Edsel

Edsel

File:EdsellogoE.png
Company type	Division
Industry	Automobile
Founded	1957
Defunct	1959 Production Continued Until 1960
Fate	Dissolved
Headquarters	Dearborn, Michigan, United States
Products	Full-size: Citation, Corsair, Pacer, Ranger Station wagon: Bermuda, Villager, Roundup
Parent	Ford Motor Company

The Edsel was a brand of car of the Ford Motor Company during the 1958, 1959, and 1960 model years. Due to its disastrous history, the word "Edsel" has become synonymous with failure.

History

File:Edseldevelopment.jpg

Ford vice president of design George Walker, right, talks to I.B. "Bud" Kaufman, a member of the E-Car design team, in the mid-1950s.

1958 Edsel Citation convertible.

1959 Edsel Corsair convertible.

1960 Edsel Ranger Convertible.

Edsel Ranger interior, showing the Teletouch system.

In the early 1950s, the Ford Motor Co. became a publicly traded corporation that was no longer entirely owned by members of the Ford family. They were then able to sell cars according to then-current market trends following the sellers' market of the postwar years. The new management compared the roster of Ford makes with that of General Motors, and noted that Lincoln competed not with Cadillac, but with Oldsmobile. Since Ford had an excess of money on hand from the success of the Ford Thunderbird, a plan was developed to move Lincoln upmarket, with the Continental at the top, and to add another make to the intermediate slot vacated by Lincoln. Research and development had begun in 1955 under the name "E-car", which stood for "experimental car." Ford Motor Company eventually decided on the name "Edsel", in honor of Edsel B. Ford, son of the company's founder, Henry Ford. This represented a new division of the firm alongside that of Ford itself and the Lincoln-Mercury division, whose cars at the time shared the same body.

The Edsel was introduced amidst considerable publicity on "E Day"—September 4, 1957. It was promoted by a top-rated television special, The Edsel Show, on October 13, but it was not enough to counter the adverse public reaction to the car's styling and conventional build. For months, Ford had been circulating rumors that led people to expect an entirely new kind of car, when in reality, the Edsel shared its bodywork with other Ford models.

The Edsel was to be sold through a new division of the Ford Motor Company, as a companion to the Ford Division, Mercury Division, Lincoln Division and (newly formed but also short-lived) Continental Division, each with its own retail organizations. The free-standing Edsel Division existed from November 1956 until January 1958, after which Edsel sales and marketing operations were integrated into the Mercury-Edsel-Lincoln division (referred to as M-E-L). Initially Edsel was sold through a new network of approximately 1,187 dealers. This briefly brought total dealers of all Ford products to 10,000. Ford saw this as a way to come closer to parity with the other two companies of the Big Three: Chrysler had 10,000 dealers and General Motors had 16,000. As soon as it became apparent that the Edsels were not selling, many of these dealers added Lincoln-Mercury, Ford of Britain, or Ford of Germany franchises to their dealerships with the encouragement of Ford Motor Company. Some dealers, however, closed.

For the 1958 model year, Edsel produced four models, including the larger Mercury-based Citation and Corsair, and the smaller Ford-based Pacer and Ranger. The Citation came in two-door and four-door hardtop and two-door convertible versions. The Corsair came in two-door and four-door hardtop versions. The Pacer was available as a two-door or four-door hardtop, four-door sedan, or two-door convertible. The Ranger came in two-door and four-door hardtop or sedan versions. The four-door Bermuda and Villager wagons and the two-door Roundup wagon were based on the 116″-wheelbase Ford station wagon platform and shared the trim and features of the Ranger and Pacer models. It included several innovative features, among which were its "rolling dome" speedometer and its Push-button Teletouch transmission shifting system in the center of the steering wheel. Other design innovations included ergonomically designed controls for the driver and self-adjusting brakes (often claimed as a first for the industry, even though Studebaker had pioneered them earlier in the decade).

Unlike Ford and Mercury, the Edsel Division never had any of its own manufacturing plants. All Edsels were built in Ford or Mercury plants on a contract basis.

In the first year, 63,110 Edsels were sold in the U.S., with another 4,935 sold in Canada. Though below expectations, it was still the second-largest car launch for any brand to date, exceeded only by the Plymouth introduction in 1928.

For the 1959 model year, there were only two Edsels, the Ford-based Ranger and the Corsair; the Mercury-based cars were discontinued. The new Corsair came in two-door and four-door hardtop, four-door sedan, and two-door convertible, replacing the Pacer model name as the high-end Ford-based Edsel. The Ranger came in two-door and four-door hardtop, two-door and four-door sedan, and the Villager station wagon. In the 1959 model year, 44,891 cars were sold in the U.S., with an additional 2,505 sold in Canada.

For the 1960 model year, Edsel's last, only 2,846 vehicles were produced. All but the pilot cars were made at the Louisville, Kentucky, assembly plant. The marque was pared down to only Ranger (for sedans, hardtops, and convertibles) and Villager wagons. Sharing a basic chassis, glass, and major sheet metal with the 1960 Ford Galaxie and Fairlane models that came down the Louisville line with it, the Edsel had its own unique grille, hood, and four upright oblong taillights, along with its side sweep spears. Front and rear bumpers were also unique. Though most of its running gear was shared with the Ford, such as engines and transmissions, the 1960 Edsel had a longer wheelbase and different rear suspension.

An unusual change in the 1960 Edsel line is that 4-door hardtop Ranger models used the thin-pillar Ford Fairlane 4-door sedan roof line, as opposed to the corresponding Ford's "square-roof line" 4-door hardtop (only available as a Galaxie). The Galaxie 4-door hardtop's rear door trim panel however, was fitted to the Ranger, giving the Edsel 4-door hardtop a unique body style never available on any 1960 Ford.

End of the Edsel

Ford announced the end of the Edsel program on Thursday, November 19, 1959. However, cars continued being produced until late in November, with the final tally at 2,846 1960 models. Total sales were approximately 84,000, less than half the company's projected break-even point. The company lost $350 million ($1.55 billion in 2009 values) on the venture. Only 118,287 Edsels were built (including 7,440 produced in Ontario, Canada.) By Detroit standards, these production figures were dismal, particularly when spread across a run of three model years.

On Friday, November 20, United Press International's (UPI) wire service reported that book values for used Edsels had decreased by as much as $400 [approximately $2,800 in 2006 dollars] (based on condition and age) immediately following the Ford press release. In some newspaper markets, dealers scrambled to renegotiate newspaper advertising contracts involving the 1960 Edsel models, while others dropped the name from their dealership's advertising "slugs." Ford issued a statement that it would distribute coupons to people who purchased 1960 models (and carryover 1959 models) prior to the announcement, valued at $300 to $400 towards the purchase of new Ford products to offset the decreased values. The company also issued credits to dealers for stock unsold or received following the announcement.

Edsel and its failures

There is no single reason why the Edsel failed, and failed so epically. Popular culture often faults the car’s styling. Consumer Reports cited poor workmanship. Marketing experts hold the Edsel up as a supreme example of corporate America’s failure to understand American people. Business analysts cite the weak internal support for the product inside Ford’s executive offices. According to author and Edsel scholar Jan Deutsch, the Edsel was "the wrong car at the wrong time."

"The aim was right, but the target moved"

One popular misconception was that the Edsel was an engineering failure, or a lemon, although it shared the same general reliability of its sister Mercury and Ford models that were built in the same factories. The Edsel is most famous for being a marketing disaster. Indeed, the name Edsel came to be synonymous with commercial failure, and similar ill-fated products have often been colloquially referred to as Edsels. Since it was such a debacle, it provided a case study for marketers on how not to market a product. The main reason the Edsel's failure is so famous was that it flopped despite Ford’s investment of $400,000,000 in its development.

The prerelease advertising campaign touted the car as having "more YOU ideas", and the teaser advertisements in magazines only revealed glimpses of the car through a highly blurred lens or wrapped in paper or under tarps. Edsels were shipped to the dealerships undercover and remained wrapped on the dealer lots.

But the public also had a hard time understanding what the Edsel was, mostly because Ford made the mistake of pricing the Edsel within Mercury’s market price segment. Theoretically, the Edsel was conceived to fit into Ford’s marketing plans as the brand slotted in between Ford and Mercury. However, when the car arrived in 1958, its least expensive model—the Ranger—was priced within $73 of the most expensive and best-trimmed Ford sedan and $63 less than Mercury’s base Medalist model. In its mid-range pricing, Edsel's Pacer and Corsair models were more expensive than their Mercury counterparts. Edsel's top-of-the-line Citation four-door hardtop model was the only model priced to correctly compete with Mercury’s mid-range Montclair Turnpike Cruiser model, as illustrated in the chart below.

1958 Ford Motor Company Pricing (FOB) Structure
FORD	EDSEL	MERCURY	LINCOLN
			Continental $4,802–$4,927
			Capri $4,803–$4,951
			Premiere $4,334–$4,798
		Park Lane $4,280–$4,405
	Citation $3,500–$3,766	Montclair $3,236–$3,597
	Corsair $3,311–$3,390
	Pacer $2,700–$2,993	Monterey $2,652–$3,081
Fairlane 500 $2,410–$3,138	Ranger $2,484–$2,643	Medalist $2,547–$2,617
Fairlane $2,196–$3,407
Custom 300 $1,977–$2,119

Not only was the Edsel competing against its own sister divisions, but model for model, people did not understand what the car was supposed to be—a step up or a step below the Mercury.

After its introduction to the public, the Edsel did not live up to its overblown hype, even though it did have many new features, such as self-adjusting rear brakes and automatic lubrication. While consumer focus groups had said these and other features would make the "E" car attractive to them as car buyers, the cost of the cars outstripped what the public was willing to pay. When many potential buyers saw the base price tag, they simply left the dealership, and others were frightened by the price for a fully loaded top-of-the-line model.

The wrong car at the wrong time

One of the external forces working against the Edsel was the onset of the recession in late 1957. BONER BONER BONER BONER BONER BONER BONER BONER

Compounding Edsel's problems was that the car had to appeal to buyers of other well-established nameplates from the Big Three, such as Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, Dodge, DeSoto, and even its internal sister division, Mercury – itself never a stellar sales success.

Even if the 1958 recession had not hit when it did, the Edsel was entering into a shrinking marketplace. While Ernest Breech convinced Ford management that this market segment offered great untapped opportunity in the early 1950s, when the "E" car was in its earliest stages, by 1957, independent manufacturers in the mid-price field were drifting towards insolvency. Hoping to turn around their losses, Studebaker acquired Packard, yet it stopped producing under the venerable Packard badge after 1958. On the other hand, American Motors changed its focus to the compact Rambler models, while their pre-merger brands (Nash and Hudson) were discontinued after the 1957 model year. Even Chrysler saw sales of its DeSoto marque drop dramatically from its 1957 high by over 50% in 1958. Following a disastrous 1959 model year, plans were made in Highland Park to discontinue DeSoto during its 1961 model year run.

Indeed, sales for all car manufacturers, even those not introducing new models, were down; people started buying more fuel-efficient automobiles, particularly Volkswagen Beetles, which were selling at rates exceeding 50,000 a year in the U.S. from 1957 onward. Edsels were fast, but required premium gas and did not have the fuel economy desired.

Ford Motor Company had the right marketing study, it is just that they came up with the wrong answer to fill the gap between Ford and Mercury. By 1958 consumers became fascinated with economy cars and a big car like the Edsel was seen as too expensive to buy and to own. Readers should note that Ford introduced the Falcon in 1960 and it promptly sold over 400,000 units in its first year!

By 1965 the market for middle priced cars recovered and this time Ford had the right car, the Galaxie 500 LTD. The LTD was a such a huge success that Chevrolet quickly put together the Caprice as a mid-1965 model to compete with the LTD. The legacy of the Edsel is not so much as it was a flop as it was the wrong answer to a gap in the Ford Motor Company product portfolio. Internal Ford memos clearly show that the Edsel was a victim of internal turmoil within Ford. In short the Edsel was labeled a "flop" by Ford managers, Ford wasted no PR money bragging about how much money was "lost" on the Edsel program. The most interesting story of the Edsel is how company politics can kill a good idea.

Edsel, a difficult name to place

The name of the car, Edsel, is also often cited as a further reason for its unpopularity. Naming the vehicle after Edsel Ford was proposed early in its development. However, the Ford family strongly opposed its use; Henry Ford II stated that he didn't want his father's good name spinning around on thousands of hubcaps. Ford also ran internal studies to decide on a name and even dispatched employees to stand outside movie theaters to poll audiences as to what their feelings were on several ideas. They reached no conclusions.

Ford hired the advertising firm Foote, Cone, and Belding to come up with a name. However, when the advertising agency issued its report, citing over 6,000 possibilities, Ford's Ernest Breech commented that they had been hired to develop a name, not 6,000. Early favorites for the name brand included Citation, Corsair, Pacer, and Ranger, which were ultimately chosen for the vehicle's series names.

David Wallace, manager of marketing research, and coworker Bob Young unofficially invited poet Marianne Moore for input and suggestions. Moore's unorthodox contributions (among them "Utopian Turtletop", "Pastelogram", and "Mongoose Civique") were meant to stir creative thought and were not officially authorized or contractual in nature.

At the behest of Ernest Breech, who was chairing a meeting in the absence of Henry Ford II, the car was finally called "Edsel" in honor of Edsel Ford, former company president and son of Henry Ford. Marketing surveys later found the name was thought to sound like the name of a tractor (Edson) and therefore was unpopular with the public. Moreover, several consumer studies showed that people associated the name "Edsel" with "weasel" and "dead cell" (dead battery), drawing further unattractive comparisons.

Reliability

There were reports of mechanical flaws in the models originating in the factory, due to lack of quality control and confusion of parts with other Ford models. Edsels in their first (1958) model year were made in both Mercury and Ford factories; the longer-wheelbase models, Citation and Corsair, were produced alongside the Mercury products, and the shorter-wheelbase models, Pacer and Ranger, were produced alongside the Ford products. There was never a standalone Edsel factory devoted solely to Edsel model production; workers making Fords and Mercurys literally had to change parts bins and tools to assemble extra Edsels once their hourly quota of regular Fords and Mercurys was achieved. As such, the desired quality control of the different Edsel models was difficult to attain for the new make of car. Many Edsels left the line unfinished, with the extra parts having been put into the trunks, with assembly instructions for the mechanics at the dealerships.

Design controversies

The Edsel is best remembered for its trademark "horsecollar" grille, distinct from other cars of the period. A widely circulated wisecrack at the time was that "It looked like an Oldsmobile sucking on a lemon".

The front of the original Edsel turned out nothing like what was originally intended. Roy Brown, the original chief designer on the project, wanted a slender, almost delicate opening in the center; engineers, fearing engine cooling problems, vetoed the intended design, which led to the "horsecollar." Some have speculated that the car's failure was because the grille looked like a vagina. The vertical grille theme, while improved for the 1959 models, was discontinued for the 1960 models, which were similar to Ford models of the same year, although the new front-end design bore no small resemblance to that of the 1959 Pontiac.

Many drivers disliked having the automatic transmission selector as pushbuttons mounted on the steering wheel hub: this was the traditional location of the horn, and drivers ended up shifting gears instead of honking the horn. While the Edsel was fast, the location of the transmission pushbuttons was not conducive to street racing. There were jokes about stoplight dragsters and the buttons: D for Drag, L for Leap, and R for Race (instead of Drive, Low and Reverse).

There were also complaints about the taillights on 1958-model Edsel station wagons, which were boomerang-shaped and placed in a reverse fashion; at a distance, they appeared as arrows pointed in the opposite direction of the turn being made. While the left turn signal blinked, its arrow shape pointed right, and vice versa. However, there was little that could be done to give the Ford-based station wagons a unique appearance from the rear; corporate management insisted that no sheetmetal could be changed. Only the taillights and trim could be touched. There was room for separate turn signals in addition to the boomerangs, but the U.S. industry had never supplied them up to that point, and they were probably never seriously considered.

Mechanics disliked the Edsel's bigger engine because its perfectly-flat cylinder head lacked a distinct combustion chamber. The head was set at an angle, with "roof" pistons forming both a squish zone on one side and a combustion chamber on the other. Combustion thus took place entirely within the cylinder bore. This design was similar to Chevrolet's 348-cubic-inch "W" engine, which was also introduced in 1958. While the design reduced the cost of manufacture and possibly carbon buildup, it was also unfamiliar to many mechanics.

The role of Robert McNamara

While the car and Ford’s planning of the car are the most often cited reasons for its failure, internal politics within the executive offices at Ford are as much to blame for the failure of the Edsel. Following World War II, Henry Ford II brought on Robert McNamara as one of the "whiz kids" to help turn Ford around. McNamara’s cost cutting and cost containment skills helped Ford emerge from its near collapse after the war. As such, McNamara eventually assumed a great deal of power at Ford. In many ways, McNamara was very much like Henry Ford: both men were committed to Ford above all other things and had little use for the Continental, Lincoln, Mercury, and Edsel brand cars made by the company.

McNamara was against the formation of the separate divisions for Continental, Lincoln, Mercury, and Edsel cars, and moved to consolidate Lincoln, Mercury, and Edsel into the M-E-L division. McNamara saw to it that the Continental program was canceled and that the model was merged into the Lincoln range for 1958. He next set his sights on Edsel by maneuvering for elimination of the dual wheelbases and separate bodies used in 1958; instead, the Edsel would share the Ford platform and use Ford’s inner body structure for 1959. In 1960, the Edsel emerged as a Ford with different trim. McNamara also moved to reduce Edsel’s advertising budget for 1959, and for 1960, he virtually eliminated it. The final blow came in the fall of 1959, when McNamara convinced Henry Ford II and the management structure that the Edsel was doomed and that it was time to end production before the Edsel bled the company dry. (Note: McNamara also attempted to end the Lincoln nameplate; however, that effort ended with Elwood Engel's now classic redesign of 1961.) McNamara left Ford when he was named Secretary of Defense by President John F. Kennedy.

During the 1964 presidential election, Republican nominee Barry Goldwater blamed McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, for the Edsel's failure. Eventually, Ford's former executive vice president (and financial contributor to Goldwater's campaign) Ernest R. Breech wrote the Senator's campaign, explaining that "Mr. McNamara… had nothing to do with the plans for the Edsel car or any part of the program." However, the charge continued to be leveled against McNamara for years. During his time as head of the World Bank, he instructed his public affairs officer to distribute copies of Breech's letter to the press whenever the accusation was made.

The Edsel Comet

The scheduled 1960 Edsel Comet compact car was hastily rebranded as the Comet and assigned to Mercury dealerships as a standalone product. The Comet was an instant success, selling more cars in its first year than all models of Edsel produced during its three-year run. Styling touches seen in the Comets sold to the public that allude to being part of the Edsel family of models included the instrument cluster, rear tailfins (though canted diagonally), and the taillight shape (the lens is visually similar to that used on the 1960 Edsel, and even retained the embossed "E" code). The Comet's keys were even shaped like Edsel keys, with the center bar removed from the "E" to form a "C." For 1962, Ford officially assigned the Comet to the Mercury brand; the Mercury name does not appear anywhere on the 1960 and 1961 models.

Today

Fifty years after its spectacular failure, Edsel has become a highly collectible item amongst vintage car hobbyists. Fewer than 6,000 Edsels survive and are considered collectors’ items. A mint 1958 Citation convertible sometimes sells for over $100,000, while rare models, like the 1960 convertible, may bring up to $200,000. While the design was considered "ugly" fifty years ago, many other car manufacturers, such as Pontiac and Alfa Romeo, have employed similar vertical grilles successfully in their car designs.

Many of the Edsel's features, such as transmission lock on ignition, self-adjusting brakes, gear selection by steering wheel buttons, etc., which were considered "too impractical" in the late 1950s, are today standard features of sports cars.

References

• Deutsch, Jan (1976). The Edsel and Corporate Responsibility. Yale University Press.
• Wallace, David (1975). "Naming the Edsel". Automotive Quarterly Magazine. XIII (2): 182–191. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Barron, James (2007-08-01). "To Ford, a Disaster. To Edsel Owners, Love". The New York Times.

External links

• Edsel.com History, specifications, resources for owners.
• Smith Motor Company Virtual Edsel Dealer
• The International Edsel Club
  • Famous Ford Flops
• Edsels in the Media Listing of Edsel references in popular culture.
• Edsel Promo Time A Web site devoted to plastic dealer promotional models of Edsels.
• Washington Post article about the Edsel
• The Edsel Tinsmith A catalog of tin toy Edsels that were manufactured in Japan