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Federal Security Service

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FSB

The FSB (Federal Security Service) (Russian: ФСБ, Федера́льная слу́жба безопа́сности; Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) is a domestic state security agency of the Russian Federation and the main successor of the Soviet Cheka, NKVD, and KGB. Its headquarters are in Lubyanka Square, Moscow.

Overview

Lubyanka Headquarters

FSB is engaged mostly in domestic affairs, while the espionage duties were taken over by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (former First Chief Directorate of the KGB). However FSB also includes the FAPSI agency, which is involved in electronic surveillance abroad. In addition, FSB operates freely at the territories of the former Soviet republics, and it can conduct anti-terrorist military operations anywhere in the World if ordered by the President, according to the recently adopted terrorism law. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Russia work under guidance of FSB if needed. For example, GRU, spetsnaz and Internal Troops detachments of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs work together with FSB in Chechnya.

FSB is responsible for internal security of the Russian state, counterespionage, and the fight against organized crime, terrorism, and drug smuggling. However, critics claim that it is actually more engaged in suppression of internal dissent, bringing the entire population of Russia under total control, and influencing important political events, just as the KGB did in the past. To achieve these goals, FSB implements mass surveillance and a variety of active measures, including disinformation, propaganda through the state-controlled mass media, provocations, and persecution of opposition politicians, investigative journalists, and dissidents.

FSB is a very large organization that combines functions and powers like those exercised by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Protective Service, the Secret Service, the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, United States Coast Guard, and Drug Enforcement Administration. FSB also commands a contingent of Internal Troops, spetsnaz, and an extensive network of civilian informants [1]. The number of FSB personnel and the budget remain state secret, although the budget was reported to jump nearly 40% in 2006[2]. The number of Chekists in Russia in 1992 was estimated as approximately 500,000 [3].

Some observers note that FSB is more powerful than KGB was, because it does not operate under the control of the Communist Party as KGB did in the past. [4] Moreover, the FSB leadership and their partners own most important economic assets in the country and control Russian government and State Duma. According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, "In the Soviet Union, the KGB was a state within a state. Now former KGB officers are running the state. They have custody of the country’s 6,000 nuclear weapons, entrusted to the KGB in the 1950s, and they now also manage the strategic oil industry renationalized by Putin. The KGB successor, rechristened FSB, still has the right to electronically monitor the population, control political groups, search homes and businesses, infiltrate the federal government, create its own front enterprises, investigate cases, and run its own prison system. The Soviet Union had one KGB officer for every 428 citizens. Putin’s Russia has one FSB-ist for every 297 citizens." [5]

Some critics argue that FSB is now the leading political force in Russia, which simply replaced the Communist Party. [2] Others claim that FSB became an international criminal organization that actually promotes and perpetrates the terrorism and organized crime in order to achieve its political and financial goals, instead of fighting the terrorism and crime. [6] [7] [8]

Official FSB activities

Counterintelligence

FSB Director Nikolay Kovalev said in 1996: "There has never been such a number of spies arrested by us since the time when German agents were sent in during the years of World War II." FSB reported that around 400 foreign intelligence agents were uncovered in 1995 and 1996. [9] In 2006 FSB reported about 27 foreign intelligence officers and 89 foreign agents whose activities were stopped. [10]

Federal Border Guard Service

Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) has been part of the FSB since 2003. Russia has 61,000 kilometers of sea and land borders, 7,500 kilometers of which is with Kazakhstan, and 4,000 kilometers with China. One kilometer of border protection costs around 1 million rubles per year. Vladimir Putin called on the FPS to increase the fight against international terrorism and "destroy terrorists like rats". [11]

Anti-terrorist operations

Over the years, FSB and affiliated state security organizations have killed all elected and appointed presidents of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria including Dzhokhar Dudaev, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, Aslan Maskhadov, and Abdul-Khalim Saidullaev. Just before his death, Saidullaev claimed that Russian government "treacherously" killed Maskhadov, after inviting him to "talks" and promising his security "at the highest level." [12]

A few dozen people have been convicted in courts for alleged terrorist activities or for "promoting national hatred". Islamist guerrilla leader Shamil Basaev was reportedly killed by FSB forces. During the Moscow theater hostage crisis and Beslan school hostage crisis, all hostage takers were executed on the spot by FSB spetsnaz forces. Only one of the suspects, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, survived and was convicted later by the court. It is reported that more than 100 leaders of terrorist groups have been killed during 119 operations on North Caucasus during 2006. [10]

On July 28, 2006 the FSB presented a list of 17 organizations recognized as terrorist by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, to Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, which published the list that day. The list had been available previously, but only through individual request. [13][14] Commenting on the list, Yuri Sapunov, head of anti-terrorism at the FSB, named three main criteria necessary for organizations to be listed. [15]

Fight with corruption and organized crime

FSB cooperates with Interpol and other national and international law-enforcement agencies. It has provided information on many Russian criminal groups operating in Europe. FSB has also been involved in preparation of requests for extradition of high-profile suspects who escaped abroad, such as Aleksander Litvinenko, Oleg Kalugin, Akhmed Zakayev, Leonid Nevzlin, and Boris Berezovsky. However, these requests have been denied by UK, US, and Israeli courts.

Heads of the FSB and its predecessors

On June 20, 1996, Yeltsin fired FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov and appointed Nikolay Kovalyov acting Director and later Director of the FSB. Russian president Vladimir Putin was head of the FSB from July 1998 to August 1999.

Structure

Structure of the Federal Office (incomplete):

Military Counterintelligence Directorate - chiefs: Alexander Bezverkhny (at least since 2002), Vladimir Petrishchev (since January 1996)
Directorate for Terrorism and Political Extremism Control – chiefs: Mikhail Belousov, before him Grafov, before the latter Boris Mylnikov (since 2000)
Inspection Directorate – chiefs: Vladimir Anisimov (2004-May 2005), Rashid Nurgaliyev (July 12 2000 - 2002),
Internal Security Directorate – chiefs: Alexander Kupryazhkin (until September 2006), Sergei Shishin (before Kupryazhkin since December 2002), Sergei Smirnov (April 1999 – December 2002), Viktor Ivanov (1998 – Aril 1999), Nikolay Patrushev (1994-1998)

Besides the services (departments) and directorates of the federal office, the territorial directorates of FSB in Federal subjects of Russia are also subordinate to it.

Of these, St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate of FSB and its predecessors (historically covering both Leningrad/Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast) have played especially important role in the history of this organization, as many of the officers of the Directorate, including Vladimir Putin and Nikolay Patrushev, later assumed important positions within the federal FSB office or other government bodies. After the last Chief of the Soviet time, Anatoly Kurkov, the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate has been led by Sergei Stepashin (November 29, 1991 - 1992), Viktor Cherkesov (1992 –1998), Alexander Grigoryev (October 1, 1998 – January 5, 2001), Sergei Smirnov (January 5, 2001 – June 2003), Alexander Bortnikov (June 2003 – March 2004) and Yury Ignashchenkov (since March 2004).

History

Initial reorganization of KGB

Following the attempted coup of 1991 against Mikhail Gorbachev, the KGB was dismantled and formally ceased to exist after November 1991.[16] Its successor, the FSK (Federalnaya Sluzhba Kontrrazvedki (Федера́льная Слу́жба Контрразве́дки), Federal Counterintelligence Service, which had been known for some time as the Security Ministry of Russia) was reorganized into the FSB by the Federal Law of April 3, 1995, "On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation", making the new FSB a more powerful organization.

This law described the FSB role in the regions:

  • Clarified the FSB role in the Armed Forces
  • Gave the FSB director ministerial status and the rank of army general
  • Allowed it to conduct intelligence work and to protect Russian citizens and enterprises abroad
  • Obliged the FSB to inform the president and the prime minister about national threats
  • Gave the FSB powers of detention and the right to enter any premises or property "if there is sufficient evidence to suppose that a crime is being been perpetrated there" without a warrant
  • Permitted the FSB to set up special units, carrying firearms, and to train security personnel in private companies
  • Established the control structures over the FSB.

The FSB reforms were rounded out by [[decree] No. 633, signed by Boris Yeltsin on June 23, 1995. The [[decree] made the tasks of the FSB more specific, giving the FSB substantial rights to conduct cryptographic work, and described the powers of the FSB director. The number of deputy directors was increased to 8: 2 first deputies, 5 deputies responsible for departments and directorates and 1 deputy director heading the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate. Yeltsin appointed Colonel-General Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov as the new director of the FSB.

1997

In May 1997, the FSB was reorganized again following a political power struggle. The FSB structure was changed into five departments and six directorates:

  • Counterintelligence Department
  • Anti terrorist Department
  • Analysis, Forecasts and Strategic Planning Department
  • Personnel and Management Department
  • Operational Support Department
  • Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of the Activity of Criminal Organizations
  • Investigation Directorate
  • Operational-Search Directorate
  • Operational-Technical Measures Directorate
  • Internal Security Directorate
  • Administration Directorate
  • Prison
  • Scientific-Technical centre

The FSB was not to recruit civilian personnel and the number of places offered by the FSB Academy was cut back.

2000-2004

FSB has a complex and somewhat shady structure, which has been reorganized several times.

On June 172000, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree, according to which FSB was supposed to have a director, a first deputy director and eight other deputy directors, including one stats-secretary and the chiefs of six departments (Economic Security Department, Counterintelligence Department, Organizational and Personnel Service, Department of activity provision, Department for Analysis, Forecasting and Strategic Planning, Department for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism). On June 112001, the President introduced one more deputy director position.

According to a decree signed by Putin on March 112003, by July 1 Border Guard Service of Russia had been transferred to FSB while FAPSI, agency of government telecommunications, had been abolished, granting FSB with a major part of its functions.

On August 122003 Putin allowed FSB to have three first deputy directors, including the Chief of the Border Guard Service (Vladimir Pronichev), and specified that a deputy director position must be assumed by the Chief of the Inspection Directorate. On July 112004, the President reorganized FSB again. [1] It was prescribed to have a director, two first deputy directors (Sergei Smirnov and Vladimir Pronichev), one of whom should be the Chief of the Border Guard Service (Pronichev), and two other deputy directors (Vladimir Anisimov and Vyacheslav Ushakov) including one stats-secretary (Ushakov). Seven other deputy director positions ceased to exist. By the same decree the departments were renamed to services (and the Department for Analysis, Forecasting and Strategic Planning to Operational Information and International Relations Service). The previously independent Military Counterintelligence Directorate was subordinated to the Counterintelligence Directorate, and the Control Service was created out of the Inspection Directorate, Internal Security Directorate as well as some other subdivisions that had previously been subordinate directly to the FSB Chief.

On December 22005, Putin authorized FSB to have one more deputy director. This position was assumed by Vladimir Bulavin on March 32006.

Recent Developments

In September 2006 almost out of sight of the public eye FSB was shaken by a major reshuffle, which, combined with some earlier resignments (most remarkably, those of FSB Deputy Directors Yury Zaostrovtsev and Vladimir Anisimov in 2004 and 2005, respectively), were widely believed to be linked to the Three Whales Corruption Scandal that had slowly unfolded since 2000. Some analysts considered it to be an attempt to undermine FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev's influence, as it was Patrushev's team from the Karelian KGB Directorate of the late 1980s – early 1990s that had suffered most and he had been on vacations during the event. [2], [3], [4]

Criticism of FSB actions

Alleged coup organized by FSB

Starting from 1998, people from state security services came to power as Prime Ministers of Russia: a KGB veteran Yevgeny Primakov; former FSB Director Sergei Stepashin; and finally former FSB Director Vladimir Putin who was appointed in August 8 1999.

In August 7, Shamil Basaev began incursion to Dagestan which was regarded by Anna Politkovskaya as a provocation intitiated from Moscow to start war in Chechnya, because Russian forces provided safe passage for Islamic fighters back to Chechnya [17]. It was reported that Aleksander Voloshin from Yeltsin administration paid money to Shamil Basayev to stage this military operation [18] [19] [20] (Basaev reportedly worked for Russian GRU at this time and earlier [21] [22] [23]).

In September 4 a series of four Russian apartment bombings began. Three FSB agents were caught while planting a large bomb at the basement of an apartment complex in the town of Ryazan in September 22. That was last of the bombings. Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Rushailo congratulated police with preventing the terrorist act, but FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev had declared that the incident was a training exercise just an hour later, when he had learned that the FSB agents are caught.

Next day, Boris Yeltsin received a demand from 24 Russian governors to transfer all state powers to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, according to Sergei Yushenkov [24] Second Chechen War began in September 24. This war made Prime Minister Vladimir Putin very popular, although he was previously unknown to the public, and helped him to win a landslide victory in the presidential elections in March 26 2000.

That was a successful coup d'état organized by the FSB to bring Vladimir Putin to power, according to former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, lawmaker Sergei Yushenkov, and journalist David Satter, a Johns Hopkins University and Hoover Institute scholar [6] [24] [8]. All attempts to independently investigate the Russian apartment bombings were unsuccessful. Journalist Artyom Borovik died in a suspicious plane crash. Vice-chairman of Sergei Kovalev commission created to investigate the bombings Sergei Yushenkov was assassinated. Another member of this commission Yuri Shchekochikhin died presumably from poisoning by thallium. Investigator Mikhail Trepashkin hired by relatives of victims was arrested and convicted by Russian authorities for allegedly disclosing state secrets.

FSB as ruling political elite

According to former Russian Duma member Konstantin Borovoi, "Putin's appointment is the culmination of the KGB's crusade for power. This is its finale. Now the KGB runs the country." [25] Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of the Moscow-based Center for the Study of Elites, has found that up to 78% of 1,016 leading political figures in Russia have served previously in organizations affiliated with KGB or FSB [2]. She said: "If in the Soviet period and the first post-Soviet period, the KGB and FSB people were mainly involved in security issues, now half are still involved in security but the other half are involved in business, political parties, NGOs, regional governments, even culture... They started to use all political institutions."[2] "Like cockroaches spreading from a squalid apartment to the rest of the building, they have eventually gained a firm foothold everywhere," said Sergei Grigoryants, a Soviet dissident. [25]

This situation is very similar to that of the former Soviet Union where all key positions in the government were occupied by members of the Communist Party. The KGB or FSB members usually remain in the "acting reserve" even if they formally leave the organization ("acting reserve" members receive second FSB salary, follow FSB instructions, and remain "above the law" being protected by the organization, according to Kryshtanovskaya [26]). As Vladimir Putin said, "There is no such thing as a former KGB man" [27]. GRU defector and writer Victor Suvorov explained that members of Russian security services can leave such organizations only in a coffin, because they know too much. Soon after becoming prime minister of Russia, Putin also claimed that "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission." [25].

The idea about KGB as a political force rather than a security organization has been discussed by journalist John Barron, historian Victor Suvorov, retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin [28], and Evgenia Albats, a Harvard graduate and writer on KGB subjects, who was assigned to examine the KGB archives after the failed Soviet coup attempt of 1991. According to Albats, most KGB leaders, including Lavrenty Beria, Yuri Andropov, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, have always struggled for the power with the Communist Party and manipulated the communist leaders. Moreover, FSB has formal membership, military discipline, an extensive network of civilian informants [1], hardcore ideology, and support of population (60% of Russians trust FSB [29]), which makes it a perfect totalitarian political party [3] However the FSB party does not advertise its leading role because the secrecy is an important advantage.

With regard to death of Aleksander Litvinenko, the highest-ranking Soviet Bloc intelligence defector, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa stated that there is "a band of over 6,000 former officers of the KGB — one of the most criminal organizations in history — who grabbed the most important positions in the federal and local governments, and who are perpetuating Stalin’s, Khrushchev’s, and Brezhnev’s practice of secretly assassinating people who stand in their way." [30]

Suppression of internal dissent

Many Russian opposition lawmakers and investigative journalists have been assassinated while investigating corruption and alleged crimes conducted by FSB and state authorities: Sergei Yushenkov, ‎Yuri Shchekochikhin, Galina Starovoitova, Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Litvinenko, Paul Klebnikov, Nadezhda Chaikova, Nina Yefimova, and many others [17] [31] [32], [1]. Former KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky believes that murders of writers Yuri Shchekochikhin (author of "Slaves of KGB" [5]), Anna Politkovskaya, and Aleksander Litvinenko show that FSB has returned to the practice of political assassinations [6] which were conducted in the past by Thirteenth KGB Department.[33] Just before his death, Alexander Litvinenko accused Vladimir Putin of personally ordering the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya.

An increasing number of scientists have been accused of espionage and illegal technology exports by FSB during the last decade: researcher Igor Sutyagin[34], physicist Valentin Danilov[35] , physical chemist Oleg Korobeinichev [36], academician Oskar Kaibyshev [37], and physicist Yury Ryzhov [38]. Some other widely covered cases of political prosecution include investigator Mikhail Trepashkin [39] and journalist Vladimir Rakhmankov [40]. All these people are either under arrest or serve long jail sentences. Human rights groups also identified Mikhail Khodorkovsky as a political prisoner.

Ecologist and journalist Alexander Nikitin, who worked with Bellona Foundation, was accused of espionage. He published material exposing hazards posed by the Russian Navy's nuclear fleet. He was acquitted in 1999 after spending several years in prison (his case was sent for re-investigation 13 times while he remained in prison). Other cases of prosecution are the cases of investigative journalist and ecologist Grigory Pasko [41] [42], Vladimir Petrenko who described danger posed by military chemical warfare stockpiles, and Nikolay Shchur, chairman of the Snezhinskiy Ecological Fund [9]

Other arrested people include Viktor Orekhov, a former KGB officer who assisted Soviet dissidents, Vladimir Kazantsev who disclosed illegal purchases of eavesdropping devices from foreign firms, and Vil Mirzayanov who had written that Russia was working on a nerve gas weapon [9]

Political dissidents from the former Soviet republics, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, are often arrested by FSB and extradited to these countries for prosecution, despite to protests from international human rights organizations. [43] [44] Special services of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaidjan also kidnap people at the Russian territory, with the implicit approval of FSB [45]

There are credible reports that FSB use drugs to erase memory of people who had access to secret information [46]

Criticism of anti-terrorist operations

Use of excessive force by FSB spetsnaz was criticized with regard to resolving Moscow theater hostage crisis and Beslan hostage crisis. According to Sergey Kovalev, Russian government kills its citizens without any hesitation. He provided the following examples: murdering of hostages by the poison gas during Moscow theater hostage crisis; burning school children alive by spetsnaz soldiers who used RPO flamethrowers during Beslan school hostage crisis; crimes committed by death squads in Chechnya[47]; and assassination of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev [48]. Anna Politkovskaya and Irina Hakamada, who conducted unofficial negotiations with terrorists, stated that the hostage takers were not going to use their bombs to kill the people and destroy the building during Moscow theater hostage crisis [7]. This was supported by the subsequent events when the Chechens did not use their bombs.

It is also possible that FSB has returned to the old NKVD practice of creating puppet rebel forces, as during the Trust Operation, Basmachi Revolt, or operations against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army [49] Former FSB officer Aleksander Litvinenko stated in a June 2003 interview, with the Australian SBS television programme Dateline, that two of the Chechen terrorists involved in the 2002 Moscow theatre hostage crisis — whom he named as "Abdul the Bloody" and "Abu Bakar" — were working for the FSB, and that the agency manipulated the rebels into staging the attack.[50] Litvinenko said: "[w]hen they tried to find [Abdul the Bloody and Abu Bakar] among the dead terrorists, they weren't there. The FSB got its agents out. So the FSB agents among Chechens organised the whole thing on FSB orders, and those agents were released." The story about FSB connections with the hostage takers was confirmed by Mikhail Trepashkin. [51] Yulia Latynina and other journalists also accused FSB of staging many smaller terrorism acts, such as market place bombing in the city of Astrakhan, bus stops bombings in the city of Voronezh, and the blowing up the Moscow-Grozny train [52] [53], whereas innocent people were convicted or killed. Journalist Boris Stomakhin claimed that bombing in Moscow metro in 2004 [54] was probably organized by FSB agents rather than by the unknown man who called to Kavkaz Center and claimed his responsibility [55]. Stomakin was arrested and imprisoned for writing this and other articles. [56]

Many journalists and workers of international NGOs are reported to be kidnapped by FSB-affiliated forces in Chechnya who pretended to be Chechen terrorists: Andrei Babitsky from Radio Free Europe, Arjan Erkel and Kenneth Glack from Doctors Without Borders, and others [57]

According to Anna Politkovskaya, most of the "Islamic terrorism cases" were fabricated by the government, and the confessions have been obtained through the torture of innocent suspects. "The plight of those sentenced for Islamic terrorism today is the same as that of the political prisoners of the Gulag Archipelago... Russia continues to be infected by Stalinism", she said. [58].

Alleged involvement in organized crime

Former FSB officer Aleksander Litvinenko accused FSB personnel of involvement in organized crime, such as drug trafficking and contract killings. [59] It was noted that FSB, far from being a reliable instrument in the fight against organized crime, is institutionally a part of the problem, due not only to its co-optation and penetration by criminal elements, but to its own absence of a legal bureaucratic culture and use of crime as an instrument of state policy [60]

International affairs

FSB collaborates very closely with secret police services from some former Soviet Republics, especially Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan [61] [62] The FSB is accused of working to undermine governments of Baltic states[62] and Georgia [63]. During 2006 Georgian-Russian espionage controversy several Russian GRU officers were accused by Georgian authorities of preparations to commit sabotage and terrorist acts. Historian J. R. Nyquist believes that "The KGB president of Russia wants to reestablish the USSR. Whether America likes it or not, this very fact leads us to a new Cold War." [64]

Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission Richard Butler found than many Russian state-controlled companies are involved in the Oil-for-Food Programme-related fraud. As a part of this affair, former FSB Director Yevgeny Primakov had received large kickbacks from Saddam Hussein according to Butler [8]. KGB, FSB and Russian government had very close relationships with Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Intelligence Service Mukhabarat according to Yossef Bodansky, the Director of Research of the International Strategic Studies Association.

Trivia

In the beginning of 2006 the Italian news agency ANSA reported the publication on the FSB website of an offer, open to Russian citizens working as spies for a foreign country, to work as double agents.

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c Slaves of KGB. 20th Century. The religion of betrayal (Рабы ГБ. XX век. Религия предательства), by Yuri Shchekochikhin Moscow, 1999.
  2. ^ a b c d In Russia, A Secretive Force Widens - by P. Finn - Washington Post, 2006
  3. ^ a b Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia--Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN 0-374-52738-5.
  4. ^ Symposium: KGB Resurrection, interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, Ion Mihai Pacepa, and R. James Woolsey, Jr., FrontPageMagazine.com, April 30, 2004.
  5. ^ Symposium: When an Evil Empire Returns, interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, R. James Woolsey, Jr., Yuri Yarim-Agaev, and Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney, FrontPageMagazine.com, June 23, 2006.
  6. ^ a b A. Litvinenko and A. Goldfarb. Gang from Lubyanka (Russian) GRANI, New York, 2002. ISBN 0-9723878-0-3. Cite error: The named reference "Litvinenko1" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  7. ^ Yuri Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, and Geoffrey Andrews. Blowing up Russia : Terror from within. New York 2002. ISBN 1-56171-938-2.
  8. ^ a b David Satter. Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State. Yale University Press. 2003. ISBN 0-300-09892-8.
  9. ^ a b c Counterintelligence Cases- by GlobalSecurity.org
  10. ^ a b Story to the Day of Checkist - by Vladimir Voronov, for grani.ru, December 2006.
  11. ^ Putin Calls On FSB To Modernize Border Guards by Victor Yasmann for Radio Free Europe, December 2005.
  12. ^ Russia Used 'Deception' To Kill Maskhadov, March 8, 2006 (RFE/RL)
  13. ^ "17 particularly dangerous" (in Russian). Rossiyskaya Gazeta. July 28, 2006. Retrieved 2006-08-13.
  14. ^ "'Terror' list out; Russia tags two Kuwaiti groups". Arab Times. August 13, 2006. Retrieved 2006-08-13.
  15. ^ "Russia names 'terrorist' groups". BBC News. July 28, 2006. Retrieved 2006-08-13.
  16. ^ But see N. Gevorkian, The KGB: "They still need us", 49 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 36 (1993)).
  17. ^ a b Politkovskaya, Anna (2003) A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya
  18. ^ The Second Russo-Chechen War Two Years On - by John B. Dunlop, ACPC, October 17, 2001
  19. ^ Paul Klebnikov: Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism, ISBN 0-15-601330-4
  20. ^ The Operation "Successor" by Vladimir Pribylovsky and Yuriy Felshtinsky (in Russian).
  21. ^ Western leaders betray Aslan Maskhadov - by Andre Glucksmann. Prima-News, March 11, 2005
  22. ^ CHECHEN PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER: BASAEV WAS G.R.U. OFFICER The Jamestown Foundation, September 08, 2006
  23. ^ Analysis: Has Chechnya's Strongman Signed His Own Death Warrant? - by Liz Fuller, RFE/RL, March 1, 2005
  24. ^ a b Sergei Yushenkov: That was a coup in 1999.
  25. ^ a b c The KGB Rises Again in Russia - by R.C. Paddock - Los Angeles Times, January 12, 2000
  26. ^ Interview with Olga Kryshtanovskaya (Russian) "Siloviks in power: fears or reality?" by Evgenia Albats, Echo of Moscow, 4 February 2006
  27. ^ A Chill in the Moscow Air - by Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova - Newsweek International, Feb. 6, 2006
  28. ^ The Triumph of the KGB by retired KGB Major General Oleg D. Kalugin The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies
  29. ^ Archives explosion by Maksim Artemiev, grani.ru, December 22, 2006
  30. ^ The Kremlin’s Killing Ways - by Ion Mihai Pacepa, National Review Online, November 28, 2006
  31. ^ Amnesty International condemns the political murder of Russian human rights advocate Galina Starovoitova
  32. ^ Yushenkov: A Russian idealist
  33. ^ *Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, Gardners Books (2000), ISBN 0-14-028487-7
  34. ^ Case study: Igor Sutiagin
  35. ^ AAAS Human Rights Action Network
  36. ^ Russian Scientist Charged With Disclosing State Secret
  37. ^ Oskar Kaibyshev convicted
  38. ^ Researchers Throw Up Their Arms
  39. ^ Trepashkin case
  40. ^ Russia: 'Phallic' Case Threatens Internet Freedom
  41. ^ Grigory Pasko site
  42. ^ The Pasko case
  43. ^ "An oppositioner was transfered to Rakhmonov" by Irina Borogan - Novaya Gazeta
  44. ^ FSB serves to Islam - by Aleksander Podrabinek - Novaya Gazeta
  45. ^ "Special services of former Soviet republics at the Russian territory" - by Andrei Soldatov - Novaya Gazeta (Russian)
  46. ^ "A nuclear chemist has been returned to a childhood state". - by Aleksei Tarasov - Novaya Gazeta (Russian)
  47. ^ Russia Condemned for Chechnya Killings
  48. ^ Sergey Kovalev - Interview to Radio Free Europe
  49. ^ Yossef Bodansky The Secret History of the Iraq War (Notes: The historical record). Regan Books, 2005, ISBN 0-060-73680-1
  50. ^ Lazaredes, Nick (04 June 2003). "Terrorism takes front stage — Russia's theatre siege". SBS. Retrieved 2006-11-28. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  51. ^ Template:Ru icon"М. Трепашкин: «Создана очень серьезная группа»". Chechen Press State News Agency. 1 December, 2006. Retrieved 2006-12-01. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  52. ^ Special services stage undermining activities - by Yulia Latynina, Novaya Gazeta, 03 April, 2006.
  53. ^ The marketplace was blown up by photorobots by Vjacheslav Izmailov, Novaya Gazeta, 07 November, 2005.
  54. ^ The Moscow metro bombing - by Roman Kupchinsky, RFE/RL Reports, 12 March, 2004
  55. ^ Pay back for genocide (Russian) - by Boris Stomakhin
  56. ^ ARTICLE 19’S Statement on the conviction of Russian newspaper editor Boris Stomakhin, 23 November 2006
  57. ^ Special services of delivery (Russian) - by Vyacheslav Ismailov, Novaya Gazeta 27 January, 2005
  58. ^ Stalinism Forever - by Anna Politkovskaya - The Washington Post
  59. ^ A. Litvinenko and A. Goldfarb. Gang from Lubyanka Template:Ru icon GRANI, New York, 2002. ISBN 0-9723878-0-3. Full book in Russian
  60. ^ Russia's Great Criminal Revolution: The Role of the Security Services - by J. M. Waller and V. J. Yasmann, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1995.
  61. ^ Special services of the former Soviet Union work in Russian Federation (Russian) - by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Dorogan, Novaya Gazeta, 27 February, 2006.
  62. ^ a b Special services of Russian Federation work in the former Soviet Union (Russian) - by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Dorogan, Novaya Gazeta, 27 March, 2006.
  63. ^ Moscow Accused of Backing Georgian Revolt - by Olga Allenova and Vladimir Novikov, Kommersant, Sep. 07, 2006.
  64. ^ Eternal Recurrence by J. R. Nyquist, Geopolitical Global Analysis, April 29, 2005

Further reading

External links