 vehicles and forty-eight 2-pounder anti-tank guns.[56]
  5. ^ The 5th Light Division had 25 Panzer I, 45 Panzer II, 60 Panzer III, and 17 Panzer IV.[71]
  6. ^ The brigade comprised the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse), the 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force), and the 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry. These battalions were motorised infantry, and lacked artillery, anti-tank weapons, and had half of the required wireless sets.[99][100] The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade was joined by elements of the Australian 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment and the British 3rd Royal Horse Artillery (an anti-tank unit). They formed a perimeter around the fort, and dispatched patrols.[96]
  7. ^ Joslen listed this regiment as a divisional asset from January through May 1941, but also as part of 3rd Armoured Brigade for the period 26 February until 22 March 1941.[129][57]

Citations

  1. ^ Chappell 1987, p. 12.
  2. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 128–129.
  3. ^ French 2001, pp. 28–29.
  4. ^ French 2001, pp. 36–37.
  5. ^ French 2001, pp. 37–41.
  6. ^ Perry 1988, p. 45.
  7. ^ a b French 2001, p. 42.
  8. ^ Bell 1997, pp. 3–4.
  9. ^ Bell 1997, pp. 258–275, 277–278.
  10. ^ Gibbs 1976, pp. 503–504.
  11. ^ Gibbs 1976, p. 511.
  12. ^ Gibbs 1976, pp. 514, 525.
  13. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Joslen 2003, p. 16.
  14. ^ Hardy 2017, pp. 40–44; Pallud 2014, p. 42.
  15. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 14, 16, 168–169.
  16. ^ a b Joslen 2003, p. 144.
  17. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 168.
  18. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 216.
  19. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 138.
  20. ^ a b Playfair et al. 2004a, p. 478.
  21. ^ Zaloga 2015, pp. 80, 82.
  22. ^ Newbold 1988, p. 408.
  23. ^ a b c Hughes, Broshot & Philson 1999, p. 35.
  24. ^ Evans 1942, p. 59.
  25. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 144, 168.
  26. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 139.
  27. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 129.
  28. ^ Newbold 1988, pp. 68, 410.
  29. ^ Hardy 2017, p. 40.
  30. ^ "No. 34485". The London Gazette. 18 February 1938. p. 1080.
  31. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 345.
  32. ^ Collier 1957, p. 125.
  33. ^ Collier 1957, p. 125; Newbold 1988, p. 417.
  34. ^ Collier 1957, p. 130.
  35. ^ Newbold 1988, pp. 250, 421.
  36. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, p. 190; Fraser 1999, pp. 119–120.
  37. ^ a b "No. 37638". The London Gazette (Supplement). 2 July 1946. p. 3424.
  38. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, p. 190.
  39. ^ Newbold 1988, pp. 422, 426.
  40. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 244–247, 251.
  41. ^ Joslen 2003, p. 16, 151, 168–169.
  42. ^ Higham & Knighton 1955, p. 152; Farndale 1996, p. 103.
  43. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 244–245.
  44. ^ Farndale 1996, p. 103.
  45. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 144, 151.
  46. ^ McCorquodale, Hutchings & Woozley 1950, pp. 144, 151.
  47. ^ Regimental Association. "Second World War 1939–1945". 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards, Regimental Association. Retrieved 28 October 2019. {{cite web}}: |archive-date= requires |archive-url= (help)CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  48. ^ Smithers 1987, p. 82, 100.
  49. ^ Doherty 2013, p. 238.
  50. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 122.
  51. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 258–261, 355–362.
  52. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 372–376.
  53. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 2–3.
  54. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 144, 216.
  55. ^ a b Long 1953, p. 30.
  56. ^ War Office 1941, WO 106/3132.
  57. ^ a b c d e f Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 3.
  58. ^ Smithers 1987, p. 82.
  59. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 151, 216.
  60. ^ Playfair et al. 2004a, pp. 290–291.
  61. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 85–88.
  62. ^ French 2001, p. 226.
  63. ^ Jentz 1998, p. 88.
  64. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 4–6.
  65. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 15.
  66. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 1–9.
  67. ^ Carver 2002, p. 19.
  68. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 14.
  69. ^ Bauer 2000, p. 121.
  70. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 13.
  71. ^ a b Jentz 1998, pp. 82–86.
  72. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 10–12.
  73. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 36–38.
  74. ^ Jentz 1998, p. 82.
  75. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 89–91.
  76. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 49.
  77. ^ Jentz 1998, p. 91.
  78. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 49–50.
  79. ^ a b Jentz 1998, pp. 90–91.
  80. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 49–52.
  81. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 54.
  82. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 92–93.
  83. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 92–95.
  84. ^ a b Jentz 1998, p. 101.
  85. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 94–95.
  86. ^ a b Carver 2002, p. 21.
  87. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 57–58.
  88. ^ a b Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 25–26.
  89. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 95–96.
  90. ^ a b c Jentz 1998, p. 96.
  91. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 59–63.
  92. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, pp. 26–27.
  93. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 27.
  94. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 67.
  95. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 67, 76.
  96. ^ a b c Maughan 1966, p. 76.
  97. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 81–82.
  98. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 85; Jentz 1998, p. 97; Mackenzie 1951, p. 71; Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 28.
  99. ^ a b Mackenzie 1951, p. 71.
  100. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 8.
  101. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 84, 89.
  102. ^ a b Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 28.
  103. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 85–86.
  104. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 86, 94.
  105. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 86, 89, 102.
  106. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 87.
  107. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 89.
  108. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 90–95.
  109. ^ a b Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 29.
  110. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 97–99.
  111. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 99.
  112. ^ a b c Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 30.
  113. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 102–103.
  114. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 103.
  115. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 103–104.
  116. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 104–107.
  117. ^ Maughan 1966, pp. 107–108.
  118. ^ a b Maughan 1966, p. 100.
  119. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 133.
  120. ^ Playfair et al. 2004c, pp. 1, 40, 45, 68, 91.
  121. ^ French 2001, p. 227.
  122. ^ French 2001, p. 231.
  123. ^ French 2001, p. 117, 231.
  124. ^ Carver 2002, p. 22.
  125. ^ Fraser 1999, p. 151.
  126. ^ Jentz 1998, pp. 101–102.
  127. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 144.
  128. ^ Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 168.
  129. ^ a b c Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 151.
  130. ^ a b c d e Joslen 2003, pp. 16, 216.
  131. ^ Playfair et al. 2004b, p. 20.
  132. ^ Maughan 1966, p. 47.

References

Further reading

  • Shales, J. (2015). A Detailed Fighting Account of the 2nd Armoured Division, 9th Australian Division, 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, 7th Support Group and 22nd Guards Brigade in Combat with the Afrikakorps and Units of the Ariete, Brescia, Bologna, Pavia and Trento Divisions: February–May 1941. Infantry, Artillery and Tank Combat in Libya and Egypt. Vol. I. Rainham, Kent: Armour. ISBN 978-0-9931732-0-2.