Battle of the Ruhr

This article is about the March–July 1943 campaign. For Ruhr Area bombing information at other times, see Ruhr Area § History.

Battle of the Ruhr
Part of Strategic bombing during World War II
The Krupp factory at Essen, 1945
Date 5 March – 31 July 1943 Location Ruhr Area Result British victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom Australia Canada New Zealand South Africa United States	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Arthur Harris	Hermann Göring Josef Kammhuber
Strength
6 Bomber Command groups March: 380 heavy, 160 medium bombers July: 800 aircraft	radar anti-aircraft guns day and night fighters
Casualties and losses
Bomber Command 4.7 per cent (43 attacks, 18,506 sorties) 5,000 aircrew USAAF: unknown	21,000 killed

The Battle of the Ruhr (5 March – 31 July 1943) was a British strategic bombing campaign during the Second World War against the Ruhr in Nazi Germany, which had coke plants, steelworks and ten synthetic oil plants. RAF Bomber Command attacked 26 Combined Bomber Offensive targets. The targets included the Krupp armament works (Essen), the Nordstern synthetic-oil plant (Gelsenkirchen) and the Rheinmetal–Borsig plant in Düsseldorf, which was evacuated during the Battle of the Ruhr. Although not in the Ruhr, the battle included other cities such as Cologne which were within the Rhine-Ruhr region considered part of the same industrial complex. Some targets were not sites of heavy industry but part of the production and movement of materiel.

Although the Ruhr had been attacked by Bomber Command from the start of the war, the organized defences and the large amount of industrial pollutants produced a semi-permanent smog or industrial haze that hampered bomb aiming. The Germans also built large night-time decoys like the Krupp decoy site (Kruppsche Nachtscheinanlage) near Essen. Before the end of the Battle of the Ruhr, Operation Gomorrah on 24 July 1943 began the week-long Battle of Hamburg. After the turn to Hamburg, Bomber Command raided the Ruhr to keep German defences dispersed, just as there had been raids on areas outside the Ruhr during the battle.

Background

1942

See also: Butt Report, Area bombing directive, and Casablanca Conference

Vickers Wellington bomber, superseded in Bomber Command by newer four-engined heavy bombers during 1943

In 1942 some answers to the chronic problems of night navigation and target finding began to emerge but the number of bombers had stagnated. In November 1941 Bomber Command had a daily average of 506 bombers available and in January 1943 the average was 515. To carry out the Thousand-bomber raids Bomber Command drew on crews and aircraft from the Operational Training Units, which could only be exceptional. Navigation had been helped by the introduction of Gee but this device lacked accuracy for bombing through the dark and smog of the Ruhr, lacked range and from August 1942 the Germans began to jam the device. The Pathfinder Force (PFF) was established on 15 August 1942 but with Gee jammed and no target indicator bombs to mark the aiming point for the rest of the bombers (the Main Force), the task of the PFF varied from thankless to impossible. Despite its problems, Bomber Command had been able to achieve some spectacular results but these had been isolated events and due to favourable circumstances as well as judgement. The loss of 1,404 aircraft and 2,724 damaged to German night defences of increasing quantity and quality, especially German night fighters (Nachtjäger) had become a serious threat to the viability of the command and of strategic bombing as a theory of war.

In 1942 Bomber Command had created 19 new squadrons but 13 had been transferred to other commands. The quantity of aircraft had barely increased but a big improvement in quality had been achieved. Bristol Blenheim light bombers and Armstrong Whitworth Whitley medium bombers had been retired from the command in mid-1942, followed by the Handley Page Hampden medium bomber in September. The disappointments of the Short Stirling and the early Handley Page Halifax variants and the fiasco of the Avro Manchester, withdrawn in June 1942, was balanced by the Avro Lancaster, which made its operational début in March and demonstrated its superiority over all other bombers. Re-equipment with new types of aircraft led to an average of 16.36 per cent of Bomber Command squadrons withdrawn from operations for conversion onto new aircraft in 1942, against 3.3 per cent in 1943. On 1 January 1942 the command had 48 squadrons, 9 with heavy bombers, 34 with medium and five with light bombers (Blenheims). On 1 January 1943, there were 49 squadrons, 32 heavy, 11 medium and six light (de Havilland Mosquito). The command had flown 30,508 operational sorties in 1941 and dropped 31,646 long tons (32,154 t) of bombs, in 1942 it dropped 45,501 long tons (46,231 t) from 29,929 sorties.

1943

Diagram of the operation of the Oboe system

At the beginning of 1943, the political resolve of the British government to support the bomber offensive remained and more resources had been provided. A plan to create a 4,000-strong bomber force had been abandoned as unrealisable but the diversion of Bomber Command squadrons to Coastal and overseas commands was constrained and its expansion continued. A blind bombing device, Oboe, had been introduced on the night of 20/21 December 1942 and H2S, a ground-scanning radar, on 30/31 January and a new target indicator bomb had come into service on 16/17 January. The new devices and the increase in the number of heavy bombers promised a large improvement in the quantity of bombs dropped and in accuracy of aim, releasing both the PFF and the Main Force from the constraints occasioned by the adoption of night bombing in 1940. The tactical use of the new devices was developed quickly but the new equipment had limitations. The range of Oboe was little beyond the Ruhr and only a few aircraft could use the device simultaneously; although Oboe had the potential for a vast improvement in target finding, it was not of pin-point accuracy. H2S could be installed on any aircraft but was complicated, difficult to use and emitted radiation which could be detected, paradoxically exposing the aircraft to interception. Gee remained useful as a mean of navigation on return journeys but required development to overcome German jamming.

German defences

Main article: Defence of the Reich

The German defence consisted of anti-aircraft weapons and day and night fighters. The Kammhuber Line used radar to identify bombers and then controllers directed night fighters onto them. During the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command estimated that about 70 per cent of their aircraft losses were due to fighters. By July, the German night fighter force totalled 550 aircraft.

Through the summer of 1943, the Germans increased the ground anti-aircraft defences in the Ruhr; by July there were more than 1,000 large FlaK (anti-aircraft) guns (88 mm guns or bigger) and 1,500 lighter guns (chiefly 20 mm and 37 mm calibre) about a third of the anti-aircraft guns in Germany. Six-hundred thousand personnel were required to man the AA defences of Germany. British crews called the area "Happy Valley" or the "valley of no return".

Bombing operations

Raids during the campaign

Date	Target	Notes
5 March	Essen	442 aircraft (131 Wellingtons, 94 Halifaxes, 52 Stirlings, 157 Lancasters, 8 Mosquitos) in three waves, Halifaxes first, Wellingtons and Stirling second and Lancasters third. Bomb load was 67 per cent incendiary and 33 per cent high-explosive bombs, a third with long-delay fuzes dropped in under an hour. There were 56 early returns (13 per cent) including 3 Oboe Mosquitos, due to mechanical defects and sundry causes; 362 crews claimed to have bombed on target but only 153 succeeded in bombing inside a 3 mi (4.8 km) radius. Losses were 4 Wellingtons, 3 Halifaxes, 3 Stirlings and 4 Lancasters. Photographic reconnaissance (PR) showed 160 acres (65 ha) of destruction in the city centre and 53 buildings at the Krupp works destroyed. German records showed 457–482 people killed, 3,018 houses destroyed, 2,166 seriously damaged.
9 March	Ruhr	8 Mosquitoes
10/11 March	Essen, Mulheim	2 Mosquitoes
12/13 March	Essen	457 aircraft (158 Wellingtons, 156 Lancasters, 91 Halifaxes, 42 Stirlings and 10 Mosquitos) Krupps marked by Oboe Mosquitos, later bombing drifted to the north-west. PR showed 30 per cent more damage than on 5/6 March. Losses were 23 aircraft, 6 Wellingtons, 8 Lancasters, 7 Halifaxes, 2 Stirlings, 5 per cent of the force; 169–322 people killed, including 64 men, 45 women, 19 children, 4 soldiers, 61 foreign workers and 5 POW; c. 500 houses destroyed. German records place a third of the bombs outside Essen, with 39 people killed in other towns, Bottrop worst hit.
26/27 March	Duisburg	455 aircraft (173 Wellingtons, 157 Lancasters, 114 Halifaxes, 2 Stirlings, 9 Mosquitos); six losses 3 Wellingtons, 1 Lancaster, 1 Halifax, 1 Mosquito (first Oboe loss), 1.3 per cent. Five Oboe Mosquitoes returned early and one shot down, along with cloud cover, gave a widely scattered raid. German records show 11 people killed, 36 injured, 15 houses destroyed and 70 damaged.
29/30 March	Bochum	149 Wellingtons and 8 Oboe Mosquitoes while Main Force raided Berlin; 12 Wellingtons lost, 8 per cent. Moonless cloudy night, Oboe Mosquitos unable to keep to timetable, left gaps in sky marking. German records show 28 people killed, 4 buildings destroyed and 35 damaged.
3/4 April	Essen	348 aircraft (225 Lancasters, 113 Halifaxes, 10 Mosquitos), 21 losses, 12 Halifaxes, 9 Lancasters, 6 per cent. Sky marking and ground marking, depending on the weather, caused some Main Force crews confusion but the best bombing photographs on Essen yet. German records show 118 killed, 88 civilians, 10 FlaK crew, 2 railway workers, 2 police and 16 French workers, 458 people wounded; 635 buildings destroyed and 526 badly damaged.
8/9 April	Duisburg	392 aircraft (156 Lancasters, 73 Halifaxes, 56 Stirlings, 10 Mosquitos), 19 losses, 7 Wellingtons, 6 Lancasters, 3 Halifaxes, 3 Stirlings, 4.8 per cent. Pathfinder marking spoilt by thick cloud and bombing widely scattered; 36 people killed, 40 buildings destroyed, 72 badly damaged and 15 other towns reported damage.
9/10 April	Duisburg	104 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes, 8 Lancasters lost. German sources recorded 27 people killed and 50 houses destroyed; bombs dropped all over the Ruhr
26/27 April	Duisburg	561 aircraft (215 Lancasters, 135 Wellingtons, 119 Halifaxes, 78 Stirlings, 14 Mosquitos), 17 losses, 7 Halifaxes, 5 Wellingtons, 3 Lancasters, 2 Stirlings 3 per cent. Pathfinders claimed accurate marking but PR showed most bombing to the north-east of the city. The Main Force may have bombed early or been spoofed by decoy fires. German records show 130–207 people killed, 300 buildings destroyed and six other cities hit by bombs. Four Mosquitos from 2 Group bombed three hours later, then dived for home. The group comprised light and medium bombers and was transferred from Bomber Command on 1 June 1943.
30 April/1 May	Essen	305 aircraft (190 Lancasters, 105 Halifaxes, 10 Mosquitos), 12 losses, 6 Lancasters and 6 Halifaxes, 3.9 per cent. Cloud expected over Essen and sky marking (musical Wanganui) was used, 238 crews claiming to have bombed the target. German record show scattered bombing with 53 people killed, 218 injured, 189 buildings destroyed, 237 badly damaged, Krupp works hit and ten other towns hit, Bottrop by 86 HE bombs.
1943-05-4 4/5 May	Dortmund	596 aircraft (255 Lancasters, 141 Halifaxes, 110 Wellingtons, 80 Stirlings, 10 Mosquitos), 31 losses, 12 Halifaxes, 7 Stirlings, 6 Lancasters, 6 Wellingtons, 5.6 per cent; another 7 aircraft crashed in England. PFF marking accurate but some backing-up dropped short and some bombers spoofed by a decoy fire but half of Main force bombed within a radius, severely damaging central and northern districts. German records show 693 people killed, including 200 POW and 1,075 people injured; 1.218 buildings destroyed and 2,141 severely damaged, including two steel foundries and the docks.
1943-05-1313/14 May	Bochum	442 bombers (135 Halifaxes, 104 Wellingtons, 98 Lancasters, 95 Stirlings, 10 Mosquitos), 24 losses 13 Halifaxes, 6 Wellingtons, 4 Stirlings and 1 Lancaster, 5.4 per cent. Bombing began accurately but after 15 minutes decoy markers diverted much of the bombing. German records show 302 people killed, 394 buildings destroyed and 716 badly damaged.
1943-05-2323/24 May	Dortmund	826 bombers (348 Lancasters, 199 Halifaxes, 151 Wellingtons, 120 Stirlings, 13 Mosquitos), 38 losses, 18 Halifaxes, 8 Lancasters, 6 Stirlings, 6 Wellingtons, 4.6 per cent. PFF marked in clear weather and much of the centre, north and east of the city hit. German records show 599 people killed, 1,275 injured and 25 people missing; about 2,000 buildings destroyed, many being industrial concerns like the Hoesch steelworks where production stopped.
1943-05-2525/26 May	Düsseldorf	729 against Düsseldorf. Two layers of cloud and decoy fires caused widely spread bombing. 26 bombers were lost.
1943-05-2727/28 May	Essen	518 aircraft against Essen with 23 lost. Scattered bombing led to damage to parts of Essen and ten other towns
1943-05-2929/30 May	Wuppertal	719 bombers attacked Wuppertal; Oboe marking was used, and being relatively close to the UK maximum payloads were carried. With only light defences, the bombing force was able to deliver their bombs accurately 1,000 acres (4.0 km2) of the old town burned down when a firestorm took hold. "Five of the six major factories" were destroyed, as were the homes of 100,000 people.
1943-06-1111/12 June	Düsseldorf	783 aircraft. Although initial marking was accurate for the first wave, a backup marker Mosquito dropped target indicators 14 mi (23 km) to the north-east and part of the bombing fell there. 130 acres (0.53 km2) of Düsseldorf claimed as destroyed. 38 aircraft lost.
12/13 June 1943	Bochum	503 aircraft with targeting by Oboe skymarking. "severe damage to the centre of Bochum" was recorded in the war diary. 24 aircraft lost.
14/15 June	Oberhausen	197 Lancasters plus six Oboe Mosquitoes which sky marked as cloud covered the target. 8.4 per cent aircraft loss.
16/17 June	Cologne	212 bombers. Marking by Pathfinder Force heavy bombers with H2S. Cloud cover and equipment trouble gave scattered bombing. 14 bombers lost.
17/18 June	Cologne and Ruhr	3 Mosquitoes; no aircraft lost.
19/20 June	Cologne, Duisburg and Düsseldorf	6 Mosquitoes; no loss
21/22 June	Krefeld	705 aircraft raid on a moonlit night; 44 aircraft were lost. Oboe Mosquitoes marked the ground in good visibility, the main force started a fire that "raged out of control, for several hours".
1943-06-2222 June	Huls	USAAF daylight raid on synthetic rubber plant
22/23 June	Mülheim	557 aircraft, marking through cloud layer. According to the post-war British Bombing Survey Unit, this raid destroyed 64 per cent of the town.
24/25 June	Wuppertal	630 aircraft, post-war British estimates 94 per cent of Elberfeld destroyed by this raid
25/26 June	Gelsenkirchen, Nordstern oil plant	473 RAF bombers attack the Nordstern synthetic-oil plant at Gelsenkirchen but fail due to cloud and unserviceable equipment on 5 of the 12 Oboe Mosquitoes
28/29 June	Cologne	608 aircraft with 25 lost. Only half the Oboe Mosquitoes sent were able to sky mark.
9/10 July	Gelsenkirchen	418 bombers fail in an attack on Gelsenkirchen – Oboe equipment failed to operate in 5 of the Mosquitoes and a 6th marked 10 mi (16 km) north of the target.
25/26 July	Essen	600 bombers attacked Essen in less than an hour.
30/31 July	Remscheid	The last raid of the Battle of the Ruhr attacked Remscheid with 273 aircraft. 15 aircraft were lost

Operation Chastise

Main article: Operation Chastise

The specially-trained veteran crews of 617 Squadron dispatched 19 Lancasters in three waves against Ruhr dams. One Lancaster was an early returnafter hitting the sea and losing its bomb. Five bombers were shot down before bombing and three on the return journey. It was thought that four were lost to light FlaK, one crashed after its bomb was hit and exploded, two came down after hitting electric power lines and one after the pilot was dazzled by a searchlight and hit a tree. Of fifty-six men in the lost aircraft, 53 were killed and three taken prisoner (two wounded). Twelve Lancasters bombed, five the Möhne Dam, three the Eder Dam, two the Sorpe Dam and one the Schwelme Dam and one returned with its bomb. The Möhne Reservoir was an important supplier of water to the Ruhr and the floods after its breach caused much damage to road, rail and canals, electricity and water shortages; water rationing lasting until the autumn rains. The Eder Dam was larger but was 60 mi (97 km) from the Ruhr and the breach had more effect on Kassel and its vicinity. The Sorpe Dam was slightly damaged and managed to keep the Ruhr operating during the repairs to the Möhne Dam. Deaths amounted to 1,294 people, 859 at Neheim-Hüsten (now Arnsberg), where 493 female Ukrainian slaves drowned; another 58 bodies were found around the Eder Dam.

Other targets

• Berlin 27/28 March, 29/30 March
• Stettin (now Szczecin, Poland) 339 aircraft on the night of 20/21 April

Aftermath

In 1956 the New Zealand official historian H. L. Thompson wrote that at Essen, after more than 3,000 sorties and the loss of 138 aircraft, the "Krupp works...and the town...itself contained large areas of devastation" and Krupp did not resume locomotive production after the second March raid.

In the 2006 English translation of the German unofficial official history Germany and the Second World War (volume VII) Horst Boog wrote that by late July Harris thought that the Ruhr has been reduced to chaos, that German arms production had been substantially cut and that the morale of the population had been undermined but the Germans had already begun to disperse industry. Bomber Command had created much more destruction in Essen in 1943 with 5.6 per cent of Bomber Command (3,261 aircraft) and 138 losses against 10 per cent (3,724 aircraft) and 201 losses in 1942. Bomber Command exaggerated its effect but achieved a real reduction of four to six weeks of German industrial output. In its 43 raids on the Ruhr, Bomber Command dispatched about 18,500 bomber sorties for a loss of 872 (4.7 per cent) of the aircraft and 6,000 aircrew; another 2,126 aircraft were damaged, sometimes beyond recovery. The average loss rate was 5 per cent, with losses and damaged reaching16 per cent, Oboe proved its worth and production exceeded losses realising a nett increase from 663 aircraft in March 1943 to 776 in July.

In the 2007 edition of his study of the German war economy, Adam Tooze wrote that in the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command severely disrupted German production. Steel production was cut by 200,000 long tons (200,000 t) when Albert Speer, head of the Reich Ministry of Armaments and War Production was expecting an increase of 200,000 long tons (200,000 t). After doubling production in 1942, production of steel increased only by 20 per cent in 1943 and planned increases in production were not realised. This disruption resulted in the Zulieferungskrise (sub-components crisis) beyond the Ruhr. The increase of aircraft production for the Luftwaffe also came to an abrupt halt. Monthly output failed to increase between July 1943 and March 1944. "Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks".

Casualties

In 1961, Webster and Frankland, in their 1961 official history The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945 (volume II), recorded that in February 1943, Bomber Command had an average of 593 crews and aircraft available for operations and 787 in August. During the battle, Ruhr targets were raided 43 times on 39 nights. Bomber Command dispatched 18,506 sorties, in which 872 aircraft failed to return and 2,126 were damaged, causing 6,000 aircrew casualties. Some aircraft were badly enough damaged to cause the loss of the aircraft and crew. The casualty rate (of all natures) was 16 per cent of sorties, 4.7 per cent being losses over Germany. Of 203 Mosquito bomber sorties, two aircraft were lost and from 282 Oboe-Mosquito sorties, there were two losses and six damaged.

Dams raid

Operation Chastise caused some temporary effect on industrial production, through the disruption of the water supply and hydroelectric power. The Eder Valley dam "had nothing whatsoever" to do with supplying the Ruhr Area. A backup pumping system had already been built for the Ruhr and Organisation Todt rapidly mobilized repairs, taking workers from the construction of the Atlantic Wall. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would have caused significantly more damage but since it was a stronger design and less likely to be breached it was a secondary target.

References

• Bowyer, M. J. F. (1979) [1974]. 2 Group RAF: A Complete History 1936–1945 (2nd Faber Paperbacks ed.). London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 0-571-11460-1.
• Boog, Horst; Krebs, Gerhard; Vogel, Detlef (2006) [2001]. The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944/5 [Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943 bis 1944/45]. Germany and the Second World War. Vol. VII. Translated by Cooke-Radmore, Derry; Garvie, Francisca; Osers, Ewald; Smerin, Barry; Wilson, Barbara (trans. Clarendon Press, Oxford ed.). Potsdam, Germany: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History). ISBN 978-0-19-822889-9.
  • Boog, Horst. "Part 1, I The Allied Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany (Pointblank) from Early 1943 to July 1944. 2. Bomber Command Night Raids up to November 1943 (b) The Battle of the Ruhr". In Boog, Krebs & Vogel (2006).
• Brown, L. (1999). A Radar History of World War II: Technical and Military Imperatives. Philadelphia PA: Institute of Physics Publications. ISBN 978-0-7503-0659-1.
• Davis, Richard D. (2006). Bombing the European Axis Powers: A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 1939–1945. AD-a450 007. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press. OCLC 1050615005.
• Gurney, Gene (1962). The War in the Air: A Pictorial History of World War II Air Forces in Combat. New York: Bonanza Books. ISBN 9780517099483. OCLC 500521272.
• Levine, Alan J. (1992). The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945. Greenwood. ISBN 0-275-94319-4.
• Lloyd, Ian (1978). Rolls Royce: The Merlin at War (e-book ed.). London: The Macmillan Press. ISBN 978-1-349-03908-1.
• Maynard, John (1996). Bennett and the Pathfinders. London: Arms and Armour. ISBN 1-85409-258-8.
• Middlebrook, M.; Everitt, C. (2014) [1985]. The Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book 1939–1945 ([online scan] 2nd repr. Pen & Sword Aviation, Barnsley ed.). London: Viking. ISBN 978-1-78346-360-2.
• Speer, Albert (1970). Inside the Third Reich. Translated by Winston, Clara; Winston, Richard. New York and Toronto: Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-684-82949-4. LCCN 70119132.
• Thompson, H. L. (1956). Chapter 3: Bomber Command and the Battle of the Ruhr. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45. Vol. II (online scan ed.). Wellington, NZ: Historical Publications Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs. OCLC 270208181 – via New Zealand Electronic Text Collection. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
• Tooze, Adam (2007) [2006]. The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (2nd pbk. ed.). London: Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-100348-1.
• Webster, C.; Frankland, N. (1961). Butler, James (ed.). The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945: Endeavour (Part 4). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. II. London: HMSO. OCLC 1068104819.
• Webster, C.; Frankland, N. (2006) [1961]. Butler, James (ed.). The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945: Annexes and Appendices. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. IV (facs. pbk. repr. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-350-5.

Further reading

• Baughen, Greg (2018). RAF on the Offensive: The Rebirth of Tactical Air Power 1940–1941. Barnsley: Air World (Pen & Sword). ISBN 978-1-52673-5157.

External links

• Royal Air Force Bomber Command 60th Anniversary, National Archives