Continuation War

Continuation War
Part of Eastern Front, World War II
Finnish soldiers pass fallen Soviet soldiers at the Sommee pocket.
Date June 25, 1941 - September 19, 1944 Location Finland, Karelia and Murmansk Result Moscow armistice
Belligerents
Finland Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim
Strength
250,000 (total 530,000) Finns + 100,000 (total 220,000) Germans	650,000 (total ???)
Casualties and losses
58,715 dead or missing 158,000 wounded 1,500 civilian casualties	200,000 dead or missing 385,000 wounded 190,000 hospitalized due to sickness 64,000 captured

The Continuation War or War of Continuation (Template:Lang-fi, Template:Lang-sv), lasting from June 25, 1941, until September 19, 1944, was one of the two wars fought between Finland and the Soviet Union during World War II.

The Continuation War is widely perceived as a continuation for the Finnish-Soviet Winter War (1939–1940), Stalin's attempt to occupy Finland, based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed between Stalin and Hitler in 1939.

The United Kingdom declared war on Finland on December 6 1941, but did not participate actively in the Continuation War. Nazi Germany took part by providing critical material support and military cooperation to the Finnish side. USA did not fight or declare war against either party, but it did provide massive multi-level assistance to the Soviet Union. That help was officially meant for the Soviet war efforts against Germany.

The formal conclusion for the Continuation War was ratified by the Paris peace treaty of 1947.

The Continuation War was so named in Finland - already during the war itself - to make clear its relationship to the Winter War (November 30 1939, to March 12 1940). The Soviet Union, however, perceived the war merely as one of the fronts of the "Great Patriotic War" against Nazi Germany and its allies. Likewise, Germany saw its own operations in the region as a part of its overall war efforts of World War II.

The break up of the Soviet Union appeared to have brought a significant change in the policies and attitudes acquired by the new Russian leadership in this respect, when in 1991 President Boris Yeltsin publicly admitted that the Soviet Union had started the Continuation War. When confronted with the question, President Vladimir Putin referred to President Yeltsin's earlier statements, saying that there was no reason for the Russian leaders to further apologize about the matter.

Introduction

Although the Continuation War was fought on the periphery of World War II and the troops engaged were relatively few, its history is intriguing as it challenges both conventional wisdom about the moral clarity of the Allied effort and the popular and academic theory that democratic countries do not wage war against each other. Britain and its dominions declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941, the Finnish Independence Day, the United States did not. The only British action against Finnish soil was a Swordfish attack on German ships in the Finnish harbor of Petsamo in the far North. Finnish radio intelligence is said to have participated effectively in German actions against British convoys to Murmansk.

During the conflict, Finland acted in concert with Germany against the Soviet Union, which in turn was allied with Britain and, for most of the period, the United States. Memories of the 1939 Winter War with the Soviet Union, and the inability of the Allies to support the Finns in it, were key motivators for the alliance with Germany.

The issue was less controversial in Finland, and in hindsight a relatively broad Finnish consensus asserts that the Finns as an independent people would most likely not have survived the war without cooperating with Nazi Germany. Conventional wisdom among Finns who grew up in the 1960s–70s, and who saw friendly relations with Soviet Union paramount, depicted the Continuation War as a Finnish mistake. Nowadays, some tend to assert that there was really nothing Finland could have done to avoid the Winter War and the Continuation War — at least not in the last years before the wars.

Major events of World War II, and the tides of war in general, had significant impact on the course of the Continuation War:

• Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) is closely connected to the Continuation War's beginning.
• The Allied invasion of France (Battle of Normandy) was coordinated with the Soviet major offensive against Finland (June 9–July 15, 1944), leading to a five week long alliance between democratic Finland and Germany (June 26 to August 4, 1944).
• The subsequent US/Soviet race to Berlin brought about the end of the Continuation War by rendering Northern Europe irrelevant.

Aims of the War

Finland's main goal during World War II was, although nowhere literally stated, to survive the war as an independent democratic country, capable of maintaining its sovereignty in a politically hostile environment. Specifically for the Continuation War, Finland aimed at reversing its territorial losses under the March 1940 Moscow Peace Treaty and by extending the territory further east, to have more non-Finnish land to defend before the USSR would enter Finnish territories. Also some small right-wing groups supported Greater Finland ideology. Finland's exertion during the World War was, in the former respect, successful, although the price was high in war casualties, reparation payments, territorial loss, bruised international reputation and subsequent adaptation to Soviet international perspectives. The Finnish-German alliance was far different from most of the other axis relationships. A striking example of this can be found in the participation of Finnish Jews in the fight against the Soviet Union. Despite the Nazi’s repetitive requests, the Finns did not feel they had a Jewish question to be solved.

The Soviet Union's war goals are harder to assess on account of the secretive nature of the Stalinist Soviet Union. The Soviet Union of the 1930s was a militarily weak power, and it can be argued that all of its policies up to the Continuation War are best explained as defensive measures by offensive means: the sharing of Poland with Germany, the annexation of the Baltic states and the attempted invasion of Finland in the Winter War can all be seen as elements in the construction of a security zone between the perceived threat from the capitalist powers of Western Europe and the Communist Soviet Union – similar to the post-war establishment of Soviet satellite states in the Warsaw Pact countries and the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded with post-war Finland. Accordingly, after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa, June 22, 1941), the Red Army's attack on Finland, harbouring yet unleashed German forces, could be seen as a pre-emptive or preventive attack aiming to protect Soviet civilians and troops: through control of Finland's territory, the threat against Leningrad (the old imperial capital Saint Petersburg) and the important harbour in Murmansk could be eliminated.

Background

Before World War II

Although East Karelia has never been part of Finland, a significant part of its inhabitants were Finnic-speaking Orthodox Karelians. After the Finnish declaration of independence, voices arose advocating the annexation of East Karelia to "rescue it from oppression". This led to a few incursions to the area (Viena expedition and Aunus expedition), but these were unsuccessful. Finland unsuccessfully raised the question of East Karelia several times in the League of Nations.

In non-leftist circles, Imperial Germany's role in the "White" government's victory over rebellious Socialists during the Finnish Civil War was celebrated, although most preferred British or Scandinavian support over that of Germany. The security policy of an independent Finland turned first towards a cordon sanitaire, whereby the newly independent nations of Poland, the Baltic Republics and Finland would form a defensive alliance against the USSR, but after negotiations collapsed, Finland turned to the League of Nations for security. Contacts with the Scandinavian countries also met with little success. In 1932, Finland and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, but even contemporary analysts considered it worthless. The 1920 peace agreement was actively broken by the Soviet Union in 1937 by ending the navigation of Finnish ships between Lake Laatokka (Ladoga) and the Gulf of Finland via River Neva. The free use of this route for merchant vessels had been one of the articles in the agreement.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Winter War

Main article: Winter War

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 enabled the Soviet Union to pressure the Baltic republics and Finland. The Baltic republics soon gave in to Soviet demands, but Finland continued to refuse. As a result, on November 30, 1939, the Winter War began. Condemnation by the League of Nations and by countries all over the world had no effect on Soviet policy. International help to Finland was planned, but very little actual help materialised.

The Moscow Peace Treaty in 1940, which ended the Winter War, was perceived as a great injustice. A fifth of the country's industry and 11% of agricultural land were lost. 12% of Finland's population had to be moved to the Finnish side of the border. Hanko was rented to the Soviet Union as a military base. However, Finland had managed to force the Soviet Union to give up its plan to annex the whole country.

Interim Peace

Main article: Interim Peace

The Moscow Peace Treaty, in 1940, was a shock to the Finns. It was perceived as the ultimate failure of Finland's foreign policy, which had been based on multilateral guarantees for support. Binding bilateral treaties were now sought and formerly frosty relations, such as with the Soviet Union and the Third Reich, had to be eased. Public opinion in Finland longed for the re-acquisition of Finnish Karelia, and put their hope in the peace conference that was assumed would follow the World War. The term Välirauha ("Interim Peace") became popular after the harsh peace was announced.

Although the peace treaty was signed, the state of war and censorship was not revoked because of the widening world war, the difficult food supply situation, and the poor shape of the Finnish military. This made it possible for president Kyösti Kallio to ask Field Marshal Mannerheim to remain commander-in-chief and supervise rearmament and fortification work. During 1940, Finland received material purchased and donated during and immediately after the Winter War. Military expenditures rose in 1940 to 45% of Finland's state budget. A war trade treaty with Britain had little effect due to German occupation of Norway and Denmark.

Nazi Germany attacked Scandinavia on April 9, 1940 (Operation Weserübung). Finland, like Sweden, was spared occupation but was encircled by Nazi Germany and Soviet Union. Dozens of Norwegian volunteers had participated the Winter War, and as a gesture of gratitude Finnish volunteers participated in the campaign against Germany, forming an ambulance unit under direct personal influence of Marshal Mannerheim. Especially damaging was the loss of fertilizer imports, that, together with the aftereffects of the Winter War, resulted in a drastic fall of food production. Some of the deficit could be purchased from Sweden and some from the Soviet Union, although delayed deliveries were a means to exert pressure on Finland. In this situation, Finland felt, that it had no alternative but to turn to Germany.

From May 1940, Finland pursued a campaign to re-establish the good relations with Germany. The Finnish media not only refrained from criticism of Nazi Germany, but also took active part in this campaign. Dissent was censored. After the fall of France, the campaign was stepped up.

The implementation of the Moscow Peace Treaty created problems. The forced return of evacuated machinery, locomotives, and rail cars, inflexibility on questions which could have eased hardships created by the new border, such as fishing rights and the usage of Saimaa Canal, heightened distrust about the objectives of the Soviet Union. The new Soviet ambassador to Helsinki, Ivan Zotov behaved undiplomatically and strove to advance Soviet interests in Finland. In his reports he recommended that Finland ought to be finished off and wholly annexed by the Soviet Union.

On June 23, 1940, the Soviet Union demanded mining rights in Petsamo. On June 27, Moscow demanded demilitarization of Åland. After Sweden had signed the troop transfer agreement with Germany on July 8, Soviet Union demanded similar rights for a Soviet troop transit to Hanko. The transfer rights were given on September 6, and demilitarization of Åland was agreed on October 11, but negotiations on Petsamo continued to drag on. The Soviet Union also demanded several changes in the Finnish internal politics, for example forcing the resignation of Väinö Tanner from the cabinet. All of this reminded the public of how the Baltic Republics had been occupied and annexed only a few months earlier.

Unbeknownst to Finland, Adolf Hitler had started to plan an invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa). He had not been interested in Finland before the Winter War, but now he saw the value of Finland as an base of operations, and perhaps also the military value of the Finnish army. In the first weeks of August, German fears of a likely immediate Soviet attack on Finland caused Hitler to lift the arms embargo. Negotiations were initiated concerning German troop transfer rights in Finland in exchange for arms and other material. For the Third Reich, this was a breach of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as well as being for Finland a breach of the Moscow Peace Treaty. Soviet negotiators had insisted that the troop transfer agreement (to Hanko) should not be published making it easy for the Finns to keep a troop transfer agreement with the Germans secret until the first German troops arrived.

Road to war

The negotiations about Petsamo nickel mining rights had dragged on for six months when the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced in January 1941 that the negotiations had to be concluded quickly. On the same day, the Soviet Union interrupted grain deliveries to Finland. Soviet ambassador Zotov was recalled home January 18 and Soviet radio broadcasts started attacking Finland. Germans in Northern Norway reported in February 1 that the Soviet Union had collected 500 fishing ships in Murmansk, capable of transporting a division. Hitler ordered troops in Norway to occupy Petsamo (Operation Renntier) immediately if the Soviet Union started attacking Finland.

After the failure of the nickel negotiations, diplomatic activities were halted for a few months. The period did, however, see an increased German interest in Finland.

The German Foreign Ministry sent Ludwig Weissauer to Finland May 5, this time to clarify that war between Germany and the Soviet Union would not be launched before spring 1942. Finnish leadership believed that, at least officially, and forwarded the message to the Swedes and the British. When the war broke out only a couple of months later, it was understandable that both Swedish and British governments felt that the Finns had lied to them.

In the spring of 1941 joint battle plans were discussed with Germany, as well as communications and securing sea lanes. Finland made significant requests for material aid. Finland was willing to join Germany against Soviet Union with some prerequisites: a guarantee of Finnish independence, the pre-Winter War borders (or better), continuing grain deliveries, and that Finnish troops would not cross the border before a Soviet incursion. The arrival of German troops participating in Operation Barbarossa began on June 7 in Petsamo.

Finnish parliament was informed for the first time on June 9, when first mobilization orders were issued for troops needed to safeguard the following general mobilization phases. On June 20 Finland's government ordered 45,000 people at the Soviet border to be evacuated. On June 21 Finland's chief of the General Staff, Erik Heinrichs, was finally informed by his German counterpart that the attack was to begin.

The war breaks out

Relative strengths of Finnish, German and Soviet troops at the start of the Continuation War in June 1941. Finnish borders before the Moscow Peace Treaty shown in light color

Operation Barbarossa had already commenced in the northern Baltic by the late hours of June 21, when German minelayers, which had been hiding in the Finnish archipelago, laid two large minefields across the Gulf of Finland. These minefields ultimately proved sufficient to confine the Soviets' Baltic Fleet to the easternmost part of the Gulf of Finland. Later the same night, German bombers flew along the Gulf of Finland to Leningrad and mined the harbour and the river Neva. On the return trip, these bombers refuelled in Utti airfield. Finland feared that the Soviet Union would occupy Åland so Operation Kilpapurjehdus (Sail Race) was launched in the early hours of June 22 to occupy Åland. Soviet bombers launched attacks against Finnish ships during the operation but no damage was inflicted. Finnish submarines also laid six small minefields at 8:00-10:00 between Suursaari and Estonian coast according to pre-war defensive plans of Finland and Estonia.

On the morning of June 22, the German Gebirgskorps Norwegen started Operation Renntier and began its move from Northern Norway to Petsamo. Finland did not allow direct German attacks from its soil to the Soviet Union, so German forces in Petsamo and Salla had to hold their fire. There were occasional individual and group level small arms shooting between Soviet and Finnish border guards, but otherwise the front was quiet.

After three days, early on the morning of June 25, the Soviet Union unleashed a major air offensive against 18 cities with 460 planes, mainly striking civilian targets and airfields. The Soviet Union justified the attack as being directed against German targets in Finland, but even the British embassy had to admit that this was not so. German targets were not hit. A small number of Soviet infantry launched attacks over the Finnish side of the border in Parikkala. A meeting of parliament was scheduled for June 25 when Prime Minister Rangell had been due to present a notice about Finland's neutrality in the Soviet-German war, but the Soviet bombings led him to instead observe that Finland was once again at war with the Soviet Union. Later, Finland would join the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25 1941. The Continuation War had begun.

Finnish Offensive of 1941

Mobilized units started moving towards the border on June 21, and they were arranged into defensive formations as soon as they arrived at the border. Finland mobilized 16 infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, and two "Jäger" brigades, which were practically normal infantry brigades, except for one battalion in the 1st Jäger Brigade (1.JPr), which was armoured using captured Soviet equipment. There were also a handful of separate battalions, mostly formed from Border Guard units and used mainly for reconnaissance. Soviet military plans estimated that the Finns would be able to mobilize only 10 infantry divisions, as they had done in the Winter War, but they failed to take into account the material the Finns had purchased between the wars and the training of all available men. In northern Finland there were also two German Mountain Divisions at Petsamo and two German Infantry divisions at Salla. Another German infantry division was en route through Sweden to Ladoga Karelia, although one reinforced regiment was later redirected from it to Salla.

When the war started, the Soviet Union had the 23rd Army in the Karelian Isthmus consisting of the 50th, the 19th Corps and the 10th Mechanized Corps, together with 5 Infantry, 1 Motorized and 2 Armored divisions. At Ladoga Karelia there was the 7th Army consisting of 4 Infantry divisions. In Murmansk-Salla region the Soviet Union had the 14th Army with 42nd Corps, consisting of 5 Infantry divisions (1 as reserve in Archangelsk) and 1 Armored division. Also the Soviets had around 40 battalions, separate regiments and fortification units which were not part of their divisional structure. In Leningrad there were 3 Infantry divisions and one Mechanized Corps.

The initial German strike against the Soviet Air Force had not touched air units located near Finland, so the Soviets could field nearly 750 Air Force planes and part of the 700 planes the Soviet Navy had against 300 Finnish planes.

The Soviet war against Germany did not go as well as pre-war Soviet war games had envisioned, and soon the Soviet High Command had to take units from wherever they could, so although Soviets had started the war against Finland, they could not follow the initial air offensive with a supporting land offensive. They also had to withdraw the 10th Mechanized Corps with two armoured divisions and 237th Infantry division from Ladoga Karelia thus stripping reserves from defending units.

Reconquest of Ladoga Karelia

The furthest advance of Finnish units in the Continuation War. Borders for both before and after the Winter War are shown.

Initially the Finnish army was deployed in a defensive posture, but on June 29 Mannerheim created the Army of Karelia, commanded by Lt. Gen. Heinrichs, and ordered it to prepare to attack Ladoga Karelia. The Army of Karelia consisted of VI Corps (5th and 11th Divisions), VII Corps (7th and 9th divisions) and Group O (Cavalry Brigade, 1st Jaeger Brigade and 2nd Jaeger Brigade). Also later when the 1st division and two regiments of the German 163rd division arrived in the area, they were given to the Army of Karelia.

Opposing them were the Soviet 7th Army with 168th Division near Sortavala and 71st Division north of Jänisjärvi ("Hare Lake"). The Soviets had prepared field fortifications along the border across Sortavala and at the important road crossings at Värtsilä and Korpiselkä.

On July 9, the order for the offensive was given. The task to break through the Soviet defences was given to VI Corps, commanded by the hero of Battle of Tolvajärvi, Maj. Gen. Paavo Talvela. He had borrowed as much artillery as possible from other units of the Army of Karelia and even 1st Jäger Brigade. (Col. Ruben Lagus) from Group O. With strong artillery support he unleashed 5th Division (Col. Koskimies) to Korpiselkä July 10, overwhelming its defenders by next morning. Talvela wasn't satisfied with the aggressiveness of Koskimies, and he relieved him from command and gave 5th Division to Col. Lagus.

Lagus pursued retreating Soviet IR 52 eastward with his light units and reached Tolvajärvi July 12. Then he turned southwards and advanced using small roads, some in such poor shape that his men had to carry their bicycles. On July 14 his forces have cut off Sortavala-Petrozavodsk railroad, and next day they reached shores of Lake Ladoga, severing Soviet routes around the lake. The Soviets had to transfer two regiments and separate battalions from Karelian Isthmus to close down the hole on the eastern side of Lake Ladoga.

The 11th division (Col. Heiskanen) had already (by July 4) found that Soviet forces had temporarily abandoned their trenches across the border, and they used the opportunity to capture them. When the general offensive began, they had already (by July 9) pushed eastward from their captured positions over the roadless terrain and cut the road running from Korpiselkä to Värtsilä and Suistamo, on the eastern shore of Jänisjärvi. From there they threatened to encircle Soviet forces south of Korpiselkä and those fortified in Värtsilä. To prevent encirclement, the Soviets had to leave their positions and retreat eastward. The Soviet IR 367 was able to hold its positions north of Jänisjärvi until defenders of Värtsilä had retreated there by July 12. Heiskanen continued pressing IR 367 around the eastern side of Jänistärvi, and reached Jänisjoki, running from Jänisjärvi to Lake Ladoga July 16, where they went on the defensive.

Lagus continued his offensive immediately along the north-eastern coast of Lake Ladoga. The Soviet Mot. IR 452 was coming from the Karelian Isthmus and its first units were set to defensive at Salmi, where the Tulemajoki reaches Lake Ladoga. Finnish forces arrived there on July 18, and early next morning they started the battle by crossing the river 5 km north of Salmi and managed to cut the roads leading to Salmi by afternoon. Next day the Finns were able to push into the village and only small units were able to escape the encirclement. Salmi was finally captured by early hours of July 21.

The strengthened 5th division continued its advance as fast as possible and crossed the old border July 22 at Rajakontu. Meanwhile, a battle detachment under Järvinen (Col. Järvinen) had secured the left flank of the main thrust by crossing the old border at Känsäselkä and captured July 19 the villages of Kolatselkä and Palalahti by Tulemajärvi where they secured north and east leading roads and continued their advance to the south. And on 23 July the 5th division from the west and detachment Järvinen from the north began their attack to the village of Vitele, which was captured the next morning. Lagus unsuccessfully tried to encircle the retreating Soviet forces and had by the evening reached Tuuloksenjoki, but Soviet tanks and artillery managed to stop the advance of his light forces there.

The 1st division (Col. Paalu) had arrived and was transferred to VI Corps on July 16, but it was not until July 20 when they reached the fast-moving front line and released attachment Järvinen to their attack towards Vitele. From there they continued to attack north towards Hyrsylä and east toward Vieljärvi which they captured a few days later. The Soviet AR2, IR24, IR28 and parts of IR9 and IR10 began a counteroffensive on July 23, and after five days of fighting the front line was established 10 km east of Vieljärvi.

The Soviet North Front reorganized its forces on July 21 by transferring the 168th division and one regiment from the 71st division to the 23rd Army, which was responsible for the defence of the Karelian Isthmus. The same day the 7th Army was reorganized into two operative groups, Petrozavodsk Group (Lt. Gen. M. Antonjuk) with infantry regiment, two motorized regiments, one armoured regiment and separate units and South Group (Lt. Gen. V. Tsvetajev) with a Marine brigade, two motorized regiments and a number of smaller units.

Mannerheim had recognized the situation, and had already ordered on July 19 to stop the attack at the Vitele-Vieljärvi line, as strong enemy formations were still on the southwestern side of Jänisjärvi and the fast advance had opened the Lake Ladoga coastline at the right flank of the 5th division, where the defence had to be arranged.

The fears of Mannerheim were real, as on July 19 Mj. Gen. Pavlov, commander of the coastal defence of Lake Ladoga ordered the 4th Marine Brigade to conduct incursions behind Finnish defences. During early hours of July 24, they landed successfully on Lunkulansaari and Mantsi, two islands right beside Salmi. All 11th, 5th and 1st divisions were committed at the time so Talvela had to scrape whatever forces he was able to get (including a bridge building company) to throw attackers back to the lake. With the help of heavy artillery, which destroyed four of the fifteen ships Soviets were using, the Finns were able to push marines to three separate mottis, and the attempt to reinforce these forces at the morning of July 25 was repulsed. One by one remaining mottis were destroyed. On July 26 the Soviets landed in Mantsi and this time they almost managed to capture the whole island before Talvela managed to reinforce the forces there, and fighting continued in to the late night of July 27 when the last Soviet resistance ended.

Finnish VII Corps (Maj. Gen. Hägglund) was ordered to attack along the right flank of VI Corps to Sortavala. The isthmus between Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border was quite narrow and the important rail junction of Matkaselkä was only ten kilometres from the border. So, it was no wonder that Soviets had started to fortify the border region, in depth, right after the Moscow Peace. These fortifications were weakest at the northern section of the front, so Hägglund decided to put the main thrust there. The 7th division (strengthened with pioneer units) and all of the Corps' artillery were concentrated there. The 19th division-south had to manage with only its own artillery.

On the evening of July 10 the attack began. As a heavy thunderstorm was raging at the area, it was decided that infantry would attack without artillery support so that surprise could be achieved. The plan succeeded and most Soviet forces were encircled in their pillboxes, which were then eliminated with artillery support. During the next day, the 7th division advanced, encircling Soviet strongpoints. By the morning of July 12, they managed to break through the region where the Soviets had prepared minefields and fortifications.

This proved to be only a short relief, as the defending Soviet 168th division (Col. A. Bondarev) proved to be very capable in defence. Time after time, it created new minefields, dug strongpoints and trenches and skillfully evaded encircling Finnish units. The fighting of the 168th division was later used as a textbook example for defensive warfare in Soviet military schools.

The 7th division reached the western shore of Jänisjärvi July 13 and turned southward. By July 15 they managed to reach the Sortavala-Petrozavodsk railroad at Pirttipohja and encircled defenders there.

The 19th division (Col. Hannuksela) had the unenvied duty to assault the best defended section of the 168th division. Hannuksela decided to create a very narrow and deep breach at Niinisyrjä village, only 200-300 meters wide and four kilometres deep, to breach the fortified border region. IR58 (Lt. Col. Juva) was to spearhead the assault which began late in the evening of July 10. IR58 fought all the night and the next day, advancing one and half kilometres. It became evident that they had insufficient artillery so they had to borrow artillery from II Corps. IR58 continued the attack and reached the end of border fortifications July 12. The Soviet 168th division counterattacked to close the breach and encircle the IR58, but the Finns managed to hold the corridor, although Soviets managed to close its usage with artillery fire. The Finnish IR16 (Col. M. Laurila), which followed IR58, managed to open the corridor by the morning of July 15.

The 7th division continued its attack July 15 eastward along the railroad. On July 17 they managed to breach Soviet defences at the isthmus between Jänisjärvi and Vahvajärvi. Meanwhile, IR30 and IR51 of the 7th division, advanced east towards Jänisjoki, where they contacted the 11th division at the same day. IR30 and IR51 cleared the western shore of Jänisjoki and reached Lake Ladoga by July 20, then started to clear islands at the front of Sortavala.

The IR37/7th division was ordered to advance westward at the southern coast of Vahvajärvi to contact the 19th division, trying to encircle the Soviets between the divisions. Bondarev recognized the situation and ordered the retreat of the IR402. The 19th division had continued its attack southeast, and between July 25-18 25 fierce encirclements and counter-encirclements raged before the Finns managed to capture the main road and cut the railroad between Sortavala and Matkaselkä, which was captured July 18. Soviet forces managed to hold the IR37 at the village of Särkisyrjä between July 19-18 19 and again at the next village, Ilola, on July 22-20 22, securing the retreat route of IR402. By July 25 the Soviet 168th Division had managed to straighten its front line to a geographically more defensible line running from the Kiteenjoki river through the hills of Tirimäki, Okanmäki and Voinmäki to the Tohmajoki river.

As the Soviets were pushed out of the Jänisjoki valley, the remainder of the 7th division turned to the south-west. On July 25 they crossed the Tohmajoki. Advancement was slow, as the Soviets managed to hold their prepared strongpoints on hills, forcing the Finns to encircle them. At July 28, the 7th Division found a hole in Soviet defences and IR30/7 Division quickly poured through and captured Voinmäki. The advancing Finnish troops managed to ambush a car transporting the Chief of Staff of the Soviet 198 Division, Lt. Col. Sinyk. The documents captured contained the order for a Soviet counterattack, which was to start next day, so all Finnish units were ordered to stop their offensive operations and prepare for defence.

The Soviet 23rd Army transferred the 198th Division from the Karelian Isthmus to Sortavala with an order to join the counteroffensive with the 168th Division. The goal of the attack was to recapture the isthmus between Jänisjärvi and Lake Ladoga, as that would create a difficult situation for Finnish forces at the northern side of the Lake Ladoga. When the offensive began on July 29, it failed to gain ground anywhere, as available forces were too few against the Finns, and the captured information had given the Finns time to prepare for the offensive beforehand. The Finns continued their offensive against the remaining Tirimäki and Okanmäki strongpoints (which prevented advancement towards Sortavala) on August 3 and captured them on August 5.

Meanwhile, the Finnish II Corps had started its own offensive July 31 at the narrowest point between Lake Ladoga and the Finnish border and quickly managed to break through Soviet defences and advanced towards the coast of Lake Ladoga, threatening Soviet forces with encirclement. The Soviet 23rd Army cancelled its offensive and ordered the 198th Division to proceed southwards for a counteroffensive against the advancing Finnish II Corps. The 168th Division was ordered to withdraw towards Lake Ladoga, starting August 5. The Soviet IR367 was given the responsibility to defend Sortavala.

Although Sortavala was militarily insignificant, and had been neutralized when the Finns captured the islands controlling access to Lake Ladoga on July 27, it was politically important. So, instead of pursuing the 168th Division, the Finns concentrated their forces to capture the city. On August 12 Sortavala was reached by the 7th Division and the city was taken from the Soviets at August 15. Only small groups of defending soldiers managed to escape from the city.

Finnish II Corps had cut railroads between Viipuri and Sortavala on August 6, and August 8. Mannerheim formed the new I Corps from the 19th, 7th and 2nd Divisions, with the task to clear the western shore of Lake Ladoga. The II Corps reached Lake Ladoga August 8 at Lahdenpohja, thus capturing the harbour 168th Division had been instructed to use for evacuation on July 23.

The Soviet 168th Division, with a number of separate regiments and battalions, continued its retreat towards the shores of Lake Ladoga, with the Finnish 2nd Division pressing from the south-west and 19th Division from the north, while the 7th Division continued its offensive against Sortavala. On August 17, Soviets controlled only a 12 km wide and 10 km deep bridgehead, but during the following days Soviets concentrated naval and air units to protect the evacuation of the 168th Division and other units. This evacuation was a great success, and Finns could only capture a small booty from the motti, including 40 artillery pieces, 8 tanks, 310 cars, 35 tractors and 1500 live or dead horses.

At the northern side of the Finnish main offensive group, Oinonen, with the Cavalry Brigade and the 2nd Jäger Brigade, was ordered to advance to the old border. Opposing them were parts of the IR52/71 Division, 80th Border Guard detachment and the IR126/71 Division, which was commanded by Maj. Valli (a Finnish-born Communist who had emigrated to the Soviet Union during the Finnish Civil War). Many Karelian, Ingern and Finnish-born Communists served in its ranks, as well as many veterans from Kuusinen's People's Army of the Winter War.

The probing attacks started on July 7, then the main attack started, with the southernmost 2nd Jäger Brigade reaching Tolvajärvi by July 14. From there the Brigade began a northern encirclement towards Ägläjärvi. The attack of the Cavalry Brigade didn't succeed as well, and the Finns were forced to encircle the well prepared Soviet hillforts, which Finns were unable to capture directly, due to lack of artillery and air support.

By that time the German 163rd Division (Lt. Gen. Engelbrecht) (lacking one brigade and a part of the artillery, which was diverted to Salla during transport) had reached the front at Tolvajärvi and attempted to breach Soviet positions there on July 21, with only one brigade, but failed as the Soviet forces turned out to be stronger than expected.

A new offensive started on July 25, when two battalions from the German IR310 and one from the Finnish IR56 started attacking along the railroad, near the Näätäoja station. At Tolvajärvi, Engelbrecht decided to use the route the 2nd Jäger Brigade had opened, and ordered them, and one German infantry battalion from the IR307, to capture the village of Ägläjärvi, to sever the Soviet supply route to Tolvajärvi. The attack failed and the Soviets managed to keep the road through Ägläjärvi open, although they lost a supply depot during the fighting.

Lt. Gen. Engelbrecht exchanged the Cavalry Brigade with a couple of infantry battalions which were ordered in defence , and ordered the Cavalry Brigade to cut the road between Tolvajärvi and Ägläjärvi, by advancing through the forests. The attack started August 2 and by August 4 they reached the road and started advancing towards Tolvajärvi and Ägläjärvi. On August 3, the 2nd Jäger Brigade and German I/IR307 started attacking the village of Ägläjärvi, which they captured on August 5. On August 6 they contacted the Cavalry Brigade south of Ägläjärvi. The Soviets continued their retreat to Aittojoki, where they blew up the bridges and dug in. Also, their northern forces feared encirclement from Ägläjärvi, and left their fortified positions there August 8, retreating east of Kuolismaa.

On July 20, the 11th Division had been relieved from Jänisjoki and was moved first to the reserve and then to the area between the German 163th and 1st Divisions, against Hyrsylä, on August 11. The Soviets reinforced their forces in the area with the new 272nd Division on August 10, and they immediately started attacking towards Vieljärvi against Finnish 1st Division, but managed, in only a few places, to advance two kilometres in five days, before the attack was stopped.

On August 19, the 11th Division started the attack from Hyrsylä northwards and reached the Petrozavodsk railroad, and the main road, the next day. From there they continued northeast towards Suvilahti, which they captured August 21, and northwards towards Tsalkki, the location of the last usable supply road for Soviet defenders. Also on August 19, the 2nd Jäger Brigade, the Cavalry Brigade and German IR307 stormed over the Aittojoki. The Cavalry Brigade tried to encircle the defending Soviet forces, but recognized their precarious situation and quickly withdrew, managing to retreat most of their forces eastward before the 11th Division cut their retreat route at Tsalkki on August 23. With the capture of Suojärvi, the last town in Ladoga Karelia had been reconquered.

Reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus

Between the Army of Karelia and Gulf of Finland there were three Finnish corps: II Corps (2.D, 15.D and 18.D) north of the Vuoksi River, V Corps (10.D) and IV Corps (4.D, 12.D and 8.D) defending the coast. At the Soviet side there were XIX Corps (142.D, 115.D), L Corps (43.D, 123.D), X Mechanized Corps (21.Armored D, 24.Arm.D. and 198.Mech.D) in reserve and the division-strength 22. Fortification Area, which defended the coast. The Soviet X Mechanized Corps were transferred at the end of June from the Karelian Isthmus to southwest of Leningrad to defend against advancing Germans but left 198.D as the only reserve to Soviet forces. The Finnish V Corps were disbanded and 10.D were attached first to IV Corps (Lt.Gen. Karl Lennart Oesch) and late July to II Corps (MJ.Gen. Taavetti Laatikainen) as a reserve. Both parties were first on the defensive, and only small, company or battalion size probing attacks were made by both sides to improve their own positions. The loss of reserves prompted the Soviets to retreat to more defensible lines at the nothernmost part of the front and continued fortifying in depth, creating concrete and wooden strongpoints, digging trenches and laying minefields, although the Finns advanced to keep contact with enemy. The quiet lasted until July 31, when the Finnish offensive began.

The Soviet fortification works had been concentrated near the river Vuoksi and along the roads, so Finns concentrated their forces to narrow, deep breakthroughs over the roadless terrains which were supported by pioneers building temporary supply roads through the forests and over the swamps. The 18.D (Col. Pajari) attacked through the forest against the northernmost section of the Soviet 115.D and instead of following roads they secured a roadcrossing and advanced again over the forest to the next road where they did the same. The roadcrossings were occupied by stronger units, which had to defend against several armor supported Soviet counterattacks. During one of those counterattacks Private Vilho Rättö captured a Soviet AT gun and aiming through the barrel he managed to destroy four enemy tanks, earning him the first Mannerheim Cross granted to a private. Finally at August 4 Finns managed to encircle and capture the Ilmee road, crossing thus forcing the Soviets to abandon their prepared positions between Ilmee and the border. The main thrust of 15.D (Col. Hersalo) was against Soviet IR588/142.D, and concentrated the thrust against only a two kilometer wide section, where most of the artillery was concentrated. After breaching the border fortifications, they advanced five kilometers through the forest before coming to the road thus bypassing Soviet defences, which were encircled and captured one by one by forces coming behind the leading elements. After six days advance 15.D was only three kilometers from the Viipuri-Sortavala railroad and 15km from the western corner of Lake Ladoga and close to encircling Soviet forces on its left side. The 2.D (Col. Blick) decided to encircle two battalions of Soviet IR461 which were defending Tyrjä village by encircling the village from east and pushing the defenders to Lake Tyrjänjärvi by using IR7/2.D while IR28/2.D passed the village and advanced southwards. While supported by artillery the Soviets managed to hold on four days, before the encirclement was complete. Some of the men were able to escape through the forests, but most of them and all their heavy equipment were trapped to the village. Also the Finns suffered heavy casualties in the fighting and the IR7 received the nickname Tyrjän rykmentti (Regiment of Tyrjä). The capture of Tyrjä opened road towards the Elisenvaara railway crossing and at August 5 the first Finnish units reached the Viipuri-Sortavala railroad.

The commander of the Soviet 23. Army, Lt.Gen. M. Gerasimov, ordered on August 4 that 198.D cease its counterattack near Sortavala and move south to attack advancing 2.D together with 142.D. Meanwhile 115.D and 43.D should tie up the Finnish reserves. Unfortunately this wasn't sufficient and 115.D retreated to river Helisevänjoki, where hills and a river formed good defensive positions against attacking 18.D. The 18.D advanced to the river Helisevänjoki and reached the Viipuri-Sortavala railroad at the Inkilä roadcrossing at August 8. The 10.D (Col. Sihvo) was ordered to advance between 15.D and 18.D and at August 6 they reached Viipuri Sortavala railroad. 10.D continued attack towards the Käkisalmi-Hiitola railroad, but Soviet forces managed to keep the railroad and road open until August 8, when 10.D captured the village of Hiitola. When the first troops of 10.D reached Lake Ladoga next day, the last land connection to Soviet troops defending the northwest coast of Lake Ladoga was severed. The Soviets tried to open the connection with strong counterattacks during August 10 and 11 but were unsuccessful.

Meanwhile IR28/2.D had captured the Elisenvaara railway junction on August 9, thus opening supply routes through railways from Finland. After the battle of Tyrjä IR7/2.D rested two days as a division reserve before continuing the attack along the railroad towards the town of Lahdenpohja, which it captured on August 8, thus dividing Soviet forces in the forming bridgehead. At the same day, 2.D was transferred to new I Corps with an order to clear northern Soviet bridgehead. It was left to 15.D and 10.D to clear southern bridgehead where Soviet 142.D and 198.D were ordered to withdraw to Kilpolansaari island for naval transport. This withdrawal was executed in an orderly fashion and Finns couldn't encircle any bigger enemy formations. At August 11 15.D captured the Hiitola railway junction, and at August 13 all Soviet forces had retreated to the Huiskonniemi peninsula and the Kilpolansaari island. Having total air superiority, the Soviets managed to withdraw almost all the men and material from the bridgehead and at August 23 15.D, which was left to press the Soviets, had cleared all remaining rearguards from the island.

The Soviet intention was to start a large counteroffensive on August 10, and the 23. Army had received 265.D reinforcements to the Räisälä area. The offensive was to be directed against 18.D and 10.D, the objective being to open roads to encircled forces on northwest coast of Lake Ladoga. Coincidentally, the 18.D had been resting and received order to continue advance on the same day, so when the Soviet attack started at Inkilä, Finns in turn started their own only 5km westwards. While the Soviet attack failed to gain ground, Finnish attack managed to cut Soviets' main supply route and subsequent Finnish counterattack forced Soviet forces to retreat southwards while fighting delaying action and first Finnish troops reached the Vuoksi River at August 14 at Antrea, where they continued clearing the left shore of the river. Soviets started to move forces from southwestern side of Viipuri to defend Enso and to counterattack to Antrea at August 16, but when the attack failed, the Soviets were forced to evacuate northern shore at August 21. At the eastern side the Finns advanced southeastward and reached Vuosalmi at August 17 and northern outlet of river Vuoksi at August 18. Immediately, the Finns crossed River Vuoksi unopposed a few kilometers west of Vuosalmi at August 17, and by August 20 they had secured the beachhead.

The Soviet counterattack against 10.D started August 14 and it managed to push Finns 2km northwards before Finnish reinforcements managed to stop it. The 10.D left the coast of Lake Ladoga to IR36/15.D and concentrated all of its forces against Soviet 265.D at Räisälä. At August 15 the 10.D started its own attack in which it encircled Soviet defenders in Räisälä at August 17 and captured it next day. From there it continued cleaning the left bank of northern outlet of River Vuoksi. At August 19 IR43/10.D continued attack southward and reached Lake Suvanto at August 21. From there it continued eastward with IR1/10.D. This threatened all Soviet forces north of Vuoksi with encirclement and they started retreating from Käkisalmi which was captured at August 21. The attack continued southward and as only small border guard units were capable to delay attackers, the river Taipaleenjoki and the shore of Lake Ladoga was reached at August 23, but the Finnish troops were unable to cross river on the move.

STAVKA recognized the serious situation, and ordered at August 20 to retreat to the new, unprepared defence line running from the southwest side of Viipuri northwards to river Vuoksi and along it to Lake Suvanto and through River Taipaleenjoki to Lake Ladoga. This decision shortened the frontline considerably, but it also meant abandoning defensive installations they had prepared last months along the border. The Finns were preparing to start their own attack along the southernmost stretch of the border at, so when they noticed the Soviets leaving their positions at August 21, they were ordered to commence immediate pursuit. Although Soviet 43.D (MJ.Gen. V. Kirpitsnikov) managed to man new positions north and west of Viipuri, they were unable to prevent Finnish 12.D (Col. Vihma) to advance along the right bank of River Vuoksi and contact 18.D, which was enlarging their beachhead at Vuosalmi, and at the evening of August 22 the whole right bank was in Finnish hands. Soviet 123.D (MJ.Gen. F. Aljabusev) was defending the southwest side of Viipuri. Much of the troops of 123.D and of 115.D (MJ.Gen. Konjkov) which had retreated from upper Vuoksi were still unorganized due to fast retreat from their positions. The Finnish 4.D (Col. Viljanen) advanced along the Saimaa Canal, pressing Soviet 43.D from north. By August 23 the southernmost Finnish division, 8.D (Col. Winell), had cleared the western shore of the Bay of Viipuri up to the river Ykspäänjoki, and started to prepare the crossing of the bay.

During August 23, the Finns had managed to advance from the east to 8km from Viipuri, but in the morning of August 24 Soviet 123.D and 115.D started a counteroffensive against Finnish forces east of Viipuri, propably trying to capture initiative and force Finns back to the northern side of River Vuoksi. Using heavy artillery fire, Soviets managed to push the defending Finns over 5 km backwards in places, but they didn't manage to create breaches to the front, and when the reserve of 12.D, IR26, which was already moving to the place for troop rotation, arrived, the Soviets were pushed back to their starting positions next day. The Soviet counterattack failed to affect the already-ordered attack by 12.D, which severed the main railroad connection between Viipuri and Leningrad at August 25.

At the morning of August 24, the Finnish 8.D started crossing the Bay of Viipuri with the forces of III/IR45 to Lihaniemi Peninsula which it secured during the same day. At the next day they continued their attack and managed to sever last railroad running from Viipuri during afternoon, and managed to enlage their beachhead few kilometers to every direction during next two days. The 12.D had continued their offensive southwest, and severed Viipuri-Leningrad main road at August 27. At August 28 STAVKA allowed the 23. Army to withdraw from Viipuri and form new a defensive line to approximately the same place where Mannerheim Line had been. The Soviet forces began immediate retreat and tried forcefully to open the roads. At Ylä-Somme they managed to open one road at the evening of August 28, and during the night they managed to move several truck trains through, although under Finnish fire. The artillery fire caused several casualties, and little by little the road become more and more congested until finally only men on foot were able to pass. During the next two days, the Soviets tried repeatedly to open the railroad line along the bay of Viipuri, but at the late evening of August 30 IR3/12.D reached the positions of the 8.D. The motti of Porlampi was ended.

As the Soviet attempts to open the encirclement during the next day failed and as Finnish encirclement tightened, they made a final attempt to save the men by abandoning all vehicles and trying to escape on foot through the forests. The ring was already too tight and only small groups managed to escape at this last night. In the next morning, demoralized troops started to surrender. 9,000 men surrendered and 7,000 were buried there, but almost 12,000 men had managed to escape before the ring closed. Also, the booty was abundant: 306 artillery pieces, 55 tanks, 673 trucks, almost 300 tractors and around 4,500 horses.

Along the main road and railroad between Viipuri and Leningrad, the Soviet order to retreat and form a new defensive line along the old Mannerheim Line came too late, as the 12.D at the same day captured Leipäsuo and continued advance southwest, towards Lake Kuolemanjärvi, and southeast, along the railroad. The Soviet defences at main road at Summa held, but the Finns encircled these defences by breaching the defences at Munasuo. The defending remains of Soviet 123.D managed to hold Finnish advance only few places and continued withdrawing towards Leningrad. At the morning of August 30 12.D cut the Koivisto-Leningrad railroad at Kuolemanjärvi and reached the Gulf of Finland during the same day. Also at Vammelsuu, 12.D cut the railroad at the same evening, but failed to cut main road. The Gulf was reached also here in the next morning, and the attack continued east to Terijoki, which was captured August 31 and reached old border at the river Rajajoki next day. The encircled Soviet forces at Koivisto retreated to the islands and Soviet fleet transferred them to Leningrad. The last defenders of Koivisto were evacuated November 1.

At the left side of 12.D from August 23 the 18.D started attacking southeast between Lake Muolaanjärvi and Vuoksi. By August 26, the first lake isthmuses had been breached. Meanwhile first units of 2.D were relieving the forces of the 18.D from the isthmus between Lake Kirkkojärvi and Lake Punnusjärvi and 10.D those from Lake Punnusjärvi to the river Vuoksi. After the mottis at the northwestern shores of Lake Ladoga had been cleared, I Corps was moved to the river Vuoksi where it took 10.D and 15.D to its command. The 18.D breached the second lake isthmuses August 27 and rested one day before continuing attack towards the Kivennapa road crossing which it captured August 29. The attack continued towards the old border which was reached August 31. Also the 2.D reached the old border at August 31. The 10.D had more troubles as Soviet 198.D had started its counterattack August 29. The Finnish attack started to gain speed during August 30, and also 15.D joined the attack from the other side of the river Vuoksi. The Valkjärvi railroad endpoint was captured at August 31 and because of the threat of encirclement, the Soviet forces were ordered to withdraw from the souther side of the river Vuoksi behind the old border. 15.D followed the retreating Soviets closely and by September 2 old border had been reached everywhere.

At August 20, General W. Erfurth notified Mannerheim that Field Marshall W. Wilhelm Keitel would send a letter describing where Finns were asked to attack Leningrad. Mannerheim explained practical difficulties of the proposal and presented the opposition of both the political and military leadership to this attack. The government had decided beforehand that Finland would not attack Leningrad, and only after the pressure of military leadership they accepted a small advance across the old border to capture better defensive positions. The social democrats especially opposed crossing the border. When Keitel's letter came, Ryti and Mannerheim together prepared a negative answer. On August 31, Erfurth contacted Mannerheim again and proposed that Finns should cancel the attack to East Karelia and instead attack Leningrad. Ryti and Mannerheim again refused. On August 31 Mannerheim gave the order that the attack be stopped at the line from the mouth of the river Rajajoki to Ohta. The exact line between Ohta and Lake Ladoga would be ordered later, when the Finns had reached the old border there. That would shorten the frontline without the need to attack Soviet fortifications north of Leningrad (KaUR). In this last phase, the Soviets had six infantry divisions and a number of separate battalions and regiments defending Leningrad from the north, but all of them were at half strength due to the hard fighting with the Finns.

12.D had reached the target already on September 1, but elsewhere the attack started on September 2. 18.D captured Mainila at the same day and Valkeasaari at next day. By September 7 both 18.D and 2.D had reached their targets between River Rajajoki and Ohta. The commander of I Corps, Colonel Mäkinen, ordered his troops to advance to the line Ohta-Lake Lempaalanjärvi-Old border at Lake Ladoga with an addition, that if strong defences were met, the offensive could be stopped there. At September 4 the attack began, and at September 6 10.D managed to encircle and destroy Soviet IR941 at Kirjasalo. Finally at September 9 the ordered line was reached everywhere and Finnish forces moved to the defensive.

The Soviet military leadership quickly learned of lessened Finnish pressure, and already at September 5 two divisions were transferred from Karelian Isthmus to the south of the city, against the Germans. Although the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus didn't actively participate in the Siege of Leningrad, merely just their existence contributed to the siege by hampering the supply of the city around and across the Lake Ladoga.

Occupation of East Karelia

Over a month had Karelian Army stayed at place, replenished its forces and prepared for continuation of its offensive while Finns had recaptured Karelian Isthmus. Also Soviets had prepared new fortifications and brought new troops to the front. When encirclements at western shore of Lake Ladoga were resolved, also Finnish 7.D were transferred to the junction of VI and VII Corps where it could assist both of them.

The Finnish offensive started at the early hours of September 4 at Tuulos, when largest artillery barrage so far in Finnish history was unleashed. This artillery barrage, its effectiveness, leading practices and ammunition usage was carefully inspected right after the battle, and prompted numerous improvements which were honed to perfection in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. Closely following the barrage, the 5.D crossed the River Tuulos 7km from the mouth of the river at 5am. The river crossing was easy, but soon Soviet defence strengthened. The Finnish armored battalion followed the spearhead and helped to destroy enemy strongpoints, and finally the coastal road was severed at 11am. The Soviet counterattack started at 1pm, and managed to encircle the Finns who had advance to the coastal road. At 2pm when situation seemed dangerous to Finns, Col. Karhu committed division reserve, the light detachtment 4 to the battle, and together with tanks they managed to break encirclement at 17:30, and in the ensuing battle scatter defending forces and reach the coast of Lake Ladoga, thus cutting the retreat route of the forces still between them and River Tuulos. During the night the encircled forces were destroyed. In the battle Soviet 3. Marine Br., IR452 and IR419 were shattered and partially destroyed; the road to Olonets was open.

As soon as breakthrough was secured, Detachment Lagus rushed through the 5.D towards Olonets which it captured at September 5 with only a short firefight. From there it advanced through the night towadrs River Svir which first units reached at 5am September 7. A Detachment Marttinen was separated from Detachment Lagus and armored battalion, and it advanced east from Olonets and captured the northern end of the railroad bridge over River Svir and severed the western branch of Murmansk railroad at the morning of September 8.

At the left side of 5.D, the 17.D wasn't so successful, but Soviet 3.D was able to hold its positions at Säntämä. Further north 17.D managed better and its IR13 reached Olonets-Petrozavodsk road at the evening of September 5, where IR 34 continued advance southward along the road. From Olonets IR44, which was part of detachment Lagus, started advancing northwards September 6 along the road towards Nurmoila, which was captured at the next morning. This meant that all road connections were severed from Soviet 3.D and it quickly broke away from Säntämä and tried to recapture Nurmoila unsuccessfully. During the September 7 Finns managed to capture whole road between Nurmoila and IR34, but by abandoning their vehicles most of the Soviet 3.D managed to break through the Finnish lines at September 8 and cross the road eastward, thus escaping to the roadless forests there.

The 17.D marched to River Svir and started to clean both banks eastward from the railway bridge where Murmansk railroad crosses the Svir. Soviets had reinforced area with new 314.D, and Finnish advance was slow, and by September 22, Finns had consolitated a 5-10km deep and 40 km wide bridgehead on the southern bank of the River Svir.

At the northern side of the 7.D, the 1.D and 11.D were preparing to attack along the Olonets-Petrozavodsk road. To this purpose, it started already at August 31 to capture bridgeheads across the River Säpsänjoki. Also here Soviets have prepared defences along the roads, so Finns decided to advance through roadless forests to encircle defending Soviet forces. At September 7 it managed to cut Aunus-Petrozavodsk road north of Prääsä roadcrossing, witch was captured next day. This resulted that Soviet 272.D, IR9 and IR24 were cut from their supply. The 1.D had attacked against these forces and at September 7 it reached the main road.

Soviets started counterattack to open the road to Petrozavodsk from the both sides against the roadblock at Prääsä, September 11-September 13, but they failed to open the road. This meant that Soviet forces had no other option than to abandon their heavy equipment and retreat through forests eastward, which they did during the next three days. After the area was cleared from Soviet forces, the 11.D continued attack at September 20 by advancing by the main road and cutting it every two kilometers thus forcing defenders to abandon their positions. Advancing this way the 11.D reached the village of Puoliväli at September 24, 20km from Petrozavodsk.

Meanwhile, Col. Lagus has collected his forces to the railroad bridge over the River Svir. At September 18 he restarted his offensive by attacking eastwards along the river to the village of Ostretsina, where he turned northwards to Latva village. The 7.D had build between September 15-20 over 30km road through the swamps and marshy forests towards Latva station at Murmansk railroad. The intention of these maneuvers was to encircle in double envelopement Soviet defenders (3.D and separate battalions) who had prepared defences along the railroad and who were supported by armored train, impenetrable by Finnish AT weapons. The Finnish attack achieved surprise and railroad was severed and the village of Latva was captured at September 21. Encircled Soviet forces started immediate retreat northwards along the railroad, and with the help of the armored train they managed to break the encirclement and retreat northwards at September 22.

Lagus didn't wait the end of the battles at Latva station, but ordered two battalions (lead by Lt.Col. Björkman) to attack northwards from Latva village and at September 24 they reached the shores of Lake Onega at the village of Derevjannoje, thus severing last land connection south from Petrozavodsk.

At September 25 Lagus ordered Björkman to cut the railroad again near Petrozavodsk, and at September 27 he cut the railroad at Orsega. At the next day, Björkman was only 4km from Petrozavodsk, when the attack was stopped as the forces were needed in Orsega, where Soviets were trying to break their encirclement. At September 29 Soviets managed to force their way through Finnish frontline at Orsega, and managed to advance still 5km northwards before the Finns stopped them. The 7.D was following on the heels of the Soviet forces and at September 30 fierce fighting started at Orsega. The IR9 of the 7.D attacked southwards along the coastal road of Lake Onega, and at reached the River Svir at October 2. The planned immediate crossing had to be postponed as tired troop refused to cross the river in the darkness of the night. The crossing succeeded at October 6 at 14:00, and during the following week the 7.D created 10km deep bridgehead to the southern bank of River Svir, until the arrival of Soviet 114.D halted Finnish advance and all troops started to prepare defensive positions.

At September 26 11.D and 1.D had continued their attack towards Petrozavodsk. The Soviet forces recognized the threatening situation and started to evacuate forces from Petrozavodsk, so when the 11.D cut the main road and railroad northwards from Petrozavosk at September 30, most of the Soviet forces had already left the town. The last defenders of the town were evacuated over the Lake Onega and Finns captured the town at the morning of October 1.

The Soviet 3.D realized that the road northwards was blocked, and after destroying its heavy equipment, including the armored train, it retreated to the roadless forest and started a long retreat southwards. The Finnish IR30 started the pursuit, and after two weeks the remaining few hundred men of the 3.D managed to escape over the River Svir.

At the left side of the 11.D the 4.D advanced along the Sortavala-Petrozavodsk railroad. The direction was heavily fortified before the Winter War, and advancement was much slower so 4.D was still 12km from Petrozavodsk when the town fell to the Finns. At the further north there was group Oinonen with 2.JBr and Cav.Br. with an orders to advance northeast. There were two roads with the wide roadless forest between which group Oinonen had to use, so Soviet 71.D decided to concentrate their forces against one of these, so they were able to force 2.JBr. in a counterattack of September 16-September 21 almost 10km backwards before they were forced to retreat as the attack of the cavalry brigade threatened them with an encirclement. Group Oinonen continued pressuring Soviet 71.D, and reached Lake Vatselänjärvi at September 29, thus opening the road eastward.

After the capture of Petrozavodsk, Karelian Army was ordered to continue offensive northward along the railroad and capture the string of lake isthmuses up to River Suununjoki. The 1.D crossed the Bay of Petrozavodsk to Cape Gromovskoje October 2 and had cleared the southern part of the cape at October 7. The first isthmus was breached by 4.D at October 5, but the advance was slow because of delaying Soviet IR 1072. So the 1.D took responsibility of the attack and attacking IR5 was transferred from 4.D to 1.D. Also a new IR29 was sent from Petrozavodsk to help 1.D, and finally at October 18 the River Suununjoki was reached. The 4.D continued attack northward on the western side of the lakes, leaving only small detachments to secure next two isthmuses until it reached group Oinonen which had advanced eastward to the isthmus between Lake Sunjärvi and Lake Pälläjärvi at October 13. The attack continued northward along the western bank of Lake Pälläjärvi, and at October 19 the 4.D captured Juustjärvi roadcrossing, opening the road towards Karhumäki right before Soviet IR126 managed to pass the crossing, forcing it to abandon it's heavy equipment and retreat north through the woods.

The 8.D had been transported from Karelian Isthmus to Porajärvi, which had been captured by Brigade Kuusjärvi at October 12 when Soviet forces started to retreat from their prepared positions in threat of the advance of the 4.D towards Juustjärvi. At October 15 the 8.D, strengthened with Brigade Kuussaari, started the attack across the River Suununjoki and at October 18 captured the roadcrossing at Lake Jänkäjärvi, from where it continued towards Juustjärvi, where 4.D was contacted at October 20, and towards Lake Seesjärvi, which was reached at October 19. The 8.D continued cleaning the southern shore of the Lake Seesjärvi, and captured the village of Maaselkä at November 1 before it has to stop when it faced a new Soviet 289.D. The attack started again after three weeks preparations at November 21, and managed to press defenders against the shores of the lake, but those managed to retreat over the frozen lake at November 28. Also the capture of the Maaselkä railway station failed, as a new Soviet 263.D reached the station right before the Finns. As it became evident that offensive couldn't be continued to the target (the railway station), the 8.D was ordered to prepare defensive positions.

The capture of Juustjärvi threatened the long right flank of Soviet forces defending the eastern bank of River Suununjoki. So 4.D reinforced with IR45 was ordered to advance to the shores of Lake Onega and isolate Soviet forces there. The attack started at October 20, and October 24 it captured the village of Mäntyselkä at the southern end of the Lake Semsjärvi, but failed to advance from there. IR26 was ordered to encircle the enemy by going around the lake, and in the early morning of October 27 it managed to capture the village of Kumsa, thus severing the Soviet connection behind and forcing them to retreat. Meanwhile the IR45 had advanced through forest paths and improved them so that motorized vehicles could use the route, and reached the railroad near Käppäselkä station at October 27. During the next two days, they managed to capture the station and an armored train which became stuck at station.

At the same time, October 27, the main offensive across the River Suununjoki started, and Cavalry Brigade managed to secure bridgehead. On the next day, also the 2.JBr. crossed the river and started advancing towards Kontupohja, while Cavalry Brigade turned northwards to race around the Lake Santalanjärvi. In the following day also the 1.D crossed the river and together with the 2.JBr. they started attacking Kontupohja, but the first assault on the move failed and Finns stopped for preparations. The Soviet 313.D, which defended Kontupohja, had noticed that additional Finnish units threatened it's connections northward, so it started withdrawing from Kontupohja at the evening of November 2, just before the planned Finnish offensive of the next morning. Finns captured the burned down town before midnight and continued pursuing retreating Soviets, but although Cav.Br. had severed the railroad and main road northwards, the Soviet division managed to retreat using the hastily built road between the main road and the shores of the lake.

The situation although improved for the defenders, as the length of the front shortened and it was anchored on the both ends to the lakes. The reinforcements had improved the force ratio: There was three Finnish divisions and two brigades against four Soviet divisions and a brigade. Also the high hills south and west of town Karhumäki provided natural defensive positions which were improved by extensive field fortifications, where Finnish advance stopped November 8.

During the next two weeks Finns proped the defences, and at November 21 1.D started an attack which managed to drive 5km deep wedge to the Soviet defences before being stopped. At the northern side of Karhumäki, the 4.D had to stop only 4km from the center of the town at November 19. The renewed offensive started at November 29, which managed to breach the outer defences west of the town by December 2. Meanwhile, Mj.Gen. Lagus' 1.JBr. reached the front and joined the offensive at December 4. At the next morning the 4.D from north and the 1.JBr. from west breached the Soviet lines and advanced to the town. The 2.JBr. followed right behind Lagus' men and started clearing the town when 1.JBr. continued quickly eastward towards Poventsa, which they reached next day, thus closing the White Sea Canal. Small units crossed the canal and advanced few kilometers before returning to Poventsa, where they were ordered to form defensive positions. At the night of December 8 the Soviet pioneers blew up the locks of the canal, and the following flood breached the protecting banks of Poventsa thus drowning a few men.

North of the Karelian Army, the Finnish 14. Infantry Division (Col. E. Raappana) was ordered to advance to Rukajärvi. The area was defended by Soviet IR337 (of 54.ID) and 73.Border Guard Detachment, and also here the defenders had prepared 15-20km deep area with field fortifications.

First patrols crossed the border July 1, and general advance started July 3. Defenders managed to delay Finnish advance, and it was July 8, when Finns captured Repola. The advance continued July 11, when Finns crossed Lake Lieksajärvi, and started to encircle Soviet forces defending narrow isthmuses. The encirclement was completed July 21, and as Soviet attempt to open the road eastward was repulsed July 23, it started evacuate personel over the Lake Roukkulanjärvi. The evacuation wasn't fully successful, as over 100 men drowned and 300 was captured, when the motti of Omelia finally surrendered at July 24.

Because Finns had no light units available, they advanced slowly eastward, and next battles were fought about the control of Ontrosenvaara hills between July 30 and August 12, where Soviet 54.D had brought reinforcements, including parts of IR137 and 71.Border Guard Detachment. When these forces were unable to stop Finnish attack, Soviet 7.Army ordered new 27.ID to be formed to the area. It turned out, that Soviets had carefully prepared positions at Rukavaara hill only few kilometers eastward, and retreating forces manned these positions and managed to stop Finnish advance for three weeks there. At September 3, Finns attacked, encircling the hill and forcing the defenders to leave their positions at September 8. The village of Rukajärvi was captured September 11, and the River Onkajoki was crossed September 15. After advancing only 2km Finns reached the Soviet positions which it couldn't capture on the move. Although the regimental target wasn't reached, the target Mannerheim had ordered was reached by capturing Rukajärvi and securing it, so 14.D was ordered to defensive.

Advancement from Northern Finland

Main article: Operation Silver Fox

Political development

On July 10, the Finnish army began a major offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. Mannerheim's order of the day, the Sword scabbard declaration, clearly states that the Finnish involvement was an offensive one.[1] By the end of August 1941, Finnish troops had reached the pre-war boundaries. The crossing of the pre-war borders led to tensions in the army, the cabinet, the parties of the parliament, and domestic opinion. Military expansionism might have gained popularity, but it was far from unanimously championed.

Also, international relations were strained — notably with Britain and Sweden, whose governments in May and June had learned in confidence from Foreign Minister Witting that Finland had absolutely no plans for a military campaign coordinated with the Germans. Finland's preparations were said to be purely defensive.

Sweden's leading cabinet members had hoped to improve the relations with Nazi Germany through indirect support of Operation Barbarossa, mainly channelled through Finland. Prime Minister Hansson and Foreign Minister Günther found however, that the political support in the National Unity Government and within the Social Democratic organizations turned out to be insufficient, particularly after Mannerheim's Sword Scabbard Declaration, and even more so after Finland within less than two months undeniably had begun a war of conquest. A tangible effect was that Finland became still more dependent on food and munitions from Germany.

The Commonwealth put Finland under blockade and the British ambassador was withdrawn. On July 31, 1941, British RAF made an air raid on the northern Finnish port of Petsamo [2]. Damages were limited since the harbour was almost empty of ships.

September 11, the U.S. ambassador Arthur Schoenfeld was informed that the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was halted on the pre-Winter War border (with a few straightened curves at the municipalities of Valkeasaari and Kirjasalo), and that "under no conditions" would Finland participate in an offensive against Leningrad, but would instead maintain static defence and wait for a political resolution. Witting stressed to Schoenfeld that Germany, however, should not hear of this.

On September 22, a British note was presented (by Norway's ambassador Michelet) demanding the expulsion of German troops from Finland's territory and Finland's withdrawal from East Karelia to positions behind the pre-Winter War borders. Finland was threatened by a British declaration of war unless the demands were met. The declaration of war was exacted on Finland's Independence Day, December 6.

In December 1941, the Finnish advance had reached River Svir (which connects the southern ends of Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega and marks the southern border of East Karelia). By the end of 1941, the front stabilized, and the Finns did not conduct major offensive operations for the following two and a half years. The fighting morale of the troops declined when it was realized that the war would not soon end.

It has been suggested that the execution of the prominent pacifist leader Arndt Pekurinen in November 1941 was due to fear of army demoralization being exacerbated by such activism.

War in Trenches 1942-1943

Diplomatic manoeuvres

Operation Barbarossa was planned as a blitzkrieg lasting a few weeks. British and US observers believed that the invasion would be concluded before August. In the autumn of 1941, this turned out to be wrong, and leading Finnish military officers started to mistrust Germany's capacity. German troops in Northern Finland faced circumstances they were not properly prepared for, and failed badly to reach their targets, most importantly Murmansk. Finland's strategy now changed. A separate peace with the Soviet Union was offered, but Germany's strength was too great. The idea that Finland had to continue the war while putting its own forces at the least possible danger gained increasing support, perhaps in the hopes that the Wehrmacht and the Red Army would wear each other down enough for negotiations to begin, or to at least get them out of the way of Finland's independent decisions. Some may also have still hoped for an eventual victory by Germany.

Finland's participation in the war brought major benefits to Nazi Germany. The Soviet fleet was blockaded in the Gulf of Finland, so that the Baltic was freed for the training of German submarine crews as well as for German shipping, especially for the transport of the vital iron ore from northern Sweden, and nickel and rare metals needed in steel processing from the Petsamo area. The Finnish front secured the northern flank of the German Army Group North in the Baltic states. The sixteen Finnish divisions tied down numerous Soviet troops, put pressure on Leningrad — although Mannerheim refused to attack — and threatened the Murmansk Railroad. Additionally, Sweden was further isolated and was increasingly pressured to comply with German and Finnish wishes, though with limited success.

Despite Finland's contributions to the German cause, the Western Allies had ambivalent feelings, torn between residual goodwill for Finland and the need to accommodate their vital ally, the Soviet Union. As a result, Britain declared war against Finland, but the United States did not. With few exceptions, there was no combat between these countries and Finland, but Finnish sailors were interned overseas. In the United States, Finland was denounced for naval attacks made on American Lend-Lease shipments, but received approval for continuing to make payments on its World War I debt throughout the inter-war period.

Because Finland belonged to the Anti-Comintern Pact and signed other agreements with Germany, Italy and Japan, the Allies characterized Finland as one of the Axis Powers, although the term used in Finland is "co-belligerence with Germany".

International volunteers and support

Like in the Winter War, Swedish volunteers were recruited. Until December, for guarding the Soviet naval base at Hanko, that was then evacuated by sea, and the Swedish unit was officially disbanded. During the Continuation War, the volunteers signed for three to six months of service. In all, over 1,600 fought for Finland, though only about 60 remained by the summer of 1944. About a third of the volunteers had been engaged already in the Winter War. Another significant group, about a fourth of the men, were Swedish officers on leave.

There was also a SS-battalion of volunteers on the northern Finnish front from 1942 to 1944, that was recruited from Norway, then under German occupation, and similarly some Danes.

About 3,400 Estonian volunteers took part in the Continuation War.

Jews in Finland

Finland refused to allow extension of Nazi anti-Semitic practices. Finnish Jews served in the Finnish army, and Jews were not only tolerated in Finland but most Jewish refugees were granted asylum (8 of the more than 500 refugees were handed over to the Nazis). The field synagogue in Eastern Karelia was one of the very few on the Axis side during the war. In the few cases in which Jewish officers from Finland's defence forces were awarded the German Iron Cross, they declined.

Finnish occupation policy

Russian children in a Finnish-run transfer camp in Petrozavodsk after the Finnish occupation in the end of June, 1944. The sign reads: "Transfer camp. Camp entrance and conversations through the fence are forbidden by threat of shooting."

About 2,600–2,800 Soviet prisoners of war were handed over to the Germans. Most of them (around 2,000) joined the Russian Liberation Army. Many of the rest were army officers and political officers, and based on their names, 74 of them were Jews, most of them dying in Nazi concentration camps, while some were given to the Gestapo for interrogation. Sometimes these handovers were demanded in return for arms or food.

The latter was especially scarce in 1942 in Finland due to bad harvest, and primarily for this reason the number of deaths in Finnish camps rose high. Punishments for escape attempts or serious breaking of rules included solitary confinement and execution. Out of 64,188 Soviet POWs, 18,318 died in Finnish prisoner of war camps.

After the war, for their crimes based on the testimonies of the former prisoners of war charges have been preferred against 1381 Finnish prisoner of war camp staff members from which 723 persons have undergone to different punishments and 658 person has been released from punishment. They were accused of 42 executions, 242 murders. There were the seven cases led death under the request of former prisoners, 10 cases of death as a result of the tortures, eight infringements of the property right, 280 official infringements and 86 other crimes.

A significant number of Soviet immigrants who had come to East Karelia after 1917 were placed in concentration camps. These were Russian women, young children, and the elderly as almost all working age male and female population were either drafted or evacuated: only ⅓ of original population of 470 000 remained in East Karelia when Finnish occupier came, and only half of them were Karelians. About 30% (24,000) of remaining Russian population were collected to camps, 6,000 of them refugees on move captured when waiting Soviet transportation over the Lake Onega, and 3,000 from the southern side of River Svir to secure the area behind frontline against partisan attacks. The first of the camps were set up on October 24 1941 in Petrozavodsk. At the spring and summer of 1942 3,500 of detained died on malnourishment. During the last half of 1942 the number of detained dropped quickly to 15,000, and as nutrition situation improved, only 500 more people died during the last two years of war.

On other occasions, the Finns received around 2,100 Soviet prisoners of war in return for those POWs they turned over to the Germans. These POWs were mainly Estonians and Karelians willing to join the Finnish army. These, as well as some volunteers from the occupied Eastern Karelia, formed the Kin Battalion (Finnish: "Heimopataljoona"). At the end of the war, the USSR required that the members of the Kin Battalion were to be handed over to the Soviet Union. Some managed to escape before or during the transport, but most of them were either sent to the Gulag camps or executed.

In 1941, even before the Continuation War, one battalion of Finnish volunteers joined the German Waffen-SS with silent approval of the Finnish government. It has been concluded that the battalion served as a token of Finnish commitment to cooperation with Nazi Germany. The agreement was, that the Finnish volunteers would not be sent to fight against Britons or Greeks (the only European nations in war with Germany at the moment of signing). This battalion, named the Finnisches Freiwilligen Bataillon fought as part of SS Division Wiking in the Ukraine and Caucasus. The battalion was pulled back from the front in May 1943 and was transported to Tallinn where it was disbanded on July 11. The soldiers were then transferred into different units of the Finnish army.

Soviet Offensive 1944

Overtures for peace

Areas ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union

Finland began to actively seek a way out of the war after the disastrous German defeat at Stalingrad in January–February 1943. Edwin Linkomies formed a new cabinet with the peace process as the top priority. Negotiations were conducted intermittently in 1943–44 between Finland and its representative Juho Kusti Paasikivi on the one side, and the Western Allies and the Soviet Union on the other, but no agreement was reached. Stalin decided to force Finland to surrender, first with a terror bombing campaign. "The Battle of Helsinki" in February 1944 included three major air attacks to the capital, involving combined over 6000 bombing sorties. However, the Finnish anti-aircraft defences managed very successfully to repel the raids, it is estimated that only about 5% of the bombs hit the planned targets. Major air attacks hit also Oulu and Kotka and minor ones many other places. However, because of the forewarning from radio intelligence and the effects of the AA defence the number of casualties was small compared to the bombings of Central European cities or Tallinn. The fighting spirit of the citizens was unbroken.

Recapture of Karelian Isthmus

Main article: Fourth strategic offensive

On June 9, 1944, the Soviet Union opened a major offensive against Finnish positions on the Karelian Isthmus and in the Lake Ladoga area (it was timed to accompany D-Day). On the second day of the offensive, the Soviet forces broke through the Finnish lines, and in the succeeding days they made advances that appeared to threaten the survival of Finland. On the 21.7 km wide breakthrough point the Soviet Union had concentrated 2851 pcs of 45mm guns and 130 pcs of 50mm guns. On the heaviest places in Karelian isthmus, the Soviet Union had concentrated over 200 guns for each frontier kilometer (one for each 5m). Eg. on9 June, Soviet artillery fired over 80 000 rounds at the Karelian isthmus. The first week of the Soviet offensive in the Karelian isthmus is one of the largest single World War II offensives in Europe. In some aspects the second largest after the D-Day invasion in Normandy. Soviet troops liberated Petrozavodsk on June 28 1944. Before they retreated the Finns delivered two weeks worth of food to the locals. This is a rare or even unequaled act in the history of war.

Finland especially lacked modern anti-tank weaponry, which could stop heavy Soviet tanks, and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop offered them in exchange for a guarantee that Finland would not again seek a separate peace. On June 26 President Risto Ryti gave this guarantee as a personal undertaking, which he intended to last for the remainder of his presidency. In addition to material deliveries, Hitler sent some assault gun brigades and a Luftwaffe fighter-bomber unit to temporarily support the most threatened defence sectors.

With new supplies from Germany, the Finns were now able to handle the crisis, and halted the Soviets in early July 1944. At this point the Finnish forces had retreated about one hundred kilometres bringing them to approximately the same line of defence they had held at the end of the Winter War. This line was known as the VKT-line (for "Viipuri–Kuparsaari–Taipale", running from Vyborg to River Vuoksi, and along the river to Lake Ladoga at Taipale) where the Soviet offensive was stopped in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala in spite of their numerical and material superiority. Finland had already become a sideshow for the Soviet leadership, who now turned their attention to Poland and southeastern Europe. The Allies had already succeeded in their landing in France and were pushing towards Germany, and the Soviet leadership did not want to give them a free hand in Central Europe. Although the Finnish front was once again stabilized, the Finns were exhausted and wanted to get out of the war.

To the Armistice

Mannerheim had repeatedly reminded the Germans that in case their troops in Estonia retreated, Finland would be forced to make peace even at very unfavourable terms. Soviet-occupied Estonia would have provided the enemy a favourable base for amphibious invasions and air attacks against Helsinki and other cities, and would have strangled Finnish access to the sea. When the Germans indeed withdrew, the Finnish desire to end the war increased. Perhaps realizing the validity of this point, initial German reaction to Finland's announcement of ambitions for a separate peace was limited to only verbal opposition. However, the Nazis arrested hundreds of sailors on Finnish merchant ships in Germany, Denmark or Norway.

President Ryti resigned, and Finland's military leader and national hero, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, was extraordinarily appointed president by the parliament, accepting responsibility for ending the war.

On September 4 the cease-fire ended military actions on the Finnish side. The Soviet Union ended hostilities exactly 24 hours after the Finns. The Moscow armistice was signed in Moscow on September 19 between the Soviet Union and Finland. Finland had to make many limiting concessions: the Soviet Union regained the borders of 1940, with the addition of the Petsamo area; the Porkkala Peninsula (adjacent to Finland's capital Helsinki) was leased to the USSR as a naval base for fifty years (but returned in 1956), and transit rights were granted; Finland's army was to demobilize in haste, and Finland was required to expel all German troops from its territory. As the Germans refused to leave Finland voluntarily, the Finns had no choice but to fight their former allies in the Lapland War. The Finns were also to clear the mine fields in Karelia (including East Karelia) and in the Gulf of Finland (of course later also in Lapland). The mine clearance was a long operation, especially in the sea areas, lasting until 1952 and causing 100 men killed and over 200 wounded, most of them in Lappland. Up to the 70s old mines were found occasionally floating on the Gulf of Finland.

Conclusion

In retrospect the Continuation War can be seen as the result of a series of political miscalculations by the Finnish leadership in which Finland's martial abilities clearly outshone its diplomatic skills. However, many commentators also hold that Finland was a victim of bad luck in addition to any failings on its own part, being forced to make a choice in a situation when any of the available alternatives would result in being attacked by either side. It has been claimed that not joining the war with Germany against Soviet Union would almost certainly have lead to occupation attempts by either side of that great conflict, and thus Finland's involvement anyway.

It is also claimed that after the fall of the Soviet Union, it has become clear that Finland, maybe more by luck than by skill, happened to make the right choice after the Winter War by fervently seeking to reverse the German disinterest. This claim rests on the idea that Soviet occupation, and a fate surely worse than that of the other Border States, would otherwise have been unavoidable.

By the end of the war, the aging Field Marshal Mannerheim had earned a remarkable reputation among former foes and allies, in Finland as well as abroad, which - to a considerable degree - eased Finland's extrication from a potentially disastrous undertaking.

In any event, Finland's fate was no worse than any other country struck by the World War — quite the contrary. Only 2,000 Finnish civilians were killed during World War II, and only relatively narrow border regions had been conquered by force. For nearly three years until June 20, 1944, when Vyborg fell, not one major Finnish town was besieged or occupied. During the war there were three capital cities of belligerent European countries that were not occupied by force at some stage: London, Moscow and Helsinki. Ultimately, Finland was successful in retaining independence, parliamentary democracy and a market economy.

After the war, Finland preserved its independence while adjusting its foreign policy to avoid offence to the USSR, at the time a world superpower, a concession which the Soviet government reciprocated by surrendering part of its gains from the postwar settlement and refraining from too obvious intrusions in Finland's domestic affairs. Finland also signed a pact of co-operation and mutual assistance that guaranteed that in the event of a war between the western powers and the Soviet Union, Finland would defend its territory and airspace against the western powers. To Moscow, an independent Finland linked to it by a cooperation treaty was seemingly a price worth paying for keeping Sweden formally neutral in the Cold War, a quid pro quo that for forty years safeguarded wider Soviet strategic interests in the region.

Contentious history views

It seems fair to state that determining the winner/s of the Continuation War is largely in the eyes of the beholder. Finland had succeeded in her goal, to save her independence and sovereignty and to prevent the take-over attempts by the Soviet Union, set forth by two all-out attacks by the Red Army, one initiating the Winter War on November 30, 1939, and the other initiating the Continuation War on June 25, 1941.

The Soviet Union - on the other hand - had fallen far from its main objective, conquering Finland, a goal set forth in Moscow on August 23, 1939, by the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Stalin and Hitler.

Finland had abandoned the City of Viipuri, using only hours of delaying tactics on June 20, 1944, up to 16:40 (20th Br, 120 dead/MIA; research by Eeva Tammi, 8/2006). The following nine consecutive final battles were victorious for the Finnish Armed Forces. In the very final Battle of Ilomantsi the Finns had even succeeded in pushing the enemy back.

Ever since its initial attack in the beginning of the war on June 25, 1941, and the following retreat, the Red Army had not been able to cross the 1940 Finnish-Soviet border, except for a short-lived moment in the final Battle of Ilomantsi in 1944, where it suffered a loss, after two of its divisions were decimated and shattered by the Finns.

A narrow but massive Soviet spearhead on the Karelian Isthmus had been stopped in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala. On other areas, Finns were on the Soviet soil. Of the territory eventually ceded to USSR, the Red Army had won only a fraction in battles, by fighting. In this respect - from military point of view - Finland clearly had come out a winner on the final battle stages.

However, if Finland was to be portrayed as an ally of Germany, it would be fair to view Finland to at least have been on the losing side of the World War.

Yet again - from Finland's perspective -, as the Finnish leaders have consistently reminded the world; forced to do so, the Finns had accepted help from Germany, but they by no means took the relationship much further that that. There was no official pact signed between the two nations, and although there was a common enemy, the objectives were very different.

Finland wanted to live, and to protect her sovereignty, and in order to do so it had to accept help from anywhere available, as by 1940 it was evident that the Soviet Union was not about to honor the promises set forth in the end of the Winter War. Finland was rapidly losing all control of her internal matters. What the Soviet Union had not been able to gain in the battle arena of the Winter War, it was now grapping during the interim peace period.

By this time the Soviet Union had committed numerous border violations, it had controlled the Finnish elections, it had taken control of some vitally important Southern Finnish railroads, and its army was building up forces on the Finnish border, etc.

All the access from Finland to the rest of the world had become sealed by either the Soviets or the Germans, who at this stage had taken control of the Baltic nations and Norway and Denmark. Thus, even in theory, Germany now was the only place from where Finland could receive help for her protection. Pressed between a rock and a hard place, Finland saw that she had no choice but to go for the minimum amount of cooperation necessary for her protection. Nevertheless, a bulk of Hitler's key demands Finland refused to honor:

Besides refusing to hand out her Jews to the Nazis (except for eight deported refuge seekers), the Finns refused to join Germany's - nearly successful - attack against Leningrad, the lose of which could have been detrimental to USSR in several ways, not least from the moral stand point of view. The Finns also held back from interrupting the American "lifeline" of help to the defenders of Leningrad, over the Lake Ladoga. Furthermore, the Finns categorically refused to cut the Murmansk railroad near its border, along which the crucially important and massive American help was transported to the Soviet Army, and Finland also held her forces from advancing any further east than the River Svir (Syväri).

These all were among the attempts on Finland's behalf to make the Soviet counterparts - and the rest of the world - to realize that Finland sincerely was only fighting for her survival, against Josef Stalin's continued attempt to conquer Finland, for which the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had sought for Adolf Hitler's final approval - on his visit to Berlin on November 12-13, 1940 -, based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.

Thus, as Finland's current President Tarja Halonen recently once again reminded the world in a speech in Paris, the Continuation War was a separate war from the World War Two, with a separate armistice in 1944, independent from the German armistice and trials of WW2 later. Whereas many of the Italian and German key figures were executed, Field Marshal Mannerheim had advanced to become the President of Finland on August 4, 1944, continuing in the job until March 4, 1946.

In his memoirs, the Field Marshal Mannerheim emphasizes, how Finland - importantly - had prepared for a defense - rather than offense -, coming up to the Soviet attack of June 25, 1941. Thus, rearranging the troops to offensive formations to the level of the city of Viipuri took all of three weeks to accomplish, and another three weeks had to be spent to spread the offensive to the north side of the Lake Ladoga.

Although the Soviet history writing of the Cold War period had appeared to have all but forgotten the Winter War, since the break up of the Soviet Union the new Russian leaders - beginning from Boris Yeltsin - have publicly admitted to the Soviet Union having started not only the Winter War but the Continuation War as well. This has encouraged a new choir of voices to join those no longer chanting the mantras of the Gold War period about a Finnish defeat:

In his last interview, on December 17, 2003, the Finnish General Adolf Ehrnrooth followed the suite:

"I, having participated in both the Winter War and the Continuation War, could stress: I know well, how the wars ended on the battle fields. Particularly the Continuation War ended to a defensive victory, in the most important meaning of the word."

In his memoirs, Josef Stalin's predecessor Nikita Khrushchev points out how the Soviet Union categorically lied about the results and casualties of the battles on the Finnish front. In the praised Russian book Bitva za Leningrad 1941-1944 ("The Battle of Leningrad") edited by Lieutenant General S.P. Platonov, it is stated:

"The repeated offensive attempts by the Soviet Forces failed ... to gain results. The enemy succeeded in significantly tightening its ranks in this area and repulse all attacks of our troops ... During the offensive operations lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July, the forces of the right flank of the Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks assigned to them on the orders of the Supreme Command issued on June 21."

The President of Finland Mauno Koivisto spoke at a seminar held in August, 1994, in the North Karelian city of Joensuu, to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Finnish victory in the crucial Battle of Ilomantsi. The future President of Finland witnessed this battle as a soldier in a reconnaissance company commanded by the legendary Finnish war hero and a Knight of the Mannerheim Cross, Captain Lauri Törni (who later became a legend also in USA as a Green Beret under the name Larry Thorne, raised to the rank of major upon his disappearance in Laos in 1965, during the Vietnam War):

In the summer of 1944, when the Red Army launched an all-out offensive, aimed at eliminating Finland, the Finns were "extremely hard-pressed", President Koivisto itenerated, but they "did not capitulate".

"We succeeded in stopping the enemy cold at key points", the President said, "and in the final battle at Ilomantsi even in pushing him back."

In a speech held on September 4th, 1994, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the armistice, ending the Finnish-Soviet hostilities, the Prime Minister of Finland Esko Aho declared:

"I do not see a defeat in the summer's battles, but the victory of a small nation over a major power, whose forces were stopped far short of the objectives of the Soviet leadership. Finland was not beaten militarily ..."

"Finland preserved her autonomy and her democratic social system ..."

"Finland ... won the peace."

In the 1943 Allied leaders' Tehran conference, Josef Stalin referred to the Finnish over-all war efforts as a "defensive" campaign. In Moscow, in 1948, Stalin reminded about his respect for the Finnish defense:

"Nobody respects a country with a bad army. Everybody respects a country with a good army. I raise my toast to the Finnish army."

- Josef Stalin

Battles and operations

• Operation Silberfuchs (1941)
• Battle of Tali-Ihantala (1944)
• Battle of the Bay of Viipuri (1944)
• Battle of Vuosalmi (1944)
• Battle of Nietjärvi (1944)
• Battle of Ilomantsi (1944)

See also

• Co-belligerence
• Finlandization
• Finnish Waffen SS volunteers
• Military history of Finland
• History of Finland
• History of the Soviet Union
• List of Finnish corps in the Continuation War
• List of Finnish divisions in the Continuation War
• List of Finnish wars
• Lotta Svärd
• Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line
• Salpalinja
• Luftwaffe Northern (Arctic) detachment(Luftflotte 5)(Finland-Norway)

Further reading

• Jokipii, Mauno (1987). Jatkosodan synty. Otava. ISBN 951-1-08799-1.
• Sana, Elina (1994). Luovutetut/ The Extradited: Finland's Extraditions to the Gestapo. WSOY. ISBN 951-0-27975-7.
• Seppinen, Ilkka (1983). Suomen Ulkomaankaupan ehdot 1939-1944. ISBN 951-9254-48-X.
• Platonov, S.P. (editor) (1964). Битва за Ленинград. Voenizdat Ministerstva oborony SSSR. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)
• Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun Historian laitos (editor) (1994). Jatkosodan historia 1-6. WSOY. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)
• Leskinen, Jari & Juutilainen, Antti (editors) (2005). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen. WSOY. ISBN 951-0-28690-7. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Template:Ru icon Хельге Сеппяля Финляндия как оккупант в 1941-1944 годах Журнал "Север" ISSN 0131-6222, 1995. See
• Finnish National Archive Luovutukset: Research on prisoner-of-war deaths, extraditions and deportations from Finland between 1939-55, Research project, See