Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)

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The Iraqi resistance comprises groups and political parties advocating violent and non-violent actions in Iraq during the occupation and the interim period.

The collective term usually denotes the various guerrillas and insurgents battling and opposed to the presence of the American-led coalition forces and Iraqi security forces during the occupation that followed the Iraq war on May 1, 2003. As of the transfer of power to the Iraq interim government, forces controlled by the interim government have also become targets by the militants. Not all resistance to the occupation and interim government is violent: there are various Iraqi groups and political parties advocating peaceful non-violent resistance.

Composition

File:Baqubahmilitant.jpg
Iraqi militants : Members of the insurgency on a street corner during clashes with U.S troops in Baquba, north of Baghdad, on July 25, 2004.

The Iraqi resistance is composed of over a dozen major resistance organizations and countless smaller cells. It can be subdivided into several main ideological strands, some of whom can overlap:

The Ba'athists are former former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power. The prewar organization of the Ba’ath Party and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-Saddam resistance after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for guerrilla war following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power. Following Saddam's capture, the rhetoric of the Ba’athist insurgents gradually shifted to become either nationalist or Islamist, with the goal of restoring the Ba’ath Party to power as it once was seemingly out of reach. Ba'athists may have switched to nationalism. Many former Ba'athists have adopted an Islamist facade in order to attract more credibility within the country and perhaps funding from outside Iraq.

The nationalists, largely hailing from the Sunni regions, are former members of the Iraqi military as well as some ordinary Iraqis. Their reasons for opposing the occupation vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to the Coalition’s failure to keep its promises to restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty. Many Iraqis who have had relatives killed by Alliance soldiers may also be involved in the nationalist resistance as part of the Iraqi code of tribal revenge. Beyond the expulsion of Coalition troops from Iraq, there is no coherent political goal being pursued by the Iraqi guerrillas fighting under the banner of nationalism, only references to self-rule and even elections. Most likely, the majority of the low-level members of the indigenous Sunni resistance (such as foot soldiers) fall under this broad category.

File:Sadrprotest.jpg
Iraqi Shi'ites arrive in Najaf in a show of support for Moqtada al-Sadr in August 2004

The Moqtada al-Sadr followers, adherants to the commands of the young Shiite Islamist cleric (and following, reportedly, Islamist politics), are largely young, unemployed and often impoverished men from the Shiite urban areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shiite cities. The armed wing of the Sadr movement, and Sadr’s personal militia, is known as Jaish-i-Mahdi or the Mahdi Army. The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from Basra in the south to Sadr City in central Iraq (some scattered Shiite militia activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shiite minorties exist). The Mahdi Army uprising involved several thousand fighters; almost 1,000 participated in one assault alone in Sadr City on a Coalition convoy. On March 29, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority shut down Sadr's daily newspaper, al-Hawza, claiming it was an incitement to violence. Thousands of people turned out to protest. The ensuing riots ended up with the deaths of one Salvadoran and several American soldiers.

Supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr are driven by a variety of beliefs and grievances, a combination of religious zealotry and a desire to establish a Shiite Islamic state. They believe that the members of the Coalition are foreign occupiers and oppressors, that they have failed to live up to their promises, and that Islamic law must be eventually be established in Iraq. Sadr’s movement also opposes any breakup of Iraq according to ethnic, religious, or other lines. The Mahdi Army is believed to number between 3,000 and 10,000 guerrillas.

The Sunni Islamists are composed of Iraqis belonging to the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, which advocates a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and opposes any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia (of which Osama bin Laden is a member), one difference being that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards Shiites. Hard-line clerics and remaining underground cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq have helped provide support for the indigenous militant Islamist movement. Emerging as the most public face of this faction of the Iraqi insurgency, and the most influential of the hard-line Salafi clerics, is the founder of the ultra-conservative Association of Islamic Scholars, Sheik Hareth al Dhari.

Foreign Fighters are outside Islamists (and others) who have entered the country, mostly through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, and see Iraq as the new “field of jihad” in the battle against coalition forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam may be involved. The U.S and its allies point to Jordanian-born suspected al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi is believed the head of an insurgent group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy Struggle), which according to U.S estimates numbers in the low hundreds. The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of controversy. If the Coalition military is to be believed, however, he is the single most dangerous and capable insurgent operative working against the U.S-led coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major terrorist-style attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of Zarqawi, including both foreign guerrillas and some Iraqis who have adopted a hardline Wahabi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the insurgency. The main source of the divide is over the suicide bombings that have inflicted heavy Iraqi civilian casualties, along with disagreements about whether to cooperate with the Shiites and the Shiite resistance.

Apart from the armed resistance, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation Congress set up by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi includes a broad range of religious/ethnic and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed resistance which it regards as any nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. It opposes institutions designed to implement American plans” such as the Allawi government and the US-organized national conference designed as the antecedent to a parliament.[1]

Although banned by the CPA, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq’s Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition. [2]. However, the divisions in Iraq between religious and ethnic groups (and, in particular, between the general population and various violent groups) have became more apparent.

Insurgents' tactics

For most attacks, the Iraqi guerrillas operate in small teams of 5-10 men in order to maintain mobility and escape detection. Since April 2004, attacks involving larger groups of insurgents have become more common, although large units also appeared in a few instances beforehand, such as a battle near the Syrian border town of Rawa on June 13, 2003 and a large ambush of a U.S convoy in the town of Samarra on November 30, 2003.

Assaults combining the following weapons and tactics, involving IEDs, RPGs, mortars, and car bombs all at once, have increasingly appeared.

IEDs

Many Iraqi guerrilla attacks against coalition targets have taken the form of attacks on convoys and patrols using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. These explosive devices, made from former Iraqi military armaments and/or homemade materials, are concealed or camouflaged along main roads and detonated either by remote control or by wire when a convoy or patrol passes. The devices come in a wide variety of forms, but usually take the form of 155mm artillery shells, rigged with plastic explosives, and attached to a detonator that is triggered by cell phone signal or through a garage-door opener.

They are hidden behind roadside rails, on telephone poles, buried in the ground or in piles of garbage, disguised as rocks or bricks, and even placed inside dead animals. This has emerged as the most lethal method the insurgents have developed to attack coalition forces. Ambushes on Coalition forces with small arms and/or RPG fire also occurs, and both suicide and non-suicide car bombs have also been used.

Ambushes

In addition, guerrillas frequently launched ambushes of U.S convoys and patrols, along with those of Iraqi security forces, using AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Soft-skinned humvees are most commonly targeted. The congested and constricted terrain of the urban areas, and in the rural areas, palm groves and other crops, offer cover and concealment for insurgents launching ambushes. These attacks are usually broken off before support can be called in, in traditional guerrilla fashion. There have been isolated cases of larger ambushes, such as an attack on a Coalition convoys in Samarra on November 30 that involved 100 fighters and a massive ambush of a Coalition convoy in Sadr City on April 4 by Mahdi Army militiamen numbering over 1,000 men.

Mortar and rocket strikes

Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run mortar strikes on coalition bases, or on specific buildings in urban areas associated with the Iraqi government or coalition forces. Insurgents fire a few mortar rounds or rockets and quickly escape before their position can be identified and effective counter-fire directed. Insurgents use urban areas heavily populated by civilians as firing positions to discourage counter-fire, and in the countryside, palm groves and orchards are used for concealment.

This method is very inaccurate and rarely hits the intended target, since the guerrillas don’t have time to aim properly, but casualties are still periodically inflicted by incoming mortar rounds and rockets (reportedly, due to the volume of fire). Improvised multiple-rocket launchers have also been used to target buildings in urban areas. The daily RPG and mortar attacks usually rely on squad-sized teams of 5-10 men.

Attacks on helicopters

Since the beginning of November of 2003, helicopters have also been increasingly targeted. The insurgents, often concealed in palm groves, lie in wait for the helicopters and then, usually, attack the helicopter from the rear. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the SA-7, SA-14, and in one case the SA-16. Countermeasures taken by helicopter pilots, such as flying very low at a high speed, have considerably reduced the number of helicopters shot down by reducing the accuracy of the heat-seeking missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.

File:Sabotage.jpg
An Iraqi policeman guards a blazing oil pipeline after a sabotage attack in southern Iraq on July 3, 2004.

Sabotage

Insurgent saboteurs have also repeatedly assaulted the Iraqi oil industry. Guerrillas, using either rocket-propelled grenades or explosives, regularly destroy portions of oil pipeline in northern Iraq, and had expanded to southern Iraq by April of 2004. This sabotage has set back reconstruction efforts by Iraq and the multinational coalition by reducing oil revenues. Coalition officials contend the sabotage is intended to set back reconstruction efforts and to push back progress in Iraqi society towards democracy.

There have also been allegations of attacks on water pipelines and the electrical grid by the Iraqi insurgents, although there is controversy as to whether the incidents in question did indeed represent intended sabotage. Among the reasons the resistance gives for the sabotage is to prevent an American seizure of Iraqi oil, which some opponents of the occupation believe was one of the main reasons for the invasion.

In the early months of the occupation, oil pipelines repeatedly came under attack. The northern oil pipeline to Turkey was destroyed immediately following the U.S. announcement of the intent to ship oil out via that route, and on June 23 a major pipe junction leading to Syria and Lebanon was destroyed. Together these attacks crippled much of the ability to transport northern Iraqi oil. In the south an attack on June 22 destroyed the main oil pipeline leading from southern oil fields to the Baghdad oil refineries. In addition widespread looting, which contractors believe to be systematic and intended as sabotage, has crippled the attempt to bring production in the supergiant Rumaila oil field back up to speed. By April 2004, after the establishment of Iraqi oil pipeline police, production in the north and south oil fields had returned back to pre-war levels. The overall production was still 600,000 barrel (95,000 m³) per day below the pre-war level, and 2.8 million barrel (450,000 m³) per day below US plans for 2004. A series of attacks in early June 2004 again crippled production to near zero.

Suicide bombers

Since August of 2003, as Coalition forces gradually strengthened their defences, suicide car bombs have been used increasingly as weapons by guerrilla forces. The car bombs, known in the military as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, have emerged as one of their most effective weapons, along with the roadside improvised explosive devices. They have a number of benefits for the rebels: they deliver a large amount of firepower and inflict large amounts of casualties at little cost.

File:Suicidebombcarnage.jpg
Relatives mourn over the bodies of victims of a massive suicide car bomb in Baquba, north of Baghdad, which left a scene of carnage in its wake, mostly among civilians.

Non-military and civilian targets

There also have been several attacks on non-military and civilian targets, especially since August of 2003. These include the murder of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Governing Council and suicide bombings targeting the U.N., the Jordanian Embassy, Shiite mosques and civilians, the International Red Cross, the Iraqi police, Coalition forces, Kurdish political parties, the president of the Iraqi Governing Council, hotels, Christian churches, and a restaurant. Militants target private contractors working for the coalition, as well as other non-Alliance support military personnel. The number of these attacks on soft targets has steadily increased. The origin of these devastating bombings remains a mystery. The main suspects are foreign jihadis, former Iraqi intelligence operatives, or perhaps a combination of the two.

Coalition officials and some analysts suspect that the aim of these attacks is to sow chaos and sectarian discord. Coalition officials point to an intercepted letter suspected to be from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he makes the case for attacking Shiites in order to provoke an anti-Sunni backlash and thereby galvanize the Sunni population in support of the insurgents, as evidence. While hard-core Wahabi jihadists among the resistance, who may indeed desire a sectarian war, other insurgents charge that the Coalition is attempting to instill a fear of civil war as part of a divide and conquer strategy.

Assassinations and kidnappings

Assassination of local and government officials, translators for coalition forces, employees at coalition bases, informants, and other (so-called) collaborators has been a regular occurrence. Assassinations have taken place in a variety of ways, from close-range small arms fire and drive-by shootings to suicide car-bombers ramming convoys.

Kidnapping, and in some cases, beheadings, have emerged as another insurgent tactic since April. Foreign civilians have borne the brunt of the kidnapings, although U.S military personnel have also been targeted. After kidnaping the victim, the insurgents typically make some sort of demand of the government of the hostage's nation and give a time limit for the demand to be carried out, often 72 hours. Beheading is often threatened if the government fails to heed the wishes of the hostage takers. At least two individuals, an American civilian (Nicholas Berg) and a South Korean (Kim Sung Il), have been beheaded. Other hostages may have also been killed, although it is unconfirmed as no evidence as emerged. In both cases, tapes of the beheadings were distributed for propaganda purposes.

The goal of the kidnapings mainly appears to be to terrify foreign civilians into immobilization and to attract media attention and possibly inspire recruits. Most kidnapings have been conducted by radical Sunni groups, but a Shiite group, possibly indirectly linked to Jaish-i-Mahdi, kidnaped an American journalist in August of 2004. Aides of Moqtada al-Sadr successfully lobbied for the individual’s release. The Mahdi Army, as well as the nationalist and more moderate religious elements of the Sunni resistance, have rejected kidnaping as a legitimate tactic.

Attacks on the police

Another insurgent tactic that has been increasingly used since April of 2004 consists of assaults and raids on police stations and compounds of Iraqi security forces involving platoon-sized elements or larger, oftentimes up to 150 men. The insurgents do this in order to increase their control over the population and punish, in the militant's view, "collaborators".

Raids and larger attacks

Assaults combining the following weapons and tactics, involving IED's, RPG's, mortars, and car bombs all at once, have increasingly appeared. Such raids and larger attacks have been advanced by Sunni insurgents in cities such as Fallujah, Ramadi, and Baquba and by Shiite Mahdi Army militiamen in Baghdad, Najaf, Kufa, al-Kut, Nasiriyah, and other central and southern cities. These attacks are usually coordinated and are meant to kill soft targets , to throw the Iraqi security forces into disarray, to conduct psychological warfare, and to draw out the coalition occupation forces. Guerrillas have also conducted large ambushes, including a coordinated ambush on U.S convoys in Sadr City by the Mahdi Army in April of 2004 that involved nearly 1,000 militiamen.

Analysis and polls

A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerrillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning hearts and minds. It appears as though the Iraqi resistance retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition counterinsurgency operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation.

Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is for a number of reasons: many residents received employment and opportunities from the former regime, the area has a history of strong tribalism and suspicion of outsiders, it is religiously conservative, and it has seen civilian casualties from coalition counterinsurgency operations.

Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is largely eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, although supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there is a great deal of pro-American sentiment and an almost unanimous distaste for anti-coalition violence. The situation is more complicated in the Shiite regions. There has grown a sizeable support for Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical cleric who has advocated violent resistance, from about 1/3 of the Shiite community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas, and that support has grown dramatically, once numbering little more than 2%. However, support for violent resistance is notably less enthusiastic in the Shiite than the Sunni community, who like the Kurds saw persecution under the Ba'ath regime and from the Sunnis. Shiite therefore been more hesitant, along with having a moderate clerical establishment under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that has advocated caution.

Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, believe in cooperation with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and peaceful protest instead of violence. Many Shiites and Kurds suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime which may cause a reluctanceto use violence against Coalition forces. This is in contrast to the more radical Moqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes, the uneducated, and the Shiite urban population.

A series of polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on the insurgency and the Coalition occupation. A poll in late 2003 showed that about one-third of all Sunni Arabs are staunch supporters of the guerrillas and consider armed attacks on occupying forces acceptable. In al-Anbar province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, solid support for the Iraqi resistance stood at 70%. Only about 10% of the Shiite Arab population supported violent resistance. Support was very minimal for attacks on Alliance forces among the Kurds. Curiously, the poll (which was supposed to cover an even distribution of the Iraqi population) showed more people stating that they are Sunnis (44%) than Shiites (33%), leading to speculation that the poll's sample was skewed. [3]. The poll was also conducted before the spring 2004 occupation crackdown on the insurgency in Fallujah and the fighting in the Shiite heartland which was widely condemned by Iraqis, including normally pro-US members of the governing council, and turned more people against the occupation.

In another instance, in late January and early February 2004, a joint statement was distributed in leaflet form by a dozen resistance organizations vowing to take control of Iraqi cities after occupation forces withdraw, and portraying the Alliance's planned withdrawal as a defeat. Iraqi civilians' reaction to the statement were reported to vary widely, from being "hailed as the manifesto for a legitimate resistance movement" to being dismissed "as mere bravado".

U.S./Middle East historian Juan Cole assesses the recent outcome of the Najaf standoff of August 2004 as follows: the Americans (becoming more unpopular) and the Allawi government (more viewed as the indecisive neo-imperialistsist's puppet) are losers. Sistani has gained nationalist credentials as a national hero saving Najaf. Muqtada has neither lost nor gained. His southern cities slums movement is intact, even with a weakened paramilitary. [4]

Scope and size of the insurgency

The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in Baghdad and a triangle stretching west from the capital to the town of Ramadi and north to Tikrit in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Guerrilla activity also takes place around al-Qaim in western Iraq and around the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk to the north, as well as some other areas of the country. Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas vary, and the number itself likely fluctuates, the latest assessment put the number at 20,000, including both the Sunni and Shiite insurgencies. In November of 2003 the Coalition military and the U.S. CIA put the total number of core fighters at 5,000, along with a network of 20,000 to 50,000 active supporters. This included only the Sunni insurgents since the Mahdi Army uprising had not yet occurred. The Iraqi police and insurgents have certain factors in common: they include a large number of veterans of the elite former military and security services, they are traditionally religiously conservative, and they have histories of strong tribalism. At various points, the Alliance has provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions (although these numbers likely fluctuate).

In Fallujah, a major safe-haven and base area for the guerrillas and considered the center of the Sunni insurgency, it was estimated in April of 2004 that 2,000 guerrillas were present. There were reportedly over 2,000 in Samarra. In Baquba, another Sunni city north of Baghdad considered a major flashpoint, a June 2004 estimate put the number of insurgents at 1,000. In December of 2003, the Coalition military reported that it believed there were 1,000 insurgents in Baghdad (this number has likely grown larger, especially including the Shiite insurgency) and 2,000 in Samarra, another Sunni guerrilla center about 25 miles south of Tikrit.

Guerrilla activity also takes place in a number of other areas. One is the city of Ramadi, which has seen some of the heaviest and most skilled resistance and is under guerrilla control with the exception of about half a dozen small forts operated by the U.S Marines. Another is the region around al-Qaim, a Sunni city near the Syrian border and believed to be a foreign fighter infiltration route. Insurgents are also contesting control of the ethnically diverse northern city of Mosul, and both Sunni and Shiite insurgents have been known to operate in Kirkuk, another northern city with religious and ethnic tensions. The rural belt of land along the Tigris river stretching north of Baghdad to Tikrit has also seen concentrated Sunni guerrilla activity.

Rate of attacks and Coalition casualties

Main article: Invasion and occupation of Iraq casualties

The total number of guerrilla attacks on coalition forces from June 2003 to March 2004 generally remained steady at between 12 and 20 attacks per day, with the exception of a surge of attacks in November 2003 during which as many as 50 attacks per day were reported on some days. The average number of attacks spiked to 70 a day during April, before stabilizing to 35-50 a day after the beginning of May, where it has remained since. As of August 25, 2004, 1,097 Coalition soldiers have been killed since the war in Iraq began, 966 of them American. From the beginning of the war to August 14, 2004, 6,497 U.S coalition soldiers were wounded in action, with many more injured in non-hostile incidents such as vehicle accidents.

History of the Insurgency

Main article: History of Iraqi insurgency

Beginning

File:IraqMosul.jpg
Supporters of Iraqi ex-President Saddam Hussein march in the streets of the northern city of Mosul on July 4, 2004 in protest of the Iraqi Special Tribunal.

In May of 2003, after the war to topple Saddam Hussein had officially ended and the Iraqi conventional forces had been defeated, the Coalition noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on Alliance troops in various regions of the so-called “Sunni Triangle,” especially in Baghdad and in the regions around Fallujah and Tikrit. These consisted of small groups of suspected guerrillas firing assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades at Coalition patrols and convoys in attacks that were often poorly planned and demonstrated poor marksmanship and training. In many cases the insurgents were killed in the return fire. The attacks were blamed on remnants of the Ba’ath Party and the Fedayeen Saddam militia, and it now seems likely that these were the forces driving the budding insurgency at that time.

On December 13, 2003, Saddam Hussein was arrested, removing the leader of the Ba'athists, the Fedayeen Saddam, and others agents. On June 30, 2004, Saddam Hussein, along with 11 senior Ba'athist officials, were handed over legally to the interim Iraqi government to stand trial for alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other offences. The first legal hearing in Saddam's case was held before the Iraqi Special Tribunal on July 1, 2004. Broadcast later on Arabic and Western television networks, it was his first appearance in footage aired around the world since his capture by Coalition forces the previous December.

Early 2004

The period from the end of November 2003 to the beginning of March 2004 marked a relative lull. It is believed that although some real damage was done to the underground insurgency, especially to the Saddam Hussein loyalists that had not yet given up the fight, this was mainly a period of reorganization during which new Coalition tactics were studied and a renewed offensive planned.

File:Fallujahtracer.jpg
A burst of tracer rounds emanate from Marine positions during fighting near Fallujah.

In the spring of 2004, some Iraqi security forces refused to fight against the insurgency and, in some cases, joined them in their uprising against the occupation. Though this period saw fewer guerrilla attacks, it was fraught with terrorist bombings taken to an entirely new scale. Attacks on Iraqi security forces increased both in brazenness, number, and lethality. Although the guerrilla attacks were less intense, the terrorist offensive, possibly connected to the followers of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, only increased. Hundreds of Iraqi civilians and police were killed over this period in a series of massive bombings. The bombings indicated that as the relevance of Saddam Hussein and his followers was diminishing, radical Islamists, both foreign and Iraqi, were stepping in to fill the vacuum.

The Coalition military had failed to develop significant and reliable human intelligence capability, while the insurgents continued to undermine efforts to do so by exploiting Coalition missteps for propaganda and through intimidation. A Sunni insurgency, with nationalist and Islamist motivations, was becoming clearer. Shiite dissatisfaction with the occupation, especially among the urban poor, had been gradually increasing for some of the same reasons it had been among the Sunnis: the perception that the coalition had failed to deliver on its promises and a nationalist dissatisfaction with foreign occupation. Over three months, over 1500 Mahdi Army militiamen, dozens of coalition soldiers, and (reportedly) hundreds of civilians were killed in the conflict. The Coalition gradually took back the southern cities. A truce was reached, temporarily ending the fighting.

Transfer of sovereignty

As 2004 progressed, the guerrillas seemed to move to more advanced military tactics and demonstrated much more assertive organization. On June 28, 2004, the occupation was formally ended by the Coalition, which transferred power to a new Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. With the situation in the south seemingly settled, many hoped that the transfer of sovereignty would help take the steam out of the ongoing Sunni insurgency. Although many Iraqis were optimistic about the government, militants saw it as little more than an Western alliance puppet and continued the fight unabated. On July 18, Iraqi militants offered a $285,000 reward for Allawi's assassination.

Najaf hostilities

The insurgency did not go away. In August 2004, fighting in the south broke out again. The U.S Marines, having taken control from the U.S Army of the area around Najaf, began to adopt a more aggressive posture with the Mahdi Army and began patrolling zones previously considered off-limits. Soon, the Mahdi Army declared that the truce had been broken and militiamen launched an assault on a police station. U.S forces responded, and in the first week of August, a prolonged conflict broke out in Najaf (one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam) over control of the Imam Ali shrine, often thought of as the holiest Shi'ite shrine in Iraq. Although much of the coalition fighting was done by US forces, it was anticipated that only Iraqi forces would enter the shrine. Negotiations with radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, a leading Shi'ite cleric in Iraq and leader of the Mahdi Army defending the shrine, did not resolve the standoff.

British troops in Basra also moved against al-Sadr followers, arresting four on 3 August. After the expiry of a noon deadline to release them on 5 August, the Basra militia men declared holy war on British forces. [5]. On 12 August, British journalist James Brandon, a reporter for the Sunday Telegraph was kidnapped in Basra by unidentified militants. A video tape was released, featuring Brandon and a hooded militant, threatening to kill him unless US forces withdrew from Najaf within 24 hours. He was released after intervention by al-Sadr. [6], [7] While negotiations continued between the interim government and the Mahdi army, there were unconfirmed reports that al-Sadr had been wounded [8]. In the following days, a delegation sent by Iyad Allawi was welcomed into the shrine to negotiate with al-Sadr. The members arrived in a Black Hawk helicopter and waited to meet with al-Sadr, but were eventually turned away without seeing him. Further information on the Najaf standoff can be found in articles on the Mahdi Army and Muqtada al-Sadr.

On August 25, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, arrived in Iraq and began travelling with a "peace convoy" towards Najaf "to stop the bloodshed." By the next day, an agreement brokered by Sistani seemed to come into force. Although the exact terms of the agreement are not clear, it requires the Mahdi militia to disarm and leave Najaf and U.S. troops to withdraw from the city; these forces are to be replaced by interim government security forces. An interim government spokesman said al-Sadr's supporters could join the political process and al-Sadr may remain free. These requirements are essentially the same as those under the truce agreed on in June. According to the agreement, Ayatollah Sistani would also take over responsibility for the Imam Ali Mosque; fighters would leave the shrine, and visitors would be allowed in; Additionally, the Iraqi interim government would agree to repair damage to buildings caused by the fighting. [9] Militia men began handing in their weapons after al-Sadr asked them to do so and left the complex escorted by worshippers. The U.S. welcomed the agreement and vowed to respect a ceasefire. This resolution occured two days before the one year anniversary of the assassination of Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a prominent Shi'ite cleric from Najaf.

Continuing insurrection

On August 30, insurgents attack pipelines and brought oil exports from southern Iraq to a complete halt. An oil company official stated this was part of a rebel campaign to undermine the nation's post-war reconstruction efforts. [10] On the same day, the French government refused demands of elements of the resistance who had kidnapped two French journalists in Iraq (the French government insisting that a law banning Muslim headscarves in school would not be ended). [11] Later that day, the radical Iraqi resistance cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, called for a nationwide cease-fire. An aide to Sadr stated that the cleric would join the political process. [12] [13]

Iraqi Resistance Organizations

Major Iraqi guerrilla groups include, but are not limited to, the following:

External links and references

Middle east

Pro resistance

Editorials

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