Aung San: Difference between revisions
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The BIA reached the Burmese border in January 1942. Their force grew as it advanced through Burma, taking as many recruits with it as it could along the way. By the time the BIA reached Rangoon on 18 March 1942 it was 10,000 men strong, and by May 1942 it had 23,000 soldiers.<ref>Naw 81,88</ref> The BIA left most of the fighting to the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Japanese Army]] but occupied the areas behind Japanese lines after the British had retreated. The arrival of BIA units in many areas of Burma was followed by escalating communal violence, especially against [[Karen people]], which lasted for several weeks until the Japanese Army was able to intervene.<ref>Thant 230</ref> Throughout the war the Burmese Independence Army would be responsible for numerous massacres and "reprisal" attacks on civilian areas perceived to be more loyal to the British than themselves, especially in the [[Irrawaddy Delta]], [[Tanintharyi Region|Tenessarrim Division]], and in the [[Karen Hills]], and especially against non-Buddhist, non-[[Bamar people|Bamar]] communities.<ref>South 22</ref>.<ref>Thant 230</ref> |
The BIA reached the Burmese border in January 1942. Their force grew as it advanced through Burma, taking as many recruits with it as it could along the way. By the time the BIA reached Rangoon on 18 March 1942 it was 10,000 men strong, and by May 1942 it had 23,000 soldiers.<ref>Naw 81,88</ref> The BIA left most of the fighting to the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Japanese Army]] but occupied the areas behind Japanese lines after the British had retreated. The arrival of BIA units in many areas of Burma was followed by escalating communal violence, especially against [[Karen people]], which lasted for several weeks until the Japanese Army was able to intervene.<ref>Thant 230</ref> Throughout the war the Burmese Independence Army would be responsible for numerous massacres and "reprisal" attacks on civilian areas perceived to be more loyal to the British than themselves, especially in the [[Irrawaddy Delta]], [[Tanintharyi Region|Tenessarrim Division]], and in the [[Karen Hills]], and especially against non-Buddhist, non-[[Bamar people|Bamar]] communities.<ref>South 22</ref>.<ref>Thant 230</ref> |
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Aung San recognized many of the early abuses of the BIA, and attempted to control them by threatening punishment and reminding them that he had intended the BIA to be composed of "true patriots irrespective of political creed or race". The Japanese recognition that many of the soldiers who had initially joined the BIA were undisciplined and "vicious" was one of the factors they cited to justify the BIA's abolishment and reorganization soon after the Japanese invasion of Burma.<ref>Naw 87-90</ref> |
Aung San recognized and was distressed by many of the early abuses of the BIA, and attempted to control them by threatening punishment and reminding them that he had intended the BIA to be composed of "true patriots irrespective of political creed or race". The Japanese recognition that many of the soldiers who had initially joined the BIA were "undisciplined" and "vicious" was one of the factors they cited to justify the BIA's abolishment and reorganization soon after the Japanese invasion of Burma. In 1943 he visited many of the Karen areas that had been attacked by the BIA, apologizing for his men, reassuring their leaders that he did not intend to attack them, and secretly agreeing with them that they would soon work together to fight against the Japanese.<ref>Naw 87-90, 105-106</ref> |
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Early attempts by the Japanese army to prevent the Burmese from establishing a meaningfully independent government were successful. When Suzuki attempted to establish an independent BIA government following the fall of [[Moulmein]] on 30 January 1942 he was prevented by orders from the [[55th Division (Imperial Japanese Army)|Japanese Fifty-Fifth Army Division]]. The army also refused the distribution of leaflets proclaiming the independence of Burma, even though this had been previously agreed to. On 9 February 1942 the Japanese South Area Army ordered its officers to delay independence until after the war was over. When the BIA entered Rangoon in March, ten days after the Japanese Army had taken it, they attempted to set up an independent administration at the governor's house, but were prevented from doing so by the Japanese Army, who had already occupied the building and were using it as the headquarters of their military administration. The BIA formed an administration for the country under Suzuki Keiji and Thakin Tun Oke that operated in parallel with the Japanese military administration for several months, but this government was soon superseded and effectively disbanded by the administration of the Japanese South Area Army in June 1942.<ref>Naw 82-83</ref> |
Early attempts by the Japanese army to prevent the Burmese from establishing a meaningfully independent government were successful. When Suzuki attempted to establish an independent BIA government following the fall of [[Moulmein]] on 30 January 1942 he was prevented by orders from the [[55th Division (Imperial Japanese Army)|Japanese Fifty-Fifth Army Division]]. The army also refused the distribution of leaflets proclaiming the independence of Burma, even though this had been previously agreed to. On 9 February 1942 the Japanese South Area Army ordered its officers to delay independence until after the war was over. When the BIA entered Rangoon in March, ten days after the Japanese Army had taken it, they attempted to set up an independent administration at the governor's house, but were prevented from doing so by the Japanese Army, who had already occupied the building and were using it as the headquarters of their military administration. The BIA formed an administration for the country under Suzuki Keiji and Thakin Tun Oke that operated in parallel with the Japanese military administration for several months, but this government was soon superseded and effectively disbanded by the administration of the Japanese South Area Army in June 1942.<ref>Naw 82-83</ref> |
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In general the continued changes and delays regarding Japanese policy towards Burmese independence contributed to a sense of friction between the occupying Japanese army and the Burmese. By March 1942 there were incidents of fist fighting between Burmese and Japanese soldiers. The Japanese Army's actions to limit Burmese autonomy seemed to confirm the suspicions of Aung San, who had warned his comrades before the invasion of Burma began to beware Japanese duplicity, and to use caution when dealing with them. He complained about being merely Suzuki Keiji's Senior Staff Officer, rather than being in charge of his own soldiers. Another source of friction between the Japanese and the Burmese was the forced labour conscription, torture, and disappearances of people by the Japanese army and secret police. Aung San eventually came to suspect that the Japanese Army often gave his forces marching orders simply to keep them busy and to keep them out of the way. By the beginning of the Japanese occupation Aung San and other Burmese leaders were already considering a resistance against the Japanese; but, as he wrote, "everything was in confusion". He wrote that, under the Japanese, the Burmese people were "treated like dogs". In the end, due to their general lack of training, organization, and resources, Aung San and his comrades resolved to continue working with the Japanese until a favourable alternative presented itself.<ref>Naw 83-91</ref> |
In general the continued changes and delays regarding Japanese policy towards Burmese independence contributed to a sense of friction between the occupying Japanese army and the Burmese. By March 1942 there were incidents of fist fighting between Burmese and Japanese soldiers. The Japanese Army's actions to limit Burmese autonomy seemed to confirm the suspicions of Aung San, who had warned his comrades before the invasion of Burma began to beware Japanese duplicity, and to use caution when dealing with them. He complained about being merely Suzuki Keiji's Senior Staff Officer, rather than being in charge of his own soldiers. Another source of friction between the Japanese and the Burmese was the forced labour conscription, torture, and disappearances of people by the Japanese army and secret police. Aung San eventually came to suspect that the Japanese Army often gave his forces marching orders simply to keep them busy and to keep them out of the way. By the beginning of the Japanese occupation Aung San and other Burmese leaders were already considering a resistance against the Japanese; but, as he wrote, "everything was in confusion". He wrote that, under the Japanese, the Burmese people were "treated like dogs". In the end, due to their general lack of training, organization, and resources, Aung San and his comrades resolved to continue working with the Japanese until a favourable alternative presented itself.<ref>Naw 83-91</ref> |
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In March 1942, in response to a letter of complaint he had received from Aung San, Suzuki reformed the BIA into two divisions and placed Aung San in command. In July 1942 the BIA was reformed under the direction of the local Japanese Army as the Burma Defense Army (BDA). The word "independence" was removed from the force's name because, according to the Japanese, the Burmese had not yet proven themselves worthy of it. |
In March 1942, in response to a letter of complaint he had received from Aung San, Suzuki reformed the BIA into two divisions and placed Aung San in command. In July 1942 the BIA was reformed under the direction of the local Japanese Army as the Burma Defense Army (BDA). The word "independence" was removed from the force's name because, according to the Japanese, the Burmese had not yet proven themselves worthy of it. Aung San was made a colonel and put in charge of the force. Suzuki eventually lost his case for Burmese independence with the Japanese Army and was transferred out of Burma in July 1942, after the dissolution of the BIA. <ref>Naw 86-92</ref> |
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In 11 1943 March Aung San and several other senior members of the Burmese government were invited to Japan to discuss the possible future independence of Burma. While there, on 18 March, they were decorated by the Japanese Emperor [[Hirohito]]. Aung San was awarded the [[Order of the Rising Sun]], Third Class with Middle Cords. While in Tokyo he met Suzuki Keiji again, who explained that he had been sent back to Japan for being "too friendly with the Burmese". This conversation further convinced him to be suspicious of the intentions of the Japanese.<ref>Naw 99, 230</ref> |
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On 1 August 1943 the Japanese held an "independence ceremony" in Rangoon, in which they formally granted Burma "independence" in a manner similar to the puppet government of [[Manchukuo]] in China. The Japanese had planned to make Aung San the leader of the country, but in the end they were more impressed with Dr. Ba Maw, and made him the leader instead, giving him virtually dictatorial control under their direction. Aung San was made the second most powerful person in the government. The government was organized on a fascist model, and intentionally eschewed democratic principles and patterns of government. The army, still under the control of Aung San, took their motto, "One Blood, One Voice, One Command" at this time. It is still the official motto of the [[Tatmadaw|Burmese military]].<ref>Thant 232-233</ref> |
On 1 August 1943 the Japanese held an "independence ceremony" in Rangoon, in which they formally granted Burma "independence" in a manner similar to the puppet government of [[Manchukuo]] in China. The Japanese had planned to make Aung San the leader of the country, but in the end they were more impressed with Dr. Ba Maw, and made him the leader instead, giving him virtually dictatorial control under their direction. Aung San was made the second most powerful person in the government. The government was organized on a fascist model, and intentionally eschewed democratic principles and patterns of government. The army, still under the control of Aung San, took their motto, "One Blood, One Voice, One Command" at this time. It is still the official motto of the [[Tatmadaw|Burmese military]].<ref>Thant 232-233</ref> |
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By the time of Burmese "independence" both the political and military leadership within Burma understood that the Japanese only intended to use them as a puppet government under their administration, but resolved to continue working together in the hopes that continued unity might eventually lead to a solution to the Japanese problem. Although Aung San did not agree with the Japanese policy or administration, he concealed this in public, and the Japanese did not grow to doubt his loyalty. He took advantage of the situation to have the Japanese train the nucleus of the Burmese army: by |
By the time of Burmese "independence" both the political and military leadership within Burma understood that the Japanese only intended to use them as a puppet government under their administration, but resolved to continue working together in the hopes that continued unity might eventually lead to a solution to the Japanese problem. Although Aung San did not agree with the Japanese policy or administration, he concealed this in public, and the Japanese did not grow to doubt his loyalty. He took advantage of the situation to have the Japanese train the nucleus of the Burmese army: by 1945 the Japanese had trained ten [[battalion]]s of Burmese soldiers. During 1943 and 1944 Aung San was successful in convincing many factions within the Burmese army to delay their rebellion against the Japanese, ensuring them that the fight against them would take place at a time when it would be most advantageous.<ref>Naw 92-94, 101-102</ref> |
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As the war continued Aung San became doubtful not only about Japanese promises of true independence, but also of Japan's ability to win the war. As [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim|General William Slim]], the commanding officer of Allied forces in the [[Burma campaign]], put it: <blockquote>It was not long before Aung San found that what he meant by independence had little relation to what the Japanese were prepared to give—that he had exchanged an old master for an infinitely more tyrannical new one. As one of his leading followers once said to me, "If the British sucked our blood, the Japanese ground our bones!" He became more and more disillusioned with the Japanese, and early in 1943 we got news from [[Hugh Seagrim|Seagrim]], a most gallant officer who had remained in the [[Karen Hills]] at the ultimate cost of his life, that Aung San's feelings were changing. On 1 August 1944 he was bold enough to speak publicly with contempt of the Japanese brand of independence, and it was clear that, if they did not soon liquidate him, he might prove useful to us. ... At our first interview, Aung San began to take rather a high hand. ... I pointed out that he was in no position to take the line he had. I did not need his forces; I was destroying the Japanese quite nicely without their help, and could continue to do so. I would accept his help and that of his army only on the clear understanding that it implied no recognition of any provisional government. ... The British Government had announced its intention to grant self-government to Burma within the British Commonwealth, and we had better limit our discussion to the best method of throwing the Japanese out of the country as the next step toward self-government.<ref>Field Marshal Sir William Slim, [[Defeat into Victory]], Cassell & Company, 2nd edition, 1956</ref></blockquote> |
As the war continued Aung San became doubtful not only about Japanese promises of true independence, but also of Japan's ability to win the war. As [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim|General William Slim]], the commanding officer of Allied forces in the [[Burma campaign]], put it: <blockquote>It was not long before Aung San found that what he meant by independence had little relation to what the Japanese were prepared to give—that he had exchanged an old master for an infinitely more tyrannical new one. As one of his leading followers once said to me, "If the British sucked our blood, the Japanese ground our bones!" He became more and more disillusioned with the Japanese, and early in 1943 we got news from [[Hugh Seagrim|Seagrim]], a most gallant officer who had remained in the [[Karen Hills]] at the ultimate cost of his life, that Aung San's feelings were changing. On 1 August 1944 he was bold enough to speak publicly with contempt of the Japanese brand of independence, and it was clear that, if they did not soon liquidate him, he might prove useful to us. ... At our first interview, Aung San began to take rather a high hand. ... I pointed out that he was in no position to take the line he had. I did not need his forces; I was destroying the Japanese quite nicely without their help, and could continue to do so. I would accept his help and that of his army only on the clear understanding that it implied no recognition of any provisional government. ... The British Government had announced its intention to grant self-government to Burma within the British Commonwealth, and we had better limit our discussion to the best method of throwing the Japanese out of the country as the next step toward self-government.<ref>Field Marshal Sir William Slim, [[Defeat into Victory]], Cassell & Company, 2nd edition, 1956</ref></blockquote> |
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On 1 August 1944 the anniversary of Burmese "independence" was celebrated at Jubilee Hall in Rangoon, attended by the most important Japanese and Burmese administrators in the city. Aung San gave a speech in Burmese criticizing the administration. He criticized the idea of Burmese "independence" as it existed by stating that the benefits of Burmese "independence" only extended as far as the ministers present, and could not be enjoyed by the Burmese population until the Japanese were gone. Before the speech the Japanese had requested a translation, but Aung San refused to give one. The Burmese officials present, including Ba Maw, were shocked by Aung San speaking so openly and refused to translate the speech for the Japanese, which angered them. Though the Japanese newspaper in Yangon only reported that a speech was given by Aung San without reporting what it was, the Japanese government in Tokyo was reportedly disturbed.<ref>Naw 108-109</ref> |
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| ⚫ | Aung San made plans to organize an anti-Japanese uprising in Burma, secretly forming the "[[Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League]]" in August 1944 following a secret meeting in [[Bago, Myanmar|Bago]] between the Burma National Army, the Burmese Communist Party, and the People's Revolutionary Party (which later reformed into the Socialist Party).<ref>Smith 60</ref> Following this meeting, Aung San's forces began to secretly store supplies in preparation of their fight against the Japanese. In late March 1945, as Allied forces advanced towards Rangoon, Aung San led the BNA in a parade in front of [[Ministers' Building|Government House]] in Rangoon, after which they were sent by the Japanese to the front. A few days later, on 27 March, the BNA switched sides and attacked the Japanese instead.<ref>Thant 238-240</ref> 27 March came to be commemorated as Resistance Day, until the military regime renamed it "[[Tatmadaw]] (Armed Forces) Day". |
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| ⚫ | Aung San made plans to organize an anti-Japanese uprising in Burma, secretly forming the "[[Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League]]" in August and September 1944 following a secret meeting in [[Bago, Myanmar|Bago]] between the Burma National Army, the Burmese Communist Party, and the People's Revolutionary Party (which later reformed into the Socialist Party).<ref>Smith 60</ref> Following this meeting, Aung San's forces began to secretly store supplies in preparation of their fight against the Japanese. In late March 1945, as Allied forces advanced towards Rangoon, Aung San led the BNA in a parade in front of [[Ministers' Building|Government House]] in Rangoon, after which they were sent by the Japanese to the front. A few days later, on 27 March, the BNA switched sides and attacked the Japanese instead.<ref>Thant 238-240</ref> 27 March came to be commemorated as Resistance Day, until the military regime renamed it "[[Tatmadaw]] (Armed Forces) Day". |
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When he led his army west on 27 March 1945 Aung San was confronted by a Japanese officer who accompanied him and suspected what he was planning to do. The officer challenged Aung San by asking him what deal he had made with the British. Aung San replied that his intention was to negotiate for "total independence for Burma", though at the time he thought he would need to accept independence within the [[Commonwealth of Nations|British Commonwealth]].<ref>Naw 119</ref> |
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After the Burmese army began the attack on the Japanese, it was renamed the "Patriotic Burmese Forces" and its command structure was divided into eight different regions. Aung San was given command of the first region, comprising the areas of [[Pyay|Prome]], [[Hinthada|Henzada]], [[Tharrawaddy, Myanmar|Tharrawaddy]], and [[Insein Township|Insein]]. His designated political advisor was [[Thakin Ba Hein]], a Communist Party leader. On 30 March, the Allied commander in Southeast Asia, [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Louis Montbatten]], formally recognized the Burmese army as "an Allied force".<ref>Lintner 2003 73</ref> |
After the Burmese army began the attack on the Japanese, it was renamed the "Patriotic Burmese Forces" and its command structure was divided into eight different regions. Aung San was given command of the first region, comprising the areas of [[Pyay|Prome]], [[Hinthada|Henzada]], [[Tharrawaddy, Myanmar|Tharrawaddy]], and [[Insein Township|Insein]]. His designated political advisor was [[Thakin Ba Hein]], a Communist Party leader. On 30 March, the Allied commander in Southeast Asia, [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Louis Montbatten]], formally recognized the Burmese army as "an Allied force".<ref>Lintner 2003 73</ref> Many officers within the British army believed that Aung San should be treated as a traitor and a war criminal for his activities working with the Japanese, but Montbatten mediated between both sides, leading them to agree to work together, that no general amnesty would be granted, and that the political future of Burma would need to be negotiated following the conclusion of the war.<ref>Naw 122</ref> |
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The Burmese National Army continued to harass the Japanese throughout the remainder of the war, later claiming to have killed 12,000 Japanese soldiers and wounded 4,000. When Allied forces retook Rangoon on 2 May 1945, the BNA were symbolically sent into the city two days before any other soldiers. The Allies helped to arm Aung San's forces somewhat after their defection, supplying the BNA with 3,000 small arms.<ref>Smith 65</ref> |
The Burmese National Army continued to harass the Japanese throughout the remainder of the war, later claiming to have killed 12,000 Japanese soldiers and wounded 4,000. When Allied forces retook Rangoon on 2 May 1945, the BNA were symbolically sent into the city two days before any other soldiers. The Allies helped to arm Aung San's forces somewhat after their defection, supplying the BNA with 3,000 small arms.<ref>Smith 65</ref> |
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Aung San first met with General Slim on 16 May 1945, appearing unexpectedly in Slim's camp in the uniform of a Japanese major general. At the meeting Aung San stated his intentions to ally with the British until the Japanese had been driven out of Burma, and agreed to incorporate his forces into Slim's British-led army. When Slim asked Aung San whether he was taking a risk by unexpectedly coming to his camp in the uniform of a Japanese officer and adopting a bold attitude, Aung San answered that he was not, "because you are a ''British'' officer." Slim later wrote that Aung San had made a good impression in the meeting.<ref>Thant 240-241</ref> |
Aung San first met with General Slim on 16 May 1945, appearing unexpectedly in Slim's camp in the uniform of a Japanese major general. At the meeting Aung San stated his intentions to ally with the British until the Japanese had been driven out of Burma, and agreed to incorporate his forces into Slim's British-led army. When Slim asked Aung San whether he was taking a risk by unexpectedly coming to his camp in the uniform of a Japanese officer and adopting a bold attitude, Aung San answered that he was not, "because you are a ''British'' officer." Slim later wrote that Aung San had made a good impression in the meeting.<ref>Thant 240-241</ref> When Slim criticized Aung San for only switching sides now that the British were winning, Aung San responded that it would not be much benefit switching sides if the British were losing. On 25 May 1945 Aung San agreed with Slim to place his forces under the overall command of the British Army in return for Slim providing his soldiers with rations and other supplies.<ref>Naw 124</ref> |
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In a meeting on 30 May 1945 the Allied leaders agreed to rename the forces under Aung San again, calling them the "Local Burmese Forces" (LBF). At this meeting it was agreed that Aung San's soldiers would be treated as an Allied force, with the intention to later assimilate them into the Burma-British Army after the war.<ref>Naw 128</ref> |
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When the British army held a victory parade in Rangoon on 15 June 1945, the LBF were prevented from fully attending due to their former cooperation with the Japanese, but were represented by a small contingent of soldiers. Aung San attended the parade as an official spectator.<ref>Naw 129</ref> |
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Following the war Aung San was appointed the inspector-general of the PBF. worried that the British would attempt to reorganize his forces in order to disband them, and argued against this by arguing that a Burmese military was necessary in order for Burma to evolve into a "fully self-governing member of the British Common-wealth of Nations". However, after the general demobilization of British soldiers began following the surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945 he led a coalition of local organizations in demanding "full sovereignty".<ref>Naw 131-134</ref> |
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The leaders of the Patriotic Burmese Forces, while disbanded, were offered positions in the Burma Army under British command according to the [[Kandy]] conference agreement with [[Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma|Lord Louis Mountbatten]] in [[Ceylon]] in September 1945.<ref>Smith 65-66</ref> The delegates agreed that the new Burmese army would be composed of 5,000 of Aung San's Japanese-trained [[Bamar people|Bamar]] soldiers, and 5,000 British-trained soldiers, most of whom were either Chin, [[Kachin people|Kachin]], or Karen.<ref>Thant 244-245</ref> The army was to be led by two inspectors-general, one who would be Bamar and a second who would be from an ethnic minority. Montbatten met with Aung San on 6 September, but their discussions were confined to the disbandment of Aung San's forces and their reorganization within the new Burmese army. The agreements made at the conference were signed by Montbatten, Than Tun, and Aung San. Following the conference, on 25 September 1945, Aung San resigned from the military with the intention of re-entering civilian politics.<ref>Naw 135-136</ref> |
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By the time that the Burmese Governor General Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith arrived back in Rangoon on 17 October 1945 Aung San led a coalition that included virtually all political, ethnic, and religious groups in the country, under the leadership of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). By this time he openly rejected Dorman-Smith's proposed plan for gradual road to Burmese independence as a member of the British Commonwealth, and rejected taking part in his cabinet, since he did not believe that he and his supporters would be included in sufficiently senior positions. As the head of the AFPFL he advocated for a general amnesty for crimes committed during the Japanese occupation and promoted civil disobedience while arguing against the use of force.<ref>Naw 142-145</ref> |
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Aung San wrote to U Seinda in [[Arakan]], saying that he supported U Seida's guerrilla fight against the British, but that he would cooperate with the British for tactical reasons. In December 1945 he reorganized his formally disbanded soldiers as a paramilitary organization instead, the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO), which continued to wear uniforms and drill in public. The PVO was personally loyal to Aung San and his party rather than the government. By 1947, the PVO had over 100,000 members.<ref>Smith 66</ref> |
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In January 1946 a victory festival was held in the Kachin capital of [[Myitkyina]]. Governor Dorman-Smith was invited to attend, but neither Aung San nor anyone from his party were, due to "their connection with the Burma Independence Army".<ref>Smith 73</ref> |
In January 1946 a victory festival was held in the Kachin capital of [[Myitkyina]]. Governor Dorman-Smith was invited to attend, but neither Aung San nor anyone from his party were, due to "their connection with the Burma Independence Army".<ref>Smith 73</ref> |
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In March 1946 allegations that Aung San had committed a war crime while working with the Japanese, the public execution of a Muslim headman in [[Thaton]], were published in newspapers across Burma, India, and Britain. These allegations were likely made public by Tun Ok, a political rival, who claimed to have witnessed the event. Governor Dorman-Smith was not sure whether, or how, Aung San should arrested for the crime. Montbatten sent a telegram strongly arguing against arresting Aung San, while several security officials worried that arresting him would lead to a rebellion or a mutiny within the Burmese army. Lieutenant-General [[Harold Rawdon Briggs|Harold Briggs]], most senior military officer then in Burma, warned that arresting Aung San would lower world opinion of the British administration, especially in Asia. He also argued that the main goals of the British administration in Burma were economic recovery, increasing rice production to meet global shortages, and preparing the country for self-government, and that arresting Aung San would undermine those goals. An influential director of public relations, Reverend [[George Appleton]], argued that the Burmese people did not naturally think in terms of "justice or reason", but more in terms of "personalities and relationships", and so would not naturally understand or accept Aung San's arrest. In the end, since public opinion seemed against arresting Aung San, and since the British army was unavailable in the event that it led to a disturbance, Dorman-Smith and his administration decided against arresting Aung San. In April 1946 Dorman-Smith changed his mind about whether Aung San should be arrested after receiving a petition from the murdered headman's widow, but was directly told not to act by [[Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, 1st Baron Pethick-Lawrence|Sir Pethwick-Lawrence]], the secretary of state for India and Burma, who was then negotiating Indian independence with its leaders and did not want any disturbance to jeopardize these talks. On 7 May 1946 Dorman-Smith declared a general amnesty for war crimes committed during WWII.<ref>Naw 152-160</ref> |
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| ⚫ | On 14 June Dorman-Smith was recalled from his post, largely due to his inability to negotiate with Aung San. Dorman-Smith was replaced by a new Governor General of Burma, Sir [[Hubert Rance]]. Rance agreed to recognize and negotiate directly with Aung San, possibly to distance them both from the Communist Party of Burma. He also agreed to appoint Aung San to the position of counselor for defense on the Executive Council (a provisional [[Cabinet (government)|cabinet]] made in lieu of the upcoming Burmese national election). On 28 September 1946, Aung San was appointed to the even higher position of deputy chairman, making him effectively the 5th prime minister of the British-Burma Crown Colony.<ref>Smith 69</ref> Aung San had at first worked closely with the Burmese Communist Party, but after they began criticizing him for working with the British he banned all communists from his Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League on 3 November 1946.<ref name="Lint80">Lintner 2003 80</ref> |
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===Aung San-Atlee agreement and the Panglong Conference=== |
===Aung San-Atlee agreement and the Panglong Conference=== |
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Aung San was to all intents and purposes prime minister, although he was still subject to a British veto. British Prime Minister [[Clement Attlee]] invited Aung San to visit London in 1947 in order to negotiate the conditions of Burmese independence.<ref name="Thant 252" /> At a press conference during a stopover in [[Delhi]],<ref name="as" /> while on the way to meet Atlee in London,<ref name="Lint80" /> he stated that the Burmese wanted "complete independence" and not [[dominion status]], and that they had "no inhibitions of any kind" about "contemplating a violent or non-violent struggle or both" in order to achieve it. He concluded that he hoped for the best, but was prepared for the worst.<ref name="as" /> He arrived in Britain by air in January 1947 along with his deputy [[Tin Tut]], who he considered his brightest official. Attlee and Aung San signed their agreement on the terms of Burmese independence on 27 January: following the Burmese election in 1947 Burma would join the [[Commonwealth of Nations|British Commonwealth]] (like Canada and Australia); though its government would have the option to leave, its government would control the Burmese Army once Allied armies had withdrawn; a constitutional assembly would be drawn up as soon as possible, with the resulting constitution presented to the British parliament as soon as possible; and, Britain would nominate Burma's entrance into the newly founded [[United Nations]].<ref name="Thant 252" /> The agreement was not unanimous: two other delegates who attended the conference, U Saw and Thakin Ba Sein, refused to sign it, and it was denounced in Burma by Aung San's critics, including [[Than Tun]] and [[Thakin Soe]]. No delegates representing Burma's ethnic minorities were present, and both Karen and [[Shan people|Shan]] leaders sent messages warning that they would not consider any agreement signed at the conference legally binding to their communities.<ref>Smith 77-78</ref> |
Aung San was to all intents and purposes prime minister, although he was still subject to a British veto. British Prime Minister [[Clement Attlee]] invited Aung San to visit London in 1947 in order to negotiate the conditions of Burmese independence.<ref name="Thant 252" /> At a press conference during a stopover in [[Delhi]],<ref name="as" /> while on the way to meet Atlee in London,<ref name="Lint80" /> he stated that the Burmese wanted "complete independence" and not [[dominion status]], and that they had "no inhibitions of any kind" about "contemplating a violent or non-violent struggle or both" in order to achieve it. He concluded that he hoped for the best, but was prepared for the worst.<ref name="as" /> He arrived in Britain by air in January 1947 along with his deputy [[Tin Tut]], who he considered his brightest official. Attlee and Aung San signed their agreement on the terms of Burmese independence on 27 January: following the Burmese election in 1947 Burma would join the [[Commonwealth of Nations|British Commonwealth]] (like Canada and Australia); though its government would have the option to leave, its government would control the Burmese Army once Allied armies had withdrawn; a constitutional assembly would be drawn up as soon as possible, with the resulting constitution presented to the British parliament as soon as possible; and, Britain would nominate Burma's entrance into the newly founded [[United Nations]].<ref name="Thant 252" /> The agreement was not unanimous: two other delegates who attended the conference, U Saw and Thakin Ba Sein, refused to sign it, and it was denounced in Burma by Aung San's critics, including [[Than Tun]] and [[Thakin Soe]]. No delegates representing Burma's ethnic minorities were present, and both Karen and [[Shan people|Shan]] leaders sent messages warning that they would not consider any agreement signed at the conference legally binding to their communities.<ref>Smith 77-78</ref> |
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==Family== |
==Family== |
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[[File:Aung San, Khin Kyi, Aung San Oo.jpg|thumb|Aung San, his wife [[Khin Kyi]] and their eldest son, [[Aung San Oo]]]] |
[[File:Aung San, Khin Kyi, Aung San Oo.jpg|thumb|Aung San, his wife [[Khin Kyi]] and their eldest son, [[Aung San Oo]]]] |
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While he was War Minister in 1942 Aung San was attended by a senior staff nurse, [[Khin Kyi]], and began a romantic relationship with her. Their marriage was shocking to Aung San's comrades because he had always claimed that young men should avoid romantic relationships until Burmese independence was achieved, so that they could dedicate their energy towards that goal. Due to his previous rhetoric some of his comrades were afraid that Aung San's marriage would distract him from his political goals, but this turned out not to be the case.<ref>Naw 94-95</ref> |
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While he was War Minister in 1942, Aung San met and married [[Khin Kyi]], and around the same time her sister met and married [[Thakin Than Tun]], the Communist leader. Aung San and Khin Kyi had four children. |
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Around the same time Khin Kyi's sister met and married [[Thakin Than Tun]], the Communist leader. |
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After Aung San's assassination his widow was appointed Burma's ambassador to India, and the family moved abroad.<ref>Rogers 27</ref> |
After Aung San's assassination his widow was appointed Burma's ambassador to India, and the family moved abroad.<ref>Rogers 27</ref> |
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Aung San's youngest surviving child, [[Aung San Suu Kyi]], was only two years old when Aung San was assassinated.<ref>Thant 333</ref> She is a [[Nobel Peace Prize]] laureate, served as [[State Counsellor of Myanmar]], was the first female [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Myanmar)|Myanmar Minister of Foreign Affairs]], and is the leader of the [[National League for Democracy]] (NLD) political party. Aung San's oldest son, [[Aung San Oo]], is an engineer working in the United States who has disagreed with his sister's political activities. Aung San's second son, Aung San Lin, died at age eight, when he drowned in an ornamental lake in the grounds of the family's house.{{cn|date=February 2021}} |
Aung San and Khin Kyi had four children. Aung San's youngest surviving child, [[Aung San Suu Kyi]], was only two years old when Aung San was assassinated.<ref>Thant 333</ref> She is a [[Nobel Peace Prize]] laureate, served as [[State Counsellor of Myanmar]], was the first female [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Myanmar)|Myanmar Minister of Foreign Affairs]], and is the leader of the [[National League for Democracy]] (NLD) political party. Aung San's oldest son, [[Aung San Oo]], is an engineer working in the United States who has disagreed with his sister's political activities. Aung San's second son, Aung San Lin, died at age eight, when he drowned in an ornamental lake in the grounds of the family's house.{{cn|date=February 2021}} |
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Aung San's youngest daughter, Aung San Chit, born in September 1946, died on 26 September 1946, the same day Aung San got into |
Aung San's youngest daughter, Aung San Chit, born in September 1946, died on 26 September 1946, the same day Aung San got into the governor's executive council, a few days after her birth.<ref>{{cite book |title=Perfect hostage: a life of Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's prisoner of conscience |last=Wintle |first=Justin |year=2007 |publisher=Skyhorse Publishing |isbn=978-1-60239-266-3 |page=[https://archive.org/details/perfecthostageli00wint/page/143 143] |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/perfecthostageli00wint/page/143 }}</ref> Aung San's wife Daw Khin Kyi died on 27 December 1988. |
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Revision as of 15:20, 28 March 2021
Aung San | |
|---|---|
အောင်ဆန်း | |
 | |
| Premier of British Crown Colony of Burma | |
| In office 26 September 1946 – 19 July 1947 | |
| Preceded by | Sir Paw Tun |
| Succeeded by | Office abolished U Nu as Prime Minister |
| Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War of the State of Burma | |
| In office 1 August 1943 – 27 March 1945 | |
| Preceded by | Office created |
| Succeeded by | Office abolished |
| President of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League | |
| In office 27 March 1945 – 19 July 1947 | |
| Preceded by | Office created |
| Succeeded by | U Nu |
| General Secretary of Communist Party of Burma | |
| In office 15 August 1939 – 1940 | |
| Preceded by | Office created |
| Succeeded by | Thakin Soe |
| Personal details | |
| Born | Htein Lin 13 February 1915 Natmauk, Magwe, British Burma |
| Died | 19 July 1947 (aged 32) Rangoon, British Burma |
| Manner of death | Assassination |
| Resting place | Martyrs' Mausoleum, Myanmar |
| Nationality | Myanmar |
| Political party | Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League Communist Party of Burma Burma Socialist Party Thakin Society |
| Spouse | |
| Children | Aung San Oo Aung San Lin Aung San Suu Kyi Aung San Chit |
| Parent(s) | U Phar (father) Daw Su (mother) |
| Relatives | Ba Win (brother) Sein Win (nephew) Alexander Aris (grandson) Kim Aris (grandson) |
| Alma mater | Rangoon University Yenangyaung High School |
| Occupation | Politician, major general |
| Signature |  |
| Military service | |
| Allegiance | Burma Independence Army Burma National Army Imperial Japanese Army |
| Rank | Major general (highest rank in military at that time) |
Bogyoke Aung San (Burmese: ဗိုလ်ချုပ် အောင်ဆန်း; MLCTS: aung hcan:, pronounced [àʊɰ̃ sʰáɰ̃]; 13 February 1915 – 19 July 1947) was a Burmese politician and revolutionary. He was instrumental in Burma's independence from British rule, but was assassinated just six months before his goal was realized. Today, Aung San is widely considered the Father of the Nation of modern-day Myanmar.
Devoted to ending British rule in Burma, Aung San founded or was closely associated with many Burmese political groups and movements and explored various schools of political thought throughout his life. He was a life-long anti-imperialist and studied communism and socialism as a student, and Japanese Pan-Asianism upon joining the Japanese military. In his first year of university he was elected to the executive committee of the Rangoon University Students' Union and served as the editor of its newspaper. He joined the Thakin Society in 1938, working as its general secretary, and founded both the Communist Party of Burma and the Burma Socialist Party.
Shortly before the outbreak of World War II Aung San fled Burma to escape arrest with the cooperation of the local Japanese consulate, though possibly with the intention of soliciting support from Chinese communists. Aung San left for Japan and later recruited a small core of Burmese revolutionaries known as the Thirty Comrades. During the Japanese occupation of Burma, he served as the minister of war in the Japan-backed State of Burma led by Dr. Ba Maw. As the tide turned against Japan, he switched sides and merged his forces with the Allies to fight against the Japanese. After World War II, he negotiated Burmese independence from Britain in the Aung San-Atlee agreement. He served as the 5th Premier of the British Crown Colony of Burma from 1946 to 1947. He led his party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, to victory in the 1947 Burmese general election, but he and most of his cabinet were assassinated shortly before the country became independent.
Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, is a stateswoman and politician. She was Burma's State Counsellor and its 20th (and first female) Minister of Foreign Affairs in Win Myint's Cabinet until the 2021 Myanmar coup d'état.
Ancestry
Aung San's paternal grandfather was U Dae Ko [a Chin name]. Aung San's paternal grandmother was Daw Thu Sa,[1] whose family traced their lineage from the royal family of the Pagan Kingdom through its last king, Narathihapate.
Aung San's paternal grandmother was Daw Thu Sa,[1] whose family traced their lineage from the royal family of the Pagan Kingdom through its last king, Narathihapate. Daw Thu Sa had several cousins who had worked within the government of the last Burmese kingdom. One of her cousins, Bo Min Maung, had been the royal treasurer during the reign of King Mindon. King Mindon awarded Bo Min Yaung the title of "Mahar Min Kyaw Min Htin", an honorary title similar to knighthood given to those who are not close relatives of the Burmese royal family. He had a reputation for having a gentle and soft personality.[2]
Bo Min Maung had a younger brother, Bo Min Yaung, who had a great impact on Aung San's patriotic outlook.[3] The younger brother was remembered by Daw Thu Sa as being popular in his hometown for his handsomeness, strength, writing ability, and swordsmanship, which he practiced every day. King Mindon employed him in diplomatic service, and by the reign of Burma's last king, Thibaw, he had been appointed to administer the region of Myo Lu Lin, close to the northern side of the Pegu Mountain Range in Upper Burma. After learning of King Thibaw's abdication and subsequent exile to western India following the brief Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885, Bo Min Yaung became angry, and made up his mind to resist the British.[4]
Bo Min Yaung began his rebellion by gathering local soldiers from the region that he had governed, taking the name "King Shwelayaung" (King "Golden Moon"). He took control of a base area near Myint Ma Nie Mountain, and he constructed a temporary palace and a wooden fort in the area, often conducting raids and attacks on nearby British forces. Eventually British pressure forced him to abandon that base and relocate to the area around Taungdwingyi (now in the division of Magway). He built a fort near Lay Taing Sin, 22 miles from where Aung San was born.[5]
Bo Min Yaung continued to attack British forces in the area, but eventually the British defeated and captured him. After his capture, the British officer in charge (remembered as "Captain Gyan Daw" by Daw Thu Sa) told him that they would release him and allow him to be the governor of Taungdwingyi as long as he agreed to stop fighting the British, but Bo Min Yaung refused, saying that he would not give obeisance to foreigners as if they had the authority of the Burmese royal family. After this refusal, the British soldiers beheaded Bo Min Yaung.[6]
Some sources have reported Bo Min Yaung's relationship to Aung San differently, claiming that he was Aung San's paternal grandfather, rather than his paternal grandmother's cousin.[7] Modern scholars generally view these narratives as attempts to create a noble lineage for Aung San in the tradition of premodern Burmese historiography, and stress that such accounts should not be taken at face value.[8]
Aung San's parents were U Phar and Daw Su. U Phar, his father, was very introverted and reserved. According to Aung San, U Phar studied law and passed his bar exam third in his class of 174,[9] but was not a successful lawyer, and his mother took much of the responsibility for raising the family by doing business.[10] U Phar died at the age of 51[11] in May 1931 after a two-month illness. He died while Aung San was visiting his home for summer vacation, when he was sixteen years old.[12]
Early life
Aung San was born in the small town of Natmauk, Magway District, on 13 February 1915. The family was considered middle-class.[13] He was the youngest of nine siblings: he had three older sisters and five older brothers.[1] After his birth his family consulted a traditional astrologer, who gave him the name "Htein Lin", which he never used. Aung San's name, "Aung San", was given to him by one of his older brothers, Aung Than, who wanted a brother whose name rhymed with his own: this was very unusual at the time, since names starting with "A" were then only given to children born on Sundays, but Aung San was born on a Saturday.[14]
Aung San received his primary education at the U Thaw Bita Buddhist monastic school in Natmauk.[15] In grade seven he moved to Yenangyaung to attend the Yenanchaung Anglo-Vernacular National High School, where his eldest brother, Ba Win, had become a teacher. Aung San wanted to go to the school because he envied his older brothers' ability to speak English, and refused to eat any food until his parents allowed him to attend. After one year of study he was ranked the top student among all vernacular and Anglo-vernacular schools in Burma, after which he was awarded a government scholarship of ten kyats per month for the rest of his time in high school. He was able to complete the last three years of high school in only two years (with distinctions in Burmese and Pali), enabling him to continue collecting this scholarship during his first year at university. His favourite subjects in school were literature and history. While in high school he also worked as the editor of the Yenanchaung National School newsletter.[16]
Aung San did not speak before the age of three,[17] and afterwards rarely spoke before the age of eight. While he was a teenager he often spent hours reading and thinking alone, not responding to those around him. In his youth he was generally unconcerned with his appearance and clothing. In his earliest articles, published in the "Opinion" section of The World of Books, he opposed the ideology of Western-style individualism supported by U Thant in favour of a social philosophy based on the "standardization of human life". Aung San later became friends with U Thant through their mutual friendship with U Nu.[18]
University years
After Aung San entered Rangoon University in 1933, he quickly became involved in student politics,[19] but was not at not at first successful. U Nu, Aung San's close friend and the future prime minister of Burma, admitted after independence that his first impression of Aung San in 1934 was that he was "a really queer character", and he became widely known for being very eccentric. In his first attempt to run for a student office, a committee representative for his dormitory association, he was not successful. The same year Aung San attempted to run as a member of the student union, but was not elected because some members thought he "lacked friendliness and respect for others". His admitted goal at the time was to eventually be elected president of the student union, but he lacked the social skills needed to do so. In 1935, after U Nu was elected the student union's general secretary, Aung San was appointed the editor of Oway ("Peacock's Call"), the student union's magazine.[20] While he was enrolled in university his heroes included Abraham Lincoln, the nationalist nineteenth-century Mexican politician Benito Juarez, and Edmund Burke, whose parliamentary speeches he memorized.[13]
In February 1936 he was threatened with expulsion from the university, along with U Nu, for refusing to reveal the name of the author of an article he had run in the student newspaper called "Hell Hound at Large", which criticized a senior university official.[21] After refusing to give the name of the student who had authored the article, Aung San was expelled from the university. His friend U Nu was also expelled for giving anti-British speeches, leading to the three-month long Second University Students' Strike, after which the university authorities subsequently retracted their expulsions.[22]
The events of 1936 has a profound effect on the future of Aung San. Before 1936 he was not well-known outside of Rangoon University, but during the student strike his name and image were published and discussed in daily newspapers, and he became known nationwide as a nationalist revolutionary and a student leader. He also served in his first student leadership positions, first as secretary of the student boycott council and second as the student representative for the government's University Act Amendment Committee, which the government formed in response to the strike. Later in 1936, after the student strike was over, he was elected the vice president of the Rangoon University Student Union. Because of his participation in the student strike he was not able to sit for the examination in 1936, and received his Bachelor of Arts in 1937.[23]
After his graduation Aung San began studying for a law degree. His intention at the time was to "take a shot at the examinations for the Indian Civil Service... and go into politics". Along with other student leaders he founded the All Burma Student Union in 1937, in which he was elected secretary. in 1938 he became the president of both the All Burma Student Union and the Rangoon University Student Union, but his pursuit of these commitments did not leave him enough time to study, and he failed his examination in 1938. After 1938 he resolved to abandon the pursuit of a conventional career and commit himself to revolutionary politics.[24]
In October 1938 Aung San left his law classes and entered national politics. At this point, he was anti-British and staunchly anti-imperialist. He became a Thakin ("lord" or "master": a politically motivated title that proclaimed that the Burmese people were the true masters of their country, often used at the time as an informal title for Westerners in Burma) when he joined the Dobama Asiayone ("We Burmans Association"). He acted as its general secretary from 1938 until August 1940. While in this role he helped organize a series of countrywide strikes that became known as the ME 1300 Revolution. The name of this movement was based on the Burmese calendar year 1300: in the Western calendar this year occurred between August 1938 and July 1939.[25]
In 18 January 1939 the Dobama Asiayone declared its intention to use force in order to overturn the government, leading the authorities to crack down on the organization. On 23 January Police raided their headquarters at Shwedagon Pagoda, arrested Aung San, and held him in prison for fifteen days on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government, but these charges were dropped.[26] Upon his release Aung San proposed a strategy of pursuing Burmese independence by staging countrywide strikes, anti-tax drives, and guerrilla insurgency.[27]
On 19 August 1939 Aung San became a founding member and the first Secretary General of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Aung San later claimed that his relationship with the CPB was not smooth, since he joined and left the party twice. Shortly after founding the CPB, Aung San founded a similar organization, alternatively known as either the "People's Revolutionary Party" or the "Burma Revolutionary Party". This party was Marxist, formed with the goal of supporting Burmese independence against the British. It survived and was reformed into the Socialist Party following World War II.[28]
Aung San was not paid for most of his work as a student or political leader, and lived for most of this time in a state of poverty. He was recognized by his peers for his strong work ethic and organizational skills, but was sometimes criticized by them for having poor public relations skills or for a perceived arrogance. He never drank alcohol and abstained from romantic relationships.[29]
The Second World War
Following the outbreak of World War II on 1 September 1939 Aung San helped to found another nationalist organization, the Freedom Bloc, by forming an alliance between the Dobama, the All Burma Students Union, politically active monks, and Dr. Ba Maw's Poor Man's Party.[30] Dr. Ba Maw served as the anarshin ("dictator") of the Freedom Bloc, while Aung San worked under him as the group's general secretary. The group's goals were organized around the idea of taking advantage of the war to gain Burmese independence.[31] The organization, goals, and tactics of the Freedom Bloc were modeled on the Bengali revolutionary group "Forward Bloc", whose leader, Chandra Bose, was in regular contact with Ba Maw.[32]
In March 1940, he attended an Indian National Congress Assembly in Ramgarh, India,[21] along with other Thakins, including Than Tun and Ba Hein. While there, Aung San met many leaders of the Indian independence movement, including Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, and Chandra Bose, as well as the leaders of the Indian Communist Party.[33] Aung San returned to Burma and began touring the country in June 1940 in order to promote the idea that, if Burma was invaded, the Burmese people should not support the British government. That month, while giving a speech at a village named Daung Gyi, he was warned by local policemen not to mention political events which had happened recently in the Chin Hills (which had been administered separately from Burma since 1924), which made him go out of his way to do so. On 29 June 1940, immediately after this speech, the district superintendent of police at Henzada, a man named "Xavier", issued a reward of 500 rupees issued a warrant for his arrest under the charge of sedition.[34][35] By mid-1940 the Burmese government had also issued warrants for many other leaders of the Thakins and the Freedom Bloc, due to those organizations' efforts to organize a revolution against the British, at least partially with Japanese support.[36][35] [33]
After hearing of the warrant for his arrest Aung San decided to leave the country and consulted with Ba Maw about how to do so.[37] Some of Aung San's colleagues advised him to go to the Shanghai International Settlement and make contact with communist agents there, but he was unable to find passage on a ship travelling to that city.[35] Ba Maw was advised by a contact at the Japanese consulate, Vice Consul Fuki, that Aung San could not leave on a Japanese ship, since the British authorities were monitoring them, but should instead leave on a ship friendly with the British government bound for Japanese-occupied Xiamen, after which they would be intercepted by Japanese agents. Aung San agreed with this plan and spent a month waiting inside the Japanese consulate for an opportunity to escape.[37] Besides Ba Maw's account of how the trip had been organized by the Japanese consulate, the Communist Party of Burma claimed that Aung San had left to seek the cooperation of the Chinese Communist Party, and Aung San stated that the goals for the trip were open-ended.[33]
On 14 August 1939, Aung San and another Thakin colleague, Hla Myaing, boarded the Norwegian cargo ship Hai Lee to Xiamen, China.[33] Neither Aung San nor Hla Myaing gave their real names, identifying themselves as "Tan Luang Shun" and "Tan Su Taung".[35] They arrived in Xiamen on 24 August 1939 and stayed at an inexpensive lodging house at the international settlement on Gulangyu Island, which was administered by a joint Chinese, Japanese, and American government. During their first two months on the island they tried unsuccessfully to establish contact with the Chinese Communist Party. By the end of this time they had nearly run out of money and Aung San had contracted dysentery. Eventually Aung San wrote to his friend Bo Let Ya about his poverty and illness, and requested that his friend arrange contact with the Japanese to rescue them. Bo Let Ya wired several hundred rupees to them and forwarded this request to his Japanese contacts along with pictures of Aung San and Hla Myaing. This request eventually reached a Japanese intelligence operative active in Burma, Colonel Suzuki Keiji, who then forwarded the request to his friend, Colonel Kiyoshi Tanaka at the Japanese Army Command in Taiwan, who agreed to send several Japanese intelligence officers to the island to look for the two Burmese men. In November 1939 a Japanese spy, Major Kanda, found Aung San and Hla Myaing and arranged for their passage to Japan.[38] The pair left for Tokyo via Taiwan and arrived in Japan on 27 September 1940, the same day that Japan signed its military alliance with Nazi Germany.[33]
In the spring of 1939[39] Japanese intelligence officers led by Suzuki Keiji had arrived in Yangon posing as journalists in order to gather information and to seek the cooperation of local parties for the intended Japanese invasion of Burma, occupying an office at 40 Judah Ezekiel Street for that purpose. Among their network of local collaborators they made close connections with the Thakins, of which Aung San was a leading member. The familiarity of Japanese intelligence with prominent political actors in Burma ensured that they were aware of Aung San's activities by the time he arrived in Japanese-occupied China.[40] Suzuki was later forced to leave Burma after the British learned of his activities in October 1939, but vowed to return.[41]
Formation of the Thirty Comrades
Aung San spent the rest of 1940 in Tokyo, learning the Japanese language and political ideology. At the time he wrote that he was opposed to Western individualism and that he intended to create an authoritarian government modelled on Japan and Nazi Germany including only "one state, one party, [and] one leader". While in Japan he dressed in a Japanese Kimono and adopted a Japanese name, "Omoda Monji".[42] During this time the Blue Print for a Free Burma was drafted. This document has been attributed to Aung San,[43] though it was based on a draft originally written in August 1940 by Thakin Mya, Dr. Thein Maung, and Col. Suzuki, while Suzuki was still in Rangoon.[44]
In February 1941 Aung San, working with Japanese intelligence, left Hla Myaing in Bangkok.[45] He then secretly re-entered Burma and began efforts to contact and recruit additional Burmese agents to work with the Japanese.[42] Aung San's preparations for the mission included being fitted with a pair of false teeth by a Japanese dentist and receiving a Japanese passport from the Japanese Ministry of Communications.[46] He entered the colony secretly through the port of Bassein, changed into a longyi, and booked a train to Rangoon using a pseudonym. By 8 July 1940 he had recruited thirty of his old revolutionary colleagues and smuggled them out of the country via Japanese intelligence networks. These "Thirty Comrades" were taken to the Japanese-occupied island of Hainan for further training. Aung San was twenty-five, the third-oldest of the group. The Thirty Comrades trained for six months on Hainan with Suzuki Keiji and other Japanese officers. Aung San, Ne Win, and Setkya all received special training, since the Japanese intended to place them in senior positions in the Burmese government following the Japanese conquest of the territory.[42]
The camp where the Thirty Comrades were trained was named the "San-a Agricultural Training Institute" in order to disguise the fact that it was a guerilla training base, and both local farmers and regular Japanese naval officers were forbidden to enter without special permission in order to keep its nature secret. The Burmese were trained using weapons that had been captured from Chinese soldiers, rather than Japanese weapons, for fear that if Burmese guerrillas were captured by the British during a prolonged war carrying Japanese weapons it may lead to an international incident. Aung San often served as the group's advisor, guide, and mediator during difficult points in their training.[47]
On 26 December 1941 Aung San received instructions from Suzuki to begin recruiting the descendants of Burmese settlers in Thailand[48], and by the time of the Japanese invasion of Burma was he successful in recruiting approximately 3,500 Burmese volunteers from the Siam-Burma border to serve in their army.[43] On 27 December 1941 Aung San first suggested that the group adopt their pseudonyms in order to protect their families in the event that they were captured by the British, and "to give pide and confidence and sense of mission".[49] All thirty of the men took pseudonyms beginning with the word "Bo", meaning "officer", which had become a title used by Westerners in Burma. Aung San took the nom de guerre "Bo Teza" ("Teza" means "fire").[42] The event involved the thwe thauk ("blood drinking") ceremony, a tradition inherited from the Burmese aristocracy.[50] In this ceremony participants collected their blood from a cut in their arms, mixed the participants' blood together with alcohol in a silver bowl, and drank it while pledging eternal comradeship and loyalty.[43] On 28 December 1941, Aung San and the rest of the Thirty Comrades formally inaugurated the Burma Independence Army in Bangkok.[43] On 31 December the Burma Independence Army took part in the Japanese "leaving the front ceremony" in a parade through Bangkok,[51] marching towards Burma behind the invading Japanese Fifteenth Army.[43] Aung San was ranked third in the organization of the BIA, as a major general, behind Suzuki and another Japanese officer named "Kawashima".[51]
Japanese invasion and wartime administration
The BIA reached the Burmese border in January 1942. Their force grew as it advanced through Burma, taking as many recruits with it as it could along the way. By the time the BIA reached Rangoon on 18 March 1942 it was 10,000 men strong, and by May 1942 it had 23,000 soldiers.[52] The BIA left most of the fighting to the Japanese Army but occupied the areas behind Japanese lines after the British had retreated. The arrival of BIA units in many areas of Burma was followed by escalating communal violence, especially against Karen people, which lasted for several weeks until the Japanese Army was able to intervene.[53] Throughout the war the Burmese Independence Army would be responsible for numerous massacres and "reprisal" attacks on civilian areas perceived to be more loyal to the British than themselves, especially in the Irrawaddy Delta, Tenessarrim Division, and in the Karen Hills, and especially against non-Buddhist, non-Bamar communities.[54].[55]
Aung San recognized and was distressed by many of the early abuses of the BIA, and attempted to control them by threatening punishment and reminding them that he had intended the BIA to be composed of "true patriots irrespective of political creed or race". The Japanese recognition that many of the soldiers who had initially joined the BIA were "undisciplined" and "vicious" was one of the factors they cited to justify the BIA's abolishment and reorganization soon after the Japanese invasion of Burma. In 1943 he visited many of the Karen areas that had been attacked by the BIA, apologizing for his men, reassuring their leaders that he did not intend to attack them, and secretly agreeing with them that they would soon work together to fight against the Japanese.[56]
Early attempts by the Japanese army to prevent the Burmese from establishing a meaningfully independent government were successful. When Suzuki attempted to establish an independent BIA government following the fall of Moulmein on 30 January 1942 he was prevented by orders from the Japanese Fifty-Fifth Army Division. The army also refused the distribution of leaflets proclaiming the independence of Burma, even though this had been previously agreed to. On 9 February 1942 the Japanese South Area Army ordered its officers to delay independence until after the war was over. When the BIA entered Rangoon in March, ten days after the Japanese Army had taken it, they attempted to set up an independent administration at the governor's house, but were prevented from doing so by the Japanese Army, who had already occupied the building and were using it as the headquarters of their military administration. The BIA formed an administration for the country under Suzuki Keiji and Thakin Tun Oke that operated in parallel with the Japanese military administration for several months, but this government was soon superseded and effectively disbanded by the administration of the Japanese South Area Army in June 1942.[57]
In general the continued changes and delays regarding Japanese policy towards Burmese independence contributed to a sense of friction between the occupying Japanese army and the Burmese. By March 1942 there were incidents of fist fighting between Burmese and Japanese soldiers. The Japanese Army's actions to limit Burmese autonomy seemed to confirm the suspicions of Aung San, who had warned his comrades before the invasion of Burma began to beware Japanese duplicity, and to use caution when dealing with them. He complained about being merely Suzuki Keiji's Senior Staff Officer, rather than being in charge of his own soldiers. Another source of friction between the Japanese and the Burmese was the forced labour conscription, torture, and disappearances of people by the Japanese army and secret police. Aung San eventually came to suspect that the Japanese Army often gave his forces marching orders simply to keep them busy and to keep them out of the way. By the beginning of the Japanese occupation Aung San and other Burmese leaders were already considering a resistance against the Japanese; but, as he wrote, "everything was in confusion". He wrote that, under the Japanese, the Burmese people were "treated like dogs". In the end, due to their general lack of training, organization, and resources, Aung San and his comrades resolved to continue working with the Japanese until a favourable alternative presented itself.[58]
In March 1942, in response to a letter of complaint he had received from Aung San, Suzuki reformed the BIA into two divisions and placed Aung San in command. In July 1942 the BIA was reformed under the direction of the local Japanese Army as the Burma Defense Army (BDA). The word "independence" was removed from the force's name because, according to the Japanese, the Burmese had not yet proven themselves worthy of it. Aung San was made a colonel and put in charge of the force. Suzuki eventually lost his case for Burmese independence with the Japanese Army and was transferred out of Burma in July 1942, after the dissolution of the BIA. [59]
In 11 1943 March Aung San and several other senior members of the Burmese government were invited to Japan to discuss the possible future independence of Burma. While there, on 18 March, they were decorated by the Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Aung San was awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class with Middle Cords. While in Tokyo he met Suzuki Keiji again, who explained that he had been sent back to Japan for being "too friendly with the Burmese". This conversation further convinced him to be suspicious of the intentions of the Japanese.[60]
On 1 August 1943 the Japanese held an "independence ceremony" in Rangoon, in which they formally granted Burma "independence" in a manner similar to the puppet government of Manchukuo in China. The Japanese had planned to make Aung San the leader of the country, but in the end they were more impressed with Dr. Ba Maw, and made him the leader instead, giving him virtually dictatorial control under their direction. Aung San was made the second most powerful person in the government. The government was organized on a fascist model, and intentionally eschewed democratic principles and patterns of government. The army, still under the control of Aung San, took their motto, "One Blood, One Voice, One Command" at this time. It is still the official motto of the Burmese military.[61]
By the time of Burmese "independence" both the political and military leadership within Burma understood that the Japanese only intended to use them as a puppet government under their administration, but resolved to continue working together in the hopes that continued unity might eventually lead to a solution to the Japanese problem. Although Aung San did not agree with the Japanese policy or administration, he concealed this in public, and the Japanese did not grow to doubt his loyalty. He took advantage of the situation to have the Japanese train the nucleus of the Burmese army: by 1945 the Japanese had trained ten battalions of Burmese soldiers. During 1943 and 1944 Aung San was successful in convincing many factions within the Burmese army to delay their rebellion against the Japanese, ensuring them that the fight against them would take place at a time when it would be most advantageous.[62]
As the war continued Aung San became doubtful not only about Japanese promises of true independence, but also of Japan's ability to win the war. As General William Slim, the commanding officer of Allied forces in the Burma campaign, put it:
It was not long before Aung San found that what he meant by independence had little relation to what the Japanese were prepared to give—that he had exchanged an old master for an infinitely more tyrannical new one. As one of his leading followers once said to me, "If the British sucked our blood, the Japanese ground our bones!" He became more and more disillusioned with the Japanese, and early in 1943 we got news from Seagrim, a most gallant officer who had remained in the Karen Hills at the ultimate cost of his life, that Aung San's feelings were changing. On 1 August 1944 he was bold enough to speak publicly with contempt of the Japanese brand of independence, and it was clear that, if they did not soon liquidate him, he might prove useful to us. ... At our first interview, Aung San began to take rather a high hand. ... I pointed out that he was in no position to take the line he had. I did not need his forces; I was destroying the Japanese quite nicely without their help, and could continue to do so. I would accept his help and that of his army only on the clear understanding that it implied no recognition of any provisional government. ... The British Government had announced its intention to grant self-government to Burma within the British Commonwealth, and we had better limit our discussion to the best method of throwing the Japanese out of the country as the next step toward self-government.[63]
On 1 August 1944 the anniversary of Burmese "independence" was celebrated at Jubilee Hall in Rangoon, attended by the most important Japanese and Burmese administrators in the city. Aung San gave a speech in Burmese criticizing the administration. He criticized the idea of Burmese "independence" as it existed by stating that the benefits of Burmese "independence" only extended as far as the ministers present, and could not be enjoyed by the Burmese population until the Japanese were gone. Before the speech the Japanese had requested a translation, but Aung San refused to give one. The Burmese officials present, including Ba Maw, were shocked by Aung San speaking so openly and refused to translate the speech for the Japanese, which angered them. Though the Japanese newspaper in Yangon only reported that a speech was given by Aung San without reporting what it was, the Japanese government in Tokyo was reportedly disturbed.[64]
Aung San made plans to organize an anti-Japanese uprising in Burma, secretly forming the "Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League" in August and September 1944 following a secret meeting in Bago between the Burma National Army, the Burmese Communist Party, and the People's Revolutionary Party (which later reformed into the Socialist Party).[65] Following this meeting, Aung San's forces began to secretly store supplies in preparation of their fight against the Japanese. In late March 1945, as Allied forces advanced towards Rangoon, Aung San led the BNA in a parade in front of Government House in Rangoon, after which they were sent by the Japanese to the front. A few days later, on 27 March, the BNA switched sides and attacked the Japanese instead.[66] 27 March came to be commemorated as Resistance Day, until the military regime renamed it "Tatmadaw (Armed Forces) Day".
When he led his army west on 27 March 1945 Aung San was confronted by a Japanese officer who accompanied him and suspected what he was planning to do. The officer challenged Aung San by asking him what deal he had made with the British. Aung San replied that his intention was to negotiate for "total independence for Burma", though at the time he thought he would need to accept independence within the British Commonwealth.[67]
After the Burmese army began the attack on the Japanese, it was renamed the "Patriotic Burmese Forces" and its command structure was divided into eight different regions. Aung San was given command of the first region, comprising the areas of Prome, Henzada, Tharrawaddy, and Insein. His designated political advisor was Thakin Ba Hein, a Communist Party leader. On 30 March, the Allied commander in Southeast Asia, Louis Montbatten, formally recognized the Burmese army as "an Allied force".[68] Many officers within the British army believed that Aung San should be treated as a traitor and a war criminal for his activities working with the Japanese, but Montbatten mediated between both sides, leading them to agree to work together, that no general amnesty would be granted, and that the political future of Burma would need to be negotiated following the conclusion of the war.[69]
The Burmese National Army continued to harass the Japanese throughout the remainder of the war, later claiming to have killed 12,000 Japanese soldiers and wounded 4,000. When Allied forces retook Rangoon on 2 May 1945, the BNA were symbolically sent into the city two days before any other soldiers. The Allies helped to arm Aung San's forces somewhat after their defection, supplying the BNA with 3,000 small arms.[70]
Aung San first met with General Slim on 16 May 1945, appearing unexpectedly in Slim's camp in the uniform of a Japanese major general. At the meeting Aung San stated his intentions to ally with the British until the Japanese had been driven out of Burma, and agreed to incorporate his forces into Slim's British-led army. When Slim asked Aung San whether he was taking a risk by unexpectedly coming to his camp in the uniform of a Japanese officer and adopting a bold attitude, Aung San answered that he was not, "because you are a British officer." Slim later wrote that Aung San had made a good impression in the meeting.[71] When Slim criticized Aung San for only switching sides now that the British were winning, Aung San responded that it would not be much benefit switching sides if the British were losing. On 25 May 1945 Aung San agreed with Slim to place his forces under the overall command of the British Army in return for Slim providing his soldiers with rations and other supplies.[72]
In a meeting on 30 May 1945 the Allied leaders agreed to rename the forces under Aung San again, calling them the "Local Burmese Forces" (LBF). At this meeting it was agreed that Aung San's soldiers would be treated as an Allied force, with the intention to later assimilate them into the Burma-British Army after the war.[73]
When the British army held a victory parade in Rangoon on 15 June 1945, the LBF were prevented from fully attending due to their former cooperation with the Japanese, but were represented by a small contingent of soldiers. Aung San attended the parade as an official spectator.[74]
Post-World War II
World War II ended on 12 September 1945. Following the end of the war Aung San's force was renamed the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF), and then gradually disarmed by the British as the Japanese were driven out of various parts of the country.
Following the war Aung San was appointed the inspector-general of the PBF. worried that the British would attempt to reorganize his forces in order to disband them, and argued against this by arguing that a Burmese military was necessary in order for Burma to evolve into a "fully self-governing member of the British Common-wealth of Nations". However, after the general demobilization of British soldiers began following the surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945 he led a coalition of local organizations in demanding "full sovereignty".[75]
The leaders of the Patriotic Burmese Forces, while disbanded, were offered positions in the Burma Army under British command according to the Kandy conference agreement with Lord Louis Mountbatten in Ceylon in September 1945.[76] The delegates agreed that the new Burmese army would be composed of 5,000 of Aung San's Japanese-trained Bamar soldiers, and 5,000 British-trained soldiers, most of whom were either Chin, Kachin, or Karen.[77] The army was to be led by two inspectors-general, one who would be Bamar and a second who would be from an ethnic minority. Montbatten met with Aung San on 6 September, but their discussions were confined to the disbandment of Aung San's forces and their reorganization within the new Burmese army. The agreements made at the conference were signed by Montbatten, Than Tun, and Aung San. Following the conference, on 25 September 1945, Aung San resigned from the military with the intention of re-entering civilian politics.[78]
By the time that the Burmese Governor General Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith arrived back in Rangoon on 17 October 1945 Aung San led a coalition that included virtually all political, ethnic, and religious groups in the country, under the leadership of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). By this time he openly rejected Dorman-Smith's proposed plan for gradual road to Burmese independence as a member of the British Commonwealth, and rejected taking part in his cabinet, since he did not believe that he and his supporters would be included in sufficiently senior positions. As the head of the AFPFL he advocated for a general amnesty for crimes committed during the Japanese occupation and promoted civil disobedience while arguing against the use of force.[79]
Aung San wrote to U Seinda in Arakan, saying that he supported U Seida's guerrilla fight against the British, but that he would cooperate with the British for tactical reasons. In December 1945 he reorganized his formally disbanded soldiers as a paramilitary organization instead, the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO), which continued to wear uniforms and drill in public. The PVO was personally loyal to Aung San and his party rather than the government. By 1947, the PVO had over 100,000 members.[80]
In January 1946 a victory festival was held in the Kachin capital of Myitkyina. Governor Dorman-Smith was invited to attend, but neither Aung San nor anyone from his party were, due to "their connection with the Burma Independence Army".[81]
In March 1946 allegations that Aung San had committed a war crime while working with the Japanese, the public execution of a Muslim headman in Thaton, were published in newspapers across Burma, India, and Britain. These allegations were likely made public by Tun Ok, a political rival, who claimed to have witnessed the event. Governor Dorman-Smith was not sure whether, or how, Aung San should arrested for the crime. Montbatten sent a telegram strongly arguing against arresting Aung San, while several security officials worried that arresting him would lead to a rebellion or a mutiny within the Burmese army. Lieutenant-General Harold Briggs, most senior military officer then in Burma, warned that arresting Aung San would lower world opinion of the British administration, especially in Asia. He also argued that the main goals of the British administration in Burma were economic recovery, increasing rice production to meet global shortages, and preparing the country for self-government, and that arresting Aung San would undermine those goals. An influential director of public relations, Reverend George Appleton, argued that the Burmese people did not naturally think in terms of "justice or reason", but more in terms of "personalities and relationships", and so would not naturally understand or accept Aung San's arrest. In the end, since public opinion seemed against arresting Aung San, and since the British army was unavailable in the event that it led to a disturbance, Dorman-Smith and his administration decided against arresting Aung San. In April 1946 Dorman-Smith changed his mind about whether Aung San should be arrested after receiving a petition from the murdered headman's widow, but was directly told not to act by Sir Pethwick-Lawrence, the secretary of state for India and Burma, who was then negotiating Indian independence with its leaders and did not want any disturbance to jeopardize these talks. On 7 May 1946 Dorman-Smith declared a general amnesty for war crimes committed during WWII.[82]
On 14 June Dorman-Smith was recalled from his post, largely due to his inability to negotiate with Aung San. Dorman-Smith was replaced by a new Governor General of Burma, Sir Hubert Rance. Rance agreed to recognize and negotiate directly with Aung San, possibly to distance them both from the Communist Party of Burma. He also agreed to appoint Aung San to the position of counselor for defense on the Executive Council (a provisional cabinet made in lieu of the upcoming Burmese national election). On 28 September 1946, Aung San was appointed to the even higher position of deputy chairman, making him effectively the 5th prime minister of the British-Burma Crown Colony.[83] Aung San had at first worked closely with the Burmese Communist Party, but after they began criticizing him for working with the British he banned all communists from his Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League on 3 November 1946.[84]
Aung San-Atlee agreement and the Panglong Conference
Aung San was to all intents and purposes prime minister, although he was still subject to a British veto. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee invited Aung San to visit London in 1947 in order to negotiate the conditions of Burmese independence.[50] At a press conference during a stopover in Delhi,[21] while on the way to meet Atlee in London,[84] he stated that the Burmese wanted "complete independence" and not dominion status, and that they had "no inhibitions of any kind" about "contemplating a violent or non-violent struggle or both" in order to achieve it. He concluded that he hoped for the best, but was prepared for the worst.[21] He arrived in Britain by air in January 1947 along with his deputy Tin Tut, who he considered his brightest official. Attlee and Aung San signed their agreement on the terms of Burmese independence on 27 January: following the Burmese election in 1947 Burma would join the British Commonwealth (like Canada and Australia); though its government would have the option to leave, its government would control the Burmese Army once Allied armies had withdrawn; a constitutional assembly would be drawn up as soon as possible, with the resulting constitution presented to the British parliament as soon as possible; and, Britain would nominate Burma's entrance into the newly founded United Nations.[50] The agreement was not unanimous: two other delegates who attended the conference, U Saw and Thakin Ba Sein, refused to sign it, and it was denounced in Burma by Aung San's critics, including Than Tun and Thakin Soe. No delegates representing Burma's ethnic minorities were present, and both Karen and Shan leaders sent messages warning that they would not consider any agreement signed at the conference legally binding to their communities.[85]
Two weeks after the signing of the agreement with Britain, Aung San signed an agreement at the second Panglong Conference on 12 February 1947, with leaders representing the Shan, Kachin, and Chin People. In this agreement these leaders agreed to join a united independent Burma, under the condition that they would have "full autonomy"[86] and the right to secede in 1958, after ten years. Karen leaders were not consulted and were not a part of the agreement. They hoped for a separate Karen State within the British Empire.[87] The date of the signing of the Panglong Agreement has been celebrated in Burma as "Union Day", even though Ne Win effectively dissolved any agreement with Burma's minority communities following his coup in 1962.[88][89]
The general election held in April 1947 was not ideal: the Karens,[87] Mon,[90] and most of Aung San's other political opponents boycotted the process. Since they ran virtually unopposed, every delegate in Aung San's party was elected.[87] In the end Aung San's AFPFL won 176 out of the 210 seats in the Constituent Assembly, while the Karens won 24, the Communists 6, and the Anglo-Burmans 4.[91] In July, Aung San convened a series of conferences at Sorrenta Villa in Rangoon to discuss the rehabilitation of Burma.
Following the 1947 election Aung San began to form his own cabinet. It was intended to be as representative as possible of country's ethnic and religious diversity. In addition to ethnic Burmese statesmen like himself and Tin Tut, he also persuaded the Karen leader Mahn Ba Khaing, the Shan Chief Sao Hsam Htun, and the Tamil Muslim leader Abdul Razak to join his cabinet. No Communists were invited to participate.[92]
Assassination
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In the final years of the British administration of Burma, Aung San became good friends with the second-last Governor of Burma, Colonel Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, an Anglo-Irishman with whom he would regularly discuss his personal difficulties. In early 1946, approximately a year before his death, Aung San complained to Dorman-Smith that he felt melancholic, that he did not feel close to his old friends in the Burmese military, that he had many enemies, and that he was worried that someone would attempt to assassinate him soon.[93]
A little after 10:30 AM on 19 July 1947, a single army jeep carrying armed gunmen in military fatigues drove into the courtyard of the Secretariat Building, where Aung San was having a meeting with his new cabinet. There was no wall or gate protecting the government building,[92] and although Aung San had had been warned that someone may have been plotting to kill him[94] the sentries guarding the building did not challenge or stop the car in any way.[92] Four men from the car, armed with three Tommy Guns, a Sten gun,[95] and grenades, ran up the stairs towards the council chamber, shot the guard standing outside, and burst into the council chamber.[92] The gunmen shouted, "Remain seated! Don't move!"[94] Aung San stood up and was immediately shot in the chest, killing him. The gunmen sprayed the area where he was standing with gunfire for approximately thirty seconds, killing four other council members immediately and mortally wounding another three. Only three in the room survived.[92]
The eight other people who died in Aung San's assassination were among the most promising political leaders in Burma. Thakin Mya was a minister without portfolio who had been a student leader and a close friend of Aung San. Ba Choe, the minister of information, had been the editor of a prominent nationalist journal. Abdul Razak, a Tamil Muslim, the minister of education, had been a headmaster. Ba Win, the minister of trade, was Aung San's older brother. Mahn Ba Khaing, the minister of industry, was one of the few Karen politicians not to have boycotted involvement in the new government. Sao Sam Htun, the minister of the Hill Regions, was a Shan prince who had taken an active lead in convincing the other ethnic minorities to join Burma in becoming independent. Ohn Maung was a deputy minister in the ministry of transportation who had just entered the conference room to deliver a report before the assassination. Abdul Razak's 18-year-old bodyguard, Ko Htwe, was killed before the gunmen entered the room.[96]
Burma's last pre-WWII Prime Minister, U Saw (who had himself lost an eye surviving an assassination attempt in late 1946),[50] was arrested for the murders the same day.[97] U Saw was subsequently tried and hanged for his responsibility in the assassination, but there have been many other claims of responsibility from multiple parties ever since Aung San's death. Some claimed that a rogue faction in the British intelligence service was responsible.[98] In his autobiography one of the Thirty Comrades, General Kyaw Zaw, accused the British police department in Rangoon of knowing about U Saw's plot days in advance but doing nothing to prevent it.[99] Other observers blamed discontented senior members of the Burmese Army, claiming it was inconceivable that U Saw, a man with no military experience, could have planned and carried out the attack alone. The Burmese Communist Party said that it was part of "an imperialist plot", claiming that Aung San had been in discussions with them to form a "united front" government, and that the assassination had been carried out to prevent this. U Saw never admitted any responsibility, and he claimed that the weapons found behind his house, which led to his conviction, were planted in order to frame him. U Saw's claim was believed by multiple other politicians who were not part of Aung San's party, the most senior of which was U Ba Pe, who stated to the press that they also expected to be framed for other crimes by their enemies in the new government.[100] After Aung San died his old friend U Nu became the prime minister and stated publicly that he knew the British were not involved in the assassination. According to General Kyaw Zaw, this was evidence that U Nu was part of the conspiracy.[101]
A variation on the theory that the British were involved in Aung San's assassination was given new life in an influential, but sensationalist, documentary broadcast by the BBC on the 50th anniversary of the assassination in 1997. What did emerge in the course of the investigations at the time of the trial, however, was that several low-ranking British officers had sold firearms to a number of Burmese politicians, including U Saw. Shortly after U Saw's conviction, Captain David Vivian, a British Army officer, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for supplying U Saw with weapons. Vivian was freed from prison when Karen soldiers captured Insein Prison in May 1949. According to General Kyaw Zaw he then lived with the Karen people in Kawkareik until 1950, when he traveled back to Thailand and then to England, where he lived until his death in 1980. Little information about his motives was revealed either during or after the trial.[102]
Kin Oung, the son of the deputy police inspector who arrested U Saw, claimed that U Saw bought the arms found at his house from the black market after they had been sold by British soldiers, not by the soldiers directly. Kin Oung claimed that the arms, before being smuggled into the black market, were in the process of being transported to Singapore in preparation for their withdrawal from Burma, so U Saw's possession of these weapons wasn't necessarily evidence of British complicity in Aung San's murder but rather the greed of the individual soldiers. He identified the officer responsible for selling the arms as Major Lance Dane, but claimed that Dane and his associates were later "secretly released" after being imprisoned. Kin Oung claimed that the name of one of Aung San's assassins was "Yan Gyi Aung".[95]
Shortly before her house arrest, in 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi told a foreign reporter that Aung San had warned his comrades not to trust Ne Win only weeks before his assassination. She hinted that Ne Win might have been involved in her father's assassination, but that nobody in Burmese politics was comfortable with publicly accusing him.[103] According to Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San never intended for the Burmese military to be involved in politics, and if he had survived would have limited the influence of its leaders.[104] This criticism was similar to the criticism of Kyaw Zaw, who in 1976 had claimed that, before his assassination, Aung San was seriously considering removing Ne Win from office due to his actions under the Japanese, which had led Aung San to worry that Ne Win had "fascist" tendencies.[105] Aung San had disliked Ne Win since the time they trained together in Hainan, when he criticized Ne Win's tendency for cunning and political calculation, and for his habits of gambling and womanizing.[106] Aung San's dislike of Ne Win increased after the Japanese occupied Burma, when Ne Win tortured prisoners in cooperation with the Japanese secret police.[107] In the 1950s one foreign diplomat recalled that Ne Win was still "very jealous of Aung San", and as late as 1986 the Karen National Union published an article suggesting that Ne Win may have been involved in the assassination. The first detailed telegram to London from the governor following the assassination noted that the gunmen were from the 4th Burma Rifles, under Ne Win's command, though this was not reported afterwards.[108] Several decades later, in 1968, Ne Win successfully assassinated Aung San's brother-in-law, Thakin Than Tun.[109]
Besides Aung San, most of his cabinet, and U Saw, there were a number of other assassinations and attempted assassinations carried out against other men who had been close to Aung San at that time. Two of these included Aung San's English lawyer, Frederick Henry, who was murdered in his house, and F. Collins, a private detective who was investigating Aung San's assassination. According to General Kyaw Zaw these murders were evidence that somebody was trying to cover up their involvement in the assassination.[101] In September 1948, nine months after Burma's independence, somebody assassinated Tin Tut, who had been one of Aung San's closest advisors and who at the time was Burma's first foreign minister, by throwing a grenade into his car. The assassins were never caught and nobody was ever charged with his murder.[110] It was rumored that he was investigating Aung San's assassination at the time of his death.[citation needed]
Legacy
For his work towards Burmese independence and uniting the country, Aung San has consistently been seen as one of the most important and influential political figures in modern Burma. Within Burma he has been generally seen as a "larger-than-life hero" and the "architect of Burmese freedom". In the decades since Burmese independence it has been widely speculated that, had Aung San survived another twenty or thirty years, Burma would have developed a more stable political system and retained a higher standard of living. As for his own plans, his older brother Aung Than later wrote that Aung San had stated privately that he intended to retire from Burmese politics after the country's independence, believing that the political environment in Burma was too volatile, unpredictable, and dangerous for him to deal with comfortably.[111]
A Martyrs' Mausoleum was built at the foot of the Shwedagon Pagoda in 1947, and July 19 was designated Martyrs' Day, a public holiday.[112] On 9 October 1983, the President of South Korea, Chun Doo-hwan, was nearly assassinated by North Korean agents during a wreath-laying ceremony at Aung San's mausoleum.[113] The assassins detonated a bomb that they had planted in the roof of the mausoleum, killing 19 people, including four South Korean cabinet ministers, and injuring 48.[114] Chun reportedly escaped the assassination attempt only because his car was delayed by traffic. One of the assassins was killed while trying to escape the scene, and the two others were captured. The incident led Myanmar to cut off diplomatic relations with North Korea from 1983 to 2007. Aung San's original mausoleum was destroyed by the blast, and another monument was built in its place.[113]
Within months of Aung San's assassination, on 4 January 1948, the last British soldiers left Burma and it became an independent country. By August 1948 a civil war began between the Burmese military and many independent regional groups, including both Communist insurgents and various ethnic militias. The internal conflict within Myanmar continues to the present day, the oldest civil war in the world. Since Burma's independence no single government has ever controlled the entirety of Burma, no election has ever represented every area claimed by the Burmese government, and no census recording the entire population of Burma has ever been able to be conducted.[115]
In April 1959 Prime Minister U Nu convened a "Nationalities' Seminar" to discuss the possibility that the Shan and Karenni areas of Myanmar might exercise their constitutional right secede from Burma. At the conference minority leaders criticized the Burmese military for looting, raping, and unprovoked murders throughout ethnic minority areas, and the princess of Hsipaw noted that, if Aung San had not been assassinated, "things would have turned out differently."[116]
In 1962 the Burmese military, led by Ne Win, overthrew the civilian government in a coup and instituted military rule. The Burmese military justified the legitimacy of their government partially by citing the legacy of Aung San in leading the country in WWII, when he was both a military and political leader. In doing so they ignored the symbolic decision that Aung San made in 1945, when he resigned from all military positions in order to participate in politics as a civilian. After taking power the military abandoned many of the political reforms that Aung San had fought for or introduced, including the meaningful participation of ethnic minorities in the government, democracy, and federalism.[117] Following his coup Ne Win used official statements and propaganda to promote the idea that, as the leader of the armed forces and a member of the Thirty Comrades, he was the sole legitimate successor of Aung San.[118]
After Ne Win's coup in 1962 the Burmese military destroyed the Student Union Building at Rangoon University, from which Aung San had begun his efforts to campaign for Burmese independence in the 1930s, in order to intimidate students who were protesting the coup. This event was largely blamed on Ne Win, though he denied responsibility for the destruction of the building in his last public address, in 1988.[119]
Aung San's name had been invoked by successive Burmese governments since independence, until the military regime in the 1990s tried to eradicate all traces of Aung San's memory. Nevertheless, several statues of him adorn the former capital Yangon and his portrait still has a place of pride in many homes and offices throughout the country. Scott Market, Yangon's most famous, was renamed Bogyoke Market in his memory, and Commissioner Road was retitled Bogyoke Aung San Road after independence. These names have been retained. Many towns and cities in Burma have thoroughfares and parks named after him.[120] In the decades following his assassination many people came to view Aung San as a symbol of democratic reform: during the 8888 Uprising in 1988 against the military dictatorship, many protesters carried posters of Aung San as symbols of their movement.[121] Many people at the time saw Aung San as a symbol of what Burma could have been, but was not at the time: prosperous, democratic, and peaceful.[122]
Banknotes featuring Aung San were first produced in 1958, ten years after his assassination. The practice continued until the uprising in 1988, when the government replaced his picture with scenes of Burmese life, possibly in an attempt to decrease the popularity of his daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi. In 2017 the Myanmar parliament voted 286–107 in favor of reinstating Aung San's image. The new 1,000-kyat notes bearing Aung San's image were produced and released to the public on 4 January 2020, a date chosen to mark the 72nd anniversary of Independence Day.[123]
Family
While he was War Minister in 1942 Aung San was attended by a senior staff nurse, Khin Kyi, and began a romantic relationship with her. Their marriage was shocking to Aung San's comrades because he had always claimed that young men should avoid romantic relationships until Burmese independence was achieved, so that they could dedicate their energy towards that goal. Due to his previous rhetoric some of his comrades were afraid that Aung San's marriage would distract him from his political goals, but this turned out not to be the case.[124]
Around the same time Khin Kyi's sister met and married Thakin Than Tun, the Communist leader.
After Aung San's assassination his widow was appointed Burma's ambassador to India, and the family moved abroad.[125]
Aung San and Khin Kyi had four children. Aung San's youngest surviving child, Aung San Suu Kyi, was only two years old when Aung San was assassinated.[126] She is a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, served as State Counsellor of Myanmar, was the first female Myanmar Minister of Foreign Affairs, and is the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) political party. Aung San's oldest son, Aung San Oo, is an engineer working in the United States who has disagreed with his sister's political activities. Aung San's second son, Aung San Lin, died at age eight, when he drowned in an ornamental lake in the grounds of the family's house.[citation needed]
Aung San's youngest daughter, Aung San Chit, born in September 1946, died on 26 September 1946, the same day Aung San got into the governor's executive council, a few days after her birth.[127] Aung San's wife Daw Khin Kyi died on 27 December 1988.
Names of Aung San
- Name at birth: Htein Lin (ထိန်လင်း)
- As student leader and a thakin: Aung San (သခင်အောင်ဆန်း)
- Nom de guerre: Bo Teza (ဗိုလ်တေဇ)
- Japanese name: Omoda Monji (面田紋次)
- Chinese name: Tan Lu Shaung
- Resistance period code name: Myo Aung (မျိုးအောင်), U Naung Cho (ဦးနောင်ချို)
- Contact code name with General Ne Win: Ko Set Pe (ကိုဆက်ဖေ)
References
Citations
- ^ a b c Nay 99
- ^ Nay 100-102
- ^ Nay 100
- ^ Nay 102
- ^ Nay 102-103
- ^ Nay 104
- ^ Aung
- ^ Naw x
- ^ Nay 99
- ^ Naw 4
- ^ 106
- ^ Naw 3
- ^ a b Thant 213
- ^ Naw 2
- ^ Naw 8
- ^ Naw 10-11
- ^ Naw 9
- ^ Thant 214
- ^ Maung Maung 22-23
- ^ Naw 21-26
- ^ a b c d Aung San Suu Kyi (1984). Aung San of Burma. Edinburgh: Kiscadale 1991. pp. 1, 10, 14, 17, 20, 22, 26, 27, 41, 44.
- ^ Smith 54
- ^ Naw 28-37
- ^ Naw 36-38
- ^ Naw 41-43
- ^ Naw 44
- ^ Smith 58
- ^ Smith 56-57
- ^ Naw 45-48
- ^ Lintner 1990
- ^ Thant 217
- ^ Naw 49
- ^ a b c d e Thant 228
- ^ Naw 55, 62
- ^ a b c d Lintner 2003 41
- ^ Smith 57-58
- ^ a b Naw 62
- ^ Naw 63-66
- ^ Naw 65
- ^ Thant 219
- ^ Naw 66
- ^ a b c d Thant 229
- ^ a b c d e Smith 59
- ^ Naw 68
- ^ Lintner 2003 42
- ^ Naw 70
- ^ Naw 72-73
- ^ Naw 77
- ^ Naw 77
- ^ a b c d Thant 252
- ^ a b Naw 78
- ^ Naw 81,88
- ^ Thant 230
- ^ South 22
- ^ Thant 230
- ^ Naw 87-90, 105-106
- ^ Naw 82-83
- ^ Naw 83-91
- ^ Naw 86-92
- ^ Naw 99, 230
- ^ Thant 232-233
- ^ Naw 92-94, 101-102
- ^ Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Defeat into Victory, Cassell & Company, 2nd edition, 1956
- ^ Naw 108-109
- ^ Smith 60
- ^ Thant 238-240
- ^ Naw 119
- ^ Lintner 2003 73
- ^ Naw 122
- ^ Smith 65
- ^ Thant 240-241
- ^ Naw 124
- ^ Naw 128
- ^ Naw 129
- ^ Naw 131-134
- ^ Smith 65-66
- ^ Thant 244-245
- ^ Naw 135-136
- ^ Naw 142-145
- ^ Smith 66
- ^ Smith 73
- ^ Naw 152-160
- ^ Smith 69
- ^ a b Lintner 2003 80
- ^ Smith 77-78
- ^ Smith 78
- ^ a b c Thant 253
- ^ Smith 79
- ^ "The Panglong Agreement, 1947". Online Burma/Myanmar Library.
- ^ South 26
- ^ Appleton, G. (1947). "Burma Two Years After Liberation". International Affairs. 23 (4). Blackwell Publishing: 510–521. JSTOR 3016561.
- ^ a b c d e Thant 254
- ^ Thant 248
- ^ a b Lintner 2003 xii
- ^ a b Kyaw Zwa Moe
- ^ Lintner 2003 xii-xiii
- ^ Lintner 2003 xiii
- ^ Smith 71-72
- ^ Maung Zarni
- ^ Smith 71-72, 441
- ^ a b The Irrawaddy 2
- ^ The Irrawaddy 1-3
- ^ Smith 421
- ^ Rogers 2
- ^ Smith 305
- ^ Lintner 2003 42
- ^ Lintner 2003 72
- ^ Smith 6-7
- ^ Thant 306-307
- ^ Thant 270-271
- ^ Naw viii, xii-xiii
- ^ Ye Mon and Myat Nyein Aye
- ^ a b BBC News
- ^ Time
- ^ Thant 258-259
- ^ Lintner 2003 203
- ^ Smith 198-199
- ^ Lintner 2003 346
- ^ Thant 293
- ^ Smith 6
- ^ Thant 33
- ^ Lintner 2003 342
- ^ Zaw
- ^ Naw 94-95
- ^ Rogers 27
- ^ Thant 333
- ^ Wintle, Justin (2007). Perfect hostage: a life of Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's prisoner of conscience. Skyhorse Publishing. p. 143. ISBN 978-1-60239-266-3.
Sources
- Aung Zaw. "Rewards of Independence Remain Elusive". The Irrawady. 3 January 2018. Retrieved 5 September 2020.
- "North Korea's History of Foreign Assassinations and Kidnappings". BBC News. 14 February 2017. Retrieved 19 September 2020.
- Houtman, Gustaaf. "Aung San’s Lan-Zin, the Blue Print and the Japanese Occupation of Burma". In Kei Nemoto (ed). Reconsidering the Japanese military occupation in Burma (1942–45). Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA). 30 May 2007. pp. 179–227. ISBN 978-4-87297-9640, Retrieved 23 August 2020.
- "Who Killed Aung San?" The Irrawaddy. Vol. 5, No. 4/5. August 1997. Retrieved 5 September 2020.
- Kyaw Zwa Moe. "Who Killed Aung San?" The Irrawaddy. 17 July 2017. Retrieved 14 November 2020.
- Lintner, Bertil. The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma. Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publication. 1990
- Lintner, Bertil. Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948. Chiang Mai, Thaiand: Silkworm Books. 2003.
- Maung Maung. Aung San of Burma. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff for Yale University. 1962.
- Maung Zarni. "Remembering the Martyrs and Their Hopes for Burma". DVB. 19 July 2013. Retrieved 4 September 2020
- Naw, Angelina. Aung San: And the Struggle for Burmese Independence. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books. 2001.
- Nay Eain. The Political Leaders Whose Names Will Live Forever. Yangon: Myo Myanmar. 2014. [Burmese]
- Rogers, Benedict. Burma: A Nationa at a Crossroads. Great Britain: Random House. 2012.
- Smith, Martin. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London and New Jersey: Zed Books. 1991.
- South, Ashley. Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict. New York, NY: Routelage. 2009.
- Stewart, Whitney. Aung San Suu Kyi: Fearless Voice of Burma. Twenty-First Century Books. 1997. ISBN 978-0-8225-4931-4
- Thant Myint-U. The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma. London: Faber and Faber Limited. 2008.
- "A Bomb Wreaks Havoc in Rangoon". Time. 17 October 1983. Retrieved 19 September 2020.
- Ye Mon and Myat Nyein Aye. "Martyr's Mausoleum Gets and Upgrade". Myanmar Times. 17 June 2016. Retrieved 14 November 2020.
- Zaw Zaw Htwe. "Gen. Aung San Returns to Myanmar Banknotes After 30-Year Absence". The Irrawaddy. 7 January 2020. Retrieved 7 September 2020.
External links
- Aung San's resolution to the Constituent Assembly regarding the Burmese Constitution, 16 June 1947.
- Kin Oung. Eliminate the Elite – Assassination of Burma's General Aung San & his six cabinet colleagues. Uni of NSW Press. Special edition – Australia 2011
- http://www.bogyokeaungsanmovie.org/
| International | |
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